Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Round Square | Chisholm | I 21 Meinong/Chisholm: Solution: there is the possibility of something round and there is the possibility of something quare - nothing has both. - There are properties that can not even be exemplified. >Exemplification, >Instantiation, cf. >Heterology. I 22 Solution: each property is such that there is a possibility that there is someone who thinks of it. >Properties, >Predication, cf. >Conceivability. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Round Square | Frege | IV 110 "Round square"/Frege: "round square" is the name of an empty, but possible concept. Nothing has fallen under it. >Concept, >Object, >Non-existence, >Reference. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
Round Square | Quine | VII (a) 5 Round Square/Quine: There can be no unrealized possibility - it is not meaningless! - If all contradictions were meaningless, we would have no test of what has meaning and what does not - descriptions eliminate the problem of how to deny existence. Negation: E.g. "The author of Waverley does not exist" would then be: the alternation: "Either each thing has not written Waverley or more than two things wrote Waverley". "Round square" cannot be analyzed in the same way. Neither can be Pegasus be analyzed as a single word. >Pegasus example. Solution: basic: "the thing that pegasizes": then there is no more tacit presupposition that was demanded by the tradition. VII (a) 7 Existence/Descriptions/Quine: descriptions eliminate the problem of how to deny existence. Negation: Example "the author of Waverley is not": would then be: the alternation: "Either every thing did not write Waverley or more than two things wrote Waverley." "Round Square": cannot be analyzed in the same way. III 258 Unicorn/round square/name/meaning/singular term/Quine: Conclusion: that something has the task of denoting something (i.e. is significant) does not depend at all on it fulfilling this task. Significant/Quine: at first only: to have the task of designating something. Unsuccessful designation! In any case, the designated object is not the meaning of the word. (Confusion of meaning and designated object). >Meaning, >Reference. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Round Square | Russell | I 95 Identification/name/personal name/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: E.g. "round square" is a description, not a proper name. description: incomplete symbol. Name/Russell: complete symbol. >Description, >Name, >Incomplete symbol. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Meinong, A. | Brentano Vs Meinong, A. | Brandom I 128 Intending/intention /representation BrentanoVsMeinong: to represent can only be understood as intending to represent the owner. (Success verb). (> Round square). |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Meinong, A. | Quine Vs Meinong, A. | Re III 160 QuineVsMeinong "logical slums" others: "Meinong s jungle". Stalnaker I 55 QuineVsWyman/QuineVsMeinong/Stalnaker: (Quine, 1961.5, "On what there is"): (Wyman: fictitious Meinongian): his luxurious universe of possibilities is nullified if we no longer speak of Pegasus but of the round square. If - unless Pegasus would exist - it would be nonsense to say it did not exist, then for the same reason - unless the round square would exist - it would be nonsense to say that it does not exist. Quine: can we then make Wyman to assume that he accepts a realm of unrealized impossibilities? Quine: difference: Pegasus could have existed, not the round square. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Meinong, A. | Meixner Vs Meinong, A. | I 62 Round Square/Description/Meinong/Meixner: the Meinongian does not say that the round square exists, he goes even further and says that it cannot exist at all, he insists only that it is an entity. I 63 MeinongVsRussell: if the description "the golden mountain" designates an incomplete individual, then probably also the following description is exactly the same: "the existing golden mountain". MeixnerVsMeinong: not very convincing. However: "Weak Sense"/Existence: like Holmes, you can say in the weak sense, "it has the property F to exist". But that is not the strong sense. Possibilia/Meixner: individual-like entities that are at least in principle able to exist. ((s) So not a round square). Question: Is there such a thing? That would be exactly the ee maximum consistent individuals. The impossible are not ee maximum consistent. Maximum consistent individuals: e.g. Meixner, Bush, (sets of properties). Pure Posssibilia: only possible individuals. Are there any? Language: interestingly, has no names for pure Possibilia! I 64 Nevertheless, there is some ontological evidence of the presence of pure possibilia: It is clear that some individuals are actual, but could not have been actual (e.g. humans). Meixner: Thesis: the reverse assumption, that some are not actual but could have been actual, naturally occurs next to this fact. Meixner: certain actual individuals refer to non-actual ones: egg and sperm cells from which a human never emerges. Should we now say here that it merely seems as if it refers to a possible human being, and that at the other end there is no reference relationship (reference). Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the merely possible human does not have certain qualities, e.g. an exact date of birth, (i.e. he does not have them in the real (actual) world, but nevertheless he has the negation of these qualities. Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the predisposition for blue eyes (the egg and sperm cells) leave nothing to be desired in positive determination! Def maximum consistent/Meixner: of every individual characteristic the individual contains either this or his negation. ((s) > continuous determination/Kant). Pure Possibilia/Meixner: this applies to merely possible. The individual is, so to speak, nothing other than this set of properties (see above). |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Thomas Aquinas | Mackie Vs Thomas Aquinas | Stegmüller IV 394 proof of the existence of God/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: (third argument) two stages: 1. "What can not be, is not at any one time!: VsThomas: even that is doubtful: if "ephemeral things" are meant, the premise is even analytical. But it does not follow that there would have been nothing at any time. The transience may only occur in the future. 2. VsThomas: The existence of finite objects can overlap. IV 395 VSVS: this overlap could however be regarded as a single object! but this suggests the problematic idea of an underlying carrier substance. 3. VsThomas: implicitly in Aquinas: "What does not exist, can not begin to exist unless through something that exists." Now, if the sequence would have been interrupted once, it could not have been continued by anything. HumeVsThomas: we may well form the concept of uncaused cause (uncaused commencement of existence). If what we can imagine were impossible, this would have to be proven! (> Frege: contradictory terms as possible terms: then simply nothing falls into them, Cf. Round Square/Frege). Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: Anyway, let's assume there is at least one necessary and unchangeable thing. Proof of the existence of God/Infinity/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: 2. second order: Aquinas admits that the eternity of one thing could be caused by another thing; it could remain in existence by the other. But: one can not go back endlessly in the sequence of such things. IV 396 For in this order of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the second and the second is the cause of the latest, whether many intermediate links are present, or just one! But the effect is dependent on the cause. If there is no first in the sequence, then there can be no last or second. In an infinite series there is therefore no effect and no cause. MackieVsThomas: this is not conclusive: although the second is caused by the first in a finite sequence, that does of course not apply if the order of the causes were infinite. Here, every cause is caused by a previous one. Error: if we consider an infinite instead of a finite order, then the way in which the first member (first cause) "disappears", does nt include the "disappearance" of the following causes! VsVs: Mackie admits that one could improve this to become a truly conclusive argument: in a sequence, it is assumed that a relation of '"holding" or "carrying" exists, as there is in a chain. Ex. we would be very surprised if someone claimed that an infinitely long train could go without a locomotive, because the last car would be pulled from the penultimate, this one in turn from its predecessor and so on... Ex. as if an infinitely long chain did not need hangers, because each member would be held by the neighboring member. IV 397 Thomas Aquinas: his argument is: where an order of dependency relations exists, one can not go back infinitely. Such an order can therefore be neither infinite nor circular. (This is also found in the Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi). Mackie: improved version of the argument by Aquinas: ("necessary" means the same as "imperishable" here): Each necessary thing either depends on something in its imperishability or it is necessary in itself. Something whose nature does not include the existence, must others depend for its existence on anything. Mackie: thereby we actually obtain a relationship of dependency which makes it necessary to make the going back in the chain of causes come to an end. In addition, then it is certain that only a being whose essence involves existence, can conclude the going back. MackieVsThomas: however, we have no reason to accept the implicit assumption of Aquinas. IV 398 Why should there be an imperishable primordial matter, whose nature includes existence, but its existence isn't derived from anything? Unlike Leibniz: the primordial matter were simply a hard fact which would have no sufficient reason. Borrowing from Leibniz would also not save Thomas' argument. Conclusion: MackieVsThomas/MackieVsLeibniz: we understand that everything that has a chronologically previous cause depends on this (somehow). But it does not follow that everything besides God needs something else on which it depends in this way (as a cause). IV 399 "Principle of Al Farabi": in a sequence of relations of dependency (that is an order) there must be an end. MackieVsAl Farabi: why should God be the only exception? Thereby one would burden the popular argument with exactly those thoughts that led to the collapse of its philosophical correspondences. Or else one seeks refuge in a mere mystery. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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VsWyman | Quine, W.V.O. | Staln I 55 Pegasus / QuineVsWyman / Quine: could exist - the round square cannot - I 65 Wyman: Thesis: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis. |
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