Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 42 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Axioms | Bigelow | I 119 Axioms/Intuition/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, intuitions should not be allowed to throw over entire axiom systems. E.g. the principle of distribution of the disjunction can be explained as follows: Suppose that in natural languages a conditional "If A, then B" is equivalent to a quantification over situations: "In all situations where A applies, B also applies." Then you could read the distribution of the disjunction like this: Logical form: (x)((Ax v Bx) would > would Cx) (x) (Ax would > would Cx) u (x)(Bx would > would Cx)). This is indisputably logical! >Distribution, >Disjunction, >Counterfactual conditional. Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore the quantified form seems to capture the everyday language better than the unquantified. E.g. "In any situation where you would eat..." This is then a logical truth. I 120 This again shows the interplay of language and ontology. Axioms/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: our axioms are strengthened by a robust realistic correspondence theory. And this is an argument for a conservative, classic logic. >Correspondence theory. I 133 Theorems/Bigelow/Pargetter: Need a semantic justification because they are derived. This is the foundation (soundness). >Foundation. Question: Will the theorems also be provable? Then it is about completeness. >Proofs, >Provability, >Completeness. Axioms/Axiom/Axiom system/Axiomatic/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be understood as a method of presenting an interpretation of the logical symbols without using a meta-language (MS). >Metalanguage. That is, we have here implicit definitions of the logical symbols. This means that the truth of the axioms can be seen directly. And everyone who understands it can manifest it by simply repeating it without paraphrasing it. >Definition, >Definability. 134 Language/Bigelow/Pargetter: ultimately we need a language which we speak and understand without first establishing semantic rules. In this language, however, we can later formulate axioms for a theory: that is what we call Definition "extroverted axiomatics"/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: an axiomatics that is developed in an already existing language. Definition introverted axiomatics/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: an axiomatics with which the work begins. Extrovert Axiomatics/Bigelow/Pargetter: has no problems with "metatheorems" and no problems with the mathematical properties of the symbols used. We already know what they mean. Understanding and accepting the axioms is one thing here. That is, the implicit definition precedes the explicit definition. We must understand what we are working with. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causal Theory of Reference | Rorty | IV ~ 41 Causal theory of reference VsRepresentation (according to Rorty). >Causal theory of reference/Putnam >Representation. I 317 Reference/Intentionality/Rorty: the conventional "intentionalist" conception of linking words with the world is wrong and philosophically fateful in individual cases! >World/thinking, >Word meaning. Against this conventional intentionalist conception there is a new "causal", "realistic" reference theory. (Causal theory of reference). The conflict owes itself to an ambiguity of "reference". (a) Relationship of facts (b) purely intentional relation, where the object does not need to exist. Let us call a) "reference" (philosophical) and b) "talk about" (common sense). Ad b) "Talk about": in a world where there are no competing scientific theories, without the criterion of Searle and Strawson we can cheerfully talk about things, even fictions. We would really talk about the things that make most of our opinions true. >Reference/Strawson, >Referene/Searle, https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Truthmakers. I 318 For example, if there were a Mr. Lenz who in reality accomplished 99 percent of Mr. Müller's deeds, then we would want to say that in reality we are talking about Lenz. Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: If you confuse this term "really talk about" with the term of reference, you can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. >Goedel/Schmidt case/Kripke. Rorty: In my opinion, the problem doesn't arise at all. The only factual question here is the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. >Nonexistence, >Fiction. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Concepts | Kant | Term/Kant: "intuitions without concepts are blind." (KrV B 75) --- Strawson V 22 Terms/Kant: not any arbitrary amount of terms is sufficient for us - there must be terms of persistent objects and re-identifiable objects in the room. V 23 The distinctions must be created in the terms themselves, because there is no "pure perception of a reference system". V 122 Terms/Kant/Strawson: objects can only be changed in the context of a recognition - respective restrictions must somehow be reflected in the terms. - But it is not about a specific link but about the existence of any such links. V 123 Terms for objects are always summaries of causal law. V 128 Terms/StrawsonVsKant: terms are not yet socially characterized by him. --- Tugendhat I 191 Term/Kant: a term is a general idea, mediate. Intuition/Kant: immediately. Tugendhat: ambiguous: Imagined or subjective imagined - Kant per the latter. Objective meaning: "nota communis" common feature -> = species/Husserl. --- Bubner I 105 Knowledge/judgment/Kant: knowledge is formulated in judgments which always presuppose concepts. Concept/Kant: in terms, must be done transcendentally, then the realization of knowledge must be guaranteed by judgments. >Judgment/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Contracts | Social Psychology | Parisi I 147 Contracts/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: A. Economic theories: Economic theory assumes that people are motivated by rational wealth maximization and nothing else. Thus, law and economics scholars argue that promisors are indifferent between performance and breach, and that if a promisor can make any extra money from breaching a contract, she will do so. >Rationality. B. Psychology: As a descriptive matter, these assumptions are sometimes undermined by non-monetary values like reciprocity, fairness, and promise keeping. Parties to contracts behave in accordance with shared community norms, which shape what they think the law of contracts entails (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2012)(1). Intuition: People tend to assume that the applicable legal rule is the one that matches their intuitions. For example, about one-third of Americans believe that there is a legal duty to assist someone in distress; this percentage is constant regardless of whether the applicable law in the state imposes this duty or not (Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson, 2001)(2). Contracts: With regard to contracts, people tend believe that all terms are legally enforceable (even though not all types of clauses are) (Stolle and Slain, 1997)(3), and that specific performance and punitive damages are common remedies (they generally are not) (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2010). Morality: Parties to contracts imbue those contracts with morality, even when the law governing the contract does not reflect that morality. Most people think of a contract as a kind of promise, and that breaking a contract is a moral violation deserving of punishment over and above the damages associated with the breach (Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron, 2009)(4). Contract breach: The promise-keeping framework that governs most people's perceptions of contract obligations sometimes leads to a hesitance to breach even in cases of efficient breach (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2010)(5). Indeed, the non-breaching party often feels "suckered" by breach, and the anger and embarrassment felt leads to inflated damages assessments (Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman, 2010)(6). Fairness: Norms of fairness govern the behaviors of contracting parties. People are more willing to breach a contract when they perceive the other party to have behaved badly - such as walking away from an underwater mortgage after it came to light that the bank harmed communities with subprime loans (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2011)(7). Sold contracts: Selling a contract weakens its moral force: parties are less likely to perform in the face of economic incentives to default when the contract is assigned (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2012(1). 1. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess (2012). "Legal Promise and Psychological Contract." Wake Forest L. Rev. 47:843. 2. Darley, John M., Kevin M. Carlsmith, and Paul H. Robinson (2001). " The ex ante function of the criminal law." Law and Society Review 35: 165-190. 3. Stolle, Dennis P. and Andrew J. Slain (1997). "Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers' Propensity to Sue." Behavioral Sciences and the Law 15:83-94. 4. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess and Jonathan Baron (2009). "Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6(2):405-423. 5. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess (2010). "Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment." Michigan Law Review 108:633-671. 6. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess and David A. Hoffman (2010). "Breach is for Suckers." Vanderbilt Law Review 63: 1003. 7. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess (2011). "Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default." Vanderbilt Law Review 64(5): 1547. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Counterpart Theory | Plantinga | Schwarz I 57 Counterpart/Counterpart theory/PlantingaVsLewis/PlantingaVsCounterpart theory: (1974(1),115f,1987(2),209): According to Lewis, then all things strictly speaking would have all their properties essential, since there is no possible value in which they (not just any substitutes) have other properties. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Properties, cf. >Contingency, >Possible worlds. For example, if it were one degree colder today, we would all not exist, because then another world would be real, and none of us would be there. >Counterparts/Lewis, >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation. Similar to Kripke: KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, when we say "Humphrey could have won the election," according to Lewis we're not talking about Humphrey, but someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(3),44f). Counterpart/counterpart theory/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections are misunderstood by Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands exactly for the quality that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. Humphrey has this trait by virtue of his character. (1983d(4),42). >Modal properties, >Counterfactuals. The real problem is how does Humphrey win the election in the world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won, if the corresponding world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with the intuitions Kripke and Plantinga refer to. >States of affairs, >Situations, >Facts. 1. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 4. D. Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Court Proceedings | Social Psychology | Parisi I 125 Court proceedings/juror decision-making/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) each individual juror hears the evidence and arguments presented by lawyers, as well as the judge's instructions. Story model: According to the Story Model of Juror Decision-Making (Bennett, 1978(1); Pennington and Hastie, 1981(2)) jurors make sense of the evidence at trial by organizing it in a narrative fashion. Instead of passively absorbing verbatim the enormous amount of complex, Parisi I 126 ambiguous information given in a trial, jurors actively process the information using the framework of their existing knowledge to fill in gaps and construct stories from the evidence. Jurors create a story narrative that explains the different pieces of reliable evidence, and then reach a decision by matching the best-fitting story to the verdict categories. Criteria/eveluation: In order to evaluate competing stories, jurors use several criteria. The most preferred story will account for the greatest amount of evidence, will be internally consistent and leave no gaps in the causal chain of events, and will be plausible in light of what the juror believes about the world (Pennington and Hastie, 1981)(2). „Thinking aloud“: This model has been supported by "think aloud" observations of mock jurors (Pennington and Hastie, 1986)(3), as well as experiments examining judgments in mock criminal and civil trials (Huntley and Costanzo, 2003(4); Pennington and Hastie, 1992(5)). Decision-making: More recent experimental research on coherence-based reasoning has stablished that the process of reaching a decision is often bi-directional (Holyoak and Simon, 1999)(6). The decision task faced by jurors is cognitively complex because it requires consideration of information that is voluminous, contradictory, and ambiguous (D. Simon, 2004)(7). Information processing: To process the large amount of complex information presented in a trial, jurors reconstruct the information into simpler mental representations, upon which their cognitive system imposes coherence (D. Simon, 2004)(7). Schemas/beliefs: (...) jurors bring with them into the courtroom commonsense notions of legal categories like insanity, self-defense, and intent, and those existing schemas influence how jurors evaluate evidence and make legal judgments (Finkel, 2005(8); Finkel and Groscup, 1997(9); Robinson and Darley, 1995(10)). Even after receiving instructions about the definitions of crimes like burglary or robbery, jurors import their commonsense notions of these offenses into their decisions. Parisi I 127 Prediction: (...) (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966)(11) (...) found that a majority jury vote on the first ballot predicted the final verdict in over 90% of the cases, and they hypothesized that deliberation often focused on convincing the members of the minority to change their vote. Subsequent research set out to investigate more precisely the relationship between pre-deliberation preference and final verdict. In fact, immediate votes prior to deliberation seem to occur in only a small minority of cases (Devine et al., 2004(12); Diamond and Casper, 1992(13); Diamond et al., 2003(14); Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983(15); Sandys and Dillehay, 1995)(16). When the first ballot does occur, if each juror expresses their preference verbally, the early preferences can influence those voting subsequently (J. H. Davis et al., 1988)(17). Jurors' certainty and confidence in their views can be weak before deliberations begin, such that some do not begin leaning strongly toward one side until after substantial deliberations have taken place (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002)(18). To understand the influence of the jury deliberation process, it is therefore important to measure pre-deliberation preferences of individual jurors prior to deliberation. >Negotiation/Social psychology. 1. Bennett, W. L. (1978). "Storytelling in Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment." Quarterly Journa1 ofSpeech 64(1): 1-22. doi:10.1080/0033563 7809383408. 2. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1981). "Juror Decision-making Models: The Generalization Gap." Psychological Bulletin doi: 10.103 7 3-2909.89.2.246. 3. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1986). "Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (2):242-258. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.2.242. 4. Huntley, J. E. and M. Costanzo (2003). "Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-me- diated Model of Juror Decision-making in Civil Litigation." Law and Human Behavior 27(1): 29-51. 5. Pennington, N. and R. Hastie (1992). "Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62(2): 189—206. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189. 6. Holyoak, K. J. and D. Simon (1999). "Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 128(1): 3-31. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.128.1.3. 7. Simon, D. (2004). "A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making." University of Chicago Law Review 71(2): 511-586. 8. Finkel, N. J. (2005). Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 9. Finkel, N. J. and J. L. Groscup (1997). "Crime Prototypes, Objective versus Subjective Culpability, and a Commonsense Balance." Law and Human Behavior 21 (2):209-230. 10. Robinson, P. H. and J. M. Darley (199 5).Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 11.Kalven, Harry, jr. And Hans Zeisel (1967). „The American Jury“. In: 24 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 158 (1967),https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol24/iss1/18 12. Devine, D. J., K. M. Olafson, L. L. Jarvis, J. P. Bott, L. D. Clayton, and J. M. T. Wolfe (2004). "Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real?" Journal of Applied social Psychology 34(10): 2069-2098. 13. Diamond, S. S. andJ. D. Casper (1992). "Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury." Law and society Review 26(3): 513 - 563. doi:10.2307/3053737. 14. Diamond, S. S., N. Vidmar, M. Rose, and L. Ellis (2003). "Juror Discussions during Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation." Arizona Law Review 45: 1. 15. Hastie, R., S. Penrod, and N. Pennington (1983). Inside the Jury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 16. Sandys, M. and C. Dillehay (1995). "First-ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials." Law and Human Behavior 19(2): 175-195. doi:10.1007/ BF01499324. 17. Davis, J. H., M. F. Stasson, K. Ono, and S. Zimmerman (1988). "Effects of Straw Polls on Group Decision Making: Sequential Voting Pattern, Timing, and Local Majorities." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5 5(6): 918—926. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.918. 18. Hannaford-Agor, P., V. Hans, N. Mott, and T. Munsterman (2002). "Are HungJuries a Problem National Center for State Courts, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfilesl/ nij /grants/1993 72.pdf Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press Parisi I 131 Court Proceedings/racial bias/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) many attorneys try to (...) select jurors based on their assumptions that Black jurors are less likely to find defendants, especially Black defendants, guilty (Bonazzoli, 1998(1); Kerr et al., 1995(2)). In fact, behavioral and neuroimaging research provide some support for these intuitions, suggesting that we may be more able to empathize or take the perspective of individuals who are similar to ourselves (Cialdini et al., 1997(3); M. H. Davis et al., 1996(4); N. Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989(5); J. P. Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji, 2006(6); but see Batson et al., 2005(7) for an alternate behavioral mechanism). Black sheep effect: However, there is evidence that in some situations, people may want to distance themselves from ingroup members who have committed bad acts, that is, the "black sheep" effect (J. Marques et al., 1998(8); J. M. Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens, 1988)(9). >Capital Punishment/Social Psychology. 1. Bonazzoli, M. J. (1998). "Jury selection and Bias: Debunking Invidious Stereotypes through Science." Quinnapiac Law Review 18:247. 2. Kerr, N. L., R. W. Hymes, A. B. Anderson, and J. E. Weathers (1995). "Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments" Law and Human Behavior 19(6):545-567. doi:10.1007/BF01499374. 3. Cialdini, R. B., S. L. Brown, B. P. Lewis, C. Luce, and S. L. Neuberg (1997). "Reinterpreting the Empathy-Altruism Relationship: When One into One Equals Oneness." Journal of Personality and social Psychology 73(3): 481-494. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.481. 4. Davis, J. H. (1996). "Group Decision Making and Quantitative Judgments: A Consensus Model," in E. H. Witte andJ. H. Davis, eds., Understanding Group Behavior, Vol. 1: Consensual Action By Small Groups, 35—59. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 5. Eisenberg, N. and P. H. Mussen (1989). The Roots of Prosocial Behavior in Children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Mitchell, J. P., C. N. Macrae, and M. R. Banaji (2006). "Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar Others." Neuron 50(4): 655-663. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040. 7. Batson, C. D., D. A. Lishner, J. Cook, and S. Sawyer (2005). "Similarity and Nurturance: Two Possible Sources of Empathy for Strangers." Basic and Applied social Psychology 2 15-25. 8. Marques, J., D. Abrams, D. Paez, and C. Martinez-Taboada (1998). " The Role of Categorization and In-group Norms in Judgments of Groups and their Members." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.976. 9. Marques, J. M., V. Y. Yzerbyt, andJ.-P. Leyens (1988). "The 'Black Sheep Effect': Extremity of Judgments Towards Ingroup Members as a Function of Group Identification." European Journal of Social Psychology 18(1): 1—16. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420180102. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Culpable States of Mind | Social Psychology | Parisi I 142 Culpable States of Mind/law/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Both criminal and civil law distinguish various culpable states of mind, for example negligence, recklessness, knowledge, and intent (see Model Penal Code S2.02; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A). These codifications assume that jurors and judges perceive culpable mental states in a way that allows them to reliably classify them into these categories, which may seem a tall order when one considers that not even courts are always consistent in drawing distinctions between culpable states of mind (Simons, 1992)(1). Social psychology: In everyday life, people constantly make inferences about other people's mental states, and the extent to which these assessments are aligned with the MPC (Model Penal Code) categories is an important empirical question. Within the context of the justice system (and perhaps in all social perception; see Malle and Holbrook, 2012)(2), intentionality is the fundamental mental state. The literally vital role of assessing intentions ("is that person friend or foe?") leads to the primacy ofthese judgments (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick, 2007)(3). Perception: Research on lay perceptions of legally culpable states of mind has yielded mixed results. Severance, Goodman, and Loftus ( 1992)(4) found that participants were quite poor at distinguishing mental states, and could only reliably separate intentional and negligent harms. By contrast, Robinson and Darley (1995)(5) found that intuitions about liability and punishment generally tracked Model Penal Code state of mind categories. Cross-cultural studies: In a cross-cultural study, assessments of state of mind differed strongly across harm vignettes (...); nevertheless, in three out of four scenarios, people's inferences did not comport well Parisi I 143 with MPC categories (Levinson, 2005)(6). Cultural differences: Interestingly, in this study, Chinese participants systematically inferred greater state of mind culpability than American participants. Other research has suggested that collectivist cultures, including the Chinese, give more weight to situational factors than dispositional factors when explaining behavior (e.g., Morris and Peng, 1994)(7); however, these studies do not specifically assess perceptions of culpability or responsibility. Recklessness/knowing: More recently, a set of studies by Shen and colleagues suggests that people blame and punish in line with the MPC categories of blameless, negligent, and purposeful, but that they are poor at distinguishing knowing and reckless states of mind (Shen et al., 2011)(8). They point out one real-world consequence of this diffculty: being found guilty of a reckless killing versus a knowing killing can be the difference between a two-year and a forty-eight-year sentence. Intentionality: Assessments of intentionality are also influenced by motivation (Mueller, Solan, and Darley, 2012(9); Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum, 2009(10)). For example, when told that a more serious penalty depends on whether the employer intentionally harmed an employee, mock jurors are willing to perceive a minimally culpable state of mind (i.e. negligent), or a minimal perception of risk (3 %), as an intentional harm (Mueller, Solan and Darley, 2012)(9). At the same time, when asked to categorize the employer's state of mind on a five-point scale based on MPC categories, 88% of these participants accurately identified negligent behavior, and 96% accurately identified reckless behavior. These results indicate that even in situations where people are able to categorize mental states accurately, these nuanced distinctions may be overridden by their attributions of moral culpability and desire to punish a wrongdoer. 1. Simons, Kenneth W. (1992). "Rethinking Mental States." BUL Rev. 72:463. 2. Malle, Bertram F. and Jess Holbrook (2012). "Is There a Hierarchy of Social Inferences? The Likelihood and Speed of Inferring Intentionality, Mind, and Personality." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102(4):661. 3. Fiske, S. T., A. J. C. Cuddy, and P. Glick (2007). "Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 1 (2):77-83. doi:16/ j.tics.2006.11.005. 4. Severance, Laurence J., Jane Goodman, and Elizabeth F. Loftus (1992). "Inferring the Criminal Mind: Toward a Bridge Between Legal Doctrine and Psychological Understanding." Journal of Criminal Justice 20(2): 107-120. 5. Robinson, P. H. and J. M. Darley (1995). Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 6. Levinson, Justin D. (2005). "Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences." Howard LJ 49: 1. 7. Morris, Michael W. and Kaiping Peng (1994). "Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical Events." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67(6):949 8. Shen, Francis X., Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Joshua D. Greene, and René Marois (2011). "Sorting Guilty Minds." New York University Law Review 86: 1306-1360. 9. Mueller, Pam A., Lawrence M. Solan, and John M. Darley (2012). "When Does Knowledge Become Intent? Perceiving the Minds of Wrongdoers." Journal of Empirical Legal studies 9(4):859-892. 10. Ditto, Peter H., David A. Pizarro, and David Tannenbaum (2009). "Motivated Moral Reasoning." Psychology of Learning and Motivation 50:307-338. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Deterrence | Social Psychology | Parisi I 141 Retribution/law/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Two prevalent normative theories of punishment in the legal literature are retribution (or "just deserts") and utilitarianism (specific or general deterrence, as well as incapacitation and rehabilitation) (Hart, 2008(1); Ten, 1987(2)). (...) only recently have researchers systematically investigated the psychological influence of deterrence and retribution motives on people's punishment judgments. >Utilitarianism, >Retribution. Psychology: The results indicate an interesting division: in the abstract, people explicitly endorse utilitarian goals (e.g. successful deterrence leading to crime reduction), but when presented with a specific scenario, they consistently choose to impose retributive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008)(3). Retribution: This evidence suggests that people are intuitive retributivists, making judgments based on intuitions about just deserts, though these intuitive judgments can sometimes be overridden by more reasoned considerations (see Carlsmith and Darley, 2008(4) for a review). Morality: At the same time, the reasoning process itself may be oriented toward retribution: when an array of different information is made available, participants are more likely to choose to obtain information about moral severity and other retributive factors, rather than information relevant to utilitarian aims (Carlsmith, 2006(5); Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002(6)). >Morals, >Morality. Consequentialism: Indeed, certain consequentialist moral decisions, despite being socially approved, give rise to the inference that the agent making or carrying out the decision is of inferior moral character (Uhlmann, Zhu, and Tannenbaum, 2013)(7). >Consequentialism. Example: e,.g., deciding to sacrifice one life to save multiple lives can lead to negative character inferences about the agent, even though the decision is regarded as morally correct (Uhlmann et al., 2013)(7). Restoration: Restorative justice goals are also intuitively appealing in some cases. In contrast with retribution, restorative justice aims to repair the harm that was caused through processes in which the offender, victim, and perhaps community members determine an appropriate reparative sanction (Bazemore, 1998(8); Braithwaite, 2002(9)). This justice goal is compatible with retribution; when given a choice, even for severe crimes, most participants choose a consequence with both retributive and restorative components over consequences that fulfill only one ofthose goals (Gromet and Darley, 2006)(10). >Justice, >Equality. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (2008). Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Ten, C. L. (1987). Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Carlsmith, K. M. (2008). "On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions." Social Justice Research 21 (2): 119-137. doi:10.1007 /sl 1211-008-OOO-X. 4. Carlsmith, K. M. and J. M. Darley (2008). "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," in Mark P. Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, 193-236. San Diego: Academic Press. 5. Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). "The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Pun- ishment." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42(4): 43 7—451. doi: 10.1016/ j.jesp.2005.06.007. 6. Carlsmith, K. M., J. M. Darley, and P. H. Robinson (2002). "Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Desserts as Motives for Punishment." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.103 7/0022-3514.83.2.284. 7. Uhlmann, E. L., L. (Lei) Zhu, and D. Tannenbaum (2013). "When It Takes a Bad Person to Do the Right Thing." Cognition doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.005. 8. Bazemore, G. (1998). "Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration." American Behavioral Scientist 41(6): 768-813. doi:10.1177/0002764298041006003. 9. Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. 10. Gromet, D. M. and J. M. Darley (2009). "Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals." Law and society Review 43(1): 1-38. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Endurantism | Lewis | Schwarz I 32 Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at all times, at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). >Universals. LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic Theory). Schwarz I 31 Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts. Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truths about our world also about the temporal extent of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points. EndurantismVsLewis: since he has nothing to do with mosaic, this is no argument for him. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: if normal things do not have temporal parts but exist at different times, they cannot be round, nor large, but only round at time t. And that is absurd. Schwarz I 32 Properties/some authors: certainly, not all property are relational like "being remote" - but could they not be time-relational, ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989: 123f,[1], Jackson 1994b, 142f,[2] van Inwagen 1990a, 116[3]). Properties/Lewis: (2004.4) At least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not generally a relation to times. Properties/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: one should not relativize the properties, but their instantiations temporally. (Johnston, 1987, §5) E.g. I am now sitting and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989): Thesis: time specifications (> time) are adverbial modifications of propositions: For example, I am sitting in the present way and am sleeping last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: that makes no big difference. These representatives, too, deny that form properties belong directly, simply, and themselves to the things. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: the debate has been settled, both are accusing each other to analyze change away. Endurantism: is an instantiation of incompatible properties and has nothing to do with change. Perdurantism: is a timeless instantiation of compatible properties, for example, being straight exactly at t1, being curved at t0, is not a change. Schwarz: both do not correspond to our intuitions. The change is not that important. Cf. >Perdurantism. 1.Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 — [1994]: “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 339–359 2. “Metaphysics by Possible Cases”. In [Jackson 1998b] Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays. London: Routledge 3.“Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Chalmers | I 150 Epiphenomenalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: Question: when consciousness only supervenes naturally (but not logically) on the physical, there is apparently no causality involved. Then consciousness would only be a side effect and would not exist at all. (Huxley (1874) (1)) argues thus. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers. ChalmersVs: the causal unity of our physical world looks only like epiphenomenalism. I 151 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: a strategy against it would be to deny the causal unity of the physical world. We should not do that. There are better ways that assume more appropriate assumptions of metaphysics and causation. 1. Regularity-Based Causation/Chalmers: Instead of causality, we could assume regularity with Hume. Then one could argue that the behavior itself would have been the same without phenomenological consciousness. >Regularity, >Consciousness, >Behavior, >Causation. ChalmersVs: there are many systematic regularities between conscious experiences and later physical events, each of which leads us to conclude a causal link. >Causality. I 152 2. Causal overdetermination: one might assume that a physical and a phenomenal state, although completely separated, might cause a later physical state. Problem: causal redundancy. Solution: Tooley (1987) (2): we could assume an irreducible causal connection between two physical and one separate irreducible causal connection between a phenomenal and a physical state. This is a non-reducible view of causation. >Reducibility, >Irreducibility. ChalmersVsTooley: it is not easy to show that there is something wrong with it. I do not pursue this, but it has to be taken seriously. 3. Non-supervenience of the causation: facts about consciousness and those about causation are the only facts which do not logically supervene on certain physical facts. Chalmers: it is quite natural to speculate as to whether these two kinds of non-supervenience have a common root. Rosenberg: (1966) (3) has developed this. Rosenberg Thesis: Experience recognizes causation or some aspects of it. After that, causation needs recognition by someone or something. ChalmersVsRosenberg: this is, of course, very speculative, and leads among other things to panpsychism. >Panpsychism, >Aspects. I 153 In addition, the zombie problem would persist. >Zombies. 4. The intrinsic nature of the physical: thesis: a physical theory characterizes above all the relations of its entities, i.e. its propensities to interact with other elements. >Propensity, >Intrinsic. Problem: what is it that causes all these relations of causation and combinations? Russell (1927) (4): This is what the physical theory is silent about. Solution: to adopt an intrinsic nature of the physical elements. Chalmers: the only class of such intrinsic properties would be the class of phenomenal properties. >Phenomena. I 154 There must be no panpsychism following from this. Instead, we can assume proto-phanomenal properties. >Proto-phanomenal. I 159 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: Arguments against it fall into three classes: 1. Those which concern the relations of experience to normal behavior, 2. Those which concern the relations of experience to judgments about normal behavior, 3. Those which concern the overall picture of the world, which provokes the acceptance of epiphenomenalism. Ad 1. VsEpiphenomenalism: For example, the intuitions about why I withdraw my hand from a flame are strong, on the other hand, we can clarify these intuitions by assuming regularities. We simply perceive experiences more directly than the corresponding brain states. Ad 2. VsEpiphenomenalism: It seems to be extremely counterintuitive that our experiences could be irrelevant to the explanation of our behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Experience, cf. >Subjectivity. I 160 Ad. 3. VsEpiphenomenalism: the image of the world which is drawn by it is implausible because there should be nomological appendages which are not integrated into the system of other natural laws. Epiphenomenalism/Chalmers: I do not describe my own position as epiphenomenalism. The question of the causal relevance of experience remains unanswered. >Relevance. 1. T. Huxley, On the hypothesis that animals are automata. In: Collected Essays, London 1987, pp. 1893-94. 2. M. Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach, Oxford 1987 3. G. H. Rosenberg, Consciousness and causation: Clues toward a double-aspect theory, Ms Indiana Universwity, 1996. 4. B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, London 1927 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Jackson | Schiffer I 152 Epiphanomenalism/Jackson/Schiffer: MaterialismVsEpipenomenalism/MaterialismVsProperties of belief: (Jackson 1982(1), 135): Properties of belief (as epiphenomena) do nothing, they do not explain anything, they only soothe the intuitions of the dualist. It is a mystery how they should fit into science. >Dualism, >Monism. JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the critique of materialism rests on an too optimistic view of the animal that the human is, and his abilities. Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: Jackson argues only for Qualia to be epiphenomena. Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: Materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain kind, if one has no coherent representation how and why this should happen. SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P has caused having B, then this should be subsumed under a psychophysical extended causal law. At least some mechanism would have to explain the connection between B and P. I 153 But this does not exist most likely (especially when you consider that it should be possible that different physical states might have B!) And what should be a non-legal mechanism at all? >Phenomenalism. 1. Jackson, Frank. 1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136 |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Ethics | Bostrom | I 257 Ethics/morals/morality/superintelligence//Bostrom: No ethical theory commands majority support among philosophers, so most philosophers must be wrong. ((s)VsBostrom: It is not a question of applause as to which theory is correct.) I 369 Majorities in ethics/Bostrom: A recent canvass of professional philosophers found the percentage of respondents who “accept or leans toward” various positions. On normative ethics, the results were deontology 25.9%; - consequentialism 23.6%; - virtue ethics 18.2%. On metaethics, results were moral realism 56.4%; - moral anti-realism 27.7%. On moral judgment: cognitivism 65.7%; - non-cognitivism 17.0% (Bourget and Chalmers 2009(1)) >Norms/normativity/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky. Morality models: I 259 Coherent Extrapolated Volition/CEV/Yudkowsky: Our coherent extrapolated volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted. >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky. I 266 VsCEV/Bostrom: instead: Moral rightness/MR/Bostrom: (…) build an AI with the goal of doing what is morally right, relying on the AI’s superior cognitive capacities to figure out just which actions fit that description. We can call this proposal “moral rightness” (MR). The idea is that we humans have an imperfect understanding of what is right and wrong (…) ((s)VsBostrom: This delegates human responsibility and ultimately assumes that human decisions are only provisional until non-human decisions are made.) I 267 BostromVsYudkowsky: MR would do away with various free parameters in CEV, such as the degree of coherence among extrapolated volitions that is required for the AI to act on the result, the ease with which a majority can overrule dissenting minorities, and the nature of the social environment within which our extrapolated selves are to be supposed to have “grown up farther together.” BostromVsMR: Problem: 1. MR would also appear to have some disadvantages. It relies on the notion of “morally right,” a notoriously difficult concept (…). I 268 2. (…) [MR] might not give us what we want or what we would choose if we were brighter and better informed. Solution/Bostrom: Goal for AI: MP: Among the actions that are morally permissible for the AI, take one that humanity’s CEV would prefer. However, if some part of this instruction has no well-specified meaning, or if we are radically confused about its meaning, or if moral realism is false, or if we acted morally impermissibly in creating an AI with this goal, then undergo a controlled shutdown.(*) Follow the intended meaning of this instruction. I 373 (Annotation) *Moral permissibility/Bostrom: When the AI evaluates the moral permissibility of our act of creating the AI, it should interpret permissibility in its objective sense. In one ordinary sense of “morally permissible,” a doctor acts morally permissibly when she prescribes a drug she believes will cure her patient - even if the patient, unbeknownst to the doctor, is allergic to the drug and dies as a result. Focusing on objective moral permissibility takes advantage of the presumably superior epistemic position of the AI. ((s)VsBostrom: The last sentence (severability) is circular, especially when there are no longer individuals in decision-making positions who could object to it. >Goals/superintelligence/Bostrom. I 312 Def Common good principle/Bostrom: Superintelligence should be developed only for the benefit of all of humanity and in the service of widely shared ethical ideals. I 380 This formulation is intended to be read so as to include a prescription that the well-being of nonhuman animals and other sentient beings (including digital minds) that exist or may come to exist be given due consideration. It is not meant to be read as a license for one AI developer to substitute his or her own moral intuitions for those of the wider moral community. 1. Bourget, David, and Chalmers, David. 2009. “The PhilPapers Surveys.” November. Available at http://philpapers.org/surveys/ |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Ethics | Singer | I XIII Ethics/P. Singer: In the third edition of my Practical Ethics(1), I have made a transition towards an ethics that assumes more objective ethical truths. This is partly due to the reading of Derek Parfits book "On What Matters"(2). I 4 Ethics/P. Singer: Where does our ethics come from? Observations on animals such as chimpanzees show that higher animals have a sense of reciprocity. >Animals. Nature/P. Singer: it is a mistake to believe that everything natural is good and we just have to follow our natural intuitions. >Nature, >Intuitions, >Good, >Values. P. Singer: Thesis: we have inherited the standards from our ancestors. Our task is to find out which of these must be changed. >Community, >Society. I 9 Ethics/P. Singer: how can we distinguish between ethical and unethical behavior? >Ethics. Objectively, we can distinguish whether someone acts according to our conventions, according to his conventions, or after no conventions at all. >Objectivity. I 10 Convention: a mere self-interest will not be considered an ethical behavior. Why? Solution: Ethics must stand on a broader basis than the interests of the individual. >Generalizability, > Universality, >Interest. 1.Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press (2011) 2. Derek Parfit, On what Matters, Oxford (2011). |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Euclid | Kant | Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 25 Euclid/Kant/Russell: Kant rightly remarked that the Euclidean theorems cannot be deduced from the Euclidean axioms without the aid of numerals. a priori/RussellVsKant: Kant's doctrine of the a priori intuitions, by which he explained the possibility of pure mathematics, is completely useless for mathematics. >a priori, >Numerals, >Deduction. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Everyday Language | Fodor | II 126 Anomalies/deviation/irregularities/intuition/everyday language/Fodor/FodorVsCavell: it is not about explaining anomalies by intuitions. Instead: specifying the relevant similarity means exactly determining the rules of creation (>Rules). --- III 234 Everyday language/distinction/perception/use/FodorVsCavell: it is not true that we have different words for each perceived difference, e.g. for shapes, colors, sizes, sounds, etc. Then, from the absence of certain words does not follow that we do not perceive the corresponding difference ((s)> Whorf) Fodor: then, when requesting a distinction, you cannot fall back on the actual use of language. > FodorVsUse Theory: here, you need philosophy, not empiricism. >Empiricism, >Use theory, >Meaning, >Language Behavior, >Colour, >Form. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Expert Systems | Norvig | Norvig I 633 Expert Systems/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Early expert system research concentrated on answering questions, rather than on making decisions. The emergence of >Bayesian networks in the late 1980s made it possible to build large-scale systems that generated sound probabilistic inferences from evidence. The addition of >decision networks means that expert systems can be developed that recommend optimal decisions, reflecting the preferences of the agent as well as the available evidence. A system that incorporates utilities can avoid one of the most common pitfalls associated with the consultation process: confusing likelihood and importance. A common strategy in early medical expert systems, for example, was to rank possible diagnoses in order of likelihood and report the most likely. Unfortunately, this can be disastrous! (…)a testing or treatment plan should depend both on probabilities and utilities. Current medical expert systems can take into account the value of information to recommend tests, and then describe a differential diagnosis. Norvig I 634 Steps for an expert system for a medical treatment: Create a causal model: Determine the possible symptoms, disorders, treatments, and outcomes. Then draw arcs between them, indicating what disorders cause what symptoms, and what treatments alleviate what disorders Simplify to a qualitative decision model: we can often simplify by removing variables that are not involved in treatment decisions. Sometimes variables will have to be split or joined to match the expert’s intuitions. Assign probabilities: Probabilities can come from patient databases, literature studies, or the expert’s subjective assessments. Assign utilities: When there are a small number of possible outcomes, they can be enumerated and evaluated individually (…). Verify and refine the model: To evaluate the system we need a set of correct (input, output) pairs; a so-called gold standard to compare against. For medical expert systems this usually means assembling the best available doctors, presenting them with a few cases (…). Norvig I 635 and asking them for their diagnosis and recommended treatment plan. Perform sensitivity analysis: (…) checks whether the best decision is sensitive to small changes in the assigned probabilities and utilities by systematically varying those parameters and running the evaluation again. If small changes lead to significantly different decisions, then it could be worthwhile to spend more resources to collect better data. Sensitivity analysis is particularly important, because one of the main Norvig I 636 criticisms of probabilistic approaches to expert systems is that it is too difficult to assess the numerical probabilities required. Sensitivity analysis often reveals that many of the numbers need be specified only very approximately. Norvig I 639 Surprisingly few early AI researchers adopted decision-theoretic tools after the early applications in medical decision (…). One of the few exceptions was Jerry Feldman, who applied decision theory to problems in vision (Feldman and Yakimovsky, 1974)(1) and planning (Feldman and Sproull, 1977)(2). After the resurgence of interest in probabilistic methods in AI in the 1980s, decision-theoretic expert systems gained widespread acceptance (Horvitz et al., 1988(3); Cowell et al., 2002)(4). >Decision theory/Norvig, >Decision networks/AI research. 1. Feldman, J. and Yakimovsky, Y. (1974). Decision theory and artificial intelligence I: Semantics-based region analyzer. AIJ, 5(4), 349–371. 2. Feldman, J. and Sproull, R. F. (1977). Decision theory and artificial intelligence II: The hungry monkey. Technical report, Computer Science Department, University of Rochester. 3. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., and Henrion, M. (1988). Decision theory in expert systems and artificial intelligence. IJAR, 2, 247–302. 4. Cowell, R., Dawid, A. P., Lauritzen, S., and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (2002). Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems. Springer. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Fairness | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 108 Fairness/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: Assessments of fairness can turn on questions that we might otherwise think of as outside the normative sphere of equity or justice—things like the wealth of the parties, their post-incident behavior, and other factors. For example, interpersonal comparisons may affect whether or not a particular division of resources appears equitable (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989)(1). Intuitions about compensation for personal injuries appear to be highly sensitive to some of the concerns of fairness as between the parties and impervious to larger questions of the social good. Baron and Ritov (1993)(2) found, for example, that people are compensated for injuries caused by acts but not for other injuries, even when providing compensation is harmful overall. Indeed, harms caused by actions are deemed more harmful than harms caused by omissions, even when there is no clear normative distinction (in terms of intentionality and outcome) between the cases (Ritov and Baron, 1992)(3). >Compensation/Cooter, >Apologies/Experimental psychology, >Dispute resolution/Experimental psychology. 1. Loewenstein, George F., Leigh Thompson, and Max H. Bazerman (1989). “Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57: 426–441. 2. Baron, Jonathan and Ilana Ritov (1993). “Intuitions about Penalties and Compensation in the Context of Tort Law.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7: 17–33. 3. Ritov, Ilana and Jonathan Baron (1992). “Status-Quo and Omission Biases.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5: 49–61. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Imagination | Pauen | Pauen I 163 Conceivability/NagelVsKripke: it is unclear whether possibility can already be derived from conceivability. >Conceivability, >Possibility, >Th. Nagel. Imagination of mental and neural processes uses different modes of imagination. - Conceivability also does not guarantee the non-identity that it is a psychological fact. >Identity theory. Intuitions are bad witnesses for what is possible in principle. >Logical possibility, >Physical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kant | Gaus | Gaus I 111 Kant/contractualism/Gaus: Kantian contractualism must build into the account some constraint that limits consideration to only justifications that all reasonable people would accept, or that none would reject. Rawls: One way to do this is, à la Rawls, to constrain the choice situation in such a way that the rational parties are forced to advance only reasonable considerations. The nature of Rawls’s argument behind the veil of ignorance (which excludes specific knowledge about a contractor’s post-contract life and personality) is such that given the constraints on choice, the most rational choice for a contractor will model a reasonable choice for you and me. ScanlonVsRawls: Instead, though, of building into the framework of the choice situation our understanding of the demands of reasonableness, we might, as Scanlon suggests, appeal directly to our intuitions about reasonableness in the contractarian analysis (1998(1): ch. 5). Gaus: A fruitful project for Kantian liberalism is to integrate the more direct version described above with the contractual argument (Reiman, 1990(2); Gaus, 1990(3): Part II). >Person/Reiman. Some basic moral principles may be directly derived from our conceptions of ourselves as moral persons (i.e. a basic right to noninterference), while other moral principles (say, concerning specific schemes of property rights and distributive justice) may be justified via a contractual argument. 1. Scanlon, Thomas (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Reiman, Jeffrey (1990) Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1990) Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Metalanguage | Genz | II 210 Meta language/addition/algorithm/sum/Gauss/Genz: the sum of the numbers from 1 to 100 is 5050 = 101 x 50: Example 1 to 10: 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+10 = (1+10)+(2+9)+(3+8)+(4+7)+(5+6) = 11+11+11+11+11 = 5 x 11 = 55 The sum can be rearranged in such a way that the result of the addition is independent of the sequence of the numbers due to the algorithm. N.B.: this is a statement about the results of additions, in meta-language. >Object language. II 211 Meta language/blackening/characters/formalisms/Hofstadter/Genz: Example for a purely typographical derivation: if 0+0=0, 1+0= 1 etc. as well as 1 = 1 is specified, you can add 1 + x = 1 + x for any x. Derivation/Formalism/Genz: that negative numbers must be excluded here has no significance for formalism and cannot be used to justify derivations within it. >Derivation, >Derivability. >Formalization. Hofstadter/Genz: Hofstadter uses the successor relation SS0 instead of 2, so no meanings crept in. Evidence/Hofstadter: evidence is something informal. The result of reflection. Formalisation/Hofstadter: formalisation serves to logically defend intuitions. Derivation/Hofstadter: derivation artificially produced an equivalent of the evidence... II 212 ...that makes the logical structure explicit. Simplicity/derivation/Hofstadter: it may be that myriads of steps are necessary, but the logical structure turns out to be quite simple. >Simplicity. Meaning/Genz: the infinite sequence of the above statements is summed up in the sentence that all numbers, if multiplied by 0, remain unchanged. N.B.: however, this is not based on the meaning of the symbols, but only on the typographic derivation rules of the object language. Meta language/Genz: it is an insight into formalism that guarantees that all tokens are true. Object language: be so that the above generalization ("all numbers, multiplied by 0, remain unchanged") can be formulated in it, but cannot be derived. 1st meta-language: here it can be derived. It contains complete induction. 2nd meta-language: here it cannot be derived, but its negation! (see below) Both meta languages contain the object language. Therefore, the consequences can be derived from them. II 213 Object language: not all true sentences can be derived in the object language. Solution: we add the sentence to the language ourselves, then it is true as well as (trivially) derivable. N.B.: in the second meta-language, which is incompatible with the first, its negation can be added instead of the sentence without creating a contradiction. 2nd meta-language: the 2nd meta-language forces the occurrence of "unnatural" numbers, which cannot be represented as successors of 0.(1) 1. Douglas Hofstadter (2008). Gödel, Escher, Bach. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. p. 240. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Modal Logic | Bigelow | I 101 Modal logic/Language/Bigelow/Pargetter: at the end we get an orthodox language of modal logic: it is an extension of the classical language of Tarski in two respects: >A. Tarski, >Reference, >Individual constants, >Possibilia. I 102 1. extension of the referents of individual constants so that they can also include Possibilia 2. addition of rules for modal operators. That does not mean that this is the only right way. Possibilia we do not claim their existence for semantic reasons either. But there are good non-semantic reasons for believing in them. I 119 Modal Logic/Modality/Intuition/Bigelow/Pargetter: our intuitions are deceptive here. Some of our intuitions even contradict each other: E.g. Principle of the distribution of disjunction: ((a v b) would be > would be g) > ((a would be > would be g) u (b would be > would be g)). That seems to be true. For example, "If you ate or drink, you would be my prisoner." "So if you ate, you would be my prisoner and if you drank, you would be my prisoner." >Disjunction, >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: this principle cannot be added to our axiom system. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Non-Existence | Hintikka | II 37 Non-existent objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. >Possibilia. HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka/thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically). >Model theory. Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid? >Fictions. Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. >Relevance. II 38 Ontology/language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on the ontological status? >Ontology. Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels. N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional! Model Theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot. Acceptance/acceptability/inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic. Singular Terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms requires us to use an existential generalization. And thus also requires a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. > II 39 Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed.) >Existence statements. II 103 Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because Montague assumes the domain of individuals to be constant). Individual Domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. Problem: Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for". ((s) That is, that both are looking for the same unicorn). >Objects of thought, >Cob/Hob/Nob exmaple/Geach. Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual? |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Non-Existence | Parsons | Hintikka I 37 Non-Existential Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects, namely in the actual world. >Possibilia, >Actual world, >Actuality, >Actualism. HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. >Syntax. Hintikka: Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically). >Semantics, >Model Theory. Fiction/Ryle: test: Does the paraphrase apply? >Fictions, >G. Ryle. Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. >Criteria, >Relevance. I 38 Ontology/Language/Linguistic/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability make decisions about ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here, it is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels. N.B.: even if they had some, these would be just fictional ones! Model theory/Hintikka: model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) is "true in the model", means, it is true in the story that the bullets are there). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot. >Conclusions. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic. >Acceptability, >Inferences. Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a speaker. That is, it is a commitment to an inference. >Singular terms, >Ontological commitment. HintikkaVsParsons. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Object Permanence | Baillargeon | Slater I 86 Object Permanence/Baillargeon: Thesis: Piaget (1954)(1) object permanence - an awareness that an object continues to exist when not available to the senses (literally „out of sight, out of mind“) - was not fully acquired until the second year of life had dominated thinking about early infant cognition. BaillargeonVsPiaget: (Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman (1985)(2) showed that infants as young as 5 months of age and later 3.5 months of age, Baillargeon 1987(3)) appeared to remember the continued existence of hidden objects and are aware that they maintained some of their physical properties. The key was to move away from the Piagetian criteria of active retrieval (e.g., reaching) for a hidden object as a measure of knowledge. Solution/Baillargeon: [she used] the so-called violation of expectation (VoE) paradigm: it is built on the idea that infants will orient more to novel or surprising events than familiar or expected ones (see Charlesworth, 1969(4). Slater I 87 In particular, [Baillargeon] found that between 3.5 and 12 months of age infants became sensitive to the height (Baillargeon, 1987(3); Baillargeon & Graber 1987(5)), location (Baillargeon & Graber, 1988)(6), and solidity of hidden objects (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990)(7). Baillargeon and colleagues also gradually pieced together infants’ understanding of the physical support relations that can exist between objects placed next to or on top of one another (Baillargeon, 2004(8); Needham & Baillargeon, 1993(9), 2000(10)). Experiment/Drawbridge study/HaithVsBaillargeon: (Haith 1998)(11)the conclusion of the drawbridge study are a product of „rich interpretation“ (Haith 1998) on the part of the researchers, rather than rich conceptual abilities on the part of young infants. Slater I 88 Haith: There was always a more parsimonious perceptual explanation for the infants’ responses. >Object permanence/Haith. Drawbridge study/VsBaillargeon: Rivera, Wakeley, and Langer (1999)(12) Thesis: young infants simply have a general preference to look at the 180-degree rotation for cognitively uninteresting reasons (e.g., longer-lasting movement). Like Haith: Baillargeon’s findings can be explained without any attribution to an ability to think about an unseen object. VsBaillargeon: Bogartz, Shinskey, and Schilling (2000)(13): the relatively high looking times to the 180-degree impossible event in the original drawbridge studies reflected a simple familiarity preference rather than a mental representation of a hidden object. Slater I 89 After nearly two decades of argument in the literature and two highly anticipated debates on this topic at major conferences (Haith vs. Spelke at the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD), 1997; Baillargeon vs. Smith at the International Conference for Infant Studies (ICIS), 1998), it became clear that behavioral methods alone were not going to produce a scientific consensus. Two key questions that emerged from these debates are (1) what actually constitutes evidence of object permanence (i.e., does passive surprise suffice or is active engagement required?) and (2) where and how does this competence originate? >Object permanence/neuroscience, >Object permanence/connectionism. 1. Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books. 2. Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition, 20, 191–208. 3. Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3 1/2-and 4 1/2-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23, 655–664. 4. Charlesworth, W. R. (1969). The role of surprise in cognitive development. In D. Elkind & J. Flavell (Eds), Studies in cognitive development. Essays in honor of Jean Piaget (pp. 257–314). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1987). Where’s the rabbit? 5.5-month-old infants’ representation of the height of a hidden object. Cognitive Development, 2, 375–392. 6. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1988). Evidence of location memory in 8-month-old infants in a nonsearch AB task. Developmental Psychology, 24, 502–511. 7. Baillargeon, R., Graber, M., DeVos, J., & Black, J. (1990). Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects? Cognition, 36, 255–284. 8. Baillargeon, R., (2004). Infants’ reasoning about hidden objects. Evidence for event-general and event-specific expectations. Developmental Science, 7, 391-414. 9. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (1993). Intuitions about support in 4.5-month-old infants. Cognition, 47, 121–48. 10. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (2000). Infants’ use of featural and experiential information in segregating and individuating objects: A reply to Xu, Carey and Welch (2000). Cognition, 74, 255–284. 11. Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and Development, 21, 167–179. 12. Rivera, S. M., Wakeley, A., & Langer, J. (1999). The drawbridge phenomenon: Representational reasoning or perceptual preference? Developmental Psychology, 35, 427–435. 13. Bogartz, R. S., Shinskey, J. L., & Schilling, T. H. (2000). Object permanence in five-and-a-half-month-old infants? Infancy, 1, 403–428. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Pain | Chalmers | I 17 Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> Functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person. >Qualia/Chalmers. Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain! I 18 Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts. Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger. >Psychology/Chalmers. I 19 Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here. >Phenomena, >Aspects, >Emotion. Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Beliefs, >Intentionality. Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a)(1): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360). >Intentionality/Searle, >Content. I 146f Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him. >Pain/Kripke, >Identity/Kripke. Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O: Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery. >a posteriori necessity. I 147 ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility. >S. A. Kripke, >Essentialism, >Modality, >Necessity, >Possibility. I 148 Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974)(2), McGinn (1977)(3)). >Brain states. Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980)(4): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world. >Materialism, >Actual World, >Possible Worlds. I 149 Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing. ChalmersVsKripke: 1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive. 2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity. 3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain". 4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (>cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established. >Rigidity, >Supervenience. 