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Actions | Gärdenfors | I 15/16 Action/Meaning/Language/Gärdenfors: Thesis: Actions, especially exercised forces have an influence on meanings of our linguistic expressions. See Johnson (1987)(1), Clark (1997)(2), Mandler (2004, especially pp. 118-119)(3). I 91 Action/Gärdenfors: Speaking and listening are traditionally understood as autonomous actions. H. Clark (1996, p.19)(4) Thesis: one should understand both as participatory actions. Gärdenfors: It is about bringing the spirit of the participants together. >Meeting of Minds. Predecessor of this view: G. H. Mead (1934)(5). I 145 Acts/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: many of our cognitive representations affect dynamic properties (as opposed to properties denoted by most nouns and adjectives). (See van Gelder, 1995, Port & van Gelder, 1995)(6). Conceptual Space/Action/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the action space can be treated as the colour space or the shape space. Action/Gärdenfors: Thesis: Actions can be described as force patterns. >Space/Lakoff. I 146 Actions/Language/Gärdenfors: many of our everyday concepts come from acts and events, many words for artefacts - such as chairs, clocks, etc. - are categorized according to their functional properties. (See Nelson, 1996, Mandler, 2004).(7) (8) I 148 Action/Representation/Gärdenfors: Thesis: an action is represented by the force pattern, which produces it. N.B.: a consequence of this thesis is that the actors are not part of the representation. Conceptual space: the conceptual space for actions is therefore a configurational space that includes the movements e.g. of body parts. It is based on the force space. As in the case of forms, there is also a meronomic (part-whole) structure in forces. (See Westera, 2008, Robot Control).(9) I 153 Action/Categories/Function/Gärdenfors: Thesis on concepts of action: a concept of action is represented as a convex region of the space of action. Convex: one can interpret that here in the way that a linear "morph" (e.g. hiking, running, marching) between two actions within a region of a concept of action will fall under the same concept. I 198 Actions/Gärdenfors: Conclusion: 1. The models of action and the models for property changes make it possible to predict the similarities of verbs and their superordinate and subordinate hierarchies. 2. The distinction between course of action/result is directly derived from the assumption of a single area. 3. The role of intentionality in the verb meaning is underlined. Many verbs, which seem to contravene the assumption of a single space, have a dual lexical potential. Verbs: can be analyzed similarly to the pointing and similar to nouns and adjectives. Therefore, I do not divide verbs into classes. I 199 Pro verbs/Gärdenfors: Verbs like "is", "go", "make" are often placeholders for verbs of the course of action or property change. I call them "pro verbs" analog to pronouns. 1. Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The bodily basis of cognition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Mandler, J. M. (2004). The foundations of mind: Origins of conceptual thought. New York: Oxford University Press. 4. Clark, H. (1996). Using Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Port, R. F., & van Gelder, T. (Eds.). (1995). Mind as motion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 7. Nelson, K. (1996). Language in cognitive development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Mandler, J. M. (2004). The foundations of mind: Origins of conceptual thought. New York: Oxford University Press. 9. Westera, M. (2008). Action representations and the semantics of verbs. Bachelor’s thesis. Cognitive Artificial Intelligence, Utrecht University. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
Actions | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Action/Parsons/Habermas: Like Weber, Parsons proceeds from the categories of "purpose" and "means". He focuses on the most general provisions of the smallest conceivable unit of possible action. (1) Habermas IV 307 HabermasVsParsons: his concept of action is subjective ("voluntaristic"), which follows from his concept of the situation. >Situation/Parsons. Thus, his theory of action excludes objectivism from concepts of action reformulated in behavioral science. Taking normative standards into account, according to Parsons, action bridges the gap between the regions of being and should, facts and values, between the conditions of a given situation Habermas IV 308 and the orientation of the actor determined by values and norms (the ontological dimension: conditions/norms). In doing so, the "effort" that requires an action loses the empirical sense of a striving for gratification: "effort" is here rather „a name for the relating factor between the normative and conditional elements of action. It is necessitated by the fact that norms do not realize themselves automatically but only through action, so far as they are realized at all.“(2) HabermasVsParsons: the concept of action as a basic unit does not explain what it means that an actor bases its decisions on values. Habermas IV 352 Actions/System/Parsons: Action/Luhmann: "The action is a system due to its internal analytical structure".(3) Habermas: this is about the relations between values, norms, goals and resources. Action system/Parsons: is composed of subsystems that specialize in the production and maintenance of one component of action at a time: Culture: on values Society: on norms Personality: on goals Behavioral system: on means or resources.(4) >Values, >Norms, >Goals. Habermas IV 353 HabermasVsParsons: with the concept of the action system, the actors disappear as acting subjects; they are abstracted into units to which decisions and thus effects of actions are ascribed. >Systems theory, >Action systems. Actors come into view as abstract placeholders, namely as aspects of the organism capable of learning, the motivational balance of a person, the roles and memberships of a social system and the action-determining traditions of a culture. >Cultural Tradition. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, p. 43f. 2. Ibid. p. 719. 3. N. Luhmann, T. Parsons: die Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 1980, p. 8 4. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in: McKinney, Tiryakan, (1970), p. 44 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Chomsky | Deacon | I 35 Chomsky/Deacon: his theory is reminiscent of evolutionary theory by assuming "hopeful monsters": random mutations that produce new abilities. >Hopeful monsters. For example, children's ability to acquire the grammar of the grammar they learned first. Explanation/Chomsky: this can only be explained if we adopt a "universal grammar" that is built into all human brains as a blueprint. >Universal grammar. I 36 Such a "language organ" could explain why no other species has developed a language. It would also explain why there are no intermediate stages between human and non-human language. Other advantages: such a thesis explains why human and non-human communication are not similar, it explains the systematically independent nature of grammatical rules (they are all derived from the neurological interconnection of the brain), it explains the allegedly universal characteristics of language structures, it explains the reciprocal translatability of languages, it explains the ease of language acquisition with lean input and lack of error correction. I 37 DeaconVsChomsky/DeaconVsUniversal grammar: many linguists ask the wrong question: they expect something (the child's ability to learn) and ask how it comes about. The assumption of a universal grammar serves as a placeholder for everything that cannot be learned. >Learning. I 38 To say that only the human brain is able to produce a grammar, takes the problem from the linguists' hands and passes it on to the neurobiologists. >Grammar, >Neurobiology, >Neurobiology as author. Chomsky/Deacon: however, he is not concerned with the emergence of language, but with explaining the origin of language competence. >Competence, >Language acquisition, >Language emergence. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
He/ He himself | Perry | Frank I 432f "He*"/Perry: He* is not working without an antecedent: nonsense: E.g. "God knows that he* (Jones) is in the hospital." >Identification, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 439f Extra-sense/Perry: possible solution: "s": variable that ranks above sense - E.g. Sheila thinks that an s exists so that s = Ego(Ivan) and Ivan believes that s is wanted on the telephone. Here Ivans extra sense i is not part of the proposition that Sheila believes but it is part of the proposition of which she believes that Ivan believes it. Extra-sense/PerryVsCastaneda: we do not need one. >H.-N. Castaneda, >Extra-sense/Castaneda. Frank I 441 "He*"/PerryVsCastaneda: He* does not seem to be so different from "he". "F-use", "he" as a placeholder of an aforementioned object (*). In attachment to an F-using it is limited* to the meaning area on special extra sense. Problem: that does not yet exclude believing in the evening star that it is the morning star (as long as X believes that evening star = evening star, a priori argument). >Identity, >Trivial identity, >Self-identity. Solution: E.g. "Albert wanted from Mary ... so he went over to her" must be "the woman on the corner" and not the one "he had seen last week". >Anaphora. Solution: it is not the "it/she" but the "that's why", which compels us to - "he*" not composed. - "*" Does not mean "itself". Frank I 446ff "He*"/Perry: not composed of "he" and "self": E.g. the dog Elwood bites himself/...bites Elwood. Difference: a) covered with wounds, b) broken teeth. Analog: a) believes of himself, to be rich b) thinks of Privatus that he is rich. Problem: e.g. the Dean was surprised to find out that he considered himself to be overpaid (according to other description). >Description, >Context, >Intension, >Extension. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Knowledge Representation | AI Research | Norvig I 437 Knowledge representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Complex domains such as shopping on the Internet or driving a car in traffic require (…) general and flexible representations. (…) these representations [concentrate] on general concepts - such as events, time, physical objects, and beliefs (…). (>Ontology/Artificial intelligence). Ontology: instead of trying to represent everything, which is impossible, we will leave placeholders where new knowledge for any domain can fit in. >Beliefs/AI research, >Objects/AI research, >Events/AI research. Norvig I 468 Early discussions of representation in AI tended to focus on “problem representation” rather than “knowledge representation.” (See, for example, Amarel’s (1968)(1) discussion of the Missionaries and Cannibals problem.) In the 1970s, AI emphasized the development of “expert systems” (also called “knowledge-based systems”) that could, if given the appropriate domain knowledge, match or exceed the performance of human experts on narrowly defined tasks. For example, the first expert system, DENDRAL (Feigenbaum et al., 1971(2); Lindsay et al., 1980(3)), interpreted the output of a mass spectrometer (a type of instrument used to analyze the structure of organic chemical compounds) as accurately as expert chemists. >Ontology/AI research, >Representation/AI research. Norvig I 473 Minker (2001)(4) collects papers by leading researchers in knowledge representation, summarizing 40 years of work in the field. The proceedings of the international conferences on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning provide the most up-to-date sources for work in this area. Readings in Knowledge Representation (Brachman and Levesque, 1985)(5) and Formal Theories of the Commonsense World (Hobbs and Moore, 1985)(6) are excellent anthologies on knowledge representation; the former focuses more on historically important papers in representation languages and formalisms, the latter on the accumulation of the knowledge itself. Davis (1990)(7), Stefik (1995)(8), and Sowa (1999)(9) provide textbook introductions to knowledge representation, van Harmelen et al. (2007)(10) contributes a handbook, and a special issue of AI Journal covers recent progress (Davis and Morgenstern, 2004)(11). The biennial conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge (TARK) covers applications of the theory of knowledge in AI, economics, and distributed systems. 1. Amarel, S. (1968). On representations of problems of reasoning about actions. In Michie, D. (Ed.), Machine Intelligence 3, Vol. 3, pp. 131-171. Elsevier/North-Holland. 2. Feigenbaum, E. A., Buchanan, B. G., and Lederberg, J. (1971). On generality and problem solving: A case study using the DENDRAL program. In Meltzer, B. and Michie, D. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 6, pp. 165–190. Edinburgh University Press 3. Lindsay, R. K., Buchanan, B. G., Feigenbaum, E. A., and Lederberg, J. (1980). Applications of Artificial Intelligence for Organic Chemistry: The DENDRAL Project. McGraw-Hill. 4. Minker, J. (2001). Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence. Kluwer 5. Brachman, R. J. and Levesque, H. J. (Eds.). (1985). Readings in Knowledge Representation. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Hobbs, J. R. and Moore, R. C. (Eds.). (1985). Formal Theories of the Commonsense World. Ablex 7. Davis, E. (1990). Representations of Commonsense Knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann 8. Stefik, M. (1995). Introduction to Knowledge Systems. Morgan Kaufmann. 9. Sowa, J. (1999). Knowledge Representation: Logical, Philosophical, and Computational Foundations. Blackwell. 10. van Harmelen, F., Lifschitz, V., and Porter, B. (2007). The Handbook of Knowledge Representation. Elsevier. 11. Davis, E. and Morgenstern, L. (2004). Introduction: Progress in formal commonsense reasoning. AIJ, 153, 1–12. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
