Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 253 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abortion | Thomson | Singer I 132 Abortion/J. J. Thomson/P. Singer: Thought experiment: Imagine that you should be connected to the blood circulation of a seriously ill, famous violinist for 9 months in order to save his life. After that, your help is no longer needed. All the music lovers of the whole world are watching. Thomson: When you wake up in the hospital (kidnapped by music lovers to help the violinist) and find yourself in this situation, you are not morally obliged to let the violinist use your body. It may be a generosity on your part - but it is not morally wrong to reject it.(1) Singer: Thomson's conclusion does not depend on the fact that the violinist came into his circumstances involuntarily. Thomson also expressly states that the violinist has a right to life, but this right does not include the right to use another body, even if one dies without this help. Singer: the parallel to rape is obvious. Singer I 133 For the sake of the argument, we assume that the embryo is considered a fully developed human being. Question: can Thomson's argument be extended to cases of pregnancy that are not based on rape? This depends on whether the theory behind it is well-founded. For example, could I force my favorite movie star to save my life? Thomson/Singer: it does not say that although I have a right to life, I would always be forced to take the best path or to do what would have the most pleasant consequences. Solution/Thomson: instead, it accepts a system of rules and obligations that allows us to justify our actions regardless of their consequences. Cf. >Consequentialism, >Deontology. P. SingerVsThomson/UtilitarianismVsThomson, J. J./Singer, P: in the case of the violinist, the utilitarianism would reject Thomson's theory. Singer I 308 In this way, utilitarianism would also reject Thomson's position on abortion. >Utilitarianism, >Preference utilitarianism. 1. Judith J. Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion" in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971. |
ThomsonJF I James F. Thomson "A Note on Truth", Analysis 9, (1949), pp. 67-72 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 ThomsonJJ I Judith J. Thomson Goodness and Advice Princeton 2003 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Absolutism | Hobbes | Höffe I 228 Absolutism/Hobbes/Höffe: The reason leading to civil war in early modern times, the competing claims to absoluteness of religious confessions and political authorities, has often enough appeared since the 20th century as an exclusive claim of political confessions. Consequently, the closer form of Hobbes' philosophy of state, its absolutism, proves to be counterproductive even today. HöffeVsHobbes: For people to be able to be sure of their lives, they certainly need a state order. In contrast to Hobbes, however, human existence is threatened not only in the stateless state of anarchy, but also in the latent or acutely despotic situation of an omnipotent state power: the absolutist sovereign is not suitable for the guiding idea of the political. >Society, >State, >Freedom, >Individuals, >Tyranny, >Liberalism. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Abstinence Theory | Rothbard | Rothbard II 137 Abstinence Theory/interest/Rothbard: If profit were perhaps related to risk, what then accounts for the long-run ‘interest’ component of business profits? The dominant explanation for long-run interest in British economics soon became the abstinence theory of interest. The first presentation of time as the determinant of interest came from a theory related but superior to abstinence: Samuel Bailey's pioneering time-preference theory. Bailey's discussion came in the course of his brilliant demolition of Ricardo's labour theory of value and his championing of an alternative utility theory. Bailey begins his discussion of time and value by noting that if one commodity takes more time than another for its production, even using the same amount of capital and labour, its value will be greater. Ricardo: While Ricardo admits a problem here, James Mill in his Elements of Political Economy indefatigably asserts that time, being ‘a mere abstract word’, could not possibly add to anything's value. VsAbstinence theory: VsMill, James: Rebutting Mill, Bailey points out that ‘every creation of value’ implies a ‘mental operation’ - in short, a subjective analysis of value. Given a particular pleasure, Bailey went on, ‘We generally prefer a present pleasure or enjoyment to a distant one’ – in short, the omnipresent fact of time-preference for human life. >Time-preference. Rothbard II 138 Nassau William Senior: But the locus classicus of the abstinence theory was the lectures of Nassau W. Senior. It is true that they were not published until 1836, when they were published as the Outline of the Science of Political Economy (and also as the article on ‘Political Economy’ for the Encyclopedia Metropolitana), but they were delivered earlier as lectures at Oxford in 1827-28. Senior pointed out that savings and the creation of capital necessarily involve a painful present sacrifice, an abstinence from immediate consumption, which would only be incurred in expectation of an offsetting reward. Unfortunately, Senior lacked the concept of time-preference, so he was fuzzy about the specific motivation that would lead people to prefer present to future consumption. But he came to very similar conclusions, relating the degree of abstinence-pain (or, as the Austrians would later put it, time-preference for the present over the future) to ‘the least civilized’ peoples and the ‘worst educated’ classes, who are generally ‘the most improvident, and consequently the least abstinent’. >Capital/Senior. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Action Theory | Weber | Habermas III 378 Action Theory/Communicative Action/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: since Weber assumes a monological model of action, "social action" cannot be explained by the concept of meaning. It is based on the concept of purposive action and must extend it by two provisions to explain social interaction: a) Orientation towards the behaviour of other subjects b) The reflective relationship between the orientations of several interaction participants. >Purposive action, >Purpose rationality, >Action, >Interaction, >Cooperation. Habermas III 379 Act/Action/Weber/Habermas: Weber distinguishes between procedural rational value rational emotional and traditional action. Weber therefore does not start with the social relationship. >Value rationality, >Rationality, cf. >Rationalization. Habermas III 380 Purpose rational action/Weber: the subjective sense here extends to: Means, purposes, values, consequences Value rational action: on means, purposes, values Emotional action: on means and purposes Traditional action: only on the means. Cf. >Purpose-means-rationality, >Purposes, >Goals, >Values, cf. >Consequentialism. Habermas III 381 Habermas: "Inofficial version" of Weber's theory of action ((s) this is a position not explicitly represented by Weber, which could, however, be deduced from his texts): here mechanisms of coordination of action are distinguished, depending on whether only interests or also social agreement are taken as a basis. (1) >Action Theory/Habermas. 1.Vgl. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S.246f. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Aesthetics | Hamann | Gadamer I 94 Aesthetics/Hamann/Gadamer: Hamann's attempt(1) is distinguished by the fact that it really goes back to Kant's transcendental intention and thus breaks down the one-sided standard of the art of experience. By working out the aesthetic moment evenly wherever it is present, special forms for specific purposes, such as the monumental art Gadamer I 95 or poster art, are given their aesthetic value. But here, too, Hamann holds on to the task of aesthetic differentiation. For he distinguishes in them the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic references in which it is located, just as we can also speak outside the experience of art of someone behaving aesthetically. The problem of aesthetics is thus given back its full breadth and the transcendental question is restored, which had been abandoned by art's point of view and its divorce from beautiful appearance and harsh reality. The aesthetic experience is indifferent to whether its object is real or not, whether the scene is the stage or life. GadamerVsHamann: But Hamann's attempt now fails at the opposite point: at the concept of art, which he consequently pushes out of the realm of the aesthetic to such an extent that it coincides with virtuosity(2). Here the "aesthetic distinction" is taken to the extreme. It also abstracts from art. The starting point for Hamann's basic aesthetic concept is the "intrinsic importance of perception". This concept apparently says the same thing as Kant's doctrine of the purposeful agreement with the state of our cognitive faculty in general. >Aesthetic Perception/Hamann. 1. Richard Hamann, Ästhetik, 1921 2. Richard Hamann, Kunst und Können, Logos, 1933 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aggregate Capital | Economic Theories | Harcourt I 155 Aggregate capital/Economic theories/Harcourt: (…) once heterogeneity of capital goods is introduced, the parables based on jelly no longer necessarily apply. ((s) Here the (neoclassical) „parables“ again:) Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Harcourt I 156 In particular, it may no longer be argued that r equals the marginal product of 'capital' (even in an equilibrium situation), nor may the distribution of income be deduced from a knowledge of the elasticity of the FpF envelope alone. >Elasticity. Furthermore, we are now unable in general to start from the FpF envelope and derive an *as if, well-behaved, production function from it. This has led some writers to look elsewhere than to the concept and properties of an aggregate production function ('as if or real) and marginal productivity concepts to explain the distribution of income (…). Harcourt I 157 The backlash to this argument has been the contention that the existence or not of an aggregate production function (in the sense of a unique relationship between value capital per head and output per head) and marginal productivity relations in distribution theory are not one and the same thing, as Champernowne [1953-4](1) showed long ago. Bliss [1968b](2), for example - but he is only the leading species of a large genus - argues that if we assume equilibrium (a most important proviso) and price-taking, cost-minimizing, profit-maximizing behaviour under perfectly competitive conditions in linear models, factors as a matter of logic must receive their marginal products, suitably defined, even though an aggregate production function may not be shown to exist. The key points of the argument are two: 1) first, that we impose strict equilibrium assumptions; 2) secondly, that businessmen are profit-maximizers and price-takers. A subsidiary point is that in linear models, marginal products at points (corners) may only be defined as lying within a range that is given by the partial derivatives that lie on either side of them. Factors/revenues/costs: Within this range of indeterminancy, it is obvious that if any factor was not paid the value of its marginal product, a change in output consequent upon using more or less of it would add more to (or subtract less from) revenues than to (from) costs, so violating the assumptions that profits are maximized and that the economy is at equilibrium. (That the economy may not in fact get to an equilibrium position even if one can be shown to exist, that these relationships do not apply in out-of-equilibrium positions and that the real world is usually in the latter state, no one would deny.) Solow: Solow makes the same point as Bliss in several of his papers cited earlier, Solow [1962a(3), 1963b(4)] and Solow, Tobin, von Weizsacker, and Yaari [1966](5), where typical marginal productivity results are obtained without any reference to aggregate capital - or its marginal product. His latest statement may be found in his reply [1970(6)] to Pasinetti [1969](7). Having stated that he does not hold 'a peculiar version of "marginal-productivity" theory' - 'peculiar because it seems to insist (as a matter of principle, not of convenience) on aggregating the whole stock of capital into one number, and because it means by marginal productivity the derivative of net output with respect to the value of this stock of capital' (Solow [1970](6), p. 424) - he concludes his article as follows: Harcourt I 158 „. . . nobody is trying to slip over on [Pasinetti] a theory according to which the rate of profits is higher or lower according to whether the existing 'quantity of capital' is lower or higher, and as such represents a general technical property of the existing 'quantity of capital'. That is just what neoclassical capital theory in its full generality can do without.“ (pp. 427-8.) Garegnani/Pasinetti: Garegnani [1966(8), 1970a(9), 1970b](10) and Pasinetti [1969(7), 1970(12)] in particular, have come back strongly on this one (no suggestion of reswitching is implied). Garegnani points out that, in their formulation of marginal productivity theory, not all the neoclassical economists (early, late, or neo-neo) were either groping for or using an aggregate production function which could be interpreted 'as if it behaved like a well-behaved, one-commodity one. Thus its destruction both at an economy and at an industry level (which he demonstrates in his paper [1970a](10)) is not a conclusive refutation of the marginal productivity theory of value and distribution. 'Expressing the conditions of production of a commodity in terms of a production function with "capital" as a factor is a feature of only some versions of the traditional theory . . .' (Garegnani [1970a](10), p. 422.) He mentions Marshall and J. B. Clark 'who thought that the principle of substitution, drawn from a reformulation of the Malthusian theory of rent in terms of homogeneous land and "intensive" margins, could be applied without modification to labour and "capital".' But this transition foundered on the fact that 'capital' cannot be measured in a physical unit but must be measured as a value, one which, moreover, changes whenever r and w change, i.e. one which is not independent of distribution. Moreover, it changes in such a way as not to allow us to say that the marginal products of 'capital' and labour are equal to their respective rates of remuneration. All is not yet safe, because, Garegnani argues, 'traditional theory - reduced to its core as the explanation of distribution in terms of demand and supply-rests in fact on a single premise', what Pasinetti [1969](12), p. 519, calls 'an unobtrusive postulate': „This premise is that any change of system brought about by a fall in r must increase the ratio of 'capital' to labour in the production of the commodity: 'capital' being the value of the physical capital in terms of some unit of consumption goods, a value which is thought to measure the consumption given up or postponed in order to bring that physical capital into existence.“ (Pasinetti [1969](12), S. 519) >Capital demand/Garegnani. 1. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, S. 112-35 2. Bliss, C. J. [1968b] 'Rates of Return in a Linear Model', Cambridge: unpublished paper. 3. Solow, R. M. [1962a] 'Substitution and Fixed Proportions in the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxrx, pp. 207-18. 4. Solow, R. M. [1963b] 'Heterogeneous Capital and Smooth Production Functions: An Experimental Study', Econometrica, xxxi, pp. 623-45. 5. Solow, R. M., Tobin, J., von Weizsacker, C. C. and Yaari, M. [1966] 'Neoclassical Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 79-115. 6. Solow, R. M [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 7. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 8. Garegnani, P. [1966] 'Switching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics,LXXX, pp. 554-67. 9. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 10. Garegnani, P. [1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 11. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Animals | Heidegger | Gadamer I 267 Animal/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) the being of children or animals - in contrast to that ideal of "innocence" - [remains] an ontological problem (...)(1). In any case, their way of being is not in the sense and historicity that Heidegger claims for human existence. One may also ask oneself what it means that human existence in turn is carried by something extra-historical, something natural. Gadamer I 268 If one really wants to break the spell of idealistic speculation, one obviously must not conceive the way of being of "life" from self-consciousness. >Life, >Self-consciousness, >Consciousness. When Heidegger undertook to revise his transcendental-philosophical self-conception of "Being and Time", he consequently had to look at the problem of life in a new way. Thus he spoke in the Humanism- Letter of the abyss that gapes between human and animal(2). There is no doubt that Heidegger's own transcendental foundation of fundamental ontology in the analysis of Dasein (>Dasein/Heidegger) did not yet allow a positive development of the way of being of life. But all this does not change the fact that the meaning of what Heidegger calls existential is fundamentally missed if one thinks that one can play off a certain existential ideal, whatever it may be, against the existential ideal of "concern". >Terminology/Heidegger. 1. Das war die Frage O. Beckers (Vgl. Dasein und Dawesen, Pfullingen 1963, S. 67ff. 2. Über den Humanismus, Bern 1947, S. 69. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Argumentation | Habermas | III 38 Argumentation/Habermas: We call argumentation the type of speech in which the participants thematize controversial claims of validity and try to redeem or criticize them with arguments. An argument contains reasons that are systematically linked with the claim to validity of a problematic statement. The "strength" of an argument is measured, in a given context, by the validity of the reasons; this is shown, among other things, by whether an argument can convince the participants of a discourse, i. e. can motivate them to accept the respective claim to validity. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Justification, >Reasons, >Persuasion. Rationality: against this background, can be judged according to how a subject behaves as a participant in argumentation. Rational statements can also be improved due to their critical nature. >Rationality. III 45 The logic of argumentation does not refer to the formal, consequent connections between semantic units (sentences) but to internal, also non-deductive relations between pragmatic units (speech acts) from which arguments are composed. III 47 Three aspects: 1. resembles an argumentation of a communication under ideal conditions, which represents a situation to be characterized as an ideal speech situation. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. General symmetry conditions must be reconstructed here, which every competent speaker must presume to be sufficiently fulfilled. III 48 2. The procedure is a specially regulated form of interaction of the division of labour between the proponent and the opponent. A claim of validity is discussed here in a situation that is relieved of the pressure of action and experience, in which claims are examined with reasons and only with reasons. Cf. >Dialogical logic. 3. Argumentation is designed to produce valid arguments. Definition Argument/Habermas: Arguments are those means by means of which intersubjective recognition for the initially hypothetically raised claim of validity of a proponent can be achieved and thus opinion can be transformed into knowledge. See Arguments/Toulmin, >Intersubjectivity. III 55 HabermasVsKlein, Wolfgang (1): Klein wants to draw up the logic of argumentation as a nomological theory and must therefore assimilate rules to causal regularities and reasons to causes. III 56 HabermasVs: on the other hand, with Toulmin we have to allow a plurality of claims of validity without at the same time denying the critical, space-time and social restrictions transcending sense of validity. >St. Toulmin. III 57 We cannot judge the strength of arguments (...) if we do not understand the meaning of the respective action. (2) III 339 Argumentation/Reason/Justification/Habermas: Arguments or reasons have at least these in common that they, and only they, can unfold the power of rational motivation under the communicative prerequisites of a cooperative examination of hypothetical claims to validity. However, in typical forms of argumentation (depending on the claim to validity of propositional truth, normative correctness, truthfulness and authenticity). >Truthfulness. 1. W. Klein, Argumentation und Argument in. Z. f. Litwiss. u. Ling. H, 38/39, 1980, p. 49f. 2. St. Toulmin, R. Rieke, A. Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, N.Y. 1979, p.15. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Art | Kant | Gadamer I 52 Art/Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Judging according to an ideal of beauty is (...), as Kant says, not merely a judgment of taste. Gadamer I 53 (...) to be pleasing as a work of art, something must be more than just tasteful and pleasing at the same time. Note: GadamerVsAdorno/GadamerVsJauß: Unfortunately, the Kantian analysis of taste judgement is still being misused for art theory, even by T. W. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory( (Schriften Band 7, S. 22ff.) or by H. R. Jauss (Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt 1982, S. 29f.). When just now actual beauty seemed to exclude any fixation by concepts of purpose (>Beauty/Kant), then here, conversely, even a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc. is said to have no ideal, "because these purposes are not sufficiently defined and fixed by their concept, consequently the usefulness is almost as free as with vague beauty". Only of the human form, precisely because it alone is capable of a beauty fixed by a concept of purpose, is there an ideal of beauty! This doctrine, established by Winckelmann and Lessing(1), gains a kind of key position in Kant's foundation of aesthetics. For it is precisely this thesis that shows how little a formal aesthetic of taste (arabesque aesthetics) corresponds to the Kantian idea. >Beauty/Kant. Gadamer I 55 Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely with this classicist distinction between the normal idea and the ideal of beauty that Kant destroys the basis from which the aesthetic of perfection finds its incomparably unique beauty in the perfect meaningfulness of all being. Only now can "art" become an autonomous phenomenon. Its task is no longer the representation of the ideals of nature - but the self-encounter of man in nature and the human-historical world. Kant's proof that the beautiful is pleasing without concept does not prevent us from being fully interested only in the beautiful that appeals to us in a meaningful way. It is precisely the recognition of the concept-lessness ["Begrifflosigkeit"] of taste that leads beyond the aesthetics of mere taste.(2) >Art/Hegel, >Interest/Art/Kant, >Artwork/Kant, >Nature/Kant. Gadamer I 58 Def Art/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's definition of art as the "beautiful idea of a thing" takes this into account, insofar as even the ugly is beautiful in the representation by art. GadamerVsKant: Nevertheless, the true essence of art comes out badly in its contrast to the beauty of nature. If the concept of a thing were only represented beautifully, then this would again only be a matter of a "school-suitable" representation and would only fulfil the indispensable condition of all beauty. KantVsVs: Art, especially according to Kant, is more than a "beautiful representation of a thing"; it is a representation of aesthetic ideas, i.e. of something that is beyond all concept. The concept of genius wants to formulate this insight of Kant. >Genius/Kant. 1. Lessing, Entwürfe zum Laokoon Nr. 20 b; in Lessings Sämtl. Schriften ed. Lach- mann, 1886ff., Bd. 14, S. 415. 2. Kant explicitly says that "the judgement according to an ideal of beauty is not a is merely the judgement of taste".(K. d. U. S. 61). Vgl. dazu meinen Aufsatz Gadamer, Die Stellung der Poesie im Hegel'schen System der Künste( Hegel-Studien 21, (1986). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Assertibility | Lewis | V 139 Assertibility/conditional/semantics/: we assume assertibility instead of truth because of the probability. However, assertibility is best gained through truth conditions plus a sincerity condition. Adams: the other way around: there are truth conditions not for the entire conditional, but individually for antecedent and consequent "plus a rule that assertibility of the indicative conditional is possible with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given by the antecedent. Lewis pro (>Adams Conditional). LewisVsAdams: means something different: he calls this "indicative conditional" what Lewis calls a "probability conditional". Adams: the probability of conditionals is not equal to the probability of truth. AdamsVsLewis: probability of conditionals does not obey the standard laws of probability. Solution/Lewis: if we do not mention truth, probability of conditionals obeys the standard laws. Then the indicative conditional has no truth value and no truth conditions, i.e. Boolean connections, but no truth-functional ones (not Truth Functional). V 142 Assertibility/conditional/Lewis: assertibility should correspond to the subjective probability (Lewis pro Grice). The assertibility is reduced by falsehood or trivial being-true. This leads to conditional probability. From this we have to deduct the measured assertibility from the probability of the truth of the truth-functional conditional (horseshoe, ⊃). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Assertions | Geach | I 256 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code style": misleading that p does not have to be asserted! - E.g. "if p, then q; but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: Thesis: antecedent and consequent are no assertions. >Antecedent/consequent. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. >Conditional, >Statement. Ryle: here, the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p" as the "code style" suggests, but rather an "inference ticket", a "license for the inference": "p, therefore q". >Logical connectives, >Inference, cf. >Implication, >Conclusion. Solution/Geach: it is about propositions, not assertions. >Propositions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Assertions | Grice | III 89 Assertion/to say/Grice: the simultaneous positioning of two allegations does not claim a sequence. "Consequently" indicates an entailment, but it does not state it. >Assertibility, >Entailment. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Austrian School | Mises | Rothbard IV 13 Austrian School/MisesVsBöhm-Bawerk/Mises/Rothbard: (…) Mises came to realize that Böhm-Bawerk and the older Austrians had not gone far enough: that they had not pushed their analysis as far as it could go and that consequently important lacunae still remained in Austrian School economics. Money: In particular, the major lacuna perceived by Mises was the analysis of money. It is true that the Austrians had solved the analysis of relative prices, for consumer goods as well as for all the factors of production. But money, from the time of the classical economists, had always been in a separate box, not subjected to the analysis covering the rest of the economic system. For both the older Austrians and for the other neo-classicists in Europe and America, this disjunction continued, and money and the “price level” were increasingly being analyzed totally apart from the rest of the market economy. We are now reaping the unfortunate fruits of this grievous split in the current disjunction between “micro” and “macro” economics.(1) Microeconomics: “Microeconomics” is at least roughly grounded on the actions of individual consumers and producers; but when economists come to money, we are suddenly plunged into a never-never land of unreal aggregates: of money, “price levels,” “national product,” and spending. Cut off from a firm basis in individual action, “macro-economics” has leaped from one tissue of fallacies to the next. Irving Fisher: In Mises’s day in the first decades of the twentieth century, this misguided separation was already developing apace in the work of the American, Irving Fisher, who built elaborate theories of “price levels” and “velocities” with no grounding in individual action and with no attempt to integrate these theories into the sound body of neo-classical “micro” analysis. >Microeconomics, >Macroeconomics, >Neoclassical Economics. 1. Ludwig von Mises. 1912. The Theory of Money and Credit (Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, Translated by H.E. Batson in 1934; reprinted with “Monetary Reconstruction» (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953). Reprinted by the Foundation for Economic Education, 1971; reprinted with an Introduction by Murray N. Rothbard, Liberty Press Liberty Classics, 1989. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Authors/Titles | Consequentialism | Consequentialism |
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| Axioms | Waismann | I 15 ff Axioms/Euclid/Waismann: Among the axioms of Euclid, two groups can be distinguished: A) General size axioms e.g. "Two sizes equal to a third are also equal to each other. The part is smaller than the whole, equal added to equal results in equals". B) The actual geometrical axioms 1. Each point can be connected to every point by a straight line. 2. Every straight line can be extended beyond each of its endpoints. 3. A circle can be drawn around each point with any radius. 4. All right angles are equal to each other. 5. If two straight lines are intersected by a third such that the angles on the inner side of the two lines to one side of the third give a sum less than two right angles, then the two straight lines intersect, sufficiently extended, on the mentioned side. ("Parallel Axiom") I 16 Parallel axiom/Euclid: in history, the parallel axiom (5th axiom Euclid's) was always controversial, and because of the complexity one tried to derive contradictions, without success. On the contrary, it could be proved that E.g. similar figures would be impossible if it were not true, or E.g. there should be a largest triangle in the plane. E.g. Lambert: without the parallel axiom there would be a length unit distinguished by nature. As absurd as all these results sound, they are not a logical contradiction (this time in favor of the axiom). Bolanyi and Lobatschefsky then developed consequently conclusions from the omission of the 5th axiom and did not encounter contradictions but a new geometry! Non-Euclidean Geometry. New problem: how do we know that assumptions will not lead to contradictions in the future? For the first time the problem of non-contradiction in mathematics arose. A direct proof of the consistency is obviously not an option, for this, infinite conclusion chains would have to be considered. Non-Euclidean Geometry: Felix Klein found in 1870 that the whole system of non-Euclidean geometry can be mapped to the Euclidean, so that any contradiction in the new system would lead to a contradiction in the old. According to a prescription, a concept of Euclidean geometry is assigned to each concept of non-Euclidean geometry as its image, just as every sentence of one theory corresponds to a sentence of the other,... >Geometry. I 17 ...so that both theories have the same logical form. Within the Euclidean geometry a "model" has been established for the non-Euclidean geometry. E.g. We imagine in the Euclidean plane a fixed circle k. We now make a lexicon: By a point we mean a point inside k By a straight line we understand the piece of a straight line that runs within k. Additional provisions regulate the possibility that an arbitrary distance on a straight line can be copied infinitely often without leaving the circle. This distance, measured according to the Euclidean scale, is, of course, always smaller. A being that moves from the center of the circle to the periphery becomes smaller and smaller and can never reach the circle's edge (but not Zeno). >Zeno, >About Zeno. Proof: This vivid reflection has nothing to do with the power of proof. For a geometry thus defined, all Euclidean axioms apply except for the fifth. Fig. I 17 Circle, with rays from a point in the inner of the circle to the outside, somewhere secant. The rays fall into two classes that cut the secant, and those who do not. These two classes are separated by two straight lines (also rays), which we call "parallels", because they intersect the secant (with which they at first glance form a triangle) only non-euclidically at infinity. All the theorems of Euclidean geometry, with the exception of the fifth axiom, are in the circle consistent. I 18 But this is not an absolute consistency-proof. If there was a contradiction in the Euclidean geometry, the latter would also have to be applied in the theory of the real numbers. >Proofs, >Provability. >Real numbers. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Beginning | Hegel | Bubner I 61 Beginning/End/Hegel/Bubner: just like in a symphony the first note does not say that it is the beginning of a piece of music, the last note does not show that it is the end. The determination of the beginning and the end of a systematically developed context always requires external mediation. In Hegel, this mediation is done by Method Reflection. >Mediation, >Mediation/Hegel. The first insight concerns the unfoundedness of the assumption made in each case. I 62 External Mediation/Hegel: for him the method reflection plays this role. The assumption made in each case is unfounded! Last chapter of logic: What is still to be considered here is not a content as such, but the general nature of its form, that is the method. >Logic/Hegel. Content/Form/Generality/Hegel/Bubner: However, throughout the entire logic, Hegel emphasized that the content cannot be separated from the form. >Form/Content. The general nature of form must not be simply the form in which the concept with its manifold provisions was the content of the logical sciences. >Generality, >Generalization. On the contrary, the general formality is rather one which befits all those forms, under which the unified concept allowed for the topic of logic. ((s) Form of thought: is befitting). This generality then applies to only one position outside the logic. Cf. >Circularity, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Perspective. An overview of the whole becomes possible as soon as the absolute immanence is abandoned, and you know that nothing is left out. >Wholes, >Totality. Beginning/End/Hegel: consequently, the beginning and the conclusion can only be established by a mediation which creates a transition between the systematic connection and the exterior. I 63 Method/Science/Hegel/Bubner: where science is practiced there is no question of method, because the "thing itself" guarantees the law of action. (Unlike with the symphony). ((s) Thus there is no "inner necessity" of art for Hegel as Kandinsky propagated.) >Science, >Art/Hegel. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Bonds | Rothbard | Rothbard III 445 Bonds/Rothbard: Long-term I.O.U.‘s can also be bought and sold in a market. Most of these long-term debts are called bonds, and they are traded in a flourishing and flexible bond market. The fixed rate of interest at the beginning is unimportant. Thus, a 100-ounce long-term loan is contracted at 5-percent fixed interest, or five ounces per year. If the general interest rate rises, people will tend to sell their bonds, which have been yielding them only 5 percent, and invest their money elsewhere—either in whole firms, stocks of firms, or short-term loans. This increased willingness to sell bonds—an increased supply schedule—depresses the price of the bond until the interest yield to the buyer is the same as the general interest rate elsewhere. Thus, if the general interest rate goes up from 5 percent to 10 percent, the price of the bond will fall from 100 to 50, so that the fixed annual return of 5 will provide an interest yield of 10 percent. The important element in bond investment is not the original interest rate (the fixed return on the so-called “par value” of the bond), but the interest yield on the market price of the bond. A general lowering of the interest rate will, on the other hand, raise the bond prices above par and push yield below 5 percent. As the day of redemption of the bond draws near, the market price of the bond will, of course, rapidly approach the par value, until it finally sells at par, since the amount redeemed will be the original par value, or principal, of the loan. Rothbard III 446 It is clear that, in the ERE, the interest rates for all periods of time will be equal. >Evenly Rotating economy. The tendency toward such equality at any one time, however, has been disputed in the case of expected future changes in the interest rate. Although surprisingly little attention has been devoted to this subject, the prevailing theory is that, on the loan market, there will not be a tendency toward equalization if a change in interest rates is expected in the near future.(1) Suppose that the interest rate is now 5 percent, and it is expected to remain there. Then the interest rate on loans of all maturities will be the same, 5 percent. Suppose, however, that the interest rate is expected to increase steadily in the near future, say to increase each year by 1 percent until it will be 9 percent four years from now. In that case, since the short-run rate (say the rate of interest on loans lasting one year or less) is expected to increase over the next four-year period, then the present long-run rate for that period - e.g., the present rate for five-year loans - will be an average of the expected future short-run rates during this period. Thus, the present rate on five-year loans will be 5 percent plus 6 percent plus 7 percent plus 8 percent plus 9 percent divided by 5, equaling 7 percent. The long-run rate will be the average of short-run rates over the relevant period. Consequently, the long-run rates will be proportionately higher than short-run rates when the latter are expected to increase, and lower when the latter are expected to be lower. RothbardVs: This, however, is a completely question-begging theory. Suppose that a rise in interest rates is expected; why should this be simply confined to a rise in the short-term rates? Why should not the expectation be equally applicable to long-term rates so that they rise as well?(2) Rothbard III 447 Problem: The theory rests on the quite untenable assumption that it sets out to prove, namely, that there is no tendency for short-term and long-term rates to be equal. The assumption that a change in the interest rate will take place only over the short term is completely unproved and goes against our demonstration that the short-run and long-run rates tend to move together. Changing interest rates: What happens if the interest rate is expected to change in the near future? In that case, there will be a similar process as in the case of speculation in commodities. Speculators will bid up the interest rate in the expectation of an imminent rise or bid down the rate in expectation of a fall. Clearly, the earlier a rise or fall is expected to take place, the greater proportionately will be the effect on the speculators, and the greater impact it will have on current movement in the rate. In the case of a commodity, stocks would be withheld in expectation of a rise in demand and price, and then released, thereby effecting a more rapid transition to the price eventually established by underlying supply-and-demand forces. Similarly, in this case money will tend to be withheld from investments and held in cash balances until the rate reaches its expected higher level, or dislodged from cash balances and added to investment if the rate of interest is expected to be lower. 1. Thus, cf. Friedrich A. Lutz, “The Structure of Interest Rates” in Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution, pp. 499–532. 2. Since the writing of this text, Professor Luckett has published a critique of Lutz similar in part. See Dudley G. Luckett, “Professor Lutz and the Structure of Interest Rates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1959, pp. 131-44. Also see J.M. Culbertson, “The Term Structure of Interest Rates,” ibid., November, 1957, pp. 485-517. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Business | Rothbard | Rothbard III 426 Business/Rothbard: In a jointly owned firm, instead of each individual capitalist’s making his own investments and making all his own investment and production decisions, various individuals pool their money capital in one organization, or business firm, and jointly make decisions on the investment of their joint savings. >Saving, >Investments, >Production/Rothbard, >Production structure/Rothbard. The firm then purchases the land, labor, and capital-goods factors, and later sells the product to consumers or to lower-order capitalists. >Market/Rothbard, >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Capital goods/Rothbard. Thus, the firm is the joint owner of the factor services and particularly of the product as it is produced and becomes ready for sale. The firm is the product-owner until the product is sold for money. Rothbard III 427 The individuals who contributed their saved capital to the firm are the joint owners, successively, of: (a) the initial money capital – the pooled savings, (b) the services of the factors, (c) the product of the factors, and (d) the money obtained from the sale of the product. Evenly Rotating Economy: In the evenly rotating economy, their ownership of assets follows this same step-by-step pattern, period after period, without change. In a jointly owned firm, in actual practice, the variety of productive assets owned by the firm is large. >Capital structure/Rothbard, >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard. Production: Any one firm is usually engaged in various production processes, each one involving a different period of time, and is likely to be engaged in different stages of each process at any one particular time. A firm is likely to be producing so that ist output is continuous and so that it makes sales of new units of the product every day. It is obvious, then, that if the firm keeps continually in business, its operations at any one time will be a mixture of investment and sale of product. Its assets at any one time will be a mixture of cash about to be invested, factors just bought, hardly begun products, and money just received from the sale of products. The result is that, to the superficial, it looks as if the firm is an automatically continuing thing and as if the production is somehow timeless and instantaneous, ensuing immediately after the factor input. RothbardVs: Actually, of course, this idea is completely unfounded. There is no automatic continuity of investment and production. Production is continued because the owners are continually making decisions to proceed; if they did not think it profitable to do so, they could and do at any point alter, curtail, or totally cease operations and investments. And production takes time from initial investment to final product. >Time/Rothbard. Types of assets owned by any firm: Rothbard III 428 A. Money B. Productive Assets (Melange of factors, such as land and capital goods, embodying future services (…); various stages of product; the completed product.) On this entire package of assets, a monetary evaluation is placed by the market. Owners: On what principle do the individual owners mutually apportion their shares of the assets? It will almost always be the case that every individual is vitally interested in knowing his share of the joint assets, and consequently firms are established in such a way that the principle of apportionment is known to all the owners. Problem: (…) [here] there [is] no principle whereby any man’s share of ownership could be distinguished from that of anyone else. A whole group of people worked, contributed their land, etc., to the production process, and there [is] no way except simple bargaining by which the income from the sale of the product could be apportioned among them. >Loans/Rothbard, >Credit/Rothbard, >Interest rates/Rothbard. Rothbard III 601 Business/business income/Rothbard: (…) is there a function which owning businessmen perform, (…) beyond the advancing of capital or possible managerial work? The answer is that they do execute another function for which they cannot hire other factors. It goes beyond the simple capital-advancing function, (…). For want of a better term, it may be called the decision-makingfunction, or the ownership function. The decision-making factor is necessarily specific to each firm. We cannot call what it earns a wage because it can never be hired, and thus it does not earn an implicit wage. We may therefore call the income of this factor, the "rent of decision-making ability.“(1) Rothbard III 602 Granting that the "supramarginal" (i.e., the Iower-cost) firms in an industry are earning rents of decision-making ability for their owners, what of the "marginal" firms in the industry, the "high-cost" firms just barely in business? Are their owners earning rents of decision-making ability? Many economists have believed that these marginal firms earn no such income, just as they have believed that the marginal land earns zero rent. We have seen, however, that the marginal land earns some rent, even if "close to" zero. Similarly, the marginal firm earns some rent of decision-making ability. We can never say quantitatively how much it will be, only that it will be less than the corresponding "decision rents" of the supramarginal firms. Rothbard III 603 The belief that marginal firms earn no decision rents whatever seems to stem from two errors: (1) the assumption of mathematical continuity, so that successive points blend together; and (2) the assumption that "rent" is basically differential and therefore that the most inferior working land or firm must earn zero to establish the differential. We have seen, however, that rents are "absolute" - the earnings and marginal value products of factors. >Rent/Rothbard. There is no necessity, therefore, for the poorest factor to earn zero, as we can see when we realize that wages are a subdivision of rents and that there is clearly no one making a zero wage. And so neither does the marginal firm earn a decision rent of zero. Rothbard III 609 Vertical integration: Vertical integration occurs when a firm produces not only at one stage of production, but over two or more stages. For example, a firm becomes so large that it buys labor, land, and capital goods of the fifth order, then works on these capital goods, producing other capital goods of the fourth order. In another plant, it then works on the fourth-order capital goods until they become third-order capital goods. It then sells the third-order product. Vertical integration, of course, lengthens the production period for any firm, i.e., it lengthens the time before the firm can recoup its investment in the production process. The interest return then covers the time fort wo or more stages rather than one.(2) Rothbard III 612 External market: if there were no market for a product, and all of its exchanges were internal, there would be no way for a firm or for anyone else to determine a price for the good. A firm can estimate an implicit price when an external market exists; but when a market is absent, the good can have no price, whether implicit or explicit. Any figure could be only an arbitrary symbol. Not being able to calculate a price, the firm could not rationally allocate factors and resources from one stage to another. (…) complete vertical integration for a capital-good product can never be established on the free market (above the primitive level). For every capital good, there must be a definite market in which firms buy and sell that good. It is obvious that this economic law sets a definite maximum to the relative size of any particular firm on the free market.(3) >Coase theorem, >Free market/Rothbard. Because of this law, firms cannot merge or cartelize for complete vertical integration of stages or products. Because of this law, there can never be One Big Cartel over the whole economy or mergers until One Big Firm owns all the productive assets in the economy. The force of this law multiplies as the area of the economy increases and as islands of noncalculable chaos swell to the proportions of masses and continents. As the area of incalculability increases, the degrees of irrationality, misallocation, loss, impoverishment, etc., become greater. Under one owner or one cartel for the whole productive system, there would be no possible areas of calculation at all, and therefore complete economic chaos would prevail.(4) Rothbard III 644 Business/size/Rothbard: We do not know, and economics cannot tell us, the optimum size of a firm in any given industry. The optimum size depends on the concrete technological conditions of each situation, as well as on the state of consumer demand in relation to the given supply ofvarious factors in this and in other industries. >Economy/Rothbard. Rothbard III 645 The large firm will be able to purchase heavily capitalized machinery and to finance better organized marketing and distributing outlets. All this is quite clear when thousands of individuals pool their capital into the establishment of a steel firm. But why may it not be equally true when several small steel firms merge into one large company? It might be replied that in the latter merger, particularly in the case of a cartel, joint action is taken, not to increase efficiency, but solely to increase income by restricting sales. Yet there is no way that an outside observer can distinguish between a “restrictive” and an efficiency-increasing operation. >Mergers/Rothbard, >Cartels/Rothbard. Rothbard III 646 Technology/investments: (…) technological factors in production can never be considered in a vacuum. Technological knowledge tells us of a whole host of alternatives that are open to us. But the crucial questions - in what to invest? how much? what production method to choose? - can be answered only by economic, i.e., by financial considerations. >Observation/Rothbard. 1. For an interesting contribution to the theory of business income, though not coinciding with the one presented here, see Harrod, “Theory of Profit” in Economic Essays, pp. 190–95. Also see Friedman, “Survey of the Empirical Evidence on Economies of Scale: Comment.” 2. Vertical integration, we might note, tends to reduce the demand for money (to “turn over” at various stages) and thereby to lower the purchasing power of the monetary unit. For the effect of vertical integration on the analysis of investment and the production structure, see Hayek, Prices and Production, 2nd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935. Reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley, 1967. pp. 62–68. 3. On the size of a firm, see the challenging article by R.H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” in George J. Stigler and Kenneth E. Boulding, eds., Readings in Price Theory (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 1952), pp. 331–51. In an illuminating passage Coase pointed out that State “planning is imposed on industry, while firms arise voluntarily because they represent a more efficient method of organizing production. In a competitive system there is an ‘optimum’ amount of planning.” Ibid., p. 335 n. 4. Capital goods are stressed here because they are the product for which the calculability problem becomes important. Consumers’ goods per se are no problem, since there are always many consumers buying goods, and therefore consumers’ goods will always have a market. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Capital Market Theory | Neoclassical Economics | Mause I 224f Capital market theory/Neoclassics: thesis of the neoclassics: the current price of assets corresponds to the average of all expected future rates. Consequently, (...) the prevailing yield of bonds reflects all yield expectations of market participants. Neoclassical approaches assume that the circulation speed of money is largely stable or predictable. In this case, monetary policy impulses could have an unimpeded impact on the real sector of the economy. The stability of the circulation speed is justified by the theory of relative prices in the sense of Milton Friedman.(1) VsNeoclassicism see Monetary Policy/Keynesianism. 1. M. Friedman, The quantity theory of money: A restatement. In Studies in the quantity theory of money, Hrsg. Milton Friedman, 51– 67. Chicago 1956. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Carbon Taxation | Fankhauser | Fankhauser I 1 Carbon Taxation/EU/US/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Carbon taxation, in conjunction with other regulatory measures, could be an effective way of closing policy gaps in sectors that are not already covered by a functioning emissions trading system. In the EU, carbon taxes could play a role in reducing Fankhauser I 2 emissions outside the EU ETS [Emissions Trading System], where much of the future policy effort must lie, according to the European Environment Agency (2016)(1). In the United States, senior Republicans have laid out their arguments for a US $40 carbon tax in The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends (Baker III, Feldstein, Halstead, et al., 2017)(2). >Emissions Trading. A carbon tax is a relatively simple instrument to impose on the individual emitters, including the many smaller ones that dominate the non-ETS sectors and are less likely than large emitting facilities or sources to engage in carbon trading. According to the expertise collected by the World Bank, cap-and-trade systems—like the EU ETS—are best suited for industrial actors that have the capacity and skills to engage in the market actively (World Bank, 2016)(3). With their high transaction costs, such systems are less appealing for sectors with a large number of small emission sources, such as transportation and buildings (Goulder & Parry, 2008)(4). Economists advocate the use of carbon taxes because they provide the price incentive to reduce emissions without being technologically prescriptive, are simpler to administer, and do not draw on government budgets (Aldy & Stavins, 2012(5); Baranzini et al., 2017(6); Baumol & Oates, 1971(7); Goulder & Parry, 2008(4); Mankiw, 2009(8); Metcalf, 2009(9); Weitzman, 2015(10)). Fankhauser I 4 The required tax level is determined by the environmental objective and more specifically by the marginal costs of meeting a given emissions target (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(11). Fankhauser I 2 VsCarbon Taxation/VsCarbon Tax/Objections to Carbon Taxation/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Despite these advantages, carbon taxes are one of the least used climate policy instruments. Carbon tax proposals have been undone, sometimes at an advanced political stage, for example in Australia (in 2014), France (in 2000), Switzerland (in 2000 and 2015), and most recently in the United States in Washington State (in 2016). Objections to carbon taxation are often not about the introduction of the tax itself, but about its design (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006)(12) and the way relevant information is shared. Sociopsychological factors—such as perceived coerciveness, equity, and justice—all affect the extent to which voters accept different climate policy instruments (Drews & van den Bergh, 2015)(13). Factoring them into the design from the outset could make carbon tax legislation easier to pass. Opposition by vested interests has proved to be very effective in limiting public intervention in a wide range of environmental issues (Oates & Portney, 2003)(14), and their lobbying efforts can influence voters' views, preventing the passage, or even revoking the implementation of a carbon tax. Other studies, for instance by Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner (2004)(15), Van Asselt and Brewer (2010)(16), Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017)(17), and Neuhoff et al. (2015)(18), provide insights into how vested interests and other political economy aspects have affected the design of carbon pricing in recent times. Fankhauser I 3 Recognizing that there are variations in attitudes and perceptions across individuals, we identify five general reasons for aversion to carbon taxes that have been recurrently emphasized in the literature. 1. VsCarbon Taxation: The personal costs are perceived to be too high. A Swedish survey by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(19) found that people associate carbon taxes with higher personal costs, more than they do with alternative policy instruments. A discrete choice experiment by Alberini, Scasny, and Bigano (2016)(20) showed that Italians had a preference, among climate policy instruments, for subsidies over carbon taxes. Participants in a lab experiment by Heres, Kallbekken, and Galarraga (2015)(21) similarly expected higher payoffs from subsidies than from taxes, especially when there was uncertainty on how tax revenues would be “rebated.” Ex ante, individuals tend to overestimate the cost of an environmental tax, and underestimate its benefits (Carattini et al., 2018(22); Odeck & Bråthen, 2002(23); Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010(24)). The literature in social psychology also suggests that individuals prefer subsidies because they are perceived as less coercive than taxes. Taxes are “pushed” onto polluters, imposing a mandatory cost, while subsidies are seen as “pull” measures, which supposedly reward climate-friendly behavior (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012(25); Rosentrater et al., 2012(26); Steg et al., 2006(27)). 2. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes can be regressive. [Voters] perceive, rightly, that without counterbalancing measures carbon taxes may have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income households. These counterbalancing measures can, however, offset the adverse distributional effects of carbon taxes, and even make them progressive. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that alternative climate policy instruments such as subsidies for renewable energy can also have similar regressive effects and may not generate revenues to counter them (Baranzini et al., 2017)(28). 3. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes could damage the wider economy. This has been illustrated in Switzerland, where, in two different instances more than 10 years apart, concern about the potential competitiveness and employment effects of energy taxes contributed to their rejection in public ballots, even in the context of very limited unemployment (Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017(29); Thalmann, 2004(30)). While these concerns are partly justified, voters may tend to overestimate competitiveness and job effects. [This] may also result from specific information campaigns led by energy-intensive companies, as in the case of Australia (cf. Spash & Lo, 2012)(31). 4. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes are believed not to discourage high-carbon behavior (…) (Klok, Larsen, Dahl, & Hansen, 2006(32); Steg et al., 2006(27)). [Individuals] consider low-carbon subsidies to be a more powerful way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially if the cost of switching from consuming high-carbon goods to low-carbon goods is considered high. [They] believe that the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive goods is close to zero. The expectation that carbon taxes do not work is one of the main reasons for their rejection by people in surveys and real ballots (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(6); Carattini et al., 2017(29); Hsu, Walters, & Purgas, 2008(33); Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(34); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011(35)). Fankhauser I 4 5. VsCarbon Taxation: Governments may want to tax carbon to increase their revenues. [Individuals] assume—as a direct consequence of concern 4 above—that the purpose of introducing a carbon tax is not to reduce greenhouse gases but to increase government revenues (Klok et al., 2006)(32). Trust issues sometimes concern the specific environmental tax proposal under consideration, but they may also be broader, related to people's general view of tax policy or even to trust in the government itself (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(6); Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(36); Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007(37); Hammar & Jagers, 2006(38)). VsVs: Some of these perceptions are incorrect. There is evidence that carbon pricing does in fact reduce emissions (J. Andersson, 2015(39); Baranzini & Carattini, 2014(40); Martin, de Preux, & Wagner, 2014(41)) and has so far had a minimal impact on the wider economy, in terms of adversely affecting the competitiveness of domestic industry, at least in the presence of adjustments and specific measures tailored to support the most exposed firms (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017)(17). On the other hand, voters are right to suspect that governments would probably welcome the extra revenues. Indeed, its benign fiscal implications are often highlighted as one of the merits of a carbon tax (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(11). It is also the case that carbon taxes are often regressive; without counter measures they may affect poor households disproportionately (Gough, Abdallah, Johnson, Ryan Collins, & Smith, 2012(42); Metcalf, 2009(9); Speck, 1999(43); Sterner, 2011(44)). (…) the accuracy of public perceptions is less important than the fact that they are widely held and can hinder the adoption of otherwise desirable policies. People's attitudes to carbon taxes appear to be influenced more by the direct personal cost of the measure than by an appreciation of the environmental objective (Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry, 2011)(45). Consequently, the public acceptability of an environmental tax depends heavily on its policy stringency, since the proposed tax rate determines the direct costs to consumers. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. European Environment Agency (2016). Chapter 1. Overall progress towards the European Union's 20-20-20 climate and energy targets. In Trends and projections in Europe 2016—Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets (pp. 1–12). Brussels, Belgium: Author. 2. Baker, J. A. III, Feldstein, M., Halstead, T., Mankiw, N. G., Paulson, H. M. Jr., Schultz, G. P., … Walton, R. (2017). The conservative case for carbon dividends. Washington, DC: Climate Leadership Council. 3. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author. 4. Goulder, L. H., & Parry, I. W. H. (2008). Instrument choice in environmental policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(2), 152–174. 5. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience. The Journal of Environment and Development, 21(2), 152–180. 6. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227. 7. Baumol, W. J., & Oates, W. E. (1971). The use of standards and prices for protection of the environment. The Swedish Journal of Economics, 73(1), 42–54. 8. Mankiw, N. G. (2009). Smart taxes: An open invitation to join the Pigou club. Eastern Economic Journal, 35(1), 14–23. 9. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83. 10. Weitzman, M. L. (2015). Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly (NBER Working Paper No. 20925). Boston, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 11. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar. 12. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904. 13. Drews, S., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2015). What explains public support for climate policies: A review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 1–20. 14. Oates, W. E., & Portney, P. R. (2003). The political economy of environmental policy. In K.-G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (Eds.), Handbook of environmental economics (pp. 325–354). Elsevier Science B.V. 15. Hammar, H., Löfgren, A., & Sterner, T. (2004). Political economy obstacles to fuel taxation. The Energy Journal, 25(3), 1–17. 16. van Asselt, H., & Brewer, T. (2010). Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU. Energy Policy, 38(1), 42–51. 17. Dechezleprêtre, A., & Sato, M. (2017). The impacts of environmental regulations on competitiveness. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(2), 183–206. 18. Neuhoff, K., Ancygier, A., Ponssardet, J., Quirion, P., Sartor, O., Sato, M., & Schopp, A. (2015). Modernization and innovation in the materials sector: Lessons from steel and cement. Berlin, Germany: Climate Strategies and DIW Berlin. Retrieved from http://climatestrategies.org/publication/modernization-and-innovation-in-thematerials- sector-lessons-from-steel-and-cement/ 19. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237. 20. Alberini, A., Scasny, M., & Bigano, A. (2016). Policy vs individual heterogeneity in the benefits of climate change mitigation: Evidence from a stated-preference survey (FEEM Working Paper No. 80.2016). Milan, Italy: FEEM 21. Heres, D. R., Kallbekken, S., & Galarraga, I. (2015). The role of budgetary information in the preference for externality-correcting subsidies over taxes: A lab experiment on public support. Environmental and Resource Economics, 66(1), 1–15. 22. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., & Lalive, R. (2018). Is taxing waste a waste of time? Evidence from a supreme court decision. Ecological Economics, 148, 131–151. 23. Odeck, J., & Bråthen, S. (2002). Toll financing in Norway: The success, the failures and perspectives for the future. Transport Policy, 9(3), 253–260. 24. Schuitema, G., Steg, L., & Forward, S. (2010). Explaining differences in acceptability before and acceptance after the implementation of a congestion charge in Stockholm. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 44(2), 99–109. 25. de Groot, J. I. M., & Schuitema, G. (2012). How to make the unpopular popular? Policy characteristics, social norms and the acceptability of environmental policies. Environmental Science and Policy, 19–20, 100–107. 26. Rosentrater, L. D., Sælensminde, I., Ekström, F., Böhm, G., Bostrom, A., Hanss, D., & O'Connor, R. E. (2012). Efficacy trade-offs in individuals' support for climate change policies. Environment and Behavior, 45(8), 935–970. 27. Steg, L., Dreijerink, L., & Abrahamse, W. (2006). Why are energy policies acceptable and effective? Environment and Behavior, 38(1), 92–111. 28. Baranzini, A., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Carattini, S., Howarth, R. B., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017). Carbon pricing in climate policy: Seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations. WIREs Climate Change, 8(4), 1–17. 29. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128. 30. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217. 31. Spash, C. L., & Lo, A. Y. (2012). Australia's carbon tax: A sheep in wolf's clothing? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 23(1), 67–86. 32. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916. 33. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619. 34. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190. 35. Kallbekken, S., & Sælen, H. (2011). Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns. Energy Policy, 39(5), 2966–2973. 36. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929. 37. Dietz, T., Dan, A., & Shwom, R. (2007). Support for climate change policy: Social psychological and social structural influences. Rural Sociology, 72(2), 185–214. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144. 38. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625. 39. Andersson, J. (2015). Cars, carbon taxes and CO2 emissions (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 212/Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 238). London, England: London School of Economics and Political Science. 40. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2014). Taxation of emissions of greenhouse gases: The environmental impacts of carbon taxes. In B. Freedman (Ed.), Global environmental change (pp. 543–560). Heidelberg, Germany and New York, NY: Springer. 41. Martin, R., de Preux, L. B., & Wagner, U. J. (2014). The impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing: Evidence from microdata. Journal of Public Economics, 117, 1–14. 42. Gough, I., Abdallah, S., Johnson, V., Ryan Collins, J., & Smith, C. (2012). The distribution of total greenhouse gas emissions by households in the UK, and some implications for social policy. London, England: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion. 43. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667. 44. Sterner, T. (Ed.). (2011). Fuel taxes and the poor: The distributional effects of gasoline taxation and their implications for climate policy. Abingdon, England: Routledge. 45. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26. |
Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018 |
| Cartels | Rothbard | Rothbard III 636 Cartels/Rothbard: (…) is not monopolizing action a restriction of production, and is not this restriction a demonstrably antisocial act? Let us first take what would seem to be the worst possible case of such action: the actual destruction of part of a product by a cartel. This is done to take advantage of an inelastic demand curve and to raise the price to gain a greater monetary income for the whole group. >Elasticity, >Demand/Rothbard. We can visualize, for example, the case of a coffee cartel burning great quantities of coffee. In the first place, such actions will surely occur very seldom. Actual destruction of its product is clearly a highly wasteful act, even for the cartel; it is obvious that the factors of production which the growers had expended in producing the coffee have been spent in vain. Clearly, the production of the total quantity of coffee itself has proved to be an error, and the burning of coffee is only the aftermath and reflection of the error. Yet, because of the uncertainty of the future, errors are often made. Man could labor and invest for years in the production of a good which, it may turn out, consumers hardly want at all. If, for example, consumers' tastes had changed so that coffee would not be demanded by anyone, regardless of price, it would again have to be destroyed, with or without a cartel. Error is certainly unfortunate, but it cannot be considered immoral or antisocial; nobody aims deliberately at error. If coffee were a durable good, it is obvious that the cartel would not destroy it, but would store it for gradual future sale to consumers, thus earning income on the "surplus" coffee. >Durable goods/Rothbard, >Consumer goods/Rothbard. Rothbard III 637 Free market: The whole concept of "restricting production," then, is a fallacy when applied to the free market. In the real world of scarce resources in relation to possible ends, all production involves choice and the allocationof factors to serve the most highly valued ends. In Short, the production of any product is necessarily always "restricted." Such "restriction" follows simply from the universal scarcity of factors and the diminishing marginal utility of any one product. But then it is absurd to speak of "restriction" at all.(1) Rothbard: We cannot, then, say that the cartel has “restricted production.” Rothbard III 638 If there are anticartelists who disagree with this verdict and believe that the previous structure of production served the consumers better, they are always at perfect liberty to bid the land, labor, and capital factors away from the jungle-guide agencies and rubber producers, and themselves embark on the production of the allegedly “deficient” 40 million pounds of coffee. Since they are not doing so, they are hardly in a position to attack the existing coffee producers for not doing so. As Mises succinctly stated: „Certainly those engaged in the production of Steel are not responsible for the fact that other People did not likewise enter this field of production.... If somebody is to blame for the fact that the number of people who joined the voluntary civil defense organization is not larger, then it is not those who have already joined but those who have not.“ Rothbard III 640 Free market/Rothbard: Criticism of steel owners for not producing "enough" steel or of coffee growers for not producing "enough" coffee also implies the existence of a caste system, whereby a certain caste is permanently designated to produce Steel, another caste to grow coffee, etc. Only in such a caste society would such criticism make sense. Yet the free market is the reverse of the caste system; indeed, choice between alternatives implies mobility between alternatives, and this mobility obviously holds for entrepreneurs or lenders with money to invest in production. Rothbard III 642 VsCartels: A common argument holds that cartel action involves collusion. For one firm may achieve a "monopoly price" as a result of its natural abilities or consumer enthusiasm for its particular product, whereas a cartel of many firms allegedly involves "collusion" and "conspiracy." >Monopolies. RothbardVs: These expressions, however, are simply emotive terms designed to induce an unfavorable response. What is actually involved here is co-operation to increase the incomes of the producers. For what is the essence of a cartel action? Individual producers agree to pool their assets into a common lot, this single central organization to make the decisions on production and price policies for all the owners and then to allocate the monetary gain among them. But is this process not the same as any sort ofjoint partnership or theformation ofa Single corporation? What happens when a partnership or corporation is formed? >Corporations/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and, (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions. >Mergers/Rothbard. Rothbard III 651 Instability: Analysis demonstrates that a cartel is an inherently unstable form of operation. Ifthe joint pooling of assets in a common cause proves in the long run to be profitable for each of the individual members of the cartel, then they will act formally to merge into one large firm. The cartel then disappears in the merger. On the other hand, if the joint action proves unprofitable for one or more members, the dissatisfied firm or firms will break away from the cartel, and (…) any such independent action almost always destroys the cartel. The cartel form, therefore, is bound to be highly evanescent and unstable. Rothbard III 652 If the cartel does not break up from within, it is even more likely to do so from without. To the extent that it has earned unusual monopoly profits, outside firms and outside producers will enter the same field of production. Outsiders, in short, rush in to take advantage of the higher profits. Rothbard III 657 The problem of „The One Big Cartel“: (…) the free market placed definite limits on the size of the firm, i.e., the limits of calculability on the market ((s) see above III 612). In order to calculate the profits and losses of each branch, a firm must be able to refer its internal operations to external markets for each of the various factors and intermediate products. When any of these external markets disappears, because all are absorbed within the province of a single firm, calculability disappears, and there is no way for the firm rationally to allocate factors to that specific area. The more these limits are encroached upon, the greater and greater will be the sphere of irrationality, and the more diffcult it will be to avoid losses. One big cartel would not be able rationally to allocate producers' goods at all and hence could not avoid severe losses. Consequently, it could never really be established, and, if tried, would quickly break asunder. Rothbard III 660 Production factors: What about the factors? Could not their owners be exploited by the cartel? In the first place, the universal cartel, to be effective, would have to include owners of primary land; otherwise whatever gains they might have might be imputed to land. To put it in its strongest terms, then, could a universal cartel of all land and capital goods "exploit" laborers by systematically paying the latter less than their discounted marginal value products? Could not the members of the cartel agree to pay a very Iow sum to these workers? Ifthat happened, however, there would be created great opportunities for entrepreneurs either to spring up outside the cartel or to break away from the cartel and profit by hiring workers for a higher wage. This competition would have the double effect of (a) breaking up the universal cartel and (b) tending again to yield to the laborers their marginal product. As long as competition is free, unhampered by governmental restrictions, no universal cartel could either exploit labor or remain universal for any length of time.(3) >Monopolies/Rothbard. 1. In the words of Professor Mises: „That the production of a commodity p is not larger than it really is, is due to the fact that the complementary factors of production required for an expansion were employed for the production of other commodities. . . . Neither did the producers of p intentionally restrict the production of p. Every entrepreneur’s capital is limited; he employs it for those projects which, he expects, will, by filling the most urgent demand of the public, yield the highest profit. An entrepreneur at whose disposal are 100 units of capital employs, for instance, 50 units for the production of p and 50 units for the production of q. If both lines are profitable, it is odd to blame him for not having employed more, e.g., 75 units, for the production of p. He could increase the production of p only by curtailing correspondingly the production of q. But with regard to q the same fault could be found by the grumblers. If one blames the entrepreneur for not having produced more p, one must blame him also for not having produced more q. This means: one blames the entrepreneur for the fact that there is a scarcity of the factors of production and that the earth is not a land of Cockaigne.“ (Mises, Planning for Freedom, pp. 115–16) 2. Ibid. p. 115. 3. Cf. Mises, Human Action New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998., p. 592. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Causal Laws | Cartwright | I 10 Asymmetry: causal laws are asymmetrical: cause and effect cannot be interchanged. - By contrast, symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: asymmetries by explanation are not real. - There is no fact about what explains what. - CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: not sufficient E.g. malaria control: for distinguishing effective from ineffective strategies. >Association, >Symmetries. I 30 Causal Law/Causal Explanation/Cartwright: causal laws are not transitive - i.e. the causal chain does not have to be determined by a single causal law. >Transitivity. I 32 Causal Law/Cartwright: something that is always the case ((s) universal occurrence, universal fact, "permanence") cannot be consequent of a causal law. - ((s) this is a convention). - Alternatively: universal fact: Alternatively, it could be said that everything is the cause of a universal fact. - ((s) Def Universal Fact/Cartwright/(s): probability = 1.). I 36 Causal Laws/Cartwright: the reason why we need them for the characterization of effectiveness is that they pick out the right properties to which we apply our conditions. I 43 Effective Strategy/Cartwright: can only be found with assumption of causal laws. - Partition: the right one is the one that is determined by which causal laws exist - without causal laws it is impossible to pick out the right factors. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Citizenship | Gender Theory | Gaus I 281 Citizenship/Gender theory/Mottier: Much of feminist theory has focused on the absence of women from political theory. This theme was first addressed by authors such as Okin (1979)(1), Elshtain (1981)(2), Pateman (1983)(3) and Arlene Saxonhouse (1985(4); see also Mottier, Sgier and Ballmer-Cao, 2000)(5). Their pioneering work demonstrated that modern political theory neglects to address the subordinated position attributed to women in classical theories of democracy. The emergence of modern liberal democracy introduced a universalistic political discourse which claimed to be indifferent to gender or other identity differences. Citizenship/Tradition: Mainstream political theory consequently considers citizenship as a universal concept. Democratic rights of social and political participation apply to each citizen without regard for his or her race, religion or gender. FeminismVsTradition: Feminist authors have shown the central premises of universalistic conceptions of citizenship to be flawed due to gender bias. As the work of Vicky Randall (1998)(6), Ruth Lister (1997)(7) and Sylvia Walby (1994)(8) illustrates, women have been either excluded, or differentially included, in citizenship. WalbyVsTradition: Walby's historical analysis, for example, demonstrates the gendered nature of citizenship through a critical assessment of the work of T. H. Marshall (1950)(9), which is often taken to be the starting point for modern debates on the question (...). >Citizenship(Marshall. Citizenship/Marshall: According to Marshall, different types of citizenship developed successively, with civic rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. WalbyVsMarshall: Analysing the history of citizenship in the United Kingdom and the US, Walby questions Marshall's thesis. For example, up to the 1920s, in contrast to men, British and American women had not yet acquired the majority of civic and political rights. In addition, the political rights were acquired by women before the civic rights, contradicting Marhall's sequential model. In other words, as Walby demonstrates, the three types of citizenship rights described by Marshall have followed different historical trajectories for different social groups. The conception of a unique model of citizenship therefore reveals a gender bias which is also present in the work of later authors who built on Marshall's work, such as Turner and Mann. As Walby points out, these authors similarly put the emphasis on the importance of social class in the history of citizenship and the formation of the nation-state, but neglect other factors such as gender or race. Feminism: Feminist perspectives on citizenship diverge, however, as to the ways in which they conceptualize citizenship, the theoretical foundations of these conceptualizations, and the conclusions to be drawn from the questioning of the universality of citizenship. Perhaps most importantly, they diverge in their relationship to liberalist thought. There has been an important move over the last two decades within feminist theories of citizenship 'to recuperate the liberal project' (Squires, 1994a(10): 62). Authors such as Pateman (1989)(11), Susan James (1992)(12), Phillips (1993(13) and Mouffe (1992)(14) explore the affinities between liberal and feminist conceptions of citizenship. Feminist theorizations of political citizenship and the democratization of the public sphere have consequently been dominated by debates between liberal feminist theorists and their critics. Amongst the latter, maternalist and Marxist perspectives have been particularly prominent in the 1980s, but more recently the focus of debate has shifted to poststructuralist and postmodem critiques of liberal understandings of citizenship. 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1979) Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981) Public Man, Private Women: Women in Social and Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Pateman, Carole (1983) 'Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy'. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. London: Croom Helm, 281-303. 4. Saxonhouse, Arlene (1985) Women in the History of Political Thought. New York: Praeger. 5. Mottier, Véronique, Lea Sgier and Than-Huyen Ballmer-Cao (2000) 'Les rapports entre le genre et la politique'. In Thanh-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, Véronique Mottier and Lea Sgier, eds, Genre et politique: Débats et perspectives. Paris: Gallimard. 6. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. 7. Lister, Ruth (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 8. Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is citizenship gendered?' Sociology, 28 (2): 379-95. 9. Marshall, T. H. (1950) Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 10. Squires, Judith (1994a) 'Citizenship: androgynous or engendered participation'. Annuai,æ Suisse de Science Politique, 34: 51-62. 11. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 12. James, Susan (1992) 'The good-enough citizen: female citizenship and independence'. In G. Bock and S. James, eds, Beyond Equality and Difference. London: Routledge. 48-65. 13. Phillips, Anne (1993) Democracy and Difference. Cambridge: Polity. 14. Mouffe, Chantal (1992) 'Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics'. In Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds, Feminists Theorise the Political. New York: Routledge, 22-40. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Pateman | Gaus I 282 Citizenship/Pateman/Mottier: Pateman's critical rethinking of citizenship operates through a critique of theories of liberal democracy on the one hand and of theories of participatory democracy on the other. 'Feminism, liberalism and democracy (that is, a political order in which citizenship is universal, the right of each adult Gaus I 283 individual member of the community) share a common origin,' Pateman argues. >Feminism, >Liberalism, >Democracy. Femimnism, a general critique of social relationships of sexual domination and subordination and a vision of a sexually egalitarian future, like liberalism and democracy, emerges only when individualism, or the idea that individuals are by nature free and equal to each other, has developed as a universal theory of social organiza-tion.‘ (1989(1): 373ff) Similarly to Walby, Pateman (1983(2); 1989(1)) emphasizes the necessity for feminist theories of citizenship to rethink the links between the private and public spheres. She develops this argument through a rereading of classical and contemporary theories of democracy, in which citizenship is assumed to be universal. >Universalism. PatemanVsTradition: The problem with classical political theories of democracy is, in her view, that only individuals of male gender are considered to have individual rights and liberties. Social contract: Social contract theories such as those of Locke and Rousseau, for example, are founded on the subordination of women to men. As Pateman notes, contemporary democratic theory sees no contradiction between universal citizenship on the one hand and the exclusion of women from equal political participation, their relegation to the private sphere, and their subordination to men on the other. >Democratic theory. Liberalism: For theories of liberal democracy, social inequalities are in any case irrelevant to democratic citizenship. Such a view predominates in analyses of citizenship, including in those that recognize that democracy does not concern only the state, but also the organization of society (for example, Barber 1984)(3). Society: However, most authors continue to consider relations between men and women in society as part of private life, and consequently do not integrate a gender dimension in their theories. 1. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 2. Pateman, Carole (1983) 'Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy'. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. London: Croom Helm, 281-303. 3. Barber, Benjamin (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
PolPate I Carole Pateman Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change 1971 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Climate Change | Hooker | Singer I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. >Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism/David Lyons(1): Thesis: In such cases, Rule Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right.(2) >Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to utilitarianism. I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker 2000(3))): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics/Glover, J.) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 2. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 3. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000. |
Hooker I Brad Hooker Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality Oxford 2003 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Climate Change | Singer | I 217 Climate Change/Ethics/P. Singer: what we do to strangers in other communities far away today is much more serious than what we could have done to them if we had the habit of sending a group of fighters to their village. I 218 We can only combat climate change with global measures. What should the ethics on the basis of which we coordinate our actions look like? Natural Resources/Locke/P. Singer: from Locke's point of view, they can be exploited as long as there is enough and of the same quality for everyone. P. Singer: But we have now discovered that the absorption capacity of the atmosphere for greenhouse gases is limited. >J. Locke. I 220 Equal distribution: what can it look like? Principles/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles.(1) : Def Historical principle/Nozick: to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its story. Are the parties entitled to ownership on the basis of originally justified acquisition? >Public Goods, >Property. Def two-sided principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about the realization. See also Responsibility/Singer. I 224 Equal burden sharing/pollution/Singer, P: at a UN conference in 2009, Rwandan President Paul Kagame argued for equal per capita burden sharing in the elimination of environmental damage, as all people use the atmosphere to the same extent. Everything else is counterproductive. Sri Lanka made a similar proposal. Singer: this is the application of a time slice principle: Rwanda and Sri Lanka - like other developing countries - do well with it, because they consume less. It is better for them to forego the right to compensation towards industrialised countries. I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. Utilitarianism/David Lyons: (D. Lyons 1965.(3)): Thesis: In such cases, Rule-Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. >Utilitarianism. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right (>Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to Utilitarianism.(3) I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker,2000(4))): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics//Glover, J., >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974 2. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 3. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 4. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Cognitive Dissonance | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 53 Cognitive Dissonance/psychological theories: The research on dissonance theory in the decades following the two seminal studies produced a number of important conclusions, some consistent with the theory and some less so. In the original work, Festinger (1957)(1) had surmised that the key motivational factor that caused inconsistency to lead to attitude change was an aversive drive-like state that he labelled dissonance. >Cognitive dissonance/Festinger. At the time, he had no evidence for this assumption but it was the key factor that drove the predictions of the two classic studies discussed above, as well as many others. We now know that his guess was correct. We know this because (a) we can measure physiological changes (e.g., in skin conductance (SCR) and brain activity (EEG)) and the psychological discomfort that follow from advocating a position contrary to one’s attitudes (Croyle and Cooper, 1983(2); Elliot and Devine, 1994(3); Harmon-Jones, 1999(4); Losch and Cacioppo, 1990(5)); (b) we can increase dissonance by having participants ingest an arousing drug and decrease it with a sedative (Cooper et al., 1978)(6); and (c) we can eliminate attitude change following attitude–discrepant behaviour by having people misattribute their arousal to something other than their discrepant behaviour. For example, if people believed they were aroused from the side effects of a pill they had ingested rather than their discrepant behaviour, then attitude change did not occur (Zanna and Cooper, 1974)(7). Haslam I 54 VsFestinger: Linder and colleagues (1967)(8) showed that Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959)(9) induced compliance results only occur if people believe they had the choice to agree to make their counterattitudinal speech. >Experiment/Festinger. In addition, Cooper and Worchel (1970)(10) showed that making a counterattitudinal statement did not produce dissonance unless it led to some consequential event. Dissonance/Cooper/Fazio: Why should dissonance only occur under certain conditions? The original theory was silent about the impact of such variables as choice and consequences. The persistent set of limiting conditions suggested a need for a fresh perspective on the theory and that is what Russell Fazio and I provided in 1984. In our New Look model of dissonance (Cooper and Fazio, 1984)(11), we argued that dissonance was not brought about by cognitive discrepancies per se. Rather, we argued that dissonance is a state of uncomfortable arousal that occurs when a person accepts responsibility for bringing about an unwanted consequence. Other scholars took note of the limiting conditions of dissonance and suggested alternative views of the impact of attitude–discrepant behaviour (e.g., Beauvois and Joule, 1999(12); Harmon-Jones, 1999(4)). Aronson (1992)(13) argued for the key motivating role of the self, suggesting that dissonance occurs primarily when one’s self-esteem has been threatened by inconsistent cognitions. Stone and Cooper (2001)(14) modified the earlier New Look model and adopted a self-standards model. They realized that the New Look had been silent about how a person decides whether an action has brought about an aversive consequence. 1. Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2. Croyle, R. and Cooper, J. (1983) ‘Dissonance arousal: Physiological evidence’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45: 782–91. 3. Elliot, A. J., & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 382-394 4. Harmon-Jones, E. (1999) ‘Toward an understanding of the motivation underlying dissonance effects: Is the production of aversive consequences necessary?’, in E. Harmon-Jones and J. Mills (eds), Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. pp. 71–103. 5. Losch, M.E. and Cacioppo, J.T. (1990) ‘Cognitive dissonance may enhance sympathetic tonus, but attitudes are changed to reduce negative affect rather than arousal’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26: 289–304. 6. Cooper, J., Zanna, M.P. and Taves, P.A. (1978) ‘Arousal as a necessary condition for attitude change following induced compliance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36: 1101–6. 7. Zanna, M.P. and Cooper, J. (1974) ‘Dissonance and the pill: An attribution approach to studying the arousal properties of dissonance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29: 703–9. 8. Linder, D.E., Cooper, J. and Jones, E.E. (1967) ‘Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6: 245–54. 9. Festinger, L. and Carlsmith, J.M. (1959) ‘Cognitive consequences of forced compliance’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58: 203–10. 10. Cooper, J. and Worchel, S. (1970) ‘The role of undesired consequences in the arousal of cognitive dissonance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16: 312–20. 11. Cooper, J. and Fazio, R.H. (1984) ‘A new look at dissonance theory’, in L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 17. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. pp. 229–64. 12. Beauvois, J. and Joule, R.V. (1999) ‘A radical point of view on dissonance theory’, in E. Harmon-Jones and J. Mills (eds), Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. pp. 43–70. 13 Aronson, E. (1992) ‘The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback’, Psychological Inquiry, 3: 303–11. 14. Stone, J. and Cooper, J. (2001) ‘A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 228–43. Joel Cooper, “Cognitive Dissonance. Revisiting Festinger’s End of the World study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Cognitive Dissonance | Social Psychology | Haslam I 53 Cognitive Dissonance/psychological theories: The research on dissonance theory in the decades following the two seminal studies produced a number of important conclusions, some consistent with the theory and some less so. In the original work, Festinger (1957)(1) (>Cognitive dissonance/Festinger) had surmised that the key motivational factor that caused inconsistency to lead to attitude change was an aversive drive-like state that he labelled dissonance. At the time, he had no evidence for this assumption but it was the key factor that drove the predictions of the two classic studies discussed above, as well as many others. We now know that his guess was correct. We know this because (a) we can measure physiological changes (e.g., in skin conductance (SCR) and brain activity (EEG)) and the psychological discomfort that follow from advocating a position contrary to one’s attitudes (Croyle and Cooper, 1983(2); Elliot and Devine, 1994(3); Harmon-Jones, 1999(4); Losch and Cacioppo, 1990(5)); (b) we can increase dissonance by having participants ingest an arousing drug and decrease it with a sedative (Cooper et al., 1978)(6); and (c) we can eliminate attitude change following attitude–discrepant behaviour by having people misattribute their arousal to something other than their discrepant behaviour. For example, if people believed they were aroused from the side effects of a pill they had ingested rather than their discrepant behaviour, then attitude change did not occur (Zanna and Cooper, 1974)(7). Haslam I 54 VsFestinger: Linder and colleagues (1967)(8) showed that Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959)(9) (>Experiment/Festinger) induced compliance results only occur if people believe they had the choice to agree to make their counterattitudinal speech. In addition, Cooper and Worchel (1970)(10) showed that making a counterattitudinal statement did not produce dissonance unless it led to some consequential event. Dissonance/Cooper/Fazio: Why should dissonance only occur under certain conditions? The original theory was silent about the impact of such variables as choice and consequences. The persistent set of limiting conditions suggested a need for a fresh perspective on the theory and that is what Russell Fazio and I provided in 1984. In our New Look model of dissonance (Cooper and Fazio, 1984)(11), we argued that dissonance was not brought about by cognitive discrepancies per se. Rather, we argued that dissonance is a state of uncomfortable arousal that occurs when a person accepts responsibility for bringing about an unwanted consequence. Other scholars took note of the limiting conditions of dissonance and suggested alternative views of the impact of attitude–discrepant behaviour (e.g., Beauvois and Joule, 1999(12); Harmon-Jones, 1999(4)). Aronson (1992)(13) argued for the key motivating role of the self, suggesting that dissonance occurs primarily when one’s self-esteem has been threatened by inconsistent cognitions. Stone and Cooper (2001)(14) modified the earlier New Look model and adopted a self-standards model. They realized that the New Look had been silent about how a person decides whether an action has brought about an aversive consequence. 1. Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2. Croyle, R. and Cooper, J. (1983) ‘Dissonance arousal: Physiological evidence’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45: 782–91. 3. Elliot, A. J., & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 382-394 4. Harmon-Jones, E. (1999) ‘Toward an understanding of the motivation underlying dissonance effects: Is the production of aversive consequences necessary?’, in E. Harmon-Jones and J. Mills (eds), Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. pp. 71–103. 5. Losch, M.E. and Cacioppo, J.T. (1990) ‘Cognitive dissonance may enhance sympathetic tonus, but attitudes are changed to reduce negative affect rather than arousal’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26: 289–304. 6. Cooper, J., Zanna, M.P. and Taves, P.A. (1978) ‘Arousal as a necessary condition for attitude change following induced compliance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36: 1101–6. 7. Zanna, M.P. and Cooper, J. (1974) ‘Dissonance and the pill: An attribution approach to studying the arousal properties of dissonance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29: 703–9. 8. Linder, D.E., Cooper, J. and Jones, E.E. (1967) ‘Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6: 245–54. 9. Festinger, L. and Carlsmith, J.M. (1959) ‘Cognitive consequences of forced compliance’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58: 203–10. 10. Cooper, J. and Worchel, S. (1970) ‘The role of undesired consequences in the arousal of cognitive dissonance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16: 312–20. 11. Cooper, J. and Fazio, R.H. (1984) ‘A new look at dissonance theory’, in L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 17. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. pp. 229–64. 12. Beauvois, J. and Joule, R.V. (1999) ‘A radical point of view on dissonance theory’, in E. Harmon-Jones and J. Mills (eds), Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. pp. 43–70. 13 Aronson, E. (1992) ‘The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback’, Psychological Inquiry, 3: 303–11. 14. Stone, J. and Cooper, J. (2001) ‘A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 228–43. Joel Cooper, “Cognitive Dissonance. Revisiting Festinger’s End of the World study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Compassion | Nietzsche | Danto III 225 Compassion/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche has (at least) two objections against compassion. 1. that the compassionate person actually suffers vicariously with someone, and is brought to the same level as the subject of compassion - which in turn makes him "sick and melancholic".(1) Danto: This is also how it is to be understood when Zarathustra says that God dies of compassion after suffering, as one should assume, from the suffering of those in whom he has empathized. To demand compassion from the strong means (in this peculiar way) to demand from them to become weak. Christian ethics/Nietzsche: here Nietzsche observes that compassion is elevated to the "basic principle of society". For Nietzsche, it proves to be what it is: a will to negate life.(2) >Christianity/Nietzsche, >Morality/Nietzsche. DantoVsNietzsche: this is a central discrepancy in Nietzsche's thinking: by definition, the noble person stands above his companions. In addition, he/she is healthy, powerful and full of vitality. The opposite of noble is common. Unlike the noble personality, the ordinary are sick, exhausted and weak. Consequently, the herd consists of the sick, the weak and the powerless. Danto III 226 It is hardly possible to draw a more misleading conclusion, but it cannot be denied that Nietzsche has drawn it: Nietzsche: There is a surplus of miscarriages, illnesses, degenerates, infirmities, necessary sufferers in humans as in any other animal species; the successful cases are always the exception in humans as well.(3) Danto: correspondingly, the extraordinary human being is not only regarded as statistically deviating, but as a splendid example of his species, which stands out from a mass of miscasts and inferiority. Only if we take the lowest ones as yardsticks, can we believe otherwise. But this belief, as Nietzsche could oppose, would be anything but justified. >Superhuman/Nietzsche. Danto: According to Nietzsche, the average applicant is therefore rejected because one expects to fill the position with the best person. DantoVsNietzsche: that most people are not healthy is simply wrong. In epidemics, on the other hand, strong ones are taken away just like the weak ones. 1. F. Nietzsche Morgenröthe, KGW V. 1, S. 124. 2. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, S. 217. 3. Ibid. p. 79. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Conditional | Adams | Field II 252/296 Material Conditional/Adams Conditional/Field: (Lit. Adams 1974): (outside of mathematics): few of us would agree with the following conclusion: E.g. from Clinton will not die in office to If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President. That suggests that here the equivalence between A > B and ~(A v B) does not exist. >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditional. In other words: If A then B does not seem to have the same truth conditions as ~A v B. >Truth conditions. Adams-conditional: it may only be used as a main operator. - The degree of belief of A > B is always the conditional belef degree (B I A). >Operators, >Conditional probability. II 253 In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always required. - Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. Problem: then they will say less about the world. Indicative conditional sentence/material implication/truth/field: further considerations have however led many to doubt that there are truth conditions here at all. >Material implication. Conditional/Field: A > B: here the premise A is always required when concluding. That is, we accept conditional B relative to premise A. Adams: the idea of contingent acceptance justifies our intuitive beliefs according to which conclusions with conditionals are correct. Cf. >Presuppositions, >Principle of Charity. But then it is anything but obvious that conditionals say something about the world. For example, there must not be a statement C whose probability in all circumstances is the same as the conditional (contingent) probability of (B I A). That is, the conditional A > B is not such a C. N.B.: this shows that we do not have to assume "conditional propositions" or "conditional facts". This is the nonfactualist view. >Nonfactualism. ((s) Truth conditions/nonfactualism/conditional/(s): if there are no facts, then there are also no truth conditions.) Borderline case: If the conditional (contingent) probability is 0 or 1, it is justifiable that the assertibility conditions (acceptance conditions) are the same as those of the material conditional. Vs: one could argue that a sentence without any truth conditions is meaningless. >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. Field: ditto, but the main thing is that one cannot explain the acceptance conditions without the truth conditions in terms of the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. 1. R. Adams (1974). Theories of Actuality. Nous, 5: 21-231. --- Lewis V 133 Conditional/Adams/Adams-conditional/Lewis: is an exception to the rule that the speaker usually expresses nothing that is probably untrue. - Then the assertibility goes rather with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent. >Subjective probability, >Conditional probability, >Probability. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Conditional | Dummett | III (a) 19 Gap/Dummett: a gap does not occur in material conditional - but probably with bets that leave it unclear whether the antecedent is satisfied at all. III (a) 21/22 Statements/truth/Dummett: assuming simple language without counterfactual conditionals: then two types of conditionals are possible: 1) conditional statement a) if the antecedent is fulfilled, then like categorical statement b) if antecedent is not fulfilled: No statement! 2) as material conditional it is true if antecedent is false. III (a) 23 E.g. Indigenous people: then the behavior does not show which of the two statements is correct - then empty distinction - Conclusion: every sit in which nothing can be conceived as being false is one of being true. -> Truth value gap. - Analogy: Command: suspension of the test: no disobedience - conditional: no abuse possible. - The speaker implies that he precludes that the antecedent is true and the consequent is wrong - otherwise: > Atomic sentence. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Conditional | Fraassen | I 118 Conditional/truth value/Fraassen: the truth value of the conditional is partly context-dependent. >Truth values, >Context. But science does not imply that the context is either way somehow - therefore science implies counterfactual conditionals at most in the limiting case where a conditional has the same truth value in all contexts - in this case the theory plus antecedent (conditions) strictly implies the consequent. Then also the laws of attenuation and contraposition apply - but then they are useless for our task to provide an explanation. >Explanations. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Conditional | Lewis | V 145 Definition Stalnaker-conditional/Lewis: A>C (pointed) is true iff the least possible change that makes A true also makes C true - (least possible revision). Lewis: the probability of Stalnaker-conditionals are usually not equal to the conditional probability. V 146 Stalnaker-conditional/Truth conditions/Lewis: T(A>C)) WA(C) if A is possible. V 148 Conditional/Credibility/Belief/Stalnaker: in order to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1) add an antecedent to the set of beliefs - 2) minimal corrections for consistency - 3) decide whether the consequent is true - LewisVsStalnaker: that is just conditionalization and not representation. V 153 Indicative conditional/assertibility/probability/Jackson/Lewis: the discrepancy between the assertibility of P (C I A) and the probability of the truth of P (A>C) lies with one or the other Gricean >implicature. - The right of access to this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truth-functional) A ⊃ C (horseshoe). - (Lewis pro). - Implicature: E.g. "here you are right" (but mostly you are wrong). >Assertibility. V 154 Indicative conditional/Lewis: is a truth-functional conditional that conventionally implies robustness (insensitivity to new information) in terms of the antecedent - hence the probability of both conditionals must be high - therefore the assertibility of the indicative conditional comes with the corresponding conditional probability. - maxim: "assert the stronger one". |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Consent | Morris | Gaus I 204 Consent/consensus/legitimacy/state/justification/Morris: Consent can be a necessary condition for legitimacy or merely a sufficient one (or both). Assuming that consent could suffice to legitimate only (reasonably) just governments or states, we should think of consent theory as affirming both the necessity and the sufficiency of consent to legitimacy. The claim that consent is sufficient is the less controversial of the two (see Simmons, 1979(1): 57; 1993(2): 197—8; Green, 1988(3): 161—2; Beran, 1987(4)). Consent theory: Consent theory is a normative account, and it is posSible that all actual states fail to satisfy its conditions for legitimacy. This is what many contemporary consent theorists in fact claim. Consensus/Morris: Consent is to be distinguished from consensus or general agreement. Most forms of political organization depend to some degree on consensus or agreement. But the latter have to do largely with shared beliefs (or values). Sometimes terms like these are used to suggest more, but they essentially refer to agreement in belief or thought (or value).* >Agreement/Habermas. Consent/Morris: Consent, by contrast, involves the engagement of the will or commitment. Something counts as consent only if it is a deliberate undertaking. Ideally, an act is one of consent if it is the deliberate and effective communication of an intention to bring about a change in one's normative situation (i.e. one's rights or obligations). It must be voluntary and, to some degree, informed. Consent can be express (direct), or it can be tacit or implied (indirect). Both are forms of actual consent. By contrast, (non-actual) 'hypothetical consent' is not consent. Consent theory should be seen as a distinctive philosophical position, one standing in opposition to other traditions which find the polity or political rule to be natural or would see government and law as justified by their benefits. The mutual advantage, Paretian tradition and different types of consequentialism seek to base full legitimacy in what the polity does for its subjects and others (for the former see J. Buchanan, 1975(5); Gauthier, 1986(6)). Other, more 'participatory' traditions might require active involvement by citizenry for legitimacy. Political consentualism should not be conflated with these other traditions, however closely associated they may be historically (...) and it should certainly not be Gaus I 205 confused with other allegedly 'consensual' theories that base legitimacy on consensus or agreement. >Consensus. Morris: The conclusion of contemporary consent theorists seems to be that virtually no states satisfy the account's conditions for full legitimacy. It is simply that few people, 'naturalized' citizens and officials aside, have explicitly or tacitly consented to their state. It is implausible to interpret voting in democratic elections as expressing the requisite consent, and mere residence and the like do not seem to be the sort of engagements of the will required by consent theorists for obligation. Consequently, most people may not have the general obligation to obey the laws of their states that they are commonly thought to have. VsConsent theories: The adjudication of the challenge posed to state legitimacy by consentualism is a complicated matter (...). Minimal legitimacy: Supposing reasonably just and efficient states to be justified and thus to be minimally legitimate, something more seems required for full legitimacy and obligations to obey the law. The literature on this question is substantial (see Edmundson, 1999(7)), (...) >Legitimacy/Morris, >Citizenship/Morris. * Consent in this sense should also be distinguished from 'endorsement consent' in Hampton (1997(8): 94—7). 1. Simmons, A. John (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 2. Simmons, A. John (1993) On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 4. Green 1988 3. Green, Leslie (1988) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Beran, Harry (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. Beckenham: Croom Helm. 5. Buchanan, James (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. Edmundson, William A., ed. (1999) The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 8. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Boulder, CO: Westview. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Consequentialism | |||
