Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Davidson | Glüer II 108 Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father. Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation. Glüer II 109 f Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws. Brandom I 724 Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved I 726 Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent. Brandom I 727 She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow). I 728 Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs. Brandom I 957 Accordion Effect/success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action. - Example Mountain Climber. I 958 Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURDs: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded. I 729 Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine. I 957 Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto). Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established. Glüer II 92 Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object. Glüer II 96 Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted. MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely) Glüer II 110 Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - ((s) Because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers.) ((s) Something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.) >Intentions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Adverbs | Cresswell | I 164 Adverb of quantification/Cresswell: frequency: ((s) "often", etc.): Lewis: these can be used as an adverb of quantification. Irene Heim: E.g. "Any man who likes a donkey, buy it": everyone is a universal quantifier, which not only binds the man, but also a donkey. >Universal quantification, >Quantification, >Quantifiers, >Geach's donkey, >Donkey sentences, cf. >Adverbial analysis. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Adverbs | Prior | I 98 Adverb/adverbial/Prior: an adverb expresses a quasi-property of quasi-objects! >Properties, >Objects, >Predication, cf. >Adverbial analysis. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Attributive/referential | Tugendhat | I 503 attributive adjectives/truth conditions/ugendhat: Problem: the truth definition for "huge fly". Explanation: it must be told how to determine whether something is a huge F. >Relativity, >Classification, >Identification, >Truth conditions. Analog: modal adverbs e.g. "Peter runs fast": cars are always faster. cf. >Adverbial analysis. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Events | Meixner | I 167 f Event/Davidson/Meixner: from the true sentence "Hans laughed loudly" follows logically "Hans laughed" but not according to predicate logic. >Propositional Logic, >Predicate Logic. How can we receive a in conclusion predicate logic? Solution: We must assume that there are events as entities. ((s) for the quantification): "For at least one current event applies it is noisy and a laugh from Hans". (Ditto for the two part-state of affairs loudness and laughter). >"Adverbial analysis", >Quantification, >States of affairs. Event/ontology/Meixner: however, it is not even decided whether they are objects or functions. >Ontology, >Objects, >Function. Event/LewisVsDavidson: as properties they are functions. >Properties/Lewis, >Events/Lewis. DavidsonVsLewis: as individuals they are objects. >Events/Davidson. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Everyday Language | Strawson | III 189ff Everyday language/Strawson problem: the relations between action ascribing sentences are not to be understood in the predicate calculus like the relations in which the sentences of Davidson's scheme are. >Actions/Davidson. III 194 Solution/Strawson: adverbial access: direct - we cannot understand everyday language sentences (SS) in one respect, without recognizing them as equivalent to Davidson's (DS). >Adverbial analysis. III 196 Only difference: in the Davidson's scheme, the constellations are only clearer, but they are also present in the everyday language sentences - so that we can then introduce a control system for the everyday language - (without having to require control). III 197 Quotation marks show that everyday language sentences have a different but equivalent structure - solution: theory of naming with attached predication shows how the structures intersect. >Predication. III 198 Actions and events generally suffer the identity dependency of substances. >Substance, >Action, >Event. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Perception | Sellars | I XL Perception/Sellars: includes thoughts - but is not cognitive as such. >Consciousness/Sellars, >Thinking/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars, >Cognition, >Knowledge, >World/Thinking. Clarity: needs something non-cognitive. >Mapping, >Presentation. I 43 Perception/Sellars: might be explained by molecular behavior, but not by analyzing the speech behavior - and therefore not by sense data as an intermediate instance between being and appearance. >Sense data, >Language behavior, >Behavior, >Appearance. I 99: Impression/Sellars: that there is something. - Thought: that something will appear. Perception: as if there would be something. I 103 Perception/Sellars: right question: what would correspond, for example, with electromagnetic concepts in a micro theory of sentient organisms. Not: how do impressions and electro mechanics fit together. There is not only behavior, but also inner episodes. Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable symptoms in behavior. >Intersubjectivity, >Language community, >Observation language. Impressions: are states. But not physiological. >Physical/psychic. Impressions are not objects. --- Graeser I 46 Perception/Sellars/Graeser: adverbial: he preceives reddish. >Cf. >Adverbial analysis. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Sensations | Chisholm | II 190 Sensation/perception/ChisholmVsSense data/Stubenberg: adverbial analysis of sensation: The object appears to us in a certain way: e.g., in a red way. "Red" is not understood here as an adjective. Appearing in a certain way is a non-relational property. II 191 Vs: Question: is this qualitative dimension not a mental or psychic aspect of the world? The existence of the non-relational states of persons requires, in turn, the existence of a mind that has these states. Chisholm/Stubenberg: This could be met with an innocuous definition of "mental." II 192 Def "mental"/Chisholm: that which is immediately known. It is impossible for one to be appeared to in a certain way without knowing that one is appeared to in that way. This corresponds to Chisholm expression "self-presenting". Now there is no reason to assume that only spirits could have such "spiritual" states. The property need not be of material nature! Even in a world which consists only of physical objects, spiritual qualities can be exemplified. >Identification, >Individuation. >Self-knowledge. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sense Data | Chisholm Vs Sense Data | II 190 Sense data fallacy/ChisholmVsSense data: false conclusion from (A) to (B): (A) There is something that seems so and so (B) There is an appearance that is so and so. E.g. This dog seems to be 10 years old. There is a dog-like appearance, which seems to be 10 years old. If you leave aside the sense data, you do not need a container. Sensation/Perception/ChisholmVsSense data/Stubenberg: adverbial analysis of the sensation: the object appears to us in a certain way: for example, in a red way. "red" is not understood here as an adjective. Being appeared in a certain way is a non-relational property. II 191 Vs: Question: is this qualitative dimension not a mental or psychological aspect of the world? The existence of non-relational states of people in turn requires the existence of a mind that has these states. Chisholm/Stubenberg: this could be countered with a harmless definition of "mental": II 192 Def "mental"/Chisholm: what is immediately known. It is impossible that someone is appeared to in a certain way, without knowing that one is being appeared to in this way. This corresponds Chisholm term "self-representing". Now there is no reason to assume that only spirits could have such "mental" states. The property need not be of non-material nature! Even in a world that consists only of physical objects, intellectual properties can be exemplified. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| |||