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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attitudes and Behavior | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 31 Attitudes and behavior/psychological theories: are attitudes and action related? LaPiere’s 1934 study(1) was widely interpreted as showing that attitudes do not always predict behavior. LaPiere found a strong divergence in the rejection of strangers depending on whether he asked hotels for rooms in writing or spoke in person at hotels accompanied by Chinese. Alan Wicker (1969)(2) reviewed 42 experimental studies and found that the average correlation between attitudes and behaviour was only very low (r ≈ .15). On this basis, he concluded that ‘taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviours than that attitudes will be closely related to actions’ (1969(2): 65). At the same time, however, other researchers maintained that attitudes did predict behaviour and sought to understand the weak relations identified in the literature. Some researchers highlighted methodological issues related to the measurement of attitudes and behaviour. More specifically, researchers argued that there was no simple attitude–behaviour relationship and that in order to predict behaviour accurately it is necessary to take other variables into account. The most dominant of these ‘other variables’ approaches are the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975(3)) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991)(4). According to both these theories, the most immediate determinant of behaviour is a person’s intention to engage in that behaviour. Intention, in turn, is determined by attitudes (i.e., the person’s evaluation of the target behaviour), subjective norms (i.e., the person’s perception that others would approve of the behaviour), and, in the theory of planned behaviour, Haslam I 32 perceived behavioural control (i.e., the person’s perception that the behaviour is under his or her control). See meta-analyses by Albarracin et al., 2001(5); Armitage and Conner, 2001(6); Hagger et al., 2002(7)). Attitudes correlate well with intentions (the average correlation, r, ranges between .45 and .60). The same is true for correlations between subjective norms and intentions (.34 < r < .42), and between perceived behavioural control and intentions (.35 < r < .46). Indeed, overall, in combination, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control turn out to be very good predictors of intentions (.63 < r < .71). Furthermore, Sheeran (2002)(8) observes that intentions are themselves good predictors of behaviour (average r = .53). Scheme: Attitude/Subjective norm/Perceived behavioral control > Intention > Behavior (With an additional direct influence of perceived behavioral control on behavior). Haslam 33 VsLaPiere: LaPiere’s study (>Attitudes and behavior/LaPiere) was criticized for several reasons: First, there is the issue of the six-month interval between the two assessment points. Practically, we have no way of knowing whether the same individual responded to both the face-to-face request for service and the questionnaire request. (Schwarz 1978)(9). Other researchers have argued that the two measures of ‘attitude’ that LaPiere administered did not actually address the same attitude object. In particular, Ajzen and colleagues (1970)(10) note that a different result might have been obtained if the verbal attitude measure more accurately reflected the behaviour of interest. Haslam I 34 People who hold negative attitudes towards particular groups may be reluctant to express these attitudes in their public behaviour because they also adhere to widely held norms of tolerance or politeness. Haslam I 35 VsLaPiere: LaPiere (1934)(1) assessed behavior and then attitudes rather than assessing attitudes and the behavior. Had LaPiere been interested in testing whether attitudes predict behaviour, then this would constitute a serious limitation to his work. Haslam I 36 VsLaPiere: LaPiere believed that one could only truly assess attitudes by looking at individuals’ behaviour because verbal and behavioural responses to an attitude object arise from a single ‘acquired behavioural disposition’ (Campbell, 1963(11): 97). In these terms, attitudes and behaviour are seen to be formally rather than causally related – that is, they are related because they are reflections of the same underlying state, not because one leads to the other. Contemporary social psychologists tend to conceptualize attitudes as evaluative dispositions (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)(12), and this conceptualization has driven, and continues to drive, the way in which attitudes are measured. >Attitudes/psychological theories. 1. LaPiere, R.T. (1934) ‘Attitudes versus actions’, Social Forces, 13: 230–7. 2. Wicker, A.W. (1969) ‘Attitudes versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioural responses to attitude objects’, Journal of Social Issues, 25: 41–78. 3. Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975) Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 4. Ajzen, I. (1991) ‘The theory of planned behaviour’, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 50: 179–211. 5. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 6. Armitage, C.J. and Conner, M. (2001) ‘Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-analytic review’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 40: 471–99. 