| Consequentialism | Sen | Gaus I 418 Consequentialism/Sen/Weinstein: Sen concedes that his modified consequentialism turns even Williams into a consequentialist (though Williams would likely respond that, with Sen, we have an unholy hodgepodge that is no longer remotely consequentialist). Perhaps Sen's theory of equality can assist us here. >Equality/Sen, >Egalitarianism/Sen. SenVsDwoorkin/SenVsRawls: Sen rejects Rawlsian primary goods equality and Dworkin's resource equality as well as welfare equality in favour of capability equality. Capability equality is a modified needs account of equality similar to Miller's. >Egalitarianism/Miller. For Sen, functionings and capability functionings determine well-being. That is, a person's life goes well when she not only manages to do various things (functions) but also possesses the where-withal (capabilities) to choose to do these things from many alternatives. >Capabilities/Sen. Equality/Sen: Everyone deserves equal basic nourishment but not equal happiness. Freedom itself is elementary, too, and therefore everyone also deserves equal basic freedom or capability equality. Consequentialism: In sum, morality is complex though fundamentally 'consequence-based'. Moral evaluation measures how effectively freedom and rights are promoted, duties are honoured and well-being is maximized. And these metrics are prermsed, in turn, on all enjoying the basic capability equality of 'being adequately nourished, having mobility' and 'taking part in the life of the community' (Sen, 1993(1): 36—7). Weinstein: Notwithstanding the intricacies of measuring behaviour according to such diverse consequences, we still might insist that Sen's consequentialism is consequentialist in name only. 1. Sen, Amartya (1993) 'Capability and well-being'. In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 30-53. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Consequentialism | Singer | I 2 Consequentialism/ConsequentialismVsDeonology/P. Singer: Consequentialism does not begin with rules, but with goals, unlike deontology. The best-known consequentialism, though not the only one, is utilitarianism. >Utilitarianism, >Preferential utilitarianism, >Deontology, >Ethics, >Morality. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Consumption (Economics) | Rothbard | Rothbard III 280 Consumption/Rothbard: (…) at any given point in time, the consumer is confronted with the previously existing money prices of the various consumers’ goods on the market. On the basis of his utility scale, he determines his rankings of various units of the several goods and of money, and these rankings determine how much money he will spend on each of the various goods. Specifically, he will spend money on each particular good until the marginal utility of adding a unit of the good ceases to be greater than the marginal utility that its money price on the market has for him. This is the law of consumer action in a market economy. As he spends money on a good, the marginal utility of the new units declines, while the marginal utility of the money forgone rises, until he ceases spending on that good. In those cases where the marginal utility of even one unit of a good is lower than the marginal utility of its money price, the individual will not buy any of that good. Rothbard III 281 Market: In this way are determined the individual demand schedules for each good and, consequently, the aggregate market-demand schedules for all buyers. The position of the market-demand schedule determines what the market price will be in the immediate future. Thus, if we consider action as divided into periods consisting of “days,” then the individual buyers set their rankings and demand schedules on the basis of the prices existing at the end of day 1, and these demand schedules determine what the prices will be by the end of day 2. >Planning/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Contradictions | Logic Texts | Read III 194 Def contraction: make one application out of two: e.g. "If A, then if A, then ... " > "If A. ...". - Def consequentia mirabilis: If A then not A, therefore not A". >Consequentia mirabilis. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Conventions | Grice | I 2 Meaning/convention: it may be that someone who has changed a habit falls back into the old habit. Even in non-verbal cases. I 2 f Deviations/communication: deviations must have good reasons. Walker I 419 f Conventions (Walker, Grice Doc 10): you cannot find out whether a statement transmits a relationship between antecedent and consequent due to a special convention or whether this relationship is transmitted conversationally. >Implication, >Implicature, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning (Intending). |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Conventions | Lewis | Walker I 464 Convention/Lewis/Walker: is present only when alternatives are also conventions - something is only not a c if the parties cannot imagine that other kinds of speech are possible - Convention/Walker: in individual cases you cannot figure out whether the context between antecedent and consequent is secured conventionally or conversationally. --- Lewis II 222 Convention/Lewis: not just assignment of meaning, but detour over action/expectation. A convention in the sense we have defined here is a regularity of conduct. (And belief). It is essential that the regularity on the part on others is a reason to behave yourself compliantly. VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. Which alternatives might be there to general truthfulness - untruthfulness perhaps? ((s) Background: Conventions must be contingent.) II 232 LewisVs: The Convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust absolutely. It is in a particular language. Its alternatives are regularities in other languages. II 233 Therefore a convention persists, because everyone has reason to stick to it if others do, that is the commitment. >Action/Lewis. --- Walker I 479 ff Definition conventions/Lewis: a practice is only a convention, if it has alternatives, which in turn are conventions. Something can only be no convention, if the parties cannot imagine that other, less natural ways of speaking are possible. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Coordination | Austrian School | Parisi I 276 Coordination/Hayek/Austrian School: The fundamental meaning of coordination is simply the mutual compatibility of plans. This requires two things. First, each individual must base his plans on the correct expectation of what other individuals intend to do. Second, all individuals base their expectations on the same set of external events (Rizzo, 1990(1), p. 17). >Planning. In this basic meaning, the existing dissemination of knowledge has led to a state of affairs where each party is able to implement her plans. All offers to buy are accepted by sellers. All offers to sell are accepted by buyers. This is to be distinguished from the process of coordination whereby, through trial and error learning and entrepreneurial discovery, agents are able to make their plans compatible or more nearly compatible with those of others. >Compatibility. Coordination is analytically different from, though not incompatible with, the concept of optimality. Pareto optimality implies that individuals exhaust all the potential gains from trade. This is a special case of coordination.9 However, there can be coordination, or the execution of mutually compatible plans, which do not exhaust all potential gains from trade, when “ … these plans are mutually compatible and that there is consequently a conceivable set of external events, which will allow all people to carry out their plans and not cause any disappointments” (Hayek, 1937(2), p. 39). A state of mutually compatible plans “represents in one sense a position of equilibrium, it is however clear that it is not an equilibrium in the special sense in which equilibrium is regarded as a sort of optimum position” (Hayek, 1937(2), p. 51). >Pareto Optimum. Everyone within a system may have mutually compatible plans and yet there may be better trading opportunities out there so that at least some parties can improve their positions by alternative trades. Thus if there is a sense in which the mutual compatibility of plans is an optimum, it is only a local optimum, that is, between the direct parties to an exchange. 1. Rizzo, M. J. (1990). “Hayek’s Four Tendencies Toward Equilibrium.” Cultural Dynamics 3(1): 12–31. 2. Hayek, F. A. (1937). “Economics and Knowledge.” Economica 4(13): 33–54. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Coordination | Hayek | Parisi I 276 Coordination/Hayek/Austrian School: The fundamental meaning of coordination is simply the mutual compatibility of plans. This requires two things. First, each individual must base his plans on the correct expectation of what other individuals intend to do. Second, all individuals base their expectations on the same set of external events (Rizzo, 1990(1), p. 17). >Planning. In this basic meaning, the existing dissemination of knowledge has led to a state of affairs where each party is able to implement her plans. All offers to buy are accepted by sellers. All offers to sell are accepted by buyers. This is to be distinguished from the process of coordination whereby, through trial and error learning and entrepreneurial discovery, agents are able to make their plans compatible or more nearly compatible with those of others. >Compatibility. Coordination is analytically different from, though not incompatible with, the concept of optimality. Pareto optimality implies that individuals exhaust all the potential gains from trade. This is a special case of coordination.9 However, there can be coordination, or the execution of mutually compatible plans, which do not exhaust all potential gains from trade, when “ … these plans are mutually compatible and that there is consequently a conceivable set of external events, which will allow all people to carry out their plans and not cause any disappointments” (Hayek, 1937(2), p. 39). A state of mutually compatible plans “represents in one sense a position of equilibrium, it is however clear that it is not an equilibrium in the special sense in which equilibrium is regarded as a sort of optimum position” (Hayek, 1937(2), p. 51). >Pareto Optimum. Everyone within a system may have mutually compatible plans and yet there may be better trading opportunities out there so that at least some parties can improve their positions by alternative trades. Thus if there is a sense in which the mutual compatibility of plans is an optimum, it is only a local optimum, that is, between the direct parties to an exchange. Parisi I 281 Coordination/Hayek: Hayek argued that common law is an order where the legal rules facilitate the “order of actions” for individuals in a society. The “order of actions” is essentially the coordination of plans of economic actors (Hayek, 1973(3), p. 113). The emphasis is not on the “order of the law” but on the “order of actions” in society constrained by such laws. Therefore, the question is not whether a particular law is “socially optimal” and leads to wealth maximization. The question is not even whether the various laws form a socially optimal system. The important question is whether the system of legal rules facilitates greater coordination in society by enhancing expectational certainty. When the law succeeds in enhancing the order of actions, it is “praxeologically coherent.” On the other hand, other approaches to legal analysis emphasize the “logical coherence” of the law. Prominent among these is the idea that common law areas (property, contract, and tort) can be understood in a unified way as the expression of social wealth maximization. Posner made a bold claim in the first edition of the Economic Analysis of Law (1973)(4), that common law rules are “efficient,” that is, wealth-maximizing. >Efficiency/Posner. 1. Rizzo, M. J. (1990). “Hayek’s Four Tendencies Toward Equilibrium.” Cultural Dynamics 3(1): 12–31. 2. Hayek, F. A. (1937). “Economics and Knowledge.” Economica 4(13): 33–54. 3. Hayek, F. A. (1973). Law Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I, Rules and Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Posner, Richard (1972). Economic Analysis of Law. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Correctness | Wright | I 272f Def "Correct"/Wright: here: T-predicate for minimally truth-enabled discourses. >Truth predicate, >Truth evaluability, >Minimalism, >Discourse. >Truth. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) Wright I 276 Correctness/Negation/Logics/Truth/Wright: when both truth and correctness are at play, there is a distinction between the a) actual, strict negation: transforms any true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one that gives another form of negation: b) Negation: works in such a way that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument reaches no truth. >Negation, >Truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal (Nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. >Nonfactualism. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict concept of the former negation. Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the predicate of truth will generally be conservative. WrightVsVs: but there are problems elsewhere now: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition >Truth conditions. I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for "A" is true jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct. The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. Meaning Minimalism/correctness/Wright: Correctness cannot regard certain sentences (e.g. about primary qualities of material bodies) as candidates for substantial truth. >Content. The attribution of a truth condition can therefore be correct for such a proposition. Thus, even in a conservative matrix, the assertion "S has the truth condition that P" is true can be correct. But the whole basis of the argumentation is that minimalism of meaning has no choice but to view "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition as inevitably at least incorrect otherwise there is no affirmation of (i) as a premise. ((i): It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition). The insertion of "S" has the truth condition that "P" for "A" in (II) consequently produces, in a conservative matrix for meaning minimalism itself, a correct antecedence, but an incorrect consequence. I 277/278 WrightVsBoghossian: Summary: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the disquotation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), if, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The proposition is incorrect). Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argumentation at all. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Cosmopolitanism | Stoicism | Höffe I 76 Cosmopolitanism/Stoa/Höffe: (...) [for] Chrysipp (died around 205 B.C.), the cosmos is considered the common polis of all humans, but additionally of the gods. >Polis, >God/Ancient Philosophy. The cosmos is an order of the universe, of which mankind is only a part. Consequently, the cosmo-polis remains an open, but again neither legally nor politically qualified living space. There is no talk of a common ground, which Aristotle with good reason considers to be the indispensable element of a polis, of ideas of right and wrong. >Polis/Aristotle. Zenon of Kition: However, there is one significant exception. The first founder of the Stoa, Zenon of Kition (350-264 B.C.), sketched a cosmopolis of the pattern of a homogeneous world state in which a single way of life and order ruled, which is why people lived together as in a herd. >About the Stoa. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Dummett | II 90 Counterfactual Conditionals/co.co./Dummett: allow the construction of undecidable sentences. -> Intuitionism.- A counterfactual conditional can only be "simply" true if there is a logical necessity that either the Counterfactual Conditional or its opposite are true. Opposite of counterfactual conditionals: the same antecedent - contradictory consequent - but no one would assume that it is necessary that either the counterfactual conditional or its opposite is true. - E.g. "x learns languages easily" - x has never learned a foreign language. Three options: i) no determined answer. ii) objective structure of the brain, objective response. iii) no physiological feature, however neither true nor false. II 92 Allocation/Ability/Dummett: you cannot reduce the categorical sentence "he is good at …" to counterfactual conditionals. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Lewis | V 5 Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: variably strict conditional: if there are closer possible worlds, disregard the more distant ones. >Possible world/Lewis. V 5f Counterfactual conditionals/Negation/Lewis: from "would" through "could" (not): with logical antecedent and negated consequent - from "could": with "would" with the same A and negated consequent. V 10 Counterfactual conditionals: Analysis 0: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true every A-World, so that __". Analysis 1: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true in the (accessible) A-world closest to i if there is one. A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C i is true in every (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 1 1/2: A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C is true in a specific, arbitrarily selected (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 3: A were>>would C is true in the world i if a (accessible) AC-World is closer to i than any A~C-world. "Def A were>>could C is true in i iff for every (accessible) A~C-world there is an AC-world, which is at least as close to i, and if there are (accessible) A-worlds. V 8 Counterfactual conditionals/Negation: here: through "could" in the rear part - E.g. ~(A were>>would C) ↔ A were>>could ~C. ((s) could = not necessarily"). - That will do for Analysis 2: ... true in every next possible world ...- then Bizet/Verdi: not necessarily French and not necessarily non-French... etc. - "all true" false: not necessarily French-and-Italian...- that is ok. V 14 Definition counterfactual conditionals: = variably strict conditional; i.e. if there is a closer possible world, disregard the more distant ones. V 18 Counterfactual Conditional: I use it when the antecedent is probably wrong - Counterfactual Conditionals are more like the material conditional - with true antecedent are only true if the consequent is true - Problem: the Counterfactual Conditional with true antecedent are difficult to determine - they are in fact inappropriate! - Assuming someone unknowingly expressed such: - then both are convincing: a) A, ~C, ergo ~(A were>>would C: wrong, because A but not C, b) A, C, ergo A were>>would C.: true, because A and in fact C- Important argument: this depends on the adequacy of "because". Lewis: I think a) is more appropriate (should be assumend to be true) - Definition centering assumption: is thus weakened: every world is self-accessible and at least so similar to itself as any other world is with it - so a) is valid, but b) is invalid. Centering assumption: if it was violated, worlds which deviate in a neglected way would count the same as the actual world). Actual world/Counterfactual conditionals: if you want to distinguish the actual world in Counterfactual Conditionals, you can do that by expanding the comparative similarity of possible worlds so that they also include certain impossible worlds where not too impossible antecedents are true. Vs: but they are even worse than the impossible borderline worlds. >Truth value, >Impossible world/Lewis. V 25 Counterfactual conditionals/Axioms:.. system C1 the Counterfactual Conditional implies the implication "were A>>would B. >. A>B" (s) That is the Counterfactual Conditional is stronger than the implication - AB > were A>>would B. - that is, from the conjunction follows the counterfactual conditional. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: needs similarity between worlds to be comparable. Analysis 1/A1: (VsLewis) without similarity - counterfactual dependence/Lewis: always causal and thus consisting mostly in chronological order. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: antecedent normally assumed to be wrong - with assumed true antecedent. V 95/96 Counterfactual conditional: Advantage: not truth-functionally established - either both antecedent and consequent or neither applies in a possible world. V 179 Counterfactual conditional: are not transitive. - Therefore there is no specific course of increase or decrease of probability through a causal chain. V 284 Backwards/Counterfactual conditional: there is counterfactual dependence in the backward direction, but no causal dependency: false "if the effect had been different, the cause would have been something else". V 288 Probabilistic counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Form: if A were the case, there would be this and this chance for B. >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Counterfactual Dependence | Lewis | V 33 Counterfactual dependence/Time/Lewis: counterfactually dependent: assumptions about the future - not counterfactual dependence: assumptions about the past - but: if the present was very different, the past would have had to be different somehow! Lewis: Thesis: yet no strict asymmetry: E.g. A is not going to ask B for a favor after a dispute variant: a) if he asks him, there was no dispute b) there was definitely a fight. >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, >Counterfactuals/Lewis. Backward causality/past: problem: counterfactual conditionals: are always vague. E.g. Caesar in the Korean War: would have a) detonated the nuclear bomb b) used a catapult. Solution: special form: if A should ask today, there would not have been a controversy yesterday - normal cases in contrast: here there is the asymmetry. V 39f Alternative/Counterfactual dependence/Causing/Lewis: Analysis 1: Problem: we have to assume a transition period when comparing alternatives. - Because we do not allow jumps - for this transition period the counterfactual dependence does not apply. - Solution: we need an assumption for a certain period of time and a standard solution for vagueness - Analysis 2: comparative similarity of possible worlds. >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. Def truth/Lewis: a Counterfactual Conditional is true if every world that makes the antecedent true also makes the consequent true without leaving the reality for no reason. V 165 Def counterfactual dependency/Lewis: if there is a family of As, A1, A2 and of Cs, C1, C2, ... and if all Counterfactual Conditionals - wA1>wC1, ... wA2>wC2, etc., then the Cs are counterfactually dependent on the As - typical: E.g. measurements and perceptions - E.g. conD, but not causal dependency. E.g. assumed changed laws of gravity with alternative planet movements - because there are no separated events. V 265 Causality/Causal dependency/separatedness/separation/Lewis: in general: causal dependence can only exist between separate entities.) >Causal dependence/Lewis. Solution: Instead, counterfactual dependence: if Socrates had not been conceived, his death would have been impossible. --- Schwarz I 136 Cause/Causing/Counterfactual dependence/Lewis/Schwarz: cD: B is happily cD when probability for B without the occurrence of A would have been significantly lower (relative to a time after the actual occurrence of A). - 137 transitivity: Problem: accident causes recovery - fragility: different standards for effect/Cause: Cause: robust: Later throwing also cause, but effect fragile: someone else throws: this would be a different breaking. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Counterfactuals | Logic Texts | Read III 84 Conditional rates/conditional/read: We treat e.g., If Aristotle wrote dialogues, they are not preserved. as assertions that are true or false. The entire conditional sentence is true if either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true. One can rephrase: Either Aristotle wrote no dialogue or it is not preserved. Cf. >Implication, >Paradox of implication, >Disjunction. III 85 Def truth-functional: Conjunction and disjunction are called truth-functional because their truth depends directly and immediately on the truth of their constituent parts. >Truth value tables, >Truth function. III 86 Problem: The treatment of conditional sentences as truth-functional leads to a number of problems. For example, suppose the pound is devalued, but the recession continues anyway. Is this enough to confirm the claim that the recession will continue if the pound is not devalued? According to the truth-functional representation, this should be the case. III 87 But the conditional theorem suggests a closer connection between the antecedent and the consequent. We now see, however, that such a connection may not even exist. Therefore, there are doubts whether the truth-functional representation is the last word in this matter. We may now wonder whether the connections are valid. Truth-functional: Argument for the truth-functionality of conditional propositions: Conditional propositions are used to express the dependence of an argument's conclusion on its premises. III 88 The classical representation of validity said that the conclusion is true under any interpretation of the letters, even if the premises are ("conditionality principle"). It follows from the standard representation of inference and the conditionality principle together that conditional clauses are truth-functional. Problems: arise in connection with additional knowledge and assertiveness instead of truth. >Validity. III 277 Anti-realism: understanding must be shown understanding must manifest itself - truth is not evidence-transcendent. VsTradition: understanding of counterfactual situations can not be manifested and not be communicated - consequently it can not be acquainted. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Counterparts | Lewis | IV 49 Counterpart/Lewis: There is no possible world in which I could have beem a basilisk - counterparts have to resemble the originals in important respects - the counterpart relation is never identity. >Counterpart theory/Lewis. IV 29 Counterpart/Modal logic/Lewis: the theory of the counterpart (c.th.) and the modal logic with quantification (qML) are mutually translatable. The c.th. has at least three advantages over qML: 1. it has no special intensive logic 2. it is not so obscure (opaque?) a) uncertainty about analyticity and consequently b) Uncertainty as to which descriptions describe possible worlds. (Which worlds are impossible). c) which things are counterparts of what? 3. if our translation scheme is correct, then each sentence in qML has the same meaning as the corresponding sentence in c.th.. But not the other way around! Not every sentence of the c.th. is the translation or is equivalent to any sentence of the qML. ((s) Asymmetry: so the c.th. contains the qML and additional phrases that cannot be translated. So the c.th. is richer). IV 35 Essence/counterpart/Lewis: Essence and counterpart can be defined mutually. Essence: the essence of something is the attribute that shares something with all and only its counterpart. Def Counterpart/Lewis: Counterpart of something is everything that has the essential attribute of it. That doesn't mean that the attribute is the essence of the counterpart! It doesn't even have to be an essential attribute of the counterpart. ((s) Essence is not transitive over worlds). . >Counterpart theory/Plantinga. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Critical Junctures | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 106 Critical Junctures/Acemoglu/Robinson: During critical junctures, a major event or confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power in a nation. These can affect only a single country, such as the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, which at first created a critical juncture only for Communist China. Often, however, critical junctures affect a whole set of societies, in the way that, for example, colonization and then decolonization affected most of the globe. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. Once a critical juncture happens, the small differences that matter are the initial institutional differences that put in motion very different responses. >Institutional drift/Acemoglu, cf. >Path dependence. Acemoglu I 114 E.g., Western Europe, experiencing many of the same historical processes, had institutions similar to England at the time of the Industrial Revolution. There were small but consequential differences between England and the rest, which is why the Industrial Revolution happened in England and not France. This revolution then created an entirely new situation and considerably different sets of challenges to European regimes, which in turn spawned a new set of conflicts culminating in the French Revolution. The French Revolution was another critical juncture that led the institutions of Western Europe to converge with those of England, while Eastern Europe diverged further. Acemolgu I 242 Industrial Revolution: The Industrial Revolution created a transformative critical juncture for the whole world during the nineteenth century and beyond: those societies that Acemoglu I 243 allowed and incentivized their citizens to invest in new technologies could grow rapidly. But many around the world failed to do so—or explicitly chose not to do so. Nations under the grip of extractive political and economic institutions did not generate such incentives. Spain and Ethiopia provide examples where the absolutist control of political institutions and the implied extractive economic institutions choked economic incentives long before the dawn of the nineteenth century.(1) 1. The notion of a critical juncture was first developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, eds. (1967). Party System and Voter Alignments. New York: Free Press. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Critical Junctures | Robinson | Acemoglu I 106 Critical Junctures/Acemoglu/Robinson: During critical junctures, a major event or confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power in a nation. These can affect only a single country, such as the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, which at first created a critical juncture only for Communist China. Often, however, critical junctures affect a whole set of societies, in the way that, for example, colonization and then decolonization affected most of the globe. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. Such critical junctures are important because there are formidable barriers against gradual improvements, resulting from the synergy between extractive political and economic institutions and the support they give each other. Once a critical juncture happens, the small differences that matter are the initial institutional differences that put in motion very different responses. >Institutional drift/Acemoglu, cf. >Path dependence. Acemoglu I 114 E.g., Western Europe, experiencing many of the same historical processes, had institutions similar to England at the time of the Industrial Revolution. There were small but consequential differences between England and the rest, which is why the Industrial Revolution happened in England and not France. This revolution then created an entirely new situation and considerably different sets of challenges to European regimes, which in turn spawned a new set of conflicts culminating in the French Revolution. The French Revolution was another critical juncture that led the institutions of Western Europe to converge with those of England, while Eastern Europe diverged further. Acemolgu I 242 Industrial Revolution: The Industrial Revolution created a transformative critical juncture for the whole world during the nineteenth century and beyond: those societies that Acemoglu I 243 allowed and incentivized their citizens to invest in new technologies could grow rapidly. But many around the world failed to do so—or explicitly chose not to do so. Nations under the grip of extractive political and economic institutions did not generate such incentives. Spain and Ethiopia provide examples where the absolutist control of political institutions and the implied extractive economic institutions choked economic incentives long before the dawn of the nineteenth century. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Dasein | Hegel | Höffe I 332 Dasein/Hegel/Höffe: [HegelVsKant] does not understand freedom, (...) negatively as "being allowed to do" and "to let go", but positively as "being with oneself in the other". Consequently, he is not satisfied with a generally acceptable freedom, but Höffe I 333 aims at the "existence of free will," whereby "existence" means as much as "full reality".(1) cf. >Freedom/Hegel, >State/Hegel, >Morality/Hegel, >Freedom/Kant. 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Decision Theory | Decision theory: is not about decidability of problems within finite time, but about the consequences of decisions. See also rationality, actions, consequentialism, consequence, practical inference, decidability, counterfactual conditionals. |
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| Deep Learning | Lloyd | Brockman I 10 Deep Learning/Lloyd: The recent advances in deep learning and neuromorphic computation are very good at reproducing a particular aspect of human intelligence focused on the operation of the brain’s cortex, where patterns are processed and recognized. These advances have enabled a computer to beat the world champion not just of chess but of Go, an impressive feat, but they’re far short of enabling a computerized robot to tidy a room. Robots are good at making precision welds on assembly lines, but they still can’t tie their own shoes. >Software/Lloyd. Brockman I 11 Education is as hard and slow for computers as it is for teenagers. Consequently, systems based on deep learning are becoming more rather than less human. The skills they bring to learning are not “better than” but “complementary to” human learning: Computer learning systems can identify patterns that humans cannot—and vice versa. >Learning, cf. >Machine learning, >Reinforcement learning. Lloyd, Seth. “Wrong, but More Relevant Than Ever” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Lloyd I William Forster Lloyd Lecture on the Notion of Value, as Distinguished Not Only from Utility, but also from Value in Exchange Oxford 1833 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Demand for Money | Rothbard | Rothbard II 166 Demand for money/prices/Rothbard: (…) partial ‘real’ factors - such as government expenditures abroad, a sudden scarcity of food, or ‘a sudden diminution of the confidence of foreigners, in consequence of any great national disaster’ - could influence overall prices or the status of the pound in the foreign exchange market. But (…) such influences can only be trivial and temporary. The overriding causes of such price or exchange movements - not just in some remote ‘long run’ but a all times except temporary deviations - are monetary changes in the supply of and demand for money. Changes in ‘real’ factors can only have an important impact on exchange rates and general prices by altering the composition and the height of the demand for money on the market. But since market demands for money are neither homogeneous nor uniform nor do they ever change Rothbard II 167 equiproportionately, real changes will almost always have an impact on the demand for money. Salerno: ... since real disturbances are invariably attended by ‘distribution effects’, i.e. gains and losses of income and wealth by the affected market participants, it is most improbable that initially nonmonetary disturbances would not ultimately entail relative changes in the various national demands for money...[U]nder inconvertible conditions, the relative changes in the demands for the various national currencies, their quantities remaining unchanged, would be reflected in their long-run appreciation or depreciation on the foreign exchange market.(1) >Price theory/Rothbard. Rothbard III 756 Demand for money/Rothbard: The total demand for money on the market consists of two parts: Exchange demand: the exchange demand for money (by sellers of all other goods that wish to purchase money) and Reservation demand: the reservation demand for money (the demand for money to hold by those who already hold it). Because money is a commodity that permeates the market and is continually being supplied and demanded by everyone, and because the proportion which the existing stock of money bears to new production is high, it will be convenient to analyze the supply of and the demand for money in terms of the total demand-stock analysis (…). In contrast to other commodities, everyone on the market has both an exchange demand and a reservation demand for money. A. Exchange Demand Exchange demand: The exchange demand is his pre-income demand. As a seller of labor, land, capital goods, or consumers' goods, he must supply these goods and demand money in exchange to obtain a money income. >Production factors, >Income, >Goods, >Production. Demand: Aside from speculative considerations, the seller of ready-made goods will tend, (…) to have a perfectly inelastic (vertical) supply curve, since he has no reservation uses for the good. Rothbard III 757 Supply: But the supply curve of a good for money is equivalent to a (partial) demand curve for money in terms of the good to be supplied. Exchange demand: Therefore, the (exchange) demand curves for money in terms of land, capital goods, and consumers' goods will tend to be perfectly inelastic. >Elasticity/Rothbard. Labour: Some people might work a greater number of hours because they have a greater monetary inducement to sacrifice leisure for labor. Others may decide that the increased income permits them to sacrifice some money and take some of the increased earnings in greater leisure. In both cases, the man earns more money at the higher wage rate.(…) Therefore, a man’s backward-sloping supply curve will never be “backward” enough to make him earn less money at higher wage rates. Rothbard III 758 „Buying money“/market: Thus, a man will always earn more money at a higher wage rate, less money at a Iower. But what is earning money but another name for buying money? And that is precisely what is done. People buy money by selling goods and services that they possess or can create. Demand schedule for money: We are now attempting to arrive at the demand schedule for money in relation to various alternative purchasing powers or "exchange-values" of money. Exchange value of money: A Iower exchange-value of money is equivalent to higher goods-prices in terms of money. Conversely, a higher exchange-value of money is equivalent to Iower prices of goods. Labour/wages: In the labor market, a higher exchange-value of money is translated into Iower wage rates, and a Iower exchange-value of money into higher wage rates. Labour market: Hence, on the labor market, our law may be translated into the following terms: The higher the exchange-value of money, the Iower the quantity of money demanded; the Iower the exchange-value of money, the higher the quantity of money demanded (i.e., the Iower the wage rate, the less money earned; the higher the wage rate, the more money earned). Therefore, on the labor market, the demand-for-money schedule is not vertical, but falling, when the exchange-value of money increases, as in the case of any demand curve. Exchange demand for money: Adding the vertical demand curves for money in the other exchange markets to the falling demand curve in the labor market, we arrive at a falling exchange-demand curve for money. B. Reservation Demand Reservation demand: More important, because more volatile, in the total demand for money on the market is the reservation demand to hold money. This is everyone's post-income demand. After everyone has acquired his income, he must decide, between the allocation of his money assets in three directions: a) consumption spending, b) investment spending, and c) addition to his cash balance ("net hoarding"). Furthermore, he has the additional choice of subtraction from his cash balance ("net dishoarding"). How much he decides to retain in his cash balance is uniquely determined by the marginal utility of money in his cash balance on his value scale. >Cash balance/Rothbard. Reservation demand curve for money: (…) the higher the PPM (purchasing power of money; the exchange-value of money), the lower the quantity of money demanded in the cash balance. >Purchasing power/Rothbard. As a result, the reservation demand curve for money in the cash balance falls as the exchange-value of money increases. This falling demand curve, added to the falling exchange-demand curve for money, yields the market's total demand curvefor money - also falling in the familiar fashion for every commodity. Rothbard III 762 Equilibirum/purchasing power: Suppose (…) that the PPM (purchasing power of money) is slightly higher (…). The demand for money at that point will be less than the stock. People will become unwilling to hold money at that exchange-value and will be anxious to sell it for other goods. These sales will raise the prices of goods and Iower the PPM, until the equilibrium point is reached. On the other hand, suppose that the PPM is Iower (…). In that case, more people will demand money, in exchange or in reservation, than there is money stock available. The consequent excess of demand over supply will raise the PPM again (…). >Purchasing power parity/Rothbard. Rothbard III 766 Economic law: Every supply of money is always utilized to its maximum extent, and hence no social utility can be conferred by increasing the supply of money. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Money supply/David Hume. Economists have attempted mechanically to reduce the demand for money to various sources(2) RothbardVsKeynes: There is no such mechanical determination, however. Each individual decides for himself by his own standards his whole demand for cash balances, and we can only trace various influences which different catallactic events may have had on demand. >Speculative Demand, >Clearing/Rothbard. Rothbard III 772 Demand for money/Rothbard: Is the demand for money unlimited? A popular fallacy rejects the concept of "demand for money" because it is allegedly always unlimited. This idea misconceives the very nature of demand and confuses money with wealth or income. the form of holding back the good from being sold. (…) effective demand for money is not and cannot be unlimited; it is limited by the appraised value of the goods a person can sell in exchange and by the amount of that money which the individual wants to spend on goods rather than keep in his cash balance. Purchasing power: Furthermore, it is, of course, not "money" per se that he wants and demands, but money for its purchasing power, or "real" money, money in some way expressed in terms of what it will purchase. (This purchasing power of money (…) cannot be measured.) >Time preference/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 775 Value of cash balances: The only necessary result (…) of a change in the demand-for-money schedule is precisely a change in the same direction of the proportion of total cash balances to total money income and in the real value of cash balances. Given the stock of money, an increased scramble for cash will simply Iower money incomes until the desired increase in real cash balances has been attained. If the demand for money falls, the reverse movement occurs. The desire to reduce cash balances causes an increase in money income. Total cash remains the same, but its proportion to incomes, as well as its real value, declines.(3) 1. Joseph Salerno. 1980. ‘The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments’ (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), pp. 299-300. 2. J.M. Keynes’ Treatise on Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930) is a classic example of this type of analysis. 3. Strictly, the ceteris paribus condition will tend to be violated. An increased demand for money tends to Iower money prices and will therefore Iower money costs of gold mining. This will stimulate gold mining production until the interest return on mining is again the same as in other industries. Thus, the increased demand for money will also call forth new money to meet the demand. A decreased demand for money will raise money costs of gold mining and at least Iower the rate of new production. It will not actually decrease the total money stock unless the new production rate falls below the wear-and-tear rate. Cf. Jacques Rueff, "The Fallacies of Lord Keynes' General Theory" in Henry Hazlitt, ed., The Critics ofKeynesian Economics (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), pp. 238-63. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Democracy | Spengler | Brocker I 122 Democracy/Spengler: in the context of Spengler's political philosophy (see Politics/Spengler) democracy seems less like a concretely definable form of constitution, certainly not as a normative political ideal, but as a form of monetary rule - occurring in a certain phase of Western culture - and ultimately as an expression of the striving for money and property, and within this framework also for political dominance. In democracy, which according to Spengler consequently occurs at the beginning of the decay of a high culture, a certain form of striving for power manifests itself, represented by a clearly identifiable social standing (the economic bourgeoisie), which strives to snatch power from another social standing (the nobility). >Democracy. The claim to the rule of money - instead of that of a historical, qua tradition governing social standing - as well as the demand for freedom of the press is only to be understood as one of countless expressions of the will to power rooted in the primordial vitality of humanity, but not as an end in itself. >Freedom of the press, >Media, >Newspapers, >Freedom, >Power. Hans-Christof Klaus, Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918/1922) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Spengler I Oswald Spengler Politische Schriften München 1932 |
| Democracy | Spinoza | Höffe I 236 Democracy/Spinoza/Höffe: While Hobbes does not grant absolute sovereignty to the monarchy in principle, but for pragmatic reasons, according to Spinoza it belongs to democracy alone. However, democracy is "not bound by any law". Freed from all legal constraints, it amounts to a democratic absolutism, in contrast to the constitutional, legal and constitutional democracy that prevails today. Consequently, Spinoza does not speak of citizens, but of subjects. These are subject to the orders of a supreme power that is free from all over-positive criticism and correction: the subjects have "nothing other than to recognise law, except what the supreme power declares to be law"(1). >State, >Governance, >Constitution, >Violence, >Obediance, >Law. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap. 16. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Deontology | Deontology: theories within ethics that are related to the intrinsic nature of actions and do not consider their possible consequences. From this intrinsic nature obligations and prohibitions are derived. Counter position is consequentialism. See also ethics, intrinsic, actions, morals. |
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| Deontology | Nagel | III 112 Deontology/Nagel: intermediate position between purely individual and super-personal values demands to prevent injustice. >Values, >Morals, >Ethics. Problem: Conflicts for the internal point of view. >Sujectivity, >Conflicts, >Reasons, >Motives, >Goals. III 81 Deontology/Nagel: the direction of deontological reasons is against the fact that you do something specific - not against the fact that it is happening. >Actions. Formal problems: how can there be a reason for me not to torture which at the same time is a reason for someone else to torture? >Events. III 87 Deontology/Nagel: The intention may be reprehensible, even intentionally letting it happen. - Paradox: if this is not even one of my action goals, the deontological reasons would be superfluous - limiting the autonomy of the subject, yet entirely subjective. III 90 Deontology: The value must depend on the action itself. - The goal defines and guides the action - prevents the the problem of reference classes: ((s) The rescued injured person could have been Hitler.) Cf. >Consequentialism, >Utilitarianism. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Deterrence | Social Psychology | Parisi I 141 Retribution/law/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Two prevalent normative theories of punishment in the legal literature are retribution (or "just deserts") and utilitarianism (specific or general deterrence, as well as incapacitation and rehabilitation) (Hart, 2008(1); Ten, 1987(2)). (...) only recently have researchers systematically investigated the psychological influence of deterrence and retribution motives on people's punishment judgments. >Utilitarianism, >Retribution. Psychology: The results indicate an interesting division: in the abstract, people explicitly endorse utilitarian goals (e.g. successful deterrence leading to crime reduction), but when presented with a specific scenario, they consistently choose to impose retributive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008)(3). Retribution: This evidence suggests that people are intuitive retributivists, making judgments based on intuitions about just deserts, though these intuitive judgments can sometimes be overridden by more reasoned considerations (see Carlsmith and Darley, 2008(4) for a review). Morality: At the same time, the reasoning process itself may be oriented toward retribution: when an array of different information is made available, participants are more likely to choose to obtain information about moral severity and other retributive factors, rather than information relevant to utilitarian aims (Carlsmith, 2006(5); Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002(6)). >Morals, >Morality. Consequentialism: Indeed, certain consequentialist moral decisions, despite being socially approved, give rise to the inference that the agent making or carrying out the decision is of inferior moral character (Uhlmann, Zhu, and Tannenbaum, 2013)(7). >Consequentialism. Example: e,.g., deciding to sacrifice one life to save multiple lives can lead to negative character inferences about the agent, even though the decision is regarded as morally correct (Uhlmann et al., 2013)(7). Restoration: Restorative justice goals are also intuitively appealing in some cases. In contrast with retribution, restorative justice aims to repair the harm that was caused through processes in which the offender, victim, and perhaps community members determine an appropriate reparative sanction (Bazemore, 1998(8); Braithwaite, 2002(9)). This justice goal is compatible with retribution; when given a choice, even for severe crimes, most participants choose a consequence with both retributive and restorative components over consequences that fulfill only one ofthose goals (Gromet and Darley, 2006)(10). >Justice, >Equality. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (2008). Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Ten, C. L. (1987). Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Carlsmith, K. M. (2008). "On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions." Social Justice Research 21 (2): 119-137. doi:10.1007 /sl 1211-008-OOO-X. 4. Carlsmith, K. M. and J. M. Darley (2008). "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," in Mark P. Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, 193-236. San Diego: Academic Press. 5. Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). "The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Pun- ishment." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42(4): 43 7—451. doi: 10.1016/ j.jesp.2005.06.007. 6. Carlsmith, K. M., J. M. Darley, and P. H. Robinson (2002). "Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Desserts as Motives for Punishment." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.103 7/0022-3514.83.2.284. 7. Uhlmann, E. L., L. (Lei) Zhu, and D. Tannenbaum (2013). "When It Takes a Bad Person to Do the Right Thing." Cognition doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.005. 8. Bazemore, G. (1998). "Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration." American Behavioral Scientist 41(6): 768-813. doi:10.1177/0002764298041006003. 9. Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. 10. Gromet, D. M. and J. M. Darley (2009). "Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals." Law and society Review 43(1): 1-38. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Dialogue | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 183 Dialogue/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: SchleiermacherVsTradition: (...) precisely the extension of the hermeneutic task to the "meaningful conversation", which is particularly characteristic of Schleiermacher, shows how the meaning of strangeness, which hermeneutics is supposed to overcome, has fundamentally changed in comparison to the previous task of hermeneutics. In a new, universal sense strangeness is given indissolubly with the individuality of the "you". Gadamer: Nevertheless, one must not take the lively, even brilliant sense of human individuality that distinguishes Schleiermacher as an individual characteristic that influences theory here. Rather, it is the critical rejection of all that which in the Age of Enlightenment under the title "Reasonable Thoughts" was regarded as the common essence of humanity, which requires a fundamental redefinition of the relationship to tradition(1). Cf. >I-You-Relationship/Gadamer. 1. Chr. Wolff and his school included the "general art of interpretation" consequently to philosophy, since "finally everything aims at the fact that one may recognize and examine other truths, if one understands their speech" (J.Walch, Philosophisches Lexikon, (1726), p. 165). It is similar for Bentley when he demands of the philologist: "His only guides are reason, the light of the author's thoughts and their compelling force" (quoted from Wegner, Antiquity, p. 94). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Disjunction | Logic Texts | Read III 79 Disjunction / tautology / Read: In a sense, "A or B" follows from A alone - but then is not equivalent to "if ~ A, then B". Logical Constants. Undecidability: Re III 262 Not constructive: e.g. the proof that there are two irrational numbers a and b, so that a is highly b rational (the disjunction of alternatives is constructively unacceptable here). We have no construction by which we can determine whether root 2 to the power of root 2 is rational or not). The excluded third party is therefore intuitionistic and not a substantial assertion. >Undecidability, >Intuitionism. Goldbach's conjecture: every even number greater than two should be the sum of two prime numbers. Not decidable. But we must not claim that it is either true or not. Theorem of the Excluded Middle/Constructivism/Read: Constructivists often present so-called "weak counterexamples" against the Excluded Third. If a is a real number, "a= 0" is not decidable. Consequently, the constructivist cannot claim that all real numbers are either identical with zero or not. (But this is more a question of representation). >Excluded middle, >Goldbach's conjecture. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Dispositions | Armstrong | II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. >Microstructure/Armstrong. II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: II 92 but the non-disp properties plus "strong" laws of nature which connect these non-disp properties are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction is necessary. II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Dispositions | Place | Armstrong II 1 f Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability. Place III 113 Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable. Armstrong II 4f Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong. Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them. Armstrong II 5 Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. Armstrong II 6 Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/Armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations. Armstrong II 6 Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause). Place II 62 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties. Armstrong II (c) 90 Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions. ArmstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions. Armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property? Armstrong II (c) 90/91 Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Armstrong II 92 Armstrong II 93 Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 94 Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected. Place III 108 Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure. Place III 109 Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties. Place III 119 Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement. Martin III 163 Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. Armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. - Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners. Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object. Martin III 165 Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality. Martin III 166 Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation. II 174 Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Distribution | Geach | Geach I 6 Distribution: an expression cannot occur in the conclusion, which has not occurred in the premises. >Syllogism, >Premises, >Conclusion, >Inference, >Antecedent/consequent, cf. >Conservativity. ad I 54: Salmon IV 106 Distribution/Salmon (external) : each categorical expression of a term of a syllogism must be distributed (refer to each individual in the domain). E.g. All whales are mammals does not say anything about any whale but about any mammal.(1) >Domain. 1. Wesley C. Salmon Logik, Stuttgart 1983, p. 106 Geach I 102/3 Distribution/distributed "any" instead of "all" (cumulative). >All/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| Distributive Justice | Utilitarianism | Gaus I 223 Distributive Justice/Utilitarianism/Lamont: Over the last couple of centuries, one traditional answer to the question of how the goods and services of a society should be distributed has been that they should be distributed in a way that increases the welfare ofthe poor. Gaus I 224 Under utilitarianism, the right distribution is that which maximizes overall welfare, or 'utility', variously interpreted as net positive happiness, preference satisfaction, pleasure, or well-being (Bayles, 1978(1); Kelly, 1990(2); Smart and Williams, 1973(3)). VsUtilitarianism: problems: Unfortunately, through such extension, the theory makes the requirement to benefit the poor a contingent matter, according to the degree such help will maximize overall welfare. Utilitarians, who tend to accept the diminishing marginal utility of resources, believe resources will tend to produce more good when redistributed to the poor than to the rich. Nevertheless, there are easily describable conditions, such as in the case ofa poor but satisfied person and a non-satiated rich person, under which utilitarianism would prescribe forcibly transferring goods from the poor to the rich person. Because of prescriptions such as this, and others, which systematically violate common sense morality (Scheffler, 1988(4); 1994(5)), the ongoing movement in utilitarian theory, in the last two decades, has been towards variations of 'indirect' and 'institutional' utilitarianism (Bailey, 1997(6); Goodin, 1988(7); 1995(8); Pettit, 1997(9)). The most forceful idea of these theories is to restrict the application of utilitarianism to guide the choice of practices, institutions or public policies rather than to guide individual actions. >About utilitariansism. 1. Bayles, Michael D., ed. (1978) Contemporary Utilitarianism. Gloucester, MA: Smith. 2. Kelly, P. J. (1990) Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Smart, J. J. C. and Bernard Williams (1973) Utilitarianism For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Scheffler, Samuel, ed. (1988) Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Scheffler, Samuel (1994) The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. edn. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Bailey, James Wood (1997) Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Goodin, Robert E. (1988) Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the Welfare State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Goodin, Robert E. (1995) Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 9. Pettit, Philip (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Economic Rent | Ricardo | Kurz I 280 Economic Rent/Ricardo/classical economics/Kurz: In the Principles Ricardo defines rent rigorously in the following way: „Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landIord for the use of the original and indestructihle powers of the soil.“ (Ricardo 1951 : 67)(1). „It is often, however, confounded with the interest and profit of capital, and, in popular language, the term is applied to whatever is annually paid by a farmer to his landlord. If, of two adjoining farms of the same extent, Kurz I 281 and of the same natural fertility, one had all the conveniences of farming buildings, and, besides, were properly drained and manured, and advantageously divided by hedges, fences and walls, while the other had none of these advantages, more remuneration would naturally be paid for the use of one, than for the use of the other; yet in both cases this remuneration would be called rent. But it is evident, that a portion only of the oney annually to be paid for the improved farm, would be given for the original and indestructible powers of the soil; the other portion would be paid for the use of the capital which had been employed in ameliorating the quality of the land, and in erecting such buildings as were necessary to secure and preserve the produce.“ (Ricardo 1951: 67)(1) RicardoVsSmith, Adam: Adam Smith, Ricardo goes on to argue, did not stick to a rigorously defined concept when using the word rent. In Part II of Chapter XI of Book I of The Wealth of Nations ( WN)(2), 'Of the Produce of Land which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford Rent', Smith gives an example of the timber business, timber clearly being a reproducible resource, in which he confounds the concepts of profits and rent (WN I.xi.c.5)(2): „He [Smith] tells us, that the demand for timber, and its consequent high price, in the more southern countries of Europe, caused a rent to be paid for forests in Norway, which could before afford no rent. Is it not, however, evident, that the person who paid what he thus calls rent, paid it in consideration of the valuable commodity which was then standing on the land, and that he actually repaid himself with a profit, by the sale of the timber? If, indeed, after the timber was removed, any compensation were paid to the landlord for the use of the land, for the purpose of growing timber or any other produce, with a view to future demand, such compensation might justly be called rent, because it would be paid for productive powers of the land; but in the case stated by Adam Smith, the compensation was paidfor the liberty of removing and se/ling the timber, and not for the liberty of growing it.“ (Ricardo 1951(1): 68) Kurz I 282 Profit/rent/Ricardo: In Ricardo's view the distinction between profits and rent is crucial, because as capital accumulates and the population grows the two component parts of the social surplus are typically affected differently: „This is a distinction of great importance, in an enquiry concerning rent and profits; for it is found, that the laws which regulate the progress of rent, are widely different from those which regulate the progress of profits, and se/dom operate in the same direction. In all improved countries, that which is annually paid to the landlord, partaking of both characters, rent and profit, is sometimes kept stationary by the effects of opposing causes; at other times advances or recedes, as one or the other of these causes preponderates. In the future pages of this work, then, whenever I speak of the rent of land, I wish to be understood as speaking of that compensation, which is paid to the owner of land for the use of its original and indestructible powers.