Knowledge Representation | Norvig | Norvig I 437 Knowledge representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Complex domains such as shopping on the Internet or driving a car in traffic require (…) general and flexible representations. (…) these representations [concentrate] on general concepts - such as events, time, physical objects, and beliefs (…). (>Ontology/Artificial intelligence). Ontology: instead of trying to represent everything, which is impossible, we will leave placeholders where new knowledge for any domain can fit in. >Beliefs/AI research, >Objects/AI research, >Events/AI research. Norvig I 468 Early discussions of representation in AI tended to focus on “problem representation” rather than “knowledge representation.” (See, for example, Amarel’s (1968)(1) discussion of the Missionaries and Cannibals problem.) In the 1970s, AI emphasized the development of “expert systems” (also called “knowledge-based systems”) that could, if given the appropriate domain knowledge, match or exceed the performance of human experts on narrowly defined tasks. For example, the first expert system, DENDRAL (Feigenbaum et al., 1971(2); Lindsay et al., 1980(3)), interpreted the output of a mass spectrometer (a type of instrument used to analyze the structure of organic chemical compounds) as accurately as expert chemists. >Ontology/AI research, >Representation/AI research. Norvig I 473 Minker (2001)(4) collects papers by leading researchers in knowledge representation, summarizing 40 years of work in the field. The proceedings of the international conferences on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning provide the most up-to-date sources for work in this area. Readings in Knowledge Representation (Brachman and Levesque, 1985)(5) and Formal Theories of the Commonsense World (Hobbs and Moore, 1985)(6) are excellent anthologies on knowledge representation; the former focuses more on historically important papers in representation languages and formalisms, the latter on the accumulation of the knowledge itself. Davis (1990)(7), Stefik (1995)(8), and Sowa (1999)(9) provide textbook introductions to knowledge representation, van Harmelen et al. (2007)(10) contributes a handbook, and a special issue of AI Journal covers recent progress (Davis and Morgenstern, 2004)(11). The biennial conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge (TARK) covers applications of the theory of knowledge in AI, economics, and distributed systems. 1. Amarel, S. (1968). On representations of problems of reasoning about actions. In Michie, D. (Ed.), Machine Intelligence 3, Vol. 3, pp. 131-171. Elsevier/North-Holland. 2. Feigenbaum, E. A., Buchanan, B. G., and Lederberg, J. (1971). On generality and problem solving: A case study using the DENDRAL program. In Meltzer, B. and Michie, D. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 6, pp. 165–190. Edinburgh University Press 3. Lindsay, R. K., Buchanan, B. G., Feigenbaum, E. A., and Lederberg, J. (1980). Applications of Artificial Intelligence for Organic Chemistry: The DENDRAL Project. McGraw-Hill. 4. Minker, J. (2001). Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence. Kluwer 5. Brachman, R. J. and Levesque, H. J. (Eds.). (1985). Readings in Knowledge Representation. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Hobbs, J. R. and Moore, R. C. (Eds.). (1985). Formal Theories of the Commonsense World. Ablex 7. Davis, E. (1990). Representations of Commonsense Knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann 8. Stefik, M. (1995). Introduction to Knowledge Systems. Morgan Kaufmann. 9. Sowa, J. (1999). Knowledge Representation: Logical, Philosophical, and Computational Foundations. Blackwell. 10. van Harmelen, F., Lifschitz, V., and Porter, B. (2007). The Handbook of Knowledge Representation. Elsevier. 11. Davis, E. and Morgenstern, L. (2004). Introduction: Progress in formal commonsense reasoning. AIJ, 153, 1–12. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
Knowledge Representation | Russell | Norvig I 437 Knowledge representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Complex domains such as shopping on the Internet or driving a car in traffic require (…) general and flexible representations. (…) these representations [concentrate] on general concepts - such as events, time, physical objects, and beliefs (…). >Ontology/Artificial intelligence. Ontology: instead of trying to represent everything, which is impossible, we will leave placeholders where new knowledge for any domain can fit in. >Beliefs/AI research, >Objects/AI research, >Events/AI research. Norvig I 468 Early discussions of representation in AI tended to focus on “problem representation” rather than “knowledge representation.” (See, for example, Amarel’s (1968)(1) discussion of the Missionaries and Cannibals problem.) In the 1970s, AI emphasized the development of “expert systems” (also called “knowledge-based systems”) that could, if given the appropriate domain knowledge, match or exceed the performance of human experts on narrowly defined tasks. For example, the first expert system, DENDRAL (Feigenbaum et al., 1971(2); Lindsay et al., 1980(3)), interpreted the output of a mass spectrometer (a type of instrument used to analyze the structure of organic chemical compounds) as accurately as expert chemists. >Ontology/AI research, >Representation/AI research. Norvig I 473 Minker (2001)(4) collects papers by leading researchers in knowledge representation, summarizing 40 years of work in the field. The proceedings of the international conferences on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning provide the most up-to-date sources for work in this area. Readings in Knowledge Representation (Brachman and Levesque, 1985)(5) and Formal Theories of the Commonsense World (Hobbs and Moore, 1985)(6) are excellent anthologies on knowledge representation; the former focuses more on historically important papers in representation languages and formalisms, the latter on the accumulation of the knowledge itself. Davis (1990)(7), Stefik (1995)(8), and Sowa (1999)(9) provide textbook introductions to knowledge representation, van Harmelen et al. (2007)(10) contributes a handbook, and a special issue of AI Journal covers recent progress (Davis and Morgenstern, 2004)(11). The biennial conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge (TARK) covers applications of the theory of knowledge in AI, economics, and distributed systems. 