Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Climate Change | Hooker | Singer I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. >Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism/David Lyons(1): Thesis: In such cases, Rule Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right.(2) >Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to utilitarianism. I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker 2000(3))): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics/Glover, J.) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 2. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 3. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000. |
Hooker I Brad Hooker Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality Oxford 2003 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Climate Change | Singer | I 217 Climate Change/Ethics/P. Singer: what we do to strangers in other communities far away today is much more serious than what we could have done to them if we had the habit of sending a group of fighters to their village. I 218 We can only combat climate change with global measures. What should the ethics on the basis of which we coordinate our actions look like? Natural Resources/Locke/P. Singer: from Locke's point of view, they can be exploited as long as there is enough and of the same quality for everyone. P. Singer: But we have now discovered that the absorption capacity of the atmosphere for greenhouse gases is limited. >J. Locke. I 220 Equal distribution: what can it look like? Principles/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles.(1) : Def Historical principle/Nozick: to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its story. Are the parties entitled to ownership on the basis of originally justified acquisition? >Public Goods, >Property. Def two-sided principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about the realization. See also Responsibility/Singer. I 224 Equal burden sharing/pollution/Singer, P: at a UN conference in 2009, Rwandan President Paul Kagame argued for equal per capita burden sharing in the elimination of environmental damage, as all people use the atmosphere to the same extent. Everything else is counterproductive. Sri Lanka made a similar proposal. Singer: this is the application of a time slice principle: Rwanda and Sri Lanka - like other developing countries - do well with it, because they consume less. It is better for them to forego the right to compensation towards industrialised countries. I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. Utilitarianism/David Lyons: (D. Lyons 1965.(3)): Thesis: In such cases, Rule-Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. >Utilitarianism. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right (>Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to Utilitarianism.(3) I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker,2000(4))): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics//Glover, J., >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974 2. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 3. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 4. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Responsibility | Hooker | Singer I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000)): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly if we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics/Glover, J.) |
Hooker I Brad Hooker Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality Oxford 2003 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Responsibility | Singer | I 220 Historical Responsibility/Climate Change/P. Singer: is the principle of "the polluter pays" applicable in the case of climate change? In the case of pollution, it surely is: a chemical company that emits toxins must be held accountable. In the case of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, it can be observed that it is still present after a century. In this case, however, the polluter is not easily identified on an individual basis. >Climate Change, >Climate Costs, >Justice. I 221 However, it is possible to assign percentages of pollution to countries. >Emission permits, >Emission permits trading. Problem: when it comes to centuries, states are not to be regarded as constant individuals because the political map has changed. >Generational justice. One argument: one sometimes hears the argument that industrialisation has helped the whole world to increase prosperity, why should one not also bear the environmental damage together? >Progress, >History, >Technology. Vs: the concomitant rise in international trade, however, had made greater use of the industrialized nations. >Trade, >Markets, >World Economy. I 222 Argument: one sometimes hears the argument that the nations that caused them were not aware of the harmful effects. >Nations. Singer: That's true, before the 1970s, global warming was not seriously investigated. I 223 Singer: one has to take into account the size of the population. Even if we can only apply the principle of "You destroyed it, you have to fix it" when the biggest polluter knows about it, it remains that the United States and Europe must do most to repair the damage. I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: in this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit an offence or not to put up with any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. >Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism/David Lyons: (D. Lyons 1965(1)): Thesis: In such cases, Rule Utilitarianism coincides with Action Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right (> categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to utilitarianism.