“ (Ricardo 1951:68-9(1)) RicardoVsSmith, Adam: Hence what Smith called 'rent' of coal mines or stone quarries is to Ricardo profits and not rent. >Profit, >Economic Rent, >Royalties. 1. Ricardo, D. (1951 [1817]) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in P. Sraffa (ed.) with the collaboration Of M.H. Dobb, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (P/b edn 2004, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.) 2. Smith, A. (1976 [1776]) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,in R.H. Campbell, AS Skinner and WB. Todd (eds), The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (In the text quoted as WN, book number, chapter number, section number, paragraph number.) Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „Ricardo on exhaustible resources, and the Hotelling Rule.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. Rothbard II 83 Rent/land/Ricardo/Rothbard: Rent served as the linchpin of the Ricardian system. For, according to Ricardo's rather bizarre theory, only land differed in quality. Labour, as we have seen, was assumed to be uniform, and therefore wage rates are uniform, and, as we shall see, profits are also assumed to be uniform because of the crucial postulate of the economy's always being in long-run equilibrium. >Labour, >Ricardo, >Wages/Ricardo. Land is the only factor which miraculously is allowed to differ in quality. Next, Ricardo assumes away any discovery of new lands or improvements in agricultural productivity. His theory of history therefore concludes that people always begin by cultivating the most fertile lands, and, as population increases, the Malthusian pressure on the food supply forces the producers to use ever more inferior lands. In short, as population and food production rise, the cost of growing corn must inexorably rise over time. Rent, in Ricardo's phrase, is payment for the ‘use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil’. This hints at a productivity theory, and indeed Ricardo did see that more fertile and productive lands earned a higher rent. But unfortunately, as Schumpeter put it, Ricardo then ‘embarks upon his detour’. In the first place, Ricardo made the assumption that at any moment the poorest land in cultivation yields a zero rent. He concluded from that alleged fact that a given piece of land earns rent not because of its own productivity, but merely because its productivity is greater than the poorest, zero-rent, land under cultivation. Remember that, for Ricardo, labour is homogeneous and hence wages uniform and equal, and, as we shall see, profits are also uniform and equal. Land is unique in its permanent, long-run structure of differential fertility and productivity. Hence, to Ricardo, rent is purely a Rothbard II 84 differential, and Land A earns rent solely because of its differential productivity compared to Land B, the zero-rent land in cultivation. Rent/land/Ricardo: To Ricardo, several important points followed from these assumptions. First, as population inexorably increases, and poorer and poorer lands are used, all the differentials keep increasing. Thus, say that, at one point of time, corn lands (which sums up all land) range in productivity from the highest, Land A, through a spectrum down to Land J, which, being marginal, earns a zero rent. >Marginal costs/Ricardo. Rothbard II 95 RothbardVsRicardo/Problems: (…) in discussing the rise in cost of producing corn, Ricardo reverses cause and effect. Ricardo states that increasing population ‘obliges’ farmers to work land of inferior quality and then causes a rise in its price. But as any utility theory analyst would realize, the causal chain is precisely the reverse: when the demand for corn increases, its price would rise, and the higher price would lead farmers to grow corn on higher-cost land. But this realization, of course, eliminates the Ricardian theory of value and with it the entire Ricardian system. (…) as numerous critics have pointed out, it is certainly not true historically that people always start using the highest-quality land and then sink gradually and inevitably down to more and more inferior land. Rothbard II 91 VsRicardo/Rothbard: One of the greatest fallacies of the Ricardian theory of rent is that it ignores the fact that landlords do perform a vital economic function: they allocate land to its best and most productive use. Land does not allocate itself; it must be allocated, and only those who earn a return from such service have the incentive, or the ability, to allocate various parcels of land to their most profitable, and hence most productive and economic uses. >Allocation. Ricardo himself did not go all the way to government expropriation of land rent. His short-run solution was to call for lowering of the tariff on corn, or even repeal of the Corn Laws entirely. Rothbard II 108 VsRicardo: The Ricardian theory of rent was effectively demolished by Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783–1869) in his pamphlet, The True Theory of Rent (1826)(1). Thompson weighed in against this fallacious capstone to the Ricardian system: ‘The celebrated Theory of Rent’, Thompson charged, ‘is founded on a fallacy’, for demand is the key to the price of corn and to rent. The fallacy lies, in assuming to be the cause what in reality is only a consequence... [I]t is the rise in the price of produce... that enables and causes inferior land to be brought into cultivation; and not the cultivation of inferior land that causes the rise of rent. 1. Thomas Perronet Thompson. 1826. The True Theory of Rent, in Opposition to Mr. Ricardo and Others. Being an Exposition of Fallacies on Rent, Tithes, &C. In the Form of a Review of Mr. Mill's Elements of Political Economy. London. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Egalitarianism | Miller | Gaus I 417 Egalitarianism/Miller/Weinstein: Miller would resist being characterized as an egalitarian liberal; he would view this label as conflating 'simple' distributive equality with the 'complex' market socialist equality he favours.* The former stipulates that people should be equal with regard to some X and thus limits debates about equality to disputes about 'equality of what? Walzer: Following Michael Walzer, complex equality is not about distributing some X. Rather it is a 'social ideal' about how we should treat each other as equals. Miller: But Miller remains an egalitarian liberal nevertheless: 'An egalitarian society must be one which recognizes a number of distinct goods', ensuring that each 'is distributed according to its own proper criterion [desert, need and equality]'. As long as no distributive sphere dominates others, complex equality is secured. The real 'enemy of equality is dominance' which must be politically regulated (1995(1): 203). And dominance is nefarious because it is so harmful to individual self-development. Cf. >Self-realization/Hobhouse. Tradition: Miller readily concedes that his political theory draws on two political traditions: 'distributive equality from the tradition of liberalism, social equality from social democracy and socialism' (1999: 244). Consequently, Miller is a true heir to the new liberals. Equally for them, no justice principle is sovereign. Equality and need temper desert qua individual choice and responsibility, allowing all citizens real equal opportunity to develop their talents according to their own lights. MillerVsDworkin/MillerVsSen: (...) Dworkin's and Sen's versions are egalitarian in what Miller pejoratively labels the 'simple' sense. Whereas Dworkin prefers equalizing resources, Sen prefers equalizing capabilities. >Life/Dworkin. * For Miller, there is 'no profound antagonism between meritocracy' and a suitably regulated market because the more egalitarian a market economy is, the more likely it allocates rewards according to merit (1999(2): 179). Also see Miller's defence of market socialism in Market, State and Community (1989)(3) and Cohen (1995(4): ch. I l) for a critical response. 1. Miller, David (1995) 'Complex equality'. In David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds, Pluralism, Justice and Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197-225. 2. Miller, David (1999) Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Miller, David (1989) Market, State and Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Cohen, G. A. (1995) Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Egalitarianism | Sen | Gaus I 417 Egalitarianism/Sen/Weinstein: Sen's egalitarian liberalism testifies to liberalism's conceptual flexibility by combining an 'inclusive' form of consequentialism with basic 'capability equality'. For Sen, morality is 'consequence-based' though it is not more narrowly consequentialist. >Liberalism. Consequentialism: Consequentialism is narrower because it is arbitrarily evaluator-neutral.'Consequence-based evaluation' , by contrast, includes non-utility information such as agent relativity. Deontology: In Sen's words, 'deontological values can, in fact, be accommodated within consequence-based evaluation through evaluatorrelative outcome moralities' (1982(1): 38).* Deontology. Practical reasoning/Sen: More recently, Sen refers to his version of practical reasoning as 'deontic-value inclusive consequential reasoning' (2001(2) : 64). Such reasoning forbids prioritizing either the right or the good. Rather, these concepts are linked, thus requiring that we consider them simultaneously: 'While considerations of freedoms, rights and duties are not the only ones that matter (for example, well-being does too), they are nevertheless part of the contentions that we have reason to take into account in deciding on what would be best ... to do' (2001(2): 61). >Consequentialism/Sen, >Equality/Sen. * For Sen (1979)(3), welfarism is a narrower form of consequentialism while utilitarianism is a narrower form of welfarism. Whereas consequentialism evaluates actions according to the goodness of the state of affairs they produce, welfarism judges the goodness of a state of affairs by the goodness of its utilities. Utilitarianism judges the goodness of a state's utilities by their sum total. 1. Sen, Amartya (1982) 'Rights and agency'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11: 3-39. 2. Sen, Amartya (2001) 'Reply'. Economics and Philosophy, 17: 51-65. 3. Sen, Amartya (1979) 'Utilitarianism and welfarism'. The Journal of Philosophy, LXXVI: 463-89. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Emissions | Policy of the United States | Kiesling I 34 Emissions/Policy of the US/Kiesling: In 1970 the US Congress passed the Clean Air Act (CAA), enacting regulatory standards for a specific set of emissions. Geographic areas were required to meet specific National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), and companies that were the sources of emissions faced limits on their emission rates and regulation of the particular technologies that could be used in production processes. One of the “criteria pollutants” regulated under the CAA was sulphur dioxide (SO2), produced primarily from burning coal to generate electricity. When airborne SO2 combines with water, sulfuric acid is the result; it falls as acid rain and harms aquatic life, trees, and the carved faces of sculptures on buildings. Airborne SO2 also causes respiratory illness and consequent health costs. The CAA regulations led power plant owners to build tall smokestacks to reduce local SO2 emissions, but that SO2 entered the jet stream and was transported to other regions where the resulting acid rain caused harm. The CAA regulations had not reduced the harms associated with SO2 emissions, but had relocated them, and many areas were still not meeting the CAA’s air quality standards. Economists working on environmental policy suggested a different approach. |
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| Equality | Pettit | Brocker I 854 Equality/Pettit: Pettit emphasizes the primal equality of all individuals, to whose protection the political sphere and the interventions of the state must contribute.(1) "In order to be a free citizen, one must enjoy lack of control in such a spectrum of choice and on the basis of such state resources and protection that one is on an equal footing with others" (Pettit 2015 (2) and Pettit 2012 (3)). >Society, >Community, >Civil Rights, >Interventionism. It does not follow for Pettit that all individuals should be treated equally. On the contrary: unfavourable starting positions Brocker I 855 and lack of equal opportunities must be compensated as far as possible. This can also include deep interference in the unimpeded material self-development of particularly privileged citizens, i.e. making group-specific restrictions on freedom necessary. Equality does not mean individual freedom of choice in every respect. (PettitVsLiberalism.) >Liberalism, >Equal Opportunities. Pettit himself describes this pattern of reasoning as "consequentialist". The conceptualisation of the granted state's regulatory potential is measured by the consideration of the consequences it will have for the creation of the greatest possible equality for each individual.(4) >Government Regulation. 1.Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 110f 2. Philip Pettit Gerechte Freiheit. Ein moralischer Kompass für eine komplexe Welt, Berlin 2015, S. 98, vgl. S. 112 3. Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms. A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, Cambridge 2012. S. 90 4.Pettit 1997, S. 113 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Ethics | Ethics, philosophy: ethics is concerned with the evaluation and justification of actions and ultimately a justification of morality. See also good, values, norms, actions, deontology, deontological logic, consequentialism, morals, motives, reasons, action theory. |
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| Ethics | Bostrom | I 257 Ethics/morals/morality/superintelligence//Bostrom: No ethical theory commands majority support among philosophers, so most philosophers must be wrong. ((s)VsBostrom: It is not a question of applause as to which theory is correct.) I 369 Majorities in ethics/Bostrom: A recent canvass of professional philosophers found the percentage of respondents who “accept or leans toward” various positions. On normative ethics, the results were deontology 25.9%; - consequentialism 23.6%; - virtue ethics 18.2%. On metaethics, results were moral realism 56.4%; - moral anti-realism 27.7%. On moral judgment: cognitivism 65.7%; - non-cognitivism 17.0% (Bourget and Chalmers 2009(1)) >Norms/normativity/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky. Morality models: I 259 Coherent Extrapolated Volition/CEV/Yudkowsky: Our coherent extrapolated volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted. >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky. I 266 VsCEV/Bostrom: instead: Moral rightness/MR/Bostrom: (…) build an AI with the goal of doing what is morally right, relying on the AI’s superior cognitive capacities to figure out just which actions fit that description. We can call this proposal “moral rightness” (MR). The idea is that we humans have an imperfect understanding of what is right and wrong (…) ((s)VsBostrom: This delegates human responsibility and ultimately assumes that human decisions are only provisional until non-human decisions are made.) I 267 BostromVsYudkowsky: MR would do away with various free parameters in CEV, such as the degree of coherence among extrapolated volitions that is required for the AI to act on the result, the ease with which a majority can overrule dissenting minorities, and the nature of the social environment within which our extrapolated selves are to be supposed to have “grown up farther together.” BostromVsMR: Problem: 1. MR would also appear to have some disadvantages. It relies on the notion of “morally right,” a notoriously difficult concept (…). I 268 2. (…) [MR] might not give us what we want or what we would choose if we were brighter and better informed. Solution/Bostrom: Goal for AI: MP: Among the actions that are morally permissible for the AI, take one that humanity’s CEV would prefer. However, if some part of this instruction has no well-specified meaning, or if we are radically confused about its meaning, or if moral realism is false, or if we acted morally impermissibly in creating an AI with this goal, then undergo a controlled shutdown.(*) Follow the intended meaning of this instruction. I 373 (Annotation) *Moral permissibility/Bostrom: When the AI evaluates the moral permissibility of our act of creating the AI, it should interpret permissibility in its objective sense. In one ordinary sense of “morally permissible,” a doctor acts morally permissibly when she prescribes a drug she believes will cure her patient - even if the patient, unbeknownst to the doctor, is allergic to the drug and dies as a result. Focusing on objective moral permissibility takes advantage of the presumably superior epistemic position of the AI. ((s)VsBostrom: The last sentence (severability) is circular, especially when there are no longer individuals in decision-making positions who could object to it. >Goals/superintelligence/Bostrom. I 312 Def Common good principle/Bostrom: Superintelligence should be developed only for the benefit of all of humanity and in the service of widely shared ethical ideals. I 380 This formulation is intended to be read so as to include a prescription that the well-being of nonhuman animals and other sentient beings (including digital minds) that exist or may come to exist be given due consideration. It is not meant to be read as a license for one AI developer to substitute his or her own moral intuitions for those of the wider moral community. 1. Bourget, David, and Chalmers, David. 2009. “The PhilPapers Surveys.” November. Available at http://philpapers.org/surveys/ |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Ethics | Geach | I 270 Moral/Logic/Geach: morality is often regarded as imperatives, but there is a different logic. "Shall I?": there are only two possible answers, and these are contradictory. In the case of "Should I": there three possible answers: (A) the duty to do ... (B) the right to do... pro, but also contra, (C) the obligation, not ... - I 279 Contradiction/action/moral/ethics/Strawson/Geach: in interesting cases, R is not inconsistent with P and Q itself, but because the contradiction follows from P and Q together. From P and Q and R together follows S and its contradiction ~S, therefore it does not matter if we explain consequence in terms of inconsistency, or vice versa inconsistency in terms of consequence. GeachVsWilliams: even if a contradictory order follows from an earlier given, one will not say that the command recipient had received the order to draw a wrong conclusion. Williams: if no action follows, no practical conclusion was concluded. GeachVsWilliams: vice versa, if the conclusion can be derived, the conclusion exists. >Contradiction, >Conclusion, >Consequence, cf. >Deontology, >Consequentialism. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Ethics | Nagel | III 109f Ethics/Nagel. Consequentialism: thesis: the consequences of action are important - not how the action feels for the actor. >Consequentialism, >Action. NagelVs: it about the permission to lead one’s own life. III 111 Internal perspective: Problem: that murder is prohibited does not command to prevent others from committing it. Utilitarianism: good/bad. Internal perspective: legal/illegal. >Subjectivity/Nagel, >Utilitarianism. III 112 Ethics/Nagel: core question: how far may the internal point of view be included? Life is always the individual life. - It cannot be lived sub specie aeternitatis. - The limits are always the individual possibilities. >Limits. III 87ff Ethics/Nagel: the acting from one’s own perspective has such a strong value that deontological paradoxes cannot be excluded. - They would only be avoidable at the cost of the impersonal world. >Deontology. III 86 Parallel objectivity/consciousness/ethics/Nagel: the objective world must contain the subjective perspectives. >Objectivity, >Objectivity/Nagel. Ethics: the neutral reasons that consider the actions of the subject with all its seemingly superstitious reasons. >Recognition, >Intersubjectivity. II 49 Determinism/ethics/Nagel: responsibility also exists in deterministic actions when the determination is intrinsic. - Actions that are determined by nothing are incomprehensible. >Determinism. II 54 Ethics/law/moral/God/theology/Nagel: an act is not converted into something wrong just because God exists. >Morals, >God, >Justification, >Theology. II 54 Categorical imperative/NagelVsKant: nothing but a direct interest in the other can be considered as a basis of ethics. >Categorical imperative. II 55 But: the reason not to do evil to someone else cannot be anchored in the individual person - II 61 Problem: Moral should not depend on the strength of interest in others. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Eudemonia | Aristotle | Höffe I 59 Self-love/Aristoteles/Höffe: In the course of the detailed treatise on friendship, Aristotle addresses the question of who one should love most, oneself or another.(1) Only at first glance is the answer surprising: the good man should love himself, the bad man should not. For Aristotle's argument is convincing: because the good man acts morally, he benefits himself and others at the same time; he stands up for his friends and his community; he sacrifices money, if necessary, even his life. The evil one, on the other hand, follows his bad passions, thereby harming both himself and his neighbor. Consequently, only with the good man does one's own happiness form a unity with the happiness of others, and the friend becomes an "other self". At the same time, Aristotle solves a basic problem of Eudaimonism, like someone who commits himself to the principle of happiness but is nevertheless able to be an altruist: He can because he makes friendships Höffe I 60 "in the name of happiness" that go far beyond his own benefit. The form of life dedicated to the divine in man has a higher rank than the ordinary, righteous life. >Self-love/Aristotle. Self-sufficiency: The life dedicated to the Theoria (...) fulfils the eudaimony criterion, self-sufficiency, to a higher degree. For, unlike political life, there is no need for external goods, nor for fellow citizens and friends; moreover, it is free from the threat of adverse circumstances. 1.Nicomachian ethics, VII and IX. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Evenly Rotating Economy | Mises | Rothbard III 320 Evenly Rotating Economy/Mises/Rothbard: Analysis of the activities of production in a monetary market economy is a highly complex matter. An explanation of these activities, in particular the determination of prices and therefore the return to factors, the allocation of factors, and the formation of capital, can be developed only ifwe use the mental construction of the evenly rotating economy. This construction is developed as follows: We realize that the real world of action is one of continual change. Individual value scales, technological ideas, and the quantities of means available are always changing. These changes continually impel the economy in various directions. Value scales change, and consumer demand shifts from one good to another. Technological ideas change, and factors are used in different ways. Both types of change have differing effects on prices. Time preferences change, with certain effects on interest and capital formation. Problem: (…) before the effects of any one change are completely worked out, other changes intervene. Solution: What we must consider, (…) by the use of reasoning, is what would happen if no changes intervened. (…) what would occur if value scales, technological ideas, and the given resources remained constant? What would then happen to prices and production and their relations? Given values, technology, and resources, whatever their concrete form, remain constant. In that case, the economy tends toward a state of affairs in which it is evenly rotating, i.e., in which the same activities tend to be repeated in the same pattern over and over again. Cf. As if/Philosophy. Thus, if values, technology, and resources remain constant, we have two successive states of affairs: (a) the period of transition to an unchanging, evenly rotating economy, and (b) the unchanging round of the evenly rotating economy itself. Final equilibirum: This latter stage is the state of final equilibrium. It is to be distinguished from the market equilibrium prices that are set each day by the interaction of supply and demand. The final equilibrium state is one which the economy is always tending to approach. Rothbard III 321 Problem: In actual life, however, the data are always changing, and therefore, before arriving at a final equilibrium point, the economy must shift direction, towards some other final equilibrium position. Hence, the final equilibrium position is always changing, and consequently no one such position is ever reached in practice. But even though it is never reached in practice, it has a very real importance. Solution: 1) It is never reached in practice and it is always changing, but it explains the direction in which the dog ((s) the economy) is moving. 2) (…) the complexity of the market system is such that we cannot analyze factor prices and incomes in a world of continual change unless we first analyze their determination in an evenly rotating world where there is no change and where given conditions are allowed to work themselves out to the full. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Excluded Middle | Logic Texts | Read III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the conditionally excluded middle: one or the other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. - That equals the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - Stalnaker pro - LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi: all combinations are wrong - Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar - LewisVs: The amount of the possible worlds in the Lewis 2 m + e is large, whereby e decreases suitably; it has no limit. - Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: he proposes that "if A, then B" is then true in w if there is either no "A or non-B" world, or some "A" and "B" world that is more similar than any "A and non-B" world. >Similarity metrics. --- III 110 Verdi-Example: where there is no unique, most similar world, the "would" condition sentences are false because there is no similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are fellow country men, in which Bizet has a different nationality. - Example: if you get an A, you will receive a scholarship: will be true if there is a more similar world in which you get both for each world in which you get an A and not a scholarship. - ((s) without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). >Similarity. --- III 263 Law of the excluded middle/constructivism/Read: Constructivists often present so-called "weak counterexamples" against the excluded middle - if a is a real number, "a = 0" is not decidable. Consequently, the constructivist cannot claim that all real numbers are either identical to zero or not. - But this is more of a question of representation. >Constructivism, >Presentation. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Experience | Popper | Flor II 479 Experiences: between statements and experiences, there are no logical relations. Consequently, the adoption of a basic sentence is always conventional. >Background knowledge. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Experiments | Gifford | Haslam I 233 Experiment/Gifford/Hamilton: Hamilton and Gifford (1976)(1) reported two experiments that used a common method. In the first of these, participants were presented with 39 statements that described either positive or negative behaviors undertaken by a member of one of two (unnamed) groups: Group A or Group B. These statements were of the form: ‘John, a member of Group A, is not always honest about small sums of money.’ See also McConnell et al. 1994(2). Haslam I 234 The experiment’s cover story informed participants that ‘in the real world population, Group B is smaller than Group A. Consequently statements about Group B occur less frequently’. In line with this, of the 39 statements, 26 were about Group A and 13 were about Group B. Similarly, 27 statements described behaviours that had previously been judged to be positive and 12 described behaviours that had previously been judged to be negative. Positive and negative behaviours were ascribed to members of both the large group (A) and the small group (B). Results: The important feature of this set of stimulus statements is that the ratio of positive to negative statements is the same for both groups (i.e., 9:4). Because the groups are unnamed (and there are therefore no cues about the groups they might correspond to in society) there is no reason for the participants to have expectations about one group or the other. The key empirical question, then, was whether participants would see the two groups to be equally good, or whether they would judge one more positively than the other. Measuring: 1) Assignment measure: examined participant’s recognition of the statements. participants were presented with the 39 behaviours and asked to remember the group membership of the person who had exhibited each of the behaviours. Here, if the doubly distinctive behaviours (negative behaviours performed by Group B) were overrepresented in memory then one would expect negative behaviours attributed to the small group to be less likely to be forgotten and hence to be overestimated. 2) Frequency estimation: participants were asked to indicate the number of negative behaviours performed by members of the two groups. Again one would expect that if doubly distinctive behaviours are more likely to attract attention and be stored in memory, then participants would tend to overestimate the negative behaviours performed by the minority group. Haslam I 235 Results: Participants overestimated the number of undesirable behaviours performed by members of the minority group (B). Problems: Paired distinctiveness implies improved memory rather than the creation of false or distorted memories, and we would therefore expect that any effect on measures of memory would be rather muted. Solution/Gifford/Hamilton: introduction of a third measure: 3) Trait ratings: this was introduced instead of a memory task: it involved rating the two groups on a range of evaluative dimensions (e.g., indicating how popular, sociable, industrious and intelligent they were). This measure involves responses that are close to the everyday conception of stereotypes. It could show that paired distinctiveness impacts on actual judgments of groups – and indeed this is precisely what happened, with participants here rating Group A much more positively than Group B. A second study in which the majority of behaviours were negative rather than positive. This second study was important because it appears to rule out the possibility that the effect could be caused by a bias against small groups or something as simple as a preference for the label ‘Group A’ vs. ‘Group B’. Haslam I 236 For comments on the studies of Gifford and Hamilton see Richard Eiser’s Cognitive Social Psychology(3), the 3rd edition of Eliot Smith and Diane Mackie’s Social Psychology (2007)(4), Smith, 1991(5); Spears et al., 1985(6), 1986(7). 1. Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976) ‘Illusory correlation in intergroup perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407. 2. McConnell, A.R., Sherman, S.J. and Hamilton, D.L. (1994) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of groups: An extension of the distinctiveness-based account’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67: 414–29. 3. Eiser, J.R. (1980) Cognitive Social Psychology. London: McGraw-Hill. 4. Smith, E.R. and Mackie, D. (2007) Social Psychology, 3rd edn. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 5. Smith, E.R. (1991) ‘Illusory correlation in a simulated exemplar-based memory’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27: 107–23. 6. Spears, R., van der Pligt, J. and Eiser, J.R. (1985) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of group attitudes’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48: 863–75. 7. Spears, R., van der Pligt, J. and Eiser, J.R. (1986) ‘Generalizing the illusory correlation effect’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51: 1127–34. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Experiments | Hamilton | Haslam I 233 Experiment/Gifford/Hamilton: Hamilton and Gifford (1976)(1) reported two experiments that used a common method. In the first of these, participants were presented with 39 statements that described either positive or negative behaviors undertaken by a member of one of two (unnamed) groups: Group A or Group B. These statements were of the form: ‘John, a member of Group A, is not always honest about small sums of money.’ See also McConnell et al. 1994(2). Haslam I 234 The experiment’s cover story informed participants that ‘in the real world population, Group B is smaller than Group A. Consequently statements about Group B occur less frequently’. In line with this, of the 39 statements, 26 were about Group A and 13 were about Group B. Similarly, 27 statements described behaviours that had previously been judged to be positive and 12 described behaviours that had previously been judged to be negative. Positive and negative behaviours were ascribed to members of both the large group (A) and the small group (B). Results: The important feature of this set of stimulus statements is that the ratio of positive to negative statements is the same for both groups (i.e., 9:4). Because the groups are unnamed (and there are therefore no cues about the groups they might correspond to in society) there is no reason for the participants to have expectations about one group or the other. The key empirical question, then, was whether participants would see the two groups to be equally good, or whether they would judge one more positively than the other. Measuring: 1) Assignment measure: examined participant’s recognition of the statements. participants were presented with the 39 behaviours and asked to remember the group membership of the person who had exhibited each of the behaviours. Here, if the doubly distinctive behaviours (negative behaviours performed by Group B) were overrepresented in memory then one would expect negative behaviours attributed to the small group to be less likely to be forgotten and hence to be overestimated. 2) Frequency estimation: participants were asked to indicate the number of negative behaviours performed by members of the two groups. Again one would expect that if doubly distinctive behaviours are more likely to attract attention and be stored in memory, then participants would tend to overestimate the negative behaviours performed by the minority group. Haslam I 235 Results: Participants overestimated the number of undesirable behaviours performed by members of the minority group (B). Problems: Paired distinctiveness implies improved memory rather than the creation of false or distorted memories, and we would therefore expect that any effect on measures of memory would be rather muted. Solution/Gifford/Hamilton: introduction of a third measure: 3) Trait ratings: this was introduced instead of a memory task: it involved rating the two groups on a range of evaluative dimensions (e.g., indicating how popular, sociable, industrious and intelligent they were). This measure involves responses that are close to the everyday conception of stereotypes. It could show that paired distinctiveness impacts on actual judgments of groups – and indeed this is precisely what happened, with participants here rating Group A much more positively than Group B. A second study in which the majority of behaviours were negative rather than positive. This second study was important because it appears to rule out the possibility that the effect could be caused by a bias against small groups or something as simple as a preference for the label ‘Group A’ vs. ‘Group B’. Haslam I 236 For comments on the studies of Gifford and Hamilton see Richard Eiser’s Cognitive Social Psychology(3), the 3rd edition of Eliot Smith and Diane Mackie’s Social Psychology (2007)(4), Smith, 1991(5); Spears et al., 1985(6), 1986(7). >Simplification/Psychological theories, >Stereotypes/Social psychology, >Illusory correlation/Gifford/Hamilton. 1. Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976) ‘Illusory correlation in intergroup perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407. 2. McConnell, A.R., Sherman, S.J. and Hamilton, D.L. (1994) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of groups: An extension of the distinctiveness-based account’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67: 414–29. 3. Eiser, J.R. (1980) Cognitive Social Psychology. London: McGraw-Hill. 4. Smith, E.R. and Mackie, D. (2007) Social Psychology, 3rd edn. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 5. Smith, E.R. (1991) ‘Illusory correlation in a simulated exemplar-based memory’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27: 107–23. 6. Spears, R., van der Pligt, J. and Eiser, J.R. (1985) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of group attitudes’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48: 863–75. 7. Spears, R., van der Pligt, J. and Eiser, J.R. (1986) ‘Generalizing the illusory correlation effect’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51: 1127–34. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Facts | Putnam | V 266 Def Fact/Putnam: a fact is something to believe that is rational. Fact: a fact is also the idealization of the concept of a credible rational statement. Every fact is value loaden. >Idealization, >Rationality. --- I (i) 248/9 Fact/definition/QuineVsReichenbach: problem: the distinction between "fact" and "definition" has collapsed. Reichenbach did support this collapse. PutnamVsDavidson: the perception of a tree depends on our conceptual scheme. It is a matter of degree, what is a fact, and what is a convention. >Reichenbach. PutnamVsDavidson: The perception of a tree depends on our conceptual scheme. It is a matter of degree what is actual, and what is convention. >Conceptual scheme, >Convention. Parisi I 311/312 Facts/values/economic theories/Putnam: In an economic analysis of law, disputes and conflicts between parties are often framed as disagreements as to facts. When facts are in dispute the parties can undertake further investigation and they can recalculate their choices and reassess their optimal course of action. The focus on factual disagreement lends itself to the objective and rational point of viewlessness that grounds the claim that economics is a science. In law, however, disputes are frequently about something more than a disagreement as to facts; they involve disagreements as to values (Putnam, 2002)(1). These value-based disagreements shape the facts as people understand them, and influence the relative importance attributed to any given fact by any particular party. Value disputes are not easily resolved by appeal to economic analysis. At best, economics can only offer some indirect input on factors to consider in a given situation, but in the end law must operate to make a judgment—a value choice between and among competing claims that are often based on emotion, culture, and other human characteristics that are not easily subject to an economic calculus. Consequently, when economic analysis is applied to law, it often functions to redirect attention away from a conflict involving deeply held values and translates the disagreement into one of competing facts. The problem with this move is that it may function to “mask” what the law is really doing and can undermine the traditional role of law in working to mediate tensions among competing and deeply held values in our system of democratic governance (Noonan, 1976)(2). 1. Putnam, Hilary (2002). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Noonan, Jr., John T. (1976). Persons and Masks of the Law. Berkeley: University of California Press. Driesen, David M. and Robin Paul Malloy. “Critics of Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Family | Feminism | Gaus I 279 Family/Feminism/Mottier: (...) there is considerable disagreement as to how precisely to conceptualize the boundaries of the state. As Susan Moller Okin (1991)(1) points out, political science tends to confuse different usages of the terms 'public' and 'private': first, to refer to the distinction between state and society; and second, to refer to the distinction between domestic and non-domestic spheres. The first distinction between state and family is particularly problematic from a feminist point of view: this dichotomy, where everything that relates to the family is considered as private, leads to the exclusion from the conceptual field of political science of a whole series of themes that are, in fact, essential, such as the problem of justice in everyday life, the political dimension of the family, or inequalities between men and women (Okin, 1991)(1). The majority of classic and modern political thinkers (with the exception of Held, Walzer and Sandel) consequently exclude the family from their analyses of political power either explicitly, as do Rousseau, Locke or Hegel, or implicitly, as does John Rawls (Pateman, 1989(2); Okin, 1991(1)). Okin: As Okin notes, this omission is somewhat ironic since the revitalization of modern political theory has in fact coincided with major changes in the family, as well as in wider social relations of gender and their challenge by feminist theory and practice. >Inequalities/Okin, >Privay/Anne Philips. 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1991) 'Gender, the public, the private'. In David Held, ed., Political Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, 67—90. 2. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Family | Nussbaum | Brocker I 907 Family/Nussbaum: On the one hand, the family is a retreat from the individualistic, competitive society that liberal theories promote; on the other hand, however, families are also a (main) place of oppression of women, where they are not regarded as independent persons but as instruments and appendages of the family. Nussbaum's capabilities approach is not directed against the institution of the family itself, but against its supposedly private character. >Capabilities/Nussbaum Consequently, rights of privacy refer only to the individual person and not to the family as an institution. According to Nussbaum, neither the family nor female love and care can be regarded as natural. >Love. Brocker I 908 Family/Nussbaum: has always been legally and politically constructed, even stronger than voluntary organizations such as the church or universities.(2) 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p. 242f 2. Ebenda p.261-264 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Fido-Fido-Principle | Logic Texts | Read III 32f RyleVsCarnap: (Review of Carnap's meaning and necessity): Error: "Fido"-Fido principle: because the name "Fido" gets its meaning from the fact that it refers to a single individual. Hence, we are tempted to assume that other words work in the same way. In his presentation of universals Russell fell into the same trap: according to his view, atomic statements consist of a number of individuals and a universal. >Predication. E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido theory, it must have its meaning from the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to being-a-dog or the universal, dog. Statement/Russell: Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals. This is an unjustified step. "Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: it mistakenly equates meaning with reference. >Meaning, >Reference. "Fido"-Fido Principle: incorrect equation of reference and condition: Russell: falsely believed that Fido was assigned to being-a-dog, whereas predicates, verbs and adjectives would be related to universals. >Universals, >Individual. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Freedom | Hegel | Höffe I 332 Freedom/Hegel/Höffe: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. >State/Hegel, >Free Will. Free will: Hegel wants to show how the free will, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, gradually attains its full, alienation-absorbing reality. HegelVsKant: Hegel deviates significantly from (...) Kant, both in his understanding of freedom and law and in the way he argues. However, he shares the fundamental appreciation of the law and the state. Kant calls the law in eternal peace the "eyeball of God"(1) according to Hegel's basic lines it is "something sacred in the first place" (§ 30)(2). Freedom, with which the differences begin, he understands, however, not negatively as "being allowed to do" and "let do", but positively as "being with oneself in the other". Consequently, he is not satisfied with a generally acceptable freedom, but Höffe I 333 aims at the "existence of free will," where "existence" means as much as "full reality". Cf. >Dasein, >Law/Hegel, >Law/Kant. 1. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795, (Fn. zum Ersten Definitivartikel), 2. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Gender | Democratic Theory | Gaus I 281 Gender/Democratic theory/Mottier: Much of feminist theory has focused on the absence of women from political theory. This theme was first addressed by authors such as Okin (1979)(1), Elshtain (1981)(2), Pateman (1983)(3) and Arlene Saxonhouse (1985(4); see also Mottier, Sgier and Ballmer-Cao, 2000)(5). Their pioneering work demonstrated that modern political theory neglects to address the subordinated position attributed to women in classical theories of democracy. The emergence of modern liberal democracy introduced a universalistic political discourse which claimed to be indifferent to gender or other identity differences. Citizenship/Tradition: Mainstream political theory consequently considers citizenship as a universal concept. Democratic rights of social and political participation apply to each citizen without regard for his or her race, religion or gender. FeminismVsTradition: Feminist authors have shown the central premises of universalistic conceptions of citizenship to be flawed due to gender bias. As the work of Vicky Randall (1998)(6), Ruth Lister (1997)(7) and Sylvia Walby (1994)(8) illustrates, women have been either excluded, or differentially included, in citizenship. >Citizenship/Gender theory. 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1979) Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981) Public Man, Private Women: Women in Social and Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Pateman, Carole (1983) 'Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy'. In S. I. Benn and G. 4. Saxonhouse, Arlene (1985) Women in the History of Political Thought. New York: Praeger. 5. Mottier, Véronique, Lea Sgier and Than-Huyen Ballmer-Cao (2000) 'Les rapports entre le genre et la politique'. In Thanh-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, Véronique Mottier and Lea Sgier, eds, Genre et politique: Débats et perspectives. Paris: Gallimard. 6. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. 7. Lister, Ruth (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 8. Walby, Sylvia (1994) 'Is citizenship gendered?' Sociology, 28 (2): 379-95. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Gender | Mottier | Gaus I 277 Gender/sex/feminism/Mottier: The analytical distinction between sex and gender has been the subject of much discussion within feminist theory. The concept of gender (understood as the social meanings around 'natural' sex differ- ences) has been the focus of an old and now rather tired debate between essentialist and anti-essentialist views, somewhat resuscitated by the recent repopularization of evolutionist and genetic explanations. >Anti-Essentialism. Essentialism: Essentialist approaches to gender consider that women are fundamentally different from men, in particular for biological reasons - although the label of essentialism has become so unpopular today that few feminists seem comfortable with describing their own position in these terms. Anti-essentialism: Anti-essentialists, often inspired by postmodern ideas, consider gender to be a social and political construction. They insist on the cultural and historical variations and multidimensionality of gender identities, and their imbrication with institutionalized relations of power. Both essentialist and anti-essentialist feminists recognize the importance of sex differences, but the political consequences that the respective theorists draw from these diverge. Essentialism: For essentialists, the fundamental differences between men and women need to be addressed by political action, aiming to reduce inequalities between the genders. Anti-essentialism: For anti-essentialists, on the contrary, the social construction of gender identities itself is identified as 'the problem' and object of study. Consequently, not just sexual inequality, but also sexual differen- tiation are considered social constructions (Okin, 1991(1): 67). 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1991) 'Gender, the public, the private'. In David Held, ed., Political Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, 67—90. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Generalization | Freeden | Gaus I 5 Generalization/individuals/generality/political theory/Freeden: (... ) the increasing democratization of politics has shifted the emphasis of scholarship from ‘great men and women’ philosophers to the moral claims any individual and all individuals may direct at their societies and the benefits they ought to derive from social life. Just as historians now seldom tell the story of kings and queens but have developed a keen interest in popular history, so political theorists have refocused around individual selfdevelopment, participation, citizenship, and civic virtue (Young, 1986(1): 479, 484–5), notions close to the concerns of contemporary liberal theory (...). One manifestation of this has been the recent fascination of philosophers with questions of justice. >Self-realization, >Participation. Although justice is a systemic property of a wellorganized society, it has been reformulated, primarily by John Rawls (1971)(2), as establishing the correct manner of attaining fairness for individuals, through devices that ensure that ordinary persons themselves decide reasonably on the rules of justice that ought to apply to them. >Justice, >Justice/Rawls, >J. Rawls. Deontology/method: Consequently, the deontology of rights and duties has been predominantly assigned to individuals, and Anglo-American political philosophy has been resistant to the impingement of groups and communities on its fundamental epistemology – an inclination towards atomism that is itself ideological as well as methodological. >Deontology. Universality/generality: Moreover, that approach is predicated on the assumption that the rationally exercised faculties of individuals will in crucial instances converge on common ground rather than diverge in a range of acceptable, rational and good solutions radiating out from a common core, as John Stuart Mill had indicated. >Generality. 1.Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm. 2. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Generalization | Schurz | I 89 Statistical generalization/statistics/Schurz: spatiotemporally unrestricted. Ex q % of all A's are C's (A: antecedent, C: consequent). Spatiotemporally bounded: Ex p(K I A) = r, (0 I 90 Generalization/Schurz: a) strict: all-propositions with implication (allimplication). Say something about each individual. b) non-strict: statistical generalization/Schurz: ex "q % of all As are Ks". Ex. conditional probability statements. These are not all propositions! They say nothing about an individual, but only about a class. >Universal sentence. I 92 Non-strict generalization/Inference/Schurz: There are no logically deductive inference relations between non-strict generalizations and singular propositions, but only statistical or epistemically inductive probability relations. Singular proposition: Singular propositions do not contain quantifiers. I 96 Qualitative statistical generalization/Schurz: "most". Comparative statistical generalization/Schurz: ""more likely". Very weak, as nothing is communicated about the level. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Genes | Minsky | I 164 Genes/Minsky: No possible inheritance of built-in genes can tell us what is good for us — because, unlike all other animals, we humans make for ourselves most of the problems we face. Accordingly, each human individual must learn new goals from what we call the traditions and heritages of our peers and predecessors. Consequently our genes must build some sort of general-purpose machinery through which individuals can acquire and transmit goals and values from one generation to another. How could brain-machines transfer things like values and goals? >Goals/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky, >Actions/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Geographical Factors | Diamond | Acemoglu I 51 Geographical Hypothesis/Jared Diamond/Acemoglu/Robinson: [An] influential version of the geography hypothesis is advanced by the ecologist and evolutionary biologist Jared Diamond. He argues that the origins of intercontinental inequality at the start of the modern period, five hundred years ago, rested in different historical endowments of plant and animal species, which subsequently influenced agricultural productivity. In some places, such as the Fertile Crescent in the modern Middle East, there were a large number of species that could be domesticated by humans. Elsewhere, such as the Americas, there were not. Having many species capable of being domesticated made it very attractive for societies to make the transition from a hunter-gatherer to a farming lifestyle. As a consequence, farming developed earlier in the Fertile Crescent than in the Americas. Population density grew, allowing specialization of labor, Acemoglu I 52 trade, urbanization, and political development. Crucially, in places where farming dominated, technological innovation took place much more rapidly than in other parts of the world. Thus, according to Diamond, the differential availability of animal and plant species created differential intensities of farming, which led to different paths of technological change and prosperity across different continents. >Geographical factors/Acemolgu. AcemogluVsDiamond, Jared: Though Diamond’s thesis is a powerful approach to the puzzle on which he focuses, it cannot be extended to explain modern world inequality. For example, Diamond argues that the Spanish were able to dominate the civilizations of the Americas because of their longer history of farming and consequent superior technology. But we now need to explain why the Mexicans and Peruvians inhabiting the former lands of the Aztecs and Incas are poor. Diamond’s thesis implies that once the Incas had been exposed to all the species and resulting technologies that they had not been able to develop themselves, they ought quickly to have attained the living standards of the Spanish. Yet nothing of the sort happened. On the contrary, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a much larger gap in incomes between Spain and Peru emerged. VsDiamond: Diamond’s thesis does not tell us why these crucial technologies are not diffusing (...). 1.Jared Diamond (1997). Guns, Germs and Steel New York: W.W. Norton and Co. |