7. Hagger, M.S., Chatzisarantis, N.L.D. and Biddle, S.J.H. (2002) ‘A meta-analytic review of the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour in physical activity: Predictive validity and the contribution of additional variables’, Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 24: 3–32. 8. Sheeran, P. (2002) ‘Intention–behaviour relations: A conceptual and empirical review’, European Review of Social Psychology, 12: 1–36. 9. Schwartz, S. (1978) ‘Temporal stability as a moderator of the attitude–behaviour relationship’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36: 715–24. 10. Ajzen, I., Darroch, R.K., Fishbein, M. and Hornik, J.A. (1970) ‘Looking backward revisited: A reply to Deutscher’, The American Sociologist, 5: 267–73. 11. Campbell, D.T. (1963) ‘Social attitudes and other acquired behavioural dispositions’, in S. Koch (ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. 6. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 94–172. 12. Eagly, A.H. and Chaiken, S. (1993) The Psychology of Attitudes. Belmont, CA: Thomson. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Awareness | Chalmers | I 225 Attention/Awareness/Alertness/Consciousness/Chalmers: Attention is the psychological correlate to (phenomenal) awareness. Original definition: a state in which certain information is available for linguistic reports and behavioral control. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness. New: Instead of possible verbal reactions, we have to assume something more general: global control. This is always given when linguistic reports are possible. >Information, >Statements. I 226 Information: can also be unconscious here. We also want to take into account persons with limited abilities and animals and be able to attribute attention to them. >Knowledge, >Thinking, >World/Thinking, >Animals, >Animal language. I 228 Blindsight/Chalmers: (Humphrey 1992 1, Weiskrantz 1992 2, Cowey and Stoerig 1992 3) suggest that phenomenal experience is a game in these cases. >Experience. 1. N. Humphrey, A History of Mind. Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness, New York 1992. 2. L. Weiskrantz, Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications. Oxford 1986. 3. A. Cowey, P. Stoerig, Reflections on Bilndsight, in: D. Milner and M. Rugg, (Eds) The Neuropsychology of Consciousness, London 1992. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Bridge Laws | Chalmers | I 107 Bridge Laws/Explanation/Awareness/Chalmers: The fact that consciousness accompanies a given physical process is an additional fact, it is not explainable by telling the physical facts. >Explanation, >Causal explanation. I 107 Bridge laws/Bridge principles/Chalmers: can they help in the explanation of consciousness? No, they are not reductive themselves. And the fact that we need them would just show again that consciousness cannot be explained reductively. >Consciousness, >Reduction, cf. >Reductionism. Physical Facts: nothing I've said here implies, incidentally, that the physical side would be irrelevant to consciousness! Perhaps they can also help to understand the structure of consciousness: patterns of similarity and dissimilarity of experiences. >Experience, >Similarity. I 108 VsChalmers: one could argue that bridge laws are always involved when it comes to higher and lower-level phenomena. In such cases, these bridge principles are not additional facts about the world. >Phenomena, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Facts. 1. ChalmersVsVs: We can refute this with arguments that come from the domain of twins and possible worlds with an identical physical structure: it is inconceivable that a being which physically resembles me would not be alive, yet it does not follow logically that it has an awareness, too. >Twin Earth, >Possible Worlds, >Consciousness, >Zombies. 2. ChalmersVsVs: There is no "inverted life" as there are inverted spectra. 3. If one has all the physical facts, one has also all biological ones. 4. With regard to life, there is no epistemic asymmetry. >Asymmetry/Chalmers, >Asymmetry/Avramides. 5. Life is - unlike consciousness - analysable in functional terms. >Life, >Functions, >Analysis/Chalmers. I 237 Bridge Principles/Chalmers: Between physical processes and experience can serve as a criterion for the presence of consciousness in a system. The bridge principles are then an epistemic lever, which, however, cannot be tested. >Experience. Bridge principles are not conclusions themselves from experiments. They preceed them and control them. >Experiments. Cognition/Consciousness/Chalmers: according to my proposal, there is a coherence between these two and for this we need bridge principles: here the accessibility to global control. >Cognition. The most common bridge principle is the possibility to report as a criterion for experience. Experience is conscious when you can report on it. Problem: experience without language in animals. Solution: behavioral control, Logothetis and sound (1989) 1. >Animals, >Animal language. 1. N. Logothetis and J. D. Schallk, Neuronal correlates of subjective visual perception, Science 245, 1989: pp 761-63. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | Block | II 458 Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (p-consciousness/terminology) and "access-consciousness" (a-consciousness). Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept) Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): p-consciousness Prerequisite for a-consciousness. Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious. II 524 Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request. This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control. II 530 Access-consciousness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. ((s) Part or basis as a counterpart). II 531 Def p-consciousness/phenomenal consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! p-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to p-consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points. II 535 Def a-consciousness/access consciousness/Block: a state is a-conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering 2) is available for rational control of actions 3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p-conscious). p-consciousness and a-consciousness interact: Background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck. Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other. Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action. p-consciousness/Block: p-consciousness is not functional! It is about sensations. a-consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes". >Propositional attitudes. Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain. Summary: p-consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be a-consciousness. II 555 Consciousness/Dennett: 1) Cultural construct! 2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects. BlockVsDennett: Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product. Also probably not the a-consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept. Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one. II 568 Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness). |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| I, Ego, Self | Mead | Habermas IV 66 I/Self/Mead/Habermas: the transition from symbolically mediated to normatively regulated interaction not only enables a change to modally differentiated communication. It does not only mean the formation of a social world, but also the symbolic structuring of motives for action. From the perspective of socialization, this side of the socialization process presents itself as the formation of an identity. Mead: treats identity formation as a relationship between the "Me" and the "I". Me: the perspective from which the child, taking the expectations of the generalized other in the opposite, builds up a system of inner behavioral controls. Thus, on the path of internalizing social roles, a super-ego structure is formed. I/Mead: we react to this as I. (1) Habermas IV 67 I/Mead: Mead understands the "I" as the generalized ability to find creative solutions for situations where something like the self-realization of the person is at stake.(2) Habermas: according to this, the "I" is both the motor and governor of an individualization that can only be achieved through socialization. >Socialization. Habermas IV 94 I/Mead/Habermas: "The separation of "I" and "Me" is not fiction, they are not identical, since the I is never completely calculable. The "Me" calls for an "I" when we fulfil obligations...but the I is always a little different from what the situation itself demands (...) Together they form a personality as it appears in the social experience (...) The self is essentially a social process consisting of these two different phases. Without these two phases there would be no conscious responsibility and also no new experiences". (3) >Self. 1.G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 217 2.Ibid p. 248 3. Ibid. p. 221 |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Identity | Mead | Habermas IV 66 Identity/Mead/Habermas: the transition from symbolically mediated to normatively regulated interaction does not only enable a change to modally differentiated communication. It means not only the construction of a social world, but also the symbolic structuring of motives for action. From the perspective of socialization, this side of the socialization process presents itself as the formation of an identity. Mead: treats identity formation as a relationship between the "Me" and the "I". Me: the perspective from which the child, taking the expectations of the generalized other in the opposite, builds up a system of inner behavioral controls. Thus, on the path of internalizing social roles, a super-ego structure is formed. I/Mead: we react to this as I. (1) Habermas IV 67 I/Mead: Mead understands the "I" as the generalized ability to find creative solutions for situations where something like the self-realization of the person is at stake. (2) Habermas: according to this, the "I" is both the motor and governor of an individualization that can only be achieved through socialization. >I,Ego,Self, >Individuation, >Identity/Henrich, >Socialization. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, p. 217 2. Ebenda S. 248 |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Intentions | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 32 Intentions/Psychological theories: in relation to the problem of divergence between attitude and behavior researchers argued that there was no simple attitude–behaviour relationship and that in order to predict behaviour accurately it is necessary to take other variables into account. >Attitudes and behavior, >Attitudes. The most dominant of these ‘other variables’ approaches are the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975(1)) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991)(2). According to both these theories, the most immediate determinant of behaviour is a person’s intention to engage in that behaviour. >Behavior, >Decision-making processes. Intention, in turn, is determined by attitudes (i.e., the person’s evaluation of the target behaviour), subjective norms (i.e., the person’s perception that others would approve of the behaviour), and, in the theory of planned behaviour, Haslam I 32 perceived behavioural control (i.e., the person’s perception that the behaviour is under his or her control). >Social behavior, >Group behavior, >Norms. See meta-analyses by Albarracin et al., 2001(3); Armitage and Conner, 2001(4); Hagger et al., 2002(5)). Attitudes correlate well with intentions (the average correlation, r, ranges between .45 and .60). The same is true for correlations between subjective norms and intentions (.34 < r < .42), and between perceived behavioural control and intentions (.35 < r < .46). Indeed, overall, in combination, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control turn out to be very good predictors of intentions (.63 < r < .71). Furthermore, Sheeran (2002)(6) observes that intentions are themselves good predictors of behaviour (average r = .53). Scheme: Attitude/Subjective norm/Perceived behavioral control > Intention > Behavior (With an additional direct influence of perceived behavioral control on behavior). 1. Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975) Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 2. Ajzen, I. (1991) ‘The theory of planned behaviour’, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 50: 179–211. 3. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 4. Armitage, C.J. and Conner, M. (2001) ‘Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-analytic review’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 40: 471–99. 5. Hagger, M.S., Chatzisarantis, N.L.D. and Biddle, S.J.H. (2002) ‘A meta-analytic review of the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour in physical activity: Predictive validity and the contribution of additional variables’, Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 24: 3–32. 6. Sheeran, P. (2002) ‘Intention–behaviour relations: A conceptual and empirical review’, European Review of Social Psychology, 12: 1–36. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Jigsaw Method | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 221 Jigsaw method/psychological theories: in the years since Aronson’s experiments (>Jigsaw method/Aronson; Aronson et al. (1)) research on the jigsaw classroom has continued to yield positive results in terms of enhanced academic performance and esteem, particularly among students from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, as well as improved intergroup relations within the classroom and the school (Johnson et al., 2000(2); Tomcho and Foels, 2012(3)). >E. Aronson, >Learning, >Learning theory, >Socialization, >Group behavior. It has been applied successfully to diverse topical Haslam I 222 areas such as English as a second language (ESL; Ghaith and El-Malak, 2004(4)) and physics classes (Hänze and Berger, 2007)(5), and positive results have been replicated internationally (Walker and Crogan, 1998)(6). Robert Cialdini initiated an influential set of studies on social influence that drew on observations of strategies used by individuals, such as salespeople, in applied settings, identified underlying psychological principles, and tested these ideas in field settings (Cialdini, 2009)(7). Also, basic research on attitudes and behaviour, such as the work of Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980)(8) theory of reasoned action (…), significantly guided the development of effective interventions to change sexual practices and promote medical adherence to help curb the emerging international AIDS epidemic (Albarracin et al., 2001)(9). Ingroup relations: research on this topic was also inspired by the jigsaw classroom research; see Paluck and Green (2009)(10). Haslam I 223 Publications: Indeed, the earliest publications publications on the jigsaw classroom – also known as cooperative learning – were published in education journals rather than social psychological journals. Limitations of the method:/VsAronson: Aronson’s work spawned a new generation of cooperative learning interventions that were constructed to be effective in a wider range of classroom situations, not just under the specific circumstances associated with recently desegregated schools. These newer cooperation-based interventions were more generally effective educationally. So it was that when David Johnson and colleagues (2000)(2) ranked eight commonly used cooperation-based teaching methods in terms of their effectiveness the jigsaw classroom was only ranked sixth in terms of impact on educational achievement. By the early 1990s, 79% of US elementary schools used cooperative learning methods (Puma et al., 1993)(11) attests to the influence of the jigsaw classroom on policy implementation. >Jigsaw method/Social psychology. 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Johnson, D., Johnson, R.T. and Stanne, M.B. (2000) ‘Cooperative learning methods: A meta-analysis’, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Johnson50/publication/220040324_Cooperative_learning_methods_A_meta-analysis/links/00b4952b39d258145c000000.pdf (04.05. 2019)). 3. Tomcho, T.J. and Foels, R. (2012) ‘Meta-analysis of group learning activities: Empirically-based teaching recommendations’, Teaching of Psychology, 39: 159–69. 4. Ghaith, G. and El-Malak, M.A. (2004) ‘Effect of Jigsaw II on literal and higher-order EFL reading comprehension’, Educational Research and Evaluation, 10: 105–55. 5. Hänze, M. and Berger, R. (2007) ‘Cooperative learning, motivational effects, and student characteristics: An experimental study comparing cooperative learning and direct instruction in 12th grade physics classes“, Learning and instruction, 17: 29-41. 6. Walker, I. and Crogan, M. (1998) ‘Academic performance, prejudice, and the jigsaw classroom: New pieces to the puzzle’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 8: 381–93. 7. Cialdini, R.B. (2009) Influence: Science and Practice (5th edn). New York: Pearson. 8. Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M. (1980) Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior: Attitudes, Intentions, and Perceived Behavioral Control. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 9. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behavior as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’. Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 10. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67. 11. Puma M.J., Jones C.C., Rock D. and Fernandez, R. (1993) ‘Prospects: The congressionally mandated study of educational growth and opportunity’, Interim Report. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Language | Papineau | I 284 Purpose-means-thinking/language/animal/Papineau: (also as "Spandrille", side effect): Thesis: supposedly purpose-means-thinking emerged in a piggyback manner with language in the evolution. >Evolution, >Purposes, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking, >World/Thinking. PapineauVs: there is a danger of circularity: the primary biological purpose of language could be to increase the supply of information, but this would not help if the purpose-means-thinking had not already been developed. >Circular reasoning. Papineau: language could also have developed first as an instrument for passing on information. E.g. "A tiger approaches". >Information. I 285 Problem/Papineau: to explain the last step: what is the additional biological pressure that led to the language with which general information are reported? >Selection. A) If for the purpose of facilitating the purpose-means-thinking, then the purpose-means-thinking is not a side effect. It might have been language-dependent. B) If, on the other hand, language developed the ability to represent and process general information on an independent basis, there are further problems: 1. Why should language be selected for reporting and processing at all? 2. Fundamental: If language is independent of the purpose-means-thinking, then we need a story about how this independent ability is subsequently expanded as a side effect for the purpose-means-thinking. Cf. >Epiphenomenalism. The point is that the purpose-means-thinking must exercise a behavioral control. >Behavior, >Control mechanism, >Behavioral control, cf. >Self-regulation. I 286 The ability for general information processing must be able to add something to the set of dispositions: E.g.: "From now on only fish instead of meat", E.g. "At the next mailbox I will post the letter". Without this, the purpose-means-thinking makes no difference for our actions. >Information processing, cf. >Problem solving. I 286 Language/Purpose-Means-Thinking/Evolution/Papineau: Problem: how could a new way to change our behavior arise without a fundamental biological change? As a side effect? This is a pointless assumption. It must have brought the ability to develop new dispositions. >Evolution, >Dispositions. It is hard to imagine how this should have happened without biological selection. I 287 But this is not yet an argument for a wholly separate mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking in the human brain. Weaker: there could be some biological mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking, e.g. that the language has developed independently of the processing and reporting. Thereafter, further steps allow their outputs to influence the behavior. Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker. I 290 Language/Evolution/Generality/Papineau: previously I distinguished the language for special facts from one for general facts. >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. Perhaps the former has developed for communication, and the latter for the purpose-means-thinking. >Communication. Or language for general facts has evolved under the co-evolutionary pressure of purpose-means-thinking and communication. Presentation/figurative/Papineau: how could the results of the figurative representation gain the power to influence the already existing structures of the control of the action? >Imagination, >Thinking without language. I 291 Perhaps from imitation of complex action sequences of others. >Imitation. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
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