1. Amarel, S. (1968). On representations of problems of reasoning about actions. In Michie, D. (Ed.), Machine Intelligence 3, Vol. 3, pp. 131-171. Elsevier/North-Holland. 2. Feigenbaum, E. A., Buchanan, B. G., and Lederberg, J. (1971). On generality and problem solving: A case study using the DENDRAL program. In Meltzer, B. and Michie, D. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 6, pp. 165–190. Edinburgh University Press 3. Lindsay, R. K., Buchanan, B. G., Feigenbaum, E. A., and Lederberg, J. (1980). Applications of Artificial Intelligence for Organic Chemistry: The DENDRAL Project. McGraw-Hill. 4. Minker, J. (2001). Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence. Kluwer 5. Brachman, R. J. and Levesque, H. J. (Eds.). (1985). Readings in Knowledge Representation. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Hobbs, J. R. and Moore, R. C. (Eds.). (1985). Formal Theories of the Commonsense World. Ablex 7. Davis, E. (1990). Representations of Commonsense Knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann 8. Stefik, M. (1995). Introduction to Knowledge Systems. Morgan Kaufmann. 9. Sowa, J. (1999). Knowledge Representation: Logical, Philosophical, and Computational Foundations. Blackwell. 10. van Harmelen, F., Lifschitz, V., and Porter, B. (2007). The Handbook of Knowledge Representation. Elsevier. 11. Davis, E. and Morgenstern, L. (2004). Introduction: Progress in formal commonsense reasoning. AIJ, 153, 1–12. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
Lambda Calculus | Meixner | I 90 Lambda operator/Meixner: "A (b1, ... bn)" is true if and only if b1, bN .. EXEM λo1 ... oN [A (O1 ... oN] - here stands "A (b1,. ..bN)" for any sentence with N different names. >Names, >Sentences. λO1 ... ON [A (O1 ... oN]: represents the name of an N-ary (predicative) universal. >Universals. O1 the placeholder replaces the O1 b1 name wherever it occurs in A (b1, ... bn). >Placeholder. λO1 ... oN .: this prefix indicates that λo1 ... ON [A (O1 ... on] is not a complete expression, but just a name: λO1 ... oN binds all vacancies in [A (O1 ... oN]. >Expressions/Meixner. The name "λO1 [O1 is a human being."] corresponds to the characteristic of being human. >Properties. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Ontology | AI Research | Norvig I 437 Ontology/AI research/Norvig/Russell: instead of trying to represent everything - which is impossible - we will leave placeholders where new knowledge for any domain can fit in. Complex domains such as shopping on the Internet or driving a car in traffic require (…) general and flexible representations. (…) these representations [concentrate] on general concepts - such as events, time, physical objects, and beliefs. >Knowledge representation/Norvig. Norvig I 438 Upper ontology: The general framework of concepts is called an upper ontology because of the convention of drawing graphs with the general concepts at the top and the more specific concepts below them (…).A more general ontology would consider signals at particular times, and would include the wire lengths and propagation delays. This would allow us to simulate the timing properties of the circuit, and indeed such simulations are often carried out by circuit designers. Norvig I 439 General purpose ontology: A general-purpose ontology should be applicable in more or less any special-purpose domain (with the addition of domain-specific axioms). In any sufficiently demanding domain, different areas of knowledge must be unified, because reasoning and problem solving could involve several areas simultaneously. Norvig I 440 Categories: The organization of objects into categories is a vital part of knowledge representation. Although interaction with the world takes place at the level of individual objects, much reasoning takes place at the level of categories. Categories also serve to make predictions about objects once they are classified. One infers the presence of certain objects from perceptual input, infers category membership from the perceived properties of the objects, and then uses category information to make predictions about the objects. There are two choices for representing categories in first-order logic: predicates and objects. Norvig I 445 Objects: > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Individuation">Individuation/Philosophical theories, >Mass terms/Philosophical theories, >Intrinsic/extrinsic/Philosophical theories, >Categories/philosophical theories, >Description logic/AI research. Norvig I 469 Interest in larger-scale ontologies is increasing, as documented by the Handbook on Ontologies (Staab, 2004)(1). The OPENCYC project (Lenat and Guha, 1990(2); Matuszek et al., 2006(3)) has released a 150,000-concept ontology, with an upper ontology (…)I as well as specific concepts like “OLED Display” and “iPhone,” which is a type of “cellular phone,” which in turn is a type of “consumer electronics,” “phone,” “wireless communication device,” and other concepts. The IEEE working group P1600.1 created the Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) (Niles and Pease, 2001(4); Pease and Niles, 2002(5)), which contains about 1000 terms in the upper ontology and links to over 20,000 domain-specific terms. Stoffel et al. (1997)(6) describe algorithms for efficiently managing a very large ontology. A survey of techniques for extracting knowledge from Web pages is given by Etzioni et al. (2008)(7). On the Web, representation languages are emerging. RDF (Brickley and Guha, 2004)(8) allows for assertions to be made in the form of relational triples, and provides some means for evolving the meaning of names over time. OWL (Smith et al., 2004)(9) is a description logic that supports inferences over these triples. So far, usage seems to be inversely proportional to representational complexity: the traditional HTML and CSS formats account for over 99% of Web content, followed by the simplest representation schemes, such as microformats (Khare, 2006)(10) and RDFa (Adida and Birbeck, 2008)(11), which use HTML and XHTML markup to add attributes to literal text. Usage of sophisticated RDF and OWL ontologies is not yet widespread, and the full vision of the Semantic Web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001)(12) has not yet been realized. The conferences on Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS) contain many interesting papers on both general and domain-specific ontologies. >Knowledge representation/AI research. An inspirational discussion of the general project of commonsense knowledge representation appears in Hayes’s (1978(13), 1985b(14)) “Naive Physics Manifesto.” Norvig I 470 Problems: Doubts about the feasibility of a single ontology for all knowledge are expressed by Doctorow (2001)(15), Gruber (2004)(16), Halevy et al. (2009)(17), and Smith (2004)(18), who states, “the initial project of building one single ontology . . . has . . . largely been abandoned.” 