(2) I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker 2000)(3)): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly if we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. >Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics/Glover, J. 1. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 2. R. M. Hare, „Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?“ Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 3. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000). |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Rights | Consequentialism | Gaus I 107 Rights/Consequentialism/Gaus: L. W. Sumner (1987)(1) presents an especially influential consequentialist case for rights. Sumner recognizes the paradoxical air of a thoroughly consequentialist argument for rights: in so far as the consequentialist seeks to maximize achievement of a certain goal, and rights are a constraint on the ways goals are achieved, it looks as if the consequentialist must argue that the best way to achieve the goal is to constrain our efforts to achieve it. The key to resolving this paradox, says Sumner, is to distinguish consequentialism as a theory of moral justification from the preferred theory of moral decision-making (1987(1): 179) or, we might say, consequentialism as a theory of evaluation from a theory of deliberation. This argument for rights consequentialism (or, more generally, rule consequentialism) argues that there is no easy transition from the claim that the right action is that which maximizes good consequences to the claim that the best decision procedure is to perform that action which one thinks has the best consequences. Sidgwick: This type of argument was advanced by Sidgwick (1962(2): 489), who accepted that utilitarianism may be self-effacing, in the sense that it could instruct us not to encourage its use as a theory for making decisions. It may be better, he argued, if many people are guided by common sense morality. >Rights/Utilitarianism. VsSidgwick/VsSumner: Two problems confront such a view. 1) First, it is often not realized that rule utilitarianism puts more, not less, computational burdens on those devising the system of rules. 2) Second, by divorcing utilitarianism as a standard of evaluation from its role as a standard of deliberation, we invite the sort of moral elitism that attracted Sidgwick: perhaps hoi polloi should be restricted to non-utilitarian reasoning, but the class of excellent calculators may be able to better promote utility by employing utilitarianism as a method of deliberation (1962(2): 489ff). Drawing inspiration from Sidgwick, Robert E. Goodin (1995(3): ch. 4) has recently defended ‘government house’ utilitarianism, which casts utilitarianism as a ‘public philosophy’ to be employed by policy-makers, rather than a guide to individual conduct. 1. Sumner, L. W. (1987) The Moral Foundations of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Goodin, Robert E. (1995) Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rights | Sumner | Gaus I 107 Rights/Consequentialism/Sumner/Gaus: L. W. Sumner (1987)(1) presents an especially influential consequentialist case for rights. Sumner recognizes the paradoxical air of a thoroughly consequentialist argument for rights: in so far as the consequentialist seeks to maximize achievement of a certain goal, and rights are a constraint on the ways goals are achieved, it looks as if the consequentialist must argue that the best way to achieve the goal is to constrain our efforts to achieve it. The key to resolving this paradox, says Sumner, is to distinguish consequentialism as a theory of moral justification from the preferred theory of moral decision-making (1987(1): 179) or, we might say, consequentialism as a theory of evaluation from a theory of deliberation. This argument for rights consequentialism (or, more generally, rule consequentialism) argues that there is no easy transition from the claim that the right action is that which maximizes good consequences to the claim that the best decision procedure is to perform that action which one thinks has the best consequences. Sidgwick: This type of argument was advanced by Sidgwick (1962(2): 489), who accepted that utilitarianism may be self-effacing, in the sense that it could instruct us not to encourage its use as a theory for making decisions. It may be better, he argued, if many people are guided by common sense morality. >Rights/Utilitarianism. VsSidgwick/VsSumner: Two problems confront such a view. 1) First, it is often not realized that rule utilitarianism puts more, not less, computational burdens on those devising the system of rules. 