Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 25 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ambiguity | Chalmers | I 63 Ambiguity/Primary/Secondary Intension/Chalmers: there is no danger of ambiguity in truth conditions when they are related to the actual world. >Truth conditions, >Possible worlds, >Reference, >Certainty, >Intensions, >Primary intension, >Propositions/Chalmers, >Centered worlds. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Centered Worlds | Chalmers | I 133 Centered World/Indexicality/Chalmers: if a centered world is once determined, i.e. if the localization of the center (e.g., I) is established, then a primary intension (e.g., water and H2O) provides a perfect non-indexical property. Cf. >Identity across worlds, >Identification, >Indexicality, >Intensions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. Concepts: now one could assume that the term zombie would simply not be used in a zombie-centered world. >Zombies. ChalmersVs: the situation is more complicated: primary intensions do not require the presence of the original concept. This suggests that a posteriori necessity is not necessary for my arguments with regard to consciousness. >Necessity a posteriori. Intensions: the falling apart of primary and secondary intensions causes an uncertainty with regard to water: something watery does not have to be H2O. But that does not apply to consciousness. If something feels like a conscious experience, then it is conscious experience, no matter in which world. >Consciousness/Chalmers. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Character | Kaplan | Newen I 120 Two-dimensional semantics/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: Differentiation of utterance context: in it an utterance is made and a truth condition (WB) is defined - and an evaluation world: in it the utterance is judged as true or false. Character/Kaplan: Table in which an utterance (in the case of Kaplan the indexical) is written and then, in rows, the utterance contexts are entered, and in columns, the evaluation worlds are entered. This also takes into account the context dependency of indicators. ((s) Example: "I am in NY (Rio/Tokyo)" expressed in NY/Rio/Tokyo. Definition Character: Function of possible utterance contexts on truth conditions. The sentence only gets its truth conditions in a situation of utterance. >Truth conditions, >Two-dimensional semantics. Newen I 121f Two-dimensional Semantics/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: differentiates necessary/a priori: necessary: e.g. "I am Cicero": in the first line only true. (If true, necessary true, otherwise necessary false.) - a priori: e.g. "I am here now" diagonal only true, otherwise false. Diagonal: indicates the fact that the place and time is always the place and time of utterance. Stalnaker: Suggestion: to only consider the diagonal. Necessary and a priori: e. g. Cicero is identical to Cicero: here only true everywhere. --- Stalnaker I 192 Definition Character/Kaplan: = Meaning - Function of possible (usage) contexts on speakers - (Newen/Schrenk: the character is the entire table of two-dimensional semantics). Kaplan thesis: Character and content must be separated - character/meaning: is a rule that says how the speaker is determined by facts about the context. >Content/Kaplan. Content/Kaplan: = secondary intension. Content: possibly unknown despite language competence. ((s) >Gods-example: Two omniscient Gods) - ((s) Character (s): Who it could be. Contents: Who it really is.) - For example, to whom "I" refers. --- Stalnaker I 194 Content/secondary Intension: can be different in different possible worlds a) Because the context is different b) Because the meaning is different. (This is part of the metasemantics). --- Stalnaker I 208 Character/Chaplan/Stalnaker: is determined by the primary intension. Cognitive value/Stalnaker: is then the character of a thought. >Intension, >Intension/Stalnaker. |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Content | Chalmers | I 203 Content/experience/phenomenal belief/Chalmers: 1. What do our concepts like "consciousness" or "red experience" actually pick out (in a given world)? >Experience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reference. 2. What constitutes the content of these concepts, is it determined by the psychological nature alone, or also by the phenomenal? >Concepts, >Phenomena. I 204 Zombie: could it have the same intensions of beliefs as I do? If it is subject to a conceptual confusion, that might be the same for me. >Zombies, >Intensions. The zombie could not make true or false judgments about consciousness in itself, but also in relation to me! For it could not use the term properly. But the concept of consciousness differs from the concept of "water" insofar as the "acquaintance" with the object is much more direct in the case of consciousness. >Acquaintance, >Knowing how, >First person, >Other minds, >Incorrigibility. I 205 Experience: is there a public language usage, e.g. for the term "red experience"? >Language use. Problem: Inverted spectra. >Inverted spectra. Solution: Standard conditions for standard observers. Moreover, we do not want to limit the term to my personal experiences, but look at every one's experiences. >Observation, >Standard conditions. I 206 Qualia: secondary intensions are not enough. We also learn something when we learn how it is to experience something red: the experience of something red could have been different, but it is so. In this way, we limit the scope of possibilities. For this, however, we need different primary intensions. Cf. >Color researcher Mary. I 207 Communication/Qualia: Only if others can have such experiences (under relevant causal conditions), my Qualia are communicable. >Understanding, >Intersubjectivity. Content/Consciousness/Conclusion/Chalmers: Beliefs about experiences are central. And these cannot be the same with my zombie twin as with me. But we do not need a causal theory of knowledge. We can even refer to experiences by assuming a property dualism. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Property dualism. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Intensions | Chalmers | I 54 Intension/Chalmers: intension is a function that defines how a concept is used in different situations. It is not the same as "meaning" and also not a definition. >Meaning, >Definitions, >Situations, >Reference, >Use, cf. >Extension. I 57 Intension/Chalmers: depending on whether a concept picks out an object in the actual world, or in a counterfactual world, I will speak of primary and secondary intension. >Concepts, >Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Terminology/Chalmers. Secondary Intension/Chalmers: secondary intension is therefore, independent of empirical factors. It describes how reference depends on how the outer world turns out. >twin earth, > rigidity). I 61 When counterfactual worlds are involved, it is not a priori determined what the reference is, since the actual world can be determined by different speakers as their own (mirror-inverted), >Centered Worlds/Quine. The determination as a primary or secondary intension will then also vary inversely. Cf. >Intensions/Stalnaker, >Propositions/Chalmers. I 62 Meaning/Chalmers: Both primary as well as secondary intensions are candidates for the "meaning" of a concept. "Water" could mean H2O, or twin earth water, depending on what is meant by the concept in the respective world. I 63 Necessary Truth/Chalmers: both can even be constructed as a necessary truth when possible worlds are conceived as uttering contexts. Cf. >Character/Kaplan, >Content/Kaplan, >Two-dimensional Semantics. I 200 Primary Intension/Chalmers: For example, the largest star in the universe: picks out a star in every given centered world. Even non-existent objects have a primary intension, e.g. the Nicholas, (Santa Claus). This primary intension could have picked out an object if the world had turned out accordingly. Cf. >Non-existence, >Possibilia. For my concept of consciousness, the primary intension is more important than a causal relation to an object. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 205 Also, a zombie can have primary intensions that are overlapping with mine. >Zombies. I 206 Quality/Qualia: primary intensions do not specify Qualia. >Qualia. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Intensions | Stalnaker | I 16 Def C-intension/Jackson: a c-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. ((s) This is where the semantics in possible world x causes the content c to be expressed, which is perhaps different from what can be meant by it in another possible world), i.e. it is relative to possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity. Def A-intension/Jackson: the A-intension is solely determined by the idea of propositino ((s) what is meant?) (regardless of possible worlds). Then there is a difference between modal and epistemic distinctions. There are no propositions that are both necessary and a posterori, and no propositions that are both contingent and a priori - but statements! Def necessary a posteriori statement: a necessary a posteriori statement is one with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension. >Necessity a posteriori. Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is, on the other hand, one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension. I 205 Def two-dimensional sentence intension/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional sentence intension is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value. Def A-intensions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/Stalnaker: A intensions function with one argument and one centered world - their value is a truth value. Def C-intension/secondary intension/secondary sentence intension/Stalnaker: C-intensions function with one argument and one possible world - their value is a truth value. Cf. >Twodimensional semantics. I 208 Two-dimensional intension/thought/non-rigid/content/Stalnaker: the two-dimensional intension for thoughts defines a non-rigid description of a proposition: the secondary intension is the reference of this description. >Thoughts, >Rigidity. Secondary proposition/Stalnaker: the secondary proposition is not the content of the thoughts of the speaker, but is determined by the content, as a function of the facts. >Content/Stalnaker, >Facts. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Knowledge | Lycan | Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/Color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/LycanVsJackson/Lycan/Chalmers: (Lycan 1995)(1): there is a difference in intensionality between "This liquid is water" and "This liquid is H2O". In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without knowing the other. >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Twin Earth, >Implication, >Stronger/weaker. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intensions (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world). >Primary Intension, >Secondary Intension, >Possible Worlds, >Actual World. 1. William G. Lycan (1995). A limited defense of phenomenal information". In: Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 243--58 (1995) |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge | Tye | Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/Colour Researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/TyeVsJackson/Tye/Chalmers: (Tye 1986)(1): There is a difference in the intensionality between "This fluid is water" and "This fluid is H2O". >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Reference. In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without the other being known. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intension (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world). >Primary Intensions, >Secondary Intensions, >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia. 1. Tye, Michael (1986). The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17. |