1. Staab, S. (2004). Handbook on Ontologies. Springer. 2. Lenat, D. B. and Guha, R. V. (1990). Building Large Knowledge-Based Systems: Representation and Inference in the CYC Project. Addison-Wesley. 3. Matuszek, C., Cabral, J., Witbrock, M., and DeOliveira, J. (2006). An introduction to the syntax and semantics of cyc. In Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Formalizing and Compiling Background knowledge and Its Applications to Knowledge Representation and Question Answering. 4. Niles, I. and Pease, A. (2001). Towards a standard upper ontology. In FOIS ’01: Proc. International conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems, pp. 2-9. 5. Pease, A. and Niles, I. (2002). IEEE standard upper ontology: A progress report. Knowledge Engineering Review, 17(1), 65–70. 6. Stoffel, K., Taylor, M., and Hendler, J. (1997). Efficient management of very large ontologies. In Proc. AAAI-97, pp. 442–447. 7. Etzioni, O., Banko, M., Soderland, S., and Weld, D. S. (2008). Open information extraction from the web. CACM, 51(12). 8. Brickley, D. and Guha, R. V. (2004). RDF vocabulary description language 1.0: RDF schema. Tech. rep., W3C. 9. Smith, M. K., Welty, C., and McGuinness, D. (2004). OWL web ontology language guide. Tech. rep., W3C. 10. Khare, R. (2006). Microformats: The next (small) thing on the semantic web. IEEE Internet omputing, 10(1), 68-75. 11. Adida, B. and Birbeck, M. (2008). RDFa primer. Tech. rep., W3C 12. Berners-Lee, T., Hendler, J., and Lassila, O. (2001). The semantic web. Scientific American, 284(5), 4-43. 13. Hayes, P. J. (1979). The logic of frames. In Metzing,D. (Ed.), Frame Conceptions and Text Understanding, pp. 46–61. de Gruyter. 14. Hayes, P. J. (1985a). Naive physics I: Ontology for liquids. In Hobbs, J. R. andMoore, R. C. (Eds.), Formal Theories of the Commonsense World, chap. 3, pp. 71–107. Ablex. 15. Doctorow, C. (2001). Metacrap: Putting the torch to seven straw-men of the meta-utopia. 16. Gruber, T. (2004). Interview of Tom Gruber. AIS SIGSEMIS Bulletin, 1(3). 17. Halevy, A., Norvig, P., and Pereira, F. (2009). The unreasonable effectiveness of data. IEEE Intelligent Systems, March/April, 8–12. 18. Smith, B. (2004). Ontology. In Floridi, L. (Ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information, pp. 155–166.Wiley-Blackwell |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
Ontology | Esfeld | I 188 Ontology/Esfeld: things and events are placeholders for the first of the ontology, whatever it may be. >Placeholder, >Proxy, >Reality, >Actuality, >World, >Existence, >Being. I 323 Ontology/quantum mechanics/quantum holism/Esfeld: it is reasonable to assume that the global quantum state of the world has no natural division into individual quantum systems. Hence, it is not justified to assume that the world is composed of individual quantum systems. >Quantum mechanics. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Quasi-Indicator | Castaneda | Frank I 163 ff Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: is the fundamental role of the I only at the moment of the speech act - must refer to a antecedent: Peter believes that "he" ... >Anaphora, >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda. I 165 Thesis: "He*", etc. cannot be replaced by indicators, nor as variables or deputy singular terms or (descriptions). Thesis: (Conclusion of "He"): the reference of "I" is a logically irreducible category, which can only be represented equivalently by the impersonal and trans-situational quasi-indicator "he" - I 321 Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: contradicts the classical theory of propositions: that propositional attitudes are related to propositions. >Propositions, >Propositional attitudes. ChisholmVs/LewisVs: mental states are not primarily based on propositions, but a relation between subject and a property that is attributed directly. CastanedaVsChisholm: attribution theory does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-awareness. >Reference, >Self-reference, >Self-identification. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 I 430ff Quasi-Indicator He/Castaneda/Perry: he* cannot be replaced by description or names that does not, in turn, contain a quasi-indicator. >Names, >Descriptions. PerryVsCastaneda: the other one can also think "he*, i.e. the other one..." I ~459ff Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: represents the indexical reference, it does not carry it out. Not entirely deputy, included in reference. >Indexicality, >Index Words, >Proxy, cf. >Placeholders. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Relative Clauses | Quine | II 203 Relative clauses: (x:Fx) - but not: (Ey)(y=(x:Fx)) - that would testify existence of a class - here, mathematics goes beyond logic. >Existence statements. II 199 Class Name: is a singular term, indicating a class - placeholder class name: real. bindable variable whose values are classes - a relative clause is no class name. >Classes, >Proper names, >Proxy, >Singular terms. --- V 129 Relative clause/Quine: function: separating the object from what the sentence says of it. - A relative clause becomes a general term, if the relative pronoun is put in front (which stands for the name of the object): E.g. which I bought from the man who had found it. - The general term says the same as the original sentence. >General terms. GeachVs: instead understanding relative pronouns as "and he" or "if he" or "since he". Geach’s donkey: Whoever has a donkey, beats it: Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun who with "if he": every human being, if he has a donkey, be beats it. >Donkey sentences. V 133 Relative clause: can make a predication of the form a is P from every sentence on an object - E.g. Fido is such that I bought him from a man who had found him. Relative clause: has adjectival function here - substantivic: with thing, E.g. Fido is a thing such that ...