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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Extensionality | Simons | Chisholm II 185 Extensionality/Quine: we assume space time points instead of "durable goods". SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) cannot be learned. Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects. >Entia Sukzessiva. SimonsVsChisholm: it is better to accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter. This is more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. --- Simons I 3 Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place. Then we are dealing with continuants. Continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event is a continuant (see below) or everything that can have mass. >Continuants, >Parts. I 11 Extensional Mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: a characteristic property of extensional mereology is the relationship "part-of-or-identical-with". This corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship. Overlapping: overlapping can be used as the only fundamental concept. Limiting case: separateness and identity. I 105f Part/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: 1. A whole is sometimes not one of its own parts. 2. Sometimes it is not transitive. 3. The existence of "sum-individuals" is not always guaranteed. That means, that the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong. 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. I 106 5. Provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects. Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". I 117 Extensionality/Simons: extensionality is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle: I 28 Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y. Solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat). >Tibbles-expample. Simons: the coincidence of individuals is temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually). >Superposition: superposition means being at the same time in the same place. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Flux | Simons | I 1 Flux/Chisholm/Simons: problem: people have different parts at different times. This contradicts extensionality: only things with identical parts are identical. >Extensionality, >Extension, >Process, >Change. I 2 Modality: problem: e.g. a human could have other parts, as he/she has at the moment and yet could be the same human. >Modalities. I 118 Flux/mereology: winning and losing parts of objects constitutes the flux. Stock: Cartwright/Chisholm/Heller/Henry/Thomson/Invagen: only objects with temporal parts exist ((s) so no continuants (e.g. humans) but only events (processes) exist). These may change. >Continuants, >Mereology. Problem: e.g. Tibblles is unequal Tib before the accident, but identical after the accident. Problem: because Tib before equals after the accident, it follows from the transitivity of identity that Tibblles before accident is the same as Tib before the accident. This is a contradiction. >Tibbles-example. Solution/Simons: a solution offers the superposition but never the Leibnizean identity, because they differ in characteristics. >Superposition, >Leibniz-Principle. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Simons | I 121 Four-Dimensionalism/flux/Simons (instead continuants): then Tib and Tibbles do not share all parts. But non-identity does not exclude mereological extensionality. >Mereology, >Extensionality, >Extensional mereology. I 122 Four-Dimensionalism/flux/Simons: e.g. "Tibbles at t": is an instantaneous three-dimensional phase or time-slice of the four-dimensional object Tibbles. >Tibbles-example. Predicates: predicates in four-dimensionalism are "eternal". The change is supported by the terms ((s) nouns). Then Tibbles equals a cat process. Then we cannot say Tib + Tail because this is different, although they have all parts in common. Then this is no longer extensionality. To save these, modality must be denied de re. Four-Dimensionalism pro extensionality, VsModality de re. "Time slice": a "time slice" is still a whole human. ((s) The "thinness" lies in the time period.) Quine: physical objects in four-dimensional space time are indistinguishable from processes. >Four-dimensionalism/Quine. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Identity | Wiggins | II 289f Identity/Wiggins: Problem: from (1)(x)(y)(x = y)> (Fx ↔ Fy)), (2)(x)(y)[(x = y)> (N(x = x) ↔ N (y = x))] and the superfluous (3)N(x = x) should follow: ( 4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)]. II 292 Problem: (4) does not work in opaque contexts e.g. to be taken for Jekyll and not immediately for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity. Identity/possible world/Kripke: E.g. Supposing Hesperus would not be Phosphorus. Okay, but Phosphorus is Phosphorus. And besides, Hesperus is Phosphorus. So if H would not be P, P would not be P. WigginsVsKripke: yes but certainly not if H would not be P? This does not work as easily as Kripke wants it to work. >Possible worlds, >Saul A. Kripke. --- Simons I 115 Identity/extensionality/Wiggins: E.g. Tibbles whole cat, consists of Tib(body) and tail (tail). >Tibbles-Example. N.B.: if no accident happens, one must still distinguish the whole (individual cat) from the sum (Tib + Tail). Although they consist of the same parts - Sum: can be split. Process: cannot be split. >Process. There is a difference in modality de re - despite coincidence as four-dimensional object. >Modalities, >de re, >Four-dimensionalism. Therefore QuineVsModality de re. Here sum and process differ, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects. >Mereological sum. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Modal Properties | Simons | I 111 Sum/mereology/Simons: assuming, we think of any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. Then there is the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. Def cumulative predicate: if a sum exists, then the predicate which applies to it also applies to the whole, too (whole unequal sum), e.g. mass terms can form any sums. Non-cumulative: e.g. "is a human being". The sum can occupy the same space-time as the corresponding individual, without being identical with it. I 113 Sum/mereology: a sum only exists because its parts exist. ((s) So holistically an individual who exists only exists because other individuals exist.) I 191 Tibbles/Wiggins: thesis: the cat Tibbles is not identical with the sum Tib + Tail. >Tibbles-example. Despite the permanent coincidence, because only Tibbles and not the sum has the modal property to continue to exist, if the tail gets lost. I 266 Sum/identity conditions/Simons: sums have no autonomous identity conditions. E.g. sum Tib + Tail is not identical with the cat Tibbles, although it never loses its tail. The modal property of the "could-get-lost" is critical. This is non-identity despite coincidence. I 291 Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happened to it ((s) its life story.) >Mereological sum. I 354 Sum/mereology/Simons: here the structure does not matter. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Proxy | Simons | I 191 Proxy/to stand for/vouch for/existence of/Chisholm/Simons: only mereologically constant objects can stand for others. >Mereology. Sum/Simons: without mereological constancy, there would be nothing to prevent sums from being variable. >Mereological sum. Total: a total has its parts necessarily - or any other sum, e.g. Tib + Tail but not Tibbles. >Tibbles-exaple, >Totality, >Wholes. Vs: sum of variable parts: e.g. the tail may again consist of different atoms. >Parts. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Sum, mereological | Simons | I 111 Sum/mereology/Simons: assuming we consider arbitrary portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums, then it is about the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. >Predicates, >Predication, >Mereology. Def cumulative predicate: if a sum exists, then the predicate that applies to it, also applies on the whole (whole unequal sum). E.g. mass terms can form any sums. Non-cumulative: e.g. "is a human". The sum can even occupy the same space-time as the corresponding individual, without being identical with it. >Individuals, >Spacetime. I 113 Sum/mereology: a sum only exists because its parts exist. I 266 Sum/identity conditions/Simons: sums have no autonomous identity conditions, e.g. the sum of Tib + Tail is not identical with the cat Tibbles, although it may never lose its tail. >Tibbles-example, >Identiy conditions. The modal property of the "could-get-lost" is critical. There is non-identity despite coincidence. I 291 Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across to the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happened to it ((s) i.e. its life story.) >Mixed-categorical. I 354 Sum/mereology/Simons: for the sum, structure does not matter. >Structures. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Terminology | Simons | I 14 Product/mereology/Simons: the average equals the greatest lower bound. Total: "the individual that overlaps something if it at least overlaps one of x or y, is the total. It is not always equivalent to the least upper bound (lub). Lattice theory: the lattice theory is about the "smallest individual which contains both". Def difference: the largest individual that is contained in x, which has no part in common with y, exists only if x is not part of y. Def fusion/general sum: a fusion or general sum is the sum of all objects which satisfies a specific predicate Fx, denoted by the variable-binding operator s: sx [Fx]. There may be several fusions. The sum is the largest fusion. I 226 Fusion: fusion includes replacement of the former. E.g. a former F is replaced by two Fs. Def nucleus/general product: the nucleus is the product of the objects that meet a predicate px[Fx]. Universe: the universe is the sum of all objects. This corresponds to the unit element of the Boolean algebra. Atom: an individual that does not have any parts is an atom. An individual in general may have parts. A universe with 3 atoms (atom) may have 7 individuals. If there are c atoms, there are 2c-1 combinations. It follows that there cannot be even numbers. Combinations of individuals are individuals themselves again. I 32 Def upper bound/mereology/Simons: the individuals which fulfill a predicate fx are bound up if there is an individual from which they are all a part. Sum: "the individual that overlaps something if it at least overlaps one of x or y". ((S) Hasse