Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Realism | Boyd | Horwich I 495 Anti-Realism/Boyd (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two kinds: a) empiricist thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically. - b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community. >Instrumentalism, >Empiricism, >Theories, >Constructivism, >Scientific Community, cf. >Anti-Realism/Dummett, >M. Dummett. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Conflicts | Weber | Habermas III 322 Conflicts/Weber/Habermas: Weber's thesis: Conflicts emerge more sharply with the awareness of human relations to the various spheres of external and internal possession of goods. The different (cultural) value spheres are: cognitive, normative and aesthetic ideas. Ideal goods exist within the scientific community, the religious community and the art business. >Value spheres, >Science, >Art, >Culture. Rationalisation: the more it progresses, the more conflicts emerge. >Rationalization. Habermas III 323 For Weber, conflicts do not arise externally, from different interests, but internally from the incompatibility of structures. >Structures. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Dialectic | Plato | Bubner I 34 Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. I 37 DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). >Sophists/Plato. I 38 Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Def "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial. >Dialectics/Aristotle. Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary. I 39 Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. >Kant, >Dialectic/Hegel. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language. I 111 Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference. C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic. >Knowledge/Plato, cf. >Propositional logic. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Education Policy | Economic Theories | Mause I 509f Education policy/Economic Theory: Education policy is a topic that concerns various institutions such as schools, universities, further education measures, vocational promotion, etc. Educational goals can be: e.g. purpose-free personality development, acquisition of skills that are necessary for socio-cultural integration, development of professional, economically usable competencies for the world of work. University policy: "Clark's Triangle" (1): The cornerstones are: State, market, civil society. Based on this, types of higher education policy are characterized: A. "State model of authority": originates in Napoleonic higher education in France. Control through interventions covering finance, admission, curricula, human resources policy, etc. B. The Humboldt model of the "self-governing scientific community". Internal governance is achieved through a collegial system of negotiation and a professorial chair. C. Anglo-Saxon "market model": largely free of state control. Internal competition governs governance. Internally, universities and business enterprises are centrally controlled. Private resources play an important role. Similar models and configurations can also be found in adult education and continuing education (2) and in the approaches to "Varieties of Capitalism" (3). Right to education/Dahrendorf: The basic consensus in education policy today includes a right to education, irrespective of the possibilities for its exploitation by those seeking human capital (Dahrendorf 1965) (4). By investing in education, the productivity of the labour provider is increased. The wage then corresponds to the marginal productivity of the work. Offer-oriented education policy serves the interests of the learner. Individuals decide on costs and benefits by allocating their time budget. If the individual now knows the costs of the training and the future additional profits that he or she will achieve through his or her higher qualification, it can, on the assumption of a certain planning horizon and a market interest rate, determine the present value of its possible investment. If the logic of the investment calculation is followed, the investment with the highest cash value is to be preferred. 1. Clark, Burton R. 1983. The higher education system. Academic organisation in cross-national perspective. Berkeley 1983. 2. Käpplinger, Bernd, und Steffi Robak, (Hrsg). Changing configurations of adult education. Changing configurations of adult education in transitional times. Frankfurt a. M. 2014 3. Hall, Peter A., und David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford 2001. 4. Ralf Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1965. Bildung ist Bürgerrecht. Plädoyer für eine aktive Bildungspolitik. Hamburg 1965. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| IPCC | Edwards | Edwards I 585 IPCC/Edwards: Peer review is not a truth machine, automatically separating good science from bad. But the peer review of IPCC assessments differs in several ways from the processes used by scientific journals. First, most of the literature considered during IPCC assessments has already undergone peer review once (at the time of publication). Second, IPCC reports are assessments, not primary science; as a result, IPCC peer review is designed to capture both agreement and disagreement. IPCC rules of procedure specifically direct authors to call legitimate controversies to readers’ attention: “In preparing the first draft, and at subsequent stages of revision after review, Lead Authors should clearly identify disparate views for which there is significant scientific or technical support, together with the relevant arguments. . . . It is important that Reports describe different (possibly controversial) scientific, technical, and socio-economic views on a subject, particularly if they are relevant to the policy debate.”