1. J. R. Searle, Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Scineces. 13, 1990: pp.585-642. 2. F. Feldman, Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71, 1974: pp. 665-76 3. C. McGinn, Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2, 1977: pp. 78-80 4. R. N. Boyd, Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In: N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. VOl. 1. Cambridge 1980. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Philosophy | Lewis | IV X Philosophy/Lewis: I do not want to convert any people but to find out what I should believe. Theories are never completely refuted. Maybe Gödel and Gettier once managed to do something like this. Our intuitions are simply opinions. >Gödel, >Gettier. Schwarz I 9 Science/Lewis: in conflict with it, philosophy usually has to give in. Schwarz I 75 Ontology/Science/Mathematics/Lewis: Philosophy has to accept the results of the established science. It would be absurd to reject mathematics for philosophical reasons. >Ontology/Lewis. Schwarz I 234 Concept analysis/Lewis/Black. While it is separate from philosophy for most authors, it is associated with philosophy for Lewis and also for Jackson. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Political Orientation | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 117 Political orientation/ideologies/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: (...) Tetlock (1983)(1) has posited, and demonstrated experimentally, different "cognitive styles" among liberals and conservatives. He found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that conservatives rely on simple rules for evaluating policy issues, overall making significantly less complex statements of their views on the issues. More recently, Haidt and his co-authors (2004(2), 2007(3)) have argued that psychological morality differs by ideology. Conservatives value care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity, while liberals care almost entirely about care and fairness. This affects how the groups approach legal questions in a variety of domains, which of course in turn affects how they participate in political and legal debates in our society. >Cultural differences/Experimental psychology. 1. Tetlock, Philip E. (1983). "Cognitive Style and Political Ideology." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45: 1 18-126. 2. Haidt, Jonathan and Craig Joseph (2004). "Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intu- itions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues." Daedalus 133: 55-66. 3. Haidt, Jonathan and Jesse Graham (2007). "When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions That Liberals May Not Recognize." socialJustice Research 20: 98-116. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Preference Utilitarianism | Singer | I 13 Definition Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer/SingerVsBentham/SingerVsMill/SingerVsSidgwick: my utilitarianism is not about the growth of happiness and the reduction of suffering, but about promoting the preferences of those involved. General Public/ethics/P. Singer: Preference Utiliarianism cannot be inferred from the universal aspects of ethics. Preference: the preferences of the individual must be weighed against the preferences of others and the community. I 14 Where do we get a theory from that governs this? We approach simple, pre-ethical choices. However, we cannot rely on intuitions because they can be inherited evolutionarily and therefore be unreliable in terms of what is right. >Preferences. Preferences: can be for different individuals at quite different levels. Someone who would like to be a poet may forgo other forms of happiness. This cannot be pursued further here. >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 80 Killing/Preference Utilitarianism/Animals/P. Singer: for the preference utilitarianism, killing a person is worse than killing another being (which could still be a member of the Homo Sapiens species!). The reason for this is that people are more orientated towards the future. Beings with no sense for the future have no preferences regarding them. Of course, such creatures can still fight their deaths like a fish on a hook. Preference Utilitarianism has no reason, however, to reject a more painless method of killing fish when it is available. The fight against pain in an instant does not prove that the fish would be able to compare different perspectives for the future. >Animals. I 81 This argument, however, only holds in connection with considerations of what is wrong with killing a person (with prospects for the future). I 81 Life/Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer: does a person have the right to life according to preference utilitarianism? According to the preference utilitarianism a right cannot be offset against the preferences of others. Cf. >Utilitarian Liberalism. For Utilitarianism see Carlyle - Chapman - Dworkin - Gaus - Habermas - Hooker - Kant - David Lewis - Mill - Talcott Parsons - Rawls - Sen - Singer - Smart Counter concept to Utilitarianism: >Deontology. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Qualities | Kant | Strawson V 52 Primary Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: when we abstract from color and hardness and all sensation, we retain no terms but just empty words - Kant: "pure intuitions" are something other than "primary qualities". --- Adorno XIII 39 Qualities/Mediation/Kant/Adorno: Kant attempted to take the so-called objective, the primary qualities into the subject, but not to grasp them as sensual moments, but to derive them from the context of consciousness, from categorial forms. This is an example of mediating thinking. >Subject/Kant, >Knowlegde/Kant, >Sensory impressions, >Perception/Kant, >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Rationality | Scanlon | Gaus I 111 Rationality/Reason/Scanlon/Gaus: For Scanlon, ‘[t]he distinction between what it would be reasonable to do and what it would be rational to do is not a technical one, but a familiar one in ordinary language’ (1998(1): 192). A reasonable person does not make claims that others cannot be expected to live with, or are grossly unfair. Rawls: Rawls has a similar idea: parties to his original position are ‘rational and reasonable’, not simply rational: ‘Persons are reasonable … when they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so’ (1996(2): 48). In contrast to Hobbesian contractors, Rawlsian contractors seek to respect each other’s status as free and equal moral beings (Larmore, 1996(3): ch. 6). >Contractualism/Scanlon, cf. >Person/Benn, >Person/Gewirth, >Kant/Sandel. Kant: Kantian contractualism must build into the account some constraint that limits consideration to only justifications that all reasonable people would accept, or that none would reject. Rawls: One way to do this is, à la Rawls, to constrain the choice situation in such a way that the rational parties are forced to advance only reasonable considerations. The nature of Rawls’s argument behind the veil of ignorance (which excludes specific knowledge about a contractor’s post-contract life and personality) is such that given the constraints on choice, the most rational choice for a contractor will model a reasonable choice for you and me. ScanlonVsRawls: Instead, though, of building into the framework of the choice situation our understanding of the demands of reasonableness, we might, as Scanlon suggests, appeal directly to our intuitions about reasonableness in the contractarian analysis (1998(1): ch. 5). 1. Scanlon, Thomas (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, paperback edn. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Larmore, Charles (1996) The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Reason | Kant | Bubner I 142 Reason/Kant/Bubner: no one but the reason can say what reason really is - reason is bothered by the questions it cannot reject, nor answer. --- Kant I 105 Reason/unit/Kant: the law of reason to seek unity is necessary because we would not have any reason without it and therefore no sufficient feature of empirical truth. - Thus we have not only punctual correspondence, but systematic coherence. Kant assumed reason in nature. >Nature/Kant. I 113 Reason/Kant: reason in itself, is not something objective, even ideas of purposes are not. - We project reasonable causes into the object. - However: this projection is necessary, but it is only a projection that justifies no real science. Reason: Def Pure Reason/Kant: pure reason unifies ideas in an intuition by categories. Def Pure logic: unifies different ideas in a judgment. >Judgments/Kant. I 87 Def Reason/Kant: the capability of concepts. Also the pure reason can be a source of knowledge, for "philosophical" knowledge, and formal-logical. Term/Kant: "nothing but the synthesis is possible intuitions that are not given a priori ". Philosophical propositions are therefore always general principles for possible empirical intuition connections, for example, the principle of causality. >Concepts/Kant, >Categories/Kant. I 93 "Inside" acts of reason/Kant: "inner sense, of which time is the shape". - The images, which prescribe the objective units of things, are images of I of itself in time. - The unity of consciousness of the object is then also the unity of the thing. -> Schematism: recognizes categories as useful as illustrative determinations. I 99 Reason/Kant: term - Power of judgment: judgment - Reason: End. All three are forming the reason in a broader sense. --- Münch III 327 Def Reason/Kant: the capability of rules. They are separated from intuition for Kant. Holenstein: modern: intelligence. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 --- Strawson V 24 Reason/Kant: general functions also without sensuality - pure reason terms: = categories. >Categories/Kant. V 25 Schematism: transition to categories-in-use. - Only time without space. Transcendental deduction: each category must have a use in experience. StrawsonVsKant: that is logically flawed. >Experience/Kant, >Time/Kant. --- Bubner I 103 Kant/new: mind action consists in judging, a table of pure mind functions, which, however, are indeterminate with respect to all objects. The performance of union results from the act. It is not triggered from the outside! > Synthesis/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 105 Mind/Kant/Adorno: as far as reason is concerned, which refers to the possibility of recognizing the content, the material, Kant speaks of reason. Mind activity/Kant: is the activity of reason, which refers to a material which belongs to the senses ir azus and which unifies them and deals with its synthesis. Reason/Kant: here, this activity should be no longer bound to such a material but should be free of it. In the cognitive or noological meaning, reason gives us at least the regulative, in the sense of which our experience of the sensual is to proceed. Reason in this concise sense would be the ability to recognize ideas. Reason/Kant/Adorno: in a third sense, reason gives in perfect freedom its objects to itself. This is the practical use of reason. Paradoxically, we are here, according to Kant... Adorno XIII 106 ...not bound to the topic. Practical reason/Kant/Adorno: our reason or we act practically, insofar as we act purely according to reason and according to its purposes, without letting these purposes be given to us. Purpose/Kant/Adorno: Thus, we must only allow them to be given to ourselves by our own principle, the innermost principle of subjectivity itself. >Subjectivity/Kant. Reason/Kant/Adorno: is then an absolute activity of the mind in contrast to one limited by materials. In this way it becomes a higher and, to a certain extent, a counter-instance of the reason. Adorno XIII 110 Mind/Kant/Adorno: the reason activity which refers to the order functions which we are exercising against a material which comes to us from the outside and which is chaotic, unstructured and in itself quite undetermined according to Kant. Reason/Kant: once again reflects on the mind, on the use which the mind makes of itself and judges according to it, decides whether, in the sense of the purposes which it Adorno XIII 111 gives to itself, is a more highly developed one. Adorno XIII 112 Reason/Hegel/Adorno: in Hegel and already in Kant, there are reminiscences of the reification of reason in the sense that the common human should not think too much. Adorno XIII 113 Reason/Horkheimer/Adorno: Problem: reason should be the principle of freedom, but at the same time also a law and in this respect something badly repressive. In its concept, however, the relation of freedom and coercion has not actually been articulated. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Reason | Scanlon | Gaus I 111 Rationality/Reason/Scanlon/Gaus: For Scanlon, ‘[t]he distinction between what it would be reasonable to do and what it would be rational to do is not a technical one, but a familiar one in ordinary language’ (1998(1): 192). A reasonable person does not make claims that others cannot be expected to live with, or are grossly unfair. Rawls: Rawls has a similar idea: parties to his original position are ‘rational and reasonable’, not simply rational: ‘Persons are reasonable … when they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so’ (1996(2): 48). In contrast to Hobbesian contractors, Rawlsian contractors seek to respect each other’s status as free and equal moral beings (Larmore, 1996(3): ch. 6). >Contractualism/Scanlon, cf. >Person/Benn, >Person/Gewirth, >Kant/Sandel. Kant: Kantian contractualism must build into the account some constraint that limits consideration to only justifications that all reasonable people would accept, or that none would reject. Rawls: One way to do this is, à la Rawls, to constrain the choice situation in such a way that the rational parties are forced to advance only reasonable considerations. The nature of Rawls’s argument behind the veil of ignorance (which excludes specific knowledge about a contractor’s post-contract life and personality) is such that given the constraints on choice, the most rational choice for a contractor will model a reasonable choice for you and me. ScanlonVsRawls: Instead, though, of building into the framework of the choice situation our understanding of the demands of reasonableness, we might, as Scanlon suggests, appeal directly to our intuitions about reasonableness in the contractarian analysis (1998(1): ch. 5). 1. Scanlon, Thomas (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, paperback edn. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Larmore, Charles (1996) The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Reference | Rorty | I 96 Reference/Rorty: for each distinction between referees of expressions one needs some ontological categories, anything, even coarse to tailor the things. I 317f RortyVsPutnam, RortyVsKripke: If the concept of "really talk about" is confused with the concept of reference, one can easily get the idea like Kripke and Putnam that we had "intuitions" about the reference. Of course, there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical-scientific use. But then "reference" has nothing to do with "talk about", and only comes into play after you have made a choice between the interpretive strategies. I 316ff Real questions of existence are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson. What is then the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all. I 321 For Davidsons ’pure’ philosophy of language neither one nor the other is necessary. Horwich I 450 Reference/Davidson: is a byproduct of the translation - reference/Kripke: causation must have something to do with reference. Reference/Strawson: you find out what somebody is referring to by finding out for what most of his beliefs are true. Radical interpretation: reconciles the two approaches: Strawson is right when he is understood holistically. Quine: middle position between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of causation and reference is a matter of the coherence of the beliefs of the natives and the field linguists. Kripke: modular approach: causal paths of objects to speech acts. Then all beliefs can also be wrong. - That means that one does not know what one is referring to. DavidsonVsKripke: this is precisely the gap between conceptual scheme and content. >Conceptual scheme, >Content, >Scheme/content. Solution/Davidson: reversed: first maximize coherence and truth, then reference as a byproduct - then it can be as it likes! - Important argument: This ensures that in the most direct cases the intentional objects are the causes of the beliefs - the Gödel-Schmitt case must then be an exception. >Goedel-Schmidt-case. I 451 Otherwise the term of reference had no content. Radical Interpretation/DavidsonVsKripke: works if we know most of the intentional objects of the native. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects. Radical Interpretation: begins at home: we assume for ourselves and for the native that most beliefs are true - (I 452 that requires no causality!) Then we have to reject intermediate links "the determined meaning" or "intended interpretation", "imaginations". Meaning/belief/Quine/Davidson: meaning and belief cannot be found out independently of one another. Rorty I 323 Reference Theory/PutnamVscausal reference theory/Putnam/Rorty: a "causal" reference theory cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly refer to something is just as enigmatic as the question of how the term "cat" can do it. >Causal Theory of Reference. IV 23 Reference/Reference Theory/Putnam/Rorty: early: only causal theory of reference - not intentional - can spare us from relativism. ((s) Putnam later: non-intentional theory does not explain learning.) >Learning. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Reflective Equilibrium | Schurz | I 26 Reflexive equilibrium/reflexive reasoning equilibrium/Schurz: (Rawls 1979(1), 38,68 71), Goodman 1955/75(2), 85 89): Similar to rational reconstruction: reflexive equilibrium however purely coherence-theoretic: mutual adjustment of methodological rules and intuitions. >Rational Reconstruction. 1.Goodman, N. (1955). Fact, Fiction and Forecast. London, England: University of London. 2. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Retribution | Social Psychology | Parisi I 141 Retribution/law/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Two prevalent normative theories of punishment in the legal literature are retribution (or "just deserts") and utilitarianism (specific or general deterrence, as well as incapacitation and rehabilitation) (Hart, 2008(1); Ten, 1987(2)). (...) only recently have researchers systematically investigated the psychological influence of deterrence and retribution motives on people's punishment judgments. Psychology: The results indicate an interesting division: in the abstract, people explicitly endorse utilitarian goals (e.g. successful deterrence leading to crime reduction), but when presented with a specific scenario, they consistently choose to impose retributive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008)(3). >Utilitarianism. Retribution: This evidence suggests that people are intuitive retributivists, making judgments based on intuitions about just deserts, though these intuitive judgments can sometimes be overridden by more reasoned considerations (see Carlsmith and Darley, 2008(4) for a review). Morality: At the same time, the reasoning process itself may be oriented toward retribution: when an array of different information is made available, participants are more likely to choose to obtain information about moral severity and other retributive factors, rather than information relevant to utilitarian aims (Carlsmith, 2006(5); Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002(6)). >Morality. Consequentialism: Indeed, certain consequentialist moral decisions, despite being socially approved, give rise to the inference that the agent making or carrying out the decision is of inferior moral character (Uhlmann, Zhu, and Tannenbaum, 2013)(7). >Consequentialism. Example: e,.g., deciding to sacrifice one life to save multiple lives can lead to negative character inferences about the agent, even though the decision is regarded as morally correct (Uhlmann et al., 2013)(7). Restoration: Restorative justice goals are also intuitively appealing in some cases. In contrast with retribution, restorative justice aims to repair the harm that was caused through processes in which the offender, victim, and perhaps community members determine an appropriate reparative sanction (Bazemore, 1998;(8) Braithwaite, 2002(9)). This justice goal is compatible with retribution; when given a choice, even for severe crimes, most participants choose a consequence with both retributive and restorative components over consequences that fulfill only one ofthose goals (Gromet and Darley, 2006)(10). >Justice, >Equality. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (2008). Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Ten, C. L. (1987). Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Carlsmith, K. M. (2008). "On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions." Social Justice Research 21 (2): 119-137. doi:10.1007 /sl 1211-008-OOO-X. 4. Carlsmith, K. M. and J. M. Darley (2008). "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," in Mark P. Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, 193-236. San Diego: Academic Press. 5. Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). "The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Pun- ishment." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42(4): 43 7—451. doi: 10.1016/ j.jesp.2005.06.007. 6. Carlsmith, K. M., J. M. Darley, and P. H. Robinson (2002). "Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Desserts as Motives for Punishment." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.103 7/0022-3514.83.2.284. 7. Uhlmann, E. L., L. (Lei) Zhu, and D. Tannenbaum (2013). "When It Takes a Bad Person to Do the Right Thing." Cognition doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.005. 8. Bazemore, G. (1998). "Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration." American Behavioral Scientist 41(6): 768-813. doi:10.1177/0002764298041006003. 9. Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. 10. Gromet, D. M. and J. M. Darley (2009). "Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals." Law and society Review 43(1): 1-38. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Sidgwick | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 414 Sidgwick/Political philosophy/Weinstein: Sidgwick's significance for contemporary political theory has been enormously undervalued. John Rawls's Theory of Justice is, to a considerable extent, a critical response to Sidgwick. When Rawls says we 'often seem forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism', the utilitarianism he has in mind is Sidgwick's (1981(1): viii). >H. Sidgwick. Contemporary political theorists must take Sidgwick seriously if they take Rawls seriously (...). BarryVsRawls: If Barry is right in insisting that we live in a 'post-Rawlsian' world, then navigating this world requires that we take better account of Sidgwick. Cf. >J. Rawls. Utilitarianism/Sidgwick: Sidgwick's 'classical' utilitarianism was also a form of liberal utilitarianism in so far as Sidgwick held, like Mill, that utility was best promoted indirectly via intermediary moral principles. Hence, Rawls's attack on 'classical' utilitarianism is warfare against a straw man. For Sidgwick, the 'middle axioms' of common sense morality generally constituted appropriate happiness-maximizing guides and therefore needed modest critical refinement. Sidgwick nevertheless held, like Mill, that 'as this actual moral order is admittedly imperfect, it will be the Utilitarian's duty to aid in improving it' (1981(1): 476). Common sense: More recently, Rawls has embraced Sidgwick's healthy reverence for common sense. Following Sidgwick, Rawls holds that our moral intuitions play a critical role in justifying and systematizing our political principles. Whereas Sidgwick justifies and systematizes common sense by appealing to utility, Rawls deploys the veil of ignorance as a justificatory and systematizing filtering device (...). >Veil of ignorance. Sidgwick: For Sidgwick as well as Rawls, common sense tames radical reform. The utilitarian reformer ‚will naturally contemplate (established morality) with reverence and wonder, as a marvelous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth . he will handle it with respectful delicacy as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispositions, by the indispensable aid of which the actual quantum of human happiness is continually being produced.‘ (1981(1): 475). In sum, for Sidgwick, utility was best maximized indirectly via healthy but not uncritical deference to the 'middle axioms' of common sense morality. >Utilitarianism/Sidgwick. 1. Sidgwick, Henry (1981 [1907]) The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Terminology | Nussbaum | Brocker I 895 Terminology/Nussbaum: the model developed under the keyword "Aristotelian social democratism" sees it as the task of state regulation to orient itself towards "providing every citizen with the material, institutional and pedagogical conditions that give him access to the good human life and enable him to decide for a good life and action".(1) Brocker I 905 Consideration Equilibrium/Nussbaum: Following the idea of public justification, Nussbaum favours the idea of a "consideration equilibrium", by which arguments for a given theoretical position are held against the fixed points of our moral intuitions and weighed against the conflicting conceptions to be examined. >Reflective equilibrium. 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder das gute Leben, Frankfurt/M. 1999, 24 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Terminology | Wright | I 41 "Platitude"/Wright: "P" is true if and only if "P" corresponds with the facts correspondence platitude Correspondence platitude/CP/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says that they are - Deflationism/Wright: accepts (like us) following platitudes: claiming something means, representing something as true, any truth enabled content has a meaningful negation, to be true means to correspond with the facts, a statement can be justified without being true, and vice versa. I 60 Epistemic Constraint/EC: if P is true, then there is evidence for that -> enforces revision of logic, otherwise P cannot be true if there is no evidence. I 99 Platitudes: are called so because they are intended to help preventing a weighty metaphysical realm. I 108ff Definition evidence transcendence: the presence of decidable parameter does not have to ensure that the answer to the question is equally decidable. I 115 Error theory: Mackie (ethics), Field (mathematics). Everything would have to be traced back to a metaphysical realm to make it true. But there is no metaphysical realm. ad I 115ff Error theory/elsewhere: a theory that seeks to explain why our intuitions are different than the theory asserts. I 118ff Convergence 1: weak: only trend - more: Convergence 2: enforces convergence - Definition minimal capacity for truth: requires use of standards for assertibility and thus the existence of criteria - Vs "appropriate circumstances" unclear - VsWright: discourse about the strange: not minimal capable of truth. - WrightVs: there are no "permissive conditions" - Convergence platitude/representation platitude/Wright: divergent output can only be explained by divergent input - Definition cognitive coercion: a discourse enforces cognitive coercion if divergences can only be explained by divergent input - Tradition: moral discourse does not satisfy the criteria of cognitive coercion - Wright: but cognitive coercion is compatible with flexible standards, it is an additional condition for minimal truth-capable discourses. I 138 Wright pro convergence also in the discourse about the strange. I 150 Solidification/Wright: a solidification will change the modal status. Whether P is true, may be contingent, but if P is true, the statement is necessary that P is actually true. - Problem: this should not apply for the basic equation for shape - Another problem: "if S would be in the same circumstances, it would judge equally": if too much remains still valid in other possible worlds, the equation would be true in all possible worlds and the distinction gets questionable. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Transcendentals | Kant | I 81f Transcendental Knowledge/Kant: ("knowledge a priori") conditions of possibility of knowledge - can be guaranteed only by mathematization of the given of intuitions. - Criterion for science. --- Strawson V 19ff Transcendental Analytics/Kant: 1. Experience: order 2. unit in the same order as required for the awareness (Thesis of the unity of consciousness) 3. experience of objects is distinguishable of experience of what about the case is, so that judgments are also possibly independent of the subjective experience (objectivity thesis) 4. objects are substantially spatially 5. a uniform spatiotemporal system is necessary 6. Physical objects: need certain principles of perseverance and causality (theses of analogies). >Experience/Kant, >Analogies/Kant, >Principles/Kant. V 74 f Transcendental Deduction/Kant/Strawson: premise: experience includes a manifold that is suitable for being united somehow in uniform judgments. >Judgment/Kant. V 75 StrawsonVs: the "pure" terms have no necessary application on the experience. V 134 Transcendental Ideas/Kant: 1. absolute unity of the subject, 2. the conditions of phenomena, 3. the conditions of objects. --- Stroud I 153 Transcendental/Kant/Stroud: transcendental are the things independent of us, albeit every sense impression is dependent on us. - Difference: transcendent: claims an otherworldly realm of experience - transcendental/Kant: is a theory, if it has to do with the general conditions of our knowledge of things independent of experience. - This is a condition of empirical knowledge at all. - These conditions cannot be known empirically themselves - (but a priori). - Experience/Kant: shows that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be different. --- Stroud I 162 Def transcendental realism/Kant: sees the external things as something seperated from the senses - KantVs: that leads to empirical idealism. Problem: we are aware of our representations, but do not know whether they correspond with something that exists. >Thing in itself/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 13 Transcendental/Kant/Adorno: in Kant, the concept of the transcendental is, in the first place, nothing other than the epitome of all the investigations which refer to synthetic judgments a priori. >Synthetic judgments a priori. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Utilitarian Liberalism | Gaus | Gaus I 105 Utilitarian Liberalism/Gaus: Utilitarian moral theories hold that we can possess knowledge of both the good and the right; pace Rawls, these are not matters of ‘reasonable pluralism’. The most straightforward versions of utilitarianism maintain that the good is either pleasure, happiness or preference satisfaction, and the right is the overall maximization of the good. Bentham: Bentham, interestingly, did not think that the principle of utility could be proven; he did, though, contend that it could not reasonably be denied (1987(1): ch. 11, s. 11). Any reasonable person would see that pleasure is the ultimate end: consequently the principle of utility was beyond reasonable dispute. Whether or not the principle of utility could be established by reason was and is, though, a matter of dispute. Mill: Mill, famously, advanced a proof (1963c(2): ch. 4). SidgwickVsMill: Sidgwick, in contrast, insists that basic intuitions must be drawn upon in any argument for utilitarianism; in the end, Sidgwick appeared to accept that one could be an egoist and yet not irrational (1962(3): 418–22). Gaus I 106 Whether utilitarianism underwrites liberal politics and economics (...) turns on economic theory, public choice, theories of institutional design (Goodin, 1996)(4), and so on. In that sense liberal utilitarianism is indeed a partially comprehensive theory, with various theories of economics and politics being part of the case for liberal utilitarianism. >Markets/McCulloch, >Markets/Utilitarianism. Many philosophers are apt to reject liberal utilitarianism just because it turns on empirical claims; these anti-utilitarians often advance fanciful ‘what if’ examples, showing that under strange circumstances, utilitarianism might lead to strange results. In contrast, utilitarians typically have high confidence in these theories, and see no reason to suppose that our theory of political right should be independent of our best empirical theories of economics and politics (Goodin, 1982)(5). >Utilitarianism/Gaus, >Utilitarianism/Chapman. 1. Bentham, Jeremy (1987) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 2. Mill, John Stuart (1963c) Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. X, 203–59. 3. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Goodin, Robert E., ed. (1996) The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Goodin, Robert E. (1982) Political Theory and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utilitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 414 Utilitarianism/Political Philosophy/Weinstein: Contemporary English utilitarians have championed liberal utilitarianism with increasing subtlety and sophistication. Rule utilitarianism: Rule utilitarians stress utilitarianism's compatibility with accepted moral rules and intuitions (Hare, 1981(1); Harsanyi, 1985(2); Hooker, 2000(3)), whereas ... Liberal utilitarianism: ... liberal utilitarians marry utilitarianism with strong liberal rights (Gray, 1983(4); Riley, 1988(5)). All such accounts nevertheless constitute different versions of what is now commonly known as indirect utilitarianism. Indirect utilitarianism: For indirect utilitarians, according to James Griffin, the principle of utility serves as a 'criterion' for assessing classes of actions. By contrast, established moral rules and/or basic liberal rights function as sources of direct obligation (or 'decision procedures') for guiding individual actions (Griffin, 1994(6): 179). Actions are morally wrong if they violate these decision procedures. Indirect utilitarians hold that respecting such decision procedures will best maximize general utility overall, though not necessarily in short-term individual cases. In other words, sometimes acting rightly is doing wrong. But why should I act rightly if acting rightly happens not to be for the utilitarian best in a given situation? Why should I be a mindless, rule-worshipping sucker?* Fundamental rights/equal rights/Liberal utilitarianism: (...) for liberal utilitarianism, fundamental rights function as critical decision procedures, making it more juridical than rule utilitarianism. Rights indirectly steer our actions along inviolable channels of acceptable behaviour that purportedly generate overall general utility. But liberal utilitarianism is not simply a more juridical version of indirect utilitarianism. VsLiberal unitiltarianism: Contemporary liberal utilitarianism is often criticized in the same way as Mill's contemporary opponents assailed him for trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. For instance, John Gray (1989(7): 218—24) has recanted his earlier enthusiasm for liberal utilitarianism, agreeing with liberal utilitarianism's critics that it futilely seeks to join multiple ultimate normative criteria, namely utility and indefeasible moral rights. Gray: For Gray, either maximizing utility logically trumps rights, or rights (in so far as they possess authentic moral weight) trump maximizing utility. Liberal utilitarianism fails logically because it pulls in opposite normative directions, instructing us to maximize utility when doing so violates rights and to respect rights when doing so fails to maximize utility. We sometimes must choose between our liberalism and our utilitarianism. Egalitarian utilitarianism: Egalitarian liberals, in contrast to utilitarians, feature equality over utility as their overriding normative concern. Still, utilitarians are not indifferent to equality and distributive justice. As we have just seen, indirect utilitarians take these values seriously, though not so seriously that they trump maximizing utility as the ultimate normative standard. Utilitarians also prize equality in the sense that impartiality is constitutive of the principle of is counted for utility. Each person's 'happiness exactly as much as another's' (Mill, 1969(8): 257).** >J. St. Mill, >Egalitarianism. For egalitarian liberals, however, equality plays a more commanding role because many of them favour internalist arguments for equality.*** And because equality matters for them up front, they also tend to be more preoccupied with questions about equality of what rather than why. Cf. >Individuals/Bradley, >Liberty/Bosanquet, >Self-realization/Hobhouse. Gaus I 415 New Liberalism: (...) new liberals favoured a more robust threshold of equalizing opportunity rights. Although they concurred with >Bosanquet that possessing property was a potent means of 'self-utterance' and therefore crucial to successfully externalizing and realizing ourselves, they also stipulated that private property was legitimate only in so far as it did not Gaus I 416 subvert equal opportunity. >Equal opportunities. Hobson: In Hobson's words, 'A man is not really free for purposes of self-development who is not adequately provided' with equal and easy access to land, a home, capital and credit. Hobson concludes that although liberalism is not state socialism, it nevertheless implies considerably 'increased public ownership and control of industry' (1974(9): xii).ll New liberals, then, transformed English liberalism by making social welfare, and the state's role in promoting it, pivotal. They crafted welfare liberalism into a sophisticated theoretical alternative.**** >Liberalism, >Idealism. * For critics of contemporary indirect utilitarianism, rule-worshipping suckers are irrational because rule utilitarianism is not merely paradoxical, but illogical. Acting rightly can never sometimes entail doing wrong as if acting and doing mean different things. Rule utilitarians have responded by distinguishing between idealistic rule utilitarianism, actual state rule utilitarianism and conditional rule utilitarianism. Ideal rule utilitarianism holds that actions are right if they comport with rules whose general acceptance would promote utility. Actual state rule utilitariamsm adds the condition that these rules must, in fact, be generally accepted. Conditional rule utilitarianism is weaker still as it further stipulates that actions are right if they conform to rules that always maximize utility. ** Mill continues, 'The equal claim of everybody to happiness . involves an equal claim to all the means to happiness (1969(8): 257). In a revealing footnote about Spencer, Mill adds that 'perfect impartiality between persons' supposes that 'equal amounts of happmess are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons'. These egalitarian implications of impartiality are not identical and entail vastly different redistributive strategies. *** For Gerald Gaus (2000(10): 136-45), utilitarian arguments for equality are external because they endorse equal treatment for the sake of advancing some external value, namely happiness. Arguments from fundamental human equality justify equal treatment on the basis of some (internal) attribute according to which people are purportedly equal in fact. **** Idealists, like Jones and Collingwood, similarly favoured vigorously expanding equal opportunities through government. 1. Hare, R. M. (1981) Moral Thinking. Oxford: Oxford mversity Press. 2. Harsanyi, John (1985) 'Rule utilitarianism, equality and justice'. Social Philosophy and Policy, 2: 115-27. 3. Hooker, Brad (2000) Ideal code, Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Gray, John (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge. 5. Riley, Jonathan (1988) Liberal Utilitarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Griffin, James (1994) 'The distinction between a criterion and a decision procedure', Utilitas, 6: 177-82. 7. Gray, John (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge. 8. Mill, J. S. (1969) Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of J. S. Mill, vol. 10. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 9. Hobson, J. A. (1974 119091) The Crisis of Liberalism. Brighton: Barnes and Noble. 10. Gaus, Gerald (2000) Political Concepts and Political Theories. Boulder, CO: Westview. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Words | Lyons | I 71 Word/Linguistics/Lyons: is ambiguous (which we can now make clear as a) a composition of expressive elements (sounds) (realisation). b) completely abstract as a grammatical function. (formal). c) a graphic substance (irrelevant here). >Ambiguity, >Phonemes, >Morphemes, >Sentences, >Syntax, >Grammar. I 197 Word/Linguistics/Grammar/Tradition/Lyons: in traditional grammar the word is the unity par excellence. It is the basis for distinguishing between morphology and syntax and at the same time the most important unit of lexicography. (encyclopedia). I 198 Def Morphology/Tradition/Lyons: deals with the structure of words. Def Syntax: deals with the rules for joining words into sentences. Contrary to the syntax: Flexion. Flexion/Linguistics/Tradition/Lyons: = Theory of Form. I 200 Word/Linguistics/Lyons: the term "word" is ambiguous: a) phonological word that represents b) grammatical word that is represented phonologically (or orthographically). >Representation. For example, the phonological word [säng] represents the grammatical preterite of singular There are now cases where 1. one phonological word represents several grammatical [postmen]: postman and post men 2. several phonological words represent a grammatical word: Example[räd]: Preterite of read or adjective red. c) Third, abstract form of "word": lexeme. I 203 Def Word/Lyons: it was proposed to define "word" as "any section of a sentence", "at the ends of which a pause is possible". Lyons: this is of course not a definition, but a description of the material with which linguistics works. It is a help for its work. Def Word/Linguistics/Semantic Definition/Lyons: (well known definition): "a word can be defined as the connection of a certain meaning with a certain sound complex which has a certain grammatical use". Lyons: this implies that the word is simultaneously a semantic, phonological and grammatical unit. Problem: it may be that all units meet these three conditions, I 204 but they're not the only units they need. For example, whole syntagmas such as "the new book" have a fixed meaning, form and use. The same applies to distributionally limited segments, even of higher rankings. Wrong solution: to consider words as the smallest segments of expressions that meet the three conditions. Vs: that is still not enough: e.g. the "un" and "acceptable" of "unacceptable" satisfy all three conditions. Moreover, the word "unacceptable" is more or less synonymous with the syntagma "not acceptable". >Synonymy. Word/sound/criterion/phonology/Lyons: the phonological characteristic for the delimitation of the word is never more than a side effect. We define the word exclusively grammatically. Word/Definition/Lyons: Problem: how to define a unit that occupies a middle rank between morpheme and sentence, so that it somewhat corresponds to our intuitions, whereby this intuition is rather guided by the non-essential orthographic convention? I 207 Word/phonological/Lyons: in many languages words are phonologically marked, usually with an accent. Word accent/Lyons: there are fixed and rigid word accents and also "restricted free". E.g. Latin: Accent position is generally determined by the length of the penultimate syllable. Polish: always on the second to last Turkish: generally on the last Czech: on the initial syllable Vocal harmony: exists in Turkish and Hungarian within the word boundaries. I 208 Word accents/Lyons: for all languages with word accents applies that a sentence has as many accents as words. Different: e.g. Russian: here the word "ne" ("not") never has an accent. Accents/Lyons: cannot be the primary characteristic for the delimitation of words. E.g. French: here a congruence between phonological and grammatical structure can be found, if at all, for units of higher rank than the word. Word/Criteria/Lyons: the two criteria above are not only independent of each other, but also independent of the criteria for defining morphemes as smallest grammatical units. The result is that the same units in certain languages I 210 can be words and morphemes at the same time. For example the morphs /nais/, ,/boi/, /wont/ (nice, boy, want) simultaneously the morphemes "nice", "boy" and "want" and grammatical words, each consisting of a morpheme. >Morphemes. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analytic Philosophy | Nagel Vs Analytic Philosophy | Frank I 127 NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy: declares many questions pointless. Nagel: that merely shows that these questions are inaccessible to a particular type of treatment which is required by the respectively favored method. We should rather rely on our intuition, which generates the problems than on the theories that want to explain away these intuitions. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 Nagel I 57 Language/NagelVsPrimacy of Language/NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy/Nagel: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytical philosophy. Turning from Frege. Thinking is often non-linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language. I 59 We cannot explain reason through naturalistic description of the practical language methods. Because the respects in which language is a vehicle do not allow any naturalistic, psychological or sociological analysis. If language reveals principles of thought, it is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar obeys logic. E.g. there is no language in which the modus ponens is not a logical conclusion or identity is not transitive. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Aristotle | Tarski Vs Aristotle | Skirbekk I 142 Truth/Description/Tarski: If we would decide to extend the popular use of the term to "designate" and apply it not only to names but also to statements, then we could say: "A statement is true if it designates an existing fact." (Like Aristotle). Truth/Aristoteles: of something that is, to say that it is not, or of something that is not, to say that it is, is false, while of something that is, to say that it is, or of something that is not, to say that it is not, is true. TarskiVsAristoteles: this is not a satisfactory definition. We need a more precise expression for our intuitions.(1) 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in. G: Skirbekk (Hg.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Bloomfield, L. | Lyons, J. Vs Bloomfield, L. | Lyons I 201 Lexem/Linguistics/Lyons: in this (more abstract) use we have stated above that e.g. "singing" is only a form of another word, while "singer" is a word of its own. Modern LinguisticsVs: neglects this abstract form. E.g.: BloomfieldVsTradition: the school grammar is inaccurate because it designates units such as e.g. book, books, or e.g. do, does, did as different forms of the same word. I 201 LyonsVsBloomfield: but is inaccurate in that it is still up to us how we define "word". Lexem/Lyons: here we introduce the more abstract form of word (neither phonological nor grammatical). It is these abstract units that occur in different flexion forms according to the syntactic rules. Lexem/Writing/Lyons: with capital letters e.g. CUT. Word/Definition/Lyons: Problem: how to define a unit that occupies a middle rank between morpheme and proposition, so that it corresponds to some extent to our intuitions, whereby these intuitions are rather guided by the non-essential orthographic convention? Def Word/Bloomfield/Lyons: (best known modern definition): the word is the "smallest free form" ((s) in the language). Def bound form/Bloomfield/Lyons: forms that never occur alone as whole utterances. Def free form: a form that can occur alone as an utterance. Def smallest free form/Bloomfield: any free form that does not contain a part itself. (= word). LyonsVsBloomfield: this applies more to phonological than to grammatical words. I 205 Bloomfield: did not clearly distinguish between grammatical and phonological words. BloomfieldVsBloomfield/Lyons: Bloomfield himself realized that some words are not covered by his definition like "the" and "a" (indefinite article). This is because they hardly ever occur as independent utterances. Solution/Bloomfield: additional criterion: to treat "the" and "a" like "this" and "that". These sometimes occur freely ((s) in answers) and stand within the sentence in the same environment. LyonsVsBloomfield: the definition has been accepted by many, but it does not serve the main purpose of grammatical description to generate sentences from which actual and possible utterances can be derived. All questions of classification must be subordinated to this goal. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Bridge Laws | Cartwright Vs Bridge Laws | I 205 Quantum Mechanics/QM/Cartwright: even if the measurement problem turns out to be pseudo-problem, other problems remain, namely finding out the correct operator for a situation. It is a continual problem in practice. Correspondence Principle/QM: tells us which analogies exist with classical mechanics. But that does not last long. We also need our intuitions, memories of other cases, specialization general considerations, etc. Sometimes we select models only for the reason that we know how we can solve the corresponding equations! I 206 CartwrightVsBridge Principles: instead we need insights about which operator is the right one for a specific problem. Operators/Cartwright/(s): represent the energies that are decisive in a situation within the equations. I 15 "Theory-exit": underminines the conclusion of the realist to the best explanation. "Theory-entry": here we start with a factual description and see how far it can be brought under a fundamental law or equation. CartwrightVsBridge laws: this is too simple a view of how explanations work, we must first provide a description of the situation before we can figure out the mathematical requirements of the theory. "Theory-entry"/CartwrightVsTradition/CartwrightVsBridge Principles: instead, we proceed in two stages: 1) We begin with an unprepared description. As accurately as possible. Then we convert it into a prepared description. 2) the prepared description is reconciled with a mathematical representation of the theory. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Counterpart Theory | Plantinga Vs Counterpart Theory | Black I 57 Counterpart Theory/C.Th./PlantingaVsLewis/PlantingaVsCounterpart Theory: (1974(1), p. 115 f, 1987(2), p. 209): According to Lewis, strictly speaking all things would then have all their properties essentially, because there are no possible worlds in which they themselves (not just any placeholders) have different properties. E.g. if it was one degree colder today, we would all not exist, because then a different possible world would be real, and none of us would be there. Kripke similar: KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: E.g. if we say "Humphrey could have won the election," according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And he could not care less. (Kripke 1980(3), 44 f). 1. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell Schwarz I 100 Properties/VsCounterpart Theory/Schwarz: if we reject counterparts and temporal parts, we have to conceive all properties as masked relations to times and possible worlds. Then there are obviously many more fundamental relations. Stalnaker I 117 Identity/Stalnaker: ...these examples remind us of what an inflexible relation identity is. Our intuitions about the flexibility of possibilities contradict this rigid constitution of identity. Counterpart Theory/C.Th./Stalnaker: tells us "Relax!". We should introduce a more flexible relation for the cross-world identity that allows intransitivity and asymmetry. Counterpart Theory/Stalnaker: the 3rd motivation for them is the one that is closest to the phenomena and makes the least metaphysical presuppositions. Vs: actualism and the representative of a primitive thisness may have difficulty with that. I 118 PlantingaVsCounterpart Theory/Nathan SalmonVsCounterpart Theory/Stalnaker: Counterpart Theory/Plantinga/Salmon: can be divided into two doctrines: 1) Metaphysical Thesis: that the realms of different possible worlds do not overlap ((s) >Lewis: "Nothing is in two worlds"). 2) Semantic Thesis: that modal predicates should be interpreted in terms of counterparts instead of in terms of the individuals themselves. Ad 1): seems to suggest an extreme essentialism, according to which nothing could have been different than it actually is. Extreme Essentialism/Plantinga: would the thesis that "~if a leaf had dropped a day earlier in the mountains of the Northern Cascades in October 1876 than it actually did, I would either be non-existent, or a person who is different from me. And that is certainly wrong". (Plantinga 1974)(4). can ad 2): Can the semantic part of the doctrine solve that? 4. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press Plantinga/Salmon: it cannot. It can only mask the metaphysical consequences. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Davidson, D. | Fodor Vs Davidson, D. | IV 68 Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like! IV 69 Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well. Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side. QuineVsDavidson: Davidson shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: e.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. x is white and LT). This could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof". This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem. E.g. assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a truth theory (WT), which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives. That seems to be a holistic consequence. Vs: but that is premature. Language/radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation! I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct truth theory (WT) by that evidence which observation allows. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all! Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior: 1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible. IV 74 Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of a truth theory is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, it is therefore not in the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation. It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions. From the perspective of the radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist (> hermeneutic circle). These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc. IV 84 Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Davidson's idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W-sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language! IV 98 "Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true! IV 100 Principle of Charity/radical interpretation/RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that: 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions, 2) are syntactically atomistic. The interpretation of such expressions cannot be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts. IV 101 We do not know whether such forms exist, e.g. maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable. > Behavior/wish IV 120ff. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Descriptivism | Newen Vs Descriptivism | New I 137 Descriptivism/Newen: divided into a) Naturalism b) Intuitionism: Def Moral Naturalism/Newen: the meaning of ethical sentences can be completely described with non-psychological facts (in particular facts of the society). Def Intuitionism/Newen: the meaning of moral sentences can be specified by psychological facts. VsDescriptivism/Newen: leads to relativism. VsNaturalism: here the ethical principles are defined by factual habits. VsIntuitionsim: here by varying intuitions ((s) ultimately again influenced by the surroundings). |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Endurantism | Stalnaker Vs Endurantism | I 135 Vague identity/time/possible world/poss.w./Stalnaker: I ask with some examples for temporal and for cross world identity whether Salmon refuted vague identity with his argument. E.g. in Philadelphia, there are two prominent fish restaurants named "Bookbinder's". They compete with each other. B1: "Bookbinder’s classic fish restaurant" B2: "The old original Bookbinder's". B0: The original, only restaurant from 1865. Today's two restaurants may go back to the old and have a entangled history. Question: does Salmon's argument show, I 136 that there must be a fact (about the history) that decides on which restaurant is the original? One thing is clear: B1 unequal B2. Transitive identity/transitivity/Stalnaker: then due to the transitivity of the identity B0 = B1 and B0 = B2 cannot exist at the same time. Semantic indeterminacy/Stalnaker: but one is tempted to say that there is a certain semantic indeterminacy here. Question: can we reconcile this with Salmon's argument (SalmonVsVague identity)? Stalnaker: I think we can do so. Perdurantism/perduration/Stalnaker: e.g. if we say the name "B0" dates back to the time of 1865 when there was a certain restaurant "Bookbinder's" this is the most natural way. Endurantism/enduration/Stalnaker: e.g. but we can also say B0 is one of the today existing two restaurants "Bookbinder’s". StalnakerVsEndurantism. Endurantism/Stalnaker: here it is similar to vague descriptions: example "B0" is ambiguous! It is unclear whether he refers to B1 or to B2. (Indefinite reference). Perdurantism/Stalnaker: here the reference is clear. ((s) Because the original restaurant does not exist anymore. B0 therefore clearly means the original restaurant because it cannot be confused with one of the two today existing) Also, of course "B1" and "B2" are unambiguous. Question: given Salmon's argument: how can it then be indefinite if B0 = B2? Stalnaker: that just depends on if we understand continuants as endurant or perdurant. continuant/perdurantism/endurantism/Stalnaker: Perdurantism/Stalnaker: can understand continuants e.g. as four-dimensional objects (four dimensionalism) which are extended in time exactly as they are extended in space. Then the example of the restaurants corresponds to the example of buildings (see above). Example buildings: the indeterminacy is there explained by the indeterminacy of the concept "building". One building is maybe a part of another. Example restaurants: according to this view each has a temporal part in common with the original. It is indeterminate here which of the temporal parts is a restaurant and which is a composition of multiple temporal parts of different restaurants. I 137 Therefore, it is indefinite to which of these different entities "B0" refers (indefinite reference). Perdurantism/continuant/Stalnaker: one might think, but we have a specific reference, like in the example of the building through a demonstrative with a ostension: when we say "this building". But that does not work with the perdurantistic conception of restaurants. ((s) As an institution, not as a building. This should be perdurant here that means not all temporal parts are simultaneously present and anyway not as material objects). Four dimensionalism/Stalnaker: therefore has two possible interpretations: perdurantistic (here) and endurantistic (see below). Endurantism/four dimensional/four dimensionalism/continuant/Stalnaker: some authors: thesis: continuants have no temporal parts like events. That means they are at any moment with all their (only spatial) parts present. Nevertheless, they exist in time. LewisVsEndurantism: (Lewis 1986a, 203) this view uses the terms "part" and "whole" in a very limited sense. StalnakerVsLewis: that may not be quite so because the representatives acknowledge that some things e.g. football matches, wars, centuries indeed have temporal parts. Endurantism/Stalnaker: even if the whole thing is an obscure doctrine some intuitions speak for it. I will neither defend nor fight him. Endurantism: example restaurants: In 1865 there is only one restaurant "Bookbinder's" there are no other candidates for this description. Even if our criterion for "restaurant" is unclear. It seems that we have a definite reference for an endurant thing B0. Also for the today existing restaurant B1 we seem to have definite reference. Salmon/Stalnaker: if we accept his argument again, there must then be a fact which decides whether B0 is identical to B1 or not? StalnakerVs: here the semantic indeterminacy may be subtle but it still exists. We show this like that: Identity in time/Stalnaker: example statue/clay: yesterday there was the pile, today the statue, so both can not be identical. They have different historical properties. This known argument does not require four dimensionalism. Four dimensionalism/statue/clay/Stalnaker: statue and pile as four dimensional objects: here only parts of them exist today. Endurantism/statue/clay/Stalnaker: if we say both - Statue and pile - are at today "fully present" (it would have to be explained how) Salmon's argument still shows that both are (now) different. The argument does not depend on the fact that they have different parts. It requires only that they have different historical properties. Endurantism/Stalnaker: example restaurants: suppose the concept Restaurant is indefinite. After some arbitrary clarifications B0 = B1 will be, after others B0 = B2. Disambiguation/Stalnaker: then B0 has after some disambiguations temporal properties it would not have after other disambiguations. Semantic indeterminacy/reference/StalnakerVsSalmon, Nathan: the reference of "B0" is then dependent on the way of our arbitrary assumptions for disambiguation. SalmonVsStalnaker/Stalnaker: accuses me of some inconsistencies but I have shown indeterminacy of reference while Salmon refers to indeterminacy of identity between certain objects. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Extensionality | Prior Vs Extensionality | I 48 Extensionalism/Fallacy of/Extensionality/Extension/Extensional/Prior: Ontology/PriorVsQuine: existence as "being a value of a bound variable" is only a unproven dogma. Quantifiers: There is another unproven dogma: that mixed constructions like "__ is green and __" or "believes that __" cannot fall into the same category as the simple ones. In particular, it is said that "X believes that __" should not fall into the same category as "It is not the case, that __". I.e. supposedly they not both single-digit links. Resistance comes from the formal logicians who want to simplify their systems by saying that if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then every composite sentence, which only differs in that it has S1 as a sub-sentence where the other one has S2 has as a sub-sentence, has the same truth value. This is the "law of extensionality". PriorVsExtensionality: if the law was true, the following two sentences would have to mean the same thing: a) "X thinks the grass is pink" b) "X thinks the grass is purple" But everyone knows that you can think one thing without thinking the other. Point: "X thinks the grass is pink" is not a true composite sentence with "grass is pink" as a component. Technically speaking: It is no real function with "grass is pink" as an argument. Extensionality/Prior: but, apart from a certain narrow-mindedness, I cannot derive from this that the law of extensionality is wrong. One must admit that there is a long and interesting history of logic in which it is true, just like classical mechanics in physics. I 49 On the other hand, if its defenders speak of intuitive and immediate knowledge of its truth, then I can only say that I have contrary intuitions. Extensionality/Extension/Lesniewski/Lukasiewicz/Prior: both schools tell us that if you drop extensionality, you must admit that some propositions are then neither true nor false. This is justified in classic logic by the fact that there are only four cases a) "true p" is always true, no matter if "p" is true or false, b) "false p": reversed c) not p: reverses the truth value d) "asserts p": true if p is true, otherwise false. Furthermore: if "p" and "q" have the same truth value, then function of "p" has the same truth value as the function of "q". Now, if a function does not obey the law of extensionality, it cannot be one of these four, and if there are other besides these, there must be more than two truth values. (PriorVs). Vs: the first step of this argument already presupposes what it is to prove: namely, that the only property of "p", on which its truth value depends, is its truth value. E.g. "If X thinks that p" was a function of "p". But there are no functions that are false with true arguments. I 50 But why should the truth value of a function "p" not depend on of other properties of "p" than its truth value? To say that this was impossible is to say that for each function fx of a number x, the question whether x > 0 depends on whether x is > 0, which is simply false. E.g. fx = x 1: because in some cases, where x > 0, e.g. x = 2, is x 1 > 0, while in other cases, e.g.: x = 1, x is 1 not > 0. So whether this function of x itself is > 0 does not depend on whether x itself is > 0, but whether x > 1. Likewise, whether X believes that p does not depend on whether it is the case or not that p. Prior: why ever not? ((s) Both are true, but the analogy does not need to be true.) I 101 Protothetics/Protothetic/Lesniewski/Prior: our system is a fragment of Lesniewski's "Protothetics". (20s). 1) normal propositional calculus, ((s) p,q..u,v,>,...) 2) quantifier logic 3) normal identity laws. Full protothetics also includes the law of extensionality. (Tarski seems to support it, because it has proved his independence.) PriorVsExtensionality. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Fodor, J. | Newen Vs Fodor, J. | NS I131 Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis 2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm. Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. NS I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states. Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax). It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories. VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language. NS I 133 b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early." Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations. VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed. Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills. - - NS I 160 Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional. Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate. VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow." NS I 161 Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case. VsFodor: 1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried. FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept! Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Functionalism | Lewis Vs Functionalism | IV 120 VsFunctionalism/Lewis: a broader established functionalist theory of the mind is criticized by both sides: a) it seems wrong to assume that it is necessary or inalterable that mental states take exactly the causal role they have at this moment. e.g. can there be no exception like in the case of the calculator that does not work? b) on the other hand, Karl's mental states seem to be intrinsic in him. Why should the feelings he currently experiences - pain or stupidity- lead to other feelings in other humans? ((s) Meaning resulting from publicly shared language?) Lewis: I see no other way than to equally represent those two intuitions at the same time. Individualist functionalism: represents the second theory at the expense of the first one. Lewis: I have tried to use a compromise. As such, every theory is respected a bit. a) it is indeed possible that extraordinary states do not fully take up their definite causal role IV 121 b) mental states of somebody are the intrinsic states in which he/she is. Yet what makes them the states is not entirely intrinsic.To a certain extent it is related to the other representatives of his nature. But this extent is limited since most cases are not extraordinary. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Hume, D. | Kant Vs Hume, D. | Kant I 27 KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves. Kant I 98 Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself. McDowell I 123 McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms. Hume I 37 Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation. It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> Categorical imperative). Hume I 122 KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments. DeleuzeVsKant. Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison. Hume I 133 Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen. So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself. I 138 If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature. I 139 But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed: The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Hume, D. | Bigelow Vs Hume, D. | I 226 Non-modal theory/Laws of Nature/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: most non-modal theories of the LON descended from Hume. Then we can assume nomic necessity to be a relative necessity without falling into a circle. Important argument: then we can just assume nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on an independent approach to laws! Explanation: So it makes sense to make use of laws to explain nomic necessity, rather than vice versa. And that’s much less obscure than modal arguments. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Hume’s theories are unable to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. I 233 "Full generality"/"Pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain any reference to an individual: This is too weak and too strong: a) too strong: E.g. Kepler’s laws relate to all the planets, but therefore also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still no law. E.g. that everything moves towards the earth’s center. I 235 LoN/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: in our opinion, it has nothing to do with them, E.g. whether they are useful, or whether they contradict our intuitions. Counterfactual conditional/Co.co/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: for the Humean, Counterfactual Conditional are circular, if they are to represent LoN. We ourselves only use a Counterfactual Conditional when we have recognized something as a law! When we ask ourselves whether something is a law, we ask ourselves not whether it fulfils a Counterfactual Conditional. I 236 HumeVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: our modal approach for LoN is circular. BigelowVsVs: it is not! BigelowVsHume: most of Hume’s theories of the LON are circular themselves, with one exception: the theory that Lewis reads out of Ramsey. Ramsey/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is based on the logical relations of laws among each other (coherence). (Ramsey 1929, 1931, Lewis 1973a, Mellor 1980). I 237 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if theories are sets of propositions, propositions must not be sets of possible worlds! For then the best theory for a possible worlds would have to be an axiom: the one-class of this possible worlds All facts of the world are then theorems of the axiom. There would be only one law for each world. No two possible worlds would have a law in common. I 267 BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach to causality. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Identity Theory | Rorty Vs Identity Theory | Frank I 581 RortyVsIdentity Theory: a) translation version: Smart (see below) b) behavioral materialism (Ryle, Armstrong) both are unsatisfactory Translation Theory/Armstrong: a statement about the mental is translated into a statement with the subject term: "a state that is capable of producing the following behaviors" RortyVs: if so, it is hard to see why we had dualistic intuitions. Anti-dualism is only superior to dualism if it can help explain dualism. Fra I 587 VsIdentity Theory/Rorty: even if it relieves us of certain entities, it does not relieve us of the assumption of the relevant properties. Brain processes do not have the property "yellow", so for that we need something else. Solution Smart: "Something is going on inside me that is similar to what goes on when I see something yellow". ("Translation"/similar to Armstrong). >Identity Theory, >Type-/Token Identity, >Dualism. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Intrinsic Properties | Lewis Vs Intrinsic Properties | V 205 Causation/Causality/Lewis: e.g. Suppose we had two processes - whether causally linked or not - in two separate spatio-temporal regions, and we do disregard their surroundings. Suppose the laws of nature were the same. Question: Can it be that we have a causal process in one region, but not in the other one? It does not seem so. >Intrinsicness, >Extrinsicness. Causality seems to be an intrinsic characteristic of the process itself and of the relevant laws of nature. LewisVs Intrinsic: Intuitions regarding intrinsic theories should be viewed with a wary eye. They disagree too often with well-validated philosophical theories. Still, there are certain assumptions which bode well for them. intrinsic/causal/Gedankenexperiment/Lewis: Suppose a process in one region maybe does not show his pattern of dependence. But suppose in its intrinsic character the process is like processes in other regions in which the majority of processes really have this pattern. I.e. the intrinsic character of the given process is right, and the laws are right for the actual pattern of dependence - if only the surroundings differ from each other, and are also different in many other ways. Lewis: old: According to my old analysis the process is nevertheless not causal; because of its bad surroundings the process is only an imitation of a true causal process in another place. And this is contrary to our initial assumption. Solution: expanded analysis, "quasi-dependence": Def "Quasi-Dependece"/Expanded Analysis/Lewis: new: Suppose c and e are the first and last event in a process as described above. We then say that e is quasi-dependent on c because the process has the same intrinsic character as processes in other regions where the majority of the processes really show this pattern. We can count this as a sort of causation, derived from counterfactual dependence, even if there is no dependence between both events. [Wir müssen wie oben einen Vorgänger annehmen, damit die Verursachung transitiv wird.] Then mixed causal chains/series with quasi-dependence can exist. New definition of def causal chain: A chain of two or more events with either dependence or quasi-dependence. This solves the problem of a later prevention in daily situations (which gives me headaches) as well as in far-fetched ones. Late Prevention/Causality/Lewis: Problem: We seem to have a causal process which begins with a preventing cause and ends with an effect. But this process nevertheless does not show the actual pattern of counterfactual dependence, not even slightly. Dependence can be seen in states, but we cannot make them to a chain/constitute them to a series. Something external is disrupting them: prevented alternatives! Without them all would be well: We would maintain the laws constant, but change the surroundings, and would have dependence according to the old analysis. But we now need quasi-dependence as a solution. Footnote: John Etchemendy: The predecessor relation must not be omitted. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Kant | Heidegger Vs Kant | Derrida I 47 HeideggerVsKant: the "I think that must be able to accompany all my ideas" this highest principle is metaphysical. - At the same time Kant is, for Heidegger, the "first and only" who thought the temporality of categories, since they have to be applicable to intuitions. Categories / Kant/Heidegger: makes clear, that Kant already thought the categories and their unit not as eternal and immutable principles, but as variable in time and through time! II 87 VsKant: defines the being under the spell of being imagined. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A. | V 251/252 Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description. Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent). What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world). You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event. 1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r". 2. partly by cause or effect 3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check 4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above). 5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later 6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted. 7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls. 8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army. V 253 Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke): Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth. Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement. Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow. Schwarz I 55 Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it? Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa: Schwarz I 56 For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay. Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968(1),28f): this is the solution for Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967(2)): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world. Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e(3),246) I 57 KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(4): 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d(5),42). The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions. Schwarz I 223 Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980(4), Putnam 1975(6)): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily. Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b(7),59,1994b(8),313,1997(9)c,353f,Fn22). ((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless. Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980(4),88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light. If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out. This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world. I 224 Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c(12),87,1984b(8),59,1997c(9),356f) I 225 A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H2O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties. A posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation, Schwarz I 226 which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. A posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b(8),296f,2002b(10), Jackson 1998a(11): 56 86), see above 8.2) 1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. 2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193 7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342 10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Rorty Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 318 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if we confuse the concept of "really talk about" with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arises. The only question of fact that exists here, concerns the existence or non-existence of certain entities, which are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies was made. Reference is a technical term and therefore we have no intuitions about it at all! Real existential issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! It is not only possible to talk about non-existent entities, but also to find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same. >Reference. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Perry Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 170 Mental Content/Content/View/PerryVsLewis/Schwarz: some authors want to keep perspective out of the content (Perry 1977)(1): Thesis: locate perspective differences in the way of givenness: E.g. Fred in Kuala Lumpur, I in Berlin: our content is the same: that it rains on 12 August 2005 in Berlin, but the content is given differently which explains the different behavioral consequences. Def Givenness/Perry/Black: is the function that assigns to every situation the class of worlds in which it is rains at the place and time of the situation. LewisVsPerry: it makes no difference (1989b(2), 74, Fn 9). Content is simply the class of situations to which a true proposition is assigned. Perspective/Lewis: on the other hand, it is not possible to reconstruct the perspective proposition from Lewis' content. Perry: thus has an additional content component. Lewis: which is not needed with him. Perspective/Uncentered World/Perry/Schwarz: Perry has other tasks in mind: the uncentered content component should help with the semantics of beliefs and explain why Fred and I intuitively believe the same thing. LewisVsPerry: doubts that this is possible: semantics: when it comes to our intuitions about "meaning the same thing", they are more vague and complicated. E.g. there is a good sense in which Fred and I mean the same thing, if he believes that it rains where he is! E.g. "I wish it would rain" - "I wish the same thing." For this classes of possible situations are sufficient. 1. John Perry [1977]: “Frege on Demonstratives”. Philosophical Review, 86: 474–497 2. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. Stalnaker I 255 Def Belief/Conviction/Self//Stalnaker: having a conviction with a given property means to attribute this property to yourself. Belief/Lewis: (not based on the self): believe that φ (φ being a proposition) = attributing the property of living in a possible world φ to yourself. Self/Semantic Diagnostic/PerryVsLewis/Stalnaker: provides no content of a self-attribution, but distinguishes belief content from belief state. Relativized Proposition/Perry: classify believers: we have the same belief state in common if we both have the belief, e.g. "I am a philosopher." That corresponds set-centered possible worlds. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Materialism | Papineau Vs Materialism | David Papineau Literature II 309 Def Antipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: from the fact that we do not have the experiences we erroneously conclude that we could not refer to them either. Confusion of mention and use: we slide from a) to b) a) Third person thoughts do not use conscious experiences b) Third person thoughts do not mention conscious experiences. However, there is no reason why a third person could not relate (mention) thoughts to the experiences of others, but without using them. (Mention = Reference) II 310 Antipathetic False Conclusion/Papineau: What should he explain? He should explain why so many people have such strong intuitions according to which conscious states are not physical. (VsMaterialism, VsPhysicalism, Papineau pro.). II 312 PapineauVsAntipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: error that the experience is something additional to the brain state. (Category error, e.g. as if the university was something additional to the sum of its parts). Papineau: there is nothing to explain. I am not denying consciousness, but that there are additional inner lights. (McGinn uses this metaphor.) |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Menzinger, P. | Lewis Vs Menzinger, P. | Schwarz I 229 Canberra Plan/Cause/Reduction/Peter Menzies: (1989)(1): Cause could be identified with the relation that best suits our intuitions about it. Cause/LewisVsMenzies: is not a relation! A relation needs related things, not causation! (2004a(2),2004d(3)). For example, there is nothing that "the absence of oxygen" refers to, yet it is the cause of suffocation. Solution: counterfactual conditionals, counterfactual facts, without "causation" as referent; "he would not have drowned if oxygen had been present. >Causation/Lewis, >Causes/Lewis, >Causality/Lewis. 1. Peter Menzies [1989]: “Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes”. Philosophy of Science, 56: 642–663 2. David Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107 3. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Montague, R. | Wiggins Vs Montague, R. | II 312 Modal Logic/Lemmon: System S0.5 (1959)(1): excludes: necessarily ((necessarily p) > p). Thus it does not have the self enclosing properties of stronger systems. Used by Montague. WigginsVsMontague: he also ignores the real possibility that modal logic might end up being forced to recognize a hierarchy of languages to avoid paradoxes. Meta Language/Wiggins: our intuitions about "necessary" are beyond the boundary of what marks Lemmon's system S0.5. And this is also the reason why I still have to be discouraged from reading "necessary" in a meta-linguistic way de dicto, namely as a predicate of sentences that has a broader meaning than provable. 1. J. Lemmon, "Is there only one correct system of modal logic"Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. xxxiii (1959), 31 |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Mysticism | Lewis Vs Mysticism | V 169 Causal Dependency/cauD/Lewis: is simply not the same as causation. But causation without causal dependency is rare. >Causal dependenc/Lewis, >causation/Lewis. LewisVsMysticism: if there were inexplicable causal dependencies, we wouldn't (understandably) know anything about it. (If we weren't aware of it). LewisVsRegularity: a fixed regularity theory would rule out inexplicable causal dependencies, and I want to avoid that. V 182 The hidden quality must therefore be something else: it does not supervise on those qualities of the possible worlds on which as far as we see everything else supervenes. Accepting something so mystical is a serious matter. We need better reasons than isolated intuitions. (LewisVsMysticism). Some people have important reasons... |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Ordinary Language | Fodor Vs Ordinary Language | II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: this forces the philosopher of everyday language to seek ever more refuge in intuition. II 124 In particular, he will claim to intuitively recognize anomalies and say that a philosophical problem is solved when anomalies are recognized. (Cavell claims that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he means that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words incorrectly and at the same time he means that with the help of intuitions he can decide when a word is used incorrectly. While it may be intuitively clear when a word is anomalous, for philosophical purposes it is not enough to know that it is anomalous, it can be anomalous for many reasons, some of which are not flawed! For example, if the metaphysician is accused of misusing language, he will rightly answer: "So what?". Moreover, we cannot expect a theory of meaning to evaluate every utterance that an untrained theoretical speaker calls anomalous in the same way by the theory. II 125 Rather, the theory should only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about anomalies cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory at all, only overstrained intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: this misses the point: specifying the relevant similarity just means determining exactly the generation rules. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ordinary Language | Positivism Vs Ordinary Language | Fodor II 118 PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties. II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions. II 124 In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused. Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty! E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?" Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory. II 125 The theory should rather only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules. III 222 Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements) Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations. Type III Statement: Generalizations. Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world). Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language). Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act. Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 223 Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 |
| Parsons, Ter. | Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 37 Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically). Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid? Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. I 38 Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi). N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history). ((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.) Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic. Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. I 41 Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another. World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds. Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical? I 42 Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example: (1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that (2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x. And therefore (3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll. (2) and (3) say the same thing as (4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was. But this is not entailed by (1). Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects. The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness. However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons. Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x". Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails. |
