Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity/Syntheticity Dummett II 134
Analytical/Frege: Analytically equivalent sentences must have the same sense, otherwise no criterion for identity. Propositional attitude: belief objects must be different when utterance reasons are different - E.g. Cathrine = Paul’s sister - then two analytically equivalent sentences do not have the same information content. Cf. >Intensions, >Propositions, >Opaque contexts.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Complexes/Complexity Chaitin Barrow I 78
Complexity/Decidability/Paradox/Chaitin/Barrow: Order: "Print a sequence whose complexity can be proved to be greater than the length of this program!". The computer cannot respond to this. Each sequence that it generates must be of lesser complexity than the length of the sequence itself (and also of its program).
(Neumann: a machine can only build another machine if it is one degree less complex than this one itself. (Kursbuch 8, 139 ff)(1).
>J.v. Neumann.
In the above case, the computer cannot decide whether the number R is random or not. Thus the Goedel theorem is proved.
>Decisions, >Decidability, >Decision theory, >Decision-making process, >K. Gödel.
In the late 1980s, even simpler evidence was found for the Goedel theorem, with which it was transformed into statements about information and randomness.
Information content/Barrow: You can assign a certain amount of information to a system of axioms and rules by defining their information content as the size of the computer program that checks all the possible concluding chains.
I 78/79
If one attempts to extend the bounds of provability by new axioms, there are still larger numbers, or sequences of numbers, whose randomness remains unprovable. Chaitin: he has proved with the Diophantic equation:

X + y² = q
If we look for solutions with positive integers for x and y, Chaitin asked,...
I 80
...whether such an equation is typically finite or has infinitely many integral solutions if we let q pass through all possible values q = 1,2,3,4 .... At first sight it hardly deviates from the original question, whether the equation for
Q = 1,2,3 .. has an integer solution.
However, Chaitin's question is infinitely more difficult to answer. The answer is random in the sense that it requires more information than is given in the problem.
There is no way to a solution. Write for q 0 if the equation has only finitely many solutions, and 1, if there are infinitely many. The result is a series of ones and zeros representing a real number.
Their value cannot be calculated by any computer.
The individual spots are logically completely independent of each other.
omega = 0010010101001011010 ...
Then Chaitin transformed this number into a decimal number...
I 81
...omega = 0.0010010101001011010 ... and thus had the degree of probability that a randomly chosen computer program would eventually stop after a finite number of steps. It is always not equal to 0 and 1.
Still another important consequence: if we choose any very large number for q, there is no way to decide whether the qth binary digit of the number omega is a zero or a one. Human thinking has no access to an answer to this question.
The inevitable undecidability of some statements follows from the low complexity of the computer program, which is based on arithmetic, however.
>Decision problem, >Software, >Computer programming.

1. Kursbuch 8: Mathematik. H. M. Enzensberger (Hg.), Frankfurt/M. 1967.


B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988
German Edition:
Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001
Everyday Language Lyons I 92
Everyday language/information/slang/Lyons: in colloquial language there is a tendency to replace frequently used words with longer "more colourful" synonyms because the information content has been worn out by frequent use. Slang changes frequently. >Language, >Language use, >Metaphors, >Metonymies, >Synonymy,
>Information.
I 100
Information/Information Theory/Linguistics/Lyons: Dilemma: 1. statistical considerations are important for understanding the development and operation of the language.
2. It is practically impossible to calculate the information here exactly.
I 101
Solution: Linguistics today is more concerned with the structure of sentences than with utterances in concrete situations. >Syntax, >Semantics, >Grammar.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Extensions Carnap VI 59
Extensional/Carnap: E.g. "The class of humans is contained in the class of mortals" - pseudo-intensional: "x is mortal".
Newen I 28
Def Extension/Carnap: from singular terms: the object. Extension of sentence/sentence extension: the truth value. >Truth value.
Extension of predicate: single-digit: set of objects with the corresponding property
two-digit: set of pairs, etc.
Def Intension/Carnap: information content of the sentence - set of possible worlds where the corresponding sentence is true.
Individual Concept/Carnap: intension pf a description. >Descriptions, >Intensions.
I 30
Hyper-Intensionality: Problem: necessarily true or false sentences are true or false in the same sets of possible worlds. - Hence there is an indistinguishable when we use possible world semantics. >Indiscernibility, >Indistinguishability.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982