(1) Finally, IPCC review reaches well beyond the scientific community. Unlike peer review for journals, where only expert opinions are solicited, here partisan, non-expert views are deliberately solicited and their concerns addressed (to the extent the scientific framework permits). Despite its imperfections, this exhaustive, multiple-level, highly transparent review process remains the best approach we have for evaluating climate knowledge. It brings controversy within consensus, it limits bias, and it connects the world’s far-flung climate science communities in an ongoing process. This extraordinary process distinguishes climate science from nearly all other scientific arenas, and it warrants my concept of a “climate knowledge infrastructure.” 1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Procedures.” https://www.ipcc.ch/documentation/procedures/ (16.06. 2021) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Jury Theorem | Condorcet | Gaus I 148 Jury theorem/Condorcet/Dryzek: This theorem demonstrates that if each citizen has a better than even chance of being correct in his/her judgement, then the larger the number of voters, the greater the chance of the majority choosing the correct option. The jury theorem therefore justifies the rationality of majoritarian democracy, at least in a republican context of a search for the common good, though only if each citizen reaches and exercises independent judgement. So there should be no factions (which reduce the effective number of voters) and, it might seem, no communication. These, at least, were Rousseau's own views: deliberation should only be a matter of internal reflection, not communication. However, as Robert Goodin (2002(1): 125) and others point out, discussion is fine so long as people then subsequently exercise their own independent judgements when voting. >Democracy/Dryzek, >Deliberative Democray/Dryzek. Problems with deliberation and democracy: If democracy involves aggregation (however much it is downplayed by deliberative democrats), that can be across judgements and not just across preferences as emphasized in social choice theory. Such judgements can involve disagreement over (say) what is in the common good. This epistemic way of thinking about democracy is associated with Rousseau, according to whom the general will can be ascertained by voting. Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld (1988)(2) argue that if indeed there is such a thing as the common good, though people differ in their judgements about which option will best serve it, then Condorcet's jury theorem applies. 1 Goodin, Robert E. (2002) Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Grofman, Bernard and Scott Feld (1988) 'Rousseau's general will: a Condorcetian perspective'. American Political Science Review, 82: 567-76. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Parisi I 494 Jury theorem/Condorcet/Nitzan/Paroush: The Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) is considered one of the pioneers of the social sciences. In the English literature, Baker (1976)(1) and Black (1958)(2) were among the first to turn the attention of the scientific community to the importance of Condorcet’s writings (see Young, 1995)(3). In 1785 no jury existed in France. Condorcet applied probability theory to judicial questions and argued that the English demand for unanimity among jurors was unreasonable, suggesting instead a jury of twelve members that can convict with a majority of at least ten. >Condorcet Jury Theorem, >Decision-making processes. 1. Baker, M. K., ed. (1976). Condorcet: selected writings. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 2. Black, D. (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Young, P. (1995). “Optimal Voting Rules.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(1): 51–64. Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush. “Collective Decision-making and the Jury Theorems”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Condo I N. de Condorcet Tableau historique des progrès de l’ esprit humain Paris 2004 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Realism | Boyd | Horwich I 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: Horwich I 493 Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? >Realism, >Internal Realism/Putnam, >Truth. Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. >Method, >Reliability. Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods. >Theory dependency. Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism. >Positivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles. >Observation Language. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts". >Science/Kuhn. Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner". >Theory ladenness. N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation. >Observation. Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism. Ad. 3. Vs: Horwich I 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept. BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism. Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Cf. >Redundancy theory. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth. >Deflationism. Horwich I 494 Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true. M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically. Horwich I 495 Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community >Literal truth, >Bare truth. M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today. Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism. >Constructivism. Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths. >Empiricism, >Correspondence. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Science | Merton | Surowiecki I 224 Science/Surowiecki: the reward for scientists consists in attracting attention from colleagues. Science/Merton: In science, private property is founded on giving away one's substance."(1) Surowiecki I 226 Merton: Thesis: There is no such thing as a scientific truth in which only one person believes and which is questioned by the rest of the scientific community. A thought only becomes truth when it is accepted by a large majority of scientists. (...) This is meant by the term "contribution to science": it is always provisional (...).(2) >Majority, >Minority, Cf. >Truth. Surowiecki I 228 Matthew-Effect/Terminology/Merton/Surowiecki: (in allusion to the verses of the Gospel of Matthew, "Who has, is given to him"): most scientific treatises find hardly any readers, while a small part of them delight many readers. Famous scientists are quoted considerably more often. When a famous scientist collaborates with others, he is attributed a greater share of the result. When two teams or two scientists make a discovery at the same time, the more famous of them are credited with their achievements. >Fame, >Glory. Surowiecki: the Matthew-Effect can be understood as a heuristic process: it serves as a sieve to channel the immense flow of information. >Information. 1. Robert K. Merton, »The Matthew Effect«, Science 159/1968), S. 56-63. 2. Robert K. Merton, »The Matthew Effect (II) – Cumulative Advantage and the Symbolism of Intellectual Property«, Property«, Isis 79/1988, S. 606-623. |
SocMerton I Robert K. Merton Social Theory and Social Structure New York 1968 Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Terminology | Weber | Habermas III 286 Ethics/Worldviews/Weber/Habermas: a world attitude (Weber distinguishes it from worldviews) expresses rationalisation to the extent that it is directed towards nature and society as a whole and thus presupposes a systematic concept of the world. A worldview can be considered rationalized to the extent that it highlights the "world" as a sphere of moral probation under practical principles and separates it from all other aspects. It presents the world a) As a field of practical activity at all b) As a stage on which the actor can fail ethical, c) As a totality of situations to be judged according to "last" moral principles and to be dealt with according to moral judgements and therefore d) As an area of objects and occasions of moral action. Habermas III 228 Def Rationalization/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization any expansion of empirical knowledge, of forecasting ability and of instrumental and organizational control of empirical processes. Habermas III 351 Def Positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Habermas III 318 Def Ethics of Conviction/Weber/Habermas: According to Weber, ethics of conviction is characterized by the following attitude: "The Christian does right and places success in God's hands."(1) Habermas: Weber thus enters into a philosophical discussion that was able to work out the stubbornness of moral-practical questions, the logic of the justification of norms of action, after morality and law had separated themselves from the terminology of religious (and metaphysical) world views. Habermas III 322 Value spheres/Weber/Habermas: The different (cultural) value spheres are: cognitive, normative and aesthetic ideas. Ideal goods exist within the scientific community, the religious community and the art business. Habermas III 258 Def Ideas/Cultural Relativism/Weber/WeberVsRelativism/Habermas: When Max Weber speaks of "last points of view" under which life can be rationalized, he does not always mean the cultural values, the contents that develop within a sphere of life in historical configurations, but sometimes also those abstract ideas that are decisive for the autonomy of a value sphere as such: such ideas are truth and success for the cognitive value sphere; justice and generally normative correctness for the moral-practical value sphere, beauty, authenticity, truthfulness for the expressive value sphere. Habermas: these ideas (or aspects of validity) must not be confused with the special contents of individual value spheres. Habermas III 258 value spheres/Weber: - cognitive value sphere: decisive: truth and success - moral-practical value sphere: decisive: justice and normative correctness in general - expressive value sphere: decisive: beauty, authenticity, truthfulness. Habermas III 231 Def rtionalization/law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. Gaus I 195 State/Weber/Morris: [a „definition“ of the state most often is] an abbreviated version of Max Weber's well-known characterization of the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (1919(2): 78). Weber says that 'the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the "right" to use violence. Habermas III 244 Def Value rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber: "He who acts purely value rationally, regardless of the consequences to be foreseen, in the service of his conviction of what seems to command duty, dignity, beauty, religious instruction, reverence, or the importance of a 'thing' of whatever kind. ... value rational acting is acting according to 'bids' or according to 'demands', which the actor has posed for him- or herself."