2) Second, by divorcing utilitarianism as a standard of evaluation from its role as a standard of deliberation, we invite the sort of moral elitism that attracted Sidgwick: perhaps hoi polloi should be restricted to non-utilitarian reasoning, but the class of excellent calculators may be able to better promote utility by employing utilitarianism as a method of deliberation (1962(2): 489ff). >Utilitarian Liberalism/Goodin. 1. Sumner, L. W. (1987) The Moral Foundations of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rights | Utilitarianism | Gaus I 106 Rights/Utilitarianism/Gaus: Utilitarians, or more broadly, consequentialists, have spent a good deal of effort investigating in what ways personal rights might enter into a utilitarian system. Sen (1990)(1) offers a version of consequentialism that takes rights satisfaction as part of the utility of a state of affairs (cf. Scanlon, 1977(2); Nozick, 1974(3): 166). Mill’s complicated utilitarianism – which seems to integrate rules into the concept of a morality – has often been used as a model for utilitarian rights (Lyons, 1978(4); Frey, 1984(5)) (...). Russell Hardin (1988(6); 1993) has advocated an ‘institutional utilitarianism’ that takes account of knowledge problems in designing utilitarian institutions, which he offers as an alternative to both act and rule utilitarianism. According to Hardin, ‘[w]e need an institutional structure of rights or protections because not everyone is utilitarian or otherwise moral and because there are severe limits to our knowledge of others, whose interests are therefore likely to be best fulfilled in many ways if they have substantial control over the fulfillment.’ Gaus I 107 That, he adds, ‘is how traditional rights should be understood’ (1988(6): 78). >Rights/Consequentialism. 1. Sen, Amartya K. (1990) ‘Rights consequentialism’. In Jonathan Glover, ed., Utilitarianism and its Critics. London: Macmillan, 111–18. 2. Scanlon, Thomas (1977) ‘Rights, goals and fairness’. Erkenntnis, 11 (May): 81–95. 3. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic. 4. Lyons, David (1978) ‘Mill’s theory of justice’. In A. I. Goldman and J. Kim, eds, Values and Morals. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1–20. 5. Frey, R. G. (1984) ‘Act-utilitarianism, consequentialism and moral rights’. In R. G. Frey, ed., Utility and Rights. Oxford: Blackwell, 61–95. 6. Hardin, Russell (1988) Morality within the Limits of Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 601 Rights/Utilitarianism: for utilitarianism, maximising the overall well-being is the central objective. Rights, for example in the form of ownership guarantees, can also benefit the overall welfare. It can never be excluded that sacrificing fundamental individual interests of individuals or groups could increase the overall benefit. DworkinVsUtilitarianism: Rights always protect the individual with reference to fundamental and central interests.(1) >Utilitarianism/Dworkin, >Utilitarianism. 1.cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Utilitarianism | Hooker | Singer I 233 Utilitarianism/Climate change/Brad Hooker/Singer, P.: (B. Hooker 2000)(1)): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. >Utilitarianism, >Rule utilitarianism. He believes that we are acting wrongly if we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. >Education, >Education policy. P. Singer: an example of such a complex rule would be: "Only cross the lawn when no one is watching". >Rules, >Community, >Society, >Law. Christopher KutzVs: (Chr. Kutz 2000)(2): Complicity Principle: If I knowingly participate in the wrong thing others do until I am responsible for what these others do. 1. B. Hooker (2000). Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford. 2. Chr. Kutz, (2000). Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Cambridge. |
Hooker I Brad Hooker Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality Oxford 2003 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Utilitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 414 Utilitarianism/Political Philosophy/Weinstein: Contemporary English utilitarians have championed liberal utilitarianism with increasing subtlety and sophistication. Rule utilitarianism: Rule utilitarians stress utilitarianism's compatibility with accepted moral rules and intuitions (Hare, 1981(1); Harsanyi, 1985(2); Hooker, 2000(3)), whereas ... Liberal utilitarianism: ... liberal utilitarians marry utilitarianism with strong liberal rights (Gray, 1983(4); Riley, 1988(5)). All such accounts nevertheless constitute different versions of what is now commonly known as indirect utilitarianism. Indirect utilitarianism: For indirect utilitarians, according to James Griffin, the principle of utility serves as a 'criterion' for assessing classes of actions. By contrast, established moral rules and/or basic liberal rights function as sources of direct obligation (or 'decision procedures') for guiding individual actions (Griffin, 1994(6): 179). Actions are morally wrong if they violate these decision procedures. Indirect utilitarians hold that respecting such decision procedures will best maximize general utility overall, though not necessarily in short-term individual cases. In other words, sometimes acting rightly is doing wrong. But why should I act rightly if acting rightly happens not to be for the utilitarian best in a given situation? Why should I be a mindless, rule-worshipping sucker?