Tye I M. Tye Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge how | Chalmers | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia, >Knowledge, >Propositional Knowledge, >Experience, >Intentions, >Primary Intension, >Terminology/Chalmers. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. >Conceivability, >Possible worlds. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge how | Loar | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Necessity | Chalmers | Schwarz I 27 Definition strong necessity/Chalmers: Thesis: In addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: For example, Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. N.B.: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999(2)). >Modality, >Modal truth, >Possible worlds, >Essentialism, >Pain, >Identity, >Identity theory, >Contingency. Schwarz I 208 A posteriori/Necessity/Lewis/Schwarz: here the secondary truth conditions are generally fulfilled, but not the primary ones! The first circumstance makes the sentences necessary - secondary truths reflect the behavior in modal embeddings - the second makes them a posteriori. But not because primary conditions of truth would be determined by embedding in epistemic operators (as in (Chalmers, 2003)(3)), but because, according to our language conventions, e.g. "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" may not always be expressed, but only when certain conditions are available about which we must first inform ourselves. >Truth conditions. Schwarz I 209 E.g. if the astronomers announce tomorrow that the Morning Star is not the Evening Star, then they have real news, but they do not violate our language conventions. This has something to do with Lewis' description theory of the reference. >Reference/Lewis, >Conventions/Lewis, >Language use, >Morning star/Evening star. 1. [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. In [van Inwagen 2001] 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46 3. [2003]: “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. Manuskript. Online verf¨ugbar unter http://www.consc.net/papers/foundations.html --- Chalmers I 63 Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979 (1)): Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: E..g "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. related to the actual world (The world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980 (2)). It may turn out that the reference is different. (I.e., that it was different all the time). >Reference, >Actuality, >Actual World. Def "deep necessity"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations. These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds. Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary,> Intensions/Chalmers). I 13 Strong metaphysical necessity/Chalmers: would be one that assumes that it would be metaphysically impossible for a world to be identical with ours in regard to the physical facts, but not for all positive facts. I 137 This is stronger than Kripke's metaphysical necessity, which we may call weak metaphysical necessity. >Metaphysical necessity. Conceivability/Chalmers: then worlds are conceivable that are not possible at all. Strong metaphysical necessity goes beyond the limitations we have described as "wrongly described worlds". Then "Zombie world" could correctly describe a world that we imagine, even with regard to a secondary intension. It is only the case that such a world would not be metaphysically possible. >Zombies, >Secondary Intension/Chalmers, >Intensions, >Terminology/Chalmers. 1. Vs: there is no reason to believe that there is such a modality of metaphysical necessity. There are no analogies to this of how they are provided by examples such as water/H2O or Hesperus/Phosphorus, since they require only one possible world. A posteriori Information: always affects only our own world! This can help to locate our world in the space of possible worlds. 2. Vs: If we allow this kind of metaphysical necessity, we open the door for further ad hoc modalities. I 138 Zombie World: someone who believes that a zombie world is logically possible but metaphysically impossible, cannot answer the key question: Why could not God have created a Zombie world? If he had created it, it would still be metaphysically impossible. This is too arbitrary. >Metaphysics. 1. G. Evans, Reference and contingency. The Monist 62, 1979: pp. 161-89. 2. M. K. Davies and I. L. Humberstone, Two notions of necessity. Philosophical Studies 38, 1980: pp. 1-30. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Necessity | Evans | Chalmers I 63 Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979): Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: e.g. "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. in relation to the actual world (the world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980). It may turn out that the reference is different. (i.e. that it was different all the time). Definition "deep need"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations. These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds. Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary, > secondary intension/Chalmers). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Necessity | Stalnaker | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Pain | Chalmers | I 17 Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> Functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person. >Qualia/Chalmers. Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain! I 18 Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts. Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger. >Psychology/Chalmers. I 19 Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here. >Phenomena, >Aspects, >Emotion. Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Beliefs, >Intentionality. Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a)(1): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360). >Intentionality/Searle, >Content. I 146f Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him. >Pain/Kripke, >Identity/Kripke. Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O: Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery. >a posteriori necessity. I 147 ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility. >S. A. Kripke, >Essentialism, >Modality, >Necessity, >Possibility. I 148 Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974)(2), McGinn (1977)(3)). >Brain states. Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980)(4): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world. >Materialism, >Actual World, >Possible Worlds. I 149 Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing. ChalmersVsKripke: 1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive. 2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity. 3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain". 4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (>cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established. >Rigidity, >Supervenience. 1. J. R. Searle, Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Scineces. 13, 1990: pp.585-642. 2. F. Feldman, Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71, 1974: pp. 665-76 3. C. McGinn, Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2, 1977: pp. 78-80 4. R. N. Boyd, Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In: N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. VOl. 1. Cambridge 1980. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Propositions | Chalmers | Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] --- Chalmers I 64 Propositions/Chalmers: there are primary and secondary propositions corresponding to the primary and secondary intensions shown here. >Two-dimensional semantics, See Kaplan's distinction >content / >character). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Propositions | Jackson | Schwarz I 207 (Note) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. >Two-dimensional semantics. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. Cf >Intensions/Stalnaker. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Supervenience | Blackburn | Chalmers I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(1), (Horgan 1993)(2): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: for logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the finding that the reference is preserved over possible worlds (is rigid). >Rigidity, >Intensions, >Primary Intension. The supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. >Conditional, >a priori. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). >Secondary Intension. Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/Chapter 2) >Contingency. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, therefore we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule. >Supervenience/Chalmers 1. Simon Blackburn (1985). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215. 2. Terence Horgan (1993). On What There Isn’t. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):693-700. |
Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Supervenience | Chalmers | I 33 Supervenience/Chalmers: supervenience is in general a relation between two sets of properties: B properties: higher-level properties A properties: lower-level properties (for us physical properties). The specific nature of these properties is not relevant to us. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Basic pattern: Definition Supervenience/Chalmers: B-properties supervene on A-properties, if two possible situations are not identical with regard to their A-properties and at the same time differ in their B-properties. For example, biological properties supervene on physical ones insofar as two possible physically identical situations are also biologically identical. Local/Global Supervenience/Chalmers: we distinguish global supervenience, depending on how the situations under consideration, refer to individuals or possible worlds. Local Supervenience/Chalmers: B supervenes locally on A when the A properties of an individual determine the B properties of that individual. I 34 E.g. form supervenes on physical properties. Definition Global Supervenience/Chalmers: when A facts about the world determine B facts about the world. That is, there are no two possible worlds which are identical with respect to A, which are not also identical with regard to B. For example biological properties supervene globally on physical properties. Definition local supervenience implies global supervenience, but not vice versa. E.g. two physical organisms can differ in certain biological characteristics, one individual can be fitter than the other, triggered by environmental conditions. >Extrinsic properties,> Niches. Chalmers: For example, one could imagine that two physically identical organisms might belong to different species, if they had different evolutionary stories. Consciousness: here it will be more about local supervenience. I 35 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: logical supervenience is conceptual and stronger than natural supervenience. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: this term is used to distinguish between logical supervenience. I 38 A situation would be conceivable in which laws that automatically produce B facts might not produce these for once. (Kripke 1972, 1980)(1). I 39 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: Problem: There could be a possible world which is identical to our actual world, but not additionally with non-physical elements such as angels and ghosts. These could be physically identical with us, but biologically different from us. This has led some authors (Haugeland 1982(2), Petrie 1987(3)) to say that the logical possibility and logical necessity are too strong terms for our supervenience relations. Solution/Chalmers: we must explicitly refer to our actual world or specified possible worlds. I 40 Other problems have to do with negative existence statements about what does not exist in our world, or does not exist in other possible worlds. Such problems can never be determined by local facts or local characteristics. Supervenience should always be determined