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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acceptability | Lyons | I 140f Def Acceptability/Grammar/Lyons: an utterance is acceptable if it was or could be used by a native speaker in a particular context and is or would be perceived by other native speakers as belonging to that language. Linguistics: one of its tasks is to explain which sentences are acceptable within the framework of a general theory of language structure. I 146 Acceptability/Level: at a lower level: here phonology is responsible for the acceptability of statements. >Phonemes. Grammar: replaces phonology at a higher level. >Grammar. I 151 Grammatical/meaningful/(sensible)/Lyons: we can now rewrite this distinction provisionally: Acceptable: e.g. 1. The dog bites the man. 2. The chimpanzee eats the banana. 3. The wind opens the door. 4. The Linguist recognizes the fact. 5. The meaning determines the structure. 6. The woman undresses the child. 7. The wind frightens the child. 8. The child drinks the milk. 9. The dog sees the meat. Tradition: would describe all as subject-predicate-structure and say that the subject is a syntagma (unit of several words consisting of articles and nouns). Def Syntagma/Linguistics: Unit of several words: Example predicate: = verb + object. I 152 Word classes: N = {dog, man, chimpanzee, fact...} V = {bites, eats, opens, recognizes… T: article Grammatical Rule: ∑1: T + N + V + T + N Notation: : stands for “sentence”. Subscript: shows that the rule only applies to one class of sentences. Grammatical rule: not only requires a lexicon that classifies all words of the language grammatically as N, V, or T, but also one or more rules for lexical substitution. First of all, we assume that such rules exist. I 153 Subclassification/Grammar/Lyons: now we can allow finer rules by dividing the classes finer ((s) to exclude "The banana bites the child"): Na = {dog, man, chimpanzee, linguist, child, wind... Nb = {banana, door, milk, meat…} Nc = [{ fact, meaning, structure… Vd = {eats, bites, frightens, undresses, sees,… Ve = { recognizes, determines, sees, eats… Vf = {determines…} 1. How we came to the decisions of the classification is irrelevant. I 154 Instead, it is about which classification allows the grammarian to set up a number of rules that cover the largest number of acceptable and the smallest number of unacceptable sentences. 2. The new subclasses can be considered as if there were no longer any relationship between them. 3. Some words are assigned to several classes. Example determines, sees. New: we then replace the original rule with several new rules (which define very different sentence types): a) ∑ 1: T + Na + Vd + T + Nas (e.g. The dog bites the man) b) ∑ 2: T + Na + Vd + T + Nb (e.g. The chimpanzee eats the banana) c) ∑ 3: T + Na + Ve + T + Nc (e.g. The linguist recognizes the fact) d) ∑ 4: T + Nc + Vf + T + Nc (e.g. The meaning determines the structure) I 155 N.B.: the new rules redefine the distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical English sentences. "The banana bites the meaning" is no longer possible, according to the simple rule T + N + V + T + N it would not have been excluded. However, there are still inadmissible statements that cannot be ruled out. Formal Grammar/Lyons: this is all about acceptability according to rules. Lexicon/Grammar/Lyons: the distinction between lexical and grammatical elements can still be neglected here. Grammaticality/Lyons: the linguist will draw the limit at an arbitrary place in his description. Two main factors: 1. law of "decreasing profitability": I 156 It should be avoided that one needs too many rules, which in the end only capture very few words. 2. Because of the unlimited number of sentences, it is not possible to decide for each sentence whether it is acceptable or not. This leads to an "indeterminacy of grammar". Problem: (see I 389 below): the design of sentences of a certain type within a certain theoretical framework can make the design of sentences of another type within the same theoretical framework very difficult. That is still unsolved today (1968). Acceptability/Grammar/Lyons: can only be determined in relation to one rule system. Different grammars assess the grammaticality of certain sentences differently. >Grammar, >Generative Grammar, >Universal Grammar, >Transformational grammar, >Categorial grammar, >N. Chomsky. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Basic Concepts | Lorenzen | Thiel I 80 Formula language for logic: Paul Lorenzen: "prototype approach": rule system for producing linearly composed figures composed of 0 and +. "A" represents such figures as a schematic letter): Rules: (1) > + (2) A > A 0 (3) A > + A +. According to this "calculus" e.g. the figure ++ 00 + can be produced: (1), 2 times (2), then (3). I 80/81 Each figure that can be created must either have a 0 on the right or a + on the left. Test figure 0++ does not work therefore. If we introduced the additional rule: (4) A > 0 A + It would be producible. On the other hand, the following rule would not allow for new figures: (5) A > + + A. This is called "redundancy" (in meta-mathematics "admissibility") Such rule systems can also be referred to as "operative logic". I 83 They can serve the introduction of junctors (I 82 e.g. v) Protologics is therefore still before the logic. >Logic, >Dialogical logic, >Rules, >Rule systems, cf. >Axioms, >Junctions, >Connectives. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Calculus | Lorenzen | Thiel I 216 A "fully formalized" calculus for the arithmetic of Lorenzen 1962 consists of 75 rules, including those with 7 premises. I 217 We can "linearize" such rule systems: i.e. introduce basic rules without premises, then continue ascending. >Introduction, >Premises, >Systems, >Rule systems. I 219 Ideal is the complete syntactic grasping of evidence. >Proofs, >Provability, cf. >Completeness. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Calculus | Thiel | I 20/21 Calculus/Ontology/Mathematics/Thiel: Calculus Theory: It is part of the mathematician's activity both to proceed according to the rules of the calculus and to reflect on them. The boundary between mathematics and meta mathematics is questionable. The demarcation serves only certain purposes, it is sometimes obstructive: e.g. nine-probe: a number is divisible by 9, if its cross sum is divisible by 9. Thiel I 211 Calculus/Thiel: Example: The constructive arithmetics with the calculus N and the construction equivalence of counting signs provides an operative model of the axioms. Mathematicians do not do this in practice or in books. Practice is not complete. I 213 Insisting on "clean" solutions only comes up with meta mathematical needs. Terminology/Writing: Rule arrow: >> Implication imp The following applies to all: V Rule (VP) A(y) imp B >>Vx A(x) imp B. I 214 Everyday language translation: the rule (VP) states that we may pass from a valid implication formula A(y) imp B, in which "y" occurs as a free variable, to one in which the statement form "A(y)" is quantified by an existential quantifier. Clarification: "y" must not occur freely in the conclusion of the rule and "x" must be free for yx, i.e. not within the sphere of influence of an already existing quantifier with the index "x". However, this applies only to evidence practice. Evidence theoretical considerations require further precision. The object of the formalization can be differentiated to such an extent that we have to speak of a new object. Thiel I 216 A "fully formalized" calculation for arithmetics in Lorenzen consists of 75 rules, including those with 7 premises. I 217 We can "linearize" such rule systems: i.e. introduce basic rules without premises and then continue in ascending order. I 219 The complete syntactic capture of evidence is ideal. >Proofs, >Provability, >Syntax, >Formalization. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Completeness | Mates | I 182 Def Completeness/rule system/Mates: a rule system is complete if one can use it to derive any conclusion from a given set of propositions. >Derivation, >Derivability, >Systems, >Rules, >Rule systems, >Consequence, >Inference, >Conclusion. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Corruption | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 209 Corruption/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: Gerring and Thacker (2004)(1) find that parliamentary systems suffer from significantly less corruption than do presidential ones. They argue (2004(3), p. 314) that "effective accountability arises from a highly structured relationship between voters and political parties and from the relatively clear lines of authority instituted by a centralized political apparatus." Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005)(2) also find that parliamentary systems suffer less from corruption than do presidential ones and also draw on the concept of accountability to explain why. Their argument is that parliamentary systems "allow for a stronger and more immediate monitoring of the executive by the legislature... " They conclude that after "political institutions are accounted for, variables usually found to be important determinants of corruption… lose virtually all their relevance." In his survey, Treisman (2007)(3) replicates these results but finds that presidentialism becomes insignificant as soon as one controls for Catholicism or when a dummy for South America is included. Parisi I 210 Geography/history: In a recent study, Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2013)(4) find a large degree of heterogeneity across the characteristics usually attributed to the forms of government and conclude (2013(4), p. 3): "Indeed, knowing whether a constitution is parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential is less helpful in predicting a constitution's executive-legislative structure ... than is knowing the geographic region in which the constitution was produced or when it was written." Cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. Parisi I 211 Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(5). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Gerring, J. and S. Thacker (2004). "Political Institutions and Corruption: the Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 34:295—330. 2. Lederman, D., N. Loayza, and R. Soares (2005). "Accountability and Corruption." Economics and Politics 17(1): 1-35. 3. Treisman, D. (2007). "What have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" Annual Review of Political Science 10: 211-244. 4. Cheibub, J., Z. Elkins, and T. Ginsburg (2013). "Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 44(3):515-544. 5. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Ethics | Moore | Stegmüller IV 172 Objectivity/Ethics/Mackie: However, there is a level of objectivity in the question of what are generally accepted measures of value. >Objectivity, >Values, >Noncognitivism/Cognitivism, >Acceptability. Stegmüller IV 173 This corresponds to a second-level subjectivism. This is supported by: 1. Relativity argument: we meet different moral rule systems in the world. Objectivism would have to characterize all but one as an error. >Subjectivism, >Objectivism, >Subjectivity, >Emotivism, >Relativism. Stegmüller IV 175 2. Peculiarity argument: whoever believes in objective values and norms must take this belief seriously. This leads to peculiar entities such as "shouldbedone", "shouldnotbedone", etc. >Norms. Representatives: Moore: Values are "nonnatural qualities". They demand a special ability of insight. (Detectiveism, "Euthyphro", intuitionism).