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Actions | Lewis | IV 158 Action/explanation/unrealized possibilities/possibilia/Lewis: problem: how can unrealized possibilities explain our actions? Solution: brain states are characterized by belief. These are associated with thought objects, i.e. with quantities that are partially made of un-updated individuals. They are in these relations because they bear these interpretations and they bear the interpretations through the causal powers - not vice versa. >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought, >Possibilia. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
ChatGPT | Logic Texts | Our team from the Dictionary of Arguments had asked ChatGPT about a logic problem from Peter T. Geach: The three farmers Cob, Hob and Nob argue about whether it was "the same witch" who caused all kinds of damage in the village. The question is whether one can establish identity at all with thought objects - non-existent objects. ChatGPT's response clearly missed the mark by assuming the three farmers to be the fictitious objects, which is completely trivial. These persons could just as well be real; the logical problem would still exist. Thus, one level was missing in the search depth, similar to GoogleTranslate years ago, where nested sentences were simplified by omitting partial sentences, i.e. the deepest level was hidden. >Cob/Hob/Nob-problem, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Intensional objects, >Peter T. Geach. >More entries on AI Research. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 |
Content | Boer | I XIII Definition Thought/Boer: can be common to different states of mind. Proposition/Boer: I do not call it thought content, because this expression brings too much ballast with it. --- Note I XVIII Intensional transitive verbs: have three conditions, each of which is sufficient for itself: (i) failure of the principle of the substitutability of identity (ii) quantification permits a specific "narrow range" (iii) there is no existential (ontological) commitment. --- I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional settings/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/proopositional attitudes/individuation/Boer: N.B.: The fulfillment conditions do not appear to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Propositional attitudes/Individuation/Lewis: (1969)(1): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain fulfillment conditions. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: in order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition mental reference/Terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only a partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only the item/s to which a subject by the power of having ψ refers to. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves. Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/thought content/Boer: is the that-sentence. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself. 1. David Lewis 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Foundation | Peacocke | I 199 Foundation/Peacocke: for each component of a thought it must be possible that it does not already come from other thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Reality, >Knowledge, >Perception. Problem: Radical holism/Dummett: if everything depends on other thoughts: then we get a circle. >Holism, >Circular reasoning. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Individuation | Castaneda | Frank I 216 Individuation/Castaneda: Thinking events are individuated by their contents. >Content, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Identification, >Thinking, >Thought, >Propositional content. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Intensional Objects | Intensional objects: intensional objects are objects of thought which may or may not correspond to external objects. Properties can be attributed to these objects, which cannot be attributed in any case to external objects. For example, dreamed things and situations with physically impossible properties. A fundamental problem is that in every discussion it must be ensured that the objects which can be disputed are not only intensional. A special problem is the status of intensional objects to which the object character is denied. See also mentalism, intensions, thought objects. |
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Intensional Objects | Boer | I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional attitudes/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/propositional attitudes/Individuation/Boer: N.B.: The conditions of fulfillment do not seem to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: In order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition reference/terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then be only a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. Thought object/Tradition/Boer: Thought objects are often understood in the tradition as the thought content of a propositional attitude with all involved objects: BoerVs: confusion of thinking-that with thinking-about. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only that/these item/s to which a subject refers to by the power of ψ. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves! Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/Thought content/Boer: is the that-Satz. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Meaning | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Mental States | Rorty | Rorty I 28 Wittgenstein, Strawson: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes. >Dualism, >Monism, >Cartesianism. Non-spatiality is not a clear criterion for a mental state, because the concept of the state is so unclear, neither spatial nor non-spatial. >Materialism, >Physicalism, >Functionalism. I 77f Ryle: opinions, wishes and feelings (traits of reason and character) can be thought of as something that requires the human itself as a substrate, and not a non-material medium. This is more difficult with sensations, mental images and thoughts. >Beliefs, >Desire, >Emotions, >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Objects of belief, >Psychological theories on personality traits. I 77ff State: this above argument makes it so easy to consider sensations, etc. not as states of things, but rather as things themselves. (RortyVs). This allows some contemporary philosophers to afford mental things without a soul. Cf. >Mental objects/AI research. I 80 Def Neutral monism: considers the mental and the material as two "aspects" of an underlying reality. - Reality accessible with intuition (Bergson). Reality also to be identified with the material and the perception (Russell, Ayer). The only way to escape skepticism. (Dewey, James). >Skepticism, >Skepticism/James, >Bergson. I 106f RortyVs: you cannot find a "neutral material" which is neither mental nor physical, and has its own powers and dispositions. Therefore, you simply postulate it. But that does not help. >Substance, >Substratum. Frank I 581 Mental/Rorty: a) Events: sensations, thoughts, etc. b) states that are no events: opinions, moods, intentions, etc. >Intentions, >Intentionality, >Sensation, >Event, >State. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 Rorty I 60 Idea/mind/Antiquity/Rorty: antiquity had no concept of the mental and no concept of a mind separated from the body - no concept of idea - no concept of consciousness. >Ancient philosophy. Idea: new with Locke - this only makes epistemology possible. >Idea/Locke, >Ideas. I 117 Mind/mental/RortyVsRyle: Ryle believed to have avoided the image of the mirror, but he failed in the attempt to prove that there are no uncorrectable reports. >Mental states/Ryle, >Ryle, >Incorrigibility. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Mentalese | Peacocke | I 206 Mentalese/belief/Field/Peacocke: Field Thesis: systems that are sufficiently complex for belief terms, have systems of internal representations in which the sentence-analogues have significant grammatical structure. >Complexity, >Structure, >Systems, >Beliefs, >Thoughts, >Propositional Attitudes, >Thinking, >Representation, >Internal States, >Internal Objects, >Belief Objects, >Thought Objects, cf. >Artificial Intelligence. I 209 Mentalese/Peacocke: a model that works without the assumption of a language of thought would have to explain two things: 1. How can one ascribe propositional content, without referring to syntactic structures? - That means, relatively complex content must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (psychic) states. >Propositional content, >Content. 2. It must be shown, how these states interact with perception and behavior. >Perception, >Behavior. I 215 A simple model (relation instead of language) does not seem to require the instrumentalist conception of a rational actor. - On the contrary, if someone meets the relational model, a realism regarding mechanisms of rational belief-desire psychology would be justified. >Realism, >Rationality. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Mentalism | Mentalism, philosophy of the mind: the assumption that there are inner, mental objects that play causal or functional roles in the formation of attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, etc. These roles are rather understood as processes by theories, which are opposed to mentalism. See also intensional objects, thought objects. |
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Non-Existence | Montague | Hintikka I 103 Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague's semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because in Montague the domain of individuals is assumed to be constant). >Possible worlds, >Identity between worlds, >Individual domain, >Identification, cf. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory. Individual domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. But there is a problem: Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it, too. ((s) the same unicorn). Cf. >Thought objects, >Belief objects. Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "looks for". >Range, >Quantification, >Narrow/wide range. ((s) That is, that both are looking for unicorns.) Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?). >Unicorn example. I 103 Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless the example (11) shows that the way of reading should not oblige us to accept the existence of unicorns. Cf. >Ontological commitment. Non-existence/epistemic context/intensional/belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can look for the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some worlds. For this, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: with more complex sentences, all problems come back: I 104 Example: John does not know whether unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn because Mary is looking for it. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a special unicorn. (Otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true), although he is considering the possible non-existence. >Anaphora, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Identification. World line/Hintikka: in order to extent the Montague semantics, we must allow more or less unnatural world lines. >World lines, cf. >Four-dimensionalism. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Objects of Thought | Brentano | Prior I 121 Objects of thought/Brentano/Meinong/Findlay: Brentano: is a modern echo of Reid: Prior I 121/122 Brentano: Scholasticism called the intentional existence of an object a "direction (pointing) to an object" (this does not have to be something real) or "an immanent objectivity". Mental state/Brentano: everyone has in himself something that serves as an object, even if not all do this in the same way. Brentano's modern echo is Findlay. Intentional objects/thought objects/Findlay: (like Meinong): we can think of objects that do not exist. We can even make many true claims about them. Meinong: e.g. that the golden mountain does not exist is true but it is undoubtedly that it is both a mountain and a golden one. ((s) VsMeinong: E.g. just as an impossible thing is both: 1. impossible, 2. a thing.) Findlay/Meinong: existence or non-existence does not make any difference in reference to "being what". Non-existence/Meinong: "incomplete objects" that lie before us, whenever we think of them, in the general way "something that is so and so" (Similar to Reid:> triangle). Prior I 123 Intentionality/Brentano: unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation. >Intentionality, >Non-existence, >Objectivity. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Opacity | Castaneda | Frank I 383 Referential opacity/opacity/Castaneda: Quine is concerned with the reference of the speaker (de re-aspects of communication) - I am concerned with the de dicto-aspects of thinking. >de re, >de dicto, >Thinking, >Reference, >Identification, >Thought objects, >Belief objects. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Pierre (Londres-Example) | Pierre example: (from Saul Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief", in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds. “Propositions and Attitudes” (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 124.) Pierre has learned that Londres is a beautiful city. He also believes at the same time that London is ugly. The problem is a special one here, as it is not about "capital of ...", but names, which are supposed to not change their referents. See also reference, propositional attitudes, de re, de dicto, thought objects, intensional objects, opacity. |
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Possible Worlds | Castaneda | Frank I 329ff Possible world/Lewis: Possible world have only publicly accessible physical objects, no premises, no propositional knowledge, extensional (E.g. 2 omniscient Gods). >Two omniscient gods, >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Propositions, >Propositional knowledge. CastanedaVsLewis: but private items and indicator phrases ("I", "here", "now") are individuable in possible worlds (intensional). >Intensions, >Intensionality. Lewis: if access to possible worlds is limited perspectively, then worse: we no longer know what we believe propositionally, because propositions would no longer be transparent as sets of possible worlds. >Accessibility, >Opacity. Frank I 357 Possible world/CastanedaVsLewis: not suitable as accusative of thinking: as sets too much extended - not intensional. >Content, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Thoughts. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Predicates | Millikan | I 109 Subject/predicate/picture/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of sentences map... I 110 ...the world, and the way in which logical predicates do this. 1. Because one can replace predicates by other predicates, e.g. "... swims" by "... flies", they are still not to be viewed as objects. (BrandomVsMillikan/(s): distinction between the frame and the insertion-"gap"). 2. Question: Do predicates have to correspond to universals when we treat them as substances? In any case, we must not look at them as single objects, but rather as in tradition as thought objects or as possibilities. Universals/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature? Predicates/Millikan: every simple predicate must reflect a historically variability rooted in nature ((s) disjunction, >disjunctive). Complex Predicates/Millikan: They too are supposed to reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things. Property/kind/Millikan: property and kind have only one settlement space: that is nature itself. >Natural kind. I 111 3. Relation/property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in the same way in nature as is their identity or their sameness. >Identity/Millikan, >Terminology/Millikan. I 227 Negation/Predicate/Logical Subject/Millikan: the common basis in the opposite corresponds to the logical subject. E.g. Bill cannot be both large and small at the same time. >Negation/Millikan. Negation: operates on the logical predicate. It does not change the meaning (the mapping rules). It operates on the part of the logical predicate, which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence. E.g. "painfully disappointed, Johnny never came back". Embedded sentence: "Johny was painfully disappointed": is embedded in the