Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 37 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Lycan | Cresswell I 112 Lycan/Belief/Conviction/Cresswell: Lycan's solution is quite different, Lycan thesis the sentence to which the belief is related, is not an entity of public language - rather, it is a kind of brain configuration. Cf. >Relation theory, >Belief objects, >Objects of thought, >Brain state. Brain State/Meaning/Lycan: thesis is not something that has a meaning, but I 113 a brain state is something that is a meaning. >Meaning, cf. >Propositions, >Intensions, >Language of thought. Brain State/Meaning/Cresswell: thesis: there is no way to understand a mental event, like e.g. that broccoli is disgusting, differently than based on any specification of its parts. >Understanding, >Analysis. I 114 Solution/Stalnaker/Cresswell: would probably say that mental events should be analyzed in terms of the actions that they have as a result. Then they would again be sets of possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Actions. (s) Conclusion: this is about whether a formalization is possible that does not exclude that someone does not know what he thinks. If such a formalization is possible, then the theory from which it follows cannot be right.) >Beliefs, >Self-knowledge, >Knowledge. |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Body | Nietzsche | Danto III 142 Thinking/body/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche tends to assume that just like a thought comes when it wants to and not when I want it to come - my body moves when it moves, and not when I want it to move. Danto III 150 Thinking as such does not need to be conscious. The term unconscious thinking is not contradictory.(1) Private language/language/Nietzsche: paradoxically, it follows from this that allegedly private words - words referring to our own inner states - form the basis and main component of our common and public language. Danto III 265 Body/Nietzsche/Danto: My idea is that each specific body strives to become master over the whole space and expand its power (...) but it continually encounters similar aspirations of other bodies and ends up arranging itself with those ('unite') that are sufficiently related to it.(2) >Unconscious, cf. >Private language/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. S. 274. 2. F. Nietzsche, Nachlass, Berlin 1999, S. 705. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Colour | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 117 Color/Color Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: red cannot be defined. >Definitions. I 165 Color/Color Words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: if colors were only represented by different names, that would be all the incompatibility - (no contradiction, no logical incompatibility) - on the other hand: if it is real functions that the points in the field of vision project on the color space (Wittgenstein pro), then there is real logical incompatibility .- "Red" and "green" as mere names are not contradictory - but they are when it comes to one single point - "(form of thought: Third) - (Hintikka: not explicit in Wittgenstein). >Contradictions, >Names. I 191/192 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The "colors" are not things that have certain properties so that you could easily look for colors or imagine colors that we do not know yet." I 323 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not want to let the differences between the individual experience of colors disappear. - On the contrary: public language must adapt to the nature of these experiences. I 324 It is not about "publicly used", but about "accessible for the public" - E.g. Robinson: must behave in a certain way for us to say that he plays a language game with himself. >Language Game. I 349 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is impossible to drive a wedge between physical and phenomenological color attribution... I 343 ...nor between pain and pain behavior. >Behavior. I 276ff Color/Color Words/Color Concepts/Color Theory/Experience/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at the end, we may delete the color experiences from our statements. I 377 The experiences, however, can be deleted just as little as pain - Color experience is, however, not about spontaneous expressions like sensations - WittgensteinVsPsychological Color Theories - VsEffect Theories of color - color tables are neither linguistically nor behavioristically bound. I 378 But our color words are not based on tables - (that would be like trying to put the rules above the language game)... I 379 ...nor on memories. I 380 Because of their privacy, our notions cannot be used in public language games. I 381 Solution: people simply follow certain language games - this is conceptual, not psychological - in the case of "red" we choose the image that comes to us while listening - (Philosophical Investigations/PI). I 383f Color/Color Words/Impression/Expression/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: We live in a world of impressions - (E.g. color impressions) - but we can only speak of them with reference to physical colors - Representation (Philosophical Investigations/PI § 280): if the painter gives a representation in addition to the image, by what right do we call both a representation? >Sensory impressions, >Representation. I 385 Although colors have a clearer structure than feelings, there is no essential difference between sensation concepts and color concepts. >Concepts. --- II 30 Colors/Color Words/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the fact that we can speak of greenish blue, but not of greenish red, is part of grammar - not psychology - Therefore, the entire color octahedron is not part of psychology. >Grammar. II 60 We need something additional to the color word "green". II 114 Color/Color Words/Grammar/Rule/Idea/Wittgenstein: it would be useless even to try to imagine red and green at the same time at the same place - on the other hand: useful: imagining to lift a man with one hand. II 118 MooreVsWittgenstein e.g. (see above) ...red and green... is a rule for "and". >Rules. II 212 Color/Notion/Wittgenstein: in color words it is essential that we envision a mental image - but this is not a mental act that animates a symbol. >Symbols. II 269 Color/General/Wittgenstein: the many instances of red have nothing in common - there is no thing that is common to all numbers. >Numbers. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Content | Chalmers | I 203 Content/experience/phenomenal belief/Chalmers: 1. What do our concepts like "consciousness" or "red experience" actually pick out (in a given world)? >Experience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reference. 2. What constitutes the content of these concepts, is it determined by the psychological nature alone, or also by the phenomenal? >Concepts, >Phenomena. I 204 Zombie: could it have the same intensions of beliefs as I do? If it is subject to a conceptual confusion, that might be the same for me. >Zombies, >Intensions. The zombie could not make true or false judgments about consciousness in itself, but also in relation to me! For it could not use the term properly. But the concept of consciousness differs from the concept of "water" insofar as the "acquaintance" with the object is much more direct in the case of consciousness. >Acquaintance, >Knowing how, >First person, >Other minds, >Incorrigibility. I 205 Experience: is there a public language usage, e.g. for the term "red experience"? >Language use. Problem: Inverted spectra. >Inverted spectra. Solution: Standard conditions for standard observers. Moreover, we do not want to limit the term to my personal experiences, but look at every one's experiences. >Observation, >Standard conditions. I 206 Qualia: secondary intensions are not enough. We also learn something when we learn how it is to experience something red: the experience of something red could have been different, but it is so. In this way, we limit the scope of possibilities. For this, however, we need different primary intensions. Cf. >Color researcher Mary. I 207 Communication/Qualia: Only if others can have such experiences (under relevant causal conditions), my Qualia are communicable. >Understanding, >Intersubjectivity. Content/Consciousness/Conclusion/Chalmers: Beliefs about experiences are central. And these cannot be the same with my zombie twin as with me. But we do not need a causal theory of knowledge. We can even refer to experiences by assuming a property dualism. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Property dualism. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Content | Lewis | Schwarz I 161 Content/DavidsonVsLewis: depends on the language that we speak - LewisVsDavidson: Content is a class of possible individuals that e.g. get the desire fulfilled - Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs. --- Schwarz I 169 Mental Content/Content/Lewis: class of possible situations where it rains, not class of possible worlds where it rains - What kind of worlds should that be? - It would have to be somewhere it rains here and now. Possible situations are centered worlds with a designated here and now. >Situations, >possible worlds. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Denotation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 328 Denotation/Reference/Wittgenstein: language game: reference occurs only within a language game. - On the other hand: Denotation: runs without a language game. >Reference, >Language game. Hintikka: It is precisely the absence of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotate". I 327 ff Denotation/Description/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a simple relationship of the type "denotation" only has content if the corresponding object exists and is open to the public. "Naming is something like attaching a name tag to an object." (WittgensteinVs, QuineVs) I 328 Remarks on the philosophy of Psychology/Wittgenstein: e.g. names that have meaning only in company of their bearers. They serve only for the avoidance of the constant pointing/showing, example: lines, points, angles in geometric figures, with A, B, C, ..a, b. etc." Denotation/Wittgenstein/Beetle Example/Hintikka: as Wittgenstein puts it, it is quite possible that everyone has something different in the box. If that were the case, we would not use the word "beetle" to describe a thing. For the word beetle to make sense, a public language game is needed to support it semantically. But it is precisely the lack of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotating". Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein: Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. >Colour. The point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Elm/Beech Example | Millikan | I 153 Elm/Beech/Expert/Layman/Understanding/to mean/Millikan: the layman can think something of gold, elm trees or monotremes, even if he has no knowledge of these. To mean: he can even mean the same as the expert! N.B.: there are therefore no full-bodied intensions, which are common to all idiolects of the speakers of a public language. Names/knowing/understanding/claiming/Millikan: Problem: is that not paradoxical? If I do not know anything about monotremes, except I've heard the name once, how can I mean the same with the word as the expert? E.g. Expert: I'm going to Brazil, to explore monotremes. I: What are monotremes? Expert: what do you mean with "monotreme"? Me: I mean what you mean, of course. Expert: do you know what monotremes are? Me: no idea, so I ask. Expert: then you cannot have meant the same as I have. Menon's paradox/Millikan: here we see a shadow of Menon's paradox. Solution/Carnap: instead of "What are monotremes" we actually ask "What does the term 'monotreme' mean?" ((s) > semantic ascent). Intuitive/Millikan: but this is the question about monotremes, not about words. Understanding/Millikan: even a parrot can ask something about monotremes without understanding anything of them. I 154 To mean/Parrot/Millikan: the parrot cannot mean the question of course. To mean/Millikan: I can mean something with "monotreme", because I intend that the word has its eigenfunction, even if I cannot specify it in detail. Expert/Layman/To mean/understanding/knowing/knowledge/Millikan: the paradox does not come from the fact that I cannot mean the same as the expert, but that there is a sense in which the expert knows what he means with "monotreme" and I do not know this in this sense ((s) not what I mean and not what the expert means). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Errors | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 106 Object/Acquaintance/Deception/Error/Russell/Moore/Hintikka: Thesis: because one can be mistaken, the objects of acquaintance are not the same as the physical objects ("illusion argument"). >Deceptions. I 335 Primary Language Games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: e.g. physiognomic language games - here doubts about certainty are useless. In primary language games, epistemological terms such as knowledge/belief/truth/error etc. do not occur. >Language games. I 339 Pain/Sensation/Error/Deception/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: I cannot be systematically mistaken in identifying my feelings. The connection to the public language is logical (conceptual), not empirical. II 59 Sense/Deception/Error/Wittgenstein: what enables us to judge the world correctly also enables us to judge it wrongly. >Sense. II 62 Machine/Deception/Error/Mistake/Wittgenstein: the machine itself contains nothing that can be right or wrong - it runs as it does. II 103 Memory/Criteria/Deception/Error/Wittgenstein: if you do not remember correctly, there must be another criterion besides memory. Then the memory itself is not tested. If one further asks: "how do you know?" You cannot help but say, "It seems to me." VI 188 Error/Deception/Wittgenstein/Schulte: only if error is possible we can say that we are right. Therefore, we cannot be wrong about our own pain. Therefore, however, it is pointless to talk about "absolute safety". (No criteria!). >Criteria. VI 189 But I can be as wrong about the contents of my bag as anyone. VI 220/221 Error/Wittgenstein/Schulte: can one say: an error has not only a cause, but a reason? I.e. approximately, it can be classified into the correct knowledge of the one erring. (Wittgenstein, On Certainty § 74). Only those who have further knowledge can make a mistake in the relevant field. VII 152 Skepticism/Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Late: the words "error", "doubt", etc. were also learned by philosophers from everyday language; they were not invented for the purpose of philosophy. VII 153 Deception/Wittgenstein/Late: when the philosopher asks if one could not be mistaken about everything ((s) "If everything were different..." > Skepticism/Davidson) then he uses the words in a way he would never use them in everyday life. VII 154 Wittgenstein: For example, one cannot say that one is wrong about something in one's joy. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Explanation | Schiffer | I 140 Explanation/reduction/Schiffer: if semantics can be reduced to the psychological, the contents of propositional attitudes can be explained without reference to meanings in public language. >Semantics, >Content, >Propositional attitudes, >Meaning, >Everyday language. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| First Person | First person, philosophy: this is about the question, how far the internal states of a subject are only accessible for this subject. Approaches that focus on the language assume that the acquisition of public language is a precondition for this access. They further claim that the access is not different in principal from the acces we have to others. See also privileged access, introspection, subjectivity, objectivity. |
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| Grice | Schiffer | Avramides I 114 Grice/Schiffer: (= intention-based approach) Grice is obliged to deny logical functions of meanings. - Instead: dependence on a (causal) fact (which is non-semantically specified). >Intention-based semantics, >Facts, >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. --- Schiffer I 13 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: the meaning must not determine the content. - Because semantic vocabulary must be avoided - therefore VsRelation Theory. The belief objects would have to be language independent. >Relation theory, >Objects of belief. I 241 Intention-based approach/Grice/Schiffer: works without Relation Theory and without compositional semantics. - Extrinsic explanation is about non-semantically describable facts of use. SchifferVsGrice: his theory has not enough to say about the semantic properties of linguistic units. I 242 Grice/Schiffer: (Grice 1957)(1): attempts to define semantic concepts of public language in terms of propositional attitudes (belief, wishing, wanting). With that nothing is assumed about the meaning itself. Def speaker-meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) Is non-circular definable as a kind of behavior with the intention to trigger a belief or an action in someone else. Def expression meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) that means the semantic features of expressions of natural language. - Is non-circular definable as certain types of correlations between characters and types of exercise of speaker-meaning. - Statement/extended: every act, that means something. >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. Schiffer: thus questions of meaning are reduced to questions about propositional attitudes. I 243 A character string has to have a particular feature, so that the intention is detected. >Intentions. I 245 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: Falsifying evidence is not a meaning-problem. Common knowledge is necessary, but always to refute by counter-examples. >Language community. Solution: to define common knowledge by counterfactual conditions. >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: not even two people have common knowledge. SchifferVsGrice: no one has set up a lot of reasonable conditions for speaker-meaning. Problem: a person can satisfy the conditions of (S) when he merely says that A intended to cause it, that A believes that p ((S) = lies). SchifferVsGrice: this approach is hyper-intellectual, presupposes too much intentions and expectations, that will never be divided. - The normal speaker knows too little to understand the expression-meaning by Grice. >Utterance meaning. I 247 E.g. I hope you believe me, but not on the basis of my intention. - A necessary condition to tell something is not a necessary condition to mean it as well. >Meaning/Intending. 1. H. Paul Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388 |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| I, Ego, Self | Davidson | Frank I 26 I, Ego, Self/Davidson: The "Myth of the Subjective" is the superstition, a thought required "mental objects". >Objects of Thoughts. Misguided self-belief can also be correctable in the first person authority, the social character of language is not abolished. Misguided self-belief is possible! >First Person, >incorrigibility, >public language. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Idiolect | Dummett | I 144 Kripke/Dummett: (Pierre - Example, Londres Example, Pierre believes London to be ugly but Londres to be beautiful) a translation is no hypothesis, but a constitutive principle (public language instead of idiolect). - (DummettVsQuine: idiolect not a priority. > Idiolect/Quine). III (c) 145 Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares himself responsible of the common usages - without fully dominating them. III (c) 150 The concept of Idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Introspection | Introspection: introspection is the investigation of a self-conscious subject of its own inner states. Prerequisites are, among other things, the ability to distinguish interior from external influences, as well as at least to some extent the use of a public language. Moreover, the subject must be able to compare past internal and external states with present internal and external states, and must be able to deliberately distinguish itself from other subjects. |
