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The author or concept searched is found in the following 89 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adverse Selection | Barr | Gaus I 213 Adverse Selection/public goods/welfare state//Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. >Welfare state, >Society. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992(1): 755). >Insurances. Moral hazard: adverse selection is reinforced by a second process or condition, called 'moral hazard'. People who are insured against a certain risk may be more willing to take chances than they would be in the absence of insurance. Knowing that if I get sick or injured, my medical bills will be covered, may make me more willing to engage in risky behaviour, such as downhill skiing. To the extent that this occurs, organizations may face higher claims, thereby forcing them to raise their charges, and discouraging others from purchasing protection. More obviously, unemployment insurance schemes are subject to moral hazard, for knowing that I will be covered in the event that I am unemployed, I have an incentive to quit (or arrange to be fired) and/or not to seek or accept employment. Of course, state schemes are subject to moral hazard as well, but the key point is that if the genuine risk of losing one's job is to be covered at all, it must be covered through a public programme (see Barr, 1998(2): 190—2). >Moral Hazard. 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Average Utility | Rawls | I 161 Average utility/Rawls: the principle of average utility differs from that of contract theory. Applied to the initial situation of a society to be built, in which the individuals are behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their later position, the principle of average utility requires that institutions be arranged in such a way that the absolute weighted sum of the expectations of the relevant representative individuals is maximized. I 162 This sum increases as the number of people in a society grows. Utilitarianism: here expectations are measured by the sum of actual and predictable satisfaction. >Utilitarianism. Theory of justice as fairness: on the other hand, this is a list of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). Classical theory of average utility: was represented by Mill and Wicksell(1)(2)(3). >J. St. Mill. Sum of Benefits/Population Growth/Rawls: the sum will not grow if we apply it to the fractions of society with certain positions, as long as the percentage of these fractions does not change. Population growth: only when a population changes there is a difference between the classical theory and the theory of justice as fairness. I 166 Average benefit/Rawls: the assumption of an initial situation of a society to be built, in which all are behind a veil of ignorance, argues for the introduction of the average principle and against the classical view. However, the average theory is not teleological, like the classical theory. Average Principle: it is not that it requires the same kind of risk-taking from all participants. I 171 Average Benefits/Rawls: It seems that the average principle must be tied to the principle of insufficient reason (see Risks/Rawls). We need something like the Laplace rule for decisions under uncertainty: the possibilities are determined in a natural way and everyone is given a probability. This does not assume general information about the company(4)(5)(6). >Probability/Rawls. I 188 Average Benefit/Ideal Observer/Rawls: From the point of view of individuals in the initial situation, there is no reason to agree with the assessments of a compassionate ideal observer. Such an accordance would have all the disadvantages of the classical utility principle. However, if the participants are considered complete altruists, i.e. those who agree with the goals of the compassionate ideal observer,... --- I 189 ...then the classical principle would be adopted. The greatest amount of bliss satisfies the observer as well as the altruist within the system. This gives us the surprising result that, while the principle of average utility corresponds to the ethics of the individual, the classical utilitarian doctrine is one of altruistic ethics! >Altruism, >Altruism/Rawls. 1. See for this: Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory London, 1953, pp.38f.; 2. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 18.; 3. J.C. Harsanyi „Cardinal Utilitry in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking“, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, 1953. 4. Cf. W. Feller, Profitability and Profit, pp. 210-233.; 5. L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 1954.; 6. H.E. Kyburg, Probability and Inductive Logic, Riverside, 1970. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Climate Change | Singer | I 217 Climate Change/Ethics/P. Singer: what we do to strangers in other communities far away today is much more serious than what we could have done to them if we had the habit of sending a group of fighters to their village. I 218 We can only combat climate change with global measures. What should the ethics on the basis of which we coordinate our actions look like? Natural Resources/Locke/P. Singer: from Locke's point of view, they can be exploited as long as there is enough and of the same quality for everyone. P. Singer: But we have now discovered that the absorption capacity of the atmosphere for greenhouse gases is limited. >J. Locke. I 220 Equal distribution: what can it look like? Principles/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles.(1) : Def Historical principle/Nozick: to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its story. Are the parties entitled to ownership on the basis of originally justified acquisition? >Public Goods, >Property. Def two-sided principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about the realization. See also Responsibility/Singer. I 224 Equal burden sharing/pollution/Singer, P: at a UN conference in 2009, Rwandan President Paul Kagame argued for equal per capita burden sharing in the elimination of environmental damage, as all people use the atmosphere to the same extent. Everything else is counterproductive. Sri Lanka made a similar proposal. Singer: this is the application of a time slice principle: Rwanda and Sri Lanka - like other developing countries - do well with it, because they consume less. It is better for them to forego the right to compensation towards industrialised countries. I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. Utilitarianism/David Lyons: (D. Lyons 1965.(3)): Thesis: In such cases, Rule-Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. >Utilitarianism. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right (>Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to Utilitarianism.(3) I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker,2000(4))): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics//Glover, J., >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974 2. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 3. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 4. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Collective Action | Olson | Brocker I 476 Communicative action/joint action/Olson: 1. Thesis: The common interest in a good does not necessarily lead to joint action for the production of this good. It does not follow from the fact that groups are composed of rational individuals that these groups behave according to their senses. (1) Instead, individuals aim for their personal advantage. Def Group/Macur: a set of actors who share a common interest. (2) Members may also have their own particular interests. A group is interested in the production of a collective good. Def Collective goods/Olson: "A common, collective or public good is defined here as any good that cannot practically be withheld from the other persons in a group if any person Xi in a group X1,...Xi,...Xn consumes it" (3). See Social Goods. Collective goods are therefore defined with regard to a group of actors. Brocker I 478 Free-rider problem: "Although all members of the group have a common interest in obtaining this collective advantage, they have no common interest in bearing the costs of procuring this collective good. Everyone would prefer to let the others bear the entire cost. (4) Brocker I 479 2. Thesis: It is easier for small and/or privileged groups to provide public goods than large and/or latent groups. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., p. 2 2. Ibid. p. 7 3. Ibid. p. 13 4. Ibid. p. 20 Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Collectives | Olson | Brocker I 475 Collectives/Olson: Olson's starting question is why some groups succeed in providing public goods while others fail. >Communicative Action/Olson. Def Group/Olson: a number of actors who share a common interest.(2) Members may also have their own particular interests. A group is interested in the production of a collective good.(1) Brocker I 476 Thesis 1: The common interest in a good does not necessarily lead to joint action for the production of that good. Brocker I 479 Thesis 2: It is easier for small and/or privileged groups to provide public goods than large and/or latent groups. Problem: it can come to the exploitation of more interested members by less interested members. Brocker I 480 Groups/Olson: small groups have the advantage that the individual contributions are perceived more strongly. Free riding can be punished. Brocker I 485 Thesis: In large groups, selective incentives are needed to make the production of collective goods possible. Public goods are created as an unintended by-product of rational action. For example, lobbying can be seen as a by-product of organisations capable of mobilising a latent group through 'selective incentives'.(2) Conversely, an organisation could not offer potential members an incentive to become members if it serves no other purpose than to provide the public good: "Only an organisation that also sells private or non-collective goods or provides individual members with beneficial social or recreational facilities would have such positive incentives" (3). Solution/Olson: When organizations have selective incentives, they develop a robustness and stability that enables them to survive. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., p. 7 2. Ibid. p. 130f. 3. Ibid. p. 131 Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Community | Rawls | I 521 Social Community/Social Union/Rawls: Hegel's legal philosophy, §§ 182-187, discusses preforms. >Philosophy of law/Hegel, >G.W.F. Hegel. Rawls: the members of a private community, whether individuals or associations, have their own private goals that are either competing or independent of each other. Anyway, they do not complement each other. Institutions here do not assume that they have a value, their activities are not seen as good but at best as a burden. Each person therefore only joins the community in pursuit of his or her own goals. No one takes note of someone else's possessions or goods, but prefers the most efficient arrangement that gives them the greatest advantage. Public goods consist primarily of the framework conditions provided by the state. I 522 Community members are not driven by the need to behave fairly, so the system of functioning requires sanctions. Social nature/Rawls: the social nature of the human being is best seen as a counter-image to the private community outlined above: People do indeed share common goals and they value the shared institutions and public goods as something good in itself. We need each other as partners I 523 ...in many aspects of life and the successes and experiences of others are part of our own social life. See Aristotelian Principle, >Principles/Rawls, >Community/Humboldt. Rawls: We can follow Humboldt and say that the social community makes it possible for everyone to participate in the whole of the realized possibilities of the other members. I 527 Justice/Community/Rawls: in order to understand how the principles of justice are connected with human socialization, we can imagine a well-ordered society as a social community of social communities. Collective intentions then arise as a consequence of the fact that everyone expects everyone (including themselves) to behave according to the principles of justice. I 528 The individual lives of individuals are, so to speak, plans within an overall plan of the community, but this overall plan does not set a superordinate goal, as e.g. in the case of a religious association, let alone any national prestige. Rather, it is a matter of the constitutional order implementing the principles of justice. I 529 Division of labour: will of course not be abolished in a social community. After all, it's about the opportunity for each member to bring in his or her individual skills. However, it is never possible for everyone to realize their skilss to an unlimited extent. >Division of labour. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Comparability | Rawls | I 174 Comparability/comparison/society/justice/Rawls: the clearest basis for interpersonal comparisons is in terms of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, health care, access opportunities), i. e. things that any rational person will probably want, no matter what else he/she wants. >Public goods, >Desires, >Preferences, >Freedom, >Infrastructure, >Healthcare system. However, the more we move on to more specific provisions, the more difficult it becomes. This is because the assessment of foreign preferences would increasingly require us to change our own nature. Purposes/intentions: it seems to be in vain to define his measure for interpersonal comparisons, taking into account all possible intentions and objectives. The value of the circumstances of others is not for us - as the construction (of the average utility) would make us expect - the value of the circumstances for the other person itself. >Average utility, >Relativism, >Circumstances, >Situations, >Values. I 175 Solution/Utilitarianism/Rawls: utilitarianism could create directories of public goods and thus define its principle. However, this would require major changes to the theory of justice. >Utilitarianism. Rawl's solution: the veil of ignorance (in the initial situation of a society to be built, members should not know which position they will take later) prevents a knowledge about the circumstances of others anyway. >Veil of ignorance. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Constitution | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 202 Constitution/constitutional economics/Voigt: Constitutions are concerned with mechanisms for the production of public goods. By writing and adopting constitutions, societies are not deciding in any meaningful detail what sort of public goods they want to provide themselves with; rather, the constitutions contain provisions that are intended to be used for making those decisions. If one is interested in analyzing a society's choice of constitution, one is really interested in analyzing a meta-choice, namely, how a society chooses (on the constitutional level) by what procedure to choose later on (on the post-constitutional level). Or, in the words of Peter Ordeshook (1993(1), pp. 23 If.): "A constitution is not a piece of legislation; it is the mechanism people use to guide the formulation of legislation and law." Any state that produces a minimum amount of public goods can thus be said to have a de facto constitution. This is, however, not the same as having a constitution in the sense of constitutionalism (…) >Constitution/Political theories, >Consent/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics, >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Ordeshook, P. (1993). "Some Rules of Constitutional Design," in P. E. Frankel, F. Miller, and J. Paul, eds., Liberalism and the Economic Order, 198—232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitutional Economics | Persson | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitutional Economics | Tabellini | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitutional Economics | Voigt | Parisi I 202 Constitutional Economics/Voigt/Parisi: the economic analysis of constitutions, also known as "constitutional economics" or "constitutional political economy," is a young research program. Standard economics used to focus on the analysis of choices within rules, thus assuming rules to be exogenously given and fixed. Constitutional economics broadens this research program by analyzing the choice of rules, using the established method of economics, that is, rational choice. A. (…) normative branch: (…) is interested in legitimizing the state and its most basic rules by drawing solely on the self-interest of rational individuals. The normative approach is dominated by adherents to social contract theory. B. (…) positive branch: (…) is interested in explaining (1) the (economic) effects of alternative constitutional rules and (2) the emergence and modification of constitutional rules. Over the last dozen years, research into the effects of constitutions experienced a veritable boost, whereas research into the emergence of constitutions is still in its infancy. Def Constitution/public choice/Voigt: Constitutions are concerned with mechanisms for the production of public goods. By writing and adopting constitutions, societies are not deciding in any meaningful detail what sort of public goods they want to provide themselves with; rather, the constitutions contain provisions that are intended to be used for making those decisions. >Constitution/Constitutional economics. A. Normative constitutional economics: possible questions: 1) How should societies proceed in order to bring about constitutional Parisi I 203 rules that fulfill some criterion like being "just" or 'deficient"? (2) What contents should the constitutional rules have? (3) Which issues should be dealt with in the constitution - and which should be left to sub-constitutional choice? (4) What characteristics should constitutional rules have? and many more. Contractarian approach/Buchanan: the frame is based on social contract theory as developed most prominently by Hobbes. According to Buchanan (1987(1), p. 249), the purpose of this contractarian approach is justificatory in the sense that "it offers a basis for normative evaluation. >Contract theory/Buchanan, >Costs/Buchanan, >Consent/Constitutional economics, >Efficiency/constitutional economics. Parisi I 205 B. Positive constitutional economics: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(2) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics, >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Buchanan, J. M. (1987). "The Constitution of Economic Policy." American Economic Review 77: 243-250. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Account- ability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Consumption (Economics) | Economic Theories | Mause I 475f Consumption/Economic Theory: Consumption may appear as an individual act of buying. But consumption is actually a complex phenomenon of institutions, norms and actions (Haupt and Torp 2009) (1). Despite all the differences in detail, the interests and needs of consumers are also collective interests or group interests that can be distinguished from provider interests. Legislators can impose rules on companies to serve the interests of consumers. See consumer policy/economic theories. Asymmetry: the economic balance between supply and demand postulated in economic theory is not reflected in a political balance between suppliers and consumers. Although consumer interests are so important for the economic cycle, they are considered "weak interests". Reason: they are so general that everyone would benefit from a product improvement. This leads to the "free rider problem". (2) Free riders: People who do not contribute to the costs are not excluded from consumption in certain cases. >Social Goods (Public Goods). Consumer protection/consumer interests: this makes it so difficult to organise the interests of consumers as well as those of businesses.(3) >Neoclassical economics. 1. Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, und Claudius Torp, Die Konsumgesellschaft in Deutschland 1890– 1990. Ein Handbuch. Frankfurt a. M. 2009. 2. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge 2003. 3.Bernd Stauss, Verbraucherinteressen. Gegenstand, Legitimation und Organisation. Stuttgart 1980. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Contracts | Buchanan | Brocker I 568 Contracts/Constitution/Buchanan: Buchanan distinguishes between pre-constitutional and post-constitutional contracts: First of all, concluding a contract leads to a temporary stabilisation of natural inequality or to cost reduction through "disarmament" on all sides. (See Inequality/Buchanan, Law/Buchanan). Since this situation still tends to be unstable, the state is needed as guarantor of order or as an arbitrator. Post-Constitutional Contract: establishes a constitutional framework for a society that knows public goods as well as private ones. Unlike private goods, public goods are not divisible. Public goods: here there is the free rider problem: because of their publicity, the goods can also be used by those who do not pay for them. (See Social Goods). Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Contracts | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 111 Contracts/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: Contractual exchanges implicate various, and sometimes conflicting, social and moral norms (...). In particular, contracts have been a subject of moral psychology, insofar as contracts tend to implicate both personal moral norms like promise-keeping as well as other-regarding preferences like generosity and reciprocity. >Norms, >Reciprocity. Exculpatory clauses: One of the first studies in this area was the Stolle and Slain ( 1997)(1) study of exculpatory clauses. They randomly assigned subjects to read one of two possible contracts, identical except for the presence or absence of a particularly egregious exculpatory clause. They found not only that subjects believed that the exculpatory was legally enforceable, but that they found the contracts equally fair. In other words, subjects in the exculpatory clause condition thought that the clause relieved the firm's obligation to compensate consumers for harms it had caused, but did not judge the contract as less fair than a contract that left open the possibility of consumer compensation. >Compensation. Public goods: Indeed, subjects in a public goods game experiment (Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee, 1977)(2) who were otherwise willing to lie about their intentions to cooperate with one another could generally be trusted to keep their word if they had explicitly promised, using that lan- guage, even without sanctions for lying. One of the core findings in this area is that individuals take breach of contract seriously as a moral harm, one that is not always fully ameliorated by expectation damages. >Social Goods. Parisi I 112 Contract breach: Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman (2010)(3) hypothesized that people find breach most outrageous when they perceive one party to be taking advantage of the other - when the non-breaching party feels "suckered." To test this they replicated the main effects of Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron (2009)(4), but looked at feelings of betrayal and exploitation as mediators of the effect. We found that harm in contract, but not tort, is felt to be a betrayal, and that when subjects perceived betrayal they responded with anger and embarrassment, in turn driving up their damages assessments. Similarly, subjects found that a greedy breacher was acting more disrespectfully than one breaching to avoid a loss, and this perception of disrespect explained much of the discrepancy in damages awards. Parisi I 113 Form of contracts: Some contracts also feel more “breachable” than others, often as a function of the contract’s form or history. Feldman and Teichman (2011)(5) investigated the willingness to breach in the context of low-probability enforcement, by asking subjects to imagine themselves as contractors in a home renovation who could save money by using a low-quality product. Individuals/parties: Hoffman and Wilkinson-Ryan (2013)(6) found that the formal fact of being, by law, party to a contract makes parties less likely to back out of the deal, even Parisi I 115 when the cancellation opportunity falls within a no-penalty window. 1. Stolle, Dennis P. and Andrew J. Slain (1997). "Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers' Propensity to Sue." Behavioral Sciences and the Law 15:83-94. 2. Dawes, Robyn M., Jeanne McTavish, and Harriet Shaklee (1977). "Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other People's Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35: 1-11. 3. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess and David A. Hoffman (2010). “Breach is for Suckers.” Vanderbilt Law Review 63: 1003–1045. 4. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess and Jonathan Baron (2009). "Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6: 405-423. 5. Feldman, Yuval and Doron Teichman (2011). "Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?" Georgetown Law Journal 100: 5—2291. 6. Hoffman, David A. and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan (2013). "The Psychology of Contract Precau- tions." University of Chicago Law Review 80: 395—445. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Data | Mayer-Schönberger | I 8 Data/Digitalisation/Mayer-Schönberger: in 2000, only a quarter of the information stored in the world was digital, the rest was stored on paper, music cassettes, magnetic tapes, film, records, etc. I 9 Today it is estimated that the digital flood flow over every citizen of the world is 320 times higher of what was stored in the library of Alexandria. The amount of stored information is growing four times faster than the global economy, computer performance is growing even faster. (See Moore's Law/Morozov). Between 1453 and 1503 it took 50 years to double the information stored in books.(1) Today, it doubles in about three years. I 45 Large amounts of data are usually not gathered in one place, but spread over many memories and computers. I 46 The Hadoop software used for the investigation assumes that the data remains where it is because there are simply too many to move it. I 47 According to some estimates, only 5% of all data are "structured", i.e. organised so that they can be included in a traditional database. I 101 Data/Mayer-Schönberger: become no less when you use them, unlike most material goods. They are therefore referred to as a "nonrivalising" good. The value of the data is therefore much more than what is extracted the first time it is used. >Public goods, >Commodities, >Markets, >Information. I 103 Mayer-Schönberger thesis: it could be helpful to compare data with the physical concept of energy (potential or stored energy). >Energy. I 104 Innovative use of data: search terms are a classic example of innovative reuse of data. (...) Previously used search terms can become extremely valuable later. >Search engines. I 107 Reuse of data: sometimes different amounts of data are brought together, which were collected for very different reasons. For example, the question of whether frequent use of mobile phones influences the probability of cancer has been investigated. I 108 In the end, there was no correlation. (2) I 113 Comprehensive Data/Data Exhaust/Mayer-Schönberger: "comprehensive data" refers to information about user behavior such as ignoring suggestions, the time spent on a page or subpage, and so on. This data is very valuable and influences what is shown to us by search engines. I 120 Value of data: is very difficult to quantify, as we no longer only have to consider the primary use, but the many possibilities of future reuses. 1. Eisenstein, Elizabeth L. The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge University Press, 1993. 2. Danish Cancer Society study—Patrizia Frei et al., “Use of Mobile Phones and Risk of Brain Tumours: Update of Danish Cohort Study,” BMJ 343 (2011) (http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d6387), and interview with Cukier, October 2012. |
MSchoen I Viktor Mayer-Schönberger Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think New York 2013 |
| Democratic Theory | Olson | Mause I 66 Democracy Theory/Olson: Olson has done the trick of making a theory based on individual action at the micro level fruitful for analyses and explanations of (political) phenomena at the meso and macro levels without conceptual breaks. Furthermore, he uses identical mechanisms of explanation for the meso and macro levels. See (1),(2). 1. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge 1965. [dt.: Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns. Tübingen 1968]. 2. Mancur Olson, The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities. Yale 1982. |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Distributive Justice | Rawls | I 274 Distributive Justice/Rawls: thesis: only by shaping markets can the problem of fair distribution be solved as a case of pure procedural justice. In this way, we also maintain efficiency and the important freedom of individual career choice. >Justice, >Markets. I 275 Institutions: We need a suitable social system to ensure distributive justice, no matter how historical coincidences turn out. The basic institutions required for this purpose include a constitution guaranteeing equal civil rights, freedom of thought and consciousness, political freedom, a fair electoral system and fair legislation, fair equal opportunities and free choice of profession. >Freedom, >Liberty/Rawls, >Institutions, >Equal Opportunities. The government must also ensure support for the socially disadvantaged and in the event of illness. The institutions that are supposed to guarantee this can be divided into four branches(1). I 276 1. Assignment: the pricing system must be kept competitive. Problem: Efficiency. The allocation system is concerned with taxes and subsidies in order to be able to correct deviations from the market. 2. Stabilization: this branch is concerned with full employment in the sense that everyone can take up the profession he/she wants and that economic development is effective. The first two branches together ensure the efficiency of the market economy. >Efficiency/Rawls. 3. Transfer: this is about social security (social minimum). Here needs have to be considered and classified. >Social minimum. Problem: A competitive system of market prices does not provide any orientation here. This leads to a division of labour between parts of the social system. I 277 4. distribution: The institutions that enable distributive justice are tax legislation and property law. 1. An equal distribution of property appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining equal freedoms. I 278 Inequality: the inequality of inherited goods is not inherently worse than that of intelligence. The point is that all inequalities are dealt with by the difference principle, so that they ultimately benefit the weakest. (See Difference Principle/Rawls). 2. Tax legislation that provides the state with revenue to guarantee public goods. I 279 The details of the design are a matter of political theory and not of the theory of justice. >Taxation. 1. See R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, New York, 1959, ch. I. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Economic Systems | Rawls | I 265 Economic systems/Political economy/Rawls: Political economy deals with the public sector and institutions that influence economic life through taxes, property rights and market structures, etc. An economic system regulates which goods are produced and by which means, who receives them in return for what compensation and what proportion of social resources is spent on the conservation of public goods (e. g. infrastructure). >Political Economy. Public sector/Rawls: has two aspects: 1. Characteristic: relates to the ownership of means of production. Thus, for example, the public sector in socialism is larger than in capitalism. It is smaller in privately organised systems and mainly affects public institutions and transport. 2. Characteristic: relates to the proportion of resources spent on public goods (infrastructure, etc.). Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. >Politics, >Markets. I 268 For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the scheme. Problem: even in a society of people of justice, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Public goods. 1. See J. M. Buchananan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Economy | Aristotle | Mause I 28 Economy/Aristoteles: Aristotle distinguishes two types of economy: the acquisition of material means for a good life ("chrematistiké") and their use ("oikonomiké"). >Division of labour/Aristotle, >Slavery/Aristotle, >Money/Aristotle, >Property/Aristotle, >Public goods/Aristotle, >Politics/Plato. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Education | Minimal State | Gaus I 124 Education/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: Widespread primary and secondary education are also often seen as, if not perfect public goods, goods that possess significant similarities to public goods, and so will be significantly undersupplied by free markets. However, while advocates of the Small State thus endorse taxation to fund general education, this does not justify public provision of that education. ‘The strong case for government finance of at least general education,’ says Hayek, ‘does not however imply that this education should also be managed by the government, and still less that government should acquire a monopoly of it’ (1979(1): 61). Thus advocates of the Small State have endorsed vouchers, by which government compensates for the undersupply of education by additional funding, but leaves provision to the market (Friedman and Friedman, 1980(2): ch. 6). ((s) For the concept of the „Small State“ see >Minimal state/Gaus.) 1. Hayek, F. A. (1979) Lau; Legislation and Liberty. vol. 111, The Political Order of a Free People. London: Routledge 2. Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman (1980) Free to Choose. London: Secker and Warburg. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Electoral Rules | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 206 Electoral Rules/Constitutional economics/Voigt: Electoral rules refer to the way votes translate into parliamentary seats: under majority rule (also called plurality or first-past-the-post), only the candidate who secured the most votes in a district is elected. Under proportional representation, parties are allocated seats according to the proportion of votes they obtain. Electoral systems include more dimensions than electoral rules, in particular district size and ballot structure. District size refers to the number of parliamentarians sent from one district. The ballot structure determines whether citizens can vote only for a party, only for individuals, or some combination thereof. Although theoretically distinct, these dimensions are highly correlated empirically: countries using majority rule (MR) often have minimum district size (single-member districts) and allow voting for individual candidates. Proportional rule: Countries relying on proportional representation (PR) often have large districts and restrict the possibility of deviating from party lists. Political parties: It has been known for many years that electoral rules can have a crucial effect on the number of parties. Duverger's (1954)(1) observations that MR is conducive to two-party systems, whereas more parties are apt to arise under PR, has even been called "Duverger's law." The analysis of the economic consequences of electoral systems is of a more recent vintage. Political coalitions: It has been argued (Austen-Smith, 2000)(2) that since coalition governments are more likely under PR than under MR, a common pool problem among governing parties will emerge. Parties participating in the coalition will want to please different constituents, which explains why both government spending and tax rates are, on average, higher under PR than under MR. Government spending: Lizzeri and Persico (2001)(3) compare the composition of government spending under alternative electoral rules. They distinguish between a) the provision of a genuine public good on the one hand, and b) pork-barrel projects that serve to re- distribute wealth on the other, and ask whether incentives to provide these goods differ systematically between MR and PR. Under MR, politicians have an incentive to cater to those who can help them obtain a plurality of the votes and they will do so by promising pork barrel projects. Under PR, on the other hand, targeting makes less sense because every vote counts, leading politicians to provide more general public goods. >Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley. 2. Austen-Smith, D. (2000). "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1235-1269. 3. Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico (2001). "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives." American Economic Review 91(1): 225—239. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Electoral Systems | Persson | Mause I 286 Majority Election/Proportional Representation/voting system/fiscal policy/Persson/Tabellini: in a simplified probabilistic model of Persson and Tabellini (Persson & Tabellini 1999)(1) (Persson & Tabellini 2000) (2), the main difference between the electoral systems was in the election programmes of the parties. Idealization adopted only one constituency for the proportional representation system. Proportional Representation: Here, the fiscal policy programmes are designed to address at least 50% of the voters necessary to win the election. Here the model predicts higher expenditure on public goods and redistribution. Majority voting: only 50% of the votes are required in a relative majority of constituencies. Therefore, a party can theoretically win a majority of seats in parliament by as little as 25% of all votes. Therefore, the election campaign here focuses on a few constituencies. As a result, public expenditure on public goods, which actually benefits a majority of voters, will be reduced. The predictions of the model of Persson and Tabellini were empirically confirmed in the following period.(3)(4) >Political elections, >Electoral rules, >Democracy, >Parliamentary system. 1. Torsten Persson &Guido Tabellini. 1999. The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review 43( 4– 6): 699–735. 2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political economics. Explaining economic policy. Cambridge 2000. 3. Torsten Persson, Torsten, und Guido Tabellini, The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge 2003. 4. Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller, Stefan Voigt, und Carsten Wolf. 2009. The economic effects of constitutions: Replicating – And extending – Persson and Tabellini. Public Choice 139: 197– 225. |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Electoral Systems | Tabellini | Mause I 286 Majority Election/Proportional Representation/voting system/fiscal policy/Persson/Tabellini: in a simplified probabilistic model of Persson and Tabellini (Persson & Tabellini 1999) (1) (Persson & Tabellini 2000) (2), the main difference between the electoral systems was in the election programmes of the parties. Idealization adopted only one constituency for the proportional representation system. Proportional Representation: Here, the fiscal policy programmes are designed to address at least 50% of the voters necessary to win the election. Here the model predicts higher expenditure on public goods and redistribution. Majority voting: only 50% of the votes are required in a relative majority of constituencies. Therefore, a party can theoretically win a majority of seats in parliament by as little as 25% of all votes. Therefore, the election campaign here focuses on a few constituencies. As a result, public expenditure on public goods, which actually benefits a majority of voters, will be reduced. The predictions of the model of Persson and Tabellini were empirically confirmed in the following period.(3)(4) >Financial policy. 1.Torsten Persson &Guido Tabellini. 1999. The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review 43( 4– 6): 699– 735. 2.Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political economics. Explaining economic policy. Cambridge 2000. 3.Torsten Persson, Torsten, und Guido Tabellini, The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge 2003. 4. Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller, Stefan Voigt, und Carsten Wolf. 2009. The economic effects of constitutions: Replicating – And extending – Persson and Tabellini. Public Choice 139: 197– 225. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Damage | Economic Theories | Mause I 402f Environmental Damage/Economic Theory: Environmental damage is often the result of the economic use of natural resources. They are caused by production and consumption as well as the absorption of pollutants within the existing environmental media (air, water, soil). These forms of use can also be described as functions of the natural environment (production, consumption, landfill function). On the other hand, increasing land use for settlement, transport and production purposes is contributing to environmental damage because natural ecosystems are being reduced, biodiversity is declining, the landscape is being affected and the soil is increasingly sealed (Cansier 1993, p. 3 (1); Hartwig 1992, p. 126ff (2)). Environmental Policy/Federal Republic of Germany: The environmental policy pursued in Germany for more than 40 years (see for an overview Böcher und Töller 2012, p. 6ff. (3)) has contributed to a significant improvement in Germany's environmental quality status, particularly in the recent past, according to the latest OECD environmental assessment report (2012) (4). For example, Germany's total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2, methane, etc.) in 2010 were 24 % below 1990 levels, although Germany is one of the few OECD countries to have completely decoupled greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth in the 2000s, not least due to a reduction in the energy intensity of industrial production. Externality: The need for government action in the field of environmental policy can be justified from an economic point of view by the concept of external effects in addition to the public good properties of the elimination of environmental damage (Feess und Seeliger 2013, p. 39ff.(5); Endres 2000, p. 18ff.(6)). Environmental damage and improvements can then be understood as a consequence of negative or positive side effects of production or consumption. Like public goods, these effects are not covered by the market price mechanism. Problem: If the state does not ensure the "internalisation of external effects" within the framework of its environmental policy, i.e. for the charging of external costs or a renumeration of the external benefits from the polluter, this leads to a misallocation in the provision of private goods, which is accompanied by an overuse of environmental resources or too little improvement in environmental quality.