EconDiam I Peter A. Diamond National debt in a neoclassical growth mode 1965 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Goals | Group Psychology | Haslam i 191 Goals/end/group behavior/Pratkanis/Turner/Group psychology: (…) individuals seek to maintain a positive image of their group and are more reactive to potential threats to that image. Image-threatening events, which can include complex and consequential tasks (particularly when they are subject to public scrutiny) shift group members’ goals towards image maintenance and away from other ends (e.g., deliberative, systematic decision-making). To the degree that image maintenance is supported by groupthink symptoms (e.g., beliefs in inherent morality, collective rationalization, stereotyping of outgroups), decision quality by the group tends to deteriorate. (Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1)). Haslam I 194 Adding nuance to Janis’ posited goal states (>Goals/Janis), Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1) and McCauley (1998)(2) point out that the goal of achieving consensus can serve different functions – for example, protecting a social identity or regaining a sense of certainty. In some instances (e.g., under collective threat), the goal of achieving consensus may be associated with specific content: that is, group members may want to reach consensus around a particular conclusion (e.g., a positive group image). In other cases (e.g., under deep uncertainty), any consensus at all might be acceptable, making groups willing to accept negative self-perceptions so long as they are convergent (e.g., see system justification theory; Jost and Banaji, 1994)(3). >System justification. Haslam I 195 Packer/Ungson: other potential goals could include: - a desire for the group to engage in effective collective action (for which consensus is perhaps a means to an end); - a desire for the group to reach a decision quickly (heightened perhaps in crisis situations, and reminiscent of speed/accuracy tradeoffs endemic to human cognition; e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)(4); - a desire for the group to reach a decision with little effort (heightened when the group is overburdened with many complex issues); - a more individual set of desires to be positively regarded and to retain one’s position in the group (as per McCauley’s (1998)(2) social discomfort hypothesis). >Groupthink/Psychological theories. Identification/goals: Pursuit of group-related goals – whatever they are – is stronger to the extent that members identify with their groups (Abrams and Hogg, 1988)(5). Strongly identified group members seek to be regarded as loyal and to make decisions that serve the interests of the group. Norms/accuracy/Packer/Ungson: any one of the goals that conflict with accuracy and deliberation could produce groupthink-type symptoms, although, as pointed out by McCauley (1998)(2), the underlying mechanisms and precise manifestations could differ as a function of the goal in question (e.g., some producing internalization, some compliance). 1. Turner, M.E. and Pratkanis, A.R. (1998a) ‘A social identity maintenance model of groupthink’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 210–35. 2. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 3. Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) ‘The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33: 1–27. 4. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’, Science, 185: 1124–3. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Goals | Pratkanis | Haslam I 191 Goals/end/group behavior/Pratkanis/Turner/Group psychology: (…) individuals seek to maintain a positive image of their group and are more reactive to potential threats to that image. Image-threatening events, which can include complex and consequential tasks (particularly when they are subject to public scrutiny) shift group members’ goals towards image maintenance and away from other ends (e.g., deliberative, systematic decision-making). To the degree that image maintenance is supported by groupthink symptoms (e.g., beliefs in inherent morality, collective rationalization, stereotyping of outgroups), decision quality by the group tends to deteriorate. (Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1)). Haslam I 194 Adding nuance to Janis’ posited goal states (>Goals/Janis), Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1) and McCauley (1998)(2) point out that the goal of achieving consensus can serve different functions – for example, protecting a social identity or regaining a sense of certainty. In some instances (e.g., under collective threat), the goal of achieving consensus may be associated with specific content: that is, group members may want to reach consensus around a particular conclusion (e.g., a positive group image). In other cases (e.g., under deep uncertainty), any consensus at all might be acceptable, making groups willing to accept negative self-perceptions so long as they are convergent (e.g., see system justification theory; Jost and Banaji, 1994)(3). >System justification. Haslam I 195 Packer/Ungson: other potential goals could include: - a desire for the group to engage in effective collective action (for which consensus is perhaps a means to an end); - a desire for the group to reach a decision quickly (heightened perhaps in crisis situations, and reminiscent of speed/accuracy tradeoffs endemic to human cognition; e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)(4); - a desire for the group to reach a decision with little effort (heightened when the group is overburdened with many complex issues); - a more individual set of desires to be positively regarded and to retain one’s position in the group (as per McCauley’s (1998)(2) social discomfort hypothesis). >Groupthink/Psychological theories. Identification/goals: Pursuit of group-related goals – whatever they are – is stronger to the extent that members identify with their groups (Abrams and Hogg, 1988)(5). Strongly identified group members seek to be regarded as loyal and to make decisions that serve the interests of the group. Norms/accuracy/Packer/Ungson: any one of the goals that conflict with accuracy and deliberation could produce groupthink-type symptoms, although, as pointed out by McCauley (1998)(2), the underlying mechanisms and precise manifestations could differ as a function of the goal in question (e.g., some producing internalization, some compliance). 1. Turner, M.E. and Pratkanis, A.R. (1998a) ‘A social identity maintenance model of groupthink’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 210–35. 2. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 3. Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) ‘The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33: 1–27. 4. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’, Science, 185: 1124–3. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Goals | Turner | Haslam i 191 Goals/end/group behavior/Pratkanis/Turner/Group psychology: (…) individuals seek to maintain a positive image of their group and are more reactive to potential threats to that image. Image-threatening events, which can include complex and consequential tasks (particularly when they are subject to public scrutiny) shift group members’ goals towards image maintenance and away from other ends (e.g., deliberative, systematic decision-making). To the degree that image maintenance is supported by groupthink symptoms (e.g., beliefs in inherent morality, collective rationalization, stereotyping of outgroups), decision quality by the group tends to deteriorate. (Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1)). Haslam I 194 Adding nuance to Janis’ posited goal states (>Goals/Janis), Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1) and McCauley (1998)(2) point out that the goal of achieving consensus can serve different functions – for example, protecting a social identity or regaining a sense of certainty. In some instances (e.g., under collective threat), the goal of achieving consensus may be associated with specific content: that is, group members may want to reach consensus around a particular conclusion (e.g., a positive group image). In other cases (e.g., under deep uncertainty), any consensus at all might be acceptable, making groups willing to accept negative self-perceptions so long as they are convergent (e.g., see system justification theory; Jost and Banaji, 1994)(3). >System justification. Haslam I 195 Packer/Ungson: other potential goals could include: - a desire for the group to engage in effective collective action (for which consensus is perhaps a means to an end); - a desire for the group to reach a decision quickly (heightened perhaps in crisis situations, and reminiscent of speed/accuracy tradeoffs endemic to human cognition; e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)(4); - a desire for the group to reach a decision with little effort (heightened when the group is overburdened with many complex issues); - a more individual set of desires to be positively regarded and to retain one’s position in the group (as per McCauley’s (1998)(2) social discomfort hypothesis). >Groupthink/Psychological theories. Identification/goals: Pursuit of group-related goals – whatever they are – is stronger to the extent that members identify with their groups (Abrams and Hogg, 1988)(5). Strongly identified group members seek to be regarded as loyal and to make decisions that serve the interests of the group. Norms/accuracy/Packer/Ungson: any one of the goals that conflict with accuracy and deliberation could produce groupthink-type symptoms, although, as pointed out by McCauley (1998)(2), the underlying mechanisms and precise manifestations could differ as a function of the goal in question (e.g., some producing internalization, some compliance). 1. Turner, M.E. and Pratkanis, A.R. (1998a) ‘A social identity maintenance model of groupthink’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 210–35. 2. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 3. Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) ‘The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33: 1–27. 4. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’, Science, 185: 1124–3. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Gold | Rothbard | Rothbard III 272 Gold/gold price/money utility/economy/Rothbard: the utility of money consists of two major elements: the utility of the money as a medium of exchange, and the utility of the money commodity in its direct, commodity use (such as the use of gold for ornaments). In the modern economy, after the money commodity has fully developed as a medium of exchange, its use as a medium tends greatly to overshadow its direct use in consumption. The demand for gold as money far exceeds its demand as jewelry. However, the latter use and demand continue to exist and to exert some influence on the total demand for the money commodity. Cf. >Regression theorem/Rothbard, >Money/Rothbard. The determination of money prices (gold prices) is therefore completely explained, with no circularity and no infinite regression. The demand for gold enters into every gold price, and today’s demand for gold, in so far as it is for use as a medium of exchange, has a time component, being based on yesterday’s array of gold prices. Rothbard III 273 This time component regresses until the last day of barter, the day before gold began to be used as a medium of exchange. On that day, gold had no utility in that use; the demand for gold was solely for direct use, and consequently, the determination of the gold prices, for that day and for all previous days, had no temporal component whatever.(1)(2) Rothbard III 275 (…) if gold, after being established as money, were suddenly to lose its value in ornaments or industrial uses, it would not necessarily lose its character as a money. Once a medium of exchange has been established as a money, money prices continue to be set. If on day X gold loses its direct uses, there will still be previously existing money prices that had been established on day X – 1, and these prices form the basis for the marginal utility of gold on day X. Similarly, the money prices thereby determined on day X form the basis for the marginal utility of money on day X + 1. From X on, gold could be demanded for its exchange value alone, and not at all for its direct use. Therefore, while it is absolutely necessary that a money originate as a commodity with direct uses, it is not absolutely necessary that the direct uses continue after the money has been established. Rothbard III 766 Gold/Rothbard: [there is an] economic law: One of the most important economic laws, therefore, is: Every supply of money is always utilized to its maximum extent, and hence no social utility can be conferred by increasing the supply of money. Gold/Rothbard: Some writers have inferred from this law that any factors devoted to gold mining are being used unproductively, because an increased supply of money does not confer a social benefit. They deduce from this that the government should restrict the amount of gold mining. RothbardVs: These critics fail to realize, however, that gold, the money-commodity, is used not only as money but also for nonmonetary purposes, either in consumption or in production. Hence, an increase in the supply of gold, although conferring no monetary benefit, does confer a social benefit by increasing the supply of gold for direct use. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Demand for money/Rothbard, >Money/Rothbard. 1. As we regress in time and approach the original days of barter, the exchange use in the demand for gold becomes relatively weaker as compared to the direct use of gold, until finally, on the last day of barter, it dies out altogether, the time component dying out with it. 2. It should be noted that the crucial stopping point of the regression is not the cessation of the use of gold as “money,” but the cessation of its use as a medium of exchange. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Gold Standard | Cairnes | Rothbard II 291 Gold standard/money/John Elliott Cairnes/Rothbard: The sudden gold discoveries in California in the late 1840s, followed rapidly by Australia in 1851 , and the consequent enormous increase in gold production, raised important questions on their economic consequences in Britain, as well as whether or not the gold pound would depreciate in terms of commodities. Politically, gold standard anti-inflationists tried to minimize the impact of this increased supply on prices, while the inflationists chortled that at least prices would rise greatly. Among economists, men such as Mill and Torrens, previously in the forefront of currency and banking school struggles, displayed remarkably little interest in the entire process. Most of the interested economists took a primitive, proto-Keynesian position that the new gold money would increase capital and employment and therefore would have little effect on prices. (…) as if monetary theory had never been discovered! Rothbard II 292 The most important response to the gold discoveries was that of John Cairnes, whose interest in the problem was piqued in 1856 by the 'ignorant and preposterous assertion(s)' by William Newmarch and other inflationists. In a series of articles published between 1857 and 1863, Cairnes set forth the quantity analysis, but he also brilliantly went beyond it to resurrect the scholastic-cantillon process analysis, realizing that the 'distribution' effects of the monetary change process were important parts of the picture that should not be swept under the rug. Cairnes pointed out that the country With new gold mines will be the first to feel their bad effects - the price increases and the waste of resources - after which, as the new gold flows abroad in return for goods, these bad effects become gradually 'exported' to the other countries of the world. In contrast to the gushing of the inflationists, Cairnes showed that the first country to suffer waste of resources from the new gold was Australia, where previously flourishing agriculture was virtually ruined. |
Cairnes I John Elliott Cairnes The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy. Dublin 1857, Reprint 2007 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Government Policy | Rothbard | Rothbard III 945 Government policy/Rothbard: Payment/taxation: Payment is made (…) not by users on the basis of their voluntary purchases, but by a coerced levy on the taxpayers. A basic split is thus effected between payment and receipt of service. This split is inherent in all government operations. Police/school system: Many grave consequences follow from the split and from the "free" service as well. As in all cases where price is below the free-market price, an enormous and excessive demand is stimulated for the good, far beyond the supply of service available. Consequently, there will always be "shortages" of the free good, constant complaints of insuffciency, overcrowding, etc. An illustration is the perpetual complaints about police insuffciency, particularly in crime-ridden district, about teacher and school shortages in the public school system(…). Free market/Rothbard: In no area of the free market are there such chronic complaints about shortages, insuffciencies, and Iow quality service. In all areas of private enterprise, firms try to coax and persuade consumers to buy more of their product. Efficiency/Public sector/Rothbard: Where government owns and operates, on the other hand, there are invariably calls on consumers for patience and sacrifice, and problems of shortages and deficiencies continually abound.(1) Rothbard III 946 Price/market: The same is true, to a lesser extent, wherever the price is under the free-market price. >Free market/Rothbard. Government decisions: The government is faced with insuperable allocation problems, which it cannot solve even to its own satisfaction. Thus, the government will be confronted with the problem: Should we build a road in Place A or Place B? There is no rational way whatever by which it can make this decision. It cannot aid the private consumers of the road in the best way. It can decide only according to the whim of the ruling government offcial, i.e., only ifthe government oficials do the "consuming," and not the public.(2) If the government wishes to do what is best for the public, it is faced with an impossible task. >Government services/Rothbard. Solution/„Operation on business basis“: Government may (…) may genuinely try to find the true market price, i.e., to "operate on a business basis." [This] is often the cry raised by conservatives - that government enterprise be placed on a business footing, that deficits be ended, etc. RothbardVs: Almost always this means raising the price. Is this a rational solution, however? Efficiency: It is often stated that a single government enterprise, operating within the sphere of a private market and buying resources from it, can price its services and allocate its resources effciently. This, however, is incorrect. There is a fatal flaw that permeates every conceivable scheme of government enterprise and ineluctably prevents it from rational pricing and effcient allocation of resources. Because of this flaw, government enterprise can never be operated on a "business" basis, no matter how ardent a government's intentions. What is this fatal flaw? Taxation: It is the fact that government can obtain virtually unlimited resources by means of the coercive tax power (i.e., limited only by the total resources of society). Private sector: Private businesses must obtain their funds from private investors. This allocation of funds by investors, based on time preference and foresight, "rations" funds and resources to the most profitable and therefore the most serviceable uses. >Time preference/Rothbard. Rothbard III 947 Government/control mechanisms: Government (…) has no checkrein on itself, i.e., no requirement of meeting a test of profit-and-loss or valued service to consumers, to permit it to obtain funds. Privet sector: Private enterprise can get funds only from satisfied, valuing customers and from investors guided by present and expected future profits and losses. Government/rationality: Government gets more funds at its own whim. With the checkrein gone, gone also is any opportunity for government to allocate resources rationally. Gain and loss: The profit-and-loss test serves as the critical guide for directing the flow of productive resources. No such guide exists for government, which therefore has no rational way to decide how much money to spend in total or in each specific line. The more money it spends, the more service, of course, it can supply - but where to stop?(3) Solution/as if: Proponents of government enterprise may retort that the government should simply tell its bureau to act as if it were a profit-making enterprise and to establish itself in the same way as a private business. Rothbard III 948 RothbardVs: There are two basic flaws in this theory: (1) It is impossible to play enterprise. Enterprise means risking one's own money in investment. Bureaucratic managers and politicians have no real incentive to develop entrepreneurial skills, to really adjust to consumer demands. They do not risk loss of their money in the enterprise. (2) Aside from the question of incentives, even the most eager managers could not function as a business. For, regardless of the treatment accorded the operation after it is established, the initial launching of the firm is made with government money, and therefore by coercive levy. Arbitrariness: A fatally arbitrary element has been "built into" the very vitals of the enterprise. Rationality: Furthermore, future decisions on expenditures will be made out of tax funds and will therefore be subject to the same flaw. Rothbard III 950 Competition: In addition, the establishment of government enterprise creates an "unfair" competitive advantage over private firms, for at least part of its capital was gained by coercion rather than service. >Government services/Rothbard. 1. See Murray N. Rothbard, "Government in Business" in Essays on Liberty (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1958), IV, 186 ff. It is therefore characteristic of government ownership and "enterprise" that the consumer becomes, not a "king" to be courted, but a troublesome fellow bent on using up the "social" product. 2. Thus, the government offcial may select a road that will yield him or his allies more votes. 3. Cf. Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 50, 53. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Government Services | Rothbard | Rothbard III 944 Government Services/Rothbard: "Free" services are particularly characteristic of government. Police and military protection, firefighting, education, parks, some water supply come to mind as examples. VsGovernment services: The first point to note, of course, is that these services are not and cannot be truly free. A free good (…) would not be a good and hence not an object of human action; it would simply exist in superabundance for all. >Goods/Rothbard, >Action/Rothbard. If a good does not exist aplenty for all, then the resource is scarce, and supplying it costs society other goods forgone. Hence it cannot be free. The resources needed to supply the free governmental service are extracted from the rest of production. Payment/taxation: Payment is made, however, not by users on the basis of their voluntary purchases, but by a coerced levy on the taxpayers. A basic split is thus effected between payment and receipt of service. This split is inherent in all government operations. Rothbard III 945 Police/school system: Many grave consequences follow from the split and from the "free" service as well. As in all cases where price is below the free-market price, an enormous and excessive demand is stimulated for the good, far beyond the supply of service available. Consequently, there will always be "shortages" of the free good, constant complaints of insuffciency, overcrowding, etc. An illustration is the perpetual complaints about police insuffciency, particularly in crime-ridden district, about teacher and school shortages in the public school system(…). Free market/Rothbard: In no area of the free market are there such chronic complaints about shortages, insuffciencies, and Iow quality service. In all areas of private enterprise, firms try to coax and persuade consumers to buy more of their product. Efficiency/Public sector/Rothbard: Where government owns and operates, on the other hand, there are invariably calls on consumers for patience and sacrifice, and problems of shortages and deficiencies continually abound.(1) Price/market: The same is true, to a lesser extent, wherever the price is under the free-market price. >Free market/Rothbard, >Government policy/Rothbard. >Rothbard III 950 Prices: Many "criteria" have been offered by writers as guides for the pricing of government services. Marginal cost: One criterion supports pricing according to "marginal cost." RothbardVs: (:..) this is hardly a criterion at all and rests on classical fallacies of price determination by costs. "Marginal" varies according to the period of time surveyed. >Marginal cost/Rothbard. Costs: And costs are not in fact static but flexible; they change according to prices and hence cannot be used as a guide to the setting of prices. Equilibrium: Moreover, prices equal average costs only in final equilibrium, and equilibrium cannot be regarded as an ideal for the real world. The market only tends toward this goal. Finally, costs of government operation will be higher than for similar operations on the free market.(2) Competition/efficiency: The ineffciencies of government operation are compounded by several other factors. (…) a government enterprise competing in an industry can usually drive out private owners, since the government can subsidize itself in many ways and supply itself with unlimited funds when desired. In cases where it cannot compete even under these conditions, it can arrogate to itself a compulsory monopoly, driving out competitors by force. This was done in the United States in the case of the post office.(3) >Competition, >Efficiency. Rothbard III 952 Calculation: (…) one cartel or one firm could not own all the means of production in the economy, because it could not calculate prices and allocate factors in a rational manner. >Calculation/Rothbard, >Factors of production/Rothbard. No government enterprise could be established on a "business basis" even i fthe desire were present. Thus, any governmental operation injects a point of chaos into the economy; and since all markets are interconnected in the economy, every governmental activity disrupts and distorts pricing, the allocation of factors, consumption/investment ratios, etc. Utility: Every government enterprise not only Iowers the social utilities of the consumers by forcing the allocation of funds to other ends than those desired by the public; it Iowers the utility of everyone (including the utilities of some government offcials) by distorting the market and spreading calculational chaos. 1. See Murray N. Rothbard, "Government in Business" in Essays on Liberty (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1958), IV, 186 ff. It is therefore characteristic of government ownership and "enterprise" that the consumer becomes, not a "king" to be courted, but a troublesome fellow bent on using up the "social" product. 2. Various fallacious criteria have been advanced for deciding between private and state action. One common rule is to weigh "marginal social costs" and benefits against "marginal private costs" and benefits. Apart from other flaws, there is no such entity as "society" separate from constituent individuals, so that this preferred criterion is simply meaningless. 3. See the interesting pamphlet by Frank Chodorov, The Myth of the Post ofice (Hinsdale, 111.: Henry Regnery Co., 1948). On a similar situation in England, see Frederick Millar, "The Evils of State Trading as Illustrated by the Post Offce" in Thomas Mackay, ed., A Plea for Liberty (New York: D. Appleton Co., 1891), pp. 305-25. For a portrayal of the political factors that have systematically distorted economic considerations in setting postal rates in the United States, see Jane Kennedy, "Development of Postal Rates: 1845-1955 Land Economics, May, 1957, pp. 93-112; and Kennedy, "Structure and Policy in Postal Rates," Journal of Political Economy, June, 1957, pp. 185-208. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Groupthink | Janis | Haslam I 182 Groupthink/Janis: Example: after the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which had been planned by a group of highly intelligent people the question came up how this failure had been possible. Janis Thesis: Although Janis concluded that the CIA’s faulty planning and lack of effective communication was partially at fault for the Bay of Pigs fiasco, he diagnosed the primary problem as stemming from social psychological processes operating within the president’s core advisory group. (Janis; 1972(1), 1982(2)). Psychological tradition: Beginning of the 1970s theory and research on group and organizational decision-making were dominated by individualistic subjective utility theory (Kramer, 1998)(3), according to which a single person’s subjective evaluations of risk and reward affect their decision-making processes. JanisVsTradition: stressed the group dynamics underlying these decisions. In particular, he theorized Haslam I 183 that the cohesiveness of groups could motivate their members to prioritize group harmony and unanimity over careful deliberation when making decisions. Haslam I 184 Def Group think/Janis: ‘Groupthink’ [is] a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. (Janis, 1972(1): 9) Janis thesis: a specific set of antecedent conditions can lead the members of a group to seek consensus with one another instead of engaging in careful and deliberative decision-making. Group think model/Janis: a) the antecedent conditions expected to produce this consensus-seeking psychology, (b) a set of observable symptoms that should arise from it, which in turn result in (c) a set of defective decision-making processes. The model suggests that these defective processes tend, much of the time, to produce suboptimal collective decisions. Antecedent conditions: highly directive (e.g., charismatic or authoritarian) leaders, limited information search, and insulation of the group from outsiders with the necessary expertise to make sound decisions. Especially important: important: a strong sense of group cohesion (i.e., a strong collective bond of some sort) and a context of high stress or crisis, especially likely when confronting a complex and consequential decision. ^Haslam I 185 Groupthink symptoms: (Janis 1971)(3) Over-estimation of group worth: 1.Illusion of invulnerability 2. Belief in morality of ingroup Closed-mindedness: 3. Collective rationalization 4. Stereotypic views of outgroups Pressures toward uniformity: 5. Self-censorship 6. Illusion of unanimity 7. Pressure placed on deviants 8. Mindguarding Problems: decision-making objectives are inadequately discussed, only a few alternative Haslam I 186 solutions are entertained, originally preferred solutions are not critically examined, initially discarded solutions are not re-examined, experts are not consulted, advice is solicited in a selective and biased fashion, and the group fails to develop contingency plans. Solution/Janis: group leaders should encourage all group members to be ‘critical evaluators’ such that they are able to freely express doubts or objections. Additionally, group leaders should avoid stating their initial preferences at the onset of any decision-making venture(…). Janis advocated for the creation of several independent groups, each with their own leader, to solve the same problem. (…) group members’ opinions should be frequently challenged, either by allowing different external experts to attend meetings, or by designating select members to serve as temporary ‘devil’s advocates.’ Finally, Janis stressed the importance of ‘second-chance’ meetings in which group decisions could be reconsidered one last time before being settled or made public. Haslam I 187 Examples for groupthink: the invasion of North Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and the Vietnam War escalation. Examples not exhibiting groupthink: the Marshall Plan and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Haslam I 189 Groups/Janis: thesis: the only goal of decision-making groups is to engage in measured deliberation to make accurate and logical decisions. VsJanis: Groups may have other goals in mind, such as gaining ‘satisfaction with and commitment to the decision,’ ‘improved implementation by group members’, or even ‘diffused responsibility for poor decisions’ (McCauley, 1998(4): 148). >Group think/psychological theories. KramerVsJanis: Roderick Kramer (1998)(5) suggested that at least some of Janis’ case examples are better understood as flawed decisions arising from politicothink rather than groupthink. President Kennedy (…) sought to make accurate decisions regarding what was the best political decision (e.g., would be popular domestically) to the detriment of making the best possible military decision. In other words, careful appraisal of choices Haslam I 190 (i.e., non-groupthink symptoms) in one domain may produce apparent groupthink in another. FullerVsJanis/AldagVsJanis: Sally Fuller and Ramon Aldag (1998)(6) argue that the easy popularity of the model has distracted social psychologists. They claim that researchers have focused on testing the original parameters of the groupthink model at the expense of asking broader questions about group decision-making. (…) – ironically – some of the best evidence for the groupthink model emerges from examination of the way in which groupthink research has itself been conducted. >Group think/psychological theories. 1. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3. Janis, I.L. (1971) ‘Groupthink’, Psychology Today, November, 43–6: 74–6. 4. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 5. Kramer, R.M. (1998) ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 236–71. 6. Fuller, S.R. and Aldag, R.J. (1998) ‘Organizational Tonypandy: Lessons from a quarter century of the groupthink phenomenon’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 163–84. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Human Rights | Locke | Höffe I 249 Human Rights/HöffeVsLocke/Höffe: Because of its superior rank, Locke's basic goods ("life, liberty and property")(1) could be considered basic and human rights. It is true that in the natural state everyone is entitled to them, but they are not secured there. Locke emphasizes time and again that the necessary violence for the state community that is therefore necessary is ceded to a strong majority, but not distributively and collectively to everyone. VsLocke: Consequently, it is not excluded what contradicts the idea of a veritable basic and human right: that the majority of a minority restricts the rights and refuses tolerance to Catholics and atheists as in Locke's letter of tolerance. >>Toleration/Locke, >State/Locke. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90, § 93 |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Humans | Wiener | II 94 Human/Wiener, Norbert: Thesis: the human is a message himself. The older notions of individuality were somehow linked to the concept of identity, whether it was the material substance of the animal or the mental substance of the human soul. Nowadays, we have to admit that individuality is related to the continuity of the scheme and consequently shares with it the essence of communication. Scheme/Wiener, >Communication, >Message, >Person. WienerVsAdorno. II 99 Identity/Individual/Wiener: the physical identity of an individual is not based on the identity of the substance from which it is made. The metabolism causes a much stronger metabolism than was thought possible for a long time. Cf. >Identity/Henrich. |
WienerN I Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965 WienerN II N. Wiener The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952 German Edition: Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952 |
| Idealism | Schopenhauer | Adorno XIII 77 Schopenhauer/Idealism/SchopenhauerVsIdealism/Adorno(1): If ((s) according to Hegelian idealism) the reality is the mind and is ultimately legitimated by the absolute which it is itself, there is also the tendency in it, to confirm, to glorify the world as it is. >World, >Absoluteness, >Reality, >Justification/Schopenhauer. Doubts on the fact that this creative mind is the good principle, such doubts are altogether alien to the mainstream of idealist philosophy. They have only become apparent in a counter-position (...) in Schopenhauer. He has named the mind, which is depersonalized,... Adorno XIII 78 ...which, therefore, (...) should have nothing in common with the subjective consciousness of the individual human being; consequently, the will, wherein also the moment of his blindness is affected, and, if you want, his demons, as well as that moment of the original creation of the apersonal, in the absolute activity ((s) spontaneity) taking place, which was the mind in Fichte. >Mind, >World/Schopenhauer, >Spontaneity, >Idealism. 1. Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Imagination | Flusser | I 114 Image/Imagination/Flusser: Reduction of dimension is motivated by the will to change the world and consequently by the tendency to beauty. >Beauty, >Reduction. Such a description, however, requires a new definition of "imagination": inference from two to four dimensions. Pictogram, for example. Stick figures in the frame: suggests a four-dimensional scene. >Images/Flusser. I 115 On the other hand: Ideogram: H - O - H (representation of the molecular composition instead of the symbol H2O. Definition Imagination: is then not only the ability to create similarities, but also the ability to imagine the relationships between objects of the world as relations of symbols on the surface. >Symbols. Def Imagination: proposing and accepting an agreement. One does not take pictures to imitate a known situation, but to make an unknown one imaginable. >Understanding, >Conceivability. I 116 The agreement is: "Reality" is designed to become flat when you abstract the depth, and stands still when you abstract time from it. I 117 Imagination is not a solitary activity because of the agreement. >Convention, >Intersubjectivity. Imagination/Flusser: we are not aware that the imaginary relationships "above" and "right" which arrange the symbols in the picture are as conventional as the relationships in the morse alphabet. We are programmed to "believe" in images, i. e. not to see them as mediations, but as images. I 123 Imagination II: Images are designed to recognize the world that has become unrecognizable: maps. >Map-example. Then the world begins to be experienced as an image, i.e. to mirror the categories of the image. In it life becomes horrible, from now on the images must serve a strategy of escaping the horrible and function as magical tools. >Magical thinking. Only when the images begin to lose their "magical dimension" as a mediation between the world and humans and become opaque will the age of imagination be over. The pictures form a wall that closes people off from the world of experiences. >Opacity. The world becomes "phantom-like", "fantastic". This development from the imaginary to the fantastic can be seen in the Aztecs or, individually, in paranoiacs. The emergence of the linear text must have been perceived as a relief here. >Texts/Flusser. I 161 Concept/perception/Flusser: We are constantly trying to imagine terms, to comprehend this idea, and then to make this concept conceivable again. >Concepts/Flusser. This overbidding of imagination through conception and vice versa, in which images become conceptual (concept art) and texts "imaginary" (science fiction) is an important aspect of today's "crisis of art". >Art, >Fictions, >Literature. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Implication | Jackson | Read III 92 Implication/Jackson/Def Robustness: (Jackson) a statement is robust if its assertiveness remains unaffected by the acquisition of information. III 93 The punch line for Jackson: the modus ponens comes into play for conditional sentences. Condition sets are not robust with respect to the falsity of their consequents. >modus ponens, >Conditional, >Implication paradox. III 94 Jackson: Assertiveness is measured by conditional probability. There is a specific convention about conditional propositions: namely, that they are robust with respect to their antecedents, and therefore cannot be claimed in circumstances where it is known that their antecedents are false. ReadVsJackson/ReadVsGrice: both are untenable. The problematic conditional sentences occur in embedded contexts. Example: Either if I was right, you were right, or if you were right, I was right. Assertion and assertiveness: are terms that are applied to complete statements, not to their parts! Conditional sentences are not truth functional. >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Implication Paradox | Wessel | I 129 C.I.Lewis VsParadoxes of the implication: "strict implication": modal: instead of "from contradiction any statement": "from impossible ..." >Implication, strict, >Modalities, >Modal logic. WesselVsLewis, C.I.: circular: modal terms only from logical entailment relationship - 2.Vs: strict Implication cannot occur in provable formulas of propositional calculus as an operator. >Consequence, >Operators. I 140ff Paradoxes of implication: strategy: avoid contradiction as antecedent and tautology as consequent. >Tautologies, >Antecedent, >Consequent. I 215 Paradoxes of implication/quantifier logic: Additional paradoxes: for individual variables x and y may no longer be used as any singular terms - otherwise from "all Earth's moons move around the earth" follows "Russell moves around the earth". Solution: Limiting the range: all individuals of the same area, for each subject must be clear: P (x) v ~ P (x) - that is, each predicate can be meant as a propositional function - Wessel: but that is all illogical. >Logic, >Domain. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Impredicativeness | Quine | XIII 93 Impredicativeness/Quine: Previously it was said that you had specified a class without knowing anything about it if you could name the containment condition. Russell's Antinomy: showed that there had to be exceptions. Problem: was to specify a class by a containment condition by directly or indirectly referring to a set of classes that contained the class in question. >Classes/Quine. Russell's Antinomy: here the problematic containment condition was the non-self elementary. Example x is not an element of x. Paradox: arises from letting the x of the containment condition, among other things, be just the class defined by this containment condition. Def impredicative/Poincaré/Russell: is just this condition of containment for a class that exists in the class itself. This must be forbidden to avoid paradoxes. Circular Error Principle/QuineVsRussell: but that was too harsh a term: Specification/Class/Sets/Existence/Quine: specifying a class does not mean creating it! XIII 94 Specification/Circle/Introduce/QuineVsRussell: by specifying something it is not wrong to refer to a domain to which it has always belonged to. For example, statistical statements about a typical inhabitant by statements about the total population that contains this inhabitant. Introduction/Definition/linguistic/Quine: all we need is to equate an unfamiliar expression with an expression that is formed entirely with familiar expressions. Russell's Antinomy/Quine: is still perfectly fine as long as the class R is defined by its containment condition: "class of all objects x, so that x is not an element of x". Paradox/Solution/Russell/Quine: a solution is to distort familiar expressions so that they are no longer familiar in order to avoid a paradox. This was Russell's solution. Finally, "x is an element of x" ("contains itself") to be banished from the language. >Paradoxes/Quine. Solution/Zermelo/Quine: better: leave the language as it is, but New: for classes it should apply that not every containment condition defines a class. For example the class "R" remains well defined, but "Pegasus" has no object. I.e. there is no (well-defined) class like R. Circle/George Homans/Quine: true circularity: For example, a final club is one into which you can only be elected if you have not been elected to other final clubs. Quine: if this is the definition of an unfamiliar expression, then especially the definition of the last occurrence of "final club". Circle/Circularity/Quine: N.B.: yet it is understandable! Impredicativeness/impredicative/Russell/Quine: the real merit was to make it clear that not every containment condition determines a class. Formal: we need a hierarchical notation. Similar to the hierarchy of truth predicates we needed in the liar paradox. XIII 95 Variables: contain indexes: x0,y0: about individuals, x1,y2 etc. about classes, but classes of this level must not be defined by variables of this level. For example, for the definition of higher-level classes x2, y2 only variables of the type x0 and x1 may be used. Type Theory/Russell/Quine/N.B.: classes of different levels can be of the same type! Classes/Sets/Existence/Quine: this fits the metaphor that classes do not exist before they are determined. I.e. they are not among the values of the variables needed to specify them. ((s) And therefore the thing is not circular). Problem/QuineVsRussell: this is all much stricter than the need to avoid paradoxes and it is so strict that it prevents other useful constructions. For example, to specify the union of several classes of the same level, e.g. level 1 Problem: if we write "Fx1" to express that x1 is one of the many classes in question, then the Containment condition: for a set in this union: something is element of it iff it is an element of a class x1, so Fx1. Problem: this uses a variable of level 1, i.e. the union of classes of a level cannot be counted on to belong to that level. Continuity hypothesis: for its proof this means difficulties. Impredicativeness/Continuum/Russell/Quine: consequently he dropped the impredicativeness in the work on the first volume of Principia Mathematica(1). But it remains interesting in the context of constructivism. It is interesting to distinguish what we can and cannot achieve with this limitation. XIII 96 Predicative set theory/QuineVsRussell/Quine: is not only free of paradoxes, but also of unspecifiable classes and higher indeterminacy, which is the blessing and curse of impredicative theory. (See "infinite numbers", "classes versus sets"). Predicative set theory/Quine: is constructive set theory today. Predicative Set Theory/Quine: is strictly speaking exactly as described above, but today it does not matter which conditions of containment one chooses to specify a class. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Incommensurability | Kuhn | I 210 Theory/Incommensurability/Theory Choice/Kuhn: Ultimately, theories are chosen for personal and subjective reasons and not by relying on good reasons since the reasons are incommensurable. ((s) The incommensurability results from historical changes in meanings of concepts, focus on problems, interests.) I 209 Change of meaning/Concept change/Kuhn: Since the vocabularies of discussions about new theories consist predominantly of the same terms some of these expressions must be applied differently to nature. - Consequently, the superiority of one theory over another is not to be proven in the discussion. >Meaning Change/Kuhn, >Observation Language/Kuhn, >Interpretation, >Critics against Kuhn; see also >Interests. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Indeterminacy | Rorty | I 231 Indeterminacy of translation: Rorty: irreducibility is always mere irreducibility and never sign of an "ontological difference." There are countless vocabularies in the language. >Vocabulary/Rorty. VI 63 Indeterminacy of translation/translation vagueness/Putnam/Rorty: we should see it as "interest relativity of translation". This is not contrary to >Objectivity, but to >Absoluteness. VI 209 Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: is something quite different from the vagueness of the theory: the differences between various psychological explanations - as opposed to the differences between various biological explanations - are inconsequential in terms of the movement of elementary particles! |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Individuals | Mill | Gaus I 102 Individual/Mill/Gaus: (...) a great deal of liberal philosophy has been built on a particular view of human excellence. What might be called a perfectionist theory of the good life, or one devoted to self-realization as the end, can be found in Mill, T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, L. T. Hobhouse, John Dewey and even, I would venture, in the third part of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice(1) - the most distinctly ‘comprehensive’ element of the book (Gaus, 1983a)(2). The crux of this theory is presented in the third chapter of On Liberty(3), ‘Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being’, where human nature is compared to ‘a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces that make it a living thing’ (Mill, 1963a(3): ch. 3). Mill closely ties individuality to this growth or development of human nature: ‘Individuality is the same thing with development’ (1963a(3): ch. 3). Mill believes that reason reveals our nature and its needs; human nature possesses impulses or energies that try to manifest themselves. Not only do we naturally possess different capacities, but these capacities are sources of energy that seek to express themselves. Consequently, to block a person from developing her capacities is to de-energize her - to make her passive and lethargic (1963a(3): ch. 3; Gaus, 1983a(2): ch. 4). >Liberalism/Gaus, >Liberalism/Waldron, >Liberalism/Mill, >Liberalism/Kymlicka, >Autonomy/Gaus; cf. >Communitarianism. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983a) The Modern Liberal Theory of Man. New York: St Martin’s. 3. Mill, John Stuart (1963a) On Liberty. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. XVIII, 213–301. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Inequalities | Okin | Gaus I 279 Inequalities/family/state/Okin/Mottier:. In Okin's (1991)(1) work (...) the numerous inequalities of the private sphere are attributed to the structuration, by the state, of the relations between men and women within the family. The labour market and the economic market have been profoundly gendered and cannot be understood adequately without taking into account their grounding in male domination and the female responsibility for the domestic sphere. Democracy: Consequently, she argues that the democratization of the public sphere is not possible without the prior democratization of the private sphere. In order to render possible the democratization of the private sphere, we need to acquire a better grasp of the ways in which the private sphere is shaped by the public sphere. Despite her critical view on the interdependency of the spheres, Okin thinks that it is important to maintain the distinction between the private and the public. Women’s rights: Quite a few women's rights such as the right to abortion, for example, require a right to 'privacy' in order to be exercised; that is, the respect of a sphere within which the individual has the right to decide freely, Okin (1991(1)) argues. >Privacy/Anne Philips. 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1991) 'Gender, the public, the private'. In David Held, ed., Political Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, 67—90. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Inference | Brandom | I 255 Inferential Structure/Brandom: Three Dimensions: 1) Determination and authorization to commitment. I 256 2) Differentiation of accompanying and communicative inheritance deontic status. I 257 3) Inferential structure: in a broader sense: authority, responsibility, authorizationty. I 284 Brandom: Keyword: Concluding combines semantic content and pragmatic significance. >Semantic content. I 496 Inference/Brandom: premises and conclusions: are complete sentences ("free-standing") - Opposite: Conditional: antecedent and consequent: are subsentential expressions ("embedded"). >Subsententials. I 650 Inference/Brandom: semantic significance of types - anaphora: semantic significance of tokenings - Inference: reporting use sentences - anaphora: deictic use of singular terms - conceptual structure is primarily inferential structure - the use of a demonstrative refers to an object and thus becomes a singular term - (other than "ouch") and can also play an anaphoric role. >Singular terms. --- II 9 Inference/Brandom: Priority of reference. >Reference II 35 Non-inferential/Brandom: E.g. perception of circumstances. >Circumstances II 70 Inference/Brandom: even non-inferential reports (perception reports) must be structured inferentially (Sellars and Hegel) - otherwise not distinguishable from RDRDs (reliable differential responsive dispositions) (machines) - Parrot: does not understand his own reactions - non-inferential concept: E.g. red - but: just like one acquires concepts through the mastery of other concepts, one needs inferential concepts to arrive at non-inferential ones. --- Newen I 164 Inferential Roles/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: a) voice exit rule: actions are considered to be adequate practical conclusions E.g. "The pot is boiling over" > urges the action of taking it from the stove - b) entry rule: involves perceptions of both the environment and of one's own body conditions. This leads to perception reports. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Inflation | Thornton | Rothbard II 176 Inflation/Henry Thornton/Rothbard: Henry Thornton did make some important contributions in the last two chapters of Paper Credit, particularly in the long-deferred paper money-as-cause of inflation sections that rested uneasily With the separate and contrary Rothbard II 177 earlier chapters. Most of the anti-bullionist writers applied Adam Smith's dictum that bank credit cannot inflate the currency if confined to short-term, self-liquidating, 'real bills'. The difference is that Smith had applied it only to a specie standard, whereas the anti-bullionists extended it to a fiat money system. Thornton replied that this criterion will not work, since an increased quantity ofbank notes will also indefinitely inflate the monetary value of the real bills. So that the Smith-anti-bullionist 'limit' is an indefinitely elastic one that will in practice only provide an open channel for bank credit inflation. Thornton further pointed out that the current usury law in Britain of 5 per cent will aggravate the problem. For the free market interest rate or profit rate will rise higher than that in wartime (or in any boom situation). Consequently, the artificial holding down of the bank Ioan rate below the profit rate will stimulate an excessive borrowing, artificially high levels of investment, and a continuing monetary and price inflation. Thus, holding the bank rate of interest below the profit rate stimulates an increase in the demand for borrowing, and the continuing increase in the supply of money allows that demand to be fulfilled. Austrian School: In setting forth the inflationary consequences of artificially Iowering the rate of interest on bank Ioans, Henry Thornton anticipated the later Austrian theory of the business cycle, set forth by Ludwig von Mises and F.A. von Hayek and in turn based on the analysis of the Swedish-Austrian economist Knut Wicksell at the end of the nineteenth century. Thornton also hinted at the Austrian analysis of 'forced saving', pointing out that if excessive issues ofpaper money raise prices of goods more rapidly than wage rates, there will be some increase of capital investment, but that this increase will be at the expense of the labouring classes, and will therefore 'be attended with a proportionate hardship and injustice'.(1) 1. Henry Thornton. 1802. An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain. London: J. Hatchard and Messrs. F. and C. Rivington. |
