Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Content	Jackson	Schwarz I 171 "Naturalization of content"/representation/Schwarz: the naturalization of content is, thesis: that mental representations are so far as to be clause-like, so that one can explain their content compositionally. (See Fodor 1990)⁽¹⁾. Cf. >Compositionality. LewisVsFodor: fundamentally missed: only the causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if the desire for e.g. mushroom soup is beautifully composed of desire for soup and desire for mushroom. Because on the opposite it is a mushroom soup desire, if it plays exactly this causal role, no matter what it is composed of. (1994b⁽²⁾, 320f). >Causal roles. One can equally well imagine beings who do not represent clause-like (see Armstrong 1973⁽³⁾, Chap. 1, Braddon-Mitchell/Jackson 1996⁽⁴⁾, chapter 10f). Lewis's theory is also intended to be valid for these worlds, as well as to explain what determines the content. >Possible worlds, >Representation. 1. Jerry A.Fodor [1990]: “A Theory of Content I & II”. In A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 51–136 2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 3. D. M. Armstrong [1973]: Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 4. David Braddon-Mitchell und Frank Jackson [1996]: Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell	Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Context/Context Dependence	Chalmers	Schwarz I 201 Contextual Intension/Chalmers: (Chalmers 2003⁽¹⁾, §3). LewisVsChalmers: the falsity of a sentence where no one says anything comes from compositional rules; situations do not always have to be utterance contexts. Therefore, truth conditions are not "contextual intensions. (Lewis, 1980a⁽²⁾, 28f). >Truth conditions, >Situations. 1. David Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in nature. IN: Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142 (2003) 2. David K. Lewis, Index, context and content. In: Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. pp. 79-100 (1980)	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Emotions		Emotion, philosophy of mind: is usually defined by examples such as joy, fear, anger in order to distinguish it from other internal states. It is controversial whether emotions are triggered solely by external circumstances. See also sensations, perception, mental states, mind states, consciousness, stimuli, introspection, other minds.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Epiphenomenalism		Epiphenomenalism, philosophy of mind: theories that conceive the mind as a side effect of brain processes, the mind itself does not cause any effects. See also supervenience, identity theory, mind, brain, materialism, reductionism, dualism, property dualism.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Functionalism		Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Grice	Avramides	I 26 Grice/Avramidis: Grice view should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism. - Grice wants a reconciliation with Frege and Davidson. >Philosophy of mind, >Gottlob Frege, >Donald Davidson, >Paul Grice. I 42f Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning of the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements. >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Clauses, >Compositionality, >Frege-Principle, >Subsententials. Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc. Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation meaning before the timeless meaning (the standard meaning). >Situation, >Situation/Psychology, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x". 1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ... 2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker. I 44 3rd Version: in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener. Vs: there are still many counterexamples. I 45 GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person. Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. Then there is no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning. >Natural meaning/non-natural meaning. The difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response. I 46 E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing. I 67 Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning. - Only for speaker-meaning. Meaning/Grice: meaning is to be found both outside language and within. I 68 Timeless meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x. - This is also an effect etc. but not a practice. It is not sufficient (because it may have a second meaning), and not necessary (it may have alternatives). - But it is a "procedure in the repertoire". >Practise, >Language behavior, >Language community, >Convention. I 111 Reductionist Gricean/Loar: This position risks to accept thinking without language. >Thinking without language.	Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Materialism	Searle	I 47 SearleVsMaterialism: wrong question: how particles without intelligence produce intelligence (higher status, simple dynamic organization). >Levels(Order), >Description level. I 18 ff "Eliminative materialism": eliminative materialism is the idea that there is no such thing as "desires", "hopes", "fears", etc.. (Feyerabend 1963, Rorty 1965). I 27 Together with the Cartesian tradition, we have inherited a vocabulary, and with it certain categories. The vocabulary is not harmless, because it implicitly contains various theoretical assertions whose falsity is almost certain: apparent opposites: physical/spiritual, body/mind. Materialism/mentalism, matter/soul. It contains the assumption that, strictly speaking, one and the same phenomenon cannot satisfy both limbs of the pair of opposites. Therefore, we should believe that something spiritual cannot be physical. I 40 SearleVsMonism, SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally missed. The real mistake was to start counting at all! >Monism, >dualism, >Cartesianism. What exactly does "materialism" mean? One might perhaps think that it consists in the view that the microstructure of the world is entirely composed of material particles. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that this conception is compatible with almost every philosophy of mind. Today, however, no one believes in the existence of immortal spiritual substances. I 53 Either identity-theoretical materialism ignores the spirit, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is false; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism. I 62 Def "elimininative materialism": Stich and Churchland are of the opinion that there are no states of mind at all. >Churchland, Patricia, >Churchland, Paul. Materialism adopts the worst assumption of dualism. I 72 The deepest reason for this fear of consciousness is that consciousness probably does not have a solution to the characteristics of subjectivity. >Subjectivity. I 112 The question of how to "naturalize" consciousness does not arise at all; it is already completely natural! >Consciousness, cf. >Identity theory. . Paul Feyerabend (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. In: Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):49-67 2. Richard Rorty !1965). Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. In: Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):24-54	Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Meaning (Intending)	Searle	II 49 Meaning: meaning is not primarily intentional, not without perceptible action. II 203 Meaning/Searle: we define the meaning (and hence linguistic meaning) by intentional forms, which per se are not linguistic. Philosophy of mind: the philosophy of mind analyzes semantic terms with deeper psychological terms > Meaning/Grice, Intending/Grice. II 204 Meaning/SearleVsGrice: meaning shall be defined by action and intentional states. VsGrice: he used intent, belief and desire unanalyzed. >Intention, >Desire, >Belief. Searle: meaning is a form of intentionality. >Intentionality. Like Grice: meaning will be effective.	Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Necessity	Jackson	Schwarz I 226 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson/Schwarz: follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (Lewis 1994b⁽¹⁾,296f,2002b⁽²⁾, Jackson 1998a⁽³⁾: 56 86). --- Stalnaker I 18 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference, cf. >Reference semantics. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context. >Two-dimensional semantics. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space. >Context. 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.	Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Ontology	Field	I 166 Logic/Ontology/Crispin Wright: instead of logical equivalence (e.g., between Platonist propositions on directions and nominalistic propositions on parallel lines): "conceptual necessity" - from a conceptual explanation. >Necessity, >Equivalence, >Explanation. If Fx is a (finally instantiated) term, then there is a thing so that hx:Fx. FieldVsWright: that would also apply to God. Solution: Conditional: "If there is a God ...". --- II 102 Properties/Ontology/Philosophy of mind/Field: in the philosophy of mind, one can assume certain properties that are simultaneously denied in the ontology. --- III 3 Physics/Ontology/Field: I make strong assumptions about the nature and structure of physical objects (also subatomic particles). Also about postulated unobservables. - ((s) In return, he avoids strong assumptions about the mathematics that deals with it). >Theoretical entities, >Mathematical entities, >Mathematics, >Physics. III 4 I will not screw my structural assumptions to a level below Platonism. ((s) That is, the assumption that the unobservable (e.g. subatomic particles) exist). >Platonism, >Unobservables.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Physical/Psychic		Physical/Psychic, philosophy: involves the question to which domain - the physical, ultimately biological, or the mental domain - a subject of research is to be counted to, is the subject of discussion in various disciplines such as philosophy of mind, neuro-philosophy or psychology. See also identity theory, naturalism, physicalism, functionalism, naturalism.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Privileged Access		Privileged Access, philosophy of mind: what is meant here is the access a human subject has to his own inner states. It is debatable whether there is any privileged access at all. Counter-arguments are put forward by authors who assume that one can only grasp one’s feelings in a public language, that is, with concepts learned in the external world. See also introspection, foreign psychological, private language.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Propositions	Chalmers	Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978⁽¹⁾): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a⁽²⁾, 38, 1994b⁽³⁾, 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a⁽⁴⁾, 2004⁽⁵⁾, Lewis 2002b⁽⁶⁾, Chalmers 1996b⁽⁷⁾, 56,65) Definition meaning₁/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975⁽⁸⁾,173): meaning₁ refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning₂/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning₂ is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] --- Chalmers I 64 Propositions/Chalmers: there are primary and secondary propositions corresponding to the primary and secondary intensions shown here. >Two-dimensional semantics, See Kaplan's distinction >content / >character).	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Propositions	Jackson	Schwarz I 207 (Note) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978⁽¹⁾): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. >Two-dimensional semantics. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a⁽²⁾, 38, 1994b⁽³⁾, 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a⁽⁴⁾, 2004⁽⁵⁾, Lewis 2002b⁽⁶⁾, Chalmers 1996b⁽⁷⁾, 56,65) Definition meaning₁/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975⁽⁸⁾,173): meaning₁ refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning₂/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning₂ is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. Cf >Intensions/Stalnaker. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]	Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Reductionism		Reductionism, philosophy: reductionism is a collective term for attempts, to either trace back statements in a subject area to statements from a sub-area of this subject area or equating statements of a subject area with statements of another subject area. The main point here is the justification of such transfers. Reductionism in the narrower sense is the thesis that reduction is possible. Typical reductionisms exist in the domain of the philosophy of mind. See also holism, eliminativism, materialism, physicalism, functionalism.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Supervenience	Pauen	Pauen I 123 Supervenience / Pauen: synonymous with "emergence": Origin: first half of the 20th century. - Two people that match in terms of their physical properties, can also have no differences in relation to moral points. - Conversely, the existence of physical differences is, however, compatible with moral conformity. In the philosophy of mind this is no ontological assumption. >Emergence, >Morality, >Ethics, >Behavior, >Consciousness, cf. >Identity theory.	Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Terminology	Chalmers	I 20 Deflationary/Terminology/Chalmers: a deflationary concept of belief would be purely psychological (explaining behavior), not phenomenal (connected with Qualia). Which is the true concept, is not so decisive for my project. More important is the separation of the psychological and the phenomenal. I 28 Alertness/Attention/awareness/Terminology/Chalmers: Consciousness is always accompanied by attention, but not always vice versa. Awareness (also attention) falls more on the psychological side of differentiation. I 29 Newell (1992)⁽¹⁾ distinguishes between "awareness" and "consciousness". Chalmers: With "awareness" (attention) I will mean from now on "psychological consciousness" (behavior explaining, functional). I 154 Definition Proto-phenomenal Property/Chalmers: as the only one, a proto-phenomenal property does not contain experience itself, but it can contain several simultaneously present ones. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. > Dualism. I 232 Registration/Chalmers: registrations are judgments in a weaker sense: representational states, e.g. of the facial field, which are not yet judgments. 1. A. Newell, SOAR as a unified theory of cognition: Issues and explanations. Behavioral and Brain Studies 15, 1992: pp.464-92. Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978⁽¹⁾): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a⁽²⁾, 38, 1994b⁽³⁾, 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a⁽⁴⁾, 2004⁽⁵⁾, Lewis 2002b⁽⁶⁾, Chalmers 1996b⁽⁷⁾, 56,65) Definition meaning₁/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975⁽⁸⁾,173): meaning₁ refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning₂/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning₂ is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Brandom, R.	McDowell Vs Brandom, R.	Esfeld I 185 McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions. 2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification. I 186 McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution: Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm. Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world. To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions. Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal. World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual! McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics. McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism. I 187 McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion. The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.	McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Coherence Theory	McDowell Vs Coherence Theory	Esfeld I 185 McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions. 2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification. I 186 McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution: Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm. Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world. To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions. Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal. World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual! McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics. McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism. I 187 McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion. The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.	McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Davidson, D.	Searle Vs Davidson, D.	Brandom I 923 SearleVsDavidson/representation: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use occurs. According to this model, the content can not be transferred during use. >Representation, >intrinsic, >content. Davidson II 112 Only the following criterion is possible: (K2) x action is intentional under the description d only if -the actor has d a primary reason g for x to the description d and - g caused x in the right way. SearleVsDavidson: proposes two types of intentions can be distinguished: a) "prior intentions" and b) "intentions in action" Intentional act only when the first caused the second. Other condition: "predictable regulatrity" predictability depends on the rest of the convictions, and is therefore never fully explicable. To explain how it apparently despite the omnipresent possibility of differing causal chains manage to rationalize actions by specifying the strongest reason, Davidson is forced to a revision of the simple syllogistic reading of the explanation relation. Searle I 28/29 SearleVsDavidson: From the zeal to stick to the traditional categories, grows some strange terminology: >"anomalous monism" >"token identity" etc. ((s) Quotation marks by Searle.) Searle I 147 Once you realize that there are forms of causation running from bottom to top, there is nothing more to do for the notion of >supervenience in the philosophy of mind. And the analogy to ethics is just a source of confusion. (SearleVsDavidson). I 148 As Wittgenstein says: If you only wrap enough paper to various pieces of furniture, you can make them all look as if they have the same shape. Searle II 238 paratactic analysis/Davidson: E.g. Galileo said that the earth moves. Be equivalent to: The earth moves. Galilei said this. Searle: the subordinate clause of the first and the second proposition are entirely extensional. After Davidson Galilei and I become by my consent "Equal Sayer". SearleVsDavidson: we are not equal sayer, because I'm just saying that Galileo has said it. In addition, the subordinate clause is intensional.	Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Dummett, M.	Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M.	II 1 "Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking. StalnakerVsDummett. II 2 The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking. Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto) Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here. Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes. II 74 Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker: K: I will be killed P: I take precautions Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary. 1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that. Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid. Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed. Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps. StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional). a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from II 75 2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion. That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)). Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this: A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B So: C v D. Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails. I 174 Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out. Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions. a) what is the semantics e.g. for names b) what facts cause that this is our semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language. ((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker). I 179 Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F. Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description). That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind. I 180 Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition. singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it). StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true. Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Fodor, J.	Lewis Vs Fodor, J.	Block I 215 Pain/Lewis (VsFodor) can be analytically understood as a condition with a certain >causal role. (>Functionalism). Functionally uncharacterized condition, not a functional state. For example, a functionally uncharacterized brain state. "Pain" can then pick out a neurophysiological state. So he is committed to the assertion that to have pain = the state of this certain causal role. Schwarz I 171 "Naturalization of the content"//Representation/Schwarz: Thesis: Mental representations are insofar alike sentences that their content can be explained by compositionality. (cf. Fodor 1990⁽¹⁾). LewisVsFodor: principally misguided: only causal role in everyday life (behavior) is relevant. Even if, e.g. the wish to eat mushroom soup, is the beautiful addition of the wish for soup and the wish for mushroom. Because if it is reversely a wish for mushroom soup if the wish plays the exact causal role, regardless of how the wish is constituted. (1994b⁽²⁾,320f) We can imagine creatures which do not represent like sentences. (vcf. Armstrong 1973⁽³⁾, chap 1, Braddon-Mitchell/Jackson 1996⁽⁴⁾, chap. 10f). Lewis' theory shall also be valid for this possible word, and shall also explain what determines the content. 1. Jerry A.Fodor [1990]: “A Theory of Content I & II”. In A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 51–136 2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 3. D. M. Armstrong [1973]: Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 4. David Braddon-Mitchell und Frank Jackson [1996]: Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Fodor, J.	Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J.	II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)⁽¹⁾: C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Folk Psychology	Functionalism Vs Folk Psychology	Schwarz I 147 Analytical Functionalism/Terminology/Schwarz: this is how Lewis's position is sometimes called because of its holistic characterization. (Block, 1978⁽¹⁾, 271ff). Schw I 148 "Analytical": because the characterization of causal roles in Lewis is supposed to be analytical. But if functionalism is to be understood as Vs Identity theory, then Lewis is not a functionalist, but an identity theorist. Standard objections Vs functionalism do not affect Lewis at all: e.g. mental states: Mental states/Lewis: for their characterization it also needs an essential connection to the perceived environment etc. Therefore there is no danger that we would have to attribute feelings to the Chinese economy. (>DennettVsSearle?). On the other hand, it does not only depend on input-output relations, so that machines that behave externally like us, but are internally completely different (E.g. Blocks (1981)⁽²⁾ "Blockhead", Searle: e.g. Chinese Room (1980)⁽³⁾, would have desires, pains and opinions (> E.g. Martian pain). Pain/VsLewis/VsFolk Psychology: if we want to know what pain is, we should ask pain researchers and not the man on the street. Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Schwarz: Thesis: that we interpret the behavior of our conspecifics with the help of an internalized set of rules and principles and not, for example, through mental simulation. This is completely wrongly attributed to Lewis. He never expressed his opinion on it. Everyday Psychology/Lewis: is not a special "theory". It only assumes that we have opinions and expectations about mental states but not necessarily about conscious ones. (1997c⁽⁴⁾: 333, early: "Collection of Platitudes" (1972,§3)⁽⁵⁾. LewisVsPsychology: that would be a change of subject. We want to know whether a biological state plays the role we associate with "pain". Schw I 149 SchwarzVsLewis: the contrast may be less strong, some pain researchers might know better what pain is. E.g. depression. 