> >Euthyphro, >Detectivism. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Federalism | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 210 Federalism/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: (…) the conjectured economic benefits of federalism are expected to arise from the competition between constituent governments; its costs are based on the necessity of cooperating on some issues. Hayek: Thus, Hayek (1939)(1) argues that competition between governments will reveal information on efficient ways to provide public goods. Assuming that governments have incentives to make use of that information, government efficiency should be higher in federations, ceteris paribus. Tiebout: In Tiebout's ( 1956)(2) famous model, the lower government levels compete Parisi I 211 for taxpaying citizens, thus giving lower-level governments an incentive to cater to these citizens' preferences. Costs: (…) if the number of states is large, economies of scale in the provision of public goods could remain unrealized. For example, Tanzi (2000)(3) suspects that those providing public goods will be insufficiently specialized. Moral hazard: Also, federal states need to deal with a moral hazard problem that is not an issue in unitary states.* The federal government will regularly issue "no-bail-out clauses" but they will not always be credible.** With regard to the issue of overborrowing, Wildasin (1997)(6) argues that large states can become "too big to fail." On the other hand, it has been argued (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7) that large member states can internalize more of the benefits generated by responsible fiscal policies. Solution: A number of factors might mitigate this free-rider problem: If strong, disciplined parties are active throughout most of the federation and one party is in charge of the federal as well as most of the constituent governments, then party leaders may be able to prevent state officials from externalizing the negative effects of overborrowing (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7). Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(3). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. Parisi I 212 Government spending: For a long time, the evidence concerning the effects of federalism on overall government spending was mixed. Over the last several years, though, this appears to have changed. Rodden (2003)(8) shows for a cross-country study covering the period 1980 to 1993 that in countries in which local and state governments have the competence to set the tax base, total government expenditure is lower. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics. * The relationship between the central government and the lower units in unitary states might be more aptly described drawing on principal-agent theory with its familiar monitoring problems. For such a view, see Seabright (1996)(4). ** Rodden (2002(5), p. 6 72) points out that the creditworthiness of the federal level might be jeopardized if it does not bail out the constituent governments. 1. Hayek, F. (1939). "Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism." New Commonwealth Quarterly 2: 131-149. 2. Tiebout, Ch. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-424. 3. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. 4. Seabright, Paul (1996). "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model." European Economic Review 40:61-89. 5. Rodden, J. (2002). "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World." American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 670-687. 6. Wildasin, D. (1997). "Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations." Nashville, TN: Mimeo. 7. Rodden, J. and E. Wibbels (2002). "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism - Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems." World Politics 54: 494-531. 8. Rodden, J. (2003). "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government." International Organization 57: 695-729. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Formal Language | Thiel | Thiel I 80 Formal Language of Logic/Lorenzen/Thiel: Paul Lorenzen: "protological approach": rule system for the production of figures linearly composed of 0 and + . "A" represents such figures as schematic letter. Rules: (1) > + (2) A > A 0 (3) A > + A +. According to this "calculation" e.g. the figure ++00+ can be produced: (1), 2 times (2), then (3). I 80/81 Each figure that can be made must either have a 0 on the right or a + on the left. Test figure 0++ therefore does not work. We introduced the additional rule: (4) A > 0 A + it would be producible. On the other hand, the following rule would not allow new figures: (5) A > + + A. This is called "redundancy" (in meta mathematics "admissibility"). Such control systems can also be described as "operational logic". I 83 They can be used to introduce punctors (I 82 Example v) Proto logic is therefore still ahead of logic. >Junctions, >Logic, >Introduction, >Calculus, >Formalization, >Systems. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Induction | Peano | A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 46 Peano, unlike Poincaré, explicitly states the principle of induction as one of his postulates, with the aid of which he defines the integers. He is therefore in a position to prove the consistency of his postulate system. >Consistency, >Proofs, >Provability, >Postulates, Poincaré agrees with Peano that a group of postulates must be proved as consistent before the system is given a real meaning. He claims, however, that Peano's attempt to prove the contradiction has failed because it is circular. >Circular reasoning, >H. Poincaré. 47 Peano actually uses the induction principle in two ways: as a postulate and then as a rule. >Rules, >Rule system. |