(7) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Cansier, Dieter. 1993. Umweltökonomie. Stuttgart/ Jena: 2. Hartwig, Karl-Hans, Umweltökonomie. In Vahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, ed. Dieter Bender, Hartmut Berg, Dieter Cassel, Günter Gabisch, Karl-Hans Hartwig, Lothar Hübl, Dietmar Kath, Rolf Peffekoven, Jürgen Siebke, H. Jörg Thieme und Manfred Willms, Vol. 2, 5. ed., 122– 162. München 1992 3. Böcher, Michael, und Annette E. Töller, Umweltpolitik in Deutschland. Eine politikfeldanalytische Einführung. Wiesbaden 2012. 4. OECD. 2012. OECD-Umweltprüfberichte. Deutschland 2012. Paris: OECD Publishing. 5. Feess, Eberhard, und Andreas Seeliger, Umweltökonomie und Umweltpolitik, 4. ed. München 2013 6. Endres, Alfred, Umweltökonomie, 3. ed. Stuttgart: 2000. 7. Ibid. p. 19 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Damage | Rawls | I 268 Environmental Damage/Costs/Rawls: (See Public Sector/Rawls): Second characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are considered. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the scheme. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Environmental Goods | Economic Theories | Mause I 408f Environmental Goods/Preferences/Economic Theories: There are individual environmental areas in which the long-term effects of environmental impairments are not always fully assessed individually (e.g. preservation of mountain forests due to avalanche danger) and therefore an at least partial correction of individual preferences through so-called meritorial interventions by the state (e.g. prohibition of deforestation of "protective forests") is necessary (Zimmermann et al. 2012, p. 498) (1). For the vast majority of environmental goods, however, it can be assumed in principle that corresponding environmental protection preferences exist in society without, however, sufficient quantities and quality of these goods being offered via the market. Mause I 409 Environmental goods have the typical characteristics of public goods. >Public Goods. a) Non-rivalry in consumption: consumption by one citizen does not diminish that of another. Example air. This means that no market prices arise here. b) The exclusion principle cannot be applied: nobody can be excluded from the use by assignment of exclusive property rights. This means that a private supplier could not achieve cost-covering prices with these goods. Conclusion: Clean environment cannot be sold via a market. Common goods/Common: these are goods for which rival consumption may occur. Although there is no market here either, the lack of ownership rights means that there is no incentive to treat the environmental goods concerned with care. Example Overfishing (2). Prisoner's Dielmma/Ostrom. Cfl. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Horst Zimmermann, Horst, Klaus-Dirk Henke, und Michael Broer, Finanzwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Lehre von der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft, 11. ed. München 2012. 2. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge 1990. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Organisations | Economic Theories | Mause I 413f Environmental Organizations/Economic Theory: According to a 1965 (1) thesis by Mancur Olson on collective action, there is an asymmetry in the organizational and conflict capacity of economic and environmental associations. VsOlson: the situation of environmental associations is not quite as it should be according to Olson's logic. Protest as a central form of action has lost importance in the last 20 years. (Roose, 2009, p. 111) (2) The asymmetries mentioned above have also eased (von Winter, 2001, p. 218) (3) Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised ed.). Harvard University Press 1965. 2. Jochen Roose, Unterstützungslogik und Informationslogik. Zu zwei Formen der Interessenvertretung im Umweltbereich. In Interessenvermittlung in Politikfeldern, Hrsg. Britta Rehder, Thomas Winter und Ulrich Willems, 109– 131. Wiesbaden 2009. 3. Thomas von Winter, Verbändemacht im kooperativen Staat. In Zukunft der Demokratie in Deutschland, Hrsg. Andrea Gourd und Thomas Noetzel, 211– 234. Opladen 2001. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Policy | Public Choice | Mause I 413 Environmental Policy/New Political Economy/Public Choice: since the New Political Economy assumes that the respective (short-term) chances of re-election constitute a central restriction to action for politicians, well-informed and influential political actors or groups in environmental policy - contrary to the common good - can shape or even block the choice of environmental policy strategies according to their specific preferences (Döring and Pahl 2003, S. 94)(1), as was already fundamentally explained by Olson (1965)(2) in his reflections on the "logic of collective action". The particular interests of relatively small and financially well-funded interest groups will therefore have a greater chance of asserting themselves. Problem: heterogeneous groups such as taxpayers, consumers and environmental activists are thus subject to asymmetry in terms of influence. >State/Public Choice. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Thomas Döring & Thilo Pahl. Kooperative Lösungen in der Umweltpolitik – eine ökonomische Sicht. In Kooperative Umweltpolitik, Hrsg. Bernd Hansjürgens, Wolfgang Köck und Georg Kneer, 89– 112. Baden-Baden 2003. 2. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge 1965. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Environmental Protection | Ostrom | Brocker I 726 Environmental protection/Economic theory/Ostrom: Initial question: How can resources that are self-organised and shared by many actors be regulated in such a way that they are preserved for their users and subsequent generations? Brocker I 727 Ostrom's thesis: Public goods (jointly used goods, social goods) can often be managed successfully and sustainably by their users themselves, without the mandatory need for state supervision or individually shared private property. (1) Brocker I 738 VsOstrom: Ostrom's analyses refer to organisational forms with less than 15,000 participants. (See Self-organization/Ostrom, Organization/Ostrom, Institutions/Ostrom, Collective action/Ostrom). She has therefore been accused of being vulnerable to the conclusions she herself draws in subsequent publications on tackling global problems such as climate change. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999. Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Federalism | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 210 Federalism/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: (…) the conjectured economic benefits of federalism are expected to arise from the competition between constituent governments; its costs are based on the necessity of cooperating on some issues. Hayek: Thus, Hayek (1939)(1) argues that competition between governments will reveal information on efficient ways to provide public goods. Assuming that governments have incentives to make use of that information, government efficiency should be higher in federations, ceteris paribus. Tiebout: In Tiebout's ( 1956)(2) famous model, the lower government levels compete Parisi I 211 for taxpaying citizens, thus giving lower-level governments an incentive to cater to these citizens' preferences. Costs: (…) if the number of states is large, economies of scale in the provision of public goods could remain unrealized. For example, Tanzi (2000)(3) suspects that those providing public goods will be insufficiently specialized. Moral hazard: Also, federal states need to deal with a moral hazard problem that is not an issue in unitary states.* The federal government will regularly issue "no-bail-out clauses" but they will not always be credible.** With regard to the issue of overborrowing, Wildasin (1997)(6) argues that large states can become "too big to fail." On the other hand, it has been argued (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7) that large member states can internalize more of the benefits generated by responsible fiscal policies. Solution: A number of factors might mitigate this free-rider problem: If strong, disciplined parties are active throughout most of the federation and one party is in charge of the federal as well as most of the constituent governments, then party leaders may be able to prevent state officials from externalizing the negative effects of overborrowing (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7). Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(3). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. Parisi I 212 Government spending: For a long time, the evidence concerning the effects of federalism on overall government spending was mixed. Over the last several years, though, this appears to have changed. Rodden (2003)(8) shows for a cross-country study covering the period 1980 to 1993 that in countries in which local and state governments have the competence to set the tax base, total government expenditure is lower. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics. * The relationship between the central government and the lower units in unitary states might be more aptly described drawing on principal-agent theory with its familiar monitoring problems. For such a view, see Seabright (1996)(4). ** Rodden (2002(5), p. 6 72) points out that the creditworthiness of the federal level might be jeopardized if it does not bail out the constituent governments. 1. Hayek, F. (1939). "Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism." New Commonwealth Quarterly 2: 131-149. 2. Tiebout, Ch. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-424. 3. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. 4. Seabright, Paul (1996). "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model." European Economic Review 40:61-89. 5. Rodden, J. (2002). "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World." American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 670-687. 6. Wildasin, D. (1997). "Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations." Nashville, TN: Mimeo. 7. Rodden, J. and E. Wibbels (2002). "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism - Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems." World Politics 54: 494-531. 8. Rodden, J. (2003). "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government." International Organization 57: 695-729. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Good | Rawls | I 396 Good/The Good/Goodness/being good/Justice/Rawls: we must distinguish between two theories of good, since in the theory of justice as fairness the concept of law precedes that of good. In contrast to teleological theory, something is only good if it can be integrated into existing principles. On the other hand, you need a concept of good to establish the principles, because you have to take into account the motives of those involved. In order not to jeopardise the primacy of the concept of law, the concept of good can only be reduced to the essentials here. That's what I call the Thin Theory of the good. I 397 Rationality: does not require the disposition of all knowledge. I suppose that rational actors are more likely to choose more than less primary public goods. >Public Goods/Rawls, >Rationality. In the initial situation of a society to be established, the participants assume that their ideas of good have a certain structure. The concept of good is later used in connection with the moral value of persons. I 398 In a well-ordered, approximately fair society it will turn that it is good in itself to be a good person. For this, however, we need a theory of good that presupposes the principles of justice. If the sense of justice itself is a good one, then only in the sense of the Thin Theory. I 399 In this case, the sense of justice contributes to the stability of an orderly society. I call this accordance of goodness and justice congruence. Def Good/The Good/Rawls: I assume the following for a definition. 1. a thing A is a good X if it has a certain property to a greater extent than something else, average(1). 2. A is a good X for a person K exactly when A has the characteristics that make it rational for K to aim for X. 3. K's life plan has to be rational on the whole. I 400 See footnotes 2-15. I 423 Being Good/Goodness as Rationality/Rawls: (See Planning/Rawls): One might think that it is necessary for the individual to constantly raisonninate to explore whether his/her plans are rational. This is a misunderstanding. Ultimately, it's about finding a criterion for the value of a person. This is mainly defined by reference to a rational (hypothetical) plan. >Rationality. I 424 However, we cannot infer from the definition of a rational plan the content of objectives. There are human needs in general, plans have to take into account human skills and social dependencies, etc. I 426 Def Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and all the more so the more they realize these abilities and the more complex they are(16)(17)(18)(19). >ceteris paribus, >Aristotle. I 429 Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. I 431 VsRawls: Why should the Aristotelian Principle be true - RawlsVsVs: we observe it on children and higher animals. It also seems to be possible to explain it with evolutionary theory. The selection will have selected the individuals to whom it applies(20)(21)(22). I 435 In order to make the Thin Theory a fully-fledged one that is about the value of a person, we ask how fellow citizens judge other fellow citizens who are in the same position. This involves average skills in an average position and in different roles, especially those that are considered more important. In addition, we assume broad characteristics that are normally sought by rational persons. (The indication of broad properties comes from T. M. Scanlon). >T.M. Scanlon. I 437 Def good person/Def moral value/Rawls: a person of moral value is then an individual with an above-average degree of broad moral qualities, so that it is rational for individuals in the initial situation of a society to be established to strive for this for themselves and for each other. N.B.: no additional ethical concepts are introduced. >Values, >Morals. Person/HareVsRawls: some authors have argued that a person qua person has no defined role or function if he/she is not treated as an instrument or object, so this definition of goodness or rationality would also have to fail(23). >R. M. Hare. I 438 RawlsVsHare/RawlsVsVs: we do not have to assume that people have a certain role and even less that they should serve as a means to higher purposes. We only refer to the initial situation of a society to be established. I 446 Good/The Good/The Right/Rightness/Rawls: how does the Good differ from the Right? 1. The principles of justice that are used for the purpose of determining the good are principles that are chosen in the initial situation of a society to be established. On the other hand, the principles of rational decision and rationality used to determine the right thing are not chosen. >Principles/Rawls. I 447 Another difference is that people differ in what is considered good, but not so in the case of determining the right thing. 1. See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford 1930), p. 67. 2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, vk. III, ch. 1-63. 3. Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Acadmy Edition, vol. IV, pp. 425-419; The Critique of Practical Reason, ch. II, bk I of pt. I. 4. See H. J. Paton on Kant in: In Defense of Reason (London, 1951), pp. 157-177. 5. H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Ed.(London, 1907), bk. I, ch. IX and bk. III, ch. XIV. 6. F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd Ed. (Oxford, 1926), ch. II. 7. Joshua Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York, 1908), lext II. 8. H. J. Paton, The Good Will (London, 1927), bk. II and III, esp. ch. VIII and IX. 9. W.D. Lamont, The Value Judgment (Edingurgh, 1955). 10. J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions (London, 1961) ch. V, secs I and III; ch. VI. (11. For the naturalistic value theory see: John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), pt. III. 12. See also R. B: Perry, General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), ch. XX-XXII. 13. As well as C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lasalle Ill. 1946), bk. III. 14. Rawls' own approach is based on: J. O. Urmson „On Grading“, Mind (1950), vol. 59, Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, NY, 1960), ch. VI. 15. Philippa Foot, „Goodness and Choice“, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 35 (1961). 16. Cf. Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, ch. 11-14, bk. X. ch. 1-5. 17. See W.F.R. Hardie, Aristote’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV. 18. G.C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp. 76-78. 19. R. W. White, „Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory“,Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175, 180f. 20. See B. G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago, 1966), pp. 49-53. 21. W. H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, (London, 1965), pp. 87-92. 22. I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Ethology (New York, 1970), pp. 217-248. 23. See R. M. Hare, Geach on Good an Evil, Analysis 17(5), p. 109ff. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Government Spending | Economic Theories | Mause I 276/277 Government Expenditure/Economic theories: Problems in determining optimal government spending arise in connection with public goods. Their value can hardly be determined, since there are an indefinite number of individuals who do not contribute to the costs (free rider problem). See Public Goods, especially Public Goods/Samuelson. For newer solutions Frey and Stutzer.(1) 1.Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer. 2011. The use of happiness research for public policy. Social Choice and Welfare 38 (4): 659– 674. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Inequalities | Burke | Rawls I 300 Inequality/Burke, E. /Rawls: many authors, including Edmund Burke, believed that some kind of hierarchical social structure and a ruling class with inherited prerogatives are essential for the development of public goods. >Public good, >Society. Political power should be exercised by experienced men whose ambitions are moderated by their privileges and advantages of their position. >Power. Burke believed that the great families of the ruling class, through their wisdom of exercising power, were deceiving from generation to generation for the general welfare. (E. Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London, 1910), p. 49; John Plamenatz, Man and Society, (London, 1963), vol. I, pp. 346-351.) >Generational Justice. I 301 RawlsVsBurke: it is not enough to accept how Burke and Hegel did, that these forms of inequality also benefited the poorer people. We would also have to accept as a condition that, by correcting these injustices, the prospects of those who are worse off would be further worsened. The argumentation that all would benefit would only apply if the lexical order of principles (processing sequentially, See Principles/Rawls) were to be abolished. >Principles/Rawls. 1. E. Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London, 1910), p. 49. 2. John Plamenatz, Man and Society, (London, 1963), vol. I, pp.346-351 |