1. Ned Block [1978]: "Troubles with Functionalism". In C.W. Savage (Hg.) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 2 .Ned Block [1981]: “Psychologism and Behaviourism”. Philosophical Review, 90: 5–43 3. John Searle [1980]: “Minds, Brains and Programs”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417– 457 4. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 5. David Lewis [1972]: “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258.	Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Kripke, S. A.	Evans Vs Kripke, S. A.	I 310 Name/Description Theory/EvansVsKripke: there are two description theories that he does not distinguish: 1) meaning theory of the speaker relation: Upon a specific occasion of its use by the speaker S, the name N refers to x iff x is the one thing that satisfies all or most of the descriptions φ. (Bundle Theory). 2) The meaning theory of what a name refers to: what can be taken from a set of opinions from a group of speakers who believe and intend that they use a name to describe the same thing. This does not imply that every speaker has to be in possession of the description. EvansVsKripke: The fact that he does not distinguish the two of them, becomes evident from the fact that he sometimes refers to speaker descriptions and sometimes to the unsettling cocnept of "idiolect". I 311 Name/EvansVsDescription Theory: the strong thesis that the conditions of the description theorist are sufficient is outrageous! I 312 The strict truth conditions are completely unacceptable. Weaker thesis: a certain descriptive identification is necessary: it is important to understand this: EvansVsKripke: his E.g. do not show that it is false. (Although I also think so). 1) in order to say something, you have to target someone or something. 2) in order to have an intention, you have to be in possession of a description. I 317 Criteria/EvansVsKripke: the criteria for "About whom does he believe something?" differ dramatically from those for "Who is the original name giver?". I 323 Causal Theory/EvansVsKripke: like K.: the absurdity lies in the lack of any causal connection. But he locates the causal relationship wrongly: Evans’ thesis is about the causal relation between the states and behaviors of the thing and the amount of information the speaker, and not between being baptized and the current use. (Poor philosophy of mind). E.g. A textbook states that Arthur had a son, Anir, "whom the legend perhaps confused with his burial site". VsKripke: if he now said that the part of the group who say that Anir is a burial site, could designate a person there is little for this term. I 324 Evans’ thesis "intended reference" is typically a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x necessarily being the source of the causal origin of the amount of information which S associated with the name x. 1 30 Name/EvansVsKripke: both VsDescription Theory and VsCausal Theory. Per Description Theory: Reference is generally determined by the amount of information that can be extracted from the users. Evans: Name stands for the object which has caused most information causally. But not causal chain! But causal relationship between states and activities of the object and the amount of information the speakers.	EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Kripke, S. A.	Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A.	V 251/252 Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description. Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent). What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world). You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event. 1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r". 2. partly by cause or effect 3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check 4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above). 5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later 6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted. 7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls. 8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army. V 253 Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke): Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth. Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement. Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow. Schwarz I 55 Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it? Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa: Schwarz I 56 For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay. Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968⁽¹⁾,28f): this is the solution for Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967⁽²⁾): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world. Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e⁽³⁾,246) I 57 KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980⁽⁴⁾: 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d⁽⁵⁾,42). The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions. Schwarz I 223 Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980⁽⁴⁾, Putnam 1975⁽⁶⁾): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily. Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b⁽⁷⁾,59,1994b⁽⁸⁾,313,1997⁽⁹⁾c,353f,Fn22). ((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless. Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980⁽⁴⁾,88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light. If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out. This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world. I 224 Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c⁽¹²⁾,87,1984b⁽⁸⁾,59,1997c⁽⁹⁾,356f) I 225 A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H₂O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties. A posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation, Schwarz I 226 which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. A posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b⁽⁸⁾,296f,2002b⁽¹⁰⁾, Jackson 1998a⁽¹¹⁾: 56 86), see above 8.2) 1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. 