Peano I Giuseppe Peano Selected works of Giuseppe Peano Toronto 1973 |
| Justification | Mates | I 159 Justification/rules/Mates: (Justification of a superfluous, ie abbreviation rule): by showing how to get the same result without using precisely this rule. >Rules, >Rule systems, >Derivation, >Derivability, cf. >Axioms. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Paradoxes | Thiel | I 321 False Conclusions/Thiel: only of interest if they are intentionally induced as "fallacies", or if they smuggle supposedly legitimate conclusions into an argument in the form of "sophisms", or as in Kant's case so-called "paralogisms" which have their reason "in the nature of human reason" and are therefore "inevitably though not indissoluble". Example: arithmetic fallacy: 5 = 7 (I 321 +). Example: Syllogism with a quaternia terminorum (hidden occurrence of four instead of three allowed terms in a final schema) Flying elephants are fantasy imaginations. Imaginations are part of our reality. So, flying elephants are part of our reality. Paradoxes are something contrary to ordinary opinion (doxa). Other form: fact wrapped in a puzzle solution. For example, that a strap placed tightly around the equator would suddenly protrude by 1/2π, i.e. by about 16cm, after being extended by only one meter. I 322 In everyday use, paradoxes are often only corny things, like the hypochondriac who only imagines himself to have delusions (question of definition) or "Murphy's law" that everything lasts longer, even if one has already considered it. Since the English scientific literature "paradoxically" compromises both paradoxes (not real antinomies) and antinomies, a distinction has not yet prevailed. I 327 Example "crocodile conclusion" (already known in ancient times): a crocodile has robbed a child, the mother begs to give it back. The crocodile places the task of guessing what it will do next. The mother (logically preformed) says: you won't give it back to me. Hence stalemate. Because the mother now argues that the crocodile must give the child back, because if the statement is true, she gets it back on the basis of the agreement, but if it is false, then it is just wrong that she does not get the child back, so because it is true that she gets it. The crocodile, on the other hand, argues that there is no need to give the child back, because if the mother's statement is false, she will not get it back because of the agreement, but if it is true, it means that she will not get the child back. Only a careful analysis reveals that the agreement made does not yet provide a rule for action. If "z" stands for giving back, "a" for the mother's answer (which is still indefinite and can therefore only be represented schematically by a), the agreement does not yet provide a rule system that can be followed, but rather the rule schema. "a" ε true >> z "a" ε false >> ~z If the range of variability of a is not restricted, then one can also make choices of a that are incompatible with Tarski's condition of adequacy for truth definitions. >Adequacy/Tarski, >Convention T. I 328 This states that for a predicate of truth "W" and any statement p, from which it can be meaningfully stated, always "p" ε W <> p has to apply. In the crocodile conclusion, the mother selects ~z for a, thereby turning the rule scheme into the rule system. (R1) "~z" ε true >> z (R2) "~z" ε false >> ~z The crocodile now concludes to R2 and Tarski (with ~z for p) to ~z. The mother, on the one hand, deduces after R1 and on the other hand metalogically from the falsity of "~z" and from there (after Tarski) further to z. Since the argumentation makes use of a predicate of truth and a predicate of falsehood as well as the connection between both, the crocodile conclusion is usually counted among the "semantic" antinomies. One can see in it a precursor of Russell's antinomy. >Russellean Paradox. I 328 One should not hastily deduce from this that the antinomies and paradoxes have no meaning for mathematics. Both Poincaré's criterion (predictiveness) and type theory force a restriction of the so-called comprehension axiom, which determines the conditions permissible as defining conditions for sets of forms of statement. >Impredicativeness, >Comprehension, >Type theory. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Rules | Foucault | II 104ff Rules/Discourse/Foucault: complex bundles of relationships function as rules. The information system draws the rule system that had to be applied so that a particular object is transformed, a certain new utterance emerges, a certain concept is worked out without, however, remaining in the same discourse. >Words, >Concepts, >Utterance, >Discourse/Foucault. Formation: a discursive formation does not play the role of a figure as the time lasts. It is not a timeless form, but a correspondence scheme between several temporal series. The information system is not the final stage of the discourse. The analysis remains on this side of the manifest level. One remains in the dimension of discourse. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rules | Searle | III 42 Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules. III 39 Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule? III 54 Constitutive rules/Searle: X counts as Y in K: e.g. X (piece of wood) counts as Y (chair) in the convention (context) K, after which sitting on it has become established. The term Y must assign a new status to the object, which it does not already have because it suffices for the term X. The object must be assigned a new status by the term Y. III 55 The physical properties alone are not enough. The formula "X counts in Y as K" is needed. This formula can become a constitutive rule. V 59 Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules. V 64 Rules/Searle: rules represent obligations. Unequal conventions play a role in the context of translation. Convention/translation/Searle: saying "je promets" in French and "I promise" in English is a convention. Rules/Searle: the things specified by rules are not natural products. Pain can be created without rules. I 217 Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. Background: is not a rule system. >Terminology/Searle. I 269 Rules: people drive right because they follow a rule, but they do not drive for that reason alone. You also do not speak just because you want to follow the rules of language. These rules are often practically inaccessible to consciousness, although they have to be, in principle, if they really exist. IV 252 Rules/Searle: example promise: Rule I: "I promise to perform the action" may only be spoken if the listener would prefer the action to be performed. Rule II: may only be pronounced if it is not clear from the outset that the action will be performed anyway. Rule III: the speaker must have the intention to. Rule IV: with the statement, the obligation to perform the act is deemed to have been accepted. VsSearle: the concept of a semantic rule ("rules of language") has so far proven to be so recalcitrant that some have concluded that there are no such rules at all. >Speech act theory/Searle. IV 253 Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection. >Semantic rules, cf. >Meaning postulates. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Terminology | Searle | I 43/44 "Topic-neutral" (smart): "topic-neutral" is not nomological. SearleVsTopic Neutral: e.g. digestion needs no additional state to be described separately. I 198 ff Background/Searle: in the background are the skills and knowledge that can make the consciousness work (e.g. understanding an image: is someone moving uphill/downhill?). The same real meaning determines in different backgrounds different satisfaction conditions. Background: the background itself is not an intention, "assume" has no explicit propositional content and no explicit belief (e.g. objects are fixed). Network: is additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself). The network is intentional but it is no ability (it exists even during sleep), e.g. "Bush is president". I 217 Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. Background: is not a rule system. III 194 Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box. The background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. II 115 Perceptual experiences and memories are causally self-referential. III 42 Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules. III 39 Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule? V 59 Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules. IV 253 Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection. VII 436 Sentence meaning/Searle: the sentence meaning consists in the speech act potential. II 25 Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts. III 44ff Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical. Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition. III 212 Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something. II 32 Belief/Searle: spirit on world orientation. Intentional states/Searle: intentional states are both caused and realized in the structure of the brain. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field, H. | Pollock Vs Field, H. | Field II 384 Rules/Standards/Evaluation/PollockVsRelativism/PollockVsField: even tries to avoid the weak relativism: Thesis: the concepts of each person are so shaped by the system of epistemic rules which applies them that there can be no real conflict between people with different systems. I.e. the systems themselves cannot be considered as being in conflict. FieldVsPollock: that is quite implausible: sure, it may be that someone with slightly different rules of induction has a slightly different concept e.g. of ravens. But not so much that one would say that there is no conflict between his belief: "The next raven will be black" and my belief "... not black ...". Concept/Pollock: at the object level, our concepts are determined by our rule system. Concept/FieldVsPollock: more plausible: our epistemic concepts like "reasonable" are determined like this: "reasonable means" "reasonable in terms of our rules." |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Searle, J.R. | Tugendhat Vs Searle, J.R. | I 256/257 TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or sentence are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a sentence are in turn indicated by a sentence. This of course presupposes that for the explanation of a sentence there is always already another sentence available. Meta-Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule. It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used like the second, it must be shown under which conditions the one sentence is used. 2. Every adoption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric sentence, which is a pseudo-explanation. I 258 TugendhatVsSearle: at this point it becomes clear that his rule system ends where it should begin. Understanding/Tugendhat: whoever understands an assertion does not know if it is true, but knows how to determine it. Claim/Mean: the listener can record the speech as follows: "he claims 'that p, but he does not mean that p'". On the other hand, the speaker cannot say of himself: "p; but I don't mean that p". Searle: sincerity rule. TugendhatVsSearle: the connection with this rule and the essential rule (in its place we have here put the thesis (7) (opening move)) does not become clear with Searle. I 