BurkeE I Edmund Burke A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 2nd Revised ed. Edition Oxford 2015 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Institutions | Morozov | I 117 Institutions/Morozov: most public institutions should not be measured against the standards of their private counterparts, simply because it is their task to provide goods and services that cannot or should not provide markets. The attitude of citizens facing the state as consumers is characterized by Catherine Needham: Needham: "The fundamental danger is that consumerism promotes privatised and disgruntled citizens whose expectations of the government can never be fulfilled and cannot develop concern for the common good, which must be the basis for democratic engagement and support for public services. (1) >Public goods, >Public sphere, >Society, >Community, >State. 1. Catherine Needham, Citizen Consumers, 2003, quoted in Matthew Flinders, Defending Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 83. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Interest | Olson | Brocker I 484 Interests/Power/OlsonVsTradition/Olson: it is not the case that larger groups have more influence (power) than smaller groups. (1) These authors take it for granted "that such groups should act to defend or advance their group interests, and that individuals in these groups must also work for their personal economic interests" (2). Brocker I 485 Solution/Olson: A common interest in a collective good is (...) not a sufficient condition for the provision of this good. Due to the structural advantages of small groups in the provision of collective goods, Olson even comes to a contrary conclusion. >Communicative Action/Olson, Collectives/Olson. Brocker I 486 Olson thesis: The interests of small groups are overrepresented in political competition. >Politics/Olson. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 107. 2.Ebenda S. 125 Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Isolation | Sen | Rawls I 267 Isolation/Economy/Public Sector/Public Goods/A. K. Sen/Rawls: Second feature of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself/herself, even if he will never be exposed to this infection. For example, also environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market.In this way, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here, there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. >Public goods, >Externalities, >Markets, >Environmental damage. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation in this case. >Infrastructure, >Freedom. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Interests. I 269 Rawls: the distinction between the problems of isolation and those of insurances is made by Amartya K. Sen. (See A. K. Sen,"Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 81,1967). Isolation: Problems arise here when the result of many individual isolated decisions is worse for everyone, even if each individual decision was completely rational. For example, the prisoner's dilemma: the classic example of this is Hobbes' natural state. (See R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, New York, 1957, ch. V, esp pp. 94-102; D. P. Gauthier,"Morality and Advantage", Philosophical Review, vol 76,1967). >Prisoner's Dilemma. I 270 Insurance Problem/A. K. Sen/Rawls: here the goal is to achieve with what unanimity has been achieved. Each contribution of an individual depends on the contributions of others. To this end, we need to introduce a superordinate scheme for the application of penalties and restrictions, which creates a situation that is better for everyone than if this scheme is lacking. |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Jurisdiction | Economic Theories | Parisi I 172 Jurisdiction/Economic theories/Wangenheim: (…) the law-and-economics discussion on competing jurisdictions relies to a substantial degree on the very evolutionary concept of competition as a discovery process (Hayek, 1949)(1) for better law. Jurisdictions invent new legal rules and jurisdictions imitate the legal rules of other jurisdictions (Mattei and Pulitini, 1991(2); Ogus, 1999(3); van den Bergh, 2000(4)). Tiebout: Tiebout (1956)(5) was the first to describe the interaction between jurisdictions - local communities in his case - as a competitive process, which will eventually entail separation of individuals into various communities according to their differential preferences and certain rather restrictive conditions, in particular concerning the mobility of individuals and the absence of externalities. Buchanan: The idea has been formalized in Buchanan's (1965)(6) theory of clubs. In these early approaches, competition between communities or clubs (governed or owned by entrepreneurs) takes place solely by movement of individuals from one community or club to another. Hirschman: Hirschman (1970)(7) extended the argument to allow for "voice" as a second mode of influencing the governor's or owner's decisions. Legal rules: While early writings in the field saw the mission of communities in the provision of public goods in general, the content of legal rules became a subject of investigation in the course of refinements of the argument. Oates and Schwab (1988)(8) were the first to combine fiscal federalism with regulatory rules in a formal model. Frey and Eichenberger (1996)(9) argued that most public goods need not be supplied and financed by regional polities but also "functional overlapping competing jurisdictions (FOCJ)" could fulfill the task. With these extensions, competition between jurisdictions may refer to legal rules and may be driven both by individuals relocating from one jurisdiction to another and by politicians competing for votes from voters in the jurisdiction who compare the policy of their own jurisdiction to that of others (yardstick competition). Obviously, this is a difference between competition between jurisdictions and competition between firms producing private goods, which should not be neglected. Parisi I 173 Equilibrium: Much of the literature interested in the equilibrium of inter-jurisdictional competition refers to specific legal fields and asks whether competition in the various fields leads to efficient or inefficient equilibria—in other words, whether there is a race to the top or a race to the bottom. Most of the prominent fields of law discussed in this realm are corporate law (e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996(10); Romano, 2005(11); Romano, 2017), including securities law (Ribstein, 2005(12); Choi and Guzman, 1998(13)) and regulation (Oates and Schwab, 1988)(8), in particular European regulation and its harmonization (e.g. Ogus, 1999(3); van den Bergh, 2000)(4). Path-dependence: Carbonara and Parisi (2009)(14) show that under certain conditions - suffciently liberal choice-of-law rules and governments that are benevolent towards their constituencies - multiple equilibria of the legal evolution emerge and hence a strong path dependency. >Path dependence. 1. Hayek, F. A. v. (1949). Individualism, and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Mattei, U. and F. Pulitini (1991). "A Competitive Model of Legal Rules," in A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, and R. Wintrobe, eds., The Competitive State: Villa Colombella Papers on Competitive Politics, 207-219. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 3. Ogus, A. (1999). "Competition between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48: 405-418. 4. van den Bergh, R. (2000). "Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe." Kyklos 53: 435-466. 5. Tiebout, C. M. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-424. 6. Buchanan, J. (1965) "An Economic Theory of Clubs." Economica 32: 1-14. 7. Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 8. Oates, W. E. and R. M. Schwab (1988). "Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?" Journal of Public Economics 3 5: 333-354. 9. Frey, B. S. and R. Eichenberger (1996). "FOCJ: Competitive Governments for Europe." International Review of Law and Economics 16: 315-327. 10. Easterbrook, F. H. and D. R. Fischel (1996). The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Romano, R. (2005). "Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?" Oxford Review of Economic Policy 21: 212-231. 12. Ribstein, L. E. (2005). "Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition." Review of Law and Economics 1:97-148. 13. Choi, S. and A. Guzman (1998). "Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation." Southern California Law Review 71:903. 14. Carbonara, E. and F. Parisi (2009). "Choice of Law and Legal Evolution: Rethinking the Market for Legal Rules." Public Choice 139:461-492. Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Knowledge | Barber | Brocker I 687 Knowledge/Political Knowledge/Politics/Epistemology/Barber: Thesis: Political knowledge is autonomous versus philosophical knowledge. The decisive question is: does it arise from the creative consensus of an autonomous will of the citizen? (1) Barber understands politics "as epistemology". (2) Barber: political knowledge is not subject to the supposedly absolute truth conditions of philosophy nor to the fundamental rules such as the avoidance of the naturalistic fallacy (the conclusion from being to should). See Naturalistic Fallacy. Skepticism/Barber: this itself is only the other side of a misguided claim to truth. Knowledge/Future/Barber: Thesis: because of its reference to a possible future, political knowledge can attain a kind of validity that can be reduced neither to principles nor to conventions. Political knowledge is reflected in "functioning rules of thumb". (3) Judgment/truth/language/Barber: Politics is always about the question "What should we do? Individual goals would be reformulated through their public theming towards a "mutual language of public goods". (4) ((s)VsBarber: not every problem can be reformulated in a "language of public goods". Nor should it be the aim of a society form to aim for it. See Psychotherapy, Self-Discovery etc. ). 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, S. 161f. 2. Ebenda chap 5 (engl). (Kap 2 dt.) 3. Ibid. p. 164. 4. Ibid. p. 165 Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Language | Barber | Brocker I 687 Language/Barber: Politics is always about the question "What should we do? Individual goals would be reformulated through their public theming towards a "mutual language of public goods". (1) ((s)VsBarber: not every problem can be reformulated in a "language of public goods". This should not be the aim of a society form either. E.g. psychotherapy, self-discovery etc. It would be an expression of extreme reification to demand that language should be oriented towards the form of public goods. See Reification. 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, p. 171. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Language | Sellars | Rorty VI 184 Language/world/Sellars/Rorty: Thesis: everything is linguistic. VsSellars: most frequent objection: small children and dogs also have pain without being able to talk about it. >Psychological Nominalism, >Concept/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars, >Pain. Rorty VI 185 Language/Sellars: cannot be verified on the base of non-liguistical things. Rorty: Therefore, the utility is only interesting for pragmatism. >Pragmatism. --- Sellars I 81ff "Our Rylean ancestors" E.g. Primitive language vocabulary for public properties of public goods, conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification, and especially the subjunctive conditional. Moreover, vagueness and openness. >Rylean ancestors. SellarsVs: an intersubjective language, must be a Rylean language: that rises from a too simple image of the relationship of intersubjective speech and public objects. >Thinking/Sellars. --- Brandom II 72 Language/Sellars/Brandom: there are languages without theoretical terms - just some terms need to have non-reporting use, so that some may have reporting use. >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Libertarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 229 Libertarianism/Political philosophy/Lamont: (...) fruitful arguments for libertarianism are based on the value of liberty itself. The most famous twentieth-century champion of such arguments was Friedrich Hayek (1944(1); 1976a(2); 1976b(3)), though there are many varieties, often inspired by John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty (1982)(4). This group of libertarians have responded to critics with greater depth. To see this, consider two of the more general criticisms of libertarianism (Haworth, 1994)(5). 1) VsLibertarianism: First, critics complain that libertarianism excludes state measures to improve the lives of the people, including the provision of public goods (Morris, 1998(6): ch. 9; Van Parijs, 1995(7)). 2) VsLibertarianism: Second, libertarianism is also charged with preventing state measures to alleviate deprivation and suffering. Lamont: Most ownership-based libertarian theories have failed to respond to the first criticism, parting com- pany at this point with neoclassical economists, who have generally taken the public goods problem more seriously than political libertarians. The most common responses to the second criticism have been various versions of 'tough luck': while it might be nice if individuals transfer some of their property rights to others in order to relieve suffering, people cannot justly be coerced to do so. >Coercion, >Property, >Society, >Equality, >Egalitarianism. Nozick: Nozick's view, for instance, is that respect for people's absolute property rights is more important than improving the lot of the least fortunate. The harshness of this reply has been unappealing to the majority in liberal democracies. >Liberalism, >Democracy. Hayek/Mill: Millean and Hayekian versions of libertarianism have been able to provide more fruitful replies, by appealing more directly to the values of liberty and autonomy (Lomasky, 1987)(8). >J. St. Mill, >F. A. v. Hayek. People's optimism about the government's ability to aid and empower people grew in the first 60 years of the twentieth century, but stalled in the late 1960s and the 1970s. VsInterventionism: Greater government intervention in the economy, particularly to increase welfare in the general population rather than just for the most needy, proved considerably less successful than preceding interventions targeted only to the poor. Hayek's explanation for this failure was that governments do not, and never will, have the information required for successful intervention to help the majority of the population. Mill: In agreement, Mill 's view was that individuals themselves are in the best informational position for improving their own situation, so the government should allow them the liberty to act upon it. Gaus I 230 Interventions/costs: a related contribution of Millean and Hayekian libertarianism is to highlight the costs of govern- ment intervention. >Interventions, >Interventionism. Public choice: Public choice theorists, inspired by libertarians such as James Buchanan (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985(9); Buchanan and Tullock, 1962(10); Buchanan, 1975(11); Rowley et al., 1988(12)), also argued forcefully that increasing government size substantially increases rent-seeking by lobby groups, professions, and other powerful groups, distorting economic distribution in their favour. Lamont: Once these and other consequences are taken into account, the success of government interventions in realizing their intended benefits is quite uncertain, compared with the clear and demonstrable detrimental effects these interventions have on people's liberty and autonomy. >Freedom, >Autonomy. 1. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge. 2. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976a) Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol. 2, The Mirage ofSocial Justice. London: Routledge. 3. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976b) The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge. 4. Mill (1982. 4. Mill, J. St. (1892) On Liberty. London: Longmans, Green 5. Haworth, Alan (1994) Anti-Libertarianism. London: Routledge. 6. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Van Parijs, Philippe (1995) Real FreedomforA11: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8. Lomasky, Loren E. (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press. 9. Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan (1985) The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michi Press. 11. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 12. Rowley, C. K., R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds (1988) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Majorities | Buchanan | Brocker I 569 Majorities/State/Constitution/Economic Theory/Buchanan: (see State/Buchanan, Constitution/Buchanan): Change. Buchanan leaves no doubt that unanimity is for him the only acceptable normative yardstick on which the legitimacy of any decision-making process regarding the creation and financing of public goods must be based. That therefore (...) only state service beyond legal protection is legitimate which is in everyone's interest; for only if it is in everyone's interest can it be assumed that they would have agreed to it. ((s) Cf. Reflective Equilibrium/Rawls, Veil of Ignorance/Rawls.) Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them. (1) 1. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Market Failure | Economic Theories | Mause I 378 Market Failure/Economic Theories: Market failure exists (Fritsch 2014)(1) when goods are characterized by such strong positive externalities that they have the character of public goods (simultaneity of non-rivalry in consumption and the non-excludability of free riders), or cost structures are so strongly characterized by subadditivity that even the entire market volume can be provided by only one company at the lowest marginal costs (natural monopolies). >Externalities, >Social goods, >Free riders, >Moral hazard, >Subadditivity, >Marginal costs, >Natural monopolies. 1. Fritsch, Michael. 2014. Marktversagen und Wirtschaftspolitik, 9. Aufl. München 2014. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Markets | Crouch | Brocker I 95o Markets/Crouch: For Crouch, the deficit of the market ((s) context: here the marketing of state services) is not primarily due to the fact that certain goods are only made available on the basis of supply and demand. The main characteristic of the market is the "commodification"(1) of goods, commercial trade, which substantially affects the quality of goods. cf. >Public Private Partnership/Crouch. Brocker I 951 The provision of goods on the market goes hand in hand with access restrictions (costs), quantifying valuation (prices) and benefit-oriented selection (profits). According to Crouch, the imperfection of the markets ensures that only those public goods are made available that meet these criteria. 1. Colin Crouch, Postdemocrazia, Rom/Bari 2003 (engl.: Oxford 2004). Dt.: Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie, Frankfurt/M. 2008, p. 104 Ludger Heidbrink, „Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolCrouch I Colin Crouch Henry Farrell Breaking the path of institutional development? Alternatives to the new determinism 2004 PolCrouch II Colin Crouch Post-democracy London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Markets | Minimal State | Gaus I 122 Markets/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: Liberal tradition thesis: Government is justified largely on the grounds of market failure: although the market generally provides for both a free and a prosperous society, it is not perfect (Buchanan, 1975(1): ch. 3). Thus the classical liberal political economists of the nineteenth century (...) insisted that the market depended on a political framework that it could not itself provide; the market could not itself provide a coercive public apparatus for the enforcement of property rights and contracts (Robbins, 1961(2); Gaus, 1983(3)). Minimal stateVsLiberalism/market anarchismVsLiberalism: Market anarchists and minimal statists may challenge these widely held views. They may argue, 1) first, that coercive state provision of public goods tends to oversupply them, so that it has its own offsetting inefficiencies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965(4)). And, 2) they may insist, market and contractual arrangements can be envisioned that will yield funding for public goods - especially rights-protective public goods - that is not significantly suboptimal (Buchanan, 1975(1); Narveson, 1988(5): 238). >Social goods/Minimal state. Minimal stateVsMarket anarchism/Gaus: Advocates of the minimal state that depict it as a natural monopoly seem better positioned to make this argument than are market anarchists. Such a minimal state will, to a considerable degree, be able to tie its clients’ purchase of non-public aspects of rights protection to their also paying for public aspects of rights protection. >Society/Minimal state, >Individuals/Minimal state, >Minimal state/Gaus. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Robbins, Lord (1961) The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical English Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983b) ‘Public and private interests in liberal political economy, old and new’. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. New York: St Martins, 183–222. 4. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1965) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 5. Narveson, Jan (1988) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Marxism | Olson | Brocker I 483 Marxism/Collective Action/Olson: OlsonVsMarx/OlsonVsMarxism: Problem: Marxist class theory and the pluralistic view of representation of interests overlook the problem of collective action. >Collective action. Brocker I 484 Although the members of the respective classes have common interests, this does not mean that each individual would also be motivated to make their individual contribution. Free rider problem: if the individuals who form a class act rationally, there will be no class-oriented action". (1) This applies to workers who form trade unions to fight for wage increases. But it also applies to the class of workers as a whole, which has an interest in overcoming the division of society into classes. >Free rider, >Moral hazard. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968), p. 104. Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Mechanism Design | Economic Theories | Parisi I 490 Mecanism design/economic theories/Güth: (…) there is a long tradition of using auctions (see Milgrom, 1989)(1), partly very delicate applications like auctions to “trade” slaves. For the German-speaking areas, (…) Gandenberger (1961)(2) who documents an impressive constancy in relying on the lowest bid price procurement auction. Whether as procurement auctions by which a buyer wants to contract with one of the potential suppliers or as sales auctions where a seller wants to find a buyer, the literature now offers a lot of auction theory (Wilson, 1985)(3), auction experiments (e.g. Kagel, 2016)(4), and related field studies (Milgrom, 1989(1)). The voluntary supply of public projects, most typically in the form of pure public goods (see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995) or common pool resources (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992)(5), also has a long tradition of applications. Rather than as a problem of mechanism design, it is usually studied by social dilemma games where community members nevertheless manage to cooperate to some extent, for example, due to repeated interaction, or some other aspects of their social life like monitoring and punishing (those who “free-ride”). Especially, the group in Bloomington has done an immense amount of field research and has also run experiments to study voluntary provision of public projects (see Ostrom, 2015)(6). Mechanism design, however, has a more recent, already very successful history (the Nobel laureates in 2007, L. Hurwicz, E. S. Mascin, and R. B. Myerson, were awarded for their achievements in the theory Parisi I 491 of mechanism design). Hurwicz (1960(7), 1973(8)) introduced the notion of incentive compatible mechanisms which in the form of dominance solvability were applied by Groves and Ledyard (1977)(9) to voluntary public good provision. The Revelation Principle had been propagated by Myerson (1979,(10) 1981(11), 1982(12)); Baron and Myerson (1982)(13); Maskin (1999)(14); Dasgupta, Hammond, and Mascin (1979)(15); Meyerson and Sattertwaithe (1983)(16); and Wilson (1985)(3), where we exclude the exercises for “large economies” (e.g. Bierbrauer and Hellwig, 2011)(17). The Revelation Principle is now a standard tool of mechanism design theory (see the more recent contributions like Bergemann and Morris, 2005(18) and Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001(19)). >Decision-making processes, >Auctions, >Cooperation. 