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| Introspection | James | Diaz-Bone I 35f Intropspection/James: introspection shows an exact analogy to the observation of physical data as the detection of single facts. There are exact relations among each other. Like in natural science. VsIntrospection: introspection presupposes prior knowledge. ((s) The meanings used in dealing with ourselves come from public language. >Private Language, >Intersubjectivity.) James pro Introspection: Peculiarities of the inner world of experience require an extension of the method. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Introspection | Millikan | I 310 Introspection/Wittgenstein/Millikan: introspection depends on others observing what I think and feel. (Millikan pro). - ((s) Access via >public language, >intersubjectivity.) |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Introspection | Putnam | V 97 Introspection/Putnam/(s): introspection does not supply the terms! It can neither specify nor constitute the content of a concept > Rule Following. Terms are only interpreted by practice. ((s) >Public Language.) |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Language | Field | Avramides I 113 Belief/Meaning/FieldVsReductionism: (VsReductive Griceans): it is circular, to want to explain the semantic properties by believe. (This also says the reductionism.) >Semantic properties. Field like Grice: one can explain believe without reference to the sentence. Solution: what makes a symbol a symbol for Caesar is the role in my learning. Field: then there can be no inner language without a public language. SchifferVsField: no problem: Grice (intention based semantics, IBS) does not need to assume that propositional attitudes have been acquired before the public language. Both goes hand in hand. Only there is no logical dependence between them (and to competence). >Intention-based semantics. Armstrong: both are logically connected. ((s) This is stronger than Schiffer's thesis.). >Propositions/Schiffer, >David Armstrong, >Stephen Schiffer. --- Soames I 481 Language/Truth-Definition/Field/Soames: when truth is defined non-semantically (i.e., speaker-independent, i.e. non-physical), language becomes an abstract object. It has its characteristics essentially. >Scott Soames. With other properties, it would be a different language - that is, it could not have been shown that the expressions could have denoted anything else. Then it is still contingent on language, which language a person speaks. But the semantic properties (truth, reference, applying) are not contingent. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Mentalese | Schiffer | I 73 Meaning in Mentalese determines meaning in public language, but not vice versa (on the content of thoughts). Fodor: we must see intentional properties of mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of the mental representations, which are implied in their tokening. Neural state: also exists if false. - There is no object, since with truth value. Schiffer: is still no system, not yet like a language. Harman: thesis: inner representations have sentence-like structure. >Mental representation. Lewis: language of the brain of synaptic connections and neuronal fires -> SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought). Other thesis: semantic properties are inherited from intentional properties. - (VsStrong thesis of a language of thought). Strong thesis of a language of thought Vs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionality. Tthis can be explained without public content. SchifferVs: that cannot be fulfilled. I 76 Mentalese/relation theory/Schiffer: which relation of sentences is there in Mentalese to sentences in English? >Relation theory. Problem: the mental sentence "s" cannot be specified by meaning in English (that would be circular). Also Vs core thesis of the strong thesis of a language of thought (semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of mental states). >Mental states. I 282 Mentalese/Schiffer: meaning is here not a question of convention and intention - unlike public language. >Convention, >Intention, >Everyday language. Solution/some authors: conceptual role (c.r.) in Mentalese. >Conceptual role. Public language: here sentences have a conceptual role only if they are also thought, not only spoken. Problem: we need a non-semantic relation between mental representation and public sentences. - Fortunately the inner code needs not to be mentioned here. E.g. "state with the same content". Problem: the speaker could believe a sentence only under additional assumptions. - This only with reference to content. - That does not work in a strong thesis of a language of thought. Conclusion: a neural sentence cannot be accepted without reference to the content as an object of belief. >Objects of belief, >Content. I 78 Mentalese/Schiffer: Relation theory requires complex properties, F which has everything; E.g. "flounders snore". Problem: we must not presuppose anything about the intentional properties of mental states or meaning in public language. I 79 Mentalese/Relation theory/belief/Fodor/Schiffer: for the attribution of truth values from situations to sentences: for this purpose, properties are used at the end of the causal chain. >Relation theory. Problem: quantification via properties as semantic values ultimately goes via propositions. >Propositions, >Quantification. Solution: SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) can use propositions together with conceptual roles for the individuation of content. - Truth values by M-function to possible situations - additional physical condition C. Problem: this approach needs the theory of representation - (in which mental representation is only a special case). Truth conditions: formula: a is the truth condition for s in x' inner code if under optimal conditions x s believes if and only if a exists. - So we can identify a pattern of neuronal firing with the display of a fly for a frog. Problem: only under optimal conditions. SchifferVsFodor: then everyone is omniscient and infallible. I 87 Mentalese/Charity Principle/Schiffer: the charity principle is not for mentalism - this would have to be explained in terms of propositions. I 83-90 Relation theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: Problem: competing attribution functions for truth conditions ("M functions") - wrong solution: "larger survival value" does not exclude wrong attribution functions - e.g. weight/mass. I 189 SLT/strong thesis of a language of thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: thesis 1. the brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code. Schiffer: I can agree with that. 2. there is a computational relation R for every belief that one can have, so that one has this belief iff one has R for this formula. Schiffer: that works, but only with substitutional quantification. E.g. "Nodnol si yggof": Mentalese for London is foggy. Then the sentence means that, but is not compositional. N.B.: then the content of belief cannot be reduced. - (SchifferVsReductionism) - ((s) Mental content is irreducible (Schiffer pro Brentano). E.g. knowledge-how cannot be analyzed in other terms - there is no fact that makes that something is this faith - + + >Knowing-how, >Nonfactualism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Other Minds | Ryle | I 249 Other minds/Ryle: our self-talk is not something that is reserved for us. ((s) Explanation: we think about ourselves in a public language.) RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Pain | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 339 Pain/sensation/error/delusion/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: I cannot systematically deceive myself in identifying my feelings - the connection to the public language is logical (conceptual), not empirical. Pain/blue book/criterion: E.g. how I explain my toothache to someone else: I hold my jaw. E.g. Supposing I observe, in certain cases, that someone has a red spot on the jaw. I would then conclude that certain phenomena always occured with the appearance of the red spot. ... >Criteria, >Certainty, >Knowledge, >Justification, >Evidence. I 264 How do you know that someone has a toothache, if he holds his jaw? Here we have reached the end of our wisdom, that is, we have arrived at the conventions. These "conventions" are exactly the same what Wittgenstein calls elsewhere in this discussion "criteria". They are the "hard rock" of the semantics of expression "toothache". "Using a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. I do not identify my sensation through criteria but I use the same expression. I 265 Behavior/language/meaning/Wittgenstein/Philosophical examination/Hintikka: if one teaches a child the word "pain", so one teaches the child a new pain-behavior. The word expression replaces crying and does not describe it. But if that is so, the use of the word "pain" can be as little related to criteria such as the crying of the child is based on criteria. I 267 Pain/Wittgenstein/late: there is simply no criterion for pain. Criteria are only criteria because of the language game, whose "steps" they are. Only in the language game of spontaneous pain expression a distorted face is a "criterion". I 321 Picture/terminology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not like the term "picture" in the Philosophical Investigation § 301 anymore: "An idea is not a picture but a picture may correspond to it." "To say: the picture of pain enters the language game with the word "pain", is a misunderstanding. The idea of pain is not a picture but the idea of pain well enters in a sense the language game, just not as a picture..." --- II 166f Pain/Wittgenstein: we certainly have criteria for real pain as opposed to feigned in others. - It is not so that we can only know foreign pain indirectly like we e.g. cannot see the content of a foreign purse - meaningful: "His pain is worse than mine" - pointless: "two people cannot have the same pain." - Pointless: if there is no criterion - then it is meaningless to speak of ignorance. II 172 Pain: Does not refer to an owner. - One might as well say "There is pain". >Reference. II 173 The location of the pain sensation has nothing to do with the person. >Person. --- VI 184 Pain/Wittgenstein/Schulte: for pain, I distinguish intensity - not owners. --- Bubner I 212 Pain/Wittgenstein/Bubner: is not the actual object of investigation, otherwise the psychical would be declared a realm of objects of its own kind. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Picture (Mapping) | Millikan | I 158 Picture/Meaning/Millikan: Expressions of the public language are often handed down for reasons that have nothing to do with their mapping function. E.g. "bewitched": such a term has no meaning, its only meaning is its intension. ((s) Intension here: personal reasons for use). N.B.: that an expression has no meaning must be discovered empirically. It cannot be known a priori. >Picture theory, >Language, >Presentation. I 198 Identity/Meaning/Picture/Millikan: The meaning of "A is B" requires that "A" and "B" map to the lowest word types that have a special relation to each other, namely that they have the same referent. Problem: the focused stabilizing function of "A is B" is not to produce inner terms in the listener that map words! Representation: this is the reason why "A is B" is an intentional icon, it is not a representation. Referent: do "A" and "B" have referents? So far we've talked about something that needs to be here, and that is the real value so that it works normally. >Terminology/Millikan. I 199 Real value: must be defined beforehand by the content of the rest of the icon or sentence. Real value: from "A": is the word type "A". And this is not determined by the content, but only by the form of the rest of the sentence. Picture/Identity/Reference/Millikan: no one who passed through Carnap's school would assume that "A" refers to the word "A". Reference/Millikan: here we have to distinguish two types of reference. >Reference/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Pierre (Londres-Example) | Dummett | I 144 Kripke/Dummett: (Pierre-Example, Londres-Example) Translation is not a hypothesis, but a constitutive principle. (It is about a public language, not about an >idiolect). - (> VsQuine: idiolect has no priority). ((s) Explanation/(s): Piere believes that Londres is beautiful but he heard that London is ugly.) |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Private Language | Nietzsche | Danto III 142 Thinking/Body/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche tends to assume that just like a thought comes when it wants to and not when I want it to come - my body moves when it moves, and not when I want it to move. >Body/Nietzsche. Danto III 150 Thinking as such does not need to be conscious. The term unconscious thinking is not contradictory.(1) Private language/language/Nietzsche: paradoxically, it follows from this that allegedly private words - words referring to our own inner states - form the basis and main component of our common and public language. >Unconscious. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. S. 274. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Private Language | Wittgenstein | Newen I 36 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: language that is enriched by expressions of private feelings. - Beetle-Example: the thing in the box is not part of the language game - it could also be missing - or constantly changing - a person alone cannot give a meaning. --- Hintikka I 308 Private Language/private/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing and rules can be private but language games cannot. >Ostension, >Rules, >Rule following, >Language games. I 308/309 Private Language/WittgensteinVsPrivate Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: because you have to understand the whole language-game, not merely its ostensive definition, or the rule for the use of a word, the language cannot be private - if the language games would not take precedence over the rules, private language would be possible. I 309 Private language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: understanding only by whole language-game, therefore not purely phenomenological (private). I 310 Self-talk: early: only possible if I can already play on the (public) language piano. I 311 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is not about the impossibility of a phenomenological language. - We can encourage ourselves, command, blame, etc. - An external researcher could also translate our self-talk. Cf. >Self-talk/Psychology, >Phenomenology. I 314 Private Language/Wittgenstein/HintikkaVsStegmüller/Hintikka: but it is not so that it would be sufficient to only need to pay attention to the role of the utterances in life - as if the private experiences would disappear. -> Beetle-Example: VsStegmüller: Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of private experiences. - The change to the physical language does not even touch the ontological status of phenomenological experiences - the objects remain, even if we have to talk in another language about them. Private language argument: should show how we accomplish this feat. I 337 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: wrong: to exclude them because of the impossibility of intersubjective comparisons of private experiences. - One could have a private language in which one only speaks about his beetle - and refuses to translate it into the public language - that would be solipsism. - However, it would not be a unsuitable language philosophy. --- Explanation/(s): Beetle-Example/Wittgenstein: assuming every human has a box with a beetle, which he never shows to anyone else. But he himself can always see if the bug is still in the box. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 293. "The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something. By this thing in the box it can be shortened. It lifts off, whatever it is." - The example shows that completely privately held entities do not exist as something objective > More authors on private language > more authors on intersubjectivity. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Privileged Access | Privileged Access, philosophy of mind: what is meant here is the access a human subject has to his own inner states. It is debatable whether there is any privileged access at all. Counter-arguments are put forward by authors who assume that one can only grasp one’s feelings in a public language, that is, with concepts learned in the external world. See also introspection, foreign psychological, private language. |
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| Privileged Access | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 316 ff Beetle-Example/private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the existence of the beetle is not disputed - Problem: comparison only through public language - Color: problem actually the concept of color uniformity (i.e., the method of comparison). - Experiences: the problem is not that the memory can be deceptive, but it is not defined what it actually is what we should remember. - Wittgenstein: an explanation cannot be uttered. I 320 Sensations are private - sensation language cannot be private. - Wittgenstein does not criticize the metaphysics of Descartes - but his semantics. >Experience, >Sensations. Beetle-Example/language game/private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the linking of experiences with words or gestures is a semantic (logical) one - it is not about remembering one's own experiences - this is not a step in the language game. - ((s) Because it takes place without words of the public language.) I 342 It's not about imperceptibility but about the impossibility of comparison with others. >Incorrigibility. I 332f I 348 Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Steps in them are not correctable - otherwise they could not serve as the basis of the relation language/world - in primary language games there are no criteria - but they can provide criteria as a whole for mental processes. - Terminology: "primary language games": for Wittgenstein: "beginning of the language game". >Language games. I 375 Definition Beetle Example/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: = the question whether the terms for private experiences are actually names of these experiences - that is not the same as the question of "natural expressions" for sensations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Loar | Avramides I 35 Propositional attitude/Loar/Avramides: when placed on the right side of biconditionals, one no longer has to do with meaning, but with the content of propositional attitudes. Avramides: caution: two types of semantics: Def wide semantics: covers meaning, truth, reference, etc. Def narrow semantics: quasi-equivalent to "meaning". Propositional attitudes/Avramides: further distinction: a) public language b) language of mind (Mentalese). >Language of thought. Reductionism: can analyze propositional attitude only non-semantically. LoarVspropositions about belief. Avramides I 78 Meaning/Grice/reduction/psychology/semantics/Avramides: Question: must the analysis use psychological terms which are not based on the semantic concepts first analyzed? >Meaning theory. Loar: yes, you can analyze propositional attitudes without semantic concepts of public language.(1) >Meaning theory/Loar. 1. Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Propositional Content | Brandom | I 215 Propositional content/Brandom: from social structures that transmit it, fundamental representational contents - ((s) what is considered to be correct perception is socially regulated by standards.) I 217 Auxiliary hypotheses are different from person to person. I 218 Access: to pragmatics. Normativally - to semantics: inferentially - to the interaction between conceptual contents: social. I 236 Propositional content/Field/Brandom: two-staged: 1) belief in Mentalese, 2) meaning in public language. I 327 Maths propositional content: without empiricism. I 240 Propositional content/Brandom: (the believable) shall be distinguished by the pragmatic property of assertibility. I 254 Definition propositional content: that which is expressed by performances and which determines the specific characteristics of their significance within the genus of asserting. I 402 Propositional content: role as premises - starts with the concept of truth instead of inference - Definition action: make something true. I 473 Propositional content/Brandom: Thesis: cannot play a fundamental explanatory role - is parasitic to the expressive role! - It is about the act of asserting and not about what is asserted. I 873 Content/Brandom: propositional and other conceptual contents with which the behavior of the system is to be measured, cannot be justified with this behavior itself. >Justification. I 897 Propositional content/Brandom: what we mean depends on the actual circumstances, even if we do not know what they are. This is the perspective character of propositional content - hence the externalism begins at home: The contents of external definitions depend on their actions and of the truth of that which they make an assertion about. >Circumstances, >Meaning (intending), cf. >Externalism. --- II 207 Propositional content/Brandom: always also representational - propositional content can be reflected on in concepts of truth or reasons - "aboutness", "about" is not necessary in addition to representation - but propositional content must be able to be characterized non-representationally. II 263 Objectivity/Brandom: of the propositional content: the objectivity (fact) says nothing about who could reasonably assert something - and such facts would even exist without living beings - this objectivity is a characteristic that we can make understandable as a structure of the definitions and authorisations - every community that recognizes definition and authorization as a normative status can recognize propositional content that are objective in this sense. >Objectivity. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Psychology | Vygotsky | Deacon I 450 Psychology/Language/Wygotski/Deacon: In the 1930s, Wygotski put forward the theory that many psychic processes in humans can be understood as internalized versions of processes that are actually social. The use of the public language can then be perceived as a means of forming a certain distance from our subjective experiences. In this way, we include a speaker/listener relationship in our cognition and thus a virtual social distance that allows us to reflect on ourselves. So we can talk to ourselves as we talk to others. >Language, >Language use, >Language/Wittgenstein, >Use, >Description levels, >Reflection, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Development/Wygotski: Wygotski sees our psychological development as a process,... I 451 ...by adapting to social norms in this way. >Norms, >Sozialisation. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Reduction | Avramides | I 78 Meaning/Grice/reduction/psychology/semantics/Avramides: Question: must the analysis use psychological terms which are not based on the semantic concepts first analyzed? >Meaning theory. Loar: yes, you can analyze propositional attitudes without semantic concepts of public language.(1) >Meaning theory/Loar. In what sense is the psychological more fundamental than the semantic? - There are several different types of asymmetry. Griceans: hope for scientific discoveries in the future. AvramidesVs: that already anticipates further reduction to the physical. >Reductionism. 1. Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Relation-Theory | Schiffer | I 8 Relation Theory/Schiffer: "There is something that he believes" - can only be inferred with referential quantification (not with substitutional quantification) . Substitutional Quantification: is true if a substitution instance of "Elmer believes that S" is true. Referential Quantification: "..believes x" whereby an x must exist. Substitutional Quantification: allows no relation theory because the substitutional quantification is consistent with every representation of the logical form of substitution instances that make the quantification true. I 15 Relation Theory/Schiffer: Relation to sentences: Davidson (1969)(1): to the public language of the attributing. Carnap (1947)(2): to the public language of the believer. Loar: public language of the attributing, but the semantic attributes (which determine the content) are in the Tarski-style (non-public). -Then there is nothing about the role of expressions or use in population. >Language use, >Language community. Problem: then beliefs must be individuated by interpersonal functional states - that does not work with Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. 1. Donald Davidson (1969). "The individuation of events". In: In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 216-34 2. Rudolf carnap (1947). Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press --- I 70 SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsRelation Theory with proposition as an object: if true, the proposition would include as content either dog property itself (this does not work because of shmog) or way of givenness of it. Way of givenness: We have no clue what it should be. >Way of givenness. I 73 Relation Theory/Schiffer: here for representation (= sentences) in mentalese (instead of propositions). >Sentences, >Propositions. Meaning in mentalese determines meaning in public language, not vice versa. (+) >Mentalese (Laguage of thought), >Everyday language. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Representation | Field | II 55 Representations/Field: if they were only related to public language, why then internal? - Solution: distinction type/token. - Question: why then referring to public language: because one can only speak with respect to types of tokens. >Type/Token, >Everyday language, >Observation language, cf. >Theory language. II 58 Representations: their syntax can be determined without regard to the meanings - if we have laws for body movements from wishes, etc. (narrow psychological theory). >Syntax, >Meaning, >Behavior, >Desire, >Explanation. II 58 Semantics/Representation: We can make truth superfluous: if we have 1. laws of beliefs from stimuli 2. laws for body movements from beliefs and desires. That would be the "narrow psychological theory": then we do not need to assume meanings in representation. II 59 But if representation should be true, it must be correlated with meanings. >Presentation. II 60 Representation without meaning: E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1 > S2] and desires S2, then he also wants S1. Field: Meanings is not needed because the believed sentences can all be wrong. - E.g. Radical Interpretation: the native raises his rifle: a reason to believe that a rabbit is nearby - (even if he is deceived). >Gavagai, >Radical interpretation. II 61 Representation/semantics/psychology: for their psychological explanations, we do not need the semantic notions like "true" and "refers to", which usually sets sentences in relation to the world. Belief/truth: nothing compels me to assume of a person that she has believes that are true of rabbits. - ((s) It is enough when he lifts his rifle.) Truth (of internal representations): we only need this if we assume that they are reliable indicators about the world. - E.g. a child behaves guiltily - For example, if a mathematician believes in a theory, it is a reason for me to believe it, too. >Reliability. II 66 Language/representation/Schiffer: early: (Schiffer, 1972)(1): The meaning of a sentence can be explained only by the notions of believe and desire. For example, to know the meaning of "Caesar was egoistic," one must know that the proposition is conventionally correlated with believe that Caesar was egoistic. >Representation/Schiffer. Everything goes through inner representations and these can be explained without further reference to language. FieldVsSchiffer: the symbols in my representation system have gained their role by appropriation of e.g. a name in the public language. >Language use, >Language community. Animals/Field: although they are likely to have representations, meanings and therefore truth cannot be applied to them. >Animal language, >Animals. II 69 Representation/Field: one could also assume this as neither linguistic nor pictoral: E.g. "light bulb model" - that would be uninterpreted and could not explain behavior. II 77f Representation: representative terms can replace properties. - Most psychology can do without them. Advantages: Intentional terms are projective. E.g.: "He raised his rifle ...". - The truth conditions do not matter then. - The advantage of representations lies in the combination of explanation and predictions. >Truth conditions, >Predictions. II 94 Representation/StalnakerVsField: the basic relation is between words rather than between sentences or "morphemes". Not even between whole states. >Words, cf. >Word meaning. Field: that could be correct. II 154 Representation/truth conditions/translation: one can accept representation without translation and without truth conditions: solution: one accepts reactions to his believe and a corresponding threshold for his reaction. Crazy cases: e.g. the person believes that something quite different is represented . Solution: the role cannot be specified exactly, but the objective core is that there is a role. Explanation 2nd order: "sufficient similarity to our own representation" E.g. "Khrushchev blinked" as an explanation for Kennedy's action. Problem: our own representations are not objective. Deflationism: for it this is not a problem. >Deflationism. Truth conditions: we only need them if we do not know how the details of the explanation are. 1. Schiffer, St. 1972. Meaning. New York, NY, USA: Oxford, Clarendon Press |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Deacon | I 451 Self-consciousness/language/symbols/signs/Deacon: Symbols (which in turn are designed as a system with internal relations) make it possible for the reference to eliminate connections to personal experiences. >Symbols/Deacon. For its part, the individual can establish new indexical connections to subjective experiences. >Experience, >Indexicality. The "subjective distance" of the public language allows a greater freedom than it would have been if it were a matter of direct memory or visualization of experiences. This is crucial for the development of self-consciousness. >Language/Vygotsky, >Everyday language, >Self-awareness. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Semantics | Schiffer | I 13 Semantic Property/Schiffer: e.g. to have content. Truth theoretical property: to be true. I 14 Relation theories/intention bases semantics/i.b.s./Grice: Solution: semantic properties (s.p.) are permitted if they do not stem from the public language - then no circularity. Propositions: not-public. Sentences: public. I 221 Verificationist Semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-conditional): Verification conditions instead of truth conditions. >Truth-conditional semantics, >Verification conditions. DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain a truth theory. >Meaning theory/Davidson, >Truth theory. I 241 Intentionality/Semantics/Schiffer: semantic concepts can be defined in terms of propostional atittudes - but not vice versa. Schiffer:There are no propositional attitudes as belief properties or belief objects. >Belief properties, >Objects of belief. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Thinking | Nietzsche | Danto III 142 Thinking/Body/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche tends to assume that just like a thought comes when it wants to and not when I want it to come - my body moves when it wants to move, and not when I want it to. >Body/Nietzsche. Danto III 150 Thinking as such does not need to be conscious. The term unconscious thinking is not contradictory.(1) Private language/language/Nietzsche: paradoxically, it follows from this that allegedly private words - words referring to our own inner states - form the basis and main component of our common and public language. >Unconscious. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. S. 274. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Thinking | Sellars | I XXIX Thinking/Perceiving: Sellars' everyday theory: modelled after the example of words and phrases of colloquial language, but no speaking with an inner tongue. >Everyday language, >Theory/Sellars, >Models/Sellars. I 80 To each of us belongs a stream of episodes that are not direct experiences themselves and to which we have privileged, but by no means immutable or infallible access. >Privileged access. They can occur without open language behavior. The word ideas are not thinking itself. Nor is the open speech behavior thought itself. We do not need to have word ideas, neither must we have an idea at all if we know what we think. It is wrong to construct the privileged access according to the model of perception. >Words/Sellars. I 83 Sellars thesis: mentalistic discourse (thoughts) ascribable to semantic speech. (Sellars pro modified Rylean explanation: thoughts are a short form for hypothetical and mixed categorical-hypothetical statements about verbal or non-verbal behavior). Tradition: thoughts without word ideas are possible. >Imagination, >Language and thought. Sellars: Categories of intentionality are semantical. >Intentionality. I 94 Thinking: the terms belonging to thinking are theoretical terms. >Theoretical terms. I 94 Thoughts are theoretical, not empirical, they cannot be defined in terms of an observation language. Their "purity" is not a metaphysical, but so to say, a methodological purity. The ability to have thoughts, is formed in the course of the acquisition of public language. Only after the public language is firmly established, the inner speech can ever occur. Theoretical episodes (thoughts) are not direct experiences. I 95 The terms belonging to thinking are theoretical terms, but their status is clarified by the opposition between theoretical and non-theoretical speech. >Theoretical language, >Observation language. Only a small step to using the language to describe oneself: if someone says who is watching us "Dick thinks 'p'" then Dick can say, "I think p". |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anscombe, E. | Wittgenstein Vs Anscombe, E. | Hintikka I 163 ff Hintikka: The problem of color incompatibility is solvable. Color/color terms/color terms/logic/AnscombeVsWittgenstein: argues what is not accepted by WittgensteinVsAnscombe that, provided red and green are objects, we know which is their logical type. --- I 164 Color words/color terms/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: incompatible does not mean contradictory: (red/green). E.g. "This patch is red" and "This patch is green" are incompatible, but this incompatibility is not logical, in the sense that it is indicated by the notation (but: see below: 4). Also it does not reduce to a truth-functional contradiction. (Contradiction is for Wittgenstein a precisely defined term in the theory of truth functions (4:46)). "It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colors at the same time, is a contradiction. Hintikka: but here it is not about the status of colors, but about the status of the color attribution. There is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein has ever believed color attributions such as "This is red" would have subject predicate form. Wittgenstein: from the use of these forms (meant here are grammatical sentences) we cannot draw, at most vague, conclusions. --- I 165 Sentence/form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. "This lecture is boring", "The weather is nice" are only seemingly sentences of the same form. They have nothing to do with each other. HintikkaVsAnscombe: their argument loses its strength with that: this is about someone who makes very different conditions. Hintikka: if you make other conditions, the situation is obviously quite different: Example: Assume that the general concept of color in the language not to be reproduced by a class of color predicates but by a function c which maps points of the visual space in a color space. The logical incompatibility would then be mirrored by the fact that the colors red and green are represented by different names. Then, the two sentences are logically incompatible! Due to their logical form a function cannot take two different values for the same argument. Wittgenstein claims even emphatically that attributions of different qualities of perception are essentially clear, that is, can be represented by real functions. --- I 165/166 Color/color words/neccessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colors incompatibility means a breach against Wittgenstein's notion that purely logical necessities are the only necessities, is now moved into a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of color terms. (Or the correct notation). Is a) every single color represented by a predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical type. b) points in a color space: then the incompatibility of various colors cause no illogical necessities. (Wittgenstein is this alternative (but certainly strange to Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of the color space. However, this concept fails to satisfy if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates --- I 341 ff Pain/private experiences/Cartesianism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the most surprising thesis of this chapter is probably the thesis of Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism, so the assertion that there are really private internal event-like experiences like pain and other such sensations according to Wittgenstein. It is undisputed that the language must be based on a public language game, one is divided what must follow for the private feelings. Implies the neccessity of a public framework that these experiences themselves are now objects, events, or anything not private? That this follows, is represented by many philosophers. e.g. --- Hintikka I 342 Anscombe: "If a word stands for a private object, it must have a private ostensive definition." Since private ostensive definitions are impossible there can probably be no personal item acording to this view. HintikkaVsAnscombe: but this implication does not apply. Of course we cannot say that sensations and the like are private in our language according to Wittgenstein. But that is not what this is about, this is just one of the consequences of inexpressibility of semantics. Actual question: are the philosophers right who claim that there are no private events according to Wittgenstein? No. PU § 272 provides a counter-example: "The essence of the private experience is actually not that each has its own example, but that no one knows whether the other also has this or something else. So it would be possible, although not verifiable, that one part of humanity has a sensation of red and the other a different one." |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Compositionality | Harman Vs Compositionality | Schiffer I 188 Mentalese/HarmanVsCompositionality/Understanding: (Harman 1975, 271): (He was not confused by puns about "use"): even for the understanding of public language compositionality is not needed, provided that thinking takes place in their own public language. He needs two premises: 1) we would only need a compositional semantics if spoken utterances were a matter of decoding language into public Mentalese. 2) But because we think in German, there is no such decoding. Compositionality/Compositional Semantics/Representation/CS Theory/Schiffer: we must also recognize that the compositional semantics theory is not threatened by what I assume about mental representations: (A) Even if we think in Mentalese, there is no true theory of intentionality or of representation as such, which implies that Mentalese has a compositional semantics (B) The truth of (A) does not imply that the public language has no compositional semantics. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Field, H. | Stalnaker Vs Field, H. | Field II 28 Equality of the inferential role/Field: must be defined only in relation to an idiolect here. This solves the problem that we otherwise might incorporate the meaning of the token in what the reference comes from. ((s) circular). VsField: (Wallace 1977, Davidson 1977, 1979, McDowell 1978 Stalnaker 1984): the reduction of the truth conditions on the semantics of the basic concepts were too atomistic. It takes too little account that the proposition itself is a unit of meaning. FieldVsVs: I should understand reduction a bit "wider". Field II 94 StalnakerVsField: would argue 1. that the causal theories of reference require the public language intentional concepts: what a word means depends on the attitude of the language user. ((s) Problem: >Humpty Dumpty theory VsVs: is this about the >speech community? Or >attitude semantics?). Field: then a non-intentional causal theory would be more successful for the "morphemes" of a thought language than words for a public language. A non-intentional theory for the public language seems irrelevant. StalnakerVsField. 2. (deeper): Field's access was too atomistic: he thinks the basic representation exists between words instead of between propositions or "morphemes" of the thought language instead of whole states. Field: he might be right with this. Two points about this: FieldVsStalnaker: 1. he thinks for me the "name-object"- or "predicate-property"-relations come first. The sentence-proposition-relation is then derived. Does that mean that people first invented names and predicates and then awesomely put them together? I have never claimed that. Rather, truth conditions are characterized by "name-object" - or "predicate property"-relations. 2. an atomistic theory can explain much of the interaction between the atoms. Stalnaker's theory is not atomistic enough. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Fodor, J. | Harman Vs Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 160 Thought Language/Mentalese/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) Thesis: the language of the thoughts is simply the public language. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56). |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Introspection | James Vs Introspection | I 37 Behaviorism: James B. Watson was a student of James! Declined introspection. VsIntrospection: assumes prior knowledge. ((s) The meanings used in dealing with ourselves come from public language. >Private Language, >Intersubjectivity.) James per introspection: peculiarities of the inner world of experience require extension of the method. |