-’ original form: useful when a relative clause functions as a general term. - E.g. in the universal categorical sentence (Construction) [an a is a b], [each a is a b]. >Predication, >Adjectives. Universal categorical sentence: no predication but a coupling of two general terms. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Schematic Letters | Quine | II 201f Problem: do not reify properties and classes. Solution: distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables. --- IX 7ff~ Predicate letters: F, G, etc. do not introduce anything explicit. --- IX 7ff~ Statement schemes: the predicate letters F, G ... should never be considered as variables that take attributes or classes as values - they are kept away from quantifiers and do not appear in statements at all. --- X 32 Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is not even variable over objects, and once schematic letter for sentences, but only variable - (no semantic ascent necessary). --- X 47 Schematic letters/Quine: placeholders for sentences of the object language. They do not belong to the object language itself. --- X 77 Model/Quine: of a scheme: is a quantity n-tuple: each schematic letter (for predicates) corresponds to a set, at the beginning of the n-tuple is a non-empty set U, the universal set or value range of the variables x, x, etc. the remaining sets of the model are the values of the set variables a, b, etc. Satisfaction: a model fulfills a scheme, if its set-theoretic analogue (sentence) is true. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Schematic Letters | Schiffer | I 121 Def T-sentence: e.g. "S is true iff p.". "p" is not a quantifiable variable. >Quantification, >Variables. It is a placeholder. Placeholder: is not a quantifiable variable. >Schematic letters, >Placeholder, >Proxy, >Variables. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Substitutional Quantification | Quine | V 140 Substitutional quantification/Quine: is open for other grammatical categories than just singular term but has other truth function. - Referential quantification: here, the objects do not even need to be specifiable by name. >Referential quantification, >Truth functions, >Singular terms. --- V 141 Language learning: first substitution quantification: from relative pronouns. - Later: referential quantification: because of categorical sentences. Substitution quantification: would be absurd: that every inserted name that verifies Fx also verifies Gx - absurd: that each apple or rabbit would have to have a name or a singular description. - Most objects do not have names. --- V 140 Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Truth Function/Quine: referential universal quantification: can be falsified by one single object, even though this is not specifiable by a name. - The same substitutional universal quantification: in contrast, remains true. - Existential quantification: referential: may be true due to a non-assignable value. - The same in substitutional sense: does not apply for lack of an assignable example. --- V 146f Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Blind spot: substitutional universal quantification: E.g. none of the substitution cases should be rejected, but some require abstention. - Existential quantification: E.g. none of the cases is to be approved, but some abstention is in order.- then neither agree nor abstain. (Equivalent to the alternation). --- Ad V 170 Substitutional Quantification/(s): related to the quantification over apparent classes in Quine’s meta language? --- V 175 Numbers/Classes/Quantification/Ontology/Substitutional quantification/Quine: first substitutional quantification through numbers and classes. - Problem: Numbers and classes can then not be eliminated. - Can also be used as an object quantification (referential quantification) if one allows every number to have a successor. - ((s) with substitution quantification each would have to have a name.) Class quantifier becomes object quantifier if one allows the exchange of the quantifiers (AQU/AQU/ - EQu/EQu) - so the law of the partial classes of one was introduced. --- X 124 Substitutional quantification/Quine: requires name for the values of the variables. Referential quantification/(s) speaks of objects at most. - Definition truth/Substitutional Quantification/Barcan/Quine: applying-Quantification - is true iff at least one of its cases, which is obtained by omitting the quantifier and inserting a name for the variable, is true. - Problem: almost never enough names for the objects in a not overly limited world. - E.g. No Goedel numbers for irrational numbers. - Then substitutional quantification can be wrong, because there is no name for the object, but the referential quantification can be true at the same time - i.e. both are not extensionally equal. X 124 Names/logic/substitutional quantification/Quine: Problem: never enough names for all objects in the world: e.g. if a set is not determined by an open sentence, it also has no name. - Otherwise E.g. Name a, Determination: x ε a - E.g. irrational numbers cannot be attributed to integers. - (s) > substitution class. --- XII 79f Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Here the variables are placeholders for words of any syntactic category (except names) - Important argument: then there is no way to distinguish names from the rest of the vocabulary and real referential variables. ((s) Does that mean that one cannot distinguish fragments like object and greater than, and that structures like "there is a greater than" would be possible?). XII 80 Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Assuming an infinite range of named objects. - Then it is possible to show for each substitution result of a name the truth of a formula and simultaneously to refute the universal quantification of the formula. - (everyone/all). - Then we have shown that the range has at least one unnamed object. - ((s) (> not enough names). - Therefore QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification. E.g. assuming the range contained the real name - Then not all could be named, but the unnamed cannot be separated. - The theory can always be strengthened to name a certain number, but not all - referential quantification: attributes nameless objects to itself. - Trick: (see above) every substitution result with a name is true, but makes universal quantification false. ((s) Thus an infinite number of objects secured). - A theory of real names must be based on referential quantification. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Truth Definition | Schiffer | I 121 Def T-sentence: E.g. "S is true iff p." "P" is not a quantifiable variable - it is a placeholder. >Variables, >Quantification. Placeholder: is not a quantifiable variable. >Placeholder, >Proxy, cf. >Schematic letters. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Variables | Schönfinkel | Berka I 277 Def Variable/Schönfinkel: A variable is nothing more than a badge to mark certain places for arguments and operators as belonging together. - So that it has the character of a bare, the constant nature of a actually unreasonable, auxiliary concept.(1) >Symbols, >Signs, >Formulas, >Logical formulas, >Constants, >Logical constants, >Placeholder. 1. M. Schönfinkel, Über die Bausteine der mathematischen Logik, Math. Ann. 92 (1924), 305-316 |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