1. Milgrom, P. (1989). “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(3): 3–22. 2. Gandenberger, O. (1961). Die Ausschreibung. Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer. 3. Wilson, R. (1985). “Incentive efficiency of double auctions.” Econometrica 53(5): 1101–1115. 4. Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E. (2016). The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 5. Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner (1992). “Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible.” American Political Science Review 86(2): 404–417. 6. Ostrom, E. (2015). Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Hurwicz, L. (1960). “Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes,” in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes, eds., Mathematical Methods in Social Sciences, 27–46. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 8. Hurwicz, L. (1973). “The design of mechanisms for resource allocation.” American Economic Review 63(2): 1–30. 9. Groves, T. and J. Ledyard (1977). “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem.” Econometrica 45(4): 783–809. 10. Myerson, R. B. (1979). “Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem.” Econometrica 47(1): 61–73. 11. Myerson, R. B. (1981). “Optimal Auction Design.” Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1): 58–73. 12. Myerson, R. B. (1982). “Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1): 67–81. 13. Baron, D. P. and R. B. Myerson (1982). “Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 4: 911–930. 14. Maskin, E. S. (1999). “Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.” Review of Economic Studies 66(1): 23–38. 15. Dasgupta, P. S., P. J. Hammond, and E. S. Mascin (1979). “The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility.” Review of Economic Studies 46: 185–216. 16. Myerson, R. B. and M. A. Satterthwaite (1983). “Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.” Journal of Economic Theory 29(2): 265–281. 17. Bierbrauer, F. and M. Hellwig (2011). Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision. Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2011/31. 18. Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005). “Robust mechanism design.” Econometrica 73(6): 1771–1813. 19. Jehiel, P. and B. Moldovanu (2001). “Efficient design with interdependent valuations.” Econometrica 69(5): 1237–1259. Werner Güth. “Mechanism design and the law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Minimal State | Gaus | Gaus I 120 Minimal State/Gauss/Mack: (...) the minimal state [is a] monopolistic agency legitimately employing force and the threat of force solely to protect people’s lives, limbs, liberties, estates, and contractual rights against both internal and external threats. This minimal state achieves the protection of these rightful claims only in ways that are themselves respectful of people’s rightful claims. The effective enforcement of these claims is taken to secure the background conditions out of which mutually beneficial and valued social and economic order is most likely and most extensively to emerge through individuals’ own, well-motivated exercise of their protected liberties. Protection/funds: According to its own champions, the minimal state is subject to the same moral strictures that apply to all of us. If it would be criminal for any one of us to seize funds from another, even if that first party proceeded to employ those funds to provide the second party with protection against third parties, then it will also be criminal for the minimal state to seize funds from any of us even if it proceeds to employ those funds to provide us with protection against (other) internal or external threats. Liberty/individuals: How, consistent with unreconstructed liberty norms, could the minimal state acquire the resources necessary to finance the services it supplies? The key to the minimal statist’s answer is that individuals do not have original (pre-contractual) moral claims to the various forms of protection that the state proposes to provide. Whereas individuals have original moral claims not to be interfered with or harmed by others in certain ways, individuals do Gaus I 121 not have original moral claims that other agents protect them against those interferences or harms. >Individuals/Minimal state, >Taxation/Minimal state. Gaus I 122 Social goods: How great will be the doctrinal cost of [a] weakening of liberty tradition norms? (>Social goods/Minmall state). We can identify three approaches to justification: (1) that coercive public goods provision is fully consistent with the basic commitments of the liberty tradition; (2) that the goods at stake justify overriding liberty; and (3) that such provision is benign paternalism. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Minority Rights | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 253 Minority rights/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: [Will] Kymlicka's(1) defence of group-differentiated rights immediately raised a range of questions and problems, and the literature on multiculturalism over the past decade has tackled many of them. >Minority rights/Kymlicka. Group rights: The first issue to be addressed was the question of whether groups could properly be the bearers of rights. To some it was plain that they could not: only individuals could have rights (Narveson, 1991(2); Hartney, 1991(3)). According to one view, groups were fictitious entities - and fictitious entities could not be rights bearers (Graf, 1994(4): 194). Yet in spite of such reservations, political theory has in recent years (with the rise of multiculturalism) become much more sympathetic to the idea of group rights. History: Even before multiculturalism acquired its current prominence, however, some philosophers had already advanced accounts of group rights. Joseph Raz (1986(5): 207—8), for example, in his influential account of rights leaves space for collective rights. Larry May (1987(6): 180), while remaining cautious about the extent to which groups should be recognized as rights holders, argued that moral theorists needed to examine more closely the actions and interests of social groups as possible bearers of rights and responsibilities. And Frances Svensson (1979)(7) had earlier suggested that group rights were needed to do justice to the claims of native peoples. VsMulticulturalism: Nonetheless, theorists (or critics) of multiculturalism did not always mean the same thing when they invoked group rights or 'cultural' rights. Levy: The most helpful elucidation of the different kinds of rights claims made on behalf of cultural groups was offered by Jacob Levy (1997(8): 24—5), who distinguished eight categories of rights. >Cultural Rights/Levy. Group rights: The consensus of opinion is that it is quite possible for groups to have rights, or for rights to be accorded both to groups and to individuals on the basis of identity. A group may hold a right as an independently recognized entity; and individuals may hold particular rights because they are members of particular collectivities. Problems: Nonetheless, this issue has remained controversial because of the implications of granting rights on the basis of group membership. >Group rights. Freedom/oppression: As Peter Jones put it, 'Group rights are often articulated as demands for group freedom, but they are also feared as vehicles for group oppression' (1999(9): 354). VsRaz: Thus Raz's view of group rights, though widely accepted (Brett, 1991(10); Freeman, 1995(11); Margalit and Halbertal, 1994(12)), has been criticized for being too capacious in as much as it identifies groups as no more than collectivities of individuals who share nothing more enduring than an interest in a matter (Réaume, 1988(13); 1994(14); Jones, 1999(9): 359). Content/education/problems: The demands of some groups for rights in the form of exemptions, for example, have generated a substantial debate about the implications of such special rights. This debate becomes especially vigorous, however, when particular issues become salient: religion, education, and children. Children/religion: While most liberal defenders of multiculturalism have been ready to grant cultural minorities the right to live by their own beliefs, children and education have raised special problems. For many, the limits of multiculturalism are set by the need to protect the interests of children, which override even the rights of parents or communities to inculcate their own religious beliefs. >Religion, >Religious belief, >Multiculturalism. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Narveson, Jan (1991) 'Collective rights?' Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 329—45. 3. Hartney, Michael (1991) 'Some confusions concerning collective rights'. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 293-314. 4. Graf, James A. (1994) 'Human rights, peoples, and the right to self-determination'. In Judith Baker, ed., Gmup Rights. Toronto: Umversity of Toronto Press, 186—214. 5. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. May, Larry (1987) The Morality of Gmups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights. Notre Dame, In: University of Notre Dame Press. 7. Svensson, Frances (1979) 'Liberal democracy and group rights: the legacy of individualism and its impact on American Indian tribes'. Political Studies, 23 (3): 421-39. 8. Levy, Jacob (1997) 'Classifying cultural rights'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS xxwx New York: New York University Press, 22—66. 9. Jones, Peter (1999) 'Group rights and group oppression'. Journal ofP01itica1 Philosophy, 7 (4): 353-77. 10. Brett, Nathan (1991) 'Language laws and collective rights'. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4: 347_60. 11. Freeman, Michael (1995) 'Are there collective human rights?' Political Studies, Special Issue, 43: 25—40. 12. Margalit, Avishai and Moshe Halbertal (1994) 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research, 61: 491-510. 13. Réaume, Denise G. (1988) 'Individuals, groups, and rights to public goods'. University of Toronto Law Journal, 38: 1-27. 14.Réaume, Denise G. (1994) 'The group right to linguistic security: Whose right? What duties?' In Judith Baker ed., Gmup Rights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 118-41. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Morals | Olson | Brocker I 481 Moral/Psychology/Motives/Behaviour/Economic Action/Olson: the unequivocal proof of moral motives in the provision of collective goods is problematic. (1) Therefore, Olson hides psychological and aesthetic incentives in an investigation of behaviour. >Behavior, >Actions, >Public good, >Moral Hazard, >Ethics, >Proofs, >Provability. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 60, FN 7. Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Organisation | Olson | Brocker I 485 Organisation/Olson: If organisations have selective incentives, they develop a robustness and stability that enables them to survive. An organisation could not offer potential members an incentive to become members if it serves no other purpose than to provide a public good (see Social Goods/Olson): "Only an organisation that also sells private or non-collective goods or provides individual members with beneficial social or recreational facilities would have such positive incentives" (1). However, privileged and medium-sized groups may succeed in representing their interests without selective incentives. In smaller groups, social goods such as praise and reprimand have a stronger impact. Brocker I 486 Problem: large groups are always in danger of being exploited by smaller groups: For example, agricultural migrant workers, employees, taxpayers, consumers: these groups usually have no organization "that could oppose the power of organized or monopolistic producers".(2) 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968), p. 131 2. Ibid. p. 163 Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Participation | Barber | Brocker I 681 Participation/Democracy/Barber: Thesis: in American democracy reigns a "lobbyist policy", a "politics of images", a "politics of mass society" instead of genuine citizen participation(1) (written in 1984). Liberalism or the concept of representation associated with liberalism, which destroys participation, was responsible for this.(2) >Liberalism. Def Strong Democracy/Barber: is "formally" a participatory policy. In the absence of an independent reason, disagreement is resolved by participation in a process of continuous, direct self-legislation and by the creation of a political community that can transform dependent, private individuals into free citizens and particular and private interests into public goods.(3) Brocker I 692 HausVsBarber: the impetus of participation as a practical reform programme has visibly evaporated. The approaches are far removed from Barbers agenda, both quantitatively and qualitatively. There is still no comprehensive policy of "strong democracy". Barber himself puts his last hope on the mayors of this earth. >Democracy. 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, S. 12. 2. Ibid. p. 13. 3. Ibid. p. 120f, cf. p 147. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Paternalism | Rawls | I 208 Paternalism/generational justice/Rawls: since the members of society have an interest in securing equal liberties for their descendants, there is no conflict over the choice of the principle of equal freedoms. For example, a son could not argue that the father neglected his interests if he accepted the principle of equal freedoms. The father would have to argue to the detriment of others if they departed from it that these other benefits would arise when they grow up. I 208 The parties therefore assume that their descendants want their freedoms to be preserved. Paternalism/Rawls: the principle of paternalism is a guideline when it comes to making decisions for others. We must do this because we have reason to believe that they would choose this themselves if they were adults and rational. Problem: the elderly do not know about the fate of their offspring than they themselves know in the initial situation of a society to be established. Therefore, they must be based on the theory of primary goods (see Social Goods/Rawls). Solution: to demand equal rights of freedom for the later ones will be least irrational. Cf. >Generational Justice. I 248 Paternalism/Care/Rawls: must be discussed as a restriction of freedom. In the initial situation of a society to be established, everyone initially assumes an equal distribution of skills and rationality. Later, however, they take into account that these are sometimes unevenly developed,... I 249 ...as in the case of children or people damaged by fate. It can happen that people agree that others act on their behalf(1). >Society/Rawls. Rawls: The principles of paternalism would therefore be those chosen by the persons in the initial situation of a society to be established, in order to protect themselves against restrictions on their own rationality in society. Paternalistic decisions on behalf of a person shall be taken in such a way that the decisions previously made by that person are first taken into account, unless they are irrational. If these are absent, the theory of primary public goods is to be assumed. >Public Goods/Rawls. The less we know of a person to be looked after, the more we act for them as we would act on our own behalf, from the point of view of the initial situation. We must be able to justify our actions by the fact that the person, if he or she has regained his or her rationality, agrees with us. >Veil of ignorance. Problem: the (fictitious) consent of the other person is not sufficient: e.g.: Assuming that the divergent religious views of two persons in full possession of their mental powers are exchanged by a psychological process against their will. I 250 After a while, both of them will accept their new settings. Problem: we are nevertheless not entitled to treat them accordingly! Paternalistic intervention is only justified if: 1. the person to be cared for is obviously limited in his or her intellectual abilities and will, 2. the intervention must start from longer-term known desires of the person as well as apply the principles of justice and the primary public goods (e. g. freedom). Paternalistic principles protect us against our own irrationality. Educational methods must also respect these principles. >Principles/Rawls. 1. See Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism" in: Morality and the Law, ed. R. A. Water flow, Belmont, 1971, pp. 107-126. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Peer Production | Benkler | Benkler I 100 Peer Production Organization/Peer Production Prerequisites/Benkler: The great success of the Internet generally, and peer-production processes in particular, has been the adoption of technical and organizational architectures that have allowed them to pool (…) diverse efforts effectively. The core characteristics underlying the success of these enterprises are their modularity and their capacity to integrate many fine-grained contributions. Modularity: “Modularity” is a property of a project that describes the extent to which it can be broken down into smaller components, or modules, that can be independently produced before they are assembled into a whole. If modules are independent, individual contributors can choose what and when to contribute independently of each other. This maximizes their autonomy and flexibility to define the nature, extent, and timing of their participation in the project. Granularity: “Granularity” refers to the size of the modules, in terms of the time and effort that an individual must invest in producing them. I 101 The number of people who can, in principle, participate in a project is therefore inversely related to the size of the smallest scale contribution necessary to produce a usable module. The granularity of the modules therefore sets the smallest possible individual investment necessary to participate in a project. If the finest-grained contributions are relatively large and would require a large investment of time and effort, the universe of potential contributors decreases. A successful large-scale peer-production project must therefore have a predominate portion of its modules be relatively fine-grained. I 102 Vs: It is not necessary, however, that each and every chunk or module be fine-grained. Free software projects in particular have shown us that successful peer-production projects may also be structured, technically and culturally, in ways that make it possible for different individuals to contribute vastly different levels of effort commensurate with their ability, motivation, and availability. I 105 In combination then, three characteristics make possible the emergence of information production (…). 1. [T]he physical machinery necessary to participate in information and cultural production is almost universally distributed in the population of the advanced economies. 2. [T]he primary raw materials in the information economy, unlike the industrial economy, are public goods - existing information, knowledge, and culture. Their actual marginal social cost is zero. 3. Third, the technical architectures, organizational models, and social dynamics of information production and exchange on the Internet have developed so that they allow us to structure the solution to problems (…). |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Perfectionism | Rawls | I 325 Perfectionism/Principle of Perfection/Rawls: two variants: a) the principle of a teleological theory that leads a society to build institutions and shape the duties and obligations of individuals in such a way that outstanding achievements in the arts, sciences and culture are achieved. >Teleology. b) (to be found in Aristotle and others) has more ambitious goals: here the principle of perfection is only one of several principles within an intuitionistic theory. >Intuitionism. The demands of perfection can even diminish for example, demands that are made on the maintenance of freedoms, e.g. when it is argued that slavery serves the goal of cultural refinement. On the other hand, it can only be a question of dividing social wealth into different areas, e. g. culture,... I 326 ... then egalitarian ideas become balanced. This less strict certainty allows for a variety of interpretations(1)(2)(3). Terminology/Rawls: we assume, Def Ideality-driven principles/ideal-regarding principles: are those that are not wish-driven(4). In other words, they are not only concerned with the distribution of a society's total wealth among needs that need to be satisfied. Then the principles of justice and perfection belong to the realm of idealistic principles. >Principles/Rawls. I 327 Contract doctrine/Rawls: holds onto an intermediate position between utilitarianism and perfectionism by not pretending to be a standard ideal of human excellence. >Utilitarianism. Perfectionism: if he wants to have a criterion of perfection, he must try to rank achievements and try to sum up their values. Problem/RawlsVsPerfectionism: in the initial situation of a society to be built, we assume that people initially have no mutual interest in each other; however, they know that they have certain moral and religious interests and also other cultural ideas that should not be put at risk. They can also have conflicting attitudes towards the aspirant. ((s) They just do not know what position they will take later in this society.) Problem: Assuming standards of perfection could lead to having to give up other freedoms, e. g. regarding religion. >Veil of ignorance, >Society/Rawls. I 328 The case here is completely different from the question of the principles according to which primary public goods (freedoms, infrastructure, etc.) are to be distributed! The latter are goods that everyone will strive for, regardless of their position. >Public Good/Rawls. In other words, striving for these goods makes no distinction between people. Criteria/perfection/Rawls: the criteria of excellence have not seen a rational basis from the point of view of daily life. On the other hand, within the arts and sciences there are standards for assessing achievements. Comparability: intrinsic values can obviously be compared. Value judgments have an important place in human life. They do not have to be vague. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Justice/value judgments/art/science/Rawls: the argument against perfectionism is rather that because of the different goals of the aspirations, the participants in the initial position of a society to be established have no reason to adopt the principle of perfection ((s) instead of the principles of justice). >Justice/Rawls. 1. See B. de Jouvenal, The Ethics of Redistribution (Cambridge, 1951), S.53-56, 62-65. 2. Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil (London, 1907), vol. I, pp. 235-243. 3. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, ch. VI. 4. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, (London, 1965) pp. 39f. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Political Economy | Rawls | I 259 Political economy/Rawls: by this I mean economic arrangements and political arrangements as well as the background institutions that are related to them. Welfare economics/K. J. Arrow/Rawls: Defines welfare economics in a similar way(1)(2)(3). Welfare/Rawls: I do not use this expression because it is reminiscent of utilitarianism. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism). >Utilitarianism, >Welfare economics, >Welfare state. The theory of justice as fairness treats social forms as closed systems. An economic system is also shaped by existing needs and necessities. The current cooperation between people in meeting these needs affects the way in which the needs of the future will look. These things are known and shared by such diverse authors as Marx and Marshall(4) >Fairness/Rawls, >Society/Rawls. I 260 Social order/Rawls: Problem: how does this reciprocal influence of needs, satisfaction and new needs in the initial situation of a society to be established, where people stand behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their future position, affect the possible shaping? Solution: only the most general assumptions about primary public goods (e. g. freedoms) are made. >Veil of ignorance. I 263 Economy/disagreement/RawlsVsArrow, K. J/Rawls: different from what K. J. Arrow(5) assumes, disagreement between parties is not a particular feature of idealism. In contract theory, it is part of the initial situation of a society to be established. It forms the content of the theory of justice as fairness. It tries to combine Kant's concept of the realm of purposes with that of autonomy and the categorical imperative. In this way, we can avoid metaphysical assumptions. >Contract Theory, >Purposes/Kant, >J.K. Arrow. 1. See K. J. Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare, Homewood, 1969, p. 1. 2. A. Bergson, essays in Normative Economics, Cambridge, MA, 1966, pp 35-39,60-63,68f. 3. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, 1970, pp. 56-59. 4. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, London, 1965. 5. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963, pp. 74f, 81-86. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Political Institutions | Persson | Mause I 285 Democratic Institutions/Parliamentarism/Presidential System/Fiscal Policy/Tabellini/Persson: Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini compared parliamentary and presidential systems with regard to their fiscal policies (Persson & Tabellini 1999) (1) (Persson & Tabellini 2000) (2) Presidential system: here the government is not dependent on its own ((s) parliamentary) majority for its continued existence. The agenda is set primarily in parliamentary committees. Parliamentarianism: here the agenda is mainly determined by the government. However, this depends on the fact that it has a majority in Parliament. >Parliamentary system. Presidential system: In a game theory model, Persson and Tabellini showed that in a presidential system parlamentarians will agree on low taxes, a low supply of public goods and low redistribution expenditure in favour of a minority of voters. The reason: parlamentarians feel more committed to their constituencies than to the government. They are also more in competition with each other. Parliamentary system: here there is a majority coalition of parlamentarians who do not compete with each other and can therefore agree jointly on the level of expenditure and taxation. This leads to higher taxation, higher expenditure on public goods and redistribution expenditure than under a presidential regime. >Majorities, >Minorities, >Minority rights, >Democracy. 1.Torsten Persson &Guido Tabellini. 1999. The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review 43( 4– 6): 699– 735. 2.Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political economics. Explaining economic policy. Cambridge 2000. |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Political Institutions | Tabellini | Mause I 286 Democratic Institutions/Parliamentarism/Presidential System/Fiscal Policy/Tabellini/Persson: Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini compared parliamentary and presidential systems with regard to their fiscal policies (Persson & Tabellini 1999) (1) (Persson & Tabellini 2000)(2) Presidential system: here the government is not dependent on its own ((s) parliamentary) majority for its continued existence. The agenda is set primarily in parliamentary committees. Parliamentarianism: here the agenda is mainly determined by the government. However, this depends on the fact that it has a majority in Parliament. Presidential system: In a game theory model, Persson and Tabellini showed that in a presidential system parlamentarians will agree on low taxes, a low supply of public goods and low redistribution expenditure in favour of a minority of voters. The reason: parlamentarians feel more committed to their constituencies than to the government. They are also more in competition with each other. Parliamentary system: here there is a majority coalition of parlamentarians who do not compete with each other and can therefore agree jointly on the level of expenditure and taxation. This leads to higher taxation, higher expenditure on public goods and redistribution expenditure than under a presidential regime. >Parliamentary system. 1.Torsten Persson &Guido Tabellini. 1999. The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review 43( 4– 6): 699– 735. 2.Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political economics. Explaining economic policy. Cambridge 2000. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Politics | Olson | Mause I 413f Politics/Collective Action/Olson: According to a 1965 (1) thesis by Mancur Olson on collective action, there is an asymmetry in the organisational and conflict capacity of business and environmental associations. VsOlson: the situation of environmental associations is not quite as it should be according to Olson's logic. Protest as a central form of action has lost importance in the last 20 years. (Roose, 2009, p. 111) (2) The asymmetries mentioned above have also eased (von Winter, 2001, p. 218) (3) Brocker I 486 Politics/Olson: Thesis: The interests of small groups are overrepresented in political competition. "The high degree of organisation of entrepreneurial interests and the power of these entrepreneurial interests must be largely due to the fact that entrepreneurs are spread across a large number of (generally oligopolistic) 'industries', each comprising only a fairly small number of companies" (4). See Collectives/Olson, Communicative Action/Olson, Power/Olson: smaller groups behave much differently according to Olson. In particular, smaller groups can be better controlled by selective incentives. Problem: large groups are always in danger of being exploited by smaller groups: For example, agricultural migrant workers, employees, taxpayers, consumers: these groups usually have no organization "that could oppose the power of organized or monopolistic producers". (5) Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised ed.). Harvard University Press 1965. 2. Jochen Roose, Unterstützungslogik und Informationslogik. Zu zwei Formen der Interessenvertretung im Umweltbereich. In Interessenvermittlung in Politikfeldern, Hrsg. Britta Rehder, Thomas Winter und Ulrich Willems, 109– 131. Wiesbaden 2009. 3. Thomas von Winter, Verbändemacht im kooperativen Staat. In Zukunft der Demokratie in Deutschland, Hrsg. Andrea Gourd und Thomas Noetzel, 211– 234. Opladen 2001. 4. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 141. 5. Ibid. p. 163. |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Power | Olson | Brocker I 484 Power/OlsonVsTradition/Olson: it is not the case that larger groups have more influence (power) than smaller groups. (1) These authors take it for granted "that such groups should act to defend or advance their group interests, and that individuals in these groups must also work for their personal economic interests" (2). Brocker I 485 Solution/Olson: A common interest in a collective good is (...) not a sufficient condition for the provision of this good. Due to the structural advantages of small groups in the provision of collective goods, Olson even comes to a contrary conclusion. According to this, it is not the large, but the small groups that prevail in the political process. >Communicative Action/Olson, >Collectives/Olson. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., p. 107. 2. Ibid. p. 125 Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Principles | Rawls | I 4 Principles/Society/Rawls: 1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice. 2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so. I 7 Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions. I 10/11 Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture. >Social contract, >Natural state, >Equality. It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice. >Justice/Rawls. I 41 Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria(1). >J.St. Mill, >Competition, >Interests, >Utility principle, >Utilitarianism. Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role(2). >H. Sidgwick. Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism. >Intuitionism/Economics, >Priorities, >Preferences. RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles. >VsUtilitarianism. I 43 Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities. I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits. I 62 Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism. I 63 The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits. I 64 Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders. I 83 Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and (b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities. I 89 I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically. I 116 Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114). I 250 Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all. Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it. I 253 Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life. I 302 Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms. 2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,... I 303 .... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged. b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected. >Equal opportunities. General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured. I 446 Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good. >Society/Rawls. 1. Mill, A System of Logic, bk. VI, ch. XII, sec. 7 and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31. 2. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV ch. II and III. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Psychology | Olson | Brocker I 481 Psychology/Motives/Behaviour/Economic Action/Olson: the unequivocal proof of moral motives in the provision of collective goods is problematic. (1) Therefore, Olson hides psychological and aesthetic incentives in an investigation of behaviour. >Social good, >Behavior, >Motives. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968), p. 60, FN 7. Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Public Choice | Olson | Brocker I 484 Public choice/behavioural economics/Olson: Olson (...) is being wronged if one characterizes him as a representative of a rational choice position that leaves no room for other motives of individual action besides rationality and self-interest. >Rational choice, >Public choice theory. Olson states that "a theory of irrational behavior that leads to class action could be relevant in some cases. Sociologically determined class differences could lead individuals to act in a class-oriented manner for irrational and emotional reasons".(1) 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 107. Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Public Sector | Rawls | I 266 Public sector/Rawls: has two aspects: 1. the first relates to the ownership of means of production. Thus, for example, the public sector in socialism is larger than in capitalism. It is smaller in privately organised systems and mainly affects public institutions and transport. 2. characteristic: relates to the proportion of resources spent on public goods (infrastructure, etc.). Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. --- I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. Problems: special problems arise for public goods: 1. the free-rider problem(2): There is a temptation not to do one's own part of the duties, because this amount does not have a noticeable effect on the overall result. For the individual, the contribution of others always appears to have already been made. Therefore, the state must take over the regulation of the corresponding public goods(3). --- I 268 2. Characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself/herself, even if he/she will never be exposed to this infection. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. (1) See J. M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. (2) Buchanan, Kap. V; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, 1965, ch. I, II. (3) See W.J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, London, 1952, ch. I, VII-IX, XII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Public-Private Partnership | Crouch | Brocker I 950 Public Private Partnership/Crouch: According to Crouch, the most important reason for post-democratic change (>Post-Democracy/Crouch) is the privatization of state tasks and the economization of political processes. The cause is not so much the market principle(1) as the effort to save money and resources. Citizens' claims lose their intrinsic character and are no longer treated as inalienable values, but as public goods comparable to other goods on the market and traded accordingly. >Markets/Crouch. Brocker I 951 With the withdrawal of politics from the responsibility of fulfilment, the delegation of services of general interest to private service providers and the commercial restructuring of the administration, according to Crouch the state has no choice but to become itself a "government entrepreneur", a government entrepreneur who more or less successfully imitates the success strategies of corporations through marketing and branding(2). 1. Colin Crouch, Postdemocrazia, Rom/Bari 2003 (engl.: Oxford 2004). Dt.: Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie, Frankfurt/M. 2008, p. 103 2. Ibid. p. 131 Ludger Heidbrink, „Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolCrouch I Colin Crouch Henry Farrell Breaking the path of institutional development? Alternatives to the new determinism 2004 PolCrouch II Colin Crouch Post-democracy London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Rational Choice | Olson | Mause I 66 Rational Choice/Democracy Theory/Olson/OlsonVsPluralism Theory: Olson destroyed a central dogma of pluralistic democracy theory on his own. (1)(2) The logic of collective action has led to the pluralism theory and its basic axioms to be criticized - every political interest organizes itself and all political interests are equally capable of organisation - as counterfactual. >Democracy, >Democratic theory, >Pluralism. 1. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge 1965. [dt.: Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns. Tübingen 1968]. 2. Mancur Olson, The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities. Yale 1982. |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Economic Theories | Mause I 275 Public goods/Economic theories: Problem: because of the free rider problem (the use of public goods by non-paying members) the value of public goods cannot be determined. >Public Goods/Samuelson. Solution: Suggestion: certain incentive mechanisms should encourage individuals to disclose their true willingness to pay. (Clarke 1971 (1), Groves & Loeb 1975 (2)) VsClarke/VsGrove/VsLoeb: Problem: 1. unwanted side effects due to the high complexity, 2. there are infinitely many Pareto optima, since the sum of the marginal willingness to pay depends on the distribution positions of the individuals in the society. Mause I 276 Public Goods/Economic theories: in a world of distorting taxes, the expenditure side cannot be viewed without the revenue side. The optimal supply of public goods then depends on which taxes can be used and to what extent these taxes lead to welfare losses due to their incentive-distorting effect. Solution/Browning/Dahlby: the marginal costs of public goods are multiplied by one that represents the marginal costs of public funds.(3)(4)(5) For counter arguments see >Public Goods/Kaplow. 1. Edward H. Clarke. 1971. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11 (1): 17– 33. 2.Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb. 1975. Incentives and public inputs. Journal of Public Economics 4: 211– 226. 3. Edgar K. Browning, 1976. The marginal cost of public funds. Journal of Political Economy 84: 283– 298. 4. Bev Dahlby, 2008. The marginal cost of public funds: Theory and applications. Cambridge, MA 5. Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton. 1992. Distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6( 3): 117– 131. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Grotius | Höffe I 309 Public Goods/Community Goods/Grotius/Höffe: According to the teacher of international law Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and his powerful writing on the law of war and peace(1), the earth and its fruits are first of all the common property of mankind. Private property is created through a contractual transfer of certain parts of it. LockeVsGrotius: In contrast, Locke claims what Rousseau follows in the social contract: According to the model of agriculture and craftsmanship, property is acquired through work, with which the object is prepared according to needs. >J. Locke. KantVsGrotius: Kant agrees with Locke's view that primary ownership does not arise from contractual agreement, but from an original acquisition. He rejects the labour theory, however. The work presupposes a material that must already belong to someone, so that it does not establish an original legal title. >I. Kant. 1. H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625, II, Chap. 2-3 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Goods | Kant | Höffe I 309 Public Goods/Community Goods/Kant/Höffe: According to the international law teacher Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645) and his powerful treatise on the law of war and peace(1), the earth and its fruits are first and foremost a common property of mankind. Private property is created through a contractual transfer of certain parts of it. LockeVsGrotius: In contrast, Locke claims what Rousseau follows in the social contract: According to the model of agriculture and craftsmanship, property is acquired through work, with which the object is prepared according to needs. KantVsGrotius: Kant agrees with Locke's view that primary ownership does not arise from contractual agreement, but from an original acquisition. He rejects the labour theory, however. The work presupposes a material that must already belong to someone, so that it does not establish an original legal title. Real Estate/Population: Kant criticizes the widespread notion of originally ownerless land. In truth, the first buyer does not encounter no-man's land, but common property, i.e. not objects that are free of rights, Höffe I 310 but that are in the community of all co-owners. To the question of how private property can then come about, Kant answers: only unilaterally, as appropriation (occupation). VsKant: Critics see in this view the partisanship for a right of the fist. In truth, the very first appropriation is not the taking away of something from someone else, but the original appropriation of something that does not yet belong to any private person. Right of residence: Before all customary legal acts humans have the right to be there "where nature, or chance (without their will) has placed them"(2). >Society/Kant. 1. H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625, II, Chap. 2-3 2. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § 13 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Goods | Kaplow | Mause I 276 Social Good/Kaplow: Thesis: from any status quo in which the Samuelson rule is not yet fulfilled, the application of this rule will always open the potential for a Pareto improvement.(1) >Social Good/Samuelson.. To this end, however, income tax must be reformed on the expenditure side to ensure distribution neutrality. See also Gahvari. (2) 1. Louis Kaplow. 1996. The optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation. National Tax Journal 49( 4): 513– 533. 2. Firouz Gahvari. 2006. On the marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics 90( 6– 7): 1251– 1262. |