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| Introspection | Ryle Vs Introspection | I 208f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: cannot be what the tradition expects from it, since its object is a myth - consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same kind as what I can find out about others - The small differences do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). >Priviledged Access, >Public language. --- I 216 RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any phenomena in the inner - there are no such events. --- I 221 Introspection/Tradition/Ryle: an ideal of a true perception, attentive observation, only executed here and there. Whereas consciousness is an ongoing component of all mental processes. RyleVsIntrospection: assuming there are certain ghostly things that one could perceive, then this observer would always have to do two things at once: to stand up in time for the realization of the plan, he would also have to pay attention to the process of plan compliance. That would become fastly infinitely. (> Regress). --- I 222 But if one admits that the number of perceivable inner things is limited, it follows that there must be imperceptible inner things. Non-introspective act, namely, the act of introspection, which already contains the greatest possible number of simultaneous attentions acts. This knowledge could not be based on introspection. But then the question arises whether it was ever based on it. Then one would have to postulate another form of privileged access. Scylla and Charybdis. >Mentalism. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Loar, B. | Schiffer Vs Loar, B. | I 274 Belief/Loar:/Schiffer (1981): ingenious theory about the thesis: belief is a relation in the public language of the ascribing, but in which the semantic properties that determine the content, are not defined in the public language, but in the Tarski-style. I 275 Tarski-style/T-Def/Schiffer: is not of any role of (translation: prescinds from any role) that can have the expression in the communication: if "T" is defined for a language, then contains [s is T] nothing about the use of s in any population of speakers. (Tarski 1956). I 15 Individuation/Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar's view makes it necessary that convictions based on interpersonal attributable functional states are individuated. ((s) So actually incompatible with Tarski). SchifferVsLoar:: (see below): which is not likely to go. That leaves as the only way: (see above). a) (compatible with IBS (intention based semantics): the local (topical) thesis that belief is a relation to a mental representation (in Mentalese). That 1. the content of signs and sounds must be reduced to contents of mental states (i.e. their intentional properties that are attributed to that-propositions). 2. then the contents of mental states are reduced to semantic properties of non-public language of mental representations that realize these mental states. ((s) representations implement mental states). Non-public language/Problem: the semantic properties of the non-public language of formulas in the inner system are contingent (!) properties! That means they require a theory that tells us what the truth conditions intends for sentences in Mentalese. This is a difficult legacy. Belief/Schiffer: but must be able to be explained without psychological vocabulary. (see above). ((s) representations/Schiffer/(s): must be explained in a non-public language, or the declaration itself in a public language, but as a phenomenon must be recognized that their contents are determined in a non-public language. (Non-public: E.g. attribution of truth values, but also Mentalese, content of mental states, etc.). I 34 SchifferVsLoar/SchifferVsFolk psychology: there are not nearly enough M-restrictions in a possible folk psychology, that by definition must be accessible to everybody, E.g. the belief that New Zealand is not a dictatorship: with which "observation moderate belief" (or amounts of such) is this belief to be connected via M-restrictions?. SchifferVsFolk psychology: they can not afford the functionalist reduction. I 45 Belief/Proposition/Loar/Schiffer: (Loar, 1981) began with propositions of belief objects, but then showed how it manages without the benefit of linguistic entities. SchifferVsLoar: 1. gives no completely general proposal. Its only meta condition is supplied from a common sense theory which is applicable only to normal adults. I 46 Problem: it is a consequence of Loar's theory that E.g. the predicate "believes that the New Yorker publishes Ved Metha" in my idiolect is partially defined by a common sense theory, which is incorrect for the blind and therefore, as I use the predicate, the proposition "Ved Metha believes that the New Yorker publishes Ved Metha" cannot be correct, because Ved Metha is blind. 2. Loar's theory is not immune to twin-earth examples and Burges examples. (He is aware of that). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Reductionism | Field Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 113 FieldVsReductionism/VsReductive Griceans: the reductive Gricean approach says that one can explain what it means to believe that Caesar was selfish, without somehow referring to the semantic properties of the sentence "Caesar was selfish". Because explaining the semantic properties of the sentence with belief would be circular. The question is whether the Gricean presupposition is true that you can explain belief without reference to the sentence. (84). ((s) This is not the argument of Pieter Seuren that one could not explain linguistic meaning linguistically. ((s)> Evans/McDowellVsSeuren)). Field: I believe that the presupposition is correct. In a typical case, that which in my system makes a symbol a symbol that stands for Caesar that this symbol has acquired its role in my representation system as a result of my learning a name. I 114 Which stands for Caesar in the public language. (85). Meaning/Language/Field: if that’s right, then ... Avramides: then there can be no inner language without public language, according to Field. SchifferVsField: there is no incompatibility. Intention-based Semantics (IBS, Grice) does not need to assume that you have propositional attitude before you have acquired public language. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Searle, J.R. | Wittgenstein Vs Searle, J.R. | Esfeld I 76 Use theory/Esfeld: does not imply that beliefs to statements can be reduced in a public speech or can be replaced by statements. Otherwise one would have to develop a theory of meaningful statements that is not referring to believe states of people. SearleVsWittgenstein: Thesis: believe states have priority of linguistic expressions. WittgensteinVsSearle: instead: thesis: to have beliefs and to master a public language is equally original. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 46 The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content). but probably of x is a belief. ((s) without content). 1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction". 2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form (R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p)) for a given specified relation R. Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe. Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R ) (FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). I 47 Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be. Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?. "Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok. (R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations. Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist. I 282 Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists). Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions. SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Tradition | Sellars Vs Tradition | I 57 Meaning/Sellars: false: to regard it as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity. There is then the danger that one perceives this relation as a type of association. ((s) >tags, Myth of the museum). Meaning/relation/SellarsVsTradition: misleading that predicates would associated with objects. E.g. it is wrong that the semantic statement, ""red" means "rot" in German" would assert "red" would associated with red things. This would mean that this semantic statement would so to speak be a defining symbol of a longer statement on associative connections. That is not the case. (Here: difference of use and mention). (> Association). I 62 Report/act/Sellars: who supplies a report, does something. (SellarsVsTradition). Epistemology/tradition: a proposition token can play the role of a report, a) without that this is a public language implementation, and b) without speaker/listener! Sellars: here the accuracy of confirmations is supposed to correspond to the correctness of actions. This is not true, moreover, not every Ought is a Doing-Ought. I 65 Knowledge/SellarsVsTradition: Observational knowledge does not stand on its own two feet! It presupposes language acquisition. (Elsewhere: we cannot perceive a tree, without the concept of a tree.) But at the time of earlier perceptions you do not necessarily have to have had the concept. Long history of acquiring linguistic habits. Myth of the Factual/Sellars: thesis: that observation is constructed by self-authenticating, not linguistic episodes whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi linguistic full executions. I 84 Thinking/language/tradition: Thesis: Thoughts are possible without verbal ideas. I 88 SellarsVsTradition: Categories of intentionality are semantical. I 86 Theory/classic explanation/science/tradition/Sellars: the construction of a theory is to develop a system of postulates that is tentatively correlated with the observation language. SellarsVsTradition: this creates an extremely artificial and unrealistic picture of the actual procedure of scientists. I 87 Theory/Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are not normally formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model (Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects that behave in the usual way). A model is distinguished primarily by the fact that it is provided with a comment which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors comply with the postulates of the logistical image of theorizing. SellarsVs logistical image of theorizing: most explanations did not come readily from the theorists' minds. There is a continuous transition between science and everyday life. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the concepts of inner episodes. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Various Authors | Cresswell Vs Various Authors | II 58 Computation/Cresswell: (representative: e.g. Moore/Hendrix, 1981) make it appear as if they have solved a problem which logicians have tried in vain to solve for years. CresswellVs: these are two completely different issues: ((s) The logicians are more concerned with the semantic one, the computation people with psychological issues). Content/Cresswell: (of a complement sentence) can be considered to be an equivalence class of all objects that are considered representations of this sentence. Belief objects/Moore/Hendrix (Hendrix 1981) some of these objects (the objects of mental states such as beliefs) are sentences in an internal language of the mind, others are in public language. There may be some that are in no language at all. (E.g. logical formulas). --- II 59 Content/Meaning/Cresswell: two sentences have the same meaning when they have the same content, providing they contain no index words. (5) The map indicates that the distance to Lower Moutere is 12 km. ... This requires each sentence to already have a meaning, so that the attitude is simply an attitude with regard to the meaning. CresswellVsMoore/CresswellVsHendrix: i.e. we can only solve the problem of Moore and Hendrix if we already have a semantics. Synonymy/Cresswell: if the synonymy relation ~~ (notation: in the book two swung dashes on top of each other) is defined like that, it can be set up compositionally for the whole language. I have no idea how this is supposed to work, but Hendrix and Moore refrain from it anyway. CresswellVsHendrix: they do not show how the synonymy classes are obtained. --- Hughes I 260 Non-standard systems/Hughes/Cresswell: have other basic operators as L and M. E.g. Halldén (1949b): limitation to a single three-digit operator which defines all other modal and truth-functional operators: [p, q, r] with the meaning that "either p is false or q is false or r is impossible" , i.e. (~p v ~q v ~Mr). Then: negation, conjunction, possibility: ~a = def [a,a,a] (a . b) = def [a,b[a, ~a,a]] Ma = def ~[[a, ~a,a],[a ~a,a],a] Hughes I 261 Hughes/CresswellVsHalldén: that makes an unnatural impression. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Language | Field, Hartry | Avramides I 114 Field: no inner language without public language. SchifferVsField: since there is no incompatibility. Intention-based semantics (Grice) does not need to assume that one has propositional attitudes before one has acquired public language. Thesis: the two go hand in hand. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Mentalese | Harman, G. | Cresswell II 160 Thought Language/Mentalese/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) Thesis: The language of thought is simply the public language. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56). Skipper I 74 Mentalese/Harman: (1978, 58) Thesis: But it is not implausible to assume that our inner states of representation have elements and structure, in a way analogous to the way in which sentences have elements and structure. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Content | Lewis, D. | Schw I 161 Mental Content/Lewis: Thesis: is determined by the causal role, by the typical causes and effects. Content/DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of the public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs. Schw I 171 Naturalization of Content/Representation/Schwarz: Thesis that mental representations are sentence-like to such an extent that their content can be explained compositionally. (cf. Fodor 1990). |
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| Satz-Bedeutung | Lewis, D. | Grover II 158 Meaning / Lewis / Grover: (Lewis 1972): truth conditions that are mapped by the pictures of circumstances (possible worlds) and contexts to truthe values, grasp the sentence meaning. Schw I 161 mental content / Lewis: is determined by the causal role, through the typical causes and effects. Content / DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language that we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning / LewisVsDavidson: what sentences of public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, desires and beliefs. |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning Theory | Loar, B. | Avramides I 29 Group: Loar/Meaning Theory: close to Lewis, VsMcDowll, VsWiggins, thesis: semantics and pragmatics are not separate - (not even with Grice) - Wiggins/McDowell: separation Theory of Sense/of Power - Loar: ultimately psychological and thus reductionist. I 31 Meaning Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Loar: thesis the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa. I 32 Loar: thinks that if we do not take the psychological concepts as fundamental, they will be forgotten. Avramides: that does not have to be. Thesis: with the reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional (the recognition of the place of the concept in the conceptual system, not reductive) in "Grice" analysis, we can just as well bring the philosophy of language into the realm of the philosophy of mind, whereby the analysis of meaning remains partially autonomous, but under the umbrella of intentional action. Not all questions of public language have to do with the philosophy of mind. EMD II 138 Meaning/Loar: Thesis: semantic concepts are localized within a larger framework of propositional attitudes, and therefore I make substantial use of intentional entities. But nowadays it is common to think that a purely extensional meaning theory is possible. We owe this largely to Davidson. Davidson/Loar: seems to make a compromise to join Quine's attack against intentions without abandoning all our intuitions about certain semantic facts. LoarVsExtensionality: Z meaning theory without intention is like Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. EMD II 146 Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the clauses (constituents) are a certain function of the propositional attitudes of the speaker. Question: Should propositional attitudes then not best be described as relations to sentences or other linguistic entities? But that would be a circle. EMD II 149 Loar thesis: What I want to show is that the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa! II 148 ... KripkeVsVs: E.g. Measuring: one object refers to another, the default, but if it didn't exist, the object would still have had a length - LoarVs: but that doesn't work for the meaning theory - thesis: therefore you have to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Belief | Loar, B. | Schiffer I 15 Belief/Loar: (1981): ingenious theory according to the thesis belief is a relation to a sentence in the public language of the attributor, but in which the semantic properties that determine the content are not defined in the public language, but in the Tarski style. I 275 Tarski-Style/Truth-Def/Schiffer: does not prescind from any role that the expression can have in communication: if "T" is defined for a language, then [s is T] contains nothing about the use of s in any population of speakers. (Tarski 1956). I 15 Individuation/Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar's view makes it necessary to individuate beliefs on the basis of interpersonal attributable functional states. ((s) So actually incompatible with Tarski). I 19 Functionalism/Schiffer: Thesis: what makes a physical state token a belief that makes it so and so is that it is a token of a physical state type, with a certain functional role. ((s): Believe: Token - Role: belongs to Type. Belief/Loar: as a function (in the set-theoretical sense) that maps propositions to internal physical states. These inner physical states have functional roles indicated by these propositions, in a way indicated by a psychological theory in which belief, desires etc. are theoretical constructs. (Loar 1981). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Mentalese | McGinn, C. | Schiffer I 73 McGinn (1982a, 70): the inner sentences are the basic objects of interpretation. Their content gives the idea of its content and thoughts transfer their contents to public language. Fodor: ((1987), "Guru of Mentalese"): (unpublished): the strategy is to take the property of the intentional mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of mental representations that are implied in their Tokening. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Meaning | Schiffer, St. | Field II 65 Def Meaning/Sentence Meaning/Schiffer/Field: (Schiffer early, 1972): the meaning of sentences in spoken and written language can be explained by concepts of belief (and desire), namely those that are conventionally correlated with these sentences. II 66 Representation Meaning/FieldVsSchiffer: Thesis: part of what it is that a symbol in my representation system stands for Caesar is that it has acquired its role there as a result of my appropriation of a name that stands for Caesar in public language. II 66 Meaning/Representation/VsSchiffer/Field: a reverse approach to Schiffer's thesis would reduce the semantics of the representation system to the semantics of the public language. Graeser I 116 Meaning/Stephen Schiffer: ("The Remnants of Meanig, 1987): provocative book: Thesis 1. There is no correct theory of meaning Thesis 2. The questions that determine the current philosophy of language are based on false assumptions. Schi passim Meaning/Schiffer/Bio: I was a student at Oxford in the 60s. SchifferVsGrice: Representation of the speaker meaning is inadequate (incomplete), but pro Thesis: Reduction of semantics to psychology (like Grice) + reduction to physicalism. > 1972 "Meaning". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Mentalese | Schiffer, St. | I 73 Mentalese/Harman: Thesis: internal representations have sentence-like structure - Lewis: Language of the brain from synaptic connections and neuronal firing - >SLT "Strong thesis of language of thoughts" = mental representation does not determine the intentionality. Belief refers to a neuronal sentence. Semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of the mental states. Other theory: semantical properties inherited from intentional properties. (VsStrong thesis of language of thoughts) - SLTVs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionaliy - this is explainable without public contents - SchifferVs: this is not fulfillable at all. I 189 SLT/Strong Thesis of Language of Thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: Thesis: 1. The brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code. Schiffer: I can agree that this is a true and interesting thesis. 2. There is a computational relation R for every belief you can have so that you have that belief iff you have R for that formula. Schiffer: I can also accept that. ... I 190 I.e. we discover an illustration relation. This is a weak mentalese thesis. It is certainly empirical. > Then we can say carefully: Meaning/Mentalese/Schiffer: the neuronal sentence µ "means" that snow is white. But that doesn't mean that we have a "semantics" there that should be explained in terms of the meaning of inner formulas. In particular, it does not imply that this semantics is compositional. |
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