* Fundamental rights/equal rights/Liberal utilitarianism: (...) for liberal utilitarianism, fundamental rights function as critical decision procedures, making it more juridical than rule utilitarianism. Rights indirectly steer our actions along inviolable channels of acceptable behaviour that purportedly generate overall general utility. But liberal utilitarianism is not simply a more juridical version of indirect utilitarianism. VsLiberal unitiltarianism: Contemporary liberal utilitarianism is often criticized in the same way as Mill's contemporary opponents assailed him for trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. For instance, John Gray (1989(7): 218—24) has recanted his earlier enthusiasm for liberal utilitarianism, agreeing with liberal utilitarianism's critics that it futilely seeks to join multiple ultimate normative criteria, namely utility and indefeasible moral rights. Gray: For Gray, either maximizing utility logically trumps rights, or rights (in so far as they possess authentic moral weight) trump maximizing utility. Liberal utilitarianism fails logically because it pulls in opposite normative directions, instructing us to maximize utility when doing so violates rights and to respect rights when doing so fails to maximize utility. We sometimes must choose between our liberalism and our utilitarianism. Egalitarian utilitarianism: Egalitarian liberals, in contrast to utilitarians, feature equality over utility as their overriding normative concern. Still, utilitarians are not indifferent to equality and distributive justice. As we have just seen, indirect utilitarians take these values seriously, though not so seriously that they trump maximizing utility as the ultimate normative standard. Utilitarians also prize equality in the sense that impartiality is constitutive of the principle of is counted for utility. Each person's 'happiness exactly as much as another's' (Mill, 1969(8): 257).** >J. St. Mill, >Egalitarianism. For egalitarian liberals, however, equality plays a more commanding role because many of them favour internalist arguments for equality.*** And because equality matters for them up front, they also tend to be more preoccupied with questions about equality of what rather than why. Cf. >Individuals/Bradley, >Liberty/Bosanquet, >Self-realization/Hobhouse. Gaus I 415 New Liberalism: (...) new liberals favoured a more robust threshold of equalizing opportunity rights. Although they concurred with >Bosanquet that possessing property was a potent means of 'self-utterance' and therefore crucial to successfully externalizing and realizing ourselves, they also stipulated that private property was legitimate only in so far as it did not Gaus I 416 subvert equal opportunity. >Equal opportunities. Hobson: In Hobson's words, 'A man is not really free for purposes of self-development who is not adequately provided' with equal and easy access to land, a home, capital and credit. Hobson concludes that although liberalism is not state socialism, it nevertheless implies considerably 'increased public ownership and control of industry' (1974(9): xii).ll New liberals, then, transformed English liberalism by making social welfare, and the state's role in promoting it, pivotal. They crafted welfare liberalism into a sophisticated theoretical alternative.**** >Liberalism, >Idealism. * For critics of contemporary indirect utilitarianism, rule-worshipping suckers are irrational because rule utilitarianism is not merely paradoxical, but illogical. Acting rightly can never sometimes entail doing wrong as if acting and doing mean different things. Rule utilitarians have responded by distinguishing between idealistic rule utilitarianism, actual state rule utilitarianism and conditional rule utilitarianism. Ideal rule utilitarianism holds that actions are right if they comport with rules whose general acceptance would promote utility. Actual state rule utilitariamsm adds the condition that these rules must, in fact, be generally accepted. Conditional rule utilitarianism is weaker still as it further stipulates that actions are right if they conform to rules that always maximize utility. ** Mill continues, 'The equal claim of everybody to happiness . involves an equal claim to all the means to happiness (1969(8): 257). In a revealing footnote about Spencer, Mill adds that 'perfect impartiality between persons' supposes that 'equal amounts of happmess are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons'. These egalitarian implications of impartiality are not identical and entail vastly different redistributive strategies. *** For Gerald Gaus (2000(10): 136-45), utilitarian arguments for equality are external because they endorse equal treatment for the sake of advancing some external value, namely happiness. Arguments from fundamental human equality justify equal treatment on the basis of some (internal) attribute according to which people are purportedly equal in fact. **** Idealists, like Jones and Collingwood, similarly favoured vigorously expanding equal opportunities through government. 1. Hare, R. M. (1981) Moral Thinking. Oxford: Oxford mversity Press. 2. Harsanyi, John (1985) 'Rule utilitarianism, equality and justice'. Social Philosophy and Policy, 2: 115-27. 3. Hooker, Brad (2000) Ideal code, Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Gray, John (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge. 5. Riley, Jonathan (1988) Liberal Utilitarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Griffin, James (1994) 'The distinction between a criterion and a decision procedure', Utilitas, 6: 177-82. 7. Gray, John (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge. 8. Mill, J. S. (1969) Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of J. S. Mill, vol. 10. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 9. Hobson, J. A. (1974 119091) The Crisis of Liberalism. Brighton: Barnes and Noble. 10. Gaus, Gerald (2000) Political Concepts and Political Theories. Boulder, CO: Westview. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intentionality | Black Vs Intentionality | I 71 VsIntentionality theory: it tries (falsely) to explain the speaker meaning through recourse to a separable and independently characterizable reaction. Black: There is no standard reaction. I 77 Intention/Black: certainly there could be no understanding and speaker if it there were no primitive situations in which it is recognized that a speaker has the intention to convince a listener. VsIntentionality: but it is a mistake to view this observation as evidence for the correctness of intentionalist analysis: The same error as confusing rule utilitarianism with act utilitarianism. It is possible that moral practices serve the purpose of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but it does not follow that the moral justification of individual actions depends on whether they directly contribute to the maximization of happiness. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Utilitarianism | Newen Vs Utilitarianism | New I 144 Def Classic Utilitarianism/Newen: Thesis: it is about the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Logical form: the main institutions of society should be such that they produce the greatest amount of happiness for all the members. Two conditions: 1) Substitution Principle: the satisfaction of the interests of one individual can be replaced by those of another individual. 2) Principle of Equivalence: dispenses with the difference between action and omission. I 145 Utilitarianism is a rational theory. Benefit/Calculation/Newen: Suppose the benefit for each person could be quantified. Then a benefit value: Ni can be specified for each individual i = 1,2, ... n ( "luck factor"). General Benefit/Common Good: W: sum of the benefit of all individuals: W = N1 + N2 + ... + Nn. VsUtilitarianism: it is not possible to specify what constitutes the happiness of a person. UtilitarianismVsVs: Modification: preference utilitarianism. Def Preference Utilitarianism/Newen: the "happiness" of the individual is no longer assessed, but their preferences are taken into account. I 146 VsUtilitarianism/VsPreference Utilitarianism/Newen: both ignore the intuition that a society in which all are doing approximately equally well is more just than one in which some are doing much worse. E.g. a society is be considered as fairer if a person is put 5 points up while at the same time two people are put 2 points down. E.g. W1 (29) = N1 (7) + N2 (7) + N3 (15) mean benefit 29: 3 = 9.66 W2 (30) = N1 (5) + N2 (5) + N3 (20) mean benefit 30: 3 = 10 W3 (31) = N1 (4) + N2 (4) + N3 (19) + N4(4) mean benefit 31: 3 = 7.75 population growth Utilitarianism: for him, the overall benefit would be increased, i.e. W2 more just than W1. Vs: intuitively, this world is not more just for us, because more people are worse off. (Rawls ditto). UtilitarismVsVs: further modification: instead of overall benefit: mean benefit. I 147 RawlsVsUtilitarianism: makes an unrestricted population growth desirable, because this would achieve an increase of overall benefit without anyone having to be better off. Even new people at the lowest level increase the overall benefit (see above, W4). Mean Benefit/VsMean Benefit/Newen: does not help to explain why W1 is more just than W2, because the mean benefit is increased in W2. Problem: also the mean benefit is ultimately independent of the individual distribution of benefit to the people. I 148 VsUtilitarianism/Newen: E.g. according to utilitarianism, it would be necessary for a healthy person to donate their heart and liver in order to save the lives of two patients and thus to shift the benefit from one person to two. UtilitarianismVsVs: Solution: rule utilitarianism (see below) Def Action Utilitarianism/Newen: every single action must be assessed according to its consequences. Def Rule Utilitarianism/Newen: this is about types of actions, the rule utilitarianism may judge a rule morally superior, because it usually has positive consequences, although there are exceptions. I 149 RawlsVsUtilitarianism/Utilitarianism/Newen: utilitarianism binds morality to a moral-independent criterion. Happiness/Rawls: it is completely open what someone defines as happiness. I.e. it is also counted if it makes somebody happy e.g. to discriminate against others. Rawls: but discrimination is wrong in itself. It violates a principle, to which we ourselves would agree in its original state. (Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, ThdG, p. 49). |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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