by reference to positive facts and characteristics. I 84 Name/Supervenience/Explanation/Chalmers: E.g. according to Kaplan (1989)(4) the name "Rolf Harris" simply picks out its speaker directly. Does that mean that the property to be Rolf Harris does not logically supervene on physical facts? >Names, >Reference, >Identification, >Vivid name/Kaplan. Secondary intension of the name: what resulted from a certain egg and sperm in all possible worlds. This supervenes logically on facts. Primary intension of the name: is that what results from the linguistic usage, of those who have, or had assiociate with Rolf Harris, or heard of Rolf Harris. The primary intension may be absent, which is a problem for the supervenience >Propositions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. I 87 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: apart from conscious experience, indexicality, and negative existence theorems everything supervenes logically on physical facts, including physical laws. >Indexicality, >Experience, >Non-existence, >Existence statements. I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(5), Horgan (1993)(6): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference over possible worlds remains preserved (is rigid). Thereby, the supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept picks out a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (See Horgan and Timmons 1992b.(7)) Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the ussual case. I 124 Supervenience/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that conscious experience does not logically supervene on the physical facts, but not that it does not supervene at all! 1. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Reprint: Cambridge 1980 2. J. Haugeland, Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982: pp. 93-103 3. B. Petrie, Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 48, 1987: pp. 119-30 4. D. Kaplan, Demonstratives. In: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (Eds) Themes from Kaplan. New York 1989 5. S. Blackburn, Supervenience revisited. In: I. Hacking (ed) Exercises in Analysis: Essay by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge 1985 6. T. Horgan, From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102, 1993: pp. 555-86 7. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Supervenience | Horgan | Chalmers I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(1), Horgan (1993)(2): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference about possible worlds is preserved (or is rigid). The supervenience conditional is thus an a priori conceptual truth. >Intensions, >Primary Intension, >Rigidity, >Reference. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/C 2) >Secondary Intension. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: is - as opposed to the logical - contingent for its part. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule. >Contingency, >Ontology. 1. Simon Blackburn (1985). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215. 2. T. Horgan (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102 (408):555-86 |
Horgan I T. Horgan Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Horgan II T. Horgan The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content 2010 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Terminology | Chalmers | I 20 Deflationary/Terminology/Chalmers: a deflationary concept of belief would be purely psychological (explaining behavior), not phenomenal (connected with Qualia). Which is the true concept, is not so decisive for my project. More important is the separation of the psychological and the phenomenal. I 28 Alertness/Attention/awareness/Terminology/Chalmers: Consciousness is always accompanied by attention, but not always vice versa. Awareness (also attention) falls more on the psychological side of differentiation. I 29 Newell (1992)(1) distinguishes between "awareness" and "consciousness". Chalmers: With "awareness" (attention) I will mean from now on "psychological consciousness" (behavior explaining, functional). I 154 Definition Proto-phenomenal Property/Chalmers: as the only one, a proto-phenomenal property does not contain experience itself, but it can contain several simultaneously present ones. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. > Dualism. I 232 Registration/Chalmers: registrations are judgments in a weaker sense: representational states, e.g. of the facial field, which are not yet judgments. 1. A. Newell, SOAR as a unified theory of cognition: Issues and explanations. Behavioral and Brain Studies 15, 1992: pp.464-92. Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Terminology | Stalnaker | Schwarz I 30 Def Perdurantism/Schwarz: thesis: timely extended things are usually composed of temporal parts. Schwarz I 31 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): thesis: things are completely (not only partially) present at any time at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). Perdurantism: perdurantism can perceive objects as four-dimensional, extended both in time and space. Endurantism: endurantism can also assume that objects have temporal parts, e.g. a football game. Stalnaker I 135f Vague Identity/Stalnaker: e.g. there are two fish restaurants Bookbinder's - only one can be identical with the original one. Endurantism: problem: B0: (the original one) is then an ambiguous name. Perdurantism: here perdurantism is unique. Stalnaker I 81 Def Individualbegriff/Stalnaker: The individual concept is a function of possible worlds on individuals. Stalnaker I 91 Def weak supervenience/Stalnaker: Weak supervenience is found within a possible world. Strong Supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience is found within one or in several. Global Supervenience/Stalnaker: Global supervenience is when any two possible worlds that are B indistinguishable are also A indistinguishable. Global Supervenience: Global supervenience must be improved. So it is not even sufficient for weak supervenience. I 124 Def