2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193 7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342 10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Loar, B.	Avramides Vs Loar, B.	Avramidis I 29 Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111 Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137	Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Phenomenalism	Evans Vs Phenomenalism	I 314 EvansVsPhilosophy of Mind: (this option): like Wittgenstein: E.g. why is it that someone is in love with one of two identical twins? Maybe he met one but not the other. I 315 However, the theorists cannot explain why no other descriptions can be the deciding factor, based on errors, or accidentally refer to the other twin. If God had seen in the mind of the person concerned, wouldn’t he have seen there with whom he was in love, or about whom he has thought.	EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Reductionism	Physicalism Vs Reductionism	Schwarz I 156 Physicalism/Vs Reductionism/VsLewis. other authors: Physicalism is not at all fixed on the a priori derivability of mental from physical truths, only on supervenience of mental on physical facts. But this does not have to be a priori. It can be a posteriori necessity. For example, the relationship between H₂O-truths and water truths. (This is non-reductive physicalism). LewisVs: this is a misunderstanding about a posteriori necessity: e.g. Assuming that "water is H₂O" is necessary a posteriori: this is not because there is a modal fact, a necessity that we can only discover a posteriori, but rather because the meaning of certain words depends on contingent, empirical factors: according to our conventions, in all possible worlds "water" picks out the substance that fills our lakes and streams. "Water is H₂O" is a posteriori, because you first have to find out that the material that fills streams and lakes in our country is H₂O. This is a contingent fact that usually requires chemical analysis, no excursions into modal space. The H₂O-truths therefore a priori imply the water truths. If pain a posteriori is identical with a physical state, then this must also be due to the fact that the reference to "pain" depends on contingent facts, on what kind of state plays the and the role with us ((s) not what kind of linguistic convention we have). (see 1994b⁽¹⁾,296f). 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a]	Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Searle, J.R.	Verschiedene Vs Searle, J.R.	Lanz I 296 VsSearle/VsChinese Room: (Lanz): the brain is also a purely syntactic machine. So in the end there is nothing left but the path taken by cognitive science: to look for subpersonal cognitive processes under as many realistic assumptions as possible! Münch III 332 Homunculi/pictorial representation/HolensteinVsSearle: it is a popular argument against pictorial representation of mental images that they must be viewed by homunculi who merely shift the problem of coding. Holenstein: this is an ontological prerequisite that does not meet scientific standards! The assumption of homunculi requires special justification! Instead of recourse, a regulated use of a physical structure of the brain is also possible. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 Tetens IV 115 Def Meaning/Searle/Tetens: an expression has meaning if the speaker expresses meaning with it! (Mental act of "giving meaning"). Artificial Intelligence/TetensVsSearle: the machine can also do the "giving" of meaning with the help of the programmer! So not only "pure syntax" in the machine, as Searle means, but also semantics. Tetens IV 117 Tetens: let us assume that we would come to the conclusion that a machine can only behave like a human being if it completely resembles the human organism. Then we would not learn anything about humans from it that we do not already know. In this respect the artificial intelligence is philosophically neutral. Searle I 26 VsSearle: I was accused of representing "property dualism" and "privileged access" and believed in "introspection". I 27 But I did not represent that explicitly anywhere. Searle I 126 Searle Thesis: my approach in the philosophy of mind: the biological naturalism. VsSearle: this is sometimes confronted with the following argument: if we can imagine that the same behavior can be produced by a zombie without consciousness, then why did evolution produce consciousness at all? I 127 But it is a false assumption that every biologically inherited trait must give the organism an advantage in selection. For example, the passion for alpine skiing certainly has a biological basis that is not the result of practice or training. It may be that we have more general biological needs that are satisfied by these activities. I 288 Foot Note: There is a distinction between what is selected and what is selected for. III 39 GiddensVsSearle: against the description of the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules.	Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Stich, St.	Lewis Vs Stich, St.	Schwarz I 171 Representation/Lewis/Schwarz: if we ourselves belong to those beings whose representation is more like a card than a sentence, individual opinions do not correspond to isolated states, each with its own causal role. For example, you cannot cut out a part of a map that only represents that Berlin is east of Bielefeld (and nothing else). Then there is also no corresponding isolated state in the brain. >Brain state. Schwarz I 172 In extreme cases we then only have a single state of opinion ((s) in which everything is networked) that is always causally relevant as a whole. (1994b⁽¹⁾,311). LewisVsStich: ((Stich 1996⁽²⁾,Kap 2): this is quite compatible with everyday psychology. For example, my going into the kitchen has little to do with my opinion that Frege was born in 1848, but the two opinions are not necessarily different biological states, each with its own causal role. It is enough if they correspond to different characteristics of my holistic state of opinion, to which we refer in causal statements. >Causal role. 1. David Lewis — [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 2. Stephen P. Stich [1996]: Deconstructing the Mind. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.