504 Modal Adverbs: Example "Peter runs fast". Analog problem: cars are faster in any case. So how is this "fast" explained? It depends on 1. that the object for which the singular term stands is in a certain state and 2. that this state can be classified in a certain way. Tugendhat: 1976: research has only just begun here. I 507 TugendhatVsSearle: he has stopped where the problem only begins. I 512 TugendhatVsSearle: false: to treat promise (central for Searle) sentences as on a level like statement sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Skepticism | Carnap Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 170 CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Thesis: the significance of our expressions is limited to their empirical use. This means that the use of the expressions themselves is limited by whether there is a possible sensation which is relevant for determining the truth or falsity of the sentence in which these expressions occur. Def Principle of Verification/Understanding/Meaning/Carnap/Stroud: Thesis: then we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if appropriate sensations are possible for us. Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: sentence: "Nobody will ever know if__." Here, the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because it is unverifiable. Def Meaningless: neither true nor false. I 174 CarnapVsSkepticism: the question "Are there external things?" would thus be pointless. It would not be a question that you could not answer (sic), because there is no meaningful question and no meaningful response here. Important argument: but that does not mean that there are no entirely meaningful questions about the existence of external things: these are the internal questions ((s) within an area of knowledge). I 176 Truth/Sense/Meaningless/Carnap/Stroud: something that is true, cannot contradict something that is meaningless. Moore/Carnap/Stroud: verificationism shows that everything Moore says can be true, without however refuting skepticism. But there is nothing meaningful that he does not consider. VerificationismVsSkepticism/CarnapVsStroud: the skepticism is not, as Kant says, to be understood transcendentally, but it is meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable. Def External/External Questions/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: are "philosophical" questions that relate to the whole (the outer frame, i.e. that is initially not possible). Def Internal/Internal Questions/Science/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: these are questions about the existence of things that are asked within a science. E.g. the question of the existence of numbers is useful in mathematics, but not outside of it. I 177 External/Existence/Verificationism/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: if skepticism allows the things outside of us to be useful at all ((s) The sentences about the things that cannot be things may be useful or useless), then he cannot describe them as unknowable. I 178 Objectivity/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: this principle prevents any concept of objectivity that does not contain the possibility of empirical verification. VsSkepticism: every concept of objectivity which includes the possibility of knowledge then makes skepticism impossible. Practical/Theoretical/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: the distinction theoretical/practical goes far beyond the verification principle. Stroud I 187 CarnapVsSekpticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic framework (reference system). This does not follow from the verification principle alone. It is part of a theory of knowledge (epistemology) according to which the insignificance of the skeptical question is indicated by a non-skeptical answer to the question how it is possible that we know something. Knowledge/Carnap/Stroud: two essential components: 1. Experience, 2. linguistic frame (reference system) within which we understand the experience. Language/Carnap/Stroud: is a rule system for the formation of sentences and for their verification or rejection (ESO 208). Thus we are equipped to determine that some statements coincide with our experience and others do not. Without those statements, which are made possible for us by the acceptance of the language, we would have nothing either to confirm or to refute the experience. Skepticism: would agree so far. It also needs expressions of language for the things of the outside world. CarnapVsSkepticism: he misunderstands the relation between the linguistic context and the truths that can be expressed within it. He thinks the frame was only needed I 188 To express something that was "objectively" true or false. ((s)> Quine:> Immanence theory of truth, immanent truth > Ontological relativity: truth only within a theory/system). Objectivity/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: every speech on objective facts or external things is within a reference system (frame) and cannot justify our possession of this frame. ((s) which is a practical choice (convention). Theoretical Question/Philosophy/Carnap: the only theoretical question that can we ask here is that about the rules of language. I 192 CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic context of the expression about external objects and the truths that are expressed within this reference system. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-skeptical approach to this relation?. 1) to what system belongs Carnap's thesis that existence claims are neither true nor false in the thing language?. 2) what does the thesis then express at all?. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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