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| Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Esfeld I 62 FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both. Fodor II 114 Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar. Fodor/Lepore IV 54 Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely: IV 52 Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.). IV 76/77 Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note IV 237 13> IV 157 o Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!. IV 218 Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Representation | Davidson Vs Representation | I (e) 93ff Scheme/Content: came into play as a pair (C.I.Lewis) Now we can let them get out as a pair as well. Then no objects are left behind in terms of which the question of representation could be raised! Beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing! With that we are also getting rid of the correspondence theory of truth. It is faith in it which gives rise to relativistic thoughts. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something may be a map of Mexico, but only with respect to the Mercator projection or a different projection. Bubner: "Language is not an instrumental sign system whose object reference is yet under discussion,... language has inherently no other function than making the world accessible". Glüer II 126 Davidson: There are no facts! (as Frege: all true sentences have the same meaning: compliance with all the facts of the world). ("Big Fact"). Davidson: There are no representations that could be t/f - beliefs are true if they are caused correctly. II 127 A true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world. Horwich I 454 Dualism/Scheme/Content/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the main criticism is the dualism of scheme and content. Dualism: that of scheme and content has the following possible forms, with the sides not being causally linked: "Tertia": like E.g. "conceptual framework" E.g. "intended interpretation": they are not causally connected with the things they organize or intend. They vary independently from the rest of the universe, just like the relations of the skepticist, the "correspondence" or "representation". Horwich I 454/455 Representation/DavidsonVsRepresentation/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: if we do not have "Tertia" such as "intended interpretation" or "conceptual framework", we have no concepts that could serve as representations and then we also do not need to ask whether they represent the world properly. Important argument: we still have beliefs, but they are now viewed from outside, just as by field linguists. Without the "Tertia" we have no "third way" anymore to see things differently. Language/Davidson/Rorty: then we see language just as we see beliefs: not as a "conceptual frame", but rather as causal interaction with the surroundings described by the field linguists. Then you can no longer ask if the language "does or does not fit" the world. At the same time you cannot formulate skepticism any longer. Scepticism cannot express itself. ((s)> Nagel: ditto, but other reasons). Tertium/Tertia/Davidson/Rorty: therefore will not be relevant for truth claims. And the fact that there is none will not be a result of an empirical study nor an "analysis of meaning". Correspondence/Rorty: the fact that it is delivered by coherence, according to Davidson, then comes down to the fact that from the perspective of the field linguists nothing is needed but word meaning and the world. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 194 DavidsonVsRepresentation/Rorty: encourages us to cultivate our "realistic intuitions" (Crispin Wright). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Russell, B. | Donnellan Vs Russell, B. | I 18/19 DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two. Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H. I 193 DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction). I 194 Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use. I 205 Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use. I 275 Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions. I 275/276 Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK). I 281 Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?. I 283 Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!. It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not. I 285/286 DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems". I 209 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end. I 222 Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband. I 232 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?. I 234 E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda. I 235 These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. Newen/Schrenk I 95 Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did..."). |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Supervenience | Stalnaker Vs Supervenience | I 93 Def Global Supervenience/Stalnaker: new: A supervenes globally on B iff for every two possible worlds (poss.w.) that are B-indistinguishable are relative to a mapping function from one poss.w. to the other, they are A-indistinguishable relative to the same mapping function. Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: is sometimes used to make a stronger statement than possible with global supervenience. E.g. a materialist who is also an internalist regarding intentional or experiential properties. He argues that intentional or experiential properties are supervenient on intrinsic physical properties VsGlobal supervenience: would not be sufficient: because it would be so compatible that the mental properties of an individual vary with the intrinsic physical properties of another individual. But: while a) the strong supervenience thesis is not generally equivalent to the global between A and B, it is b) in the case of a set A and another set B' in a specific closure (closure) on the set of the B properties. B’/closure: the set of B properties: the set of properties that can be defined from B properties with quantifiers, identity and finite and infinite Boolean combination. B’/Stalnaker: properties defined in physical terms (instead of B: physical properties). Global supervenience/Stalnaker: so is ultimately very strong: Kim has shown that if A strongly supervenes on B, then each A property is necessary equivalent for a property that is defined in concepts of B properties. Conclusion: it is also true that if A globally supervenes on B, then each A property is necessary equivalent to a property, I 94 that is defined in concepts of B properties. Necessary equivalence/identity/Stalnaker: if necessary equivalence is sufficient for identity, we can say that if A globally supervenes on B, all A properties are properties that can be defined in concepts of B properties. Necessity/Stalnaker: which of course is to maintained only with an extremely strong necessity concept. Global supervenience/identity/properties/supervenience/Stalnaker: whatever they say about the identity of properties, seems to show this equivalence that globally supervenience is suitable for most supervenience theses. Materialism/Stalnaker: it cannot assert anything stronger than global supervenience, E.g. suppose a philosopher represents the global supervenience but denies at the same time the strong one. Then he has to assume that the set of physical properties is not closed under definability. ((s) that means that you can define from physical concepts also nonphysical ones). 1. perhaps because he thinks that physical properties are not defined themselves in concepts of physical properties, or 2. because he has a robust concept of properties, after some well-defined attributes (Def attribute/Stalnaker: here: neutral to single out individuals) absolutely no properties - physical or not - correspond.) Ad 1. because he rejects the strong supervenience both for A (mental) on B (physical properties) as well as A on B' (properties definable in physical concepts) he can still assume all the properties as defined in physical concepts. Then the rejection of strong supervenience is more terminological than substantial, because it is not based on a thesis about what exists or is instantiated, but only whether to categorize certain properties or not whose physical definitions are unquestionable. Ad 2. it is more difficult here: here we need to know more about the robust theory of properties. The representative probably believes that mental properties are real properties and because she accepts the global supervenience of the mental on the physical she acknowledges that for every mental property there is a physical attribute (to single out) that is necessary and sufficient for her. She will probably think that these new nonphysical properties emerge from physical non-properties. Physical non-properties/Stalnaker: complex combinations of physical properties and relations (see below example golden mountain). Dualism/Stalnaker: she is maybe a dualist but regardless of her rejection of the strong supervenience: even if she allowed that complex physical attributes are physical properties (so that the strong supervenience were true) she might still say that mental properties are separated, I 95 they only needed to be always co-instantiated. Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: allows that complex (composite) physical attributes are physical properties. Emergence: would say that the new properties emerge from the fact that the complex are realized. Dualism: this dualism does not arise from the rejection of strong supervenience but from the rejection of the reductionist conception of supervenience. Materialism/Global supervenience/Kim/KimVsGlobal supervenience/Stalnaker: Kim has to accept another reason that global supervenience is not strong enough for materialism: Problem: global supervenience is compatible with the fact that the great and serious mental differences depend on quite trivial and irrelevant physical differences. Kim: e.g. a hydrogen atom in outer space which is changed in its position: a world that is different in this point from the real, actual world could be so different in mental terms, as you like! And without violating the globally supervenience thesis. KimVsGlobal supervenience: therefore it is too weak. Reason/intuition/Stalnaker: a "reasonable materialist" would not represent that mental properties depend on distant hydrogen atoms. He is not reasonable because of the choice of strong or global supervenience but because of his intuitions. Global supervenience/Stalnaker: I believe that it is strong enough for the materialism. But we should still look for a stronger. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Tarski, A. | Field Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 68 T-Def/FieldVsTarski: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions. (Field 1972). Semantic concepts and especially the W concept should be traceable to physical or logical-mathematical concepts. Tarski/Brendel: advocates for a metalinguistic definition himself that is based only on logical terms, no axiomatic characterization of "truth". (Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics"). Bre I 69 FieldVsTarski: E.g. designation: Def Designation/Field: Saying that the name N denotes an object a is the same thing as stipulating that either a is France and N is "France" or a is Germany and N is "Germany"... etc. Problem: here only an extensional equivalence is given, no explanation of what designation (or satisfiability) is. Bre I 70 Explanation/FieldVsTarski/Field: should indicate because of which properties a name refers to a subject. Therefore, Tarski’s theory of truth is not physicalistic. T-Def/FieldVsTarski/Field/Brendel: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions - extensional equivalence is no explanation of what designation or satisfiability is. Field I 33 Implication/Field: is also in simpler contexts sensibly a primitive basic concept: E.g. Someone asserts the two sentences. a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities such as quantities. That does not look as contradictory as Fie I 34 John is a bachelor/John is married FieldVsTarski: according to him, a) and b) together would be a contradiction, because he defines implication with quantities. Tarski does not give the normal meaning of those terms. VsField: you could say, however, that the Tarskian concepts give similar access as the definition of "light is electromagnetic radiation". FieldVsVs: but for implication we do not need such a theoretical approach. This is because it is a logical concept like negation and conjunction. Field II 141 T-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate probability theory if we just take all instances of the schema as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations that we need, for example, so that the modus ponens receives the truth. FieldVsTarski: see above Section 3. 1. Here I showed a solution, but should have explained more. Feferman/Field: Solution: (Feferman 1991) incorporates schema letters together with a rule for substitution. Then the domain expands automatically as the language expands. Feferman: needs this for number theory and set theory. Problem: expanding it to the T-theory, because here we need scheme letters inside and outside of quotation marks. Field: my solution was to introduce an additional rule that allows to go from a scheme with all the letters in quotation marks to a generalization for all sentences. Problem: we also need that for the syntax,... here, an interlinking functor is introduced in (TF) and (TFG). (see above). II 142 TarskiVsField: his variant, however, is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Approach with scheme letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1) We have the same advantage as Feferman for the schematic number theory and the schematic set theory: expansions of the language are automatically considered. 2) the use of ""p" is true iff. p" (now as a scheme formula as part of the language rather than as an axiom) seems to grasp the concept of truth better. 3) (most important) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of language. While this is important, it is also not ignored by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to come by for belief sentences. Putnam I 91 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsTarski: Tarski’s theory is not suited for the reconstruction of the correspondence theory, because fulfillment (of simple predicates of language) is explained through a list. This list has the form "Electron" refers to electrons "DNS" refers to DNS "Gene" refers to genes. etc. this is similar to (w) "Snow is white" is true iff.... (s)> meaning postulates) Putnam: this similarity is no coincidence, because: Def "True"/Tarski/Putnam: "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment (i.e. a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence fulfills it). Def Zero Sequence: converges to 0: E.g. 1; 1/4; 1/9; 1/16: ... Criterion W/Putnam: can be generalized to the criterion F as follows: (F for fulfillment): Def Criterion F/Putnam: (F) an adequate definition of fulfilled in S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1...xn) is fulfilled by the sequence y1...yn and only if P(y1...yn). Then we reformulate: "Electron (x)" is fulfilled by y1 iff. y1 is an electron. PutnamVsField: it would have been formulated like this in Tarskian from the start. But that shows that the list Field complained about is determined in its structure by criterion F. This as well as the criterion W are now determined by the formal properties we desired of the concepts of truth and reference, so we would even preserve the criterion F if we interpreted the connectives intuitionistically or quasi intuitionistically. Field’s objection fails. It is right for the realist to define "true" à la Tarski. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Tooley, M. | Lewis Vs Tooley, M. | Schwarz I 119 Natural Laws/Law of Nature/Reductionism/LewisVsTooley: this is the price for anti-reductionist intuitions: it sounds nice and good that laws of nature do not supervene on local events, that our concepts of counterfactual truths and causality cannot be reduced to something outside. (Tooley 1987(1), 2003(2)). Problem: the most obvious features of laws of nature become incomprehensible! Lewis: (as a reductionist) can explain why one can empirically discover the laws of nature, why physics is on the way to it, why it is useful to know the laws of nature, and why all Fs are Gs, if "all Fs are Gs" is a law of nature. As an anti-reductionist, one just has to acknowledge all this with humility. Lewis: the assumption of a primitive modal fact which ensures that in every possible world in nature (F,G) exists, also all Fs are Gs, is obscure and almost pointless: if there is no possible world in which nature (F,G) exists, but some Fs are not G, then this must have an explanation, then the idea of such worlds must be somewhat incoherent. Possible worlds cannot simply be missing. Laws of nature/LewisVsArmstrong: perhaps better: regularities that are additionally blessed by a primitive relationship between universals, a relationship that also exists in possible worlds where the law of nature does not apply. That's even more obscure, but then it's at least no wonder that all Fs are Gs if a law of nature demands it. 1. Michael Tooley [1987]: Causation: A Realist Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Michael Tooley [2003]: “Causation and Supervenience”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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| Epiphenomenon Epiphenomenalism | Versus | Schiffer I 152 MaterialismVsEpiphenomenalism / materialismVsBelief Properties: (Jackson 1982, 135): b.p. (as epiphenomena) do not explain anything they just soothe the intuitions of dualists, it s a mystery how they should fit into science - epiphenomenalism : argues only to ensure that qualia are epiphenomena. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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| Inference | Evans, G. | EMD II 208 Summary: we followed Davidson, and took the way as a truth theory the inferences of P and Q on P as a model of the way in which a meaning theory shows inferences as valid. EMD II 209 But the model with "big" disproved our intuitions. It is possible that the model is wrong. Thesis: Perhaps there is a concept of structurally valid inferences that does not (!) include inferences with logical constants (sic!) and therefore cannot be connected with the traditional concept of logical validity. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Prosentential Th. | Kamp/Grov/Beln | Field II 149 Prosentential Theory/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Field: (CGB 1975): in such cases, (with demonstratives, indices or unspeakable sentences) I can say instead: For example, "His utterance is true" to incorporate it into my language (indirectly). ((s) Different from "Everything he said"?). CGB: Thesis: This is the most important function of the truth predicate. ((s) The truth-predicate serves the generalization). FieldVsCGB: the most important is the disquotational function. Horwich I 315 Prosentential Theory/CGBVsTradition: is an alternative to the conventional analysis of "x is true" as a grammatical subject-predicate form. Subject: "X" , predicate "is true". CGB: this grammatical analysis is sometimes misleading, sometimes it limits our philosophical intuitions. Our approach eliminates some, if not all, problems. I 324 Pro sentence/CGB: Thesis: normal English (everyday language) has pro sentences! But not atomic ones. We start with atomic pro sentences here (i.e. "true" cannot be extracted from "is true", and there is no modification of the times). Example "It is true", example "This is true". I 324 Prosentential Theory/CGB: Thesis: We want to say in the spirit of Ramsey that all talk about truth can be understood to involve only the prosentential use of "This is true". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning Theory | Loar, B. | Avramides I 29 Group: Loar/Meaning Theory: close to Lewis, VsMcDowll, VsWiggins, thesis: semantics and pragmatics are not separate - (not even with Grice) - Wiggins/McDowell: separation Theory of Sense/of Power - Loar: ultimately psychological and thus reductionist. I 31 Meaning Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Loar: thesis the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa. I 32 Loar: thinks that if we do not take the psychological concepts as fundamental, they will be forgotten. Avramides: that does not have to be. Thesis: with the reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional (the recognition of the place of the concept in the conceptual system, not reductive) in "Grice" analysis, we can just as well bring the philosophy of language into the realm of the philosophy of mind, whereby the analysis of meaning remains partially autonomous, but under the umbrella of intentional action. Not all questions of public language have to do with the philosophy of mind. EMD II 138 Meaning/Loar: Thesis: semantic concepts are localized within a larger framework of propositional attitudes, and therefore I make substantial use of intentional entities. But nowadays it is common to think that a purely extensional meaning theory is possible. We owe this largely to Davidson. Davidson/Loar: seems to make a compromise to join Quine's attack against intentions without abandoning all our intuitions about certain semantic facts. LoarVsExtensionality: Z meaning theory without intention is like Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. EMD II 146 Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the clauses (constituents) are a certain function of the propositional attitudes of the speaker. Question: Should propositional attitudes then not best be described as relations to sentences or other linguistic entities? But that would be a circle. EMD II 149 Loar thesis: What I want to show is that the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa! II 148 ... KripkeVsVs: E.g. Measuring: one object refers to another, the default, but if it didn't exist, the object would still have had a length - LoarVs: but that doesn't work for the meaning theory - thesis: therefore you have to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Identity Theory | Papineau, D. | Metzinger II 305 Papineau: per Identity Theory. My goal is to explain away the intuitions VsIdentity Theory. II 310 Identity / explanation / Papineau: identity need not be explained! Identities are no answers to why-questions. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Continuant | Stalnaker, R. | I 137 Endurantism/Four Dimensional/Four Dimensionalism/Continuant/Stalnaker: some authors: Thesis: continuants have no temporal parts like events. I.e. they are present in every moment with all their (only spatial) parts. Nevertheless, they exist in time. LewisVsEndurantism: (Lewis 1986a, 203) this view uses the terms "part" and "whole" in a very limited sense. StalnakerVsLewis: that cannot be quite so, because the representatives admit that some things like football matches, wars, centuries have quite temporal parts. Endurantism/Stalnaker: even if the whole thing is an unclear doctrine, some intuitions speak for it. I will neither defend it nor fight it. |
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