Variables | Stechow | 130 Gap/semantics/Stechow: a gap often corresponds to a variable (there was something shifted). Interpretation of variables: here it depends on the index, so we identify it with the variable. >Indexicality, >Index Words. 161 Semantic binding/Stechow: the variables are placeholders for the meanings of expressions of their type. >Semantic categories, >Placeholders, >Meaning. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
Vocabulary | Quine | VII (b) 24 Definition/Quine: can serve opposite purposes: abbreviation - or more economical vocabulary. (Then longer chains). >Definition. --- X 49 Vocabulary/Quine: is divided into two types: lexicon and particles. - Logical particles/Quine: E.g. tilde (produces negation) (point (creates conjunction), hyphon (generates more variables), existential quantifier E, parenthesis - in the lexicon: expressions that are divided into categories (categorematic). - particles: syncategorematic: not in categories, not independent. >Lexicon, >Logical particles. --- XII 79f Substitutional quantification/sQ/Quine: Here are the variable placeholders for words of any syntactic categories (except names). - Important argument: then there is no possibility to separate names from the rest of the vocabulary and real referential variables. >Substitutional quantification. XII 80 To be distinguished from others (indistinguishability). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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Counterpart Theory | Plantinga Vs Counterpart Theory | Black I 57 Counterpart Theory/C.Th./PlantingaVsLewis/PlantingaVsCounterpart Theory: (1974(1), p. 115 f, 1987(2), p. 209): According to Lewis, strictly speaking all things would then have all their properties essentially, because there are no possible worlds in which they themselves (not just any placeholders) have different properties. E.g. if it was one degree colder today, we would all not exist, because then a different possible world would be real, and none of us would be there. Kripke similar: KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: E.g. if we say "Humphrey could have won the election," according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And he could not care less. (Kripke 1980(3), 44 f). 1. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell Schwarz I 100 Properties/VsCounterpart Theory/Schwarz: if we reject counterparts and temporal parts, we have to conceive all properties as masked relations to times and possible worlds. Then there are obviously many more fundamental relations. Stalnaker I 117 Identity/Stalnaker: ...these examples remind us of what an inflexible relation identity is. Our intuitions about the flexibility of possibilities contradict this rigid constitution of identity. Counterpart Theory/C.Th./Stalnaker: tells us "Relax!". We should introduce a more flexible relation for the cross-world identity that allows intransitivity and asymmetry. Counterpart Theory/Stalnaker: the 3rd motivation for them is the one that is closest to the phenomena and makes the least metaphysical presuppositions. Vs: actualism and the representative of a primitive thisness may have difficulty with that. I 118 PlantingaVsCounterpart Theory/Nathan SalmonVsCounterpart Theory/Stalnaker: Counterpart Theory/Plantinga/Salmon: can be divided into two doctrines: 1) Metaphysical Thesis: that the realms of different possible worlds do not overlap ((s) >Lewis: "Nothing is in two worlds"). 2) Semantic Thesis: that modal predicates should be interpreted in terms of counterparts instead of in terms of the individuals themselves. Ad 1): seems to suggest an extreme essentialism, according to which nothing could have been different than it actually is. Extreme Essentialism/Plantinga: would the thesis that "~if a leaf had dropped a day earlier in the mountains of the Northern Cascades in October 1876 than it actually did, I would either be non-existent, or a person who is different from me. And that is certainly wrong". (Plantinga 1974)(4). can ad 2): Can the semantic part of the doctrine solve that? 4. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press Plantinga/Salmon: it cannot. It can only mask the metaphysical consequences. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Dodwell, P.C. | Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C. | I 258 Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer. >Computation, >Computer Model. I 259 VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware. The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine. I 259 Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value. I 260 The idea of a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them. DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements! Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (See Rules/Brandom). Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual. Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs). I 261 Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway) Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside. Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology: As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character. I 262 No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology! Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain. (Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.) RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea: I 263 if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement: Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain. The latter is doubtful. RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself. Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs. Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle. I 263/264 It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?"). I 265 Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid. I 266 For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills: RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations. At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs). Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature. Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes. Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Propositions | Quine Vs Propositions | V 61 QuineVsPropositions: to maintain the old "ideas": the idea that a sentence expresses. Superfluous. VI 99 QuineVsPropositional Stances de re: peculiar intention relation between thoughts and intended things. There are no reliable policies for that. Not scientific. Better: Opinions de dicto. VI 142 Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This is shown by the indeterminacy of translation. X 19 Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as meaning of sentences, as an abstract entity in its own right. Some authors: consider it as what t/f is, and between which there are implications. Oxford/Terminology: many authors use "proposition" for statements. Quine: in my earlier works I used it for assertions. I gave up on it, because of the following trend: Proposition/Oxford: actions that we perform when we express assertions. X 20 Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: their representative believes to save a step and thus to achieve immediacy: Truth/Tarski/Quine: the Englishman speaks the truth, 1) Because "Snow is white" means that snow is white and 2) Snow is white. Quine: the propositionalist saves step (1). The proposition that snow is white is simply true, because snow is white. ((s) >Horwich: "because snow..."). He bypasses differences between languages and differences between formulations within a language. Quine: my disapproval does not arise from dislike of abstract things. Rather: QuineVsPropositions: if they existed, they would bring about a certain relationship of synonymy or equivalence between propositions themselves: False Equivalence/Quine: such sentences would be equivalent that express the same proposition. QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/VsSentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation makes no objective sense at the level of sentences. X 32 Letter/Quine: p can be schematic letter (only for sentences) or variable (then only for objects). Here problem: that does not work simultaneously! Solution: semantic ascent: we only talk about sentences. Sentence/Name/Quine: the other formulation could be given sense by stipulating that sentences are names, for example, of propositions. Some Authors: have done that. Before that, however, the letter "p" is no variable about anything except schematic letters, placeholder for sentences in a logical formula or grammatical structure. QuineVsPropositions: Problem: once sentences are conceived as names of propositions, the letter "p" is also a variable about objects, namely propositions. Then, however, we can correctly say: "p or not p' for all propositions p" ((s) Because the letter p is no longer at the same time a variable about objects and a schematic letter for sentences, but only a variable about objects.) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Reductionism | Cartwright Vs Reductionism | I 100 Book of Nature/Science/BoN/17th Century/Boyle/Hooke/History/Cartwright: God wrote down the fundamental laws in the BoN. Then the phenomenological ones are a consequence of it. I 101 A lot of these cann still be found even in today’s philosophy of science, especially in the reductionism and the deductive-nomological model (although not by its authors Hempel, Grünbaum and Nagel). Cartwright: I myself have formerly used such stories in the classroom with the students: namely two creation stories: a) Reductionism: E.g. God writes the book of nature, Peter was his assistant. God writes down the fundamental laws and then leaves the hard-working Peter with a bit of a poor imagination to establish the phenomenological laws. b) God takes special care of the regularities in the world, there are no distinctions between different kinds of laws, God himself dictates every single one of them. Now Peter’s task is much more demanding: he must find the possible initial conditions! According to this view, all the laws are true together. I 102 Cartwright: I have searched long for a non-metaphorical analysis of these metaphors. Today I believe that it cannot be found. Laws/Derivative/Important argument/CartwrightVsReductionism: without the story of God and the Book of Nature, there is no sense in assuming that in nature something is derived from something else. I.e. that the fundamental laws are more "fundamental" and that the others apply "by virtue of them". Deductive-nomological model/Cartwright: here is only an apparent help: because here we can look for quasi-causal relation between LoN. If we do not find any, we focus on language. Then we have formal placeholders for relations between laws. CartwrightVsRealism: but the deductive-nomological model itself is not an argument for realism. Truth/Cartwright: without all the metaphysics, the success in the organization of our knowledge is no argument for the truth of the theory. We still need a story about how the connection between fundamental equations and complex laws should be. > Grünbaum (see above I 94). |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
Wittgenstein | Strawson Vs Wittgenstein | Horwich I 195 Fact/situation/VsStrawson: it could be argued that they (because they are connected to that-sentences) are used as placeholders for yet to be specified expressions. Just as E.g. "thing" for nouns E.g. "event " for certain verbs, etc. StrawsonVsVs: the answer is twofold: World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. All the charm of these expressions like "situation", "state" (state of affairs), "fact", etc. is that we look at them as things or quantities of things. (StrawsonVs). StrawsonVsAustin: this urge is overwhelming. Austin does not resist it. He needs for concealment "feature" (feature) as a substitute for "fact". Definition feature/feature/Strawson: E.g. nose can be a feature of a face. E.g. a mountain feature a landscape.(1) 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Strawson II 265 StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. --- Wittgenstein VI 172 StrawsonVsWittgenstein/Schulte: actually one should only talk in very specific cases of the meaning of names: E.g. "Peter" (Pierre) means "stone". Schulte: that is quite foreign to Wittgenstein. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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