Disputed term/author/ism	Pro/Versus	Entry	Reference
Functionalism	Pro	Dennett I 561 Functionalism / Dennett: Sellars: father of functionalism in the philosophy of mind: function-based theory of meaning.	Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Frege Sense/Meaning	Pro	Frank I 484 Evans: "Oxford Neo-Fregeans" (together mt McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266	Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Holism	Esfeld, M.	I 2 Thesis: Holism in the philosophy of mind (HPG) and in quantum mechanics (HQM) have a common conceptual content. I 16 Holismus/Esfeld: Question: What kind of dependency exists between the parts of a holistic system? Thesis: within a holistic system there is a generic ontological dependence. This does not refer to the existence of the parts as such (isolated), but to the extent that they have certain properties. Parts/Properties/Holism/Esfeld: Thesis: for each constituent part of a holistic system (constituent) there is a family of non-disjunctive, qualitative properties that make something a constituent, given a suitable arrangement with other things. I 200 Holism/ontological/epistemic/Esfeld: the proposed social holism and persuasion holism implies the epistemological thesis that even if one has complete physical knowledge about a possible world, one cannot know whether there are beings in the world concerned who follow the rules and which rules these beings follow.	Link to abbreviations/authors
pro Frege	Evans, G.	Fra I 484 Evans: "Oxford neo-Fregean" (along with McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.	Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Meaning Theory	Loar, B.	Avramides I 29 Group: Loar/Meaning Theory: close to Lewis, VsMcDowll, VsWiggins, thesis: semantics and pragmatics are not separate - (not even with Grice) - Wiggins/McDowell: separation Theory of Sense/of Power - Loar: ultimately psychological and thus reductionist. I 31 Meaning Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Loar: thesis the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa. I 32 Loar: thinks that if we do not take the psychological concepts as fundamental, they will be forgotten. Avramides: that does not have to be. Thesis: with the reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional (the recognition of the place of the concept in the conceptual system, not reductive) in "Grice" analysis, we can just as well bring the philosophy of language into the realm of the philosophy of mind, whereby the analysis of meaning remains partially autonomous, but under the umbrella of intentional action. Not all questions of public language have to do with the philosophy of mind. EMD II 138 Meaning/Loar: Thesis: semantic concepts are localized within a larger framework of propositional attitudes, and therefore I make substantial use of intentional entities. But nowadays it is common to think that a purely extensional meaning theory is possible. We owe this largely to Davidson. Davidson/Loar: seems to make a compromise to join Quine's attack against intentions without abandoning all our intuitions about certain semantic facts. LoarVsExtensionality: Z meaning theory without intention is like Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. EMD II 146 Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the clauses (constituents) are a certain function of the propositional attitudes of the speaker. Question: Should propositional attitudes then not best be described as relations to sentences or other linguistic entities? But that would be a circle. EMD II 149 Loar thesis: What I want to show is that the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa! II 148 ... KripkeVsVs: E.g. Measuring: one object refers to another, the default, but if it didn't exist, the object would still have had a length - LoarVs: but that doesn't work for the meaning theory - thesis: therefore you have to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory.	Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Consciousness	Searle, J.R.	I 9 Searle Thesis: Consciousness and intentionality are intrinsic and cannot be eliminated by anything. I 28 Searle Thesis: according to neurophysiological research, the brain causes certain "mental" phenomena, such as conscious states of mind, and these are simply higher-level characteristics of the brain. Consciousness is a higher-level or emergent characteristic of the brain. Thesis: Consciousness is a mental (higher level) property of the brain in the sense that fluid is a higher level property of a system of molecules. It does not follow from the fact that something is mental that it is not physical. I 104 Searle Thesis: I will claim that consciousness is simply an ordinary biological feature of the world, but I will also try to show why we find it almost literally unimaginable that this is the case. I 125 Searle: Thesis: 1. Consciousness is not a "substance", it is a characteristic or property of the brain in the sense that fluidity is a characteristic of water. 2. Consciousness is not recognized by introspection. I 126 The introspection model requires that a distinction be made between the act of inspection and the object. 3. There is just as little a "connection" between consciousness and brain as there is a connection between being liquid of water and molecules. If a consciousness is a higher level characteristic of the brain, then there is no question of connection at all. I 126 Searle Thesis: my approach in the philosophy of mind: the biological naturalism. I 128 Thesis: Consciousness gives us much greater discernment than unconscious mechanisms.	Link to abbreviations/authors