New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Information Monod Dennett I 268
The information is present in the specific environmental conditions. Initial conditions ensure that one certain structure is selected from many possible ones. Through elimination ambiguity becomes clarity. ("Interpretation"). >Ambiguity, >Evolution, >Initial conditions, >Selection.
---
Monod I 29
Information/Monod: information requires a sender. (Also within a living being). For example, crystal/life: the amount of information encoded in the crystal structure is several orders of size smaller than that which is transmitted from one generation to another in the most primitive creature.
I 92
Information/Biology/Monod: the amount of information required to determine the three-dimensional structure of a protein is much greater than that required to establish the sequence. ElsässerVsMonod: Contradiction: On the one hand, the genome completely determines the function of a protein while the function is bound on the other hand to a three-dimensional structure whose information content is much greater than the direct genetic determination of the structure.
Elsässer: sees instead in the macroscopic development of the living beings a phenomenon, which is physically not explainable, because it seems to testify an "enrichment without cause".
>Emergence.
MonodVsElsässer: the objection is dispensed with when investigating the molecular level of epigenesis: information enrichment results from the fact that the genetic information (represented by the sequence) is actually expressed only under precisely defined initial conditions (in aqueous phase within certain narrow limits of temperature, the ion composition, etc.) so that only a single one of all possible structures can be realized.
Thus, the initial conditions contribute to the information that is finally contained in the globular structure, without specifying it!
Thus, in the structuring process of a globular protein, the microscopic image and the cause of the self-active epigenetic development of the organism can be seen simultaneously.

Mon I
J. Monod
Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970
German Edition:
Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Information Quine II 27
Information/Quine: Class size in biology: Information on mating behavior - is an explanation for objectification of numbers and classes.
X 21
Information/Quine: information is always given with regard to constitutional order - E.g. Photography/Screening: what is below the order of magnitude, has no information.
X 22
Problem: There is no constitutional order in everyday language, so there is no proposition as a supposedly objective information. Then equality of information is not a solution to the question of whether two sentences are equivalent. ((s) = expresses the same proposition).
X 131
Information/Quine: a) cosmological: is the distribution of elementary particles - b) epistemologically: is sense data - Quine: you cannot generally assign information content to sentences.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Information Shannon Brockman I 155
Information/Shannon/Kaiser: In Shannon’s now-famous formulation(1), the information content of a string of symbols was given by the logarithm of the number of possible symbols from which a given string was chosen. Shannon’s key insight was that the information of a message was just like the entropy of a gas: a measure of the system’s disorder. >Systems, >Entropy, >Noise.
Brockman I 154
(…) mathematician Warren Weaver explained that in Shannon’s formulation, “the word information . . . is used in a special sense that must not be confused with its ordinary usage. In particular, information must not be confused with meaning.(2) Linguists and poets might be concerned about the “semantic” aspects of communication, Weaver continued, but not engineers like Shannon.
Rather, “this word ‘information’ in communication theory relates not so much to what you do say, as to what you could say.” (2)
>Communication theory.

1. Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, Bell System Technical Journal (1948), Vol. 27/3
2. Warren Weaver, ’Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication,” in Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949), 8.

Kaiser, David “”information” for Wiener, for Shannon, and for Us” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.


Brockman I
John Brockman
Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Structures Monod Dennett I 268
Function/Structure/Monod: Problem: one can see a contradiction in the fact that on the one hand the one-dimensional structure completely determines the function of the protein, on the other hand its function is bound to a three-dimensional structure whose information content is greater. >Information, >Information content, >Unambiguity.
Solution: the information is contained in the specific milieu conditions! Initial conditions ensure that a certain structure is selected from the many possible ones. Elimination thus becomes ambiguity ("interpretation").
>Ambiguity.

