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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior | Morozov | Morozov I 214 Behavior/Social Networks/Technology/Digitalization/Politics/Economy/Kelly/Morozov: Kelly's thesis: Only by listening to the history of technology (...) we can hope to solve our personal puzzles.(1) Kelly: we can modify our legal and economic expectations by adapting them to the (...) technological development lines.(2) >Technology, >Technocracy, >Progress. I 215 MorozovVsKelly: Why should we change our economic and political assumptions if we could change those lines of development instead? Why change our notions of privacy if we could change Facebook and Google instead? Why should we accept predictive policing measures instead of restricting them to areas where they do not undermine contradiction and reason? And to what extent should we change our expectations? KellyVsMorozov: instead, he thinks you should try every idea immediately. And continue as long as this idea exists.(3) I 216 Behavior/KellyVsAmish/Kelly/Morozov: Kelly accuses the Amish of denying opportunities not only to their own people, but to all people. (4) MorozovVsKelly: It never dawned on Kelly that political communities may be entitled to determine their own lives, and that restrictions as far as they have been democratically created - as is not always the case with the Amish - could also be good for humanity. Kelly's all about the means. >Democracy, >Community, >Politics, >Power, >Society, >Freedom, >Purpose/means rationality. 1. Kevin Kelly, What Technology Wants, Kindle ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), p. 6 2. ibid. p. 174 3. ibid., p.252. 4. ibid. p. 237. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Morality | Aristotle | Gadamer I 322 Morality/Aristotle/Gadamer: The task of the moral decision is (...) to make the right decision in the concrete situation (...) , i.e. to look into the situation concretely and to take action in it. The [morally acting] person must therefore also take hold and choose the right means, and his or her action must be guided in the same way as that of the craftsman. Why is it, however, a knowledge of a different kind? One learns a "techne" - and can also unlearn it. But one does not learn moral knowledge and cannot unlearn it. One does not face it in such a way that one can or cannot acquire it, just as one can or cannot choose an objective skill, a techne. Rather, one is always already in the situation of the one who is to act (...). Application: This is precisely why the concept of application is highly problematic. Because you can only apply something that you already have for yourself. But one does not possess moral knowledge for oneself in such a way that one already has it and then applies it to concrete situations. Conception: The image that the human has of what he or she is supposed to be, for example his or her concepts of right and wrong, of decency, courage, dignity, solidarity, etc. (all concepts that have their equivalent in the Aristotelian catalogue of virtues), are in a certain sense the models the person is looking at. But there is a fundamental difference between them and the model, which is, for example, the plan of an object to be produced for the craftsman. Model/Eidos/Aristotle: the "Eidos" of what a Gadamer I 323 craftsperson wants to make, is [on the other hand] fully determined by the use for which it is intended. Rightness: (...) what is right also seems to be determined in a bad sense. (...) [It] is formulated in the laws and also contained in the general rules of conduct of the morality (...). Why is what Aristotle calls the judicial form of Phronesis (dikastike ohronesis) not a techne?(1) >Phronesis/Aristotle. Application/Laws: [The user of laws] will have to let go of the strictness of the law in the concrete situation. But if he does so, it is not because it does not work out better, but because it would not be right otherwise. By slackening the law, he does not make concessions to the law, but on the contrary he or she finds the better law. Aristotle gives the most definite expression to this in his analysis: "Epieikeia"(2) is correction of the law;(3) Aristotle shows that all law is in a necessary tension to the concretion of action, provided that it is general and therefore cannot contain practical reality in its full concretion. Gadamer I 326 Purpose/means/ends: A fundamental modification of the conceptual relationship between means and ends is shown, by which moral knowledge differs from technical knowledge. It is not only that moral knowledge does not have a merely particular purpose, but that it concerns right living as a whole - whereas, of course, all technical knowledge is particular and serves particular purposes. It is also not only the case that moral knowledge must occur wherever technical knowledge would be desirable but is not available. Moral knowledge cannot, in principle, have the precedence of teachable knowledge. The relationship between means and ends is not such that knowledge of the right means could be made available in advance, and this is because knowledge of the right purpose is not merely the object of knowledge either. There is no prior determination of what the right life as a whole is aimed at. The Aristotelian provisions of the Phronesis therefore show a significant fluctuation, provided that this knowledge soon becomes more the purpose, soon to be assigned more to the means to the end.(4) >Action/Aristotle. Gadamer I 328 Moral knowledge is really a knowledge of its own kind. It embraces means and ends in a peculiar way and is thus different from technical knowledge. For this very reason there is no point in distinguishing here between knowledge and experience, as is the case with "techne". For moral knowledge itself contains a kind of experience in itself (...). Understanding/understand: Understanding is introduced as a modification of the virtue of moral knowledge, except when it concerns myself, who must act. Then "synesis" clearly means the ability of moral judgment. 1. Eth. Nic. Z 8. 2. Eth. Nic. E 14 3. Lex superior preferenda est inferiori (writes Melanchthon explaining the ratio of the Epieikeia. (The oldest version of Melanchthon's Ethics, ed. by H. Heineck (Berlin 1893 p. 29.). 4. Aristotle generally emphasizes that the phronesis is concerned with the means (ta pros to telos) and not with the telos. It is probably the contrast to the Platonic doctrine of the idea of the good that makes him emphasize this in this way. But that the phronesis is not a mere property of the right choice of means, but itself a moral hexis, which sees the telos with which the actor is directed by his or her moral being, is clearly evident from its systematic place within Aristotelian ethics. Cf. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 b33; 1140 b 13; 1141 b 15. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Purposes | Aristotle | Gadamer I 326 Purpose/Means/Aristotle/Gadamer: ((s) This is only about the purpose-means relationship within the discussion about moral knowledge). A fundamental modification of the conceptual relationship between means and purpose is shown, by which moral knowledge differs from technical knowledge. It is not only that moral knowledge does not have a merely particular purpose, but that it concerns right living as a whole - whereas, of course, all technical knowledge is particular and serves particular purposes. It is also not only that moral knowledge must occur wherever technical knowledge would be desirable but is not available. Moral knowledge cannot, in principle, have the precedence of teachable knowledge. The relationship between means and purpose is not such that knowledge of the right means could be made available in advance, and this is because knowledge of the right purpose is not merely the object of knowledge either. There is no prior determination of what the right life as a whole is aimed at. For this reason the Aristotelian provisions of the phronesis show a significant fluctuation, as long as this knowledge soon becomes more assigned to the purpose, soon more to the means to the end.(1) >Morality/Aristotle, >Techne/Aristotle, >Self-Knowledge/Aristotle, >Morality/Aristotle, 1. Aristotle generally emphasises that the phronesis is concerned with the means (ta pros to telos) and not with the telos. It is probably the contrast to the Platonic doctrine of the idea of good that makes him emphasize this so. But that the phronesis is not a mere property of the right choice of means, but itself a moral hexis, which sees the telos with which the actor is directed by his moral being, is clearly evident from its systematic place within Aristotelian ethics. Cf. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 b33; 1140 b 13; 1141 b 15. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Purposes | Minsky | I 142 Purpose/means and ends/rationality/brain/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: How do we connect the things we have with the goals we want to achieve? The answer: We have many ways! Each use or purpose may suggest some corresponding way to split things up — and in each such view there will seem to be some most essential parts. These are the ones that, in such a view, appear to serve the goal directly; the rest will seem like secondary parts that only support the role of the main parts. >Description/Minsky. Even when we simply put something on a table, we're likely to employ several such descriptions at the same time — perhaps in different sections of the mind. The quality of our understanding depends upon how well we move between those different realms. In order to translate easily from one of them to another, we must discover systematic cross-realm correspondences. However, finding these is rare. Usually, the situation is like that we found for chairs and games: each description-element in one world corresponds to a hard-to- describe accumulation of structures in the other world. What is remarkable about the body-support concept is how often it leads to systematic cross-realm correspondences. >Creativity/Minsky. Our systematic cross-realm translations are the roots of fruitful metaphors; they enable us to understand things we've never seen before. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Purposes | Papineau | I 246 Purpose/means/thinking/animal/evolution/Fodor/Papineau: newer direction: Fodor: the adoption of purpose-built modules selected for certain tasks. >J. Fodor, >Language of thought. Problem: this bypasses the actual thinking, especially the consideration of the means. >Thinking, >Animal language. Papineau: nevertheless, pro module. But as a later addition in evolution, for the coordination of perception and action. I 247 Purpose-Means-Thinking: is a very special mechanism, not a "universal pocket knife". >Rationality/Papineau. I 254 Thinking/Knowledge/Animal/Papineau: Levels: Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": do V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). Level 0 - 4 apply to simple living beings. Nowhere is general information of the form "all A's or B's" or generic, causal information "A's cause B's". I 255 Or even conditionals about present circumstances, "If A occurs, B will also occur." I 259 Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-means-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ... of our evolutionary heritage. Then the purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. I 276 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: must also use non-egocentric causal facts. (> Map, Map-Example). I 273 Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps! >Map-example. For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would be no purpose-means-thinking. For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then plan on taking the path. This would be a combination of causal individual information. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Rationality | Papineau | I 246 Purpose/means/thinking/animal/evolution/Fodor/Papineau: newer direction: Fodor: the adoption of purpose-built modules selected for certain tasks. Problem: this bypasses the actual thinking, especially the consideration of the means. Papineau: nevertheless, per modules, Papineau per Fodor. >J. Fodor, >Language of thought. But as a later addition in evolution, for the coordination of perception and action. I 247 Purpose-Means-Thinking: is a very special mechanism, not a "universal pocket knife". Purpose-Means-thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": do V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V I 250 Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need. A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). >Purposes/Papineau, >Learning, >Learning/Papineau. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Rationality | Rawls | I 143 Rationality/Rawls: our view here is broadly in line with the standard model in social theory.(1)(2) The rational person/Rawls: be a person with a coherent set of preferences between options open to him/her. The person assesses the options with a view to his/her purposes. The person follows the plan that fulfils most of his/her wishes and has the better chances of success. >Goals, >Purposes, >Purpose/means rationality. Rawls: in addition, I rule out resentment. I 145 Initial state of a society to be established/Rawls: here we must assume that the persons involved have a sense of justice and the compliance of their principles and can expect this from others. They will know that agreements are not in vain. >Society/Rawls, >Veil of ignorance. I 418 Rationality/Rawls: the duration of a rational consideration must be taken into account, so that it becomes irrational at some point to look for the best plan. >Planning/Rawls. It is rational to follow a satisfactory plan if the expected results of further consideration do not compensate for the disadvantages of the loss of time. This assumes that a person has a certain decision-making competence with regard to his or her own situation when making rational decisions. I 422 The guiding principle for a rational individual in the pursuit of his or her plans should be that he or she will never have to blame himself or herself for the way in which these plans are ultimately realized. As an identical individual in time, it must be able to say that it has done in every moment what requires or at least allowed a weighing of the reasons.(3)(4) >Personal identity, >Responsibility. 1. Cf. Amartya Sen, Cellective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, 1970. 2. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963. 3. See Charles Fried, Anatomy of Values, (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 158-169. 4. Th. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford, 1970), esp. ch. VIII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
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