Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bundle Theory | Kripke | I 78 Relevance of theory-dependent properties (VsBundle Theory). >Relevance, >Theory dependence. Bundle theory/(s): the bundle theory states that the meaning of names consists of a certain set of properties associated with a name, e.g. Moses. Then the meaning of the name Moses would be, among other things, "the one who led the people out of Egypt". Kripke: so this means that some properties are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is to proceed. All bundle theories are ill at times because they do not specify exactly what a sufficient number of properties must be met. I 79 What are the relevant properties? If you say, "Moses did not exist", this can mean many things: it can mean: "the Israelites did not have a leader" or "their leader was not called Moses" or "there was no man who accomplished all this". >Properties/Kripke. Kripke: the essential point is that we know a priori that Moses, if the biblical story is essentially wrong, did not exist. The biblical story does not indicate any necessary qualities of Moses, so he could have lived without accomplishing any of these things. >Necessary/Kripke, >Necessary de re/Kripke. I 80 One could say "the Jonah of the Book never existed", as one could say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed". Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Presentation, >Description dependence/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Calculus | Putnam | I (a) 49 Theory/calculus/positivism/Putnam: the predictions are contained in a calculus (if you identify a theory with it). Theory Meaning/concept meaning/change of meaning/Putnam: if it were true that the theory determines the meaning of the concepts, and the theory has additional hypotheses like "there is no tenth planet", then the term "gravity" would change its meaning if a 10th planet were discovered. I 50 In fact, the theory dependence demanded by the positivists is not only one of laws, but also of additional assumptions, because if these do not belong to theory, the scheme of theory and prediction collapses. >Prediction, >Theory, >Additional hypotheses, >Meaning change. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Causal Explanation | Fraassen | Schurz I 228 Causality/van Fraassen: Thesis: the concept of causal process is theory-dependent. Schurz: ditto. Schurz: (1990a(1), 277) Proposal: to explicate the causality relation by reference to the maximal complete causal model ; M(A, E I W). (W: knowledge of circumstances initial conditions, etc.). >Theory dependence. Event/explanation/Schurz: in a deductive-nomological event explanation must. (i) the general premises must be law-like (ii) the conjunction A of antecedent premises must be a cause of E acceptable in the epistemic background system W. >Deductive-nomological explanation. 1. Schurz, G. (1990a). "Was ist wissenschaftliches Verstehen?". In: Schurz (1990, ed.) 235-267. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Facts | Mayr | I 49 Facts/Mayr: there are no pure facts, all are theory-laden. >Theories, >Theory dependence, >Observation, >Theory ladenness. I 49 Def knowledge/Mayr: facts and their interpretation. >States of affairs, >Interpretation. I 93 Fact/theory/law/Mayr: after the discovery of Pluto a theory became a fact. The laws of thermodynamics were just able to be called facts. >Laws, >Laws of nature. E.g. that birds have feathers is, however, a fact and not a law. >Generalization, >Generality. I 96 Biology/Mayr: here concepts play a bigger role than laws. >Concepts, >Classification/Mayr, >Order/Mayr. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Idealism | Putnam | I (a) 29 Idealism/science/Putnam: e.g. statements about electrons should be statements about feelings. > Phenomenalism. Idealistic Science/Putnam: >instrumentalism: theories are means to predict feelings. Problem: there is no metalanguage to distinguish between theories. Idealism: reference and truth are theory dependent. >Realism: realism is trans-theoretical. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Picture Theory | Rorty | I 323 f VsPicture Theory/VsImage Theory/VsTractatus/language/Rorty: Putnam/Goodman: a non-intentional theory of language can not explain learning and understanding of the language. >Understanding, >Language acquisition. Wittgenstein late: ditto. I 326 Also non-intentional relations are theory-dependent. >Theory dependence. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Prediction | Putnam | I (a) 49 Theory/calculus/positivism/Putnam: in a calculus (if you identify a theory with it), the predictions are contained. Theory Meaning/concept meaning/meaning change/Putnam: if it were true that the theory determines the meaning of the concepts, and the theory has additional hypotheses like "there is no tenth planet", then the term "gravity" would change its meaning if a 10th planet were discovered. I 50 In fact, the theory dependence demanded by the positivists is not only one of laws, but also of additional assumptions, because if these do not belong to theory, the scheme of theory and prediction collapses. >Theory, >Concept/Putnam. V 157 Theory change/meaning change/predictions/Putnam: to be able to judge whether the predictions of another theory are true, I need to be able to translate the languages of both theories into each other. >Meaning change, >Theory change. V 245 Logical positivism/empiricism/Putnam: logical positivism always has the tendency to majority thought (of verification). Central for positivism since Comte: predictions are seen as the goal of science. >Positivism, >Explanation/Comte. V 261 Evolution theory/prediction/Putnam: The evolution theory is one of the most successful theories at all. However, it does not imply any predictions. >Evolution/Putnam, >Evolution. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Realism | Boyd | Horwich I 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: Horwich I 493 Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? >Realism, >Internal Realism/Putnam, >Truth. Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. >Method, >Reliability. Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods. >Theory dependency. Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism. >Positivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles. >Observation Language. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts". >Science/Kuhn. Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner". >Theory ladenness. N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation. >Observation. Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism. Ad. 3. Vs: Horwich I 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept. BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism. Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Cf. >Redundancy theory. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth. >Deflationism. Horwich I 494 Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true. M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically. Horwich I 495 Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community >Literal truth, >Bare truth. M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today. Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism. >Constructivism. Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths. >Empiricism, >Correspondence. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Scales | Schurz | I 76 Def Quasi-order/Schurz: must satisfy three axioms: (i) reflexivity (ii) transitivity (iii) Connexity: i.e. everything is comparable to everything. (x)(y)(x ≤My v y ≤M x). From this follows the antisymmetry of ≤M. And it follows that ≤M is an equivalence relation. Def Order/Schurz: This order is a quasi-order in which no two objects have the same rank. Ordinal Scale: Whether the conditions of transitivity and connexity are met is an empirical question. I 77 Interval scale/measurement/Schurz: Example temperature scale: (expansion of the mercury column). Pointe: here there is no zero point, which could be found by mere observation. Ex Celsius: arbitrary choice of the zero point (freezing of water) and the degree division: (divided a hundred times until boiling). Fahrenheit/zero: is -32° a 1°F is 5/9°C. Meaningless: to say, Ex a liquid is twice as warm at 20° as one is at 10° C. The whole ratio depends on the arbitrary choice of the zero point. Fahrenheit: Here you would have the ratio 68° to 50° instead. Solution: Ex If one had three liquids, with 10°, 20° and 30°, then the statement that the temperature difference between b and a is as large as that between b and c and half as large as that between a and c has a meaning, because it is valid independently of the zero point! Interval scale/interval/difference/objectivity/zero/Schurz: truncates when forming the difference of two temperature values. Only these interval statements are objective. Ratio/Schurz: ratio statements are not objective because the zero point is arbitrary. Also e.g. location and time measurements are interval scaled, because the zero point of a spatial coordinate system or time scale is arbitrary. Meaningless: to say, "the year 2000 is twice as late as the year 1000". In contrast: Ratio scale/absolute zero/Schurz: Here the absolute zero is objectively given: Ex Mass, volume, length (as opposed to location) duration, (as opposed to time) are ratio scaled quantities. Meaningful: Bsp An object of 100 kg is twice as heavy as one of 50 kg. These ratio statements have objective meaning. Extensive size/Schurz: are such quantities on the ratio scale because they grow by joining (concatenating) objects into larger wholes. I 78 Ratio scale/Schurz: The empirical metrization of extensive quantities leads to ratio scales. Here, however, the numerical absolute value of the quantity is still arbitrary, depending on the arbitrary choice of unit. Meaningless: Ex to say the magnitude value of Peter's weight is 100. This is true only if the unit of mass is chosen as one kilogram. If one chooses 1 gram, the absolute value would be 100 000. Measure/measure/unit//Carnap: subtle problem: one must also justify that the unit chosen is constant in time. (Carnap 1976(1), 88-100). Absolute scale: simple counting scale where the unit is "one piece". Scale/Mathematics/Scale transformation/Schurz: In mathematics, the difference between the various types of scales is specified by the permissible scale transformations. These determine the degree of arbitrariness,. Def scale level/order: absolute, ratio, interval, ordinal, nominal scale. Here the level becomes lower and lower, because the scales become more and more comprehensive. Def Metricability/Schurz: Ex An extensive comparative size feature ≤M Ex "longer than" over an object area D in the form of a ratio scale is metricable, iff ≤M is a monotonous quasi-order over D and the Def Archimedean condition is fulfilled, i.e. every object b, no matter how large, must be outweighed by sufficiently many copies of an object a, no matter how small. Def derived metrization: traced back to the metrization of other terms: E.g. density to the quotient of mass by volume. theory derived metrization: theory dependent. I 79 Ex temperature scale according to Kelvin, change of scale level due to theoretical considerations. >Measurement, >Order, >Method, >Monotony. 1. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theory Dependency | |||
| Theory Dependency | Schurz | I 57 Theory dependence/observation/Schurz: at present, theory dependence is half-heartedly accepted by the majority of scientists. (Chalmers 1994(1),20-31, Nagel 1979(2),79). E.g. Suppose two theories with conflicting predictions: with complete theory dependence, I 58 then the observations of the representatives would be determined only by their theoretical expectations! These would then be self-fulfilling predictions Total circle of justification: one believes in the theory because one has observed its prediction and this because one believes in the theory. Theory dependence/Schurz: five arguments in favor: 1. Experience is theory-guided: selection of experience for relevance is essential. This selection is theory-guided: according to it, I determine which observations to look for. >Theory-ladenness. Vs: this is true, but it does not follow that observation itself is theory-guided. Proponents of contradictory theories can make the same observations. 2. Perception is an (unconscious) process of construction and interpretation: ex. ambiguities and illusions, ex. R-D-head (Jastrow), tilt pictures: are supposed to prove the theory dependence of perception. >Rabbit-Duck-Head. Vs: the cognitive psychological findings only refute the so-called direct realism, according to which we see things as they are. But they also show something else: that our perceptions are radically independent of background assumptions and background knowledge! (Fodor 1984(3), Pylyshyn, 1999(4)) Deception/Fodor: Deceptions present themselves equally to everyone, no matter how much the person has been educated about the fact that it is a deception. >Deceptions. I 59 Solution: the processes of perception are based on innate mechanisms. Theory dependence/perception/solution/Schurz: The solution is then the dependence on acquired background knowledge (not on innate mechanisms). Theory independence/perception/Schurz: individuals with different background knowledge make the same perceptions. >Background, >Perception. 3. Scientific observation data are theory dependent: here it is about observation by means of instruments (telescope, microscope etc.). Then the theories are mostly theories about the functioning of the measuring instruments. >Theory/Duhem, >Method/Duhem. pragmatic notion of observation/VsQuine: one cannot check everything at the same time. I 60 4. Continuity argument/Maxwell 1962(5)/Carnap 1962(6)/Hempel 1974(7)/Schurz: thesis: there is a continuous transition from observability with the naked eye, via glasses, magnifying glasses etc. to finally the electron microscope. Then "observation" is arbitrary. >Observation. Vs: First, the fact that there is a continuous transition between black and white does not imply that there is no difference between black and white. Second, there are distinctive cuts in this transition. 5th observation is language and culture dependent/cultural relativism: >Humboldt, >Sapir-Whorf thesis. Thesis we can only perceive what is pre-drawn in our language by concepts, Vs: from the fact that languages have special concepts, it does not follow that one cannot have certain sense experience. Sense experience/VsWhorf: experience itself is not language-dependent. This would only be so if others were not able to learn foreign observational terms by ostension. However, this ability to learn is always present. I 61 Ostension/VsWhorf: Ostension works just essentially nonverbal! >Pointing, >Ostension, >Language dependence. 1. Chalmers, D. (1994). Wege der Wissenschaft. Berlin: Springer. 2. Nagel, E. (1979). Teleology Revisited and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Fodoer, J. (1984). "Observation Reconsidered". Philosophy of Science 51, 23-43. 4. Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). "Is Vision Continouus with Cognition?", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, 341-365. 5. Maxwell, G. (1962). "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities". In. Feigl,H. and Maxwell,G. (eds.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol III, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1962. 6. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966). 7. Hempel, C. (1974). Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften. München: DTV. (Engl. Orig. 1966). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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