diagram: the upper point is part of the bottom.) Universe: here, the upper bound is for everything. The existence of an upper bound does not imply the existence of sums or least upper bound, e.g. the set of subsets of natural numbers which are either non-empty or finite or infinite and have a finite complement. Each collection is upwardly limited by the entire set of natural numbers without a least upper bound. E.g.: collection of all finite sets of even numbers. E.g. open intervals on the real number strand: here each two open intervals have at least an upper bound, namely the interval of its endpoints. I 33 Their outer extreme points are, however, separate intervals with a gap between them and they do not have a sum. If a sum exists, then also a least upper bound but not vice versa. Being part of a wider whole means: having an upper bound. I 60 Def prosthetics/Lesniewski/Simons: ("first principles"): prosthetics is Lesniewski's counterpart to the propositional calculus, which it contains as a fragment. In addition, it includes variables for each type of statements and quantifiers - equivalent with systems of proposition types (statements types) by Church or Henkin. I 112 Definition upper bound/mereology/Simons: the individuals who are fulfilling a predicate fx are bound up if there is an individual from which they are all a part. Sum: "the individual that overlaps something if it overlaps at least one of x or y". I 211 Coincidence/Simons: equality of the elements is not sufficient for equality of the parts ((s) e.g. member-like bodies may have different chairpersons). Coincidence: the coincidence is temporarily indistinguishable. The class {Tib + Tail]} has only three parts. Tibbles can have a lot more. I 225 Permanent coincidence of F1 and F2: F1 and F2 are indistinguishable in the real world. At most by modal property. I 228 Coincidence principle/Simons: coincidence (all parts have in common) is necessary for superposition (two things at the same time in the same place). Composition/mereology/Simons: e.g. the ship, but not the wood is composed of planks. A human has parts that are not shared by the collection of atoms. I 334 Topology/mereology/Simons topological concepts that go beyond the mereology: adjacency and connectivity are used for the definition of "whole". |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Four-Dimensionalism | Wiggins Vs Four-Dimensionalism | Simons I 115 WigginsVsFour Dimensionalism: the difference between a four-dimensional cat process and a sum of cat partial processes is I 116 that the later phases of the sum may be unconnected, but those of the cat process may not be unconnected. Sum: can divide - Process: cannot Process; cannot divide, sum: can divide. Sum: can divide, even if this does not happen. Process: cannot divide itself. (Logically impossible). Modality/de re/Sum/Process: So sum and process differ in the modality de re, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects. WigginsVsQuine: the modality is even referentially transparent in this case. I 120 Tibbles-Example/Simons: i): the rejection of i) (or h)) allows to reject step (2). Tib and Tibbles coincide mereologically to t', but it is also sufficient to assume the super position of the two as a fact. The positive reason for never identifying Tib and Tibbles is Leibniz's Law: they differ because they differ in the qualities they have to t. (Tib = cat without tail). I 121 g),e): their rejection blocks the step to (5). That tibbles to t' = Tib to t' then no longer means that they are identical to t. f): his refusal means reformulating identity with sortal predicates: E.g. Tib is the same cat as Tibbles to t' and the same cat part as Tib to t'. But we cannot conclude that Tib is the same cat as Tibbles to t' or the same cat part as Tibbles to t'. This blocks the transitivity. d): denying it means denying that Tib (and tail) exist to t, so the question does not arise what they are identical to what exists at the time. Problem: if Tib comes into existence in an accident, how can it be identical with the previously existing Tibbles? van Inwagen: accepts a) and b) and h) as well as classical identity. Therefore he must either deny that something (Tib) begins to exist or reject it like Chisholm: c). Chisholm: Vs c). Solution/van Inwagen: Tibbles gets smaller when the tail is gone, but the only thing that starts to exist is Tail (as a whole). SimonsVsInwagen, van: is against the common sense and unnecessarily radical. It is much easier to refuse h) or i). Chisholm/Simons: is less radical in terms of identity logic or continuants, but more radical than just denying h) or i). Because denying c) blocks the argument already in step (2). Tibbles and Tib are not identical to t', although they are very closely connected, because at the time they are both constituted from the same mereologically constant ens per se. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tibbles | Wiggins, D. | Simons I 191 Example Tibbles / Wiggins: Tibbles the cat is not the same as the sum of Tib + Tail. Despite the permanent coincidence, because only Tibbles and not the sum has the model property to continue to exist, when the tail is lost. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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