EconKapl I Louis Kaplow The optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation 1996 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Lindahl | Mause I 276 Social Goods/Taxes/Lindahl: because of the principle of equivalence (which requires that every tax be legitimized by a benefit for the citizens on the expenditure side), Lindahl proposed individualized taxes as early as 1919, which are oriented towards the individual marginal benefit from the consumption of public goods. VsLindahl: Problem: then one comes back to the Samuelson condition and the problem that the value of the public property cannot be determined because of the undetermined number of free riders. See Social Goods/Samuelson. (See also VsSamuelson). Solutions: See Social Goods/Tullock, Social Goods/Buchanan. |
EconLind I Erik Lindahl Just Taxation - A Positive Solution in: R. A. Musgrave et al. (eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, International Economic Association 1958 German Edition: Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung Lund 1919 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Minimal State | Gaus I 121 Social goods/public goods/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: the market anarchist and the minimal statist share a crucial premise, namely, that the value to individuals of their receipt of protective services will motivate almost everyone to pay for those services. >Minimal state/Gaus, >Society/Minimal state. Protection/individual liberty: the shared premise is that the protection of rightful claims is a standard economic good which people will voluntarily pay for to the extent that they value it. Unfortunately, however, important parts or aspects of the protection of rightful claims are not like standard economic goods; important parts or aspects of the protection of rightful claims are public goods. Gaus: The crucial feature of a public good is that, if the good is produced, it will not be feasible to exclude individuals who have not paid for that good from benefiting from it. >Social goods. The nonexcludability of these goods provides people with an incentive not to purchase them. Rational individuals confront a multi-person case of the well-known >prisoner’s dilemma (...).The parties thus end up at a Pareto-inferior result (...). >Pareto-Optimum. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Social Goods | Olson | Brocker I 477 Social goods/collective goods/Olson: generally, goods are differentiated in the economic literature as follows: Private Goods/Musgrave: are characterised by exclusivity (not everyone has access) and rivalry (consumption reduces the amount of goods) Club goods: Excludability - Rivalry Common goods: non-excludability - Rivalry (e.g. fishing) Public goods: Non-excludability - Non-Rivalry. (1) On the other hand Olson: distinguishes between exclusive and including goods. Def Exclusive Collective Goods: are primarily found in market-oriented groups. They are characterised by rivalry. (2) Here the total benefit of the collective good does not increase with the number of users. Thus it corresponds to the common good. The benefit for the individual decreases with the number of users. Def including collective goods/Olson: are characterized by non-rivalry. The benefits for all increase with an increasing number of users (non-excludability). These goods are also called pure collective goods. ((s) Example Networks). Brocker I 487 VsOlson: some authors note that collective goods may have far more properties than those used by Olson and that these properties may also be relevant to the question of the realisation of these goods in groups (3). Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) (4), for example, analyse collective goods that are only made possible with a large number of collective users. In addition, there are goods that are not continuously variable, but require a minimum level of participation in order to be made available at all (Chong 1991)(5). 1. Musgrave, Richard A., »Public Finance and Finanzwissenschaft Traditions Compared«, in: FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis 53/2, 1996, 145-193. Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert (suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft) (German Edition) (Kindle Locations 9884-9886). Suhrkamp Verlag. Kindle Edition. 2. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 36f. 3. Carolin Stange, Die Übertragbarkeit lokaler Lösungsansätze auf Bereitstellungsprobleme Globaler Öffentlicher Güter, Dissertation, Bamberg 2017, Kap. 2. 4. Frohlich, Norman/Oppenheimer Joe A., »I Get By With a Little Help from My Friends«, in: World Politics 23/1, 1970, 104-120. 5. Chong, Dennis, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, Chicago/London 1991. Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Social Goods | Rawls | I 92 Public goods/social goods/Rawls: primary social goods are rights and freedoms, opportunities and powers, income and prosperity. These goods are social because of their connection with the basic structure of a society; freedoms and powers are defined by the rules of the larger institutions; income distribution and prosperity are regulated by them. Rawls: The theory of common goods goes back to Aristotle and is shared by such diverse authors as Kant and Sidgwick. It is also controversial between utilitarianism and contract theory. >Contracts, >Contract theory, >Utilitarianism, >I. Kant, >H. Sidgwick. I 93 Goods/Rawls: a good is the fulfilment of a rational interest. We can assume that a rational individual has a plan that can fulfill different desires without mutual interference. Def rational plan/Rawls: be a plan that cannot be improved. I. e. there is no other plan that is preferred. >Planning. Def primary goods/Rawls: are those that all need, even if their plans differ. For example, intelligence, prosperity and opportunities are means of achieving goals that a person could not achieve by other means. In the initial state (of a society to be established), where people do not yet know what role they will play, these goods are what they know they are striving for. >Veil of ignorance. Problem: to create an index of available primary social and natural resources. Our principles, when processed in lexical order, help to do this. >Principles/Rawls. I 266 Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. Problems: special problems arise for public goods: 1. the free-rider problem(2): There is a temptation not to do one's own part of the duties, because this amount does not have a noticeable effect on the overall result. For the individual, the contribution of others always appears to have already been made. Therefore, the state must take over the regulation of the corresponding public goods(3). >Free riders. I 268 2. Characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself, even if he will never be exposed to this infection. >Externalities. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Environmental damage. I 270 Economic form: the proportion of public goods in the economy as a whole is independent of the economic form - be it socialist or private - because the proportion of social resources spent on their production is independent of the question of the ownership of the means of production. >Socialism, >Capitalism. 1. See J. M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. 2. Buchanan, ch. V; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, 1965, ch. I, II. 3. See W.J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, London, 1952, ch. I, VII-IX, XII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Social Goods | Samuelson | Mause I 274f Social Goods/Samuelson: Social Goods are Characterized 1. By non-rivalry: e.g. national defence: its quality is independent of how many individuals it benefits. Unlike on the market for private goods (see Markets/Economic Theories) the sum of all individuals with a marginal willingness to pay, who consume the nonrival goods together must be added up in the case of nonrivalising goods. 2. By non-exclusion: even non-paying members can consume public goods. (free rider problem). Solution/Samuelson: Assuming there were only two goods (a social and a private one); if now the appreciation for the jointly consumed good is equated with the marginal social costs of providing this good, the Samuelson condition is obtained. VsSamuelson: Problem: the Samuelson condition is virtually useless because the concrete values it should be fed with cannot be determined. ((s) Reason: the number of free riders is undetermined). See also Social Goods/Economic Theories. |
EconSamu I Paul A. Samuelson The foundations of economic analysis Cambridge 1947 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Wicksell | Mause I 276 Public Good/Wicksell: for Wicksell (1896) (1), the ability of a policy to approve was the decisive criterion for individuals themselves ((s) in the pursuit of this policy). Taxes are only acceptable to the individual citizen if they are used to finance public goods that the citizen wishes to have. This leads to the so-called principle of equivalence, which requires any tax to be legitimised by a benefit for citizens on the expenditure side. (For problems in this context, see Public Good/Economic Theories, Public Good/Samuelson). 1. Knut Wicksell, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen nebst Darstellung und Kritik des Steuerwesens Schwedens. Jena 1896 |
EconWicks I Knut Wicksell Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen nebst Darstellung und Kritik des Steuerwesens Schwedens Jena 1896 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Minimum | Hayek | Gaus I 124 Social minimum/Hayek/Gaus: A public goods argument can be advanced for general forced donation to the elimination of poverty. Hayek, for example, suggests that a scheme for assistance against severe deprivation is in the interest of all; indeed, he adds that ‘it may be felt a duty of all to assist, within the organized community, those who cannot help themselves’ (1976(1): 87). >Social goods, cf. >Social goods/Minimal state. 1. Hayek, F. A. (1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty. vol. 11, The Mirage of Social Justice. London: Routledge. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Social Minimum | Rawls | I 304 Social Minimum standard/Social Minimum/Rawls: if a fair saving rate is found (see Saving/Rawls), you can adjust the level of the minimum standard. Def Social minimum standards/Rawls: the sum of transfers and support for essential public goods should be designed to improve the expectations of the most disadvantaged, in line with the necessary reserves and maintaining equal freedoms. This form of distributive justice contains a large proportion of procedural justice. No information about the preferences of individuals is given. Problem: in order to guarantee procedural fairness, a system of equitable institutions must be assumed. Our two principles of justice are sufficient for this purpose. >Principles/Rawls. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| State (Polity) | Buchanan | Brocker I 568 State/Buchanan: Buchanan's approach leads to a separation of law and state. The state only stands for the validity of the legal system. See Constitution/Buchanan. According to Buchanan, the state becomes the embodiment of the arbitrator who controls the parties, assuming that everyone tries to cheat. (1) Buchanan cites the universal desire for disarmament as the reason for the conclusion of contracts in order to reduce costs. Brocker I 569 Protective State/Buchanan: a protective cover to ensure the exchange of private goods. Problem: this does not secure the handling of public goods. Productive State/Buchanan: Question: Which regulatory system must be introduced to ensure the possible and reasonably desired improvement in the situation compared to natural distribution or to a society consuming only private goods? Solution/Buchanan: the post-constitutional contract (which presupposes the constitutional contract to secure private property) creates a genuinely political system for the creation and distribution of public goods. >Majorities/Buchanan, >Public Goods. Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them.(2) 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 96f. 2. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25 Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| State Provision | Moon | Gaus I 213 State provision/welfare state/institutions/public goods, moral hazard/Moon: It is important to stress that state provision is not necessarily superior to private provision. Even if there are clear examples of 'market failures' , areas in which voluntary provision is incapable of providing an optimal level of services of one sort or another, it does not follow that government action will be superior. Just as real-world markets are subject to market failure, so real-world governments are subject to non-market failure. >Market failure. For example, while mandatory programmes can avoid the problem of adverse selection, by requiring low risk individuals to participate in the risk-sharing scheme, they may exacerbate the problem of moral hazard, by giving individuals incentives not to provide for themselves (e.g. by reducing their savings rate, or not taking a job) and relying upon the public programme of pensions or unemployment compensation to meet their needs. >Moral hazard, >Adverse selection, >Privatization/Moon. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Taxation | Friedman | Gaus I 212 Taxation/minimal welfare state/public goods/Friedman/Moon: (...) are typical welfare goods public goods (...)? To some degree, perhaps. If we all wanted to live in a society where no one suffered from destitution, and were willing to pay something to see that achieved, then we would all be better off if the government provided a safety net. Reasoning along these lines, Milton Friedman (1962(1):191) has argued for a minimal welfare state, in which a 'negative income tax' would be employed to provide a subsistence income to people without other means of support. The minimal welfare state would not, however, be an 'institutional welfare state', since its main concern would be to ensure that everyone had enough income to avoid destitution. Presumably, it would also provide other public goods such as public health and sanitation, for each of us is better off if others are inoculated against infectious diseases, or if the town disposes of every household's sewage and garbage in a sanitary manner. Vs: but many welfare programmes do not seem to provide public goods: the principal beneficiary of an old age pension is the pensioner, the principal beneficiary of a high school or college education is the student whose skills are improved and whose life is enriched, the principal beneficiary of open heart surgery is the patient whose life is saved, and so forth. >Welfare State/Political Philosophy, >Institutions/Barr, >Unemployment/Moon. 1. Friedman, Milton (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Brocker I 408 Taxation/Friedman: Friedman's proposal is to cancel all individual social and distributional measures and replace them with a negative income tax. This saves a lot of bureaucracy and the idea of self-determination of individual lifestyles is given an economic basis. (1) 1. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago 1962. Dt.: Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit, München 2004. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Taxation | Minimal State | Gaus I 121 Taxation/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: The market anarchist and the minimal statist share a crucial premise, namely, that the value to individuals of their receipt of protective services will motivate almost everyone to pay for those services. >Market anarchism, >Minimal state/Gaus, >Society/Minimal state, >Social googds/Minimal state, >Markets/Minimal state. Gaus I 122 Govvernment/Liberalism: Liberal tradition thesis: Government is justified largely on the grounds of market failure: although the market generally provides for both a free and a prosperous society, it is not perfect (Buchanan, 1975(1): ch. 3). Thus the classical liberal political economists of the nineteenth century (...) insisted that the market depended on a political framework that it could not itself provide; the market could not itself provide a coercive public apparatus for the enforcement of property rights and contracts (Robbins, 1961(2); Gaus, 1983(3)). Minimal stateVsLiberalism/market anarchismVsLiberalism: Market anarchists and minimal statists may challenge these widely held views. They may argue, 1) first, that coercive state provision of public goods tends to oversupply them, so that it has its own offsetting inefficiencies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965(4)). And, 2) they may insist, market and contractual arrangements can be envisioned that will yield funding for public goods - especially rights-protective public goods - that is not significantly suboptimal (Buchanan, 1975(1); Narveson, 1988(5): 238). >Social goods/Minimal state. Minimal stateVsMarket anarchism/Gaus: Advocates of the minimal state that depict it as a natural monopoly seem better positioned to make this argument than are market anarchists. Such a minimal state will, to a considerable degree, be able to tie its clients’ purchase of non-public aspects of rights protection to their also paying for public aspects of rights protection. >Society/Minimal state, >Individuals/Minimal state, >Minimal state/Gaus. Minimal state theoryVsLiberalism: If crucial public goods would be significantly underproduced in the absence of individuals being required to contribute to their funding (and requiring such contributions would yield a satisfactory level of the production of those public goods), members of the liberty tradition are faced with a hard choice. On the one hand, they may stick with unreconstructed versions of that tradition’s basic norms at the cost of precluding the mutual benefits associated with those public goods (while no doubt insisting that the public good characteristics of law enforcement are typically overestimated, and that most of what the state should do is to provide essentially privately consumed protection services). Or, on the other hand, they may legitimate the coercive takings that are, by hypothesis, needed to fund those valuable goods at the cost of weakening at least some of those central norms. Social goods: How great will be the doctrinal cost of [a] weakening of liberty tradition norms? (>Social goods/Minmall state). We can identify three approaches to justification: (1) that coercive public goods provision is fully consistent with the basic commitments of the liberty tradition; (2) that the goods at stake justify overriding liberty; and (3) that such provision is benign paternalism. Gaus I 123 Small state: If the arguments that support the Taxing Minimal State are extended to legitimize coercive takings for the production of other sorts of public goods (for example, the public good of mosquito abatement) or to correct other types of market failure (say, the regulation of natural monopolies), then we have gone beyond the Minimal State to the Small State. The more types of goods and services that are accepted as significantly public and, hence, as justifiably financed through taxation, the larger the Small State becomes. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Robbins, Lord (1961) The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical English Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983) ‘Public and private interests in liberal political economy, old and new’. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. New York: St Martins, 183–222. 4. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1965) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 5. Narveson, Jan (1988) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Terminology | Buchanan | Brocker I 562 Terminology/Buchanan: "protective state": Provides citizens with protection in the form of legal certainty. Productive state: here, citizens agree on what public goods they want to provide, in what quantities and at what cost to whom. Both forms complement each other according to Buchanan's concept of economic liberalism. In this way, the state separates itself from the extremes of utopian anarchy (in the sense of a spontaneous, morally harmonizing coexistence order) and a threatening, expanding bureaucracy of a welfare state by Leviathan. See Buchanan 1975 (1). 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Trade Unions | Olson | Brocker I 482 Trade Unions/Olson: Why do some unions grow while others do not? Some unions grow for the status of a compulsory union to get their membership problem under control. This status is linked to the consequence that non-members are banned from working in areas covered by unions. However, not all unions succeed in this. Alternatively, other unions also provide positive selective incentives, e.g. various types of insurance for members. (1) I 483 Olson: "There is a contradiction between the very low level of trade union participation and the overwhelming support of workers for measures that force them to support a trade union" (2). Each group member wants all other group members to be unionized, and at the same time it is rational for individuals not to be members themselves or to stay away from trade union events. Because of the non-excludability (see Social Goods/Olson), the successes of the trade unions do not represent a reason or occasion for engagement for the individual. Brocker I 484 Classes/trade unions/Olson: Although the members of the respective classes have common interests, this does not mean that each individual would also be motivated to make their individual contribution. Free rider problem: if the individuals who form a class act rationally, there will be no class-oriented action". (3) This applies to workers who form trade unions to fight for wage increases. But it also applies to the class of workers as a whole, which has an interest in overcoming the division of society into classes. See Marxism/Olson. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 71. 2. Ibid. p. 85 3. Ibid. p. 104 Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Unemployment | Moon | Gaus I 212 Unemployment/welfare state/institutions/Moon: (...) private firms and voluntary organizations are poorly equipped to protect individuals from income loss due to unemployment. Non-governmental risk-pooling schemes work best when the chances that one person will suffer a given condition - say disability or death - are more or less independent of anyone else's chances, and when the overall risks facing the group are known. Under these conditions, each individual can pay into the fund, which can accumulate enough to provide beneflts to the unfortunate. But if the risks in question are not independent, if one person's suffering increases the likelihood that others will suffer as well, then a private scheme may collapse, as more and more people shift from being contributors to being claimants, and the group's reserves are depleted. Unemployment is (in part) cyclical, which means that in a downturn some people lose their jobs, and as a result reduce their consumption, thereby leading other firms to lay off workers, in an expanding cycle. Thus, a private firm or voluntary association offering unemployment insurance would run the risk of going out of business as fewer and fewer people held jobs (and so paid into the fund) and more and more people lost their jobs, and so became claimants. Because state-sponsored schemes, unlike private associations, are able to run deficits, and to the extent that these deficits actually contribute to expanding demand and so reducing unemployment and stabilizing the economy, they can deal with problems that non-state schemes cannot. >Welfare state/Political philosophy, >Minimal welfare state/Friedman, >Public goods, >Economic cycles, >Institutions/Barr. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utilitarianism | Barry | Gaus I 418 Utilitarianism/Barry/Weinstein: With Barry, (...) we clearly have unadulterated liberalism, which is nevertheless deeply informed by English utilitarianism. As Kelly recently notes, 'there is a very real sense in which most of Barry's work has involved an engagement with utilitarianism' (1998(1):44). Contractualism: These debts aside, Barry has emerged as one of the leading champions of Anglo-American contractualism.* Like Thomas Nagel, Rawls and Thomas Scanlon, Barry holds that the existence of incompatible conceptions of the good necessarily prioritizes the right over the good. Justice as impartiality adjudicates 'between the conflicting demands that arise from the pursuit of those conceptions of the good' by giving citizens a 'veto over proposals [principles of justice] that they could not reasonably be expected to accept' (Barry, 1998(2): 229, 223).** The sieve of disapproval makes surviving principles impartial: nobody is unreasonably privileged by what survives in pursuing his respective conceptions of the good. >Contractualism. Impartiality/Problem: Utilitarian justice is precluded because reasonable citizens would purportedly veto it. Few would be prepared to bear the self-sacrificing burdens of agent neutrality. Justice as impartiality is therefore self-limiting, excluding utilitarian impartiality as too extreme. In the name of impartiality, it constrains impartiality. Being impartial about competing conceptions of good does not entail such indifference towards them that one is always prepared to sacrifice one's own interests for the general interest.*** Privacy/public goods: Justice as impartiality thus preserves the liberal public versus private goods distinction that feminists have claimed reinforces patriarchy. Barry nevertheless concedes that domestic violence and marital rape are public concerns. >Feminism/Barry. * Dunn perceptively argues that contractualism has recently 'recaptured a considerable degree of attention, especially in North America'. But unlike seventeenth- century versions, which focused on political obligation, contemporary versions concentrate on distributive justice (1996(3): 60). ** For Scanlon, principles of justice must pass the test of reasonable rejectability. And like Barry, reasonable rejectability endorses principles favouring the worst-off. ***2See especially Barry (1991(4): ch. 2). For Barry's full treatment of justice as impartiality, see Barry (1995)(5). 1. Kelly, P. (1998) 'Taking utilitarianism seriously'. In P. Kelly, ed., Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice. Edinb . Edinburgh University Press, 44_59. 2. Barry, Brian (1998) 'Something in the disputation not unpleasant'. In P. Kelly, ed., Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 186-257. 3.Dunn 1996 4. Barry, Brian (1991) Liberty and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Barry, Brian (1995) Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Veil of Ignorance | Rawls | I 136 Veil of Ignorance/society/Rawls: this is about excluding contingent peculiarities when establishing a new form of society. To this end, the parties are to remain behind a veil of ignorance in the >initial situation of a society to be established, with regard to alternatives concerning their own individual case. I 137 This is intended to ensure that the principles in question are chosen on the basis of general considerations. Certain facts are said to be unknown: No one knows their place in society, class affiliation or social status, or their endowment with goods, intelligence, strength, and so on. Even his individual psychology, such as his propensity to optimism or pessimism, risk appetite or affiliation to a certain generation. On the other hand, general facts about human society should be known: people understand political problems and economic theory, social organization and the laws of the human psyche. I 138 There should be no restrictions on general information, i. e. on general laws and theories. ((s) Rawls assumes here that there are psychological laws, especially laws of moral psychology. (DavidsonVsRawls: VsPsychological Laws: see Anomalous Monism/Davidson). Initial Condition/problems/Rawls: it must be clarified that proposals belong to the range of permissible alternatives and general consequences of proposed principles must be known. I 139 The initial state is not a general assembly, that would be too much of a strain on the imagination. On the other hand, it is important that it does not matter who accepts the perspective of the initial state or when he does it. This is what the veil of ignorance is supposed to guarantee: the information available should be relevant but always the same. VsRawls: one can argue that the veil is irrational. RawlsVsVs: it is about ensuring that everyone can be convinced by the same arguments. Then people's points of view can be picked out by chance, the other people will behave in the same way. In addition, it is possible to accept an arbitrator who declares a ban on coalition, but this is superfluous if one assumes that the consultations of the parties are the same. Since no one has any further information, he cannot adjust the situation to his personal advantage. I 140 The only exception: an egoist could basically refuse to make his savings available to posterity. He could decide to do that without having any further information. The question of intergenerational justice must therefore be tackled elsewhere. I 141 Unanimity/conformity: in the initial state it is not a matter of agreement on concrete random facts (which are not known anyway). Otherwise, only trivial problems could be solved. I 142 Through the veil of Ignorance, the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls) are preferred to the criterion of usefulness. I 143 Rationality/Initial state: even in the initial state, where individuals have only general information, we assume that they strive to have more of it than less in relation to primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). I 166 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls: there is no problem with the assumption that newcomers arriving at the initial situation, which of course have less information. The veil of ignorance erases every basis for distinguishing different levels of information. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Welfare State | Friedman | Gaus I 212 Welfare state/public goods/Friedman/Moon: (...) are typical welfare goods public goods (...)? To some degree, perhaps. If we all wanted to live in a society where no one suffered from destitution, and were willing to pay something to see that achieved, then we would all be better off if the government provided a safety net. Reasoning along these lines, Milton Friedman (1962(1): 191) has argued for a minimal welfare state, in which a 'negative income tax' would be employed to provide a subsistence income to people without other means of support. The minimal welfare state would not, however, be an 'institutional welfare state' , since its main concern would be to ensure that everyone had enough income to avoid destitution. Presumably, it would also provide other public goods such as public health and sanitation, for each of us is better off if others are inoculated against infectious diseases, or if the town disposes of every household's sewage and garbage in a sanitary manner. Vs: but many welfare programmes do not seem to provide public goods: the principal beneficiary of an old age pension is the pensioner, the principal beneficiary of a high school or college education is the student whose skills are improved and whose life is enriched, the principal beneficiary of open heart surgery is the patient whose life is saved, and so forth. >Welfare state/Political philosophy, >Unemployment/Moon. 1. Friedman, Milton (1962): Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Welfare State | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 210 Welfare state/Political philosophy/Moon: Some of the programmes of the welfare state, such as public schools and old age pensions, were first developed in the nineteenth century, but what might be called the 'institutional' welfare state did not fully emerge until after World War Il, when most democratic countries adopted a more or less integrated range of programmes of welfare provision and policies of economic management. The institutional welfare state is characterized by a range of programmes designed to meet different needs and to provide security against various contingencies. >Institutions, >Institutionalism, >Education, >Education Policy, >Welfare economics. Brian Barry: At least as an ideal, as Brian Barry (1990)(1) points out, the institutional welfare state would not even require a general safety net, since specialized programmes would cover all of the different conditions that prevent people from meeting their needs. In reality, of course, there will always be some who fall between the cracks, and so the welfare state must have a programme of 'social assistance' to cover residual cases. The emergence of the institutional welfare state is reflected in the enormous growth of government expenditures to finance its programmes, both in absolute terms and in relation to national income. In the UK, for example, social expenditure increased from less than 6 percent of GNP in 1920 to 25 percent in 1996—7 (Barr, 1998(2): 171). Political theories on welfare state: tional frameworks. Students of the welfare state have offered a variety of classifications of welfare regimes, and disagree among themselves even about whether particular countries (notably, the US) even qualify as welfare states. Some students of welfare politics emphasize the difference between selective and universal welfare states (e.g. Rothstein, 1998)(3); others discern liberal, corporatist, and social democratic regimes (e.g. Esping- Andersen, 1990)(4); while yet others distinguish among social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, and wage-earner welfare states (Huber and Stephens, 2001)(5). More philosophically oriented theorists place the welfare state in the context of different traditions of political thought, and differ- ent ideals and/or patterns of justification. Thus, some discuss the minimal state and the arguments for and against it (e.g. Nozick, 1974(6); Schmidtz and Goodin, 1998(7)); others consider the 'residual' versus the 'institutional' welfare state (e.g. Barry, 1999)(8); yet others find four distinct strands, laissez-faire, feminism, socialism, and Fabianism (Clarke, Cochrane and Smart, 1987(9)). While most recognize that class is a major concern of the welfare state, an increasing number of theorists see that gender is at least as important (Gordon, 1990(10); Fraser, 1997(11)). Cf. >Minimal State. Moon: As a political formation the welfare state tends todivide theorists who in other respects share a view Gaus I 211 of politics. Thus, defenders and critics of the welfare state include people who identify themselves as (inter alia) >conservatives, >liberals, >communitarians, >socialists, and postmodernists, and so both its critics and its defenders find themselves with strange allies and opponents. Common features: In spite of the great variability mentioned above, welfare states share important features; four of the most important are a democratic political system, a largely private market economy, a wide range of public programmes that provide monetary support or services as a matter of right, and an active role for the state in managing the economy to dampen the business cycle and to regulate economic activities. Efficiency: (...) many welfare services are provided through market transactions, such as the purchase of life or medical insurance. Why, then, should the state be involved in providing welfare, either directly in the form of specific services (such as health care or education) or in the form of resources or income to enable people to meet their own needs? Government programmes, after all, both involve an element of coercion and impose uniformity. Gaus I 212 Market: The alternative to state provision is often taken be the market, where profit-seeking firms provide consumers with goods and services. But this is an oversimplification, as families and voluntary associations also lay key roles. Private provision: The rise of the welfare state with its compulsory programmes has led to the demise of many of these voluntary associations and private firms reducing citizens' autonomy and imposing uniformity on them. The more extensive the welfare state, the more it has displaced other welfare institutions.* Efficiency: One reason for substituting state for private provision is that state provision (either of services or of resources) can sometimes be more effective than private provision, either because it can provide services or resources more cheaply, or because private provision is incapable of providing an optimal (or even adequate) level of services. For Problems: see >Market failure, >Public goods. For a Minimal welfare state: >Welfare state/Friedman. Gaus I 214 Distributional justice: A second line of argument supporting the welfare state appeals to the idea of justice rather than efficiency. The policies of the welfare state do not simply make it possible for individuals to realize their own interests more effectively, but generally redistribute income. Efficiency-based arguments normally take the outcome produced by market exchange, prior to governmental taxation and transfers, as their baseline, and show that a particular policy can at least in principle make everyone better off than they would be given that baseline. But to the extent that welfare policies deliberately redistribute income, those whose income goes down would normally (though not necessarily) be worse off; such policies could be justified, then, only by invoking values other than efficiency. >Distributive justice/welfare economics. VsEfficency-based approaches: (...) the appeal to e Iciency is itself problematic, in as much as the pretax/pretransfer baseline it takes for granted must be justified. There are some risks which we face, when we think of our lives taken as a whole, that cannot be covered by any form of private provision, because they reflect conditions into which we are born, such as congenital handicaps, genetic predispositions to certain diseases, and the cultural and economic disadvantages one's parents may suffer. >Distributive justice/Welfare economics. * See Paul (1997)(12), particularly the articles by Beito, Davies, and the references cited therein for an account of non-state forms of welfare. 1. Barry, Brian (1990) 'The welfare state versus the relief of poverty'. Ethics, 100 (June): 503-29. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 3. Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 5. Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens (2001 ) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. 7. Schmidtz, David and Robert Goodin (1998) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 8. Barry, Norman (1999) Welfare, 2nd edn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 9. Clarke, John, Allan Cochrane and Carol Smart (1987) Ideologies of Welfare. London: Hutchinson. 10. Gordon, Linda, ed. (1990), Women, State, and Welfare. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 11. Fraser, Nancy (1997) Justice Interruptus. New York: Routledge. 12. Paul, Ellen, ed. (1997) The Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Mause I 579ff Welfare State/Political Theories: given the empirical diversity of the structure of the welfare state in the various countries, one must assume that one is dealing with a mixed system in the specific case of an examined country. The term welfare state is criticized as conservative. (Schmidt 2005) (1). For the division into system types see Esping-Andersen 1990(2) and 1999(3). Mause I 581 History of the welfare state: the oldest strand of comparative welfare research used key socio-economic variables such as the state of economic development, the spread of employees in the non-agricultural sector ("employment rate") and other concepts of macro-sociological modernisation. (Customs officer 1963 (4); Wilensky 1975 (5). Functionalistic explanations: here we are concerned, among other things, with the diffusion of social policy effects across territorial borders, e.g. social learning (Hall 1993) (6). Garbage can theory: this is about the contingent interaction of political processes, one example being the multiple streams approach. (Kingdon 1984)(7). Newer approaches, on the other hand, focused on concepts such as power, conflict and institutions and examined decision-making processes. Party Difference Thesis/Hibbs: (Hibbs 1977) (8): The party-political composition of governments is significantly reflected in internationally and historically variable levels of social expenditure. (Castles 1982 (9); Schmidt 2005 ) 1. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2005 2. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton 1990. 3. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford 1999. 4. Zöllner, Detlev. Öffentliche Sozialleistungen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Ein zeitlicher und internationaler Vergleich. Berlin 1963. 5. Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The welfare state and equality. Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. Berkeley 1975. 6. Peter A. Hall, 1993. Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state. The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25( 3): 275– 296. 7. Kingdon, John W., Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston/ Toronto 1984. 8. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467– 1487. 9. Castles, Francis G. The impact of parties on public expenditure. In The impact of parties: Politics and policies in democratic capitalist states, Hrsg. Francis G. Castles, 21– 96. London 1982. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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