Mon I
J. Monod
Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970
German Edition:
Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Fictionalism Schwarz Vs Fictionalism Schwarz I 72
Fictionalism/Possible worlds/Poss.w./Lewis/Black: Thesis: propositions of possibilities and possible worlds function as propositions on absences, the average citizen or Holmes. That means they may be true, although the objects do not exist. Question: Can you rephrase propositions about possible world, so the modal words (MO) are eliminated? Yes: E.g. "possibly donkeys can speak": Problem: the modality here is still provided.
Problem: much of what we want to know about possible worlds, cannot be translated in the language with rhombus and square: E.g. whether there are two worlds which differ only in that fundamental properties that play roles.
Fictionalism: propositions about possible worlds analogue to propositions about Holmes: because Holmes is indeed a possible thing itself. (simple form: Rose, 1990(1), Sider 2002(2) nested: Armstrong 1989a(3), intermediate forms: Fine 1976(4), 2003b(5)). Thesis: propositions of the form: there is a world in which ... "interpreted as "it is possible that there is a world ... "((s) Solves the quantification in favor of modal operators).
Fiction/Rosen: then Lewis' tales of possible worlds along with a description of the actual world. Then there is "according to Lewis" a possible world in which donkeys can speak. ((s) but not: "The actual world is such that speaking donkey may exist in a possible world. That would be a property of the actual world and not the possible world, and the actual world may not have as many properties as they is at least in parts exclude themselves).
Vs: Lewis provides no full description of all possible worlds. He consciously leaves many open.
Pointe: after Rose then propositions, which Lewis does not specifically agree to, would be wrong!.
Problem: because Lewis says nothing about 17 dimensional possible world, the proposition that there is at least one and the proposition that there is none are both wrong.
Schwarz I 73
VsVs: you could try to assign more work the fiction operator "according to Lewis': from his texts it is clear that he believed that there possible worlds with 17 dimensions (he also says nothing about possible worlds with 17 cows). But the operator then becomes mysterious e.g. "From Lewis' texts follows logically ..." Vs: why should Lewis decide about possible world and not another author?.
Fiction/Schwarz: it is better to idealize. That is then an only fiction of many possible worlds.. Then we should have a "lagadonical" language again. Then we could distinguish worlds with strange things and properties: E.g. fiction can say that a strange property A in a possible world 1 plays exactly the same role as another, B, in a possible world 2. (Sider 2002)(2).
Vs: Problem: the supposed modality remains ((s) And fictionalism and ersatzism were just going to replace it).
Solution: the correct fiction would be one that accurately covers all possibilities. ((s) Vs: that would be meaningless, and would not make any distinctions, the distinctions have to be made within the fiction and would demand a meta-level).
Vs Fictionalism: further problems: e.g. the use of possible worlds for analyzing information or meaning:
Def information content of a proposition/SchwarzVsFictionalism: a class of possible worlds.. But not "in accordance with this and that fiction". Not even when the fiction in question contained a theory of information. We want our own theory, not the theory of a fiction!.
VsFictionalism: should not leave too much to fiction. If all becomes fiction (e.g. all Abstracts) the concept loses contour.
Possible world/Schwarz: you also have the obligation to possible worlds, when you talk in everyday language about possible options. But, as if you count your change, you do not need sophisticated metaphysics for this. (Jackson 1998a(6),11).
Schwarz I 93
Vs fictionalism: Problem: when properties are classes of possibilia, statements about properties must also be analyzed away in a fictional way.

1. Gideon Rosen [1990]: “Modal Fictionalism”. Mind, 99: 327–354
2. Theodore Sider [2002]: “The Ersatz Pluriverse”. Journal of Philosophy, 99: 279–315
3. D. M. Armstrong [1989a]: A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
4. Kit Fine [1975]: “Review of Lewis, Counterfactuals”. Mind, 84: 451–458
5. Kit Fine [2003b]: “The Problem of Possibilia”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003], 161–179
6. F. Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005