Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Realism | Wright | I 15 Antirealism/Dummett: understanding must manifest itself in behavior: the use of sentences. - This leads to the distinction between (perhaps unrecognized) truth and acceptability of sentences and between what it causes respectively. Evidence transcendence/(s): even if evidence is given, truth can deviate). >Acceptability, >Assertibility, >Truth. I 84 Semantic anti-realism/Dummett: when the meaning of a statement is to be set by the truth conditions, then truth cannot exceed our ability to recognize it. - ((s) Anti-realismVsassertibility: (s): circular when indexical). --- I 102f Anti-realism: thesis: truth is globally understood as superassertibility. >Super-assertibility. Def Superassertibility/(s): Future assertibility under appropriate conditions. >Assertibility/Wright. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Assertibility | Wright | I 26ff It is not the case that P is T iff it is not the case that P is T. This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left. Assertibility is naturally weaker. >Asymmetry, >Equivalence, >Implication. I 26 Justified Assertibility/Negation: Ignorance: P is not justifiably assertible, but neither is its negation. >Negation, >Justification. Truth/Ignorance: something may very well be true, even though nothing is known about it. >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. Truth/Justified Assertibility: E.g. snow is white: the decision about truth and assertibility may diverge here. I 51 Deflationism: "true" only means of affirmation, therefore not a standard different from assertibility. >Truth, cf. >Redundancy theory. A statement can be justified without being true and vice versa. >Conventions, cf. >Language use, >Language community. --- Field II 120 Assertibility/Wright/Putnam: is the only substantial property. - Because truth is not a property. - Field: both do go next to each other, because they diverge - truth goes deeper. Wright I 35 Justified Assertibility/Assertibility/Negation: E.g. it is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T - This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left - in case of ignorance, the negation is not assertible either. I 52ff Truth: timeless - justified assertibility: not timeless. >Timelessness. I 68ff Def Super-Assertibility: a statement is super-assertible if it is justified or can be justified and if its justification survived both any scrutiny of its descent and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Cf. >Justified assertibility. Ideal Circumstances/Putnam: are timeless. Super-Assertibility is no external standard, but our own practice. It is metaphysically neutral. I 81ff Super-Assertibility/Wright: Thesis: comic and moral truths can be considered as varieties of super-assertibility. - ((s) Because everything we can learn in the future comes from our own practice, we are immune to fundamental surprises.) I 102f Super-Assertibility/Wright: suitable for discourses whose standards are made by us: morals, humor. >Morals. I 115ff Super-Assertibility/Field/Mackie: the T predicates for mathematics or morality cannot be interpreted in terms of the superassertibility. - Therefore, the super-assertible need not be true in discourse. - The difference Ssuperassertibility/truth goes back to this. >Mathematics, >Truth, >Discourse. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Euthyphro | Wright | I 108 Definition Euthyphro/Plato ("Eutyphro contrast") Realist, Socrates: certain actions are liked by gods because they are pleasing to God. The gods have the ability to recognize the property, the property of Godliness is one thing, to track it another. This is the "detectivistic" version. Extension falls apart. Contrary to this: Anti-realist, Eutyphro: certain actions are pleasing to god because they are liked by gods This is constitutively dependent on the opinion of the gods, not to explore epistemically, not independent of the opinions. The "because" here is conceptual, "projectivistic". Extension: coincides here. Realist/Dummett: certain statements (in the questioned discourse) are super-asserting, because they are true. (Constitutive independence of truth of the super-assertibility). >Assertibility. Anti-realist: such statements are true because they are super-assertible. >Superassertibility, >Antirealism. I 142 Euthyphro/Plato: Certain actions are pleasing to God, because the gods like them (awarding of a predicate, projection). Counter position: Realism: they are liked, because they are pleasing to God: Here something is detected, there is an ability, it is "detectivistic". Color/Johnston: shape is read detectivistically, color projectivistically. I 143 Euthyphro/Wright: basic equation: For all S, P: P if and only if (CS, then RS) S: each actor "P": all the judgments of a very broad class of judgments; "RS": expresses that S shows a certain relevant reaction; "CS": fulfillment of certain optimality conditions for that particular reaction. The fulfillment of the conditions C through S ensures that no other circumstances of an alternative could give a greater credibility. Basic equation/Mark Johnston: E.g. x is square if and only if x is seen by standard observers under standard conditions as square. - This also applies for red. >Standard conditions. Shape/color/Johnston: central difference: shape: gets detectivistic - color: is read projectivistically. Moral discourse: this discours is like the discourse about color. I 152 Euthyphro/projectivistic:> a priori knowledge - detectivistic: not a priori, not analytical. >a priori, >Analyticity, >Knowledge, >Morality, >Color, >Perception, >Judgments. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Explanation | Wright | I 182 Best Opinion/ethics/morality/Wright: we will see in Chapter 5 that moral issues do not occur in the best explanations of our moral beliefs. >Best Explanation/Wright. I 196f Best explanation/Wright: an explanation cannot be the best if it does not contain certain details. (But this is not supposed to be any naturalistic or scientific reductionist kind of explanation). An explanation will not be considered the best, as long as there is a competing equally good explanation, but which does not use the cognitive susceptibility. If such a declaration is actually equally good, it will explain why the (different) person in his community does not stand out. >Community, >Language community, >Convention. But then, the entire community can be considered deficient. The specific cognitive ability, thus becomes a fifth wheel. >D. Wiggins, >Cognitive Coercion, >Causal Role. I 240 Best explanation/Physics: should the best explanation not always be the same? Finally, the causal antecedents are, so to say, already in place, whatever the fate of the theory will be later. Why should the best explanation go beyond the statement of reasons and laws that precisely explain the forces that generate our beliefs? Wright: There is no reason why the best explanation should refer to any state of affairs which actually conveys truth to the theory, as we assume. Best explanation/Physics/Wright: should consist in scientific heritage, as well as in observations and certain psychological laws. >Explanation/Harman. ((s) So there is no mentioning of the facts.) Could the best explanation not always be "done better" , by always searching for a more fundamental level (for example: subatomic, etc.) If explanations are only best if they are valid, then they will always "overtake" their content. >Assertibility, >Superassertibility, >Ideal assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Extensions | Wright | I 70 Extension/truth regarding the extension superassertibility can potentially diverge from the actual assertibility - e.g. gold at the time of Aristotle. >Assertibility, >Truth, >Natural kinds, >Extension, >Intension. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Justification | Wright | I 92 History/past/Wright: It is a peculiarity of evidence for the past, which can nothing guarantee, that the currently available evidence could not be misleading due to some unfortunate circumstances. Consequently, it applies to statements about objects and events in the present tense (present), that their justification may not be in general a reason for accepting that this will not be their fate. Justification/Super-assertibility/Wright: the justification is therefore no unlimited reason to regard a statement as super-assertible. >Superassertibility. Justification/Wright: thesis: the permission to state something requires the permission to look at something as super-assertible. >Assertibility. I 96 Justification/Wright: the belief that all evidence is not misleading, is not something for which a justification/permission must be acquired. It is an indispensable default assumption (Default: Absence (of evidence)). >Evidence, >Method. If that is correct, the following conditional applies: If P, then there is a favorable balance of available evidence relating to P, as long as it is finite. Although not a priori true, but a priori justified. Wright: that reaffirms the super-assertibility. I 211f Definition default relationship of the confirmation between experiences and statements. E.g. "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification, insofar as it relates to the color. An appropriate justification by experience is revocable in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but otherwise presumably valid. Question: can one assume now cognitive deficiency with that? >Cognitive coercion. A theorist who accepts on-1, can do this either because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or dispute the probative force while being biased. If there is now no other support for Hn, the adoption of Hn by the first theorists remains unjustified, and the denial in the right. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Minimalism | Wright | I 52 Definition minimalism/Wright: Ingredients: (i) the equivalent scheme "it is true that P if and only if P, (ii) "P" says that P, (iii) a sentence can be characterized as true if its proposition is true, (iv) the validity of the modus tollens, (v) that it is not malicious, "P" corresponds to the facts "more than" "the things are as "P" says that they are" - recognizes truth as a real property.(VsDeflationism) >Deflationism, >Truth, >Validity, >modus tollens, >Propositions, >Sentences, >Equivalence. I 102f Minimalism/Wright: neutral between anti-realism: (Super-assertibility) and Realism: evidence transcendental truth. >Superassertibility, >Assertibility, >Realism, >Anti-realism. I 225 Minimal capacity for truth/Wright more than minimal capacity for truth: if the facts must be mentioned in the best explanation of our true beliefs to which the beliefs relate. >Truth evaluability, >Best Explanation/Wright. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) I 267ff Global Minimalism/Wright: ... it could be a global minimalism concluded rather than a total skepticism: all meanings and the truth are only at the most minimal capable of truth. I 271 Boghossian: Global minimalism, Non-Factualism: related to meaning, not truth: there is no property that a word means something, hence no fact - attracts global non-factualism unlike any other non-factualism. >Non-factualism. I 285 Boghossian: "global minimalism": with the truth also all meaning tilts. >Meaning, >Facts. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Negation | Wright | I 275/76 Negation/logic/truth/correctness/correct: if both truth and correctness are playing a role, there is a distinction (see above > Neg) between the a) proper, strict negation: turns any true or correct sentence in a false or incorrect - another negation form: b) negation: acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly then when his argument does not reach truth. >Correctness/Wright, >Truth, >Assertibility. I 276 Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal does indeed assume that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal is, however, that A should be rather complementary to the strict notion of the former negation. Then, for the case that A is only correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative. WrightVsVs: but the (DB) carpet now throws elsewhere wrinkles >Conservativity. I 88 Negation: Definition negation operator "Neg": "Neg A" is true if A is false and false in all other cases (e.g. with a lack of assertibility or Super-assertibility) >Superassertibility. Incorrect solution: then with low validity of A <> B: negation equivalence "Neg (P) is true" <> Neg ("P" is true)? WrightVs: that will not work, even with "assertible" instead of "true". |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Realism | Wright | I 104 Realism/Wright: needs bivalence, that is, it is suitable only for certain discourses. - It forces the distinction between the Truth-predicate for discourse and for superassertibility. >Bivalence, >Truth values, >Truth predicate, >Discourse, >Superassertibility. Truth-predicate (realistic): is regardless of evidence. >Evidence. The text should then have a feature that the superassertibility has not. - Then superassertibility is inadequate. >Truth conditions, cf. >Truth criterion. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Truth | Wright | Rorty VI 41 Truth/Wright: Truth is a selfstanding standard. >Assertibility, >Justified assertibility, >Superassertibility. Rorty VI 50 Truth/Wright: concession to deflationism: truth is no metaphysically heavyweight term. >Deflationism, cf. >Disquotationalism. Truthmaker/Wright: Wright does not doubt the existence of isolable "truth-makers". >Truthmakers. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Putnam, H. | Wright Vs Putnam, H. | I 58 "Putnam's Equivalence"/(Wright): P is true if and only if P could be justified under ideal epistemic circumstances. Convergence Demand/Putnam: no statement that is justified under epistemic ideal circumstances can be asserted simultaneously with its negation. Wright: this is of course to be distinguished from the requirement for completeness: not all questions can be decided (quantum mechanics). Wright: it seems here that even ideal epistemic circumstances cannot be neutral in relation to negation. ((s) Example (s) If the location of the electron cannot be fixed, that is not a negative statement about this or any other location.) I 59 Negation/Minimalism: requires the usual negation equivalence: "It is not the case that "P" is true if and only if it is not the case that "P" is true. This does not work for quantum mechanics. WrightVsPutnam: the examples from quantum mechanics or mathematics (undecidability) are deadly for Putnam's approach. (Example generalized continuum hypothesis). It certainly does not even apply to empirical statements a priori that each of them would be decidable under ideal circumstances. I 60 (Thus confirmable or refutable). A priori/Minimalism/Wright: the minimum platitudes probably apply a priori. WrightVsPutnam: so if Putnam's informal explanation would be a priori correct it has to be like this to be correct at all - then it would have to apply a priori that also the negation of a statement that cannot be justified under ideal circumstances (electron) would be justified. Wright: exactly this cannot be the case a priori. WrightVsPutnam: erroneously a priori claim. But it gets even worse: the extension of the argumentation destroys any attempt to determine truth as essentially independent of evidence (>quantum mechanics/Putnam). Anti-Realism, Semantic/Evidence: in contrast to Putnam, may now be satisfied with a "one-way street": (EC, epistemic restriction): EC If P is true, then there is evidence that it is. Evidence/WrightVsPutnam: Truth is limited by evidence. This leads to a revision of logic. I 64 WrightVsPutnam: he must make intuitive revisions. I 66 Def Truth/Peirce: that which is justified at an ideal limit of recognition when all empirical information has been obtained. PutnamVsPeirce: one simply cannot know when one has all the information! Wright ditto I 68/69 Def Superassertibility: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrary verification of its ancestry and arbitrary extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear". |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Superassertibility | Verschiedene Vs Superassertibility | Wright I 68/69 Def Superassertibility/Wright: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrarily accurate verification of its ancestry and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear". Superassertibility/Content: the opponents of the superassertibility would have to refute the simple notion that the content of the claim that P does not include the claim that P is justified, nor that P is believed. The thought that neither the principle the proposition that P is justified if and only if P, nor the principle It is believed that P, if and only if P ((s)) is absurd) applies a priori. Superassertibility: their representatives must justify the validity of (Es) (Es) It is superassertible that P, if and only if P. I 72 Negation: this problem will be solved if it applies: (DSS) "P" is superassertible if and only if P. From this follows, as we have seen, the negation equivalence: It is not the case that "P" is superassertible if and only if it is not the case that "P" is superassertible. Here we can distinguish between propositions and sentence when it comes to negation. Then the validity of DSS depends on Es. ("It is superassertible that P...) VsEs/VsSuperassertibility: one could object that Es cannot be valid since it mixes the validity of certain high-level evidence for P with the validity of fact. For example, the Goldbach conjecture may be undetectably true and therefore not be superassertible. For example a superassertible proposition (brains in a vat) can be undetectably wrong. Since Es can be victim of counterexamples at any time, it cannot be true a priori. Therefore, superassertibility does not claim to be a truth predicate (T-predicate). I 73 VsSuperassertibility: the critics claim that the following equivalence cannot be established: (because of counterexamples): (F) It is true that it is ∏ that P if and only if it is true that P (F) However, contains two occurrences of a truth predicate that must be understood as distinct from the superassertibility. ((s) "∏" should be replaceable by "superassertible", but then allegedly does not guarantee equivalence). "∏" is more neutral than "true", which can mean true or assertible. Example: It is possible that the Goldbach conjecture is true without it being true that it is superassertible (provable), but it is certainly not evident that the conjecture could be superassertible without it being superassertible that this is the case. Pluralism: if, as minimalism thinks, there can be a pluralism of predicates of truth, then it is to be expected that the illusion of failure can be created if each occurrence of "true" is interpreted differently. It is as if someone wanted to prove that physical necessity cannot qualify as a real concept of necessity because the concept does not satisfy the following principle: Necessary (AB) |= Necessary(A) Necessary (B) ((s) right side weaker) I 74 and would then try to support his thesis by interpreting the last occurrence of "necessary" in the sense of logical necessity. ((s) There is no "logical necessity" of any object "B"! If we want to know if there are counterexamples to (Es), the right question is not whether F is fulfilled, but whether it is, which arises when the two tendentious occurrences of "true" are replaced by those of "∏". (G) It is ∏ that it is ∏ that is P, if and only if it is ∏ that is P. (Wright pro). G: Truth without limitation by evidence. F: Superassertibility. So whether it is in fact always when it is superassertible that P is also superassertible that this is the case and vice versa. Problem: if any true predicate of truth can fulfill the equivalence scheme a priori, its two possible forms (true and assertible, claimable) must be a priori coextensive. Thus, no predicate F can obviously function like a T-predicate if it has to function alongside another predicate G, which is already assumed to both fulfil the equivalence scheme and potentially diverge extensionally from F. (e.g. Goldbach's conjecture). (Since it cannot apply a priori that (P is if and only if of P F) if a priori that P applies then and only if P is G, but not a priori that (P is G if and only if P is F). (s) So coextension needs equivalence (concordance in both directions), and not only concordance in one direction. This weakens the original objection. It applies only to the following extent: if it is shown that a discourse is dominated by a truth concept - G - not restricted by evidence, then it is shown that superassertibility - F - is not a predicate of truth for this discourse. (For, trivially, if P is superassertible, evidence for P must be available.) But this does not justify a global conclusion. I 75 Oversimplification: (Gs) It is superassertible that it is superassertible that P is, if and only if it is superassertible that P is. Correct: given the equivalence scheme (see above), only the cases are counterexamples for (Es) in which (Fs) also fails: (Fs) It is true that it is superassertible that P is if and only if it is true that P. So if (Gs) applies, we know that there are no counterexamples to (Es) and consequently (Es) applies. But only provided that there are no competing predicates of truth besides superassertibility! I 76 Question: So is (Gs) unrestrictedly valid? It should be shown that the existence of an entitlement for P means that there is also an entitlement for the assertion that P is superassertible (showable in the future). For example, suppose the possession of an authorization for A also means possessing an authorization for B, and vice versa, but that for a reductio A is superassertible, B on the other hand is not! Then a total state of information I entitles to A and also all its improvements I' and hypothetically also to B. But: since B is not superassertible, there must be some improvement of I supporting A, but not B. This shows that (i) the coincidence of the assertibility conditions is sufficient for (ii) both statements of a pair to be superassertible if this is true for either of them. I 77 Superassertibility: it is less clear that the possession of an authority for the assertion also means the possession of the authority to view the statement as superassertible. Question: Can the authority to claim P coexist with the lack of authority to view P as a superassertible? ((s) Can something be assertible without being superassertible?) Assertiveness/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional view offers "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he/she uttered the sentence". |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Antirealsm | Wright, Cr. | I 102 The semantic thesis of anti-realism is thus: truth is globally understood as superassertibility. |
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