Identity/Possible World Relative/Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in any possible world w is the set of pairs such that d is in the domain of w. I 267 Def minimal subject/terminology/Stalnaker: a minimal subject is Ex anything that is a representative, something that receives, stores, or transmits information. I 192 Def kontingent a priori/zwei-dimensionale Semantik/Stalnaker: Kontingent a priori ist eine Aussage mit einer kontingenten sekundären Intension, aber einer notwendigen primären. Def notwendig a posteriori: umgekehrt: Notwendig a posteriori sind notwendige sekundäre Intensionen, kontingente primäre. Pointe: Keine Proposition ist selbst kontingent a priori oder notwendig a posteriori. Es gibt nur verschiedene Weisen, in denen notwendige und kontingente Propositionen mit Aussagen assoziiert sind. Def Charakter/Kaplan: Charakter ist gleich Bedeutung. Er ist die Funktion von möglichen (Gebrauchs-) Kontexten auf Referenten. I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: local descriptivism is simply a way of explaining one part of speech by another. ((s) According to Lewis and Stalnaker, this is the only way). I 9 Def Property/Stalnaker: (a) thin/sparse definition: a trait is a way individuals can be grouped. b) richer definition/Stalnaker: (more robust): A trait is something upon which (in relation to which) individuals are grouped. I 103 Def Fundamental property/Stalnaker: a fundamental property must provide for distinctions between individuals that could not otherwise be explained. I 154f Def essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y that are identical are essentially identical, i.e. identical in all possible worlds in which the thing exists. I 34 Def Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B gdw. a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is inconsistent. I 50 Def doxastically accessible/Lewis: Doxastically accessible means being compatible with other beliefs and knowledge. I 16 Def C-Intension/Jackson: A C-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. Def A-intension/Jackson: The A-intension is determined by the propositional thought alone. Def necessary a posteriori statement: A necessary a posteriori statement is a statement with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension. Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is conversely one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension. I 205 Def two-dimensional propositional intents/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional propositional intents is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value (WW). Def A-intentions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/stalnaker: an A-intention is a function with one argument, one centered world. Its value is a truth value. Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/Secondary Sentence Intension/Stalnaker: A C-Intension is a function with an argument and a possible world. Its value is a truth value. I 15 Def Metaphysics/Stalnaker: metaphysics concerns the distinctions that must be made between possibilities. I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/Terminology/Stalnaker: (early thesis): If practice is legitimate, (inferences, etc.) then we are really making assertions and semantics really tells us what the assertions say. I 61f Def Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is no more than a subregion, or subset of possible worlds. Def assertion/Stalnaker: asserting a proposition is nothing more than locating the real world in that subset. Def true-relative-to-x: To say a proposition is true relative to a world x is to say that the world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that the proposition constitutes. Def true simpliciter: "True simpliciter" means to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds constituting the proposition). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Twin Earth | Chalmers | I 134 Twin Earth/Chalmers: this is about the distinction between primary and secondary intensions. >Propositions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. One could have suspected a priori that water is XYZ instead of H2O. But Kripke shows us that after the actual world has emerged as as it is, we would describe it wrongly as one in which XYZ is water. >Reference/Kripke, >Twin Earth. N.B.: we would falsely describe them with the primary intension (relative to the actual world) rather than with the secondary appropriate intension. >Actual World, >Centered Worlds. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Twodimensional Semantics | Kaplan | Newen I 120 Two-dimensional semantics/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: distinction of utterance context: in it an utterance is made and a truth condition (tr. cond.) is defined - and in an evaluation world : In it the utterance will be evaluated as true or false. >Truth conditions, >Context, >Character/Kaplan, >Content/Kaplan. Character/Kaplan: the table, in which (in Kaplan indexical) an utterance is written, and then, in lines the utterance contexts, the evaluation worlds are entered in columns. - Thus, it also takes into account the context dependency of indicators. ((S) E.g. "I'm in NY (Rio/Tokyo)" expressed in NY/Rio/Tokyo.) - Definition Character: Function of possible utterance contexts on truth conditions. - The sentence only gets its truth conditions in an utterance situation. Newen I 121 f Two-dimensional semantics/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: differentiates necessary/a priori: necessary: E.g. - "I am Cicero": in the first row only true. - (If true, necessarily true, otherwise necessarily false.) - A priori: E.g. "I am here now" diagonal only true, otherwise false - Diagonal:. Denotes the fact that the time and place are always the place and time of the utterance. - Stalnaker: Proposal: to consider only the diagonal. - Necessary and a priori: E.g. "Cicero is identical with Cicero": here everywhere only true. Stalnaker I 192 Definition character/Kaplan: = Meaning - function of possible (usage-) contexts on speakers - (Newen/Schrenk: the character is the entire table of two-dimensional semantics) - Kaplan Thesis: character and content need to be separated - Character/meaning: is a rule that says how the speaker is determined by facts about the context. - Content/Kaplan: = secondary intension. - Content: may be unknown despite of language skills. - ((s)> E.g. Two omniscient Gods). - ((s) character/(s): E.g. who it could be - Content: Who it really is.) - E.g. to whom "I" refers to. Stalnaker I 194 Content/secondary intention: can be different in different possible worlds a) because the context is different. - B) because the meaning is different. - (This is part of the metasemantics). Stalnaker I 208 Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: is determined by the primary intension. - Cognitive value/Stalnaker: is then the character of a thought. >Intension, >Thought. |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Twodimensional Semantics | Stalnaker | I 17 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: Twodimensional semantics connects propositional thoughts with sentences, (s) i.e. that in a different possible world something else can be meant with the same expressions. The A-intension (independent of possible worlds) is then usually the only one to which the speaker has cognitive access. >Intensions/Stalnaker. Epistemological status: the epistemological status is therefore determined by the modal state of the A-intension. ((s) What can be known depends on the proposition (content) of the possible world-independent expression). I 18 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: twodimensional semantics can show how the possible and the true interact, i.e. separate semantic questions from factual ones in the context. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could provide a neutral view of the possibility space. I 192 Def contingent a priori/twodimensional semantics/Stalnaker: contingent a priori is a statement with a contingent secondary intension but not necessarily a primary one. Def necessary a posteriori: other way round: necessary a posteriori is a necessary secondary intension, contingent primary. >Terminology/Stalnaker. Important argument: no proposition is itself contingent a priori or necessary a posteriori. There are only different ways in which necessary and contingent propositions are associated with statements. Def Character/Kaplan: character corresponds to meaning. It is the function of possible (use) contexts on references. >Character/Kaplan. External: Newen/Schrenk: the character is the whole table of two-dimensional semantics. Kaplan: thesis: character and content must be separated. Character/meaning: character provides a rule that says how the reference is determined by facts about the context. Content/Kaplan: content corresponds to the secondary intension. >Content/Kaplan. Content: content is possibly unknown despite language skills. ((s) E.g. Two omniscient gods). >Two omniscient Gods. Character/(s):a character is e.g. who it could be in each case. Content: the content says who it actually is, e.g. to whom "I" refers. I 194 Content/secondary intension: content can be different in different possible worlds a) because the context is different and b) because the meaning is different. ((s) This is part of meta-semantics). >Terminology/Stalnaker. I 199 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: twodimensional semantics should be interpreted meta-semantically, not semantically. I 199 Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantics is fact dependent, therefore it does not give access to a priori truth. Semantics: semantics must assume internal states. I 212 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: primary propositions are the ones that represent the cognitive values of our thoughts. Secondary propositions/semantic: for Stalnaker, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed. Secondary proposition/semantic: secondary propositions are unambiguously defined as a function of the facts. Problem: they are not something to which we have cognitive access. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Zombies | Chalmers | I 94 Zombies/Robots/Chalmers: zombies and robots are logically possible. There could be a twin of me, who is molecular identical with me, but without inner experience. >Robots, >Experience, >Qualia, >Phenomena, cf. >Artificial Consciousness, >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong AI. I 95 Zombie Identity/Chalmers: The identity between my zombie twin and I will insist on the following levels: 1. Functional: he will process the same information as I do. 2. Psychological: he will show the same behavior. Phenomenal: the zombie will not be identical with me: he will not have the same inner experiences. I 96 Zombies/Chalmers: it is not a matter of whether the assumption of their existence is plausible, but whether it is conceptually incoherent. In any case, there are no hidden conceptual contradictions. >Analyticity. I 97 Conceivability: since such a zombie is not conceptually excluded, it follows that my conscious experience does not logically follow from the functional constitution of my organism. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conclusion: (phenomenal) consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 131 Zombies/Necessity a posteriori/VsChalmers: one could argue that a zombie world would be merely logical, but not metaphysically possible. There is also a distinction between conceivability and true possibility. >Necessity a posteriori, >Metaphysical possibility. Necessary a posteriori/Kripke: For example, that water is H2O, this necessity is only a posteriori knowable. Then it is logical, but not metaphysically possible, that water is not H2O. VsChalmers: it was unnatural to assume the same for zombies, and that would be enough to save materialism. ChalmersVsVs: the notion of necessity a posteriori cannot bear the burden of this argument and is only a distraction maneuver. ((s) It is not brought into play by Kripke himself). I 132 ChalmersVsVs: the argument against me would only have a prospect of success if we had used primary intensions (e.g. water and H2O), but we are dealing with secondary intensions (e.g. water and "wateriness"). Therefore, psychological/physical concepts a posteriori could pick out other things than what would correspond to the a priori distinction. I 180 Zombie/Behavior/Explanation/Chalmers: since the relationships within my zombie twin are the exact reflection of my inner being, any explanation of his behavior will also count as an explanation of my behavior. It follows that the explanation of my assertions about consciousness is just as independent of the existence of consciousness as the explanation of the assertions of the zombies. My zombie twin can adopt this argumentation, and complain about me as a zombie. It can mirror the whole situation. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Kaplan, D. | Stalnaker Vs Kaplan, D. | I 206 Def character/Kaplan: (= proposition meaning): a function of context to content. Context/Stalnaker: can be represented as centered world (centered poss.w.). Centered world/centered possible world/ poss.w./Stalnaker: shall represent the context here. I 207 Content: is here represented by propositions Proposition: function of poss.w. to truth values. Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: is then a two-dimensional intension. (Kaplan 1989b) StalnakerVsKaplan: this paradigm does not answer the questions of basic semantics to the facts that determine the semantic values. It belongs to the descriptive semantics. That means it is not a theory on the interpretation of thoughts. Thoughts/interpretation/Stalnaker: is a question of basic semantics that means of the facts. Character/content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the original motivation for the separation was that sentence meanings do not represent the expressed thoughts. Content/Stalnaker: = secondary intension. Content/Kaplan: that what is being said. The thought, the information that the speaker intends to transmit. I 208 Solution/StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan's approach must be expanded by a theory of thoughts and a language theory. This allows us to treat a wider domain of expressions as context-dependent than normally. II 5 Double indexing/double index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan Demonstratives, 1968): thesis: 1. a) the meaning of a proposition determines the content relative to the context but b) the content determines a truth value only relative to a poss.w. Stalnaker: so Kaplan's theory was two dimensional or double indicated. Context/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was represented by an index like the one of Montague and propositions were interpreted relative to this index Content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the actual values of the interpretation function were then, however, the contents and not the truth values, while Def content/Kaplan: a function of poss.w. on truth values. 2. Kaplan second modification: Index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was limited: Index/Montague/Stalnaker: only a list of time, speaker, place, maybe poss.w.) Index/Kaplan: only: the relations between these must also be considered. That means an index can represent the content only when the agent is actually at the location in the poss.w.. II 6 Context dependence/Stalnaker: is, however, pervasive: adjectives like e.g. "large" are interpreted relative to contextually specific comparison classes. Likewise e.g. "I", "here", "now" (index words). StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan (1968) says nothing about this. II 10 Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Kaplan was about proposition types. Propositional concept/p.c./StalnakerVsKaplan: are, however, associated with certain statement tokens. This p.c. is dependent on the semantic properties that these tokens have in the poss.w. in which they occur. This is no contradiction to Kaplan's and my theory. It is simply about different issues. II 162 de re/belief/ascription/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan has an intermediate position (between Quine and Stalnaker): Ascription/Kaplan: (like Quine) is not ascribed to a certain conviction. de re/logical form/Quine/Kaplan: de re-ascription: existence quantification. Truth conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: here Kaplan follows the semantic approach: ascriptions de re are only then true if the believer has to be in a relation with the knowledge. Intensification: the name must denote the individual. E.g. "a is a spy": here a must not only denote Ortcutt, but there are additional conditions 1. for the content 2. for the causal relation between the name, the individual and the believer. Pointe/Stalnaker: it is still possible that all the conditions are fulfilled by two different names. Thus, the examples can be described without having to ascribe conflicting belief. KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: his approach also covers cases in which Quine's analysis was too liberal. StalnakerVsKaplan: his approach is an ad hoc compromise. Knowledge/ascription/Stalnaker: in the semantic analysis knowledge is self-evident without it you cannot believe anything. You cannot believe a proposition without having detected the expressions occurring in the concepts in which they are defined. StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. but the need for knowledge loses its motivation when it is grafted to Quine's approach. 2. Kaplan keeps the artificial assumption that de re-ascriptions ascribe no particular belief and he is bound to the sententialism (propositions as belief objects). II 163 At least it have to be proposition-like objects with name-like constituents. de re/ascriptoin/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we instead accept propositions as sets of poss.w.. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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