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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adorno | Habermas | IV 490 Adorno/Horkheimer/Rationalization/Modernism/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno had disclosed the theory of class consciousness. They address the problem of linking the phenomena of the rationalization of life orders and the institutionalization of purpose-rational action (see Purpose Rationality/Weber) with the reification of consciousness (see Reification/Lukács) with the criticism of instrumental reason. This is a vision of an administered, totally reified world in which purpose rationality and rule merge. The theory has the advantage of focusing on the systemically induced deformation of communicatively structured life contexts. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: the weakness of its theory lies in the fact that it attributes the erosion of the lifeworld to the magic of a purpose rationality demonized to instrumental reason. Thus the criticism of instrumental reason falls into the same error as Weber's theory, and it also loses the fruits of its approach, which is nevertheless directed towards systemic effects. (See Instrumental Reason/Habermas). IV 558 Adorno/Horkheimer/Marcuse/Society Theory/Method/Habermas: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse stick to Freudian drive theory and reckon with the dynamics of an inner nature that reacts to social pressure but remains resistant to the power of socialisation at its core. (1) (AdornoVsFromm, HorkeimerVsFromm: See I/Fromm.) 1. This position has not changed later: vgl. TH.W. Adorno, Soziologie und Psychologie, in: Festschrift Horkheimer, Frankfurt 1955; H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, der, Verhalten der Psychoanalyse, in: ders, Kultur und Gesellschaft 2, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Art | Adorno | Grenz I 49 Art/Adorno: "Art is infinitely difficult, too, in the fact that it must transcend its concept [...] but that it adapts itself to the reification in which it is similar to realities, against which it protests ... (Ästhetische Theorie, p. 159). Art/Sense/Adorno: The abandonment of art to the category of meaning drives it into the arms of positivism (it is still a synonym for assimilated consciousness). (Ästhetische Theorie(1), p. 231). >Abstract Art, >Sense. Grenz I 104 Art/HabermasVsAdorno: Adorno's theory of the autonomy of art, which he sees represented in hermetic art, is a 'defensive' theory.(2) Grenz I 108 Abstract/art/Adorno/Grenz: the abstractness of the reference of the works of art to the psychological nominalism, existing before them, on which Adorno insists, are the consequences of the theorem of the ahistorical-ness of the ideological superstructure. >History/Adorno. Grenz I 186 Art/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno separates between the social content of the works of art and their monolithically-viewd suchness. >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. AdornoVs aesthetics of experience: Adorno adheres to the objectification character of the works of art. I 187 Either a work of art is communicative, but then it is at the same time, 'crude propaganda', or it is true as a critique of the communication system. But then it is socially ineffective. >Communication media. I 188 Art/Adorno: art is a practice as "formation of consciousness" (Ästhetische Theorie(1), p. 361). >Consciousness. 1. Th. W. Adorno. Ästhetische Theorie. In: Gesammelte Schriften 7, Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 1970. 2. J. Habermas. Bewusstmachende oder rettende Kritik: Die Aktualität Walter Benjamins. (1972). In: Jürgen Habermas: Politik, Kunst und Religion. Essays über zeitgenössische Philosophen. Reclam, Stuttgart 1978 (aktuelle Neuauflage 2006) S. 48–95) |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Horkheimer | Habermas | IV 490 Adorno/Horkheimer/Rationalization/Modernism/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno had disclosed the theory of class consciousness. They address the problem of linking the phenomena of the rationalization of life orders and the institutionalization of purpose-rational action (see Purpose Rationality/Weber) with the reification of consciousness (see Reification/Lukács) with the criticism of instrumental reason. This is a vision of an administered, totally reified world in which purpose rationality and rule merge. The theory has the advantage of focusing on the systemically induced deformation of communicatively structured life contexts. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: the weakness of its theory lies in the fact that it attributes the erosion of the lifeworld to the magic of a purpose rationality demonized to instrumental reason. Thus the criticism of instrumental reason falls into the same error as Weber's theory, and it also loses the fruits of its approach, which is nevertheless directed towards systemic effects. (See Instrumental Reason/Habermas). IV 558 Adorno/Horkheimer/Marcuse/Society Theory/Method/Habermas: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse stick to Freudian drive theory and reckon with the dynamics of an inner nature that reacts to social pressure but remains resistant to the power of socialisation at its core. (1) (AdornoVsFromm, HorkeimerVsFromm: See I/Fromm.) 1. This position has not changed later: vgl. TH.W. Adorno, Soziologie und Psychologie, in: Festschrift Horkheimer, Frankfurt 1955; H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, der, Verhalten der Psychoanalyse, in: ders, Kultur und Gesellschaft 2, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Instrumental Reason | Habermas | IV 490 Instrumental Reason/Habermas: the term suggests that the rationality of recognizing and acting subjects systematically expands into a higher-order purpose rationality. >Rationality, >Procedural rationality. Thus the rationality of self-regulated systems, whose imperatives override the consciousness of their integrated members, appears in the form of a totalized purpose rationality. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: thus, the two authors confuse system and action rationality. Therefore, they cannot sufficiently differentiate between the rationalization of action orientation IV 491 in the context of a (...) lifeworld on the one hand and the expansion of the control capacities of (...) social systems on the other. >System rationality, >Lifeworld. Autonomy/Spontanity: Therefore, they can only locate spontaneity, which is not yet captured by the reifying power of system rationalization, in irrational forces - in the charismatic force of leaders or the mimetic of art and love. >Spontaneity, >Art, >Mimesis. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Philosophy | Habermas | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemic against the Enlightenment turns the back on the social hopes of liberal societies. >Enlightenment, >Progress, >Liberalism, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsFoucault. Rorty III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists the assumption that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion exists in its political implications. >Marxism/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rationalization | Habermas | III 22 Rationalization/Sociology/Habermas: Understanding rational action orientations becomes the point of reference for understanding all action orientations. For sociology, this means the following relationship between meta-theoretical and methodological level: a) At the metatheoretical level, it chooses basic concepts that are tailored to the increase in rationality of modern life. b) At the methodological level, the understanding of rational action orientations becomes a reference point for the understanding of all action orientations (>Theory of Meaningful Understanding). This is about internal relationships between meaning and validity. >Sociology, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Theory, >Method. III 209 Rationalization/HabermasVsMarx/VsAdorno/VsHorkheimer/VsWeber/Habermas: the concept of rationality of these authors is too narrow to grasp the comprehensive social rationality they have in mind. >Rationality/Habermas, >Rationality/Adorno, >Rationality/Weber, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsMarx, >HabermasVsWeber. The term would have to be used at the same level as the productive forces, the subsystems of functional rational action, the totalitarian bearers of instrumental reason. >Productive Forces/Habermas. That is not happening. The concept of action of these authors is not complex enough for this. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. In addition, basic concepts of action and system theory must not be confused: LuhmannVsMarx, LuhmannVsWeber, LuhmannVsAdorno: the rationalization of action orientations and lifeworld structures is not the same as the increase in complexity of action systems.(1) >LuhmannVsWeber. III 457 Communicative action/rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 459 Rationalization/Habermas: the paradox of rationalization, of which Weber spoke, can be understood abstractly in such a way that the rationalization of the world allows a kind of system integration ((s) of subsystems with non-linguistic communication media such as money and power) that competes with the integration principle of ((s) linguistic) understanding and under certain conditions has a disintegrating effect on the world of life. >Lifeworld. IV 451 Rationalization/Modernism/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber could not classify the problems of legitimacy that a positivistically undermined legal rule raises within the pattern of rationalization of modern societies, because he himself remained imprisoned by legal-positivist views. >Legitimicy/Habermas. Solution/Habermas: Thesis: (p) The emergence (...) of modern societies requires the institutional embodiment of moral and legal concepts of a post-traditional nature, but (q) capitalist modernization follows a pattern according to which cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates beyond the realms of economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and takes precedence there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality. (r) This causes disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 452 Problem: a progressively rationalised lifeworld is simultaneously decoupled and made dependent on increasingly complex, formally organised areas of action such as economics and state administration. This takes sociopathological forms of internal colonization. To the extent that critical imbalances can only be avoided at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" experienced crises or pathologies threatening identity). IV 486 Paradoxically, rationalization releases both at the same time - the systemically induced reification and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always inherited the stigma that it dissolves traditional forms of life without saving their communicative substance. >Reification 1.N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Foucault, M. | Rorty Vs Foucault, M. | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemics against enlightenment turns the back on social hopes of liberal societies. III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists belief that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion consists in its political implications. V 8 Foundation/Final Justification/RortyVsHabermas: I distrust the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality". Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. If HabermasVsFoucault alleges relativism and challenges him to disclose its "normative standards". >Ultimate Justification. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs and says nothing. RortyVsFoucault: distrust him when he projects his desire for private Nietzschean autonomy in the public sphere. In this mood he rejects the democratic institutions. V 20 Cultures/Rorty: have no axiomatic structures. That they have institutionalized norms, actually means the same as Foucault's thesis that knowledge and power can never be separated. If at a certain time at a certain place you do not believe in certain things, you'll probably have to pay for it. V 21 RortyVsFoucault: but these standards are not "rules of language" or "criteria of rationality". They have the look of officials and policemen. Whoever disagrees, commits the Def Cartesian fallacy/Rorty: he sees axioms where nothing but shared habits reign. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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