Thornton I Henry Thornton An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain London 1802, 1939 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Information | Lewis | V 94 Admissble information/Opportunity/Lewis: hypothetical assumptions about the experimental setup change nothing- that’s why they are allowed. >Hypotheses. Inadmissible: Information about future history - e.g. information about future opportunities. - can be smuggled in by truth functions. >Truth function. Accepted: antecedent about history - consequent about chance at a certain time - non-truth-functional conditionals. These conditionals say how the chance depends on the past - not how history proceeds. >Conditional/Lewis, >Chance/Lewis, >Probability/Lewis, >Probability conditional/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 178 Twin Earth/thought experiment/Lewis/Schwarz: you cannot find out contingent information about the world by mental arithmetic - e.g. about the use of "34" and "1156", even though 34 is the square root of 1156. - (s) Otherwise circular). >Circle. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Input–Output Analysis | Leontief | Kurz I 11 Def Input–output analysis/Leontief/Kurz: Input–output analysis is a practical extension of the classical theory of general interdependence which views the whole economy of a region, a country and even of the entire world as a single system and sets out to describe and to interpret its operation in terms of directly observable basic structural relationships.(1) Objectivism/Leontief/Kurz/Salvadori: According to this statement, input–output analysis is based exclusively on magnitudes that are directly observable and that can be measured, using the ordinary instruments for measurement in economics. This objectivist concern is already present in Leontief’s Berlin PhD thesis, his 1928 paper ‘Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf’ (Leontief, 1928, an abridged English translation of which was published as ‘The economy as a circular flow’, Leontief, 1991)(2) and permeates his entire work. In the 1928 essay, the objectivist approach to economic phenomena is counterposed with the then dominant Marshallian analysis and its stress on subjective factors. Subjectivism: Marshall, it should be recalled, had tried to patch over what was a major breach with the objectivist tradition of the English classical economists, especially David Ricardo and Robert Torrens. >Subjectivism/Alfred Marshall, >D. Ricardo. Kurz I 12 In his 1936 paper(3), Leontief follows Quesnay closely in that he also takes distribution and prices to be given and reflected in the available national accounting system. He is actually forced to do so, because there is no statistical description of the production process of the economy during a year in purely material terms. Kurz I 13 Clearly, the analytical potentialities and practical usefulness of an approach that starts from a description of the production process of the economy as a whole in material terms - a ‘circular flow’ - go beyond conventional input-output analysis. To see this we may start from Paul Samuelson’s (1991)(4) commentary on the abridged English version of Leontief’s 1928 paper, because in it Samuelson places Leontief’s contribution in a wider theoretical context. >Input-Output Analysis/Samuelson. Kurz I 17 In his essay ‘Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf’(2) Leontief put forward a two-sectoral input-output system. Throughout his investigation he assumed single production and constant returns to scale; scarce natural resources are mentioned only in passing. In much of the analysis it is also assumed that the system of production (and consumption) is indecomposable. Much of his analysis focuses on the case of a stationary system characterized by constant technical coefficients. LeontiefVsMarginalism: Leontief premised his analysis on the conviction that economics should start from ‘the ground of what is objectively given’ (Leontief, 1928, p. 583)(2); economic concepts are said to be meaningless and potentially misleading unless they refer to magnitudes that can be observed and measured. He adopted explicitly a ‘naturalistic’ or ‘material’ perspective ([p. 211] p. 622). The starting point of the marginalist approach, homo oeconomicus, he considered inappropriate because it is said to give too much room to imagination and too little to facts (pp. 619–620). Economic analysis should rather focus on the concept of circular flow (…). Kurz I 19 Input-Output/prices/Leontief: „One may vary at will the exchange proportions and consequently the distribution relationships of the goods without affecting the circular flow of the economy in any way“ ([p. 194] pp. 598–599)(2). In other words, the same physical input–output schema can accommodate different price systems reflecting different distributions of income. He related this finding to the classical economists who are explicitly said to have advocated a ‘surplus theory’ of value and distribution ([p. 209] p. 619(2). Hence the exchange ratios of goods reflect not only ‘natural’, that is, essentially technological, factors, but also ‘social causes’. For example, assuming free competition, as the classical economists did in much of their analysis, the surplus is distributed in terms of a uniform rate of return on capital across all industries of the economy. With this specification, the general rate of profit together with relative prices can be determined in terms of the system of production in use and given real wages. ‘But this is the “law of value” of the so-called objective value theory’ ([p. 196] p. 601)(2), Leontief insisted. 1. Leontief, W. (1987) Input–Output analysis, in: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (Eds) The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 2, pp. 860–864 (London: Macmillan). 2. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 3. Leontief, W. (1936) Quantitative input and output relations in the economic systems of the United States, Review of Economics and Statistics, 18, pp. 105–125. 4. Samuelson, P.A. (1991) Leontief’s ‘the economy as a circular flow’: an introduction, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2, pp. 177–179. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Leontief I Wassily Wassilyevich Leontief Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 1928 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Institutional Drift | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 108 Institutional Drift/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) even societies that are far less complex than our modern society create political and economic institutions that have powerful effects on the lives of their members. No two societies create the same institutions; they will have distinct customs, different systems of property rights (...). >Institutions. E.g., Some will recognize the authority of elders, others will not; some will achieve some degree of political centralization early on, but not others. Societies are constantly subject to economic and political conflict that is resolved in different ways because of specific historical differences, the role of individuals, or just random factors. These differences are often small to start with, but they cumulate, creating a process of institutional drift. Just as two isolated populations of organisms will drift apart slowly in a process of genetic drift, because random genetic mutations cumulate, two otherwise similar societies will also slowly drift apart institutionally. Acemoglu I 114 E.g., Western Europe, experiencing many of the same historical processes, had institutions similar to England at the time of the Industrial Revolution. There were small but consequential differences between England and the rest, which is why the Industrial Revolution happened in England and not France. This revolution then created an entirely new situation and considerably different sets of challenges to European regimes, which in turn spawned a new set of conflicts culminating in the French Revolution. The French Revolution was another critical juncture that led the institutions of Western Europe to converge with those of England, while Eastern Europe diverged further. Acemoglu I 208 E.g., (...)the Glorious Revolution involved the emergence of a new regime based on constitutional rule and pluralism. This outcome was a consequence of the drift in English institutions and the way they interacted with critical junctures. Feudalism spread throughout most of Europe, West and East. But (...) Western and Eastern Europe began to diverge radically after the Black Death. Small differences in political and economic institutions meant that in the West the balance of power led to institutional improvement; Acemoglu I 209 in the East, to institutional deterioration. But this was not a path that would necessarily and inexorably lead to inclusive institutions. Many more crucial turns would have to be taken on the way. Though the Magna Carta had attempted to establish some basic institutional foundations for constitutional rule, many other parts of Europe, even Eastern Europe, saw similar struggles with similar documents. Yet, after the Black Death, Western Europe significantly drifted away from the East. Documents such as the Magna Carta started to have more bite in the West. In the East, they came to mean little. Trade: This drift of institutions now interacted with another critical juncture caused by the massive expansion of trade into the Atlantic. (...) one crucial way in which this influenced future institutional dynamics depended on whether or not the Crown was able to monopolize this trade. [Merchands] wanted and demanded different economic institutions, and as they got wealthier through trade, they became more powerful. The same forces were at work in France, Spain, and Portugal. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Institutions | Demsetz | Parisi I Institutions/law/legal history/Demsetz/Wangenheim: Initiated by Harold Demsetz's seminal paper (1967)(1), neo-institutional investigations of legal evolution typically look at specific changes of property rights regimes. Alchian: The basic idea is closely related to Alchian's (1950)(2) optimistic account of behavioral evolution: societies tend to have institutions that reflect, and are adapted to, the current needs of this society, given their environment and their preferences. Property rights/Demsetz: The Labrador Indians switched from open access property rights regimes to private property Parisi I 163 when fur trade made hunting beavers more valuable to each hunter, so that the natural setting could not sustain the radically increased burden resulting from consequentially increased hunting activities. Conditions/Demsetz: In his reappraising paper thirty-five years later, Demsetz (2002)(3) based his argument on a number of conditions that have to be satisfied to make environmental changes induce optimal institutional adaptations. In particular, he considered (1) the number and closeness of involved persons, (2) their productivity in solving resource allocation problems, and (3) the complexity of this problem as relevant conditions. If they change, most often due to new levels of specialization in production, observable property rights regimes will adapt to better solve the externality problems that become prevalent in effect, so Demsetz (2002)(4) argues. >Externalities. North: The idea of institutions evolving towards efficiency is also at the heart of the earlier writings of Douglas North (e.g. 1981)(4), who grounded his account of economic history on this argument. >Efficiency. WangenheimVsDemsetz: Independently of whether one wants to label this functionalist Demsetzian approach as truly evolutionary or not, the argument lacks any causal explanation for why the institutions change. There is no discussion of how rules in archaic societies are made, nor is there any hint of legislators' incentives when more complex societies are discussed (mainly in the 2002 paper). WittVsDemsetz: Many authors like Witt (1987)(5), Banner (2002)(6), Eggertson (1990(7), pp. 247—280), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)) have noted this pitfall of Demsetz's approach. The idea has been taken up by scholars like Umbeck (1977a(10), 1977b(11)), Ellickson (1991(12), 1994(13)), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)), who have argued that societies self-organize and develop property rights when law does not exist or is not enforced (prominent examples are farmer - rancher conflicts in Shasta County, mining claims during the California gold rush, Maine lobster fishing grounds, and grazing areas on the American Western frontier in the second half of the nineteenth century). Causality: (…) the authors proffer a causal complement to Demsetz's teleological hypothesis: they identify some individuals who find it privately worthwhile to design and enforce property rights against infringing group members or outsiders. VsUmbeck: Not all examples have remained undisputed. Clay and Wright (2005)(14), for example, challenge Umbeck's observations on mining district codes producing order. They argue that the mining district codes gave equal attention to the rights of claim-jumpers as to claim holders, whence chronic insecurity and litigation resulted. 1. Demsetz, H. (1967). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review, P&P 57: 347-359. 2. Alchian, A. (1950). "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy 58: 211—221. 3.Demsetz, H. (2002). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights Il: The Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership." Journal of Legal studies 31: S653—S672. 4. North, D. C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton. 5. Witt, U. (1987). "How Transaction Rights Are Shaped to Channel Innovativeness." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 180—195. 6. Banner, S. (2002). "Transitions Between Property Regimes." Journal of Legal studies 31: S359-S371. 7. Eggertson, T. (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (1975). "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West." Journal of Law and Economics 18: 163—179. 9. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (2002). "Cowboys and Contracts." Journal of Legal studies 31: S489-S514. 10. Umbeck, J. (1977a). "The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights." Explorations in Economic History 14: 197—226. 11. Umbeck, J. (1977b). "A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush." Journal of Law and Economics 20: 421—437. 12. Ellickson, R. (1991). Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 13. Ellickson, R. (1994). "The Aim of Order without Law." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 97—100. 14. Clay, K. and G. Wright (2005). "Order without law? Property Rights during the California Gold Rush." Explorations in Economic History 42: 155—183. Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Interest | Rothbard | Rothbard II 137 Abstinence Theory/interest/Rothbard: If profit were perhaps related to risk, what then accounts for the long-run ‘interest’ component of business profits? The dominant explanation for long-run interest in British economics soon became the abstinence theory of interest. The first presentation of time as the determinant of interest came from a theory related but superior to abstinence: Samuel Bailey's pioneering time-preference theory. Bailey's discussion came in the course of his brilliant demolition of Ricardo's labour theory of value and his championing of an alternative utility theory. Bailey begins his discussion of time and value by noting that if one commodity takes more time than another for its production, even using the same amount of capital and labour, its value will be greater. Ricardo: While Ricardo admits a problem here, James Mill in his Elements of Political Economy indefatigably asserts that time, being ‘a mere abstract word’, could not possibly add to anything's value. VsMill, James: Rebutting Mill, Bailey points out that ‘every creation of value’ implies a ‘mental operation’ - in short, a subjective analysis of value. Given a particular pleasure, Bailey went on, ‘We generally prefer a present pleasure or enjoyment to a distant one’ – in short, the omnipresent fact of time-preference for human life. >Time-preference. Rothbard II 138 Nassau William Senior: But the locus classicus of the abstinence theory was the lectures of Nassau W. Senior. It is true that they were not published until 1836, when they were published as the Outline of the Science of Political Economy (and also as the article on ‘Political Economy’ for the Encyclopedia Metropolitana), but they were delivered earlier as lectures at Oxford in 1827-28. Senior pointed out that savings and the creation of capital necessarily involve a painful present sacrifice, an abstinence from immediate consumption, which would only be incurred in expectation of an offsetting reward. Unfortunately, Senior lacked the concept of time-preference, so he was fuzzy about the specific motivation that would lead people to prefer present to future consumption. But he came to very similar conclusions, relating the degree of abstinence-pain (or, as the Austrians would later put it, time-preference for the present over the future) to ‘the least civilized’ peoples and the ‘worst educated’ classes, who are generally ‘the most improvident, and consequently the least abstinent’. >Capital/Senior. Rothbard III 556 Interest/Mises/Rothbard: „Originary [pure] interest is not a price determined on the market by the interplay of the demand for and the supply of capital or capital goods. Its height does not depend on the extent of this demand and supply. It is rather the rate of originary interest that determines both the demand for and the supply of capital and capital goods. It determines how much of the available supply of goods is to be devoted to consumption in the immediate future and how much to provision for remoter periods of the future.“(1) >Investments/Rothbard, >Structure of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 549 Rothbard: Since praxeology never establishes quantitative laws, there is no way by which we can determine any sort of quantitative relation between changes in the pure rate of interest and the amount that capital will change. >Praxeology/Rothbard. All we can assert is the qualitative relation. It should be noticed what we are not saying. We are not asserting that the pure rate of interest is determined by the quantity or value of capital goods available. >Capital goods/Rothbard, >Interest rate/Rothbard. We are not concluding, therefore, that an increase in the quantity or value of capital goods lowers the pure rate of interest because interest is the “price of capital” (or for any other reason). On the contrary, we are asserting precisely the reverse: namely, that a lower pure rate of interest increases the quantity and value of capital goods available. For „pure rate of interest“ see >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard. The causative principle is just the other way round from what is commonly believed. The pure rate of interest, then, can change at any time and is determined by time preferences. If it is lowered, the stock of invested capital will increase; if it is raised, the stock of invested capital will fall. >Time preference/Rothbard. 1. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 523 -24 |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| International Law | Kant | Höffe I 314 International Law/Kant/Höffe: In his writing On Eternal Peace (1) Kant assumes that states are "judged as individual human beings". Relations between states: Consequently, the same answers are to be expected for interstate relations as for domestic relations. According to the general legal principle of jurisprudence, state-individuals are allowed to do for themselves what they want - provided that their actions can coexist with those of all other state-individuals according to a general law. Höffe: This authority amounts to a new kind of quasi-human Höffe I 315 right, one might call it a quasi-human right of states. It consists essentially of two tasks under international law, the protection of property, here: the territorial integrity of a community, and its right to political and cultural self-determination. International treaty: [To achieve this] a global community of peace is required. This is created by a treaty among the peoples and has to end all wars forever. It is true, Kant concedes, that a world republic is needed along the lines of domestic peacekeeping. But because the states do not accept the necessary renunciations of sovereignty, he is content with a "negative surrogate," a League of Nations that is expanding more and more. Sceptical of a world republic, the peace treaty does not advocate a world legal order. >Cosmopolitanism/Kant. Höffe I 318 Aftermath: Thoughts of Kant's peace writing influence the first global association of states for securing world peace and developing international cooperation, the League of Nations (1920-1946), and also Höffe I 319 the new foundation as United Nations. Human dignity, which plays a major role in their charter, essentially follows Kant's understanding of human dignity. Moreover, Kant's understanding extends into many national and international political debates, not least in court decisions of the highest courts not only in Germany, namely the constitutional courts. 1. I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Interventions | Rothbard | Rothbard III 891 Interventions/Rothbard: (…) the free market always benefits every participant, and it maximizes social utility ex ante; it also tends to do so ex post, for it contains an effcient mechanism for speedily converting anticipations into realizations. >Free market/Rothbard; for ex ante/ex post see >Time/Rothbard. VsInterventions: With intervention, one group gains directly at the expense of another, and therefore social utility is not maximized or even increased; there is no mechanism for speedy translation of anticipation into fruition, but indeed the opposite; and finally (…) the indirect consequences of intervention will cause many interveners themselves to lose utility ex post. >Price control/Rothbard, >Minimum wage/Rothbard, >Gresham’s Law/Rothbard, >Bimetallism/Rothbard, >Taxation/Rothbard, >Government spending/Rothbard, >Government budget/Rothbard. Rothbard III 907 Intervention/Rothbard: Binary intervention occurs (…) when the intervener forces someone to transfer property to him. Binary intervention: All government rests on the coerced levy of taxation, which is therefore a prime example of binary intervention. Triangular intervention: Government intervention, consequently, is not only triangular, like price control; Binary intervention: it may also be binary, like taxation, and is therefore embedded into the very nature of government and governmental activity. >Taxation/Rothbard, >Government budget/Rothbard, >Government spending/Rothbard, >Free market/Economic theories. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Investments | Rothbard | Rothbard III 62 Investments/Rothbard: Thus, the investment decision will be determined by which is greater: the present value of the future good or the present value of present goods forgone. The present value of the future good, in turn, is determined by the value that the future good would have if immediately present (say, the “expected future value of the future good”); and by the rate of time preference. >Production/Rothbard, >Capital goods/Rothbard, >Factors of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 63 The greater the former, the greater will be the present value of the future good; the greater the latter (the rate of discount of future compared to present goods), the lower the present value. At any point in time, an actor has a range of investment decisions open to him of varying potential utilities for the products that will be provided. As he makes one investment decision after another, he will choose to allocate his resources first to investments of highest present value, then to those of next highest, etc. As he continues investing (at any given time), the present value of the future utilities will decline. On the other hand, since he is giving up a larger and larger supply of consumers’ goods in the present, the utility of the consumers’ goods that he forgoes (leisure and others) will increase - on the basis of the law of marginal utility. >Consumer goods/Rothbard, >Marginal Utility. Rothbard III 316 Investments/Rothbard: Not only do the renting and selling of consumers’ goods rest on appraisement and on hope of monetary profits, but so does the activity of all the investing producers, the keystone of the entire productive system. (…) that the term “capital value” applies, not only to durable consumers’ goods, but to all nonhuman factors of production as well—i.e., land and capital goods, singly and in various aggregates. The use and purchase of these factors rest on appraisement by entrepreneurs of their eventual yield in terms of monetary income on the market, and it will be seen that their capital value on the market will also tend to be equal to the discounted sum of their future yields of money income.(1) >Capital value/Rothbard. Rothbard III 537 Investments/production structure/Rothbard: (…) there is only one way by which man can rise from the ultraprimitive level [of production]: through investment in capital. But this cannot be accomplished through short processes, since the short processes for producing the most valuable goods will be the ones first adopted. >Production structure/Rothbard. Any increase in capital goods can serve only to lengthen the structure, i.e., to enable the adoption of longer and longer productive processes. Men will invest in longer processes more productive than the ones previously adopted. They will be more productive in two ways: (1) by producing more of a previously produced good, and/or (2) by producing a new good that could not have been produced at all by the shorter processes. Within this framework these longer processes are the most direct that must be used to attain the goal (…). >Production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 538 Time preference/production: (…) if there were no time preference, the most productive methods would be invested in first, regardless of time, and an increase in capital would not cause more productive methods to be used. The existence of time preference acts as a brake on the use of the more productive but longer processes. Any state of equilibrium will be based on the time-preference, or pure interest, rate, and this rate will determine the amount of savings and capital invested. It determines capital by imposing a limit on the length of the production processes and therefore on the maximum amount produced. A lowering of time preference, therefore, and a consequent lowering of the pure rate of interest signify that people are now more willing to wait for any given amount of future output, i.e., to invest more proportionately and in longer processes than heretofore. A rise in time preference and in the pure interest rate means that people are less willing to wait and will spend proportionately more on consumers’ goods and less on the longer production processes, so that investments in the longest processes will have to be abandoned.(2) Rothbard III 540 (…) the limits at any time on investment and productivity are a scarcity of saved capital, not the state of technological knowledge. In other words, there is always an unused shelf of technological projects available and idle. This is demonstrable by the fact that a new invention is not immediately and instantaneously adopted by all firms in the society. >Technology/Rothbard. Rothbard III 547 Labour/investments/Rothbard: The benefits to land factors, (…) accrue only to particular lands. Other lands may lose in value, although there is an aggregate gain. This is so because usually lands are relatively specific factors. >Production factors/Rothbard. For the nonspecific factor par excellence, namely, labor, there is, on the contrary, a very general rise in real wages. These laborers are “external beneficiaries” of increased investment, i.e., they are beneficiaries of the actions of others without paying for these benefits. Rothbard III 547 Investments/entrepreneurs/Rothbard: What benefits do the investors themselves acquire? In the long run, they are not great. In fact, their rate of interest return is reduced. This is not a loss, however, since it is the outcome of their changed time preferences. Their real interest return may well be increased, in fact, since the fall in the interest rate may be offset by the rise in the purchasing power of the monetary unit in an expanding economy. >Economy/Rothbard, >Interest rates/Rothbard, >Purchasing power/Rothbard. The main benefits gained by the investors, therefore, are short-run entrepreneurial profits. These are earned by investors who see a profit to be gained by investing in a certain area. But the short-run benefits earned by the workers and landowners are more certain. >Profit/Rothbard, >Rate of profit/Rothbard. 1. On appraisement and valuation, cf. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 328–30. 2. It should be clear that, as Mises lucidly put it, „Originary [pure] interest is not a price determined on the market by the interplay of the demand for and the supply of capital or capital goods. Its height does not depend on the extent of this demand and supply. It is rather the rate of originary interest that determines both the demand for and the supply of capital and capital goods. It determines how much of the available supply of goods is to be devoted to consumption in the immediate future and how much to provision for remoter periods of the future.“ (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 523 - 24) |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Judgments | Gadamer | Gadamer I 36 Judgment/"Urteilskraft"/Humanities/Gadamer: The "common sense" ["Gesunder Menschenverstand"] (...) is (...) decisively characterized by judgement. >Sensus communis, >Common sense. The introduction of the word in the 18th century thus wants to adequately reflect the concept of iudicium, which has to be considered a basic spiritual virtue. Sensus communis: In the same sense, English moral philosophers stress that moral and aesthetic judgements do not obey reason but have the character of sentiment (or taste), and similarly Tetens, one of the representatives of the German Enlightenment, sees in sensus communis an "iudicium without reflection"(1). Judgement: In fact, the activity of judgement is to subsume a particular under a general, to recognize something as the case of a rule; this is logically not demonstrable. Judgment is therefore in a fundamental embarrassment because of a principle which could guide its application. It would itself require a different power of judgement for the observance of this principle, as Kant astutely observes(2). It cannot therefore be taught in general, but only practised on a case-by-case basis, and in this respect it is more a skill as the senses are. It is something quite simply unlearnable, because no demonstration of concepts can guide the application of rules. Cf. >Rule following. Enlightenment: Consequently, the German philosophy of the Enlightenment did not attribute the power of judgement to the higher faculty of the mind, but to the lower faculty of knowledge. It has thus taken a direction that departs far from the original Roman sense of sensus communis and continues the scholastic tradition. This was to take on a special significance for aesthetics. >Judgement/Baumgarten. I 37 Urteilskraft/GadamerVsKant/Gadamer: The generality ascribed to judgement is nothing as " vulgar ["gemein"] " as Kant sees it. Judgement is not at all so very much a skill than a demand to be placed on everyone. All have enough "common sense," that is, judgment, to be able to expect of them the proof of a "common sense" of genuine moral and civic solidarity, but that is to say, judgment of right and wrong and concern for the "common good". This is what makes Vico's appeal to the humanistic tradition so impressive that, in contrast to the logics of the concept of public spirit, he captures the whole content of what was alive in the Roman tradition of this word (...). Shaftesbury/Gadamer: Likewise, Shaftesbury's taking up this I 38 concept, as we saw (>Sensus communis/Shaftesbury), at the same time a link to the political and social tradition of humanism. The sensus communis is a moment of bourgeois-moral being. Even where this term, as in Pietism or in the philosophy of the Scots (>Th. Reid), means a polemical turn against metaphysics, it still remains in the line of its original critical function. In contrast, Kant's adoption of this term is accentuated quite differently in the "Critique of Judgment"(3). >Judgement/Kant. 1. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, Leipzig 1777, 1, 520. 2. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft 1799, S. Vll. 3. Kritik der Urteilskraft, S 40. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Justice | Miller | Gaus I 416 Justice/Miller/Weinstein: According to Miller, justice is (1) pluralistic, in so far as desert, need and equality comprise its threefold criteria, and (2) contextual, in so far as the strength of these criteria varies according to the goods and social practices at issue. Miller's justificatory strategy on behalf of these three criteria owes much to Sidgwick, though he trades on Sidgwick largely via Rawls's reflective equilibrium. >Utilitarianism/Sidgwick, >Sidgwick/Political philosophy. Miller hopes to 'show that a theory of justice rooted in popular beliefs can retain a sharp critical edge' (1999(1): xi). We first try to discover the principles of justice embodied in our everyday beliefs. We next hone them philosophically before reapplying them as guides to the distributive social dilemmas facing us. But we never forgo the moorings of common sense justice lest our theory become either so abstract or so controversial as to prove irrelevant (...). Miller prefers Rawls's later writings where the original position becomes little more than a heuristic device for impartially systematizing and clarifying our common sense notions of justice. Consequently, Gaus I 417 ‚It ... merely highlights his preferred method ofproceeding, which is to move back and forth between our particular beliefs about justice and the general principles that might be used to systematize them, always bearing in mind that these principles ... must be publicly justifiable'. (1999(1): 58) Weinstein: But given this shift towards public justifiability, Rawls ought to have been more sensitive to empirical evidence about how we, in fact, understand justice. Miller, then, evokes Sidgwick unawares, and empirical social science, to rehabilitate Rawls in the name of egalitarian communitarianism. >Egalitarianism/Miller. 1. Miller, David (1999) Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justification | Ackerman | Gaus I 93 Justification/Ackerman/Waldron: Bruce Ackerman (1980)(1) developed a theory of justice in the form of a contractarian dialogue, for which it was laid down as a ground rule that no reason (adduced in conversation to justify any particular distribution of power) ‘is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert … that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens’ (1980(1): 11). >Neutrality/Waldron. Waldron: Now, why should this be the ground rule? Ackerman said that there were several ways to justify the neutrality principle: it could be justified by reference to the epistemic value of experiments in ethics, or the intrinsic importance of autonomy, or scepticism about ethics, or about the ability of power-holders to reach accurate conclusions about the good (1980(1): 11–12). The liberal state need not side with any of these justifications in particular. It only needs an assurance that everyone can reach neutrality by at least one of these routes. WaldronVsAckerman:Could this strategy work? It might, but only if we were certain that the different paths to neutrality did not make a difference to the meaning or character of the destination. But this seems unlikely. Moral principles are characteristically dependent for their interpretation on some understanding of the point or purpose for which they are imposed. Change the purpose and you provide a different basis for interpreting the principle. So far as neutrality is concerned, one of the main interpretive difficulties concerns the issue of intention: does neutrality forbid only political action motivated by a non-neutral intention or does it forbid also action, however motivated, which is non-neutral in its effects? It turns out that some of Ackerman’s paths to neutrality favour the intentionalist interpretation while one, at least, favours the consequentialist interpretation: scepticism about a power-holder’s ethical abilities should inhibit only his deliberate attempts to favour one conception of the good. The value of ethical diversity, on the other hand, should make us pause whenever state action actually has a detrimental impact on some conceptions of the good, whether this is intended or not. Ackerman’s ‘overlapping consensus’ is really a recipe for a disordered society, as citizens follow their different paths to an interpretive quarrel and find no common basis to resolve it (see Waldron, 1993(2): 151–3). 1. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2. Waldron, Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justification | Wright | I 92 History/past/Wright: It is a peculiarity of evidence for the past, which can nothing guarantee, that the currently available evidence could not be misleading due to some unfortunate circumstances. Consequently, it applies to statements about objects and events in the present tense (present), that their justification may not be in general a reason for accepting that this will not be their fate. Justification/Super-assertibility/Wright: the justification is therefore no unlimited reason to regard a statement as super-assertible. >Superassertibility. Justification/Wright: thesis: the permission to state something requires the permission to look at something as super-assertible. >Assertibility. I 96 Justification/Wright: the belief that all evidence is not misleading, is not something for which a justification/permission must be acquired. It is an indispensable default assumption (Default: Absence (of evidence)). >Evidence, >Method. If that is correct, the following conditional applies: If P, then there is a favorable balance of available evidence relating to P, as long as it is finite. Although not a priori true, but a priori justified. Wright: that reaffirms the super-assertibility. I 211f Definition default relationship of the confirmation between experiences and statements. E.g. "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification, insofar as it relates to the color. An appropriate justification by experience is revocable in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but otherwise presumably valid. Question: can one assume now cognitive deficiency with that? >Cognitive coercion. A theorist who accepts on-1, can do this either because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or dispute the probative force while being biased. If there is now no other support for Hn, the adoption of Hn by the first theorists remains unjustified, and the denial in the right. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Knowledge | Buridan | Poundstone I 186 Jean Buridan, "Sophismata": Knowledge/Knowledge Paradoxia/Buridan/Poundstone: E.g. "No one believes this sentence". If it is true, no one believes it, and consequently no one knows it. If it is wrong, at least one person believes it, but no one (neither believer nor unbeliever) knows it because it is wrong. So it is impossible for anyone to know that this sentence is true! + ... Poundstone I 187 There could be an omniscient being who knows every one of your beliefs and could tell you at any time whether you believe it. E.g. "No one knows what stands here" If it is true, no one knows it, but if it is wrong, contradiction: no one can know anything wrong. So what stands there, cannot be wrong. It is an undeniable truth that no one can know. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Knowledge | Hare | II 142 Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: it may be that we know something without being able to say what we know. E.g. how a particular word is used, or a particular dance is danced. HenleVsRyle: but this should not be extended to speech situations. >Situations, >Communication. II 143 It is by no means clear that one can always know how a word is used, even if one cannot say how it is used. Knowledge/Saying/HareVsHenle: in language, however, this is perhaps clearer than anywhere else. E.g. if we explain the use of an expression, we do not have to use it ourselves. Consequently, we can fully know its use in all contexts, even without being able to say how it is needed. For example, a child may have learned the use of the word "father", and uses it correctly, but perhaps cannot tell how it is used because it has not yet learned the use of "to mean"! >Explanation, >Use, >Meaning (Intending). Henle confuses the ability "to decide for logical reasons" whether a statement is true with the ability to use the expression "the statement is logically true". This is a confusion of mention/use (doing without knowledge). Hare: anyone who does not know how to use the term "logical true" could do the former, but not the latter. II 143 Menon/Socrates: question: what is the good? Menon: how can you look for something if you do not know what you are looking for, and when you have found it, how do you know it is what you were looking for? (Knowledge/saying). II 151 Socrates: if we already knew, we would not have asked the first question. So philosophizing can never begin, or it can never lead to a conclusion. Solution/Hare: the solution lies in the distinction between knowing how a dance is danced and the ability to also tell how it is danced. Before beginning the investigation, we can do the former but not the latter. We could start because we could do the former all the time. VsMenon: you already know what the good is, i.e. you can pick it out. >Knowledge, >Knowing how. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Knowledge | Hegel | Gadamer I 361 Knowledge/Absolute Knowledge/Hegel/Gadamer: According to Hegel, it is (...) necessary that the path of the experience of consciousness leads to a self-knowledge that has no other, foreign, beside itself. For him, the completion of experience is the "science", the certainty of oneself in knowledge. The standard by which he thinks experience is thus that of knowing oneself. Therefore, the dialectic of experience must end with the overcoming of all experience, which is achieved in absolute knowledge, that is, in the complete identity of consciousness and object. >Experience/Hegel. - Höffe I 328 Knowledge/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: [at the beginning of phenomenology] is the immediate knowledge, the sensual certainty. According to its self-understanding, it has not yet omitted anything from its "object", so that it appears as the most comprehensive and "truest" knowledge. However, it is directed toward a "this" in the "now" and "here". >Now/Hegel. This/here/now/Hegel: This truth cannot be lost by writing it down, explains Hegel: "This here and now" can be, for example, my standing desk in my study at 9:30 a.m. (...) and so on. Consequently the truth of "this" lies in all "these", correspondingly the truth of "now" in all "now", thus not in an immediate truth that at the same time leaves nothing out, but in a contentless general. Content/showing/(to) mean: This only gains content if you mean the thing you point to when you say "this". But this thing, (...) one is no longer directly certain of oneself, but one perceives it, with which one reaches the second level of consciousness: after the sensual certainty of this, here and now, one finds oneself on the level of the perception of a thing. Absolute Knowledge: The consciousness gains its climax and at the same time the final stage of the experience with itself - that begun in the viewpoint of speculative philosophy - in the (...) "absolute knowledge" reached only by it. >Speculative Philosophy/Hegel, >Speculative Philosophy/Gadamer. Dialectic/Levels: According to dialectic the different figures are not placed next to each other, but rather appear in a hierarchy, which is not brought to consciousness from outside. It results from the experiences that the consciousness makes with itself(1). >Dialectic/Hegel, >Dialectic. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Language | Foucault | I 66 Language/16th century/Foucault: the real language is not a uniform and smooth whole, but rather an opaque, mysterious, self-contained matter, a fragmented, puzzling mass from point to point. A character network in which each character, in relation to all others, can and actually does play the role of the content or character of the secret or clue. Things themselves hide their puzzles like a language and manifest it at the same time. Language belongs to the great distribution of similarities and signatures. Consequently, it must be examined as a matter of nature itself. Language is not what it is, because it has a meaning. Its representative content does not play any role at all. The original form is given by God. I 74ff Language: In the 17th and 18th centuries, the own existence of language, its old strength of a thing written into the world was dissolved in the functioning of the representation. Every language was considered a discourse. Signs were dispensed to name and then embrace the name in a simultaneously decorative and demonstrative duplication, conceale and hide it, to name it by other names, delayed presence, second sign, shape, rhetorical apparatus. I 114ff Language/Foucault: Classical Age/17th Century: Language unrestricted and restrained: unrestricted, because the words have obtained the power to represent thought, as the thinking represents itself. Classical: nothing is given which would not be given in the rep. Classical language is not an external effect of thought; it is thought itself. (17th century) This makes language almost invisible. Its entire existence consists in the representative role. No place outside the representation anymore and no more value without it. In this way it discovers a certain relation to herself, which up to then was neither possible nor comprehensible at all. 16th century: language was in a position of constant comment towards itself. 17th century: we no longer ask how to solve the great enigmatic word sequence, we ask how the discourse works, the elements that it emphasizes, how it analyzes and composes. Instead of comment now: Criticism. (>Words/Foucault). I 127 Because it has become the analysis of order, language makes connections over time that have not existed before. Languages evolve through population shifts, wars, victories, fashions, exchange of goods. They do not, however, develop by virtue of a historicity which they themselves possess. No internal developmental principle. >Discourse/Foucault, >Archeology/Foucault. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Laws | Plato | Höffe I 39 Laws/Plato/Höffe: In Greek antiquity, laws are rigidly prescribed rules, so that, as Plato criticises, they are incapable of recognising the best in individual cases and adapting to changing circumstances. Cf. >Coercion/Ancient philosophy, >Obedience/Ancient philosophy. Solution: According to Plato's undoubtedly innovative demand, laws should be written with the addressee in mind and should also be revisable, which in his opinion requires someone who has the appropriate insight, (...) the êpistemê politikê. >Politics/Plato. Plato sees laws as only a second-best instrument. Their generality offers a welcome simplification, since the legislator cannot constantly stand next to every citizen and command him what is appropriate to the situation. Laws make possible a temporary absence of the insight-led ruler, but in their rigidity and immutability they do not permit individual case justice. Consequently, the actual sovereignty is left to the "royal man gifted with insight". But since such a community is in reality highly improbable, it needs a second-best, nevertheless good option, just the rule of laws. Höffe I 40 Nomoi: The Nomoi praise the law as divine or as a god and declare it "Lord (despotês) over the authorities", thus the actual sovereign. Rule of the law: They also grant the rule of the law that salvation (sôtêria)(1) which the Politeia(2) reserves for the rule of the philosophers. The nomoi also subject the rule of law to an absolute, moral purpose, which is stated in the preambles of the laws. God: While the Politeia is reserved regarding the religious implications of the purpose, the idea of good, the Nomoi explicitly declare God to be the measure of all things. The rebuttal of three errors about the gods, a task corresponding to the poet's criticism of the Politeia, is one of the main purposes of the legislation (Nomoi, Book X). Incidentally, the Politeia also declares the regulation of the cult to be the most beautiful legislation, admittedly left to the Delphic Apollo. 1. IV 715d 2. V 473c-e |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Learning | Connectionism | Slater I 93 Learning/connectionism/Mareschal: (i.e., adapting one’s behavior) is accomplished by tuning the connection weights until some stable behavior is obtained. Supervised networks adjust their weights until the output response (for a given input) matches a target response. That target can come from an active teacher, or passively through observing the environment, but it must come from outside the system. Unsupervised networks adjust their weights until some internal constraint is satisfied (e.g., maximally different inputs must have maximally different internal representations). Slater I 94 The key conclusion from this work (Munakata et al. 1997)(1) is the notion of the graded representation of knowledge. That is, rather than existing as an all-or-none concept, object permanence was acquired gradually. Consequently, the representations that underlay this concept existed in graded states, becoming ever more robust with age and experience, and supporting ever more complex disappearance events. 1. Munakata, Y., McClelland, J. L., Johnson, M. H., & Siegler, R. S. (1997). Rethinking infant knowledge: Toward an adaptive process account of successes and failures in object permanence tasks. Psychological Review, 104, 686–713. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Learning | Mareschal | Slater I 93 Learning/connectionism/Mareschal: (i.e., adapting one’s behavior) is accomplished by tuning the connection weights until some stable behavior is obtained. Supervised networks adjust their weights until the output response (for a given input) matches a target response. That target can come from an active teacher, or passively through observing the environment, but it must come from outside the system. Unsupervised networks adjust their weights until some internal constraint is satisfied (e.g., maximally different inputs must have maximally different internal representations). >Networks, >Neural networks, >Supervised learning. Slater I 94 The key conclusion from this work (Munakata et al. 1997)(1) is the notion of the graded representation of knowledge. That is, rather than existing as an all-or-none concept, object permanence was acquired gradually. Consequently, the representations that underlay this concept existed in graded states, becoming ever more robust with age and experience, and supporting ever more complex disappearance events. >Object permanence, >Knowledge, >Connectionism. 1. Munakata, Y., McClelland, J. L., Johnson, M. H., & Siegler, R. S. (1997). Rethinking infant knowledge: Toward an adaptive process account of successes and failures in object permanence tasks. Psychological Review, 104, 686–713. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Legal Entrepreneurship | Austrian School | Parisi I 283 Legal Entrepreneurship/ Austrian school: Whitman (2002)(1) (…) extends the idea of entrepreneurship to the role played by lawyers and litigants. He examines how legal entrepreneurs discover and exploit opportunities to change legal rules—either the creation of new rules or the reinterpretation of existing ones to benefit themselves and their clients. Harper: Harper (2013)(2) believes that the entrepreneurial approach lays the groundwork for explaining the open-ended and evolving nature of the legal process—it shows how the structure of property rights can undergo continuous endogenous change as a result of entrepreneurial actions within the legal system itself. The most important differentiating factor separating the entrepreneurship of the market process from legal entrepreneurship is the absence of the discipline of monetary profit and loss in the latter case. Although money may change hands in the process of legal entrepreneurship, its outputs may not be valued according to market prices, especially when there is a public-goods quality to the rule at issue. Whether effective feedback mechanisms exist in the contexts is therefore an open question. Martin: Martin argues that, in such structures, the feedback mechanism in polities is not as tight as feedback in the market mechanism, and therefore ideology plays a greater role in such decision-making (Martin, 2010)(3). Legal entrepreneurship can be coordinating and yet also increase uncertainty and conflicts in society. It all depends on the kind of legal order in operation and the mechanism by which it is generated and maintained. Rubin/Priest: Rubin (1977)(4) and Priest (1977)(5) originally analyzed how the openly competitive legal process tends to promote economic efficiency. They more recently point out that the common law system has succumbed to interest group pressures and has deviated from producing efficient rules (Tullock, 2005/1980(6); Tullock, 2005/1997(7); Priest, 1991)(8). They argue that litigation efforts by private parties can explain both the common law’s historic tendency to produce efficient rules as well as its more recent evolution away from efficiency in favor of wealth redistribution through the intrusion of strong interest groups into political and legal processes. Zywicki: Zywicki (2003)(9) describes the common law system in the Middle Ages as polycentric. He focuses on three institutional features of the formative years of the common law system. First, courts competed in overlapping jurisdictions and judges competed for litigants. Second, there was a weak rule of precedent instead of the present-day stare decisis rule. And third, legal rules were more default rules, which parties could contract around, instead of mandatory rules. These features are missing in the present-day common law system, which is non-competitive, has strong rules of precedent, Parisi I 284 precedent, and is dominated by mandatory rules. The efficiency claims pertain to a social system grounded in private ordering where those who are subject to those legal rules select the rules in open competition. Rajagopalan/Wagner : Rajagopalan and Wagner (2013)(9) argue that the inefficiency claims pertaining to the current system of common law rules are a result of the entrepreneurial action within the contemporary system of the “entangled political economy.” The entangled political economy is essentially a “hybrid” of a monocentric state structure interacting with polycentric or private ordering, encouraging “parasitical” entrepreneurship within the legal system (Podemska-Mikluch and Wagner, 2010)(10). Rajagopalan (2015)(11) provides India as a case study to discuss a system of rules incongruent to the economy consequently giving rise to “parasitical” entrepreneurial action and entanglement of economic and legal orders. There is also “political entrepreneurship” within a given constitutional or governance structure that seeks to create coalitions to effect specific legislation or transfers of wealth (rent seeking). Martin and Thomas (2013)(2) describe such political entrepreneurship at different levels of the institutional structure, at the policy level, legislative level, or the constitutional level. These non-market orders determine the precise form that entrepreneurship takes (Boettke and Coyne, 2009(13); and Boettke and Leeson, 2009)(14). Political entrepreneurship may also attempt to change higher-level rules—like property rights systems, constitutional constraints, and so forth—as a means to gain rents and transfers within an economy (Rajagopalan, 2016)(15). 1. Whitman, D. G. (2002). “Legal Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12(2): 1–11. 2. Harper, D. A. (2013). “Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 88: 62–77. 3. Martin, A. (2010). “Emergent Politics and the Power of Ideas.” Studies in Emergent Order 3: 212–245. 4. Rubin, P. H. (1977). “Why is the Common Law Efficient?” Journal of Legal Studies 6(1): 51–63. 5. Priest, G. L. (1977). “The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules.” Journal of Legal Studies 6(1): 65–77. 6. Tullock, G. (2005/1980). “Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure,” in C. Rowley, ed., The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. IX. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 7. Tullock, G. (2005/1997). “The Case Against the Common Law,” in C. Rowley, ed., The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. IX. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 8. Zywicki, T. J. (2003). “The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply Side Analysis.” Northwestern University Law Review 97(4): 1551–1633. 9. Rajagopalan, S. and R. Wagner (2013). “Legal Entrepreneurship within Alternative Systems of Political Economy.” American Journal of Entrepreneurship 6(1): 24–36. 10. Podemska-Mikluch, M. and R. W. Wagner (2010). “Entangled Political Economy and the Two Faces of Entrepreneurship.” Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 28(2–3): 99–114. 11. Rajagopalan, S. (2015). “Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India.” Constitutional Political Economy 26(3): 328–355. 12. Martin, A. and D. Thomas (2013). “Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system.” Public Choice 154(1): 21–37. 13. Boettke, P. J. and Coyne, C. J. (2009). Context matters: Institutions and entrepreneurship. Hanover: MA, Now Publishers Inc. 14. Boettke, P. J., C. J. Coyne, and P. T. Leeson (2008). “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67(2): 331–358. 15. Rajagopalan, S. (2016). “Constitutional Change: A public choice analysis,” in Sujit Choudhary, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Madhav Khosla, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, pp 127–142. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Legal History | Demsetz | Parisi I Institutions/law/legal history/Demsetz/Wangenheim: Initiated by Harold Demsetz's seminal paper (1967)(1), neo-institutional investigations of legal evolution typically look at specific changes of property rights regimes. Alchian: The basic idea is closely related to Alchian's (1950)(2) optimistic account of behavioral evolution: societies tend to have institutions that reflect, and are adapted to, the current needs of this society, given their environment and their preferences. Property rights/Demsetz: The Labrador Indians switched from open access property rights regimes to private property Parisi I 163 when fur trade made hunting beavers more valuable to each hunter, so that the natural setting could not sustain the radically increased burden resulting from consequentially increased hunting activities. >Property. Conditions/Demsetz: In his reappraising paper thirty-five years later, Demsetz (2002)(3) based his argument on a number of conditions that have to be satisfied to make environmental changes induce optimal institutional adaptations. In particular, he considered (1) the number and closeness of involved persons, (2) their productivity in solving resource allocation problems, and (3) the complexity of this problem as relevant conditions. If they change, most often due to new levels of specialization in production, observable property rights regimes will adapt to better solve the externality problems that become prevalent in effect, so Demsetz (2002)(4) argues. >Externalities. North: The idea of institutions evolving towards efficiency is also at the heart of the earlier writings of Douglas North (e.g. 1981)(4), who grounded his account of economic history on this argument. >Institutions. WangenheimVsDemsetz: Independently of whether one wants to label this functionalist Demsetzian approach as truly evolutionary or not, the argument lacks any causal explanation for why the institutions change. There is no discussion of how rules in archaic societies are made, nor is there any hint of legislators' incentives when more complex societies are discussed (mainly in the 2002 paper). WittVsDemsetz: Many authors like Witt (1987)(5), Banner (2002)(6), Eggertson (1990(7), pp. 247—280), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)) have noted this pitfall of Demsetz's approach. The idea has been taken up by scholars like Umbeck (1977a(10), 1977b(11)), Ellickson (1991(12), 1994(13)), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)), who have argued that societies self-organize and develop property rights when law does not exist or is not enforced (prominent examples are farmer - rancher conflicts in Shasta County, mining claims during the California gold rush, Maine lobster fishing grounds, and grazing areas on the American Western frontier in the second half of the nineteenth century). Causality: (…) the authors proffer a causal complement to Demsetz's teleological hypothesis: they identify some individuals who find it privately worthwhile to design and enforce property rights against infringing group members or outsiders. VsUmbeck: Not all examples have remained undisputed. Clay and Wright (2005)(14), for example, challenge Umbeck's observations on mining district codes producing order. They argue that the mining district codes gave equal attention to the rights of claim-jumpers as to claim holders, whence chronic insecurity and litigation resulted. 1. Demsetz, H. (1967). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review, P&P 57: 347-359. 2. Alchian, A. (1950). "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy 58: 211—221. 3.Demsetz, H. (2002). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights Il: The Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership." Journal of Legal studies 31: S653—S672. 4. North, D. C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton. 5. Witt, U. (1987). "How Transaction Rights Are Shaped to Channel Innovativeness." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 180—195. 6. Banner, S. (2002). "Transitions Between Property Regimes." Journal of Legal studies 31: S359-S371. 7. Eggertson, T. (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (1975). "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West." Journal of Law and Economics 18: 163—179. 9. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (2002). "Cowboys and Contracts." Journal of Legal studies 31: S489-S514. 10. Umbeck, J. (1977a). "The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights." Explorations in Economic History 14: 197—226. 11. Umbeck, J. (1977b). "A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush." Journal of Law and Economics 20: 421—437. 12. Ellickson, R. (1991). Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 13. Ellickson, R. (1994). "The Aim of Order without Law." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 97—100. 14. Clay, K. and G. Wright (2005). "Order without law? Property Rights during the California Gold Rush." Explorations in Economic History 42: 155—183. Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Legitimacy | Weber | Habermas III 359 Legitimacy/Weber/Habermas: "Legitimacy can be considered legitimate [by the participants]: a) by agreement of the interested parties for them; b) by imposition (due to a rule of people over people considered legitimate) and submissiveness".(1) >Convention, >Interest, >Governance, >Ultimate justification, >Justification. Habermas: in both cases it is not legality as such that creates legitimacy, but either (a) a rational agreement, which already underlies the legal order, or (b) an otherwise legitimized rule of those who impose the legal order. Weber: The transition from an agreed on to an imposed order is smooth. (2) Habermas III 360 Habermas: even with flowing transitions, the two sources of legitimacy - agreement or imposition of a powerful will - can be analytically separated. Solution/Weber: the latter presupposes the belief in an authority that is legitimate in any sense. (3) Belief/HabermasVsWeber: the belief in the legality of a procedure cannot generate legitimacy per se, i.e. by virtue of positive statutes. This is already apparent from the logical analysis of the concepts of legitimacy and legality. How did Weber come to this? I only find one argument that does not hold up either: that everyday techniques are usually no longer understood in their inner reasons. Weber points this out.(4) Habermas III 361 According to Weber, we can understand the belief in legality as a secondary traditionalism that no longer poses any problems for institutions with prerequisites. >Culture, >Cultural tradition. Ultimately, however, rational foundations of the legal system are again assumed.(5) >Rationality. Habermas: Ultimately, experts are needed to justify where laypersons are not able to do so ad hoc. >Justification. HabermasVsWeber/HabermasVsDecisionism: Legality based on positive statutes alone can indicate an underlying legitimacy, but cannot replace it. Belief in legality is not an independent type of legitimacy. (6) Habermas III 363 Legitimation/Weber: thesis: the "ignorance of the ever-increasing technical content of the law" extends the path of legitimacy ((s), i.e. legitimation and legitimacy is more difficult for the individual citizen to see through, for the institutions it is more difficult to prove). Habermas III 364 Habermas: the extension of the legitimation paths does not mean, however, that the belief in legality could replace the belief in the legitimation of the legal system as a whole. Weber/Habermas: consequently understands the reversal of polarity from ethical to purely utilitarian orientations of action as a decoupling of the motivational foundations or the moral-practical value sphere. But instead of welcoming contrary tendencies, Weber sees them as a danger to the formal qualities of the law.(7) >Utilitarianism, >Value Spheres. 1. M. Weber, Methodologische Schriften, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen, 1968, S.316 2. Ibid p. 317. 3. Ibid p. 318 4. Ibid p. 212f 5. Ibid p. 214 6. W. Schluchter (following H. Heller) introduces "legal principles" which are intended to act as a bridge between positive law and the foundations of an ethics of responsibility (1979, p. 155ff). HabermasVsSchluchter: the status of these principles remains unclear. Within Max Weber's system they are a foreign element. 7. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg.v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 655 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Levinson | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 145 Levinson/adulthood/stages of development/Developmental psychology/Upton: Levinson (1986(1), 1996(2)) was correct in thinking that early adulthood is the time that we explore vocational possibilities. The evidence supports a process of making tentative commitments and revising them as necessary before establishing yourself in what you hope will be a suitable occupation (Super et al.. 1996)(3). Indeed, more than twice as many tentative and exploratory vocational decisions are seen at age 21 than at 36, and this is true for both men (Philips. 