(3) Habermas III 152 Procedural Rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber subjectively refers to a purpose-oriented action, "which is exclusively oriented towards (subjectively) as appropriately presented means for (subjectively) unambiguously conceived purposes."(4) Habermas III 245 Weber calls actions that satisfy the conditions of the rationality of means and choice 'procedural rational' and actions that satisfy the conditions of normative rationality are called 'value-rational'. Both aspects can vary independently of each other. Progress in the dimension of procedural rationality can be made at the expense of value-rational actions.(5) 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, S.552. 2. M. Weber (1946 [1919]) 'Politics as a vocation'. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociologv, eds and trans. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University 3. M.Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964. 4. M Weber, Methodologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M. 1968, p. 170. 5. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S. 22. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Theoretical Terms | Sneed | Schurz I 186 Def Theoretical Terms/Schurz: A term is called T-theoretical iff. from T follows at least one relevant assignment law for τ. >Relevance. SchurzVsSneed: There may also be other theories that provide a relevant assignment law for a given term. >Assignment. Schurz I 188 Theoretical terms/Sneed: a term is theoretical if theory must be presupposed in any measurement. BalzerVsSneed: this is too narrow: 1. the criterion refers to the entire state of knowledge of the scientific community, 2. a T theoretical term can be measured simultaneously by another theory T*. >Theoretical terms/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theory of Mind | Perner | Slater I 156 Theory of Mind/ToM/Perner: VsPerner: The whole point of Wimmer and Perner’s (1983)(1) study was to design a task that could not be mastered by mere behavior reading: only by representing the character’s belief was it possible to adequately predict her behavior. VsPerner: Problem: the (…) premise, that it is not warranted to infer the ability to represent mental states from success at the false belief task, is (…) questionable. As a matter of fact, if a typically developing child passes the standard false-belief task, the immediate inference is that she has the underlying ability to represent mental states. Similarly, if a chimpanzee were ever to pass a task structurally similar to the standard FBT (false-belief task), the scientific community would take this as the first solid evidence of ToM (Theory of Mind) in non-human animals. The interpretation of FBT passes in ASD has been radically different in the mindblindness framework. >Autism/psychological theories, >False-Belief Task/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/developmental psychology. It seems that when an individual with ASD passes a ToM test, they are never credited with a fully fledged representational ToM. (Rajendran and Mitchell 2007)(2). 1. Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition. 13, 103—128. 2. Rajendran, G., & Mitchell, P. (2007). Cognitive Theories of Autism. Developmental Review, 27, 224-260. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| World | Kuhn | I 185 World/Kuhn: The old question: how must the world be designed so that people can recognize it? - Not only the scientific community must be of a special kind - the world must have special properties. >Observability, cf. also >Anthropic Principle. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Sneed, J.D. | Schurz Vs Sneed, J.D. | I 186 Def Theoretischer Term/TT/Schurz: ein Begriff heißt T theoretisch iff aus T mindestens ein assignation law für τ relevant folgt. SchurzVsSneed: es kann auch andere Theorien geben, die ein assignation law (correspondence law) für einen bestimmten Begriff liefern. I 188 TT/Sneed: ein Begriff ist theoretisch, wenn in jeder Messung die Theorie vorausgesetzt werden muss. BalzerVsSneed: das ist zu eng: 1. bezieht sich das Kriterium auf den gesamten Wissensstand der scientific community, 2. kann ein T theoretischer Begriff gleichzeitig auch durch eine andere Theorie T* gemessen werden. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Idealism | Pro | Horwich I 492 Idealism: per: Kuhn: the scientific community states the simple facts - KuhnVsPositivism) |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Idealism | Kuhn, Th. | Horwich I 492 Positivism / theory: the observation language must be theory-neutral. Likewise, the methodological principles. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory-neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community fixes the "facts". |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Construktivism | Boyd, R. | Horwich I 495 Antirealism / Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-realism / BoydVsDummett): two ways: a) empiricist thesis that theories need to be reinterpreted in a instrumentalist manner. I 495 b) "constructivist" theory (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community. M. Williams: if this means that objects are not simply "given", then today virtually everyone is a constructivist. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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