grammatical subject. Truthmaker: Problem: e.g. "some day-active bats are not herbivores" is not made true by the fact that all bats are nocturnal. Negative sentence: its function is to give positive information. A useful negative sentence will limit the domain of possibilities. I 228 External negation: "it is not the case that ..." may also affect more than the grammatical predicate. >External negation. I 272 Subject/Predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (Subject and predicate in "Logic and Grammar") Millikan: I replaced "general concept" here by "properties": fundamental asymmetry: particular: space-temporal, exemplifying properties that come from a certain domain. Then we know for each property that it is in competition with others. Asymmetry: there is no such competition for particulars. No individual competes with others for properties within a domain. No things are related to each other, so that for each property that exemplifies the one, it would follow that the other does not exemplify them (even not at the same time). MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? It is traditionally recognized among concepts, but we cannot transfer it to properties and relations. >Particulars/Strawson. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Proper Names | Prior | I 119 ff Names/Hobbes: names are names of our ideas. >Th. Hobbes, >Ideas. MillVsHobbes: names convey to the others, what we think of someone (something), not only about our idea The idea of fire does not cause the heat, even though I must have terms to think. >Proper names/Mill, cf. >Connotation. I 158ff Name/existence/Prior: Vs the thesis, "Name is all what intends to identify a real object": Problem: indirect speech: E.g. The spokesperson believes Holmes exist, but the listener does not: then the speaker is in a position to identify Holmes the listener is not but then the listener cannot tell what the speaker has said (absurd). >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Identification, >Individuation. I 168 Names/KennyVsRussell: there is a hideen description in "B exists". >Hidden descriptions. PriorVsKenny: when names must name something then no name can be used in indirect speech with a known non-existence. >Naming, >Non-existence, >Indirect speech. I 168ff Theory/PriorVsKenny: cannot set up his own theory. - Kenny Thesis: names must intend reference - then the theorist himself cannot even intend to use the name if he talks in his example sentences of non-existent persons. >A. Kenny. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Propositional Attitudes | Meixner | I 82 Proposition/Meixner: Propositional attitudes are satisfied by facts, not by propositions. >Propositions, >Propositional attitudes, >Intensions, >Facts, >States of affairs, cf. >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Satisfaction. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Propositional Attitudes | Perry | Frank I 451f Proposition / propositional stance / PerryVsFrege: the expressions embedded in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents relate. > Cresswell: structured meanings, >Propositions, >Designation, >Objects, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Identification, >Belief Objects, >Thought Objects, >Reference. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Propositional Attitudes | Prior | I 88 Propositional attitudes/Prior: no distinction between what is said and what is meant: the object of fear is the object of fear and not a "next-intentioned" object. >Propositions, >Intensions, >Thought Objects, >Belief Objects, >Meaning/intending, >Sense. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Propositions | Castaneda | Frank I 323 Propositions/Tradition: (not represented by anyone in pure form, not even by Frege): ideal convergence of the elements of thought, speech, reality and communication. >Convergence, >Communication, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Content, >G. Frege. Propositions that are primarily defined as carriers of timeless truth values, fundamental support of linguistic meaning as constituents of reality and as publicly accessible contents of communication. >Propositions, >Communication, >Truth values. Advantage: that leaves no gap between the content of thought, and that to which it is directed - for reality arise. >Reference, >Reality, >World/Thinking. CastanedaVs: this does not apply to indexical sentences. >Indexicality, >Index Words. Individuation: of indexical sentences: in the speech act, not by meaning. >Individuation. I 340ff Proposition/Tradition: (Frege, Moore): 1) psychological units, 2) ontological, 3) ontologically objective (intersubjective) 4) metaphysical units 5) logical units 6) semantic 7) linguistic units of communication. CastanedaVs: there are discrepancies between 1 - 7 in the case of diachronic flow of experiences in the changing world. VsTradition: fails with indexical reference with "I", "here", "now". Problem: E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen in my liver": understanding is possible without knowledge of the truth value. >Understanding, >Truth value, >Truth conditions. Therefore meaning unequal truth value (VsFrege) - what is meant by the formation of a sentence is not some objective feature or thing in the world that is accessible to everyone. >Meaning, >Meaning/Frege, >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Propositions | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 409f Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. >Indexicality, >Index words. New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. >Opacity, >Substitutability. Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. Cf. >He/He himself. Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". >de re. Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. >Quantification. Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). >Sugar trail example. --- I 455f Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. >Extra-Sense/Castaneda. Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul. VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states. People understand sentences but do not form beliefs. >Understanding, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. List of extra senses for everyone: too long. Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language. Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this". Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough. >Reference, >Sense. The same meaning cannot perform different references. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Propositions | Plantinga | Cresswell II 168 Def Propositions/Plantinga: propositions are no linguistic entities for Plantinga. Cf. >Thought content, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Mental states, >Thinking, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking, cf. >Intensions, >Propositional attitudes. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Ramsey Sentence | Pauen | Pauen I 131 Ramsey sentence/Pauen: assume a theory defining a series of theoretical terms of mental states m1 ... mn as "pain", "joy", "sadness" ... by reference to stimuli i1, ... ip and reactions o1 ... oq. The theory would thus have the form: T (M1. .. mn, i1 ... ip, o1 ... oq) - as Ramsey sentence we get, by combining all the propositions of the theory by conjunctions, makung up a single sentence. E.g. Ramsey sentence for the pain is: e x1 ... xn [T (x1. .. xn, i1 ... ip, o1 ... oq) & y has x2] - i.e. "a system y if and only if in the state x2 there are states in this system, which occupy the causal roles described in the theory T and y is in the second of these states" - avoids mentalistic terms. >Theoretical terms, >Reference, >Mentalism, >Mental states, >Mental objects, >Belief objects, >Thought objects, >Pain. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Rylean Ancestors | Sellars | I 81ff Def Rylean ancestors/Sellars: language community with a primitive language, vocabulary for public properties of public objects, conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification and especially the subjunctive conditional. Moreover, there is vagueness and openness. Intersubjectivity/SellarsVs: thesis: that an intersubjective language must be a Rylean language. >Intersubjectivity. Carnap: the resources for an intersubjective language can be known from the formal logic. SellarsVsCarnap. Sellars pro Ryle: thoughts are a short form for hypothetical and mixed categorical-hypothetical statements about behavior. >Terminology/Ryle. I 93 Def Rylean Language/Sellars: a behaviorist language that is limited to the non-theoretical vocabulary of a behaviorist psychology. - (s) So nothing unobservable). >Behaviorism. I 105f Rylean Language/Rylean ancestors/Sellars: actual declaration, new language - more than just code: conceptual framework of public objects in space and time. - Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them. (Individual things have no antecedent objects of thought). Cf. >Thought objects. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
Thinking | Peacocke | Dum I 112 "Philosophy of thoughts"/Evans/Peacocke: Evans thesis: the language has no longer the basic position, - It deals with the problem of what it means to have a thought, and with the structure of thought and its components. What does it mean that a thought is about a subject of one kind or another? What does it mean to grasp a concept? What makes a term a component of a thought? >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Belief objects. I 115 DummettVsEvans: dangerous to reverse the priority of language over the idea (risk of psychologism, when thoughts are subjective and incommunicable). >Psychologism, >Analytic philosophy/Dummett, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language, cf. >Animal language, >Animals. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Thoughts | Peacocke | I 129/130 Thoughts/Frege/Peacocke: Conditions for having a thought: i) the truth conditions must not be dependent on anything >Truth conditions. ((s) Otherwise the fuel gauge would have thoughts.) >Fuel gauge example. ii) Content must be indepented of propositional attitudes. >Content, >Propositional attitudes, >Thought objects, >Belief objects. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Thoughts | Perry | Frank I 395f Thought is not the same as content: it may be that I now believe that it is a nice day today, but tomorrow do not think that it was nice yesterday, another thought, same content. - Then the thought is not the informational content. >Content, >Informational Content, >Information. Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Thoughts | Prior | I 3 Object of thought/Prior: a) Ryle: "accusative of belief": the proposition b) what we think of something, e.g. grass c) what we think about it. Predicate: predicares are is not "about". >"About", >Predicates, >Predication, >Intentionality, >Propositions, >Thinking, >Content. I 130 Thinking/object/Prior: one can know very well what it means to think of X without knowing whether X exists - even a third party can know what it is, that Y thinks of X without knowing whether X exists. >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Non-existence, >Reference. Dilemma: a) thinking constitutes a relation between X and Y, but not if X does not exist. >Relation theory. b) thinking is the same, regardless of whether the object exists or not (Anscombe). >E. Anscombe. Prior: one has to be abandoned, but which one? |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Truth | Ramsey | III 67 Truth/Ramsey: we cannot distinguish truth from falsehood if we only know what the word "true" means - true: we use the word a) for mental states b) for statements c) for "propositions" (as objects of belief). >Propositions, >Belief objects, >Thought objects. III 68 Truth/Ramsey/(s): Truth is not a property of sentences, but of meanings of sentences - (ultimately states of consciousness). >Sentences, >Utterances, >Meaning/Intending, >Speaker Intention, >Speaker Meaning, >Mental States, >Beliefs, >Beliefs. III 70 Truth/Ramsey: does not have to be well-founded or comprehensive. For example, true belief: the name of the Prime Minister starts with B - that is correct, even if false belief that Lord Birkenhead is the Prime Minister. Problem: the propositional reference of beliefs can be arbitrarily complex. We must avoid a list of truth definition for all individually - Solution: formalization: "p": a variable sentence - "A", "B": variable words (terms). Def true/Ramsey/logical form/Russell: B is true ⇔ (Ep)(B is a belief that p & p). Vs: Problem: "p" does not seem to contain a verb, but it should - Wrong solution: "is true" to add: circular. III 71 Solution/Ramsey. In reality, "p" contains a verb: e.g. "A is B". III 73 Truth/Ramsey. Example 1. the earth is round. 2. it is true that the earth is round, are equivalent, but 1 does not involve the idea of truth. Cf. >Redundancy theory. III 74 Truth without reference/Ramsey: Example "Belief at 10 o'clock": such a belief cannot yet be called true or false. >Sentences, >Statements. III 75 Truth/Ramsey: truth must be defined by reference, not vice versa. >Reference, >Truth definition. III 77 There cannot be any other kind of reference for true or false beliefs. Otherwise the future would be readable, from example "False reference" on tomorrow's rain. Therefore reference is simple, even if not unanalysable. Truth and reference are not independent expressions. >Simplicity, >Analysis, >Basic concepts. Truth must be defined by reference, not vice versa. >Dependence. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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Millikan, R. | Brandom Vs Millikan, R. | Millikan I 109 Subject/Predicate/Illustration/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of propositions I 110 depict the world and the way logical predicates do this. 1. because one can replace predicates by other predicates e.g. "...swims" by "...flies" they are not to be regarded as objects for a long time yet. (BrandomVsMillikan/(s): Differentiation of frame and insertion "gap"). 2. Question: do predicates have to correspond to universals if we treat them like substances? In any case, we do not have to look at them as individual things, but as tradition as thought objects or as possibilities. Universal/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature? Predicates/Millikan: any simple predicate must reflect a variability historically rooted in nature ((s) >disjunctive). Complex predicates/Millikan: they should also reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things. Property/Type/Millikan: have only one settlement area: that is nature itself. I 111 3. Relation/Property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in nature in the same way as their identity or selfhood is! (see part IV below). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Reid, Th. | Anscombe Vs Reid, Th. | Prior I 124 Thought Object/Anscombe: (like Reid, like Findlay): Intentionality should be treated as what it is "and not as another thing". AnscombeVsReid: sensory object, perceptual object: is closer to thinking than in Reid. I 126 Intentionality/Uncertainty/Mental Objects/Anscombe: 2. Property: their "indeterminacy": For example, I can think of a man without thinking of a man of a certain size, but I cannot hit a man without striking a man of a certain size. Because there is no man with indeterminate size (but as a thought object). 3. Property: (Like Findlay, VsReid): When I think of a certain man, it is possible that not every true description of him is one under which I think of him. (>DavidsonVsHume). (E.g. >Quine, Tullius, Cicero). Example Anscombe: someone thinks his father is a deer. Father: "material object" (of aiming!). For example, a tribe worships a god: material object: nothing but a piece of wood. Intentional object: God. N.B.: perhaps the "father" was only a dark spot in front of the foliage, but the dark spot was really there! Hallucination/Prior: does not provide identification! ((s) Not public). Intentionality/Thought Objects/Anscombe: gives a warning even here. Example: One cannot say: "They worship nothing"! That would imply that no sentence of the form: "They worship that so and so " (description) is true. But only: "What they worship is nothing". (de re, de dicto). |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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