1982(4)) and women (Jenkins. 1989)(5). Careers tend to peak during the forties (Simonton. 1990)(6), when there is a tendency for adults to define themselves in terms of their work. However, factors such as personality and gender seem to mediate career success; conscientiousness, extraversion and emotional stability are all associated with job performance (Ozer and Benet-Martinez. 2006)(7) and, even at the start of the twenty-first century, many women still subordinate career goals to family ones (Kirchmeyer, 2006)(8). VsLevinson: There is much less evidence to support Levinson’s suggestion of a midlife crisis. >Midlife Crisis/Levinson, >Midlife Crisis/Psychological theories. Upton I 148 VsLevinson/Upton: While it is good that Levinson acknowledged this personal interest, [one] might wonder whether this influenced his interpretation of the findings. [One] might also argue that the biographical interview is not very objective and that Levinson’s sample is not very representative. (…) men who were interviewed for Levinson’s studies would have been born between 1924 and 1934. They were therefore raised in the 1930s and 1940s. Women and men who grew up during this time were gender-typed to a much greater extent than males and females are today. Other problems with the studies: Life experiences: Men who have grown up in the last few decades may well have had to deal with less stable families due to high divorce rates, as well as having to deal with a different kind of economy. Women: the upbringing, aims and expectations of women today are very different from those at the time of Levinson’s work. >Aging. 1. Levinson, DJ (1986) The Seasons of a Man’s Life. New York: Alfred Knopf. 2. Levinson, DJ (1996) The Seasons of a Woman’s Life. New York Alfred Knopf. 3. Super, D, Savickas, M, and Super, C (1996). The life-span, life-space approach to careers, in D. Brown, L Brooks, and Associates (Eds.), Career Choice and Development (3rd ed., 121-78). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 4. Philips, SD (1982) Career exploration in adulthood .Journal of Vocational Behaviour, 20: 129- 40. 5. Jenkins, SR (1989) Longitudinal prediction of women’s careers: psychological, behavioral, and social-structural influences .Journal of Vocational Behavior, 34: 204-35. 6. Simonton, DK (1990). Creativity in the later years: optimistic prospects for achievement. Gerontologist) 30, 626-3 1. 7. Ozer, DJ and Benet-Martinez, V (2006) Personality and the prediction of consequential outcome. Psychology, 57:402-21. 8. Kirchmeyer, C (2006) The difference effects of family on objective career success across gender: a test of alternative explanations. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 68: 323-46. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Liberalism | Holmes | Krastev I 17 Liberalism/post-communist era/Krastev/Holmes: What the breathtaking rise of China suggests is that the defeat of the communist idea in 1989 was not, after all, a one-sided victory for the liberal idea. Instead, the unipolar order became a world much less hospitable to liberalism than anyone had predicted at the time. Some commentators have claimed that 1989, by eliminating the Cold War competition between rival universal ideologies, fatally damaged the Enlightenment project itself, in its liberal as well as communist incarnation. The Hungarian philosopher G. M. Tamás has gone even further, Krastev I 18 arguing that ‘both the liberal and socialist utopias’ were ‘defeated’ in 1989, signalling ‘the end’ of the ‘Enlightenment project’ itself.(1) KrastevVsTamás: We are not so fatalistic. (...) the anti-liberal regimes and movements (...) perhaps because they lack any broadly appealing ideological vision, may prove ephemeral and historically inconsequential. Krastev I 37 Libralism: Massive emigration, especially of the young, has arguably done more to discredit liberalism in the region than virtually nonexistent immigration. As it was understood in the region, (...) liberalism elevated the freedom to cross borders into something of a sacred value. This gave Westernizing and reform-minded leaders no ready language with which to express and take into account demographic fears fueled by outmigration from low birthrate societies. As a consequence, populist demagogues were able to exploit unspoken fears of national extinction to vilify open-border liberalism, to public applause, Krastev I 38 and claim that the liberal idea has outlived its usefulness in today’s world. Krastev I 67 Liberalism/Krastev: Liberal democracy offers provisional victories only. It denies the electoral winners the chance for a full and final victory. Liberal democracy’s renunciation of definitive and decisive victories, as opposed to temporary and indecisive ones, is what makes the allegedly full and final victory of liberal democracy itself in 1989 seem so anomalous and problematic. PopulismVsLiberalism: How could a political ideology that glorifies ongoing competition, ideological alternatives and merely provisional victories, the populists ask, claim to have done away with all three? 1. Gáspár Miklós Tamás, ‘A Clarity Interfered With’, in Timothy Burns (ed.), After History? (Littlefield Adams, 1994), pp. 82–3. |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Liberalism | Krastev | Krastev I 17 Liberalism/post-communist era/Krastev: What the breathtaking rise of China suggests is that the defeat of the communist idea in 1989 was not, after all, a one-sided victory for the liberal idea. Instead, the unipolar order became a world much less hospitable to liberalism than anyone had predicted at the time. Some commentators have claimed that 1989, by eliminating the Cold War competition between rival universal ideologies, fatally damaged the Enlightenment project itself, in its liberal as well as communist incarnation. The Hungarian philosopher G. M. Tamás has gone even further, Krastev I 18 arguing that ‘both the liberal and socialist utopias’ were ‘defeated’ in 1989, signalling ‘the end’ of the ‘Enlightenment project’ itself.(1) KrastevVsTamás: We are not so fatalistic. (...) the anti-liberal regimes and movements (...) perhaps because they lack any broadly appealing ideological vision, may prove ephemeral and historically inconsequential. Krastev I 37 Libralism: Massive emigration, especially of the young, has arguably done more to discredit liberalism in the region than virtually nonexistent immigration. As it was understood in the region, (...) liberalism elevated the freedom to cross borders into something of a sacred value. This gave Westernizing and reform-minded leaders no ready language with which to express and take into account demographic fears fueled by outmigration from low birthrate societies. As a consequence, populist demagogues were able to exploit unspoken fears of national extinction to vilify open-border liberalism, to public applause, Krastev I 38 and claim that the liberal idea has outlived its usefulness in today’s world. Krastev I 67 Liberalism/Krastev: Liberal democracy offers provisional victories only. It denies the electoral winners the chance for a full and final victory. Poland. Liberal democracy’s renunciation of definitive and decisive victories, as opposed to temporary and indecisive ones, is what makes the allegedly full and final victory of liberal democracy itself in 1989 seem so anomalous and problematic. PopulismVsLiberalism: How could a political ideology that glorifies ongoing competition, ideological alternatives and merely provisional victories, the populists ask, claim to have done away with all three? 1. Gáspár Miklós Tamás, ‘A Clarity Interfered With’, in Timothy Burns (ed.), After History? (Littlefield Adams, 1994), pp. 82–3. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Liberalism | Raz | Gaus I 416 Liberalism/Raz/Weinstein: Contemporary political theory's historical myopia has consequently made Joseph Raz's perfectionist liberalism seem more anomalous than, in fact, it is. Though Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift are correct in concluding that Raz 'transcends' the rivalry between liberalism and communitarianism, they overemphasize his originality (1996(1): 250). Perfectionist liberalism: Raz's perfectionist liberalism is refurbished new liberalism but with some differences. For instance, Raz distinguishes autonomy, a seminal value requiring serious political attention, from self- realization, which he holds is merely one variety of autonomy. >Self-realization/Hobhouse. Self-realization/Raz: Whereas a self-realizing person develops all of his capacities to their full potential, an autonomous person merely develops 'a conception of himself, and his actions are sensitive to his past'. In 'embracing goals and commitments, in coming to care about one thing or another', such persons 'give shape' to their lives, though not necessarily according to a unified plan as with Hobhouse (Raz, 1986(2): 375, 387) (...). Value pluralism: Moreover for Raz unlike new liberals, autonomy entails value pluralism because goods and virtues are incommensurable, often forcing us to trade them off, 'relinquishing one good for the sake of another' (1986(2): And, tragically, we have to make trade-offs because (though Raz fails to argue why) the menu of goods and virtues available to us is largely socially determined (1986(2): 366, 398-9) (...). Goals/Raz: Notwithstanding these differences, for Raz autonomous agents nevertheless 'identify' with their choices and remain 'loyal' to them, just like new liberal self-realizing agents. Second, in shaping their lives, autonomous agents, like self-realizing agents, don 't arbitrarily recreate themselves in spite of their social circumstances. RazVsNietzsche: Brute Nietzschean self-creation is impossible, for we are all born into communities presupposing our values. At best, acting autonomously transforms slightly, or reconfirms these values selectively (1986(2): 382, 387—8). >Perfectionism/Raz. 1. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Life | Dworkin | Gaus I 417 Life/Dworkin/Weinstein: In his recent Sovereign Virtue, Dworkin presses hard his familiar defence of equality of resources, appealing to what he calls the 'challenge model' of ethical value, which he insists is non-consequentialist. For Dworkin, lives go better when they are lived from the inside with 'ethical integrity', meaning when they are not lived mechanically from the outside in accordance with rote habit. Ethically honest lives are skilful performances exhibiting ongoing, critical self-reflection. For such lives, choice is constitutive of living well. DworkinVsUtilitarianism: Welfarism and utilitarianism are immoral since they instrumentalize choice in the name of promoting states of affairs.* Equality: For Dworkin, equality of basic resources 'flows from' the challenge view. If living well means meeting the challenges we assign ourselves, then having sufficient basic resources is ethically imperative. And if it is 'equally important how each person lives', then everyone ought to have equal basic resources. Hence, 'ethical liberals begin with a strong ethical reason for insisting on an egalitarian distribution of resources' (Dworkin, 2000a(1): 279). In other words, equal concern and respect somehow entail resource egalitarianism since equality 'must be measured in resources and opportunities' (2000a(1): 237; also see Dworkin, 1985(2): 192-3). Notwithstanding the circularity of arguing that equal concern and respect entail treating people equally along some separately identified domain, Dworkin never stipulates precisely what he means by equality of resources also 'flow[ing] from' the challenge model.** But if the latter is meant to be a source of justification, then Dworkin's egalitarian liberalism begins to look like Sen's more than Dworkin realizes. >Egalitarianosm/Sen. * Following Sen, Dworkin (2000a(1): ch. l) considers utilitarianism a form of welfarism. For Sen's rejection of utilitarianism though not consequentialism, see Sen (1979)(2). Also see Dworkin (2000a(1): ch. 7) for his criticisms of Sen 's and Cohen's conceptions of equality. ** In Dworkin's recent response to Miller's review of Sovereign Virtue, he says that by equal resources 'flow[ing] from' equal concern and respect, he means 'consistent with'. He also says that his book aims to 'find attractive conceptions of democracy, liberty, community and individual responsibility that are consistent with or flow from' equal resources in order to 'protect' these values 'from subordination' to equality (Dworkin, 2000b(3): 15). Now this meaning of 'flowlingl from' merely requires that distributive justice be compatible with equal concern and respect and not that it is entailed by it. 1. Dworkin, Ronald (2000a) Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Sen, Amartya (1979) 'Utilitarianism and welfarism'. The Journal of Philosophy, LXXVI: 463-89. 3. Dworkin, Ronald (2000b) 'Equality - an exchange'. Times Literary Supplement (London), I December: 15-16. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Limits | Thiel | I 188/189 Border/Tradition/Thiel: Old: in Aristotle the border always has a dimension smaller by 1 than the object itself. A point can then no longer have a boundary! It follows from this that the points do not touch each other, and consequently cannot form a continuum! For Aristotle, therefore, a straight line cannot consist of points. It is not a set of points in the sense of pre-aristotelian or post-aristotelian mathematics. A straight line or a line is a continuum insofar as it is divisible as often as desired, but the parts and thus also their boundaries, the points are always only potentially present "in" such a continuum. Only the two end points of a route belong to it as "actual" real points, all others are only "potential". I 190 New: Topology: one point p of a set M means one Def Accumulation point of M, if in each environment of p there is another point of the set M, and the set M is called Def completed when all their cluster points are contained in M itself. A set of M means Def coherent, if it cannot be divided in any way into two parts A and B in such a way that they together form M, but have no point in common, and none contains an accumulation point of the other. Def Continuum: a set that is both closed and coherent is called a continuum. Def dense: for every two points there is another point in between. I 191 Accumulation point: We return to the interval 0,1, .... no point of L can lie to the right of d any more. Then we can choose such a small environment U that ((s) a certain, chosen point) e no longer lies in U, because according to the definition of the accumulation point in every environment of d lies a point of R . Nevertheless, there must be a point p from R in U and therefore p < e must apply. However, this contradicts the assumed property of decomposition that every point of L is to the left of every point of R and that e < p must be valid. This shows that this accumulation point of R, situated in L, is unambiguously determined, because one of two different points with this property should lie to the right of the other, and since both should lie in L, the same contradiction would arise as between d and e. The point d is thus the "largest" i.e. the extreme right point of L. >Real numbers. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Liquidity Preference | Keynesianism | Rothbard III Liquidity Preference/Keynesianism/Rothbard: Those Keynesians who recognize the grave diffculties of their system fall back on one last string in their bow - "liquidity preference." Rothbard: Intelligent Keynesians will concede that involuntary unemployment is a "special" or rare case, and Lindahl goes even further to say that it could be only a short-run and not a long-run equilibrium phenomenon.(1) >Unemployment/Keynesianism, >Equilibrium. RothbardVsModigliani/RothbardVsLindahl: Neither Modigliani nor Lindahl, however, is thoroughgoing enough in his critique of the Keynesian system, particularly of the "liquidity preference" doctrine. Causality/method/RothbardVsKeynesianism: The Keynesian system, as is quite clear from the mathematical portrayals of it given by its followers, suffers grievously from the mathematical-economic sin of "mutual determination." The use of mathematical functions, which are reversible at will, is appropriate in physics, where we do not know the causes of the observed movements. Since we do not know the causes, any mathematical law explaining or describing movements will be reversible, and, as far as we are concerned, any of the variables in the function is just as much "cause" as another. Praxeology/Rothbard: In praxeology, the science of human action, however, we know the original cause - motivated action by individuals. >Praxeology/Rothbard. Solution/Rothbard: This knowledge provides us with true axioms. From these axioms, true laws are deduced. They are deduced step by step in a logical, cause-and-effect relationship. Since first causes are known, their consequent effects are also known. Economics therefore traces unilinear cause-and-effect relations, not vague "mutually determining" relations. Interest/Keynesianism/Rothbard: This methodological reminder is singularly applicable to the Keynesian theory of interest. For the Keynesians consider the rate of interest (a) as determining investment and (b) as being determined by the demand for money to hold "for speculative purposes" (liquidity preference). In practice, however, they treat the latter not as determining the rate of interest, but as being determined by it. RothbardVsKeynesianism: The methodology of "mutual determination" has completely obscured this sleight of hand. KeynesianismVsVvs: Keynesians might object that all demand and supply curves are "mutually determining" in their relation to price. Demand/RothbardVsKeynesianism: But this facile assertion is not correct. Demand curves are determined by utility scales, and supply curves by speculation and the stock produced by given labor and land factors, which is ultimately governed by time preferences. >Time preference/Rothbard. Rothbard III 786 The Keynesians therefore treat the rate of interest, not as they believe they do - as determined by liquidity preference - but rather as some sort of mysterious and unexplained force imposing itself on the other elements of the economic system. Thus, Keynesian discussion of liquidity preference centers around "inducement to hold cash" as the rate of interest rises or falls. According to the theory of liquidity preference, a fall in the rate of interest increases the quantity of cash demanded for "speculative purposes" (liquidity preferences), and a rise in the rate of interest Iowers liquidity preference. RothbardVsLiquidity preference: The first error in this concept is the arbitrary separation of the demand for money into two separate parts: a "transactions demand," supposedly determined by the Size of social income, and a "speculative demand," determined by the rate of interest. (…) all sorts of influences impinge themselves on the demand for money. Value/demand for money: But they are only influences working through the value scales of individuals. And there is only one final demand for money, because each individual has only one value scale. There is no way by which we can split the demand up into two parts and speak of them as independent entities. Furthermore, there are far more than two influences on demand. In the final analysis, the demand for money, like all utilities, cannot be reduced to simple determinants; it is the outcome of free, independent decisions on individual value scales. There is, therefore, no "transaction demand" uniquely determined by the size of income. >Liquidity preference/Modigliani, >Demand for money/Rothbard. 1. Cf. Lindahl's critique of Lawrence Klein's The Keynesian Revolution in "On Keynes' Economic System - Part I," p. 162. Also see Leontief, "Postulates: Keynes' General Theory and the Classicists." |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Loans | Neoclassical Economics | Rothbard III 421 Loans/Neoclassical economics/RothbardVsNeoclassical economics/Rothbard: Where is the producers’ loan market? This market is always the one that is stressed by writers, often to the exclusion of anything else. In fact, “rate of interest” generally refers to money loans, including loans to consumers and producers, but particularly stressing the latter, which is usuallyquantitatively greater and more significant for production. The rate of interest of money loans to the would-be producer is supposed to be the significant rate of interest. In fact, the fashionable neoclassical doctrine holds that the producers’ loan marketdetermines the rate of interest (…). >Neoclassic economics, >Rate of interest/Rothbard. Rothbard III 422 RothbardVsNeoclassical economics: this sort of approach completely overlooks the gross savings of the producers and, even more, the demand for present goods by owners of the original factors. Instead of being fundamentally suppliers of present goods, capitalists are portrayed as demanders of present goods. >Production structure/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard. This approach misses the point very badly because it looks at the economy with the superficial eye of an average businessman. The businessman borrows on a producers’ loan market from individual savers, and he judges how much to borrow on the basis of his expected rate of “profit,” or rate of return. The writers assume that he has available a shelf of investment projects, some of which would pay him, say 8 percent, some 7 percent, some 3 percent, etc., and that at each hypothetical interest rate he will borrow in order to invest in those projects where his return will be as high or higher. In other words, if the interest rate is 8 percent, he will borrow to invest in those projects that will yield him over 8 percent; if the rate is 4 percent, he will invest in many more projects - those that will yield him over 4 percent, etc. In that way, the demand curve for savings, for each individual, and still more for the aggregate on the market, will slope rightward as demand curves usually do, as the rateof interest falls. The intersection sets the market rate of interest. Rothbard: Superficially, this approach might seem plausible. It usually happens that a businessman foresees such varying rates of return on different investments, that he borrows on the market from different individual savers, and that he is popularly considered the “capitalist” or entrepreneur, while the lenders are simply savers. >Loans/Rothbard. Rothbard III 423 RothbardVsNeoclassical economics: The cardinal error here is an old one in economics - the attribution of value-productivity to monetary investment. There is no question that investment increases the physical productivity of the productive process, as well as the productivity per man hour. Indeed, that is precisely why investment and the consequent lengthening of the periods of production take place at all. But what has this to do with value-productivity or with the monetary return on investment,(…)? Solution/Rothbard: (…) producers benefit, not from the gross revenue received, but from the price spread between their selling price and their aggregate factor prices. >Factors of production/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Loans | Rothbard | Rothbard III 377 Loans/future goods/investment/exchange/Rothbard: What (…) are the specific types of future goods that enter the time market? There are two such types. Rothbard III 378 One is a written claim to a certain amount of money at a future date. The exchange on the time market in this case is as follows: A gives money to B in exchange for a claim to future money. The term generally used to refer to A, the purchaser of the future money, is “lender,” or “creditor,” while B, the seller of the future money, is termed the “borrower” or “debtor.” >Credit, >Time/Rothbard, >Time preference. The reason is that this credit transaction, as contrasted to a cash transaction, remains unfinished in the present. When a man buys a suit for cash, he transfers money in exchange for the suit. The transaction is finished. In a credit transaction he receives simply a written I.O.U., or note, entitling him to claim a certain amount of money at a future date. The transaction remains to be completed in the future, when B, the borrower, “repays the loan” by transferring the agreed money to the creditor. Comsumer goods: Although the loan market is a very conspicuous type of time transaction, it is by no means the only or even the dominant one. There is a much more subtle, but more important, type of transaction which permeates the entire production system, but which is not often recognized as a time transaction. This is the purchase of producers’ goods and services, which are transformed over a period of time, finally to emerge as consumers’ goods. >Service/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Investments/Rothbard, >Capitalism/Rothbard, >Evenly Rotating Economy. Rothbard III 421 Loan market/RothbardVsNeoclassical economics/Rothbard: Where is the producers’ loan market? This market is always the one that is stressed by writers, often to the exclusion of anything else. In fact, “rate of interest” generally refers to money loans, including loans to consumers and producers, but particularly stressing the latter, which is usuallyquantitatively greater and more significant for production. The rate of interest of money loans to the would-be producer is supposed to be the significant rate of interest. In fact, the fashionable neoclassical doctrine holds that the producers’ loan marketdetermines the rate of interest (…). >Neoclassic economics, >Rate of interest/Rothbard. Rothbard III 422 RothbardVsNeoclassical economics: this sort of approach completely overlooks the gross savings of the producers and, even more, the demand for present goods by owners of the original factors. Instead of being fundamentally suppliers of present goods, capitalists are portrayed as demanders of present goods. >Production structure/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard. This approach misses the point very badly because it looks at the economy with the superficial eye of an average businessman. The businessman borrows on a producers’ loan market from individual savers, and he judges how much to borrow on the basis of his expected rate of “profit,” or rate of return. The writers assume that he has available a shelf of investment projects, some of which would pay him, say 8 percent, some 7 percent, some 3 percent, etc., and that at each hypothetical interest rate he will borrow in order to invest in those projects where his return will be as high or higher. In other words, if the interest rate is 8 percent, he will borrow to invest in those projects that will yield him over 8 percent; if the rate is 4 percent, he will invest in many more projects—those that will yield him over 4 percent, etc. In that way, the demand curve for savings, for each individual, and still more for the aggregate on the market, will slope rightward as demand curves usually do, as the rateof interest falls. The intersection sets the market rate of interest. Superficially, this approach might seem plausible. It usually happens that a businessman foresees such varying rates of return on different investments, that he borrows on the market from different individual savers, and that he is popularly considered the “capitalist” or entrepreneur, while the lenders are simply savers. Rothbard III 423 RothbardVsNeoclassical economics: What is the basis for the alleged shelf of available projects, each with different rates of return? Why does a particular investment yield any net monetary return at all? The usual answer is that each dose of new investment has a “marginal value productivity,” such as 10 percent, 9 percent, 4 percent, etc., that naturally the most productive investments will be made first and that therefore, as savings increase, further investments will be less and less value-productive. This provides the basis for the alleged “businessman’s demand curve,” which slopes to the right as savings increase and the interest rate falls. The cardinal error here is an old one in economics - the attribution of value-productivity to monetary investment. There is no question that investment increases the physical productivity of the productive process, as well as the productivity per man hour. Indeed, that is precisely why investment and the consequent lengthening of the periods of production take place at all. But what has this to do with value-productivity or with the monetary return on investment,(…)? Solution/Rothbard: (…) producers benefit, not from the gross revenue received, but from the price spread between their selling price and their aggregate factor prices. >Factors of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 1002 Loans/loan market//Rothbard: Market interest rate/purchasing power: Recorded interest rates in the boom will generally rise, in fact, because of the purchasing-power component in the market interest rate. An increase in prices (…) generates a positive purchasing-power component in the natural interest rate, i.e., the rate of return earned by businessmen on the market. >Natural interest rate. Rothbard III 1003 Free market: In the free market this would quickly be reflected in the Ioan rate, which (…) is completely dependent on the natural rate. But a continual influx of circulating credit prevents the Ioan rate from catching up with the natural rate, and thereby generates the business-cycle process.(1) Loans: A further corollary of this bank-created discrepancy between the Ioan rate and the natural rate is that creditors on the Ioan market suffer losses for the benefit of their debtors: the capitalists on the stock market or those who own their own businesses. The latter gain during the boom by the differential between the Ioan rate and the natural rate, while the creditors (apart from banks, which create their own money) lose to the same extent. >Credit expansion, >Business cycle/Rothbard, >Boom/Rothbard, >Interest rate/Rothbard. 1. Since Knut Wicksell is one of the fathers of this business-cycle approach, it is important to stress that our usage of "natural rate" differs from his. Wicksell's "natural rate" was akin to our "free-market rate"; our "natural rate" is the rate of return earned by businesses on the existing market without considering Ioan interest. It corresponds to what has been misleadingly called the "normal profit rate," but is actually the basic rate of interest. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Logical Constants | Grice | Cohen I 397 Logical Constants/particles/logic/everyday language/Cohen: e.g. the inference from "q" to "p>q" has no equivalent in natural language. Cohen I 402 "And" asserts more than the truth of two subsentences. The order here is important. E.g. A republic is proclaimed and the king died or vice versa - the second truth should be part of the same kind. Cohen I 407 Logical constants/meaning/if then/conversationalistic hypothesis/Grice: the assertion of a conditional clause is truth-functional regarding the linguistic meaning, but it is associated with a (redeemable) implication that there are indirect, i.e. non-truth-functional reasons for the truth, e.g. assumptions which cards the other player has - can be the truth function in bridge (strict rules). Cohen I 410 If/truth-functional/Cohen: e.g. if he/she was surprised, he/she did not show it - if that is truth-functional, it would be acceptable, because the consequent is true, but you do not have to accept the conversion yet: if he/she was not surprised, he/she also showed no surprise - although the sentence after would be true here too. Reason: here, "if" has the meaning of "even if" and not of "if-then". >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning (Intending), >Speaker reference. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Marginal Utility of Money | Rothbard | Rothbard III 260 Marginal Utility of Money/Rothbard: Problem: the ranking of money on the various individual value scales. We know that the ranking of units of goods on these scales is determined by the relative ranking of the marginal utilities of the units. In the case of barter, it was clear that the relative rankings were the result of people’s evaluations of the marginal importance of the direct uses of the various goods. >Marginal utility/Rothbard, >Utility/Rothbard, >Value/Rothbard, >Exchange value, >Use value. Rothbard III 261 In the case of a monetary economy, however, the direct use-value of the money commodity is overshadowed by its exchange-value. Allocation of goods: a man allocates his stock of various units of a good to his most important uses first, and his less important uses in succession, while he gives up his least important uses first. Allocation of money: Now (…) every man allocates his stock of money among the various uses. The money commodity has numerous different uses, and the number of uses multiplies the more highly developed and advanced the money economy, division of labor, and the capital structure. Decisions concerning numerous consumer goods, numerous investment projects, consumption at present versus expected increased returns in the future, and addition to cash balance, must all be made. We say that each individual allocates each unit of the money commodity to its most important use first, then to the next most important use, etc., thus determining the allocation of money in each possible use and line of spending. The least important use is given up first, as with any other commodity. Consumption: We are interested here in the marginal utility of money as relevant to consumption decisions. Every man is a consumer, and therefore the analysis applies to everyone taking part in the nexus of monetary exchange. Each succeeding unit that the consumer allocates among different lines of spending, he wishes to allocate to the most highly valued use that it can serve. His psychic revenue is the marginal utility - the value of the most important use that will be served. Rothbard III 262 His psychic cost is the next most important use that must be for-gone - the use that must be sacrificed in order to attain the most important end. The highest ranked utility forgone, therefore, is defined as the cost of any action. Rothbard III 263 Marginal Utility of Money: (…) money obeys the law of marginal utility, just as any other commodity does. (…) it is true of money, as of any other commodity, that as its stock increases, its marginal utility declines; and that as its stock declines, its marginal utility to the person increases. >Money/Rothbard, >Cash balance/Rothbard. Rothbard III 311 Marginal utility of money/Rothbard: Some writers, while admitting the validity of the law of diminishing marginal utility for all other goods, deny its application to money. Thus, for example, a man may allocate each ounce of money to his most preferred uses. However, suppose that it takes 60 ounces of gold to buy an automobile. Then the acquisition of the 60th ounce, which will enable him to buy an automobile, will have considerably more value than the acquisition of the 58th or of the 59th ounce, which will not enable him to do so. RothbardVs: This argument involves a misconception identical with that of the argument about the "increasing marginal utility of eggs" (…). (…) it is erroneous to argue that because a fourth egg might enable a man to bake a cake, which he could not do with the first three, the marginal utility of the eggs has increased. (…) a "good" and, consequently, the "unit" of a good are defined in terms of whatever quantity ofwhich the units give an equally serviceable supply. Service unit: This last phrase is the key concept. The fourth egg was not equally serviceable as, and therefore not interchangeable with, the first egg, and therefore a single egg could not be taken as the unit. The units of a good must be homogeneous in their serviceability, and it is only to such units that the law ofutility applies. The situation is similar in the case of money. The serviceability of the money commodity lies in its use in exchange rather than in its direct use. Here, therefore, a "unit" of money, in its relevance to individual value scales, must be such as to be homogeneous with every other unit in exchange-value. >Measurements/Rothbard. Rothbard III 314 The fact that the units of a good must be homogeneous in serviceability means, in the case of money, that the given array of money prices remains constant. The serviceability of a unit of money consists in its direct use-value and especially in its exchange-value, which rests on its power to purchase a myriad of different goods. We have seen in our study of the money regression and the marginal utility of money that the evaluation and the marginal utility of the money commodity rests on an already given structure of money prices for the various goods. >Regression theorem. It is clear that, in any given application of the foregoing law, the money prices cannot change in the meantime. If they do, and for example, the fifth unit of money is valued more highly than the fourth unit because of an intervening change in money prices, then the "units" are no longer equally serviceable and therefore cannot be considered as homogeneous. >Purchasing power/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Master-Slave Dialectic | Hegel | Höffe I 329 Governance/Slavery/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: preliminary considerations: In competition with his peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel expands the often merely social, legal, or state theoretical debate on three further topics: a) the confrontation of humans with themselves, b) the confrontation with nature and c) the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work. HegelVsHobbes: Hegel overcomes the reduction of the human driving forces to three conflict-causing passions and the resulting war of all against all. Th. Hobbes. Hegel neither denies the competition nor its possibly deadly violent character, nor does he deny that there are fortunately Höffe I 330 opposing forces, three passions of peace and the reason serving them. But in fighting off the violent competition (...) he discovers a far more fundamental task and ultimate achievement: people are not initially finished subjects, but must develop the necessary self-concsiousness in a dynamic process. In the complex course (...) of a veritable "fight for recognition", three dimensions interlock: - the personal confrontation of the individual with him- or herself, - the social with his or her peers and the - economic with nature. Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, leads to a "fight to the death". Struggle: Whoever now clings to survival within the framework of this struggle, and consequently shuns death, submits to the one who dares to live. He becomes a servant, the other a master. Reason/Master: Here, according to Hegel, the master represents the level of consciousness of the mind. Sensuality/Slave: the slave, because he considers physical survival to be the most important thing, the level of sensuality. Dialectic: But since the slave, forced by the master to work, in this very work, instead of directly enjoying nature, he is inhibited in his own lust. The master, on the other hand, who lets the other work, finds himself in the role of the merely enjoying, consuming individual. The slave, precisely because he must inhibit his desire, frees himself from the merely naturally existing. Thus the initial order of precedence is reversed: The servant proves himself superior to the master, whereby he rises to the actual master, while the previously superior, the master, stands there as a slave. Self-consciousness: The core of this struggle for recognition consists in a "self-knowledge in the other". a) personal: One recognizes oneself first and only in a second person. b) apersonal: Self-knowledge does not come about through social recognition alone. It also requires an examination of the pre- and extra-personal world through work, i.e. economic action.(1) >Dialectic/Hegel, >History/Hegel, >World History/Hegel, >Progress/Hegel, >Self-Consciousness. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Maternalism | Dietz | Gaus I 282 Maternalism/Dietz/Mottier: The most systematic and influential critique of maternal thinking has been formulated by Dietz (1992)(1). >Maternalism/Political philosophy, >Maternalism/MacKinnon. Dietz criticizes maternalists for committing the same errors as liberal thinkers: 1) first, by transforming a historical model of female identity into a universal and ahistorical one; and 2) second, by reproducing the same rigid distinction between the public and the private as liberal approaches to citizenship. Democracy/virtues: As Dietz points out, there is no reason to think that the experience of mothering leads necessarily to democratic practices. Values that are virtues when taking care of vulnerable children in the private sphere are not necessarily a good model for political interactions between equal citizens in the public sphere. She consequently pleads in favour of a conception of citizenship that would resist the 'temptation of womanism' which attributes a superior moral nature to women (1992(1): 393). As Dietz puts it, 'such a premise would posit as a starting-point precisely what a democratic attitude must deny - that one group of citizens' voices is generally better, more deserving of attention, more worthy ofemulation, more moral, than another's' (1992(1):393). Society: Rather than a withdrawal into the assumed values of the private sphere or interest-group politics, Dietz emphasizes the active engagement of women in the public sphere. >Maternalism/Political philosophy. 1. Dietz, Mary (1992) 'Context is all: feminism and theories of citizenship'. In Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy. London: Verso, 63-85. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Maternalism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 282 Maternalism/Political theories/Mottier: 'Maternalist' thinkers also reject the liberal contractual conception of citizenship. They place the emphasis on the relational dimension of social life. Ethics: Drawing on the work of Nancy Chodorow (1978)(1) and Carol Gilligan (1982)(2), maternalists argue that the private sphere, in particular the family, is ruled by a relational morality, an 'ethics of care' anchored in mothering activities. Capacities: As Sara Ruddick (1980)(3) argues, women who are mothers have developed capacities, values and moral judgements that are both little recognized and contrast with the dominant bureaucratic and technological rationality of the modern public sphere. >Capabilities. According to maternalists, women bring to the public sphere these relational capacities, including a respect for others and a care for their well-being. They also bring a different use of power since the aim of ethics of care is to empower others, not to control them. Public Sphere: The public sphere, on the contrary, is seen to be ruled by a masculinist ethics of justice, founded on individual rights. >Public sphere, >Justice. Ethics of care: For maternalist theorists, the ethics of care is morally superior to the individualist values that dominate the public sphere. They see in the ethics of care of the private sphere a possible source for rethinking both morality in the public sphere and the model of liberal citizenship. Consequently, maternalist theorists such as Ruddick (1980;(3) 1989(4)) and Elshtain (1982)(5) argue for an integration into the public sphere of relational skills such as listening skills, emotions, and recognition of others' needs and vulnerability as a basis for democratic deliberation (Ruddick, 1980;(3) 1989(4); Elshtain, 1982(5); Held, 1990(6)). Society: Women's experiences from the private sphere are thus taken as a normative model for behaviour in the public sphere, where women's capacities for love and care for others come to be seen as a model to be emulated by others, and as a potential basis for public morality. Elshtain (1982)(5) calls for a 'social feminism' as an alternative to the 'amoral statecraft' of the modern bureaucratic state. >Bureaucracy. Problems: In her critical development of maternalist theory, Selma Sevenhuijsen (1998(7): 20) shares this emphasis on the revaluation of caring activities. However, she emphasizes that social practices of care do not always spring from worthy motives but can also be driven by the desire for control over others, or from 'Christian guilt'. As Sevenhuijsen points out, 'bad' motives can lead to 'good' care, while a 'good' motive, such as attentiveness to vulnerability, is no guarantee of good care but can lead to paternalism or undue protection. >Maternalism/MacKinnon, >Maternalism/Dietz. 1. Chodorow, Nancy (1978) The Reproduction of Mothering. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 2. Gilligan, Carol (1982) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Woman's Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Umversity Press. 3. Ruddick, Sara (1980) 'Maternal thinking'. Feminist Studies, 6 (Summer): 342—67. 4. Ruddick, Sara (1989) Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon. 5. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1982) 'Antigone's daughters'. Democracy in the world, 2:48-59. 6. Held, Virginia (1990) 'Mothering versus contract'. In Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest. University of Chicago Press, 288-304. 7. Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1998) Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality and Politics. London: Routledge. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Mathematics | Bergson | Sokal I 206 Mathematics/Bergson/Bricmont/Sokal: SokalVsBergson: we are under the impression that there is a historical connection with a philosophical tradition that puts intuition or subjective knowledge above the mind. >Subjectivity. One of the most brilliant representatives of this way of thinking is undoubtedly Bergson, who advanced this approach to such a degree that he even discussed the theory of relativity with Einstein. Sokal I 207 Theory of Relativity/Bergson/BergsonVsEinstein/SokalVsBergson: Bergson does not really try to identify innovation in the theory of relativity and to possibly derive philosophical conclusions from it; rather, these are established at the beginning and the entire analysis aims to show that the physical theory confirms si(1) Sokal: Bergson has influenced many philosophers, from Jankélévitch and Merleau-Ponty to Deleuze. >Merleau-Ponty, >Deleuze. Sokal I 208 If one considers the effort with which outstanding physicists such as Jean Becquerel, André Metz and Albert Einstein himself tried to explain the theory of relativity to him, ... Bergson can consequently be found to be unaffected by empirical arguments. Sokal I 208 SokalVsBergson: his misconceptions are quite fundamental in nature, but at least he is not spreading false erudition. Principle of relativity/Galilei/Sokal: the principle of relativity was already known to Galileo in 1632. Sokal I 211 BergsonVsEinstein: Bergson insisted that "it is irrelevant whether a motion is steady or accelerated: both systems are equal to each other, (Bergson 1922/1968(1) p. 198). Bergson: ... now, if every (also accelerated) motion is relative ... he is free to define what he wants ..." SokalVsBergson: at this point, Bergson confuses two things: the description of a motion (kinematics) and the laws to which Sokal I 209 this movement is subject to (dynamics). >Motion, >Natural Laws, >Physics. It is probably correct, at least for Newtonian kinematics, that the transformation formulas between two reference systems are completely reciprocal, even if both systems are in accelerated motion relative to each other. However, this in no way implies that the laws of dynamics are the same with respect to the two systems. Bergson's train of thought (p. 197) is based on a fundamental confusion of a reference system (e.g. a train in accelerated motion) and the motion of objects (e.g. balls lying on the ground in the moving train) with respect to this reference system. For the correct use of the concepts of physics see >Sokal. and >Feynman. 1. H. Bergson, Durée et simultanéité. Propos de la théorie d'Einstein, Paris, 1922/1968. |
Bergs I Henri Bergson Durée et Simultanéité. À propos de la théorie d’Einstein, Paris 1922 German Edition: Dauer und Gleichzeitigkeit: Über Einsteins Relativitätstheorie Hamburg 2014 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Meaning | Boghossian | Wright I 370 Boghossian: we consider a non-factualism that is based exclusively on meaning (not on truth),: there is no property such that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. >Facts, >Nonfactualism, >Words, >Word Meaning, cf. >Use Theory, >Language Use. Now that the truth condition of a sentence is a function of its significance, the non-fakcualism of meaning leads to a non-essential factualism concerning the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Then we have: For all S, P: "S has truth condition P" is not truth conditional. after Disquotation: For each S: "S" is not truthckonditional. >Truth Conditional Semantics. Intriguing consequence of a non-factualism of meaning: a global non-factualism. And precisely this is what distinguishes a non-factualism of meaning from a non-factualism with respect to any other object |
Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Nagel | I 63ff To mean something/Nagel: According to Kripke, Wittgenstein is not only convinced that no fact that affects me would make true that I meant something, but he also believed that this concept should not be explained with reference to truth conditions, but with respect to assertibility conditions. >Assertibility/Nagel. I 63ff To mean something: The fact that I refer to addition when I say "plus" cannot consist in a fact that affects my behavior, my state of consciousness or my brain, because any such fact would have to bee finite, and could not have infinitely far-reaching normative consequences. >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Facts, >Nonfactualism. I 63ff Meaning(Intending)/Nagel: Which fact in the past caused that I meant addition with "plus"? Answer: none. If there was no such meaning in the past, it cannot exist in the present. Kripke: in the end, the ladder has to be thrown away. I 63ff NagelVsKripke: we cannot throw away this particular ladder. We would otherwise have no chance to formulate the arguments that lead to the paradoxical conclusion. I 73 Nagel: some of Wittgenstein’s remarks suggest a false picture. "that’s just the way I act" and "I follow the rule blindly." It will have to be the arithmetic judgment. Cf. >Regress. I 186 To mean that something is so and so /Peirce: opinion is the willingness to act according to it in relatively inconsequential matters (Weaker than belief). >Peirce. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Meaning Change | Chladenius | Gadamer I 187 Meaning Change/Chladenius/Gadamer: [Chladenius] finds that understanding an author completely is not the same as fully understanding a speech or writing (§ 86)(1). The norm for understanding a book is by no means the opinion of the author. "[B]ecause people cannot overlook everything, their words, speeches and writings can mean something that they themselves have not been willing to speak or write" and, consequently, "by seeking to understand their writings, one can, with reason, commemorate things that do not come to the mind of the author".(1) >Understanding/Chladenius, >Hermeneutics/Chladenius. 1. J.M.Chladenius, Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftiger Reden und Schriften, 1742. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Meaning Change | Gadamer | I 187 Meaning Change/Chladenius/Gadamer: [Chladenius] states that understanding an author completely is not the same as fully understanding a speech or writing (§ 86)(1). The norm for understanding a book is by no means the opinion of the author. "[B]ecause men cannot overlook everything, their words, speeches and writings can mean something that they themselves have not been willing to speak or write of" and, consequently, "by seeking to understand their writings, one can, with reason, commemorate things that do not come to the mind of the author".(1) >Understanding/Chladenius, >Hermeneutics/Chladenius. I 301 Gadamer: The meaning of a text surpasses its author not only occasionally, but always. Therefore understanding is not only reproductive, but always productive behaviour. It is perhaps not right to speak of better understanding for this productive moment that lies in understanding. Because this formula is, I 302 (...) the transposition of a principle of factual criticism from the Age of Enlightenment to the basis of the aesthetics of genius, understanding is in truth no better understanding, neither in the sense of factual better knowledge through clearer terms, nor in the sense of the fundamental superiority that the conscious has over the unconscious of production. It is enough to say that one understands differently, if one understands at all. >Distance/Gadamer. 1. J.M.Chladenius, Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftiger Reden und Schriften, 1742. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Measurements | Rothbard | Rothbard III 311 Measurements/value/marginal utility/economics/Rothbard: (…) suppose that it takes 60 ounces of gold to buy an automobile. Then the acquisition of the 60th ounce, which will enable [the buyer] to buy an automobile, will have considerably more value than the acquisition of the 58th or of the 59th ounce, which will not enable him to do so. RothbardVs: This argument involves a misconception identical with that of the argument about the "increasing marginal utility of eggs" (…). (…) it is erroneous to argue that because a fourth egg might enable a man to bake a cake, which he could not do with the first three, the marginal utility of the eggs has increased. (…) a "good" and, consequently, the "unit" of a good are defined in terms of whatever quantity ofwhich the units give an equally serviceable supply. Service unit: This last phrase is the key concept. The fourth egg was not equally serviceable as, and therefore not interchangeable with, the first egg, and therefore a single egg could not be taken as the unit. The units of a good must be homogeneous in their serviceability, and it is only to such units that the law ofutility applies. The situation is similar in the case of money. The serviceability of the money commodity lies in its use in exchange rather than in its direct use. Here, therefore, a "unit" of money, in its relevance to individual value scales, must be such as to be homogeneous with every other unit in exchange-value. >Utility/Rothbard, >Value/Rothbard, >Indifference curve/Rothbard, >Action/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Rothbard. Rothbard III 843 Measurements/economics/Rothbard: In olden times, before the development of economic science, People nafrely assumed that the value of money remained always unchanged. >Value/Rothbard, >Money/Rothbard. "Value" was assumed to be an objective quantity inhering in things and their relations, and money was the measure, the fixed yardstick, of the values of goods and their changes. The value of the monetary unit, its purchasing power with respect to other goods, was assumed to be fixed.(1) Human action: The analogy of a fixed standard of measurement, which had become familiar to the natural sciences (weight, length, etc.), was unthinkingly applied to human action. >Action/Rothbard, >Mises, >Austrian School. Purchasing power: Economists then discovered and made clear that money does not remain stable in value, that the PPM (purchasing power of money) does not remain fixed. The PPM can and does vary, in response to changes in the supply of or the demand for money. These, in turn, can be resolved into the stock of goods and the total demand for money. Individual money prices (…) are determined by the stock of and demand for money as well as by the stock of and demand for each good. >Demand for money, >Money supply. It is clear, then, that the money relation (demand and supply) and the demand for and the stock of each individual good are intertwined in each particular price transaction. >Purchasing power/Rothbard. Exchange ratios/Problem: The fact that the use of money as a medium of exchange enables us to calculate relative exchange ratios between the different goods exchanged against money has misled some economists into believing that separate measurement of changes in the PPM (purchasing power of money) is possible. Thus, we could say that one hat is "worth," or can exchange for, 100 pounds of sugar, or that one TV set can exchange for 50 hats. It is a temptation, then, to forget that these exchange ratios are purely hypothetical and can be realized in practice only through monetary exchanges, and to consider them as constituting some barter-world of their own. In this mythical world, the exchange ratios between the various goods are somehow determined separately from the monetary transactions, and it then becomes more plausible to say that some sort of method can be found of isolating the value of money from these relative values and establishing the former as a constant yardstick. Actually, this barter-world is a pure figment; these relative ratios are only historical expressions of past transactions that can be effected only by and with money. Cf. >Price level/Fisher, >Equation of exchange/Fisher, >Inflation. Rothbard III 844 Economics: Now what can economics say has happened to the PPM over e.g., two periods? All that we can legitimately say is that now one dollar can buy e.g., 1/20 of a hat instead of 1/10 ofa hat, 1/300 of a TV set instead of 1/500 of a set, etc. Thus, we can describe (if we know the figures) what happened to each individual price in the market array. Price level: But how much of the price rise of the hat was due to a rise in the demand for hats and how much to a fall in the demand for money? There is no way of answering such a question. We do not even know for certain whether the PPM has risen or declined. Purchasing power: All we do know is that the purchasing power of money has fallen in terms of sugar, hats, and legal services, and risen in terms of TV sets. Even if all the prices in the arrayhad risen we would not know by how much the PPM had fallen, and we would not know how much of the change was due to an increase in the demand for money and how much to changes in stocks. Rothbard III 845 If the supply of money changed during this interval, we would not know how much of the change was due to the increased supply and how much to the other determinants. Indices: The index-number method of measuring changes in the PPM attempts to conjure up some sort of totality of goods whose exchange ratios remain constant among themselves, so that a kind of general averaging will enable a separate measurement of changes in the PPM itself. We have seen, however, that such separation or measurement is impossible. Cf. >Equation of exchange/Fisher. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Mention | Ryle | Geach I 255 Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are no allegations. Statements are neither used nor mentioned in conditionals. >Mention/Use, >Use, >Conditional, >Assertion, >Statement, >Truth value. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Mill | Gaus | Gaus I 102 Mill/Gaus: Mill believes that reason reveals our nature and its needs; human nature possesses impulses or energies that try to manifest themselves. Not only do we naturally possess different capacities, but these capacities are sources of energy that seek to express themselves. Consequently, to block a person from developing her capacities is to de-energize her - to make her passive and lethargic (1963a(1): ch. 3; Gaus, 1983a(2): ch. 4). Gaus I 103 Thus interpreted, Mill advances a quintessential Enlightenment argument: we can know human nature, and the knowledge of human nature provides truths about how we ought to live (Gaus, 2003(3); ch. 1; cf. Shapiro, 2003(4)). Liberalism becomes identified with the promotion of a certain sort of self-realizing individual, one who develops her nature, is rational and suspicious of custom, experiments with different ways of living and is not prone to conformism. >Liberalism/Gaus. 1. Mill, John Stuart (1963a) On Liberty. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. XVIII, 213–301. 2. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983a) The Modern Liberal Theory of Man. New York: St Martin’s. 3.Gaus, Gerald F. (2003) Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project. London: Sage. 4.Shapiro, Ian (2003) The Moral Foundations of Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Monopolies | Rothbard | Rothbard III Competition/monopolies//Rothbard: (…] a common worry of economic writers: What if the average cost curve of a firm continues to fall indefinitely? Would not the firm then grow so big as to constitute a "monopoly"? There is much lamentation that competition "breaks down" in such a situation. 1) Competition: Much of the emphasis on this problem comes, however, from preoccupation with the case of "pure competition," (…) is an impossible figment. 2) Secondly, it is obvious that no firm ever has been or can be infinitely large, so that limiting obstacles - rising or less rapidly falling costs - must enter somewhere, and relevantly, for every firm.(1) 3) Thirdly, if a firm, through greater effciency, does obtain a "monopoly" in some sense in its industry, it clearly does so, in the case we are considering (falling average cost), by Iowering prices and benefiting the consumers. And if (as all the theorists who attack "monopoly" agree) what is wrong with "monopoly" is precisely a restriction of production and a rise in price, there is obviously nothing wrong with a "monopoly" achieved by pursuing the directly opposite path.(2) Rothbard III 660 Monopolies/monopoly prices/VsMonopolies/VsMonopoly/Rothbard: Despite the fact that monopoly problems occupy an enormous quantity of economic writings, little or no clarity of definition exists. Erroneous definition: A common example of a confused definition is: "Monopoly exists when a firm has control over its price." RothbardVs: This definition is a mixture of confusion and absurdity. In the first place, on the free market there is no such thing as "control" over the price in an exchange; in any exchange the price of the sale is voluntarily agreed upon by both parties. No "control" is exercised by either party; the only control is each person's control over his own actions -stemming from his self-sovereignty - and consequently his control will be over his own decision to enter or not to enter into an exchange at any hypothetical price. There is no direct control over price because price is a mutual phenomenon. On the other hand, each person has absolute control over his own action and therefore over the price which he will attempt to charge for any particular good. Rothbard III 662 Monopoly price: (…) it is completely false to say that the [small] farmer and [Henry] Ford differ in their control over price. Both have exactly the same degree of control and of noncontrol: i.e., both have absolute control over the quantity they produce and the price which they attempt to get(3) and absolute noncontrol over the price-and-quantity transaction that finally takes place. The farmer is free to ask any price he wants, just as Ford is, and is free to lookfor a buyer at such a price. He is not in the least compelled to sell his produce to the organized "markets" if he can do better elsewhere. Every producer of every product is free, in a free-market society, to produce as much as he wants of whatever he possesses or can purchase and to try to sell it, at whatever price he can get, to anyone he can find.(4) Market price/Rothbard: Who officially “sets” the price in any exchange is a completely trivial and irrelevant technological question—a matter of institutional convenience rather than economic analysis. Rothbard III 664 Brand name/brand awareness/competition/Rothbard: One common objection is that Ford is able to acquire "monopoly power" or "monopolistic power" because his product has a recognized brand name or trademark, which the wheat farmer has not. RothbardVs: This, however, is surely a case of putting the cart before the horse. The brand name and the wide knowledge of the brand come from consumers' desire for the product attached to that particular brand and are therefore a result of consumer demand rather than a pre-existing means for some sort of "monopolistic power" over the consumers. Rothbard III 671 Definition of monopoly/Rothbard: Before adopting this definition of monopoly as the proper one, we must consider a final alternative: the defining of a monopolist as a person who has achieved a monopoly price (definition 3; (definition 1: „there is only one seller of a good“)). This definition 3 has never been explicitly set forth, but it has been implicit in the most worthwhile of the neoclassical writings on this subject. >Monopoly price/Rothbard, >Monopoly price/Economic theories. Rothbard III 692 Scarcity of production factors/Rothbard: (…) the attempt to establish the existence of idle resources as a criterion of monopolistic "withholding" of factors [is not] valid. Idle labor resources will always mean increased leisure, and therefore the leisure motive will always be intertwined with any alleged "monopolistic" motive. It therefore becomes impossible to separate them. The existence of idle land may always be due to the fact of the relative scarcity of labor as compared with available land. This relative scarcity makes it more serviceable to consumers, and hence more remunerative, to invest labor in certain areas ofland, and not in others. 1. On the “orthodox” neglect of cost limitations, see Robbins, “Remarks upon Certain Aspects of the Theory of Costs.” 2. Cf. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 367. 3. We are, of course, not considering here particular uncertainties of agriculture resulting from climate, etc. 4. For further discussion, see Murray N. Rothbard, “The Bogey of Administered Prices,” The Freeman, September, 1959, pp. 39–41. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Morals | Hare | Singer I 78 Moral/Hare/Peter Singer: Hare(1) proposes to distinguish two levels of moral: a) the intuitive level of moral and b) the critical level of moral. >Cognitivism, >Emotivism. Singer I 79 In daily life we do not calculate the theoretical-ethical consequences of our actions. Therefore, we should establish broader moral norms for our everyday life. These should be those that have had the best consequences for centuries. For example, telling the truth, keeping promises, not hurting anyone else, etc. P. SingerVsHare: 1. That sounds like the advice of a trainer. Singer I 80 P. SingerVsHare: 2. For example, an utilitarian could argue that if the killing went completely unnoticed, it could have no consequences at all. >Utilitarianism, >Deontology, >Consequentialism, >Preference utilitarianism. 1. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford, 1981 |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Motion | Russell | Kursbuch 8; p. 15 Motion/change/Russell: old/Zenon: "state of change" - today/VsZenon: at one time in one place, at another time in another place - wrong, to say that it is in the next moment located in the "adjacent place" - wrong: jump within a moment (Zenon has correctly identified this) Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 15 Time: The banishment of the infinitely small quantity has peculiar consequences: e.g. there is no longer something like a next moment. (> Time/Russell). If there are to be no infinitely small quantities, no two moments follow one another directly, but there are always more moments inbetween. Consequently, there must be an infinite number of additional moments between two arbitrary moments. If the number were finite, then one would be closer to the first of the two moments and it would be the next! This is precisely where the philosophy of the infinite begins. Space: the same applies to the space. However small a space is, it can be further subdivided. In this way we never reach the infinitely small quantity. No finite number of divisions leads to a point. Nevertheless, there are points, but they are not achieved by successive divisions. Points are not infinitely small distances. Motion, change: strange results: earlier, it was thought that when something changes, it must be in a state of change when it moves, in a state of motion. This is wrong from today's point of view: If a body moves, one can only say that it is at one time at the place and at another time at a different place. We must not say that it will be at the next place in the next moment because there is no next moment. >Zeno, >Change, >Beginning, >Time, >Space. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Motivation | Bostrom | I 162 Motivation/superintelligence/Bostrom: Suppose that an AI were designed to have as its final goal that a particular red button inside a command bunker never be pressed. What is essential is that the AI believes that the button will more likely remain unpressed if the AI continuously acts in the principal’s interest than if it rebels. Rewarding: Instead of trying to endow an AI with a final goal that refers to a physical button, one could build an AI that places final value on receiving a stream of “cryptographic reward tokens.” These would be sequences of numbers serving as keys to ciphers that would have been generated before the AI was created and that would have been built into its motivation system. I 354 Creating a cipher certain to withstand a superintelligent code-breaker is a nontrivial challenge. For example, traces of random numbers might be left in some observer’s brain or in the microstructure of the random generator, from whence the superintelligence can retrieve them; or, if pseudorandom numbers are used, the superintelligence might guess or discover the seed from which they were generated. Further, the superintelligence could build large quantum computers, or even discover unknown physical phenomena that could be used to construct new kinds of computers. Problem: The AI could wire itself to believe that it had received a reward tokens, but this should not make it wirehead if it is designed to want the reward tokens (as opposed to wanting to be in a state in which it has certain beliefs about the reward tokens). [Problem: The AI has to develop an idea of a world it is living in: >Environment/AI Research.] I 176 Motivation selection: -Direct specification: The system is endowed with some directly specified motivation system, which might be consequentialist or involve following a set of rules. -Domesticity: A motivation system is designed to severely limit the scope of the agent’s ambitions and activities. -Indirect normativity: could involve rule-based or consequentialist principles, but is distinguished by its reliance on an indirect approach to specifying the rules that are to be followed or the values that are to be pursued. >Values/superintelligence/Bostrom. -Augmentation: One starts with a system that already has substantially human or benevolent motivations, and enhances its cognitive capacities to make it superintelligent. >AI takeover/Yudkowski, >Control/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Goals/superintelligence/Omohundro. |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Music | Eco | I 40 Henri Pousseur/composition/music/Eco: "Since the phenomena are no longer interlinked with consequent determinism, it is incumbent upon the listener to consciously place himself/herself in a network of different relations, so to speak to even determine the degree of his/her approach, orientation points, reference scale (knowing well that his/her choice is determined by the object) that it is what must now exists to utilize the greatest number of possible gradations and dimensions at the same time, to dynamize and multiply his/her recording instruments, up to the limits of their possibilities. I 53 Serial composition/music/Eco: serial composition has no preferred points, all perspectives are equally valid. Eco: the perspectives are related to Einstein's universe. I 140 Meaning in music/Eco: in the quest for satisfaction - interplay of disability and emotive reaction - the musical message enriches itself with meaning: stimulus, crisis, striving. It is the erection of satisfaction of a place. Meaning: the same stimulus creates, inhibits and provides meaningful solutions. I 43 Life/sin/Mallarmé: "Le monde existe pour aboutir à un livre" ((s) Translation: The world exists only to contribute to a book.) I 127 Anton von Webern/Eco: Anton von Webern created a series which he compared to the magic square "SATOR AREPO...". |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Nationalism | Morris | Gaus I 206 Nationalism/Morris: Some have claimed that nationalism, the principle 'which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent', 'determines the norm for the legitimacy of political units in the modern world' (Gellner, 1983(1): l, 49). A related thesis is that nationality is a basis for the legitimacy of states: 'Nationalism holds that the only legitimate type of government is national self-determination' (Kedourie, 1993(2): l). >Nation/Morris. MorrisVsGellner: It is a mistake, albeit an understandable one, to characterize nationalism as Gellner does; some nationalists do not seek statehood for their people, and characterizing nationalism in terms of statehood begs the question against 'liberal' or anarchist nationalism and other moderate positions. We might expect that most contemporary nationalist movements would claim a state for their nation, but one can be a nationalist without being a statist. Nation-states: If it is not the case that every nation is entitled to become or ought to become a distinct state, and if consequently not every state will be the state of a single nation, what then are nation-states? Most states today and throughout the last two centuries have been multinational states - in this respect multiculturalism is not a new invention. country. (...) the United States is multinational, and many Americans explicitly identify themselves in multinational 'hyphenated' ways (e.g. Italian-American). These two countries are interesting as they are comparatively old states. In addition, both share an Enlightenment tradition which is hostile to nationalism; each was born of an eighteenth-century revolution fought in the name of universal principles. Even if they are multinational as well as somewhat hostile to nationalism, they both seem in certain senses to be nation-states of a kind. Each is a state which has developed a 'national' culture, easily recognizable to outsiders, whose members are readily moved by sentiments of patriotic allegiance. In terms of the characterization of nation that I have invoked, there is a way in which we can say that France and the US have become in their distinct ways multinational nations and thus nation-states. 1. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2. Kedourie, Elie (1993 119601) Nationalism, 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nations | Morris | Gaus I 205 Nations/state/Morris: States (...) are also referred to as 'nation-states', perhaps to dis- tinguish them from Greek poleis or Renaissance city-republics. If we think of states and nations as different things, an interesting question is whether states must be nation-states. To raise this question we need to distinguish states and nations. >State/Morris. Def Nation/Morris: In the sense that interests us here, a nation is a society whose members are linked by sentiments of solidarity and self-conscious identity based on a number of other bonds (e.g. history, territory, culture, race, 'ethnicity', language, religion, customs) (...). A group of humans will constitute a nation in this sense in so far as the members share certain properties and in so far as they are conscious of this shared condition and recognize one another by virtue of these common properties. Nations, then, will be collections of individuals with common histories, cultures, languages, and the like, and whose members recognize other members by virtue of their possession of these attributes (see Morris, 1998(1): ch. 8). (...) this way of characterizing nations will help in explaining and evaluating certain significant ways humans have of understanding themselves. Once states and nations are distinguished, a number of possible relations become obvious. Since the entire land mass of the globe is now the territory of some state, we do not find any nation that does not Gaus I 206 overlap with a state. We can then eliminate the possible 'one nation, no state' relation. The main remaining possibilities are: - one nation + one state (e.g. Japan, Germany) - one nation + several states (e.g. the Basques, the Kurds) - several nations + one state (e.g. Canada, Switzerland, Belgium). The first possibility is the salient one as it is that adopted by nationalists and defenders of the view that national peoples are entitled to their own state. Some have claimed that nationalism, the principle 'which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent', 'determines the norm for the legitimacy of political units in the modern world' (Gellner, 1983(2): l, 49). A related thesis is that nationality is a basis for the legitimacy of states: 'Nationalism holds that the only legitimate type of government is national self-determination' (Kedourie, 1993(3): l). >Nationalism/Morris. Nation-states: If it is not the case that every nation is entitled to become or ought to become a distinct state, and if consequently not every state will be the state of a single nation, what then are nation-states? Most states today and throughout the last two centuries have been multinational states - in this respect multiculturalism is not a new invention. country. (...) the United States is multinational, and many Americans explicitly identify themselves in multinational 'hyphenated' ways (e.g. Italian-American). These two countries are interesting as they are comparatively old states. In addition, both share an Enlightenment tradition which is hostile to nationalism; each was born of an eighteenth-century revolution fought in the name of universal principles. Even if they are multinational as well as somewhat hostile to nationalism, they both seem in certain senses to be nation-states of a kind. Each is a state which has developed a 'national' culture, easily recognizable to outsiders, whose members are readily moved by sentiments of patriotic allegiance. In terms of the characterization of nation that I have invoked, there is a way in which we can say that France and the US have become in their distinct ways multinational nations and thus nation-states. 1. Morris, Christopher W. (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 3. Kedourie, Elie (1993 119601) Nationalism, 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Negation | Boghossian | Wright I, 276 Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction between the A) real, strict negation: it transforms every true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form: B) Negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth. >Truth, >Correctness, Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposition (>Nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counter-proposal, however, is that A should rather be complementary to the strict concept of the former negation. Then, in the case that A is merely correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative. >Conservativity. WrightVsVs: but there are problems at a different end now: the transition of (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only one sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true> "A" has a truth condition I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" endangers this principle in the case where A is not true but correct. For then the conservative matrix ""a" is true" is evaluated as correct. The consequent (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. >Truth conditions. |
Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 |
| Neural Networks | Mareschal | Slater I 92 Neural networks/connectionism/Mareschal: Connectionist models are implemented computer simulations of “brain-style” learning and information processing (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986)(1). Connectionist network models are made up of simple processing units (idealized neurons) interconnected via weighted communication lines (idealized Slater I 93 synapses). Units are often represented as circles and the weighted communication lines, as lines between these circles. Activation flows from unit to unit via these connection weights. The network’s global behavior is determined by the connection weights. As activation flows through the network, it is transformed by the set of connection weights between successive layers in network. Learning/connectionism/Marechal: (i.e., adapting one’s behavior) is accomplished by tuning the connection weights until some stable behavior is obtained. Supervised networks adjust their weights until the output response (for a given input) matches a target response. That target can come from an active teacher, or passively through observing the environment, but it must come from outside the system. Unsupervised networks adjust their weights until some internal constraint is satisfied (e.g., maximally different inputs must have maximally different internal representations). >Supervised learning, >Learning. Slater I 94 The key conclusion from this work is the notion of the graded representation of knowledge. That is, rather than existing as an all-or-none concept, object permanence was acquired gradually. Consequently, the representations that underlay this concept existed in graded states, becoming ever more robust with age and experience, and supporting ever more complex disappearance events. >Object permanence/Connectionsm, >Knowledge. 1. Rumelhart, D.E. and McClelland, J.L. 1986.Parallel distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure of cognition, vols. I and II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Nietzsche | Löwith | Pfotenhauer IV 22 Nietzsche/Löwith: (K. Löwith 1953)(1): Karl Löwith deals with Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation. He doubts the context (sic) that arises from the connection to the western metaphysics Nietzsche with Aristotle, Leibniz or Hegel. (p. 90). >F. Nietzsche. Löwith believes Heidegger overestimates Nietzsche because he demonstrates on him his own motives for thinking. Löwith believes that Nietzsche is more important in the expressions of his subjective concern, which, from a philosophical point of view, would be closer to Pascal or Kierkegaard. (p. 96). >S. Kierkegaard, >B. Pascal. Eternal Return/Nietzsche/Löwith: (K. Löwith 1956)(2): Nietzsche would consider the experience of natural rhythms to be important as an impulse for philosophical reflection on transsubjective orders. The preservation and return of the forces would thus determine our physical existence and commit our thinking. >Order, >Objectivity, >Subjectivity. Pfotenhauer IV 23 Christianity/Nietzsche/Löwith: Nietzsche's critique of Christian spiritualism would basically meet the philosophical-historical view (cf. K. Löwith 1964)(3)(3) of a control and overcoming, given up by us, of given living conditions. This would only nourish self-tormenting resentment towards one's own, unassailable prerequisites for existence. It seduces to nihilism, it tempts projections of a fulfillment of existence in an unattainable future. >Nihilism, >Philosophy of history, >Christianity. Despite all the positivist naturalism (K. Löwith, 1956, p. 208ff), Löwith's concept of an antique conception of nature, which he believes he can recognize and affirm in Nietzsche, is strongly humanistic. >Naturalism. Pfotenhauer: It is based on the model of classic moderation and sublimation of modern subject claims. Consequently, he must protect Nietzsche's return to pre-socratic thinking against his own, often shrill emphasis on will. For it is not the sovereignty claims of the individual that basically determines life. (LöwithVsNietzsche). 1. K. Löwith, Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit, Frankfurt 1953, S. 76ff. 2. K. Löwith, Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen, Stuttgart 1956, S. 120ff 3. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 1964, S. 356ff |
Löw I Karl Löwith Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit Göttingen 1960 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
| Non-Existence | Quine | Stalnaker I 55f Non-Existence/Empty Name/Meinong/QuineVsWyman/Quine/Stalnaker: (fictional Wyman)/Quine: a distinction between "there is" and "exists" (reserved for actuality). - QuineVs: existence is no predicate that introduces a distinctive property. Wyman creates the illusion of a match between Meinongians and their critics. Stalnaker: pro Quine: Existence: applies to everything, what can be quantified. Stalnaker I 55 Pegasus/QuineVsWyman/Quine: Pegasus could have existed - the round square does not. >Pegasus Example/Quine. I 65 Wyman: Thesis: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis. Quine III 258 About/non-existence/meaning/reference/Quine: similar error: to say that one talks with "Zerberus" about a thing Zerberus, and then the problem arises that one "talks about nothing". Non-existence/Quine: this is not about "about". For example, what do you talk about when you say that there are no Bolivian warships? III 259 Errors: to assume that our speaking only makes sense if there are the things we are talking about. (Confusion of meaning and object under discussion). III 260 Non-existence/Possibility/meaning/significance/Quine: wrong solution: some authors think that a word for a completely impossible object is meaningless. Analogue: just as a logically unrealizable sentence is a non-sentence, it is not false but meaningless. ((s) (here sic, but otherwise mostly called senseless. QuineVs: 1. It is unnatural. 2. It is also impractical. Then we no longer have a test procedure for significance, just as quantifier logic has no decision-making procedure for universality and satisfiability. Solution/Quine: it is sufficient that words have the task of designating something. This is sufficient to express non-existence. The words have a full meaning. >Meaning/Quine. III 281 Truth Value/Existence/Non-Existence/Ontology/Logic/Quine: what truth value do sentences such as "Zerberus barks" have? (See also >Unicorn example). The answer "wrong" would be hasty. III 282 Problem: for all sentences that would be wrong, there would be a negation that would then be true! Our derivation methods prove nothing in case the object does not exist. What would have to be proved is based on an unfulfilled condition. Truth value gap/Quine: comes from the everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Each sentence should have a truth value (true or false). >Truth Value/Quine, >Truth Value Gaps/Quine. This was the reason for the convenient extension of the concept of the conditional in § 3,m which generally permitted a truth value for the entire conditional. We now need a similar extension for singular terms, which mean nothing. But this cannot be achieved by an all-encompassing decision. However, this is possible for simple sentences from which we derive rules for compound sentences. Def simple predicate: is a predicate if it does not explicitly take the form of quantification, negation, conjunction, alternation, etc. of shorter components. If a simple predicate is applied to a singular term that does not denote anything, the sentence in question should be considered false. Then, for example, "Zerberus barks" is wrong, because it represents an application of the predicate "[1] barks" to "Zerberus". I 429 Ideal objects: a case, with certain parallels to infinite quantities: the ideal objects of physics: e.g. mass points, smooth surfaces, isolated systems. Such objects would be contrary to the laws of theoretical physics. At the same time, however, the basic laws of mechanics are regularly formulated with reference to such ideal objects, usually with universal quantifying conditional sentences. "(x)(if x is a mass point, then...)" Consequently, the absence of ideal objects does not falsify the mechanics! Sentences of this kind remain true in meaningless ways, since there are no counterexamples. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Nonfactualism | Boghossian | Wright I 267 Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectics exactly achieve, in any case it enforces some kind of restriction for a realistic notion of rules and meaning. >Rules/Wittgenstein, >Rule following/Wittgenstein, >Meaning/Wittgenstein, >Meaning. I 268 And therefore also for truth, since truth is a function of meaning. I 269 Paul Boghossian: he has now presented an approach that could eliminate both concerns: I 270 Boghossian: we consider a non-factualism which is exclusively concerned with meaning (not truth): There is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. >Facts, >Properties. Since the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism necessarily implies a non-factualism with regard to the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Then the following results: (5) For all S, P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional. According to quotation redemption: (4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional. >Truth conditional semantics. "Fascinating Consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of the meaning: a global non-factualism. And precisely in this, a non-factualism differs from the meaning of non-factualism with respect to any other object. I 271 WrightVsBoghosian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but nothing can be objected to the use of the word alone. Boghossian: Global Minimalism, Non-Factualism: regarding meaning, not truth: There is no property that a word means something, and consequently no fact, is a result of global nonfactualism, as opposed to all other nonfactualisms. Wright I 271 Realism/Wright: so far, the question has been asked which additional realism-relevant properties can make the truth predicate "substantive". We can now use "correctness" ("correct") for the minimum case. (Formal >correctness). The thesis of non-factualism can then be formulated in such a way that any discourse on meaning and related terms is at most capable of being correct, and does not qualify for more substantial properties. (i) It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition. As a minimalist, one has to accept this, since truth conditions attribute a semantic, i.e., substantive property, and this is denied by the proposition. >Semantic properties. Next: (ii) It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" is true. I 272 This follows from (i) since only one sentence with a truth condition can be true. Next: (iii) It is not the case that S has the truth condition that P This follows, according to Boghossian, "due to the quotation redemption properties of the truth predicate". >Truth predicate, >Disquotation, >Disquotationalism, >Deflationism. I 272ff Nonfactualism/Boghossian/Wright: > then every discourse can be at the most correct. (i) is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition" - WrightVs: can be reworded with quotation redemption (vi) is not the case that it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition - but denial of truth is not inconsistent with the correctness of the assertion, however, (i) is not correct if both truth and correctness are involved, the matrix for that truth predicate (Definition) does not have to be conservative: i.e. That the value of ""A"is true" becomes false or incorrect in all cases, except where A is attributed with the value true. ((s) Non-conservativity demands truth, not just correctness, >truth transfer. "Correct": truth predicate "correct" is for minimal discourses that can be true. Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/Correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction (> negation) between the: a) real, strict negation: it transforms each true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form is: b) negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) proposition is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth. >Negation/Boghossian. |
Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Now | Hegel | Höffe I 328 This/Here/Now/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: [at the beginning of phenomenology stands] the immediate knowledge, the sensual certainty. According to its self-understanding, it has not yet omitted anything from its "object", so that it appears as the most comprehensive and "truest" knowledge. However, it is directed toward a "this" in the "now" and "here". >Knowledge/Hegel, >Knowledge/Hegel. This/Here/Now/Hegel: This truth cannot be lost by writing it down, explains Hegel: "This here and now" can be, for example, my standing desk in my study at 9:30 a.m. (...) and so on. >Timelessness. Consequently the truth of "this" lies in all "these", correspondingly the truth of "now" in all "now", thus not in an immediate truth that at the same time leaves nothing out, but in a contentless general. >Generality. Content/showing/(to) mean: This only gains content if you mean the thing you point to when you say "this". But this thing, (...) one is no longer directly certain of it, but one perceives it, with which one reaches the second level of consciousness: after the sensual certainty of this, here and now, one finds oneself on the level of the perception of a thing(1). >Knowledge/Hegel, cf. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Demonstratives. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Object | Frege | II 30 Object/Frege: the object is the meaning of a declarative sentence. It is at the same time the truth value and value curve of a function. >Truth value, >Value propression. (A school-adequate definition of an object is impossible, because it cannot be disassembled - due to its simplicity.) An object is anything that is not a function, i.e. whose expression does not carry an empty space with it. Truth value: A truth value cannot be a part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense, but an object. (truth value/Frege: a truth value is an object) Object/Frege: locations, times, time periods are, logically considered, objects. Consequently, the the linguistic designation of a place or date is to be interpreted as a proper name. Def Object: Something that can never be the whole meaning of a predicate, but the meaning of a subject. >Subject, >Predicate, >Meaning. II 72 "The function f(a)" is not a function (but an object). "The concept F" is not a concept (but an object). I am not saying it is wrong to say about an object what is being said here about a concept, but it is impossible, meaningless, neither false nor true. Existence proposition/existence statement/Frege: e.g. "Julius Caesar exists" is neither true nor false, but meaningless. But: "There is a man named Julius Caesar" has a sense. (A concept is needed.) Brandom I 584 Object/Frege: an object should be the result to which the predicates refer according to the judgement. Frege II 57 Object/Frege: e.g. places, times, time periods - hence their linguistic designations are names. II 74 Concept/object/sentence/Frege: one and the same sentence can be interpreted a) as a statement about a concept, b) about an object. The statements are then different. E.g. the sentence "There is at least one root of 4" cannot be changed into "There is at least one concept for the root of 4." -> concept. I 98 Object/concept/property/Frege: e.g. direction: is an object! - "Same direction as": is a predicate (concept). IV 70/71 Body/Frege: bodies are not in need of completion. (>(s) Objects are saturated). >Saturated/unsaturated. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Object | Hegel | Höffe I 328 This/Here/Now/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: [at the beginning of phenomenology stands] the immediate knowledge, the sensual certainty. According to its self-understanding, it has not yet omitted anything from its "object", so that it appears as the most comprehensive and "truest" knowledge. However, it is directed toward a "this" in the "now" and "here". >Knowledge/Hegel. This/Here/Now/Hegel: This truth cannot be lost by writing it down, explains Hegel: "This here and now" can be, for example, my standing desk in my study at 9:30 a.m. (...) and so on. Consequently the truth of "this" lies in all "these", correspondingly the truth of "now" in all "now", thus not in an immediate truth that at the same time leaves nothing out, but in a contentless general. Content/showing/(to) mean: This only gains content if you mean the thing you point to when you say "this". But this thing, (...) one is no longer directly certain of it, but one perceives it, with which one reaches the second level of consciousness: after the sensual certainty of this, here and now, one finds oneself on the level of the perception of a thing(1). >Knowledge/Hegel. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Object Permanence | Connectionism | Slater I 94 Object permanence/connectionism/neural networks/Mareschal: rather than existing as an all-or-none concept, object permanence was acquired gradually. (Munakata et al.1997)(1). Consequently, the representations that underlay this concept existed in graded states, becoming ever more robust with age and experience, and supporting ever more complex disappearance events. Mareschal, Plunkett, and Harris (1999)(2) present a model of the acquisition of object permanence incorporating a trajectory prediction module, which likewise simulates the graded emergence of representations of hidden objects through the strengthening of recurrent connections. However, the Mareschal et al. model also incorporates a second parallel route for processing feature information relevant to recognition of objects. The architecture draws on the dual route visual processing hypothesis (Milner & Goodale, 1995)(3). According to this hypothesis, Slater I 95 visual object information is processed down two segregated routes: one specialized in processing object features for recognition and the other specialized in processing object movement, location, and shape to enable action on the objects. Slater I 96 Occlusion: The network is able to predict the subsequent reappearance of the object, taking into account how long it has been behind the screen. Object representations emerge gradually through experience with an external world. However, in the Mareschal model, an additional performance factor is the need to integrate information across Slater I 97 different functional systems over development (here, the dorsal and ventral visual cortical processing routes). According to this account, infants are delayed in reaching for hidden objects (as observed by Piaget >Object permanence/Piaget) as compared to their surprise response to the violation of single object properties (as observed by Baillargeon >Object permanence/Baillargeon) because of the added need to coordinate information across multiple functional systems when engaging in volitional reaching. 1. Munakata, Y., McClelland, J. L., Johnson, M. H., & Siegler, R. S. (1997). Rethinking infant knowledge: Toward an adaptive process account of successes and failures in object permanence tasks. Psychological Review, 104, 686–713. 2. Mareschal, D., Plunkett, K., & Harris, P. (1999). A computational and neuropsychological account of object-oriented behaviours in infancy. Developmental Science, 2, 306–317. 3. Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). Oxford psychology series: The visual brain in action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Object Permanence | Haith | Slater I 87 Object permanence/Experiment/HaithVsBaillargeon/Haith: (Haith 1998)(1) the conclusion of the drawbridge study are a product of „rich interpretation“ (Haith 1998) on the part of the researchers, rather than rich conceptual abilities on the part of young infants. Slater I 88 Haith: There was always a more parsimonious perceptual explanation for the infants’ responses. In explaining the Drawbridge findings, Haith suggested that infants continue to see the box even once it is visually occluded due to a kind of lingering visual memory trace; and consequently infants look longer at the “impossible” event not because it is impossible but because of the novelty of seeing one physical object pass through another physical object. The infants’ response to novelty, it is argued, need not depend on any physical knowledge at all, but merely on the fact that in the real world objects generally do not appear to pass through other objects unimpeded. >Object permanence/Baillargeon, >Object permanence/developmental psychology, >Object permanence/Connectionism. 1. Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and Development, 21, 167–179. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Object Permanence | Mareschal | Slater I 94 Object permanence/connectionism/neural networks/Mareschal: rather than existing as an all-or-none concept, object permanence was acquired gradually. (Munakata et al.1997)(1). Consequently, the representations that underlay this concept existed in graded states, becoming ever more robust with age and experience, and supporting ever more complex disappearance events. Mareschal, Plunkett, and Harris (1999)(2) present a model of the acquisition of object permanence incorporating a trajectory prediction module, which likewise simulates the graded emergence of representations of hidden objects through the strengthening of recurrent connections. However, the Mareschal et al. model also incorporates a second parallel route for processing feature information relevant to recognition of objects. The architecture draws on the dual route visual processing hypothesis (Milner & Goodale, 1995)(3). According to this hypothesis, Slater I 95 visual object information is processed down two segregated routes: one specialized in processing object features for recognition and the other specialized in processing object movement, location, and shape to enable action on the objects. Slater I 96 Occlusion: The network is able to predict the subsequent reappearance of the object, taking into account how long it has been behind the screen. Object representations emerge gradually through experience with an external world. However, in the Mareschal model, an additional performance factor is the need to integrate information across Slater I 97 different functional systems over development (here, the dorsal and ventral visual cortical processing routes). According to this account, infants are delayed in reaching for hidden objects (as observed by Piaget >Object permanence/Piaget) as compared to their surprise response to the violation of single object properties (as observed by Baillargeon >Object permanence/Baillargeon) because of the added need to coordinate information across multiple functional systems when engaging in volitional reaching. 1. Munakata, Y., McClelland, J. L., Johnson, M. H., & Siegler, R. S. (1997). Rethinking infant knowledge: Toward an adaptive process account of successes and failures in object permanence tasks. Psychological Review, 104, 686–713. 2. Mareschal, D., Plunkett, K., & Harris, P. (1999). A computational and neuropsychological account of object-oriented behaviours in infancy. Developmental Science, 2, 306–317. 3. Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). Oxford psychology series: The visual brain in action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Opposition | Policy of Spain | Levitsky I 122 Opposition/Policy of Spain/Levitsky/Ziblatt: When (...) Spain made its first truly democratic turn in 1931, hopes were high. The new leftist government under Prime Minister Manuel Azaña stood for parliamentary democracy,(1) but it was confronted with a deeply divided society, between anarchists and Marxists on the left and monarchists and fascists on the right. Both sides regarded each other not as competing parties, but as mortal enemies. On the one hand, right-wing Catholics and monarchists watched in horror as the church, army and monarchy, social institutions they held in high esteem, were deprived of their privileges. In their eyes, the new republic had no right to exist. They saw themselves, as one historian writes, as fighters in a battle against "Bolshevik foreign agents"(2). On the other hand, many socialists and other left-wing republicans regarded right-wing politicians such as the leader of the Catholic-conservative Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), José Maria Gil-Robles, as monarchist or fascist counter-revolutionaries(3). At best, they saw in the CEDA a façade behind which ultra-conservative monarchists planned the violent overthrow of the Republic. Although the CEDA was apparently prepared to Levitsky I 123 participate in the democratic process and to compete with their political opponents in elections, their leaders refused to stand unreservedly behind the new regime(4). Consequently, mistrust of them remained high. In short, neither the Republicans on the left nor the Catholics and monarchists on the right accepted the other side as legitimate opponents. Lack of mutual respect led to the collapse of the Spanish Republic. Since many socialists and leftist republicans saw the center-left government from 1931 to 1933 as the embodiment of the Republic, they regarded attempts to change or withdraw its policies as fundamentally "disloyal" to the Republic(5). Cf. >Opposition/Policy of the United States, >Opposition/Levitsky/Ziblatt, >Polarization/Levitsky/Ziblatt. 1. Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965, p. 52. 2. Shlomo Ben-Ami, »The Republican ›Take-Over‹. Prelude to Inevitable Catastrophe«, in Paul Preston (Hg.), Revolution and War in Spain, 1931–1939, London 2001, p. 58–60. 3. Raymond Carr, Spain 1808–1939, Oxford 1966, p. 621. 4. Michael Mann, Fascists, Cambridge 2004, p. 330. 5. Juan J. Linz, »From Great Hopes to Civil War. The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain«, in Juan J. Linz/Alfred Stepan (Ed.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Europe, Baltimore 1978, p. 162. |
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| Papacy | Marsilius of Padua | Höffe I 179 Papacy/Marsilius/Höffe: MarsiliusVsPapacy: According to Marsilius, the governor of God on earth, the Roman bishop, is not a prince of peace, but the main cause of discord. >Papal power. Claim to power: Marsilius' papal criticism continues in the criticism of the claim to primacy of the Popes. Rightly understood, the Roman bishops were no longer merely a representative of Christian unity. The primacy over the other bishops had no biblical authority, it was only due to a historical habit, voluntary agreement and pragmatic considerations. Councils: Consequently, Marsilius, even in the theological field, in all questions of Christian doctrine, declares that the Bishop of Rome is subject to a higher authority and that only this, a general council, is infallible. All the Pope's worldly claims to power, as well as - it must be added - those of a council, are rejected all around. Secular power: The claim to secular power made by the clergy cannot be justified in any way: "If a plurality of governments (Höffe: i.e. the duality of state and church power) is established, then no empire and no city becomes a unity(1). >Governance/Marsilius. 1. Marsilius, Defensor pacis, I, 17, §7 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Paradoxes | Logic Texts | Read III 187f Paradoxes: Hierarchy (Tarski)-problem: the Cretan does not know which level his own statement assumes. - It is only meaningful if truth attribution takes place at a lower level - it requires knowledge! (> knowledge / >understanding). Self-reference: is not always bad or faulty. >Self-reference. III 192f Curry paradox: If A and if A. then B, then B - If this conditional sentence is true, then snow is black - ponendo ponens - solution: contraction: two applications are replaced by one - change of logic. Example: If this (conditional) theorem is true, then snow is black. Consequentia mirabilis: If A, then ~ A, thus ~ A - contraction: If A, then if A, then 0 = 1; So if A, then 0 = 1 - contraction leads to triviality: it makes every statement from the curry paradox true. III 196 Semantically complete: is a language that contains its own truth predicates. Avoidance of paradox: is done by separation of the truth conditions from fallacy conditions. >Richness of a language, >Meta language, >Object language. --- Sainsbury V 17 Zenon/Sainsbury: Zenon's thesis: no area of space is infinitely divisible, so that it has an infinite number of parts, if each part has a certain extent, for then the sum is infinitly large - Zenon tried to show with this, that not really many things exist - overall, no object can have parts, for then it must be infinitely large. >Limits, >Motion. V 19 Sainsbury: infinite division goes only mentally. Problem: then no composition to space - in the composition, however, the space does not have to grow indefinitely. - e.g. sequences with limit. V 38f Arrow/Paradox/Zenon: at any time, the flying arrow takes a space that is identical to it. The arrow cannot move in a moment because movement requires a period of time and a moment is seen as a point - this also applies to everything else: nothing moves. Time/AristotelesVsZenon: Time does not consist of points. >Zeno. SainsburyVsAristoteles: today: we are constantly trying to allow points of time: E.g. acceleration at a point, etc. V 39 The question of whether the arrow is moving or resting in a moment is also related to other moments - Defininition rest/Sainsbury: an object rests under the condition that it is also at the same point in all nearby moments - no information about the individual moment can determine whether the arrow is moving - the premise is acceptable: no movement at the moment - but the conclusion is unacceptable. V 184 Sentence/Statement: a sentence is only circular at a certain occasion. - The paradox is therefore not in the meaning, but in the occasion. >Circular reasoning, >Utterance. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Path Dependence | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 114 Path dependence/colonies/Acemoglu/Robinson: Western Europe, experiencing many of the same historical processes, had institutions similar to England at the time of the Industrial Revolution. There were small but consequential differences between England and the rest, which is why the Industrial Revolution happened in England and not France. >Critical junctures/Acemoglu, >Institutional drift/Acemoglu. E.g., The French Revolution was another critical juncture that led the institutions of Western Europe to converge with those of England, while Eastern Europe diverged further. The rest of the world followed different institutional trajectories. Colonies/poverty/prosperity: European colonization set the stage for institutional divergence in the Americas, where in contrast to the inclusive institutions developed in the United States and Canada extractive ones emerged in Latin America, which explains the patterns of inequality we see in the Americas. The extractive political and economic institutions of the Spanish conquistadors in Latin America have endured, condemning much of the region to poverty. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Perception | Hegel | Höffe I 328 Perception/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: [at the beginning of phenomenology] is the immediate knowledge, the sensual certainty. According to its self-understanding, it has not yet omitted anything from its "object", so that it appears as the most comprehensive and "truest" knowledge. However, it is directed toward a "this" in the "now" and "here". >Now/Hegel. This truth, Hegel explains, cannot be lost by writing it down: "This here and now" can, for example, be my standing desk in my study at 9:30 a.m. (...) and so on. Consequently the truth of "this" lies in all "these", correspondingly the truth of "now" in all "now", thus not in an immediate truth that at the same time leaves nothing out, but in a contentless general. Cf. >Timelessness, >Generality. Content/showing/(to) mean: This only gains content if you mean the thing you point to when you say "this". But this thing, (...) one is no longer directly certain of it, but one perceives it, with which one reaches the second level of consciousness: after the sensual certainty of this, here and now, one finds oneself on the level of the perception of a thing(1). >Knowledge/Hegel, >Pointing, >Content, >Objects, >Knowledge, >World/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Philosopher King | Plato | Gaus I 310 Philosopher King/Plato/Keyt/Miller: The absolute power of the rulers in Socrates' just polis is justified by their knowledge, especially their knowledge of what is really good. As all the world knows, they are philosophers as well as rulers, not run-of-the-mill philosophers (like you and me) but brilliant individuals whose extra-ordinary talents and rigorous education have gained them access to a realm of Forms existing Gaus I 311 outside time and space - the realm of reality and nature (Rep. VI.501b2, X.597b6-598a3). >Governance/Plato. The Good: at the apex of the realm of Forms stands the Form of the Good, the source of the being and truth of all other Forms and of the psyche's knowledge of them (Rep. VI.506d-509c). >Good/Plato. Given the metaphysics and epistemology of the Republic, the argument for the rule of philosopher-kings is straightforward: only true philosophers know what is really good and how to achieve it; everyone seeks what is really good, not what merely seems good (Rep. VI.505d5-10); whoever seeks an end seeks the means to that end; consequently, everyone (whether they realize it or not) really seeks to be ruled by a philosopher-king. >Polis/Plato, >Poitics/Plato. Literature: Santas, 2001(1), is a ground-breaking study of the central concepts of the Republic.) 1. Santas, Gerasimos (2001) Goodness and Justice: Plato, Aristotle, and the Moderns. Oxford: Blackwell. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Pigovian Tax | Wittman | Parisi I 431 Pigovian tax/fine/liability/efficiency/Wittman:[E.g.,] (…) the motorcyclist ((s) who parks in the wrong place) should pay (to the extent feasible) for the marginal costs she imposes on others. In this way, motorcyclists will tend to make efficient choices. >Marginal costs/Wittman. Clearly, a system of liability to all drivers who swerve or drive on another road in order to avoid hitting the motorcycle is totally impractical. The cost to individual drivers is minimal, but the sum total to all the drivers may be quite significant; therefore, we want the driver of the parked motorcycle to pay for the cost she shifts onto others. The appropriate solution is to charge the motorcyclist a fine equal to the total marginal cost imposed on others (a Pigovian tax on the input). This fine will create the same incentives for the motorcyclist as marginal cost civil liability. Whether the motorcyclist pays to the state or to an individual, the incentive effect on the motorcyclist is the same. If the motorcyclist is not always caught parking illegally on the highway, the fine can be increased to compensate for the reduction in probability. For example, if the motorcyclist is only caught half the time, the fine would be twice as large as it would be if she were caught all the time. We now investigate the effect of this Pigovian tax solution on truck and car drivers. Under a marginal cost liability scheme, these drivers are compensated for the cost of preventive behavior, regardless of their taking preventive measures. Compensation does not affect their short-run behavior because it is not based on any decision they make but rather on the decision the motorcyclist makes. Consequently, if the motorcyclist pays a fine to the state instead of being liable to drivers who swerved, her lack of payment to these other drivers will have no effect on their care level. In other words, compensation for marginal costs that should be incurred is not necessary for the system to work properly. >Compensation/Wittman, >Time/Wittman, >Incentive/Wittman. Time: We want drivers to take into account the marginal costs that they impose. The doctrine of last clear chance, by making drivers liable for the damage when they are truly the second in the sequence, encourages them to make efficient decisions. Parisi I 432 Thus, a ticket for illegally parking the motorcycle in the middle of the road and liability for the damage on the driver of the moving truck (because he had the last clear chance) is a marginal cost liability rule applied in sequence. Responsibility/liability: This analysis also provides an important reason for fining people for inputs such as drunken or reckless driving instead of relying only on liability for the resulting damage. Other drivers may swerve out of the way to avoid an accident (and the legal system should encourage them to do so). To the extent that these other drivers are successful, reckless drivers will not pay for their behavior if liability depends only on actual damage. Reckless drivers are not sufficiently deterred if the costs of protection are shifted onto other drivers. In other words, if liability were only based on damages, reckless drivers would not pay for some of the negative externalities that they create. Therefore, we have fines to make these reckless drivers liable for the cost of damage prevention they shift onto others. >Liability. Donald Wittman. “Ex ante vs. ex post”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Power | Gender Theory | Gaus I 277 Power/Gender theory/Mottier: (...) inequalities of power can neither be reduced to, nor explained by, gender differences alone. Gender is not just about difference between the sexes, but about power. Any convincing analysis of the gender order will therefore need to combine the analysis of gender difference with an account of gender power. The focus of the theorization of links between gender and politics thus shifts to the social and political institutionalization of sex differences. Politics/state: the state has played a central role in this process by regulating the relations between the public and private spheres of social life, as well as the access of citizens to social and political rights and to democratic decision-making. Theorizing the relations between gender and the state is consequently a central aspect of the feminist critique of mainstream political theory. >State/Gender Theory, >State/Feminism. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Praxeology | Rothbard | Rothbard III 73 Praxeology/Rothbard: To sum up the relationship and the distinctions between praxeology and each of the other disciplines, we may describe them as follows: Why man chooses various ends: psychology. What men’s ends should be: philosophy of ethics. also: philosophy of aesthetics. How to use means to arrive at ends: technology. What man’s ends are and have been, and how man has used means in order to attain them: history. The formal implications of the fact that men use means to attain various chosen ends: praxeology. Economics: What is the relationship between praxeology and economic analysis? Economics is a subdivision of praxeology - so far the only fully elaborated subdivision. Logic/Rothbard: The suggestion has been made that, since praxeology and economics are logical chains of reasoning based on a few universally known premises, to be really scientific it should be elaborated according to the symbolic notations of mathematical logic.(1) RothbardVs: This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. ((s) For logical symbols cf. >Connectives/Philosophical theories.) On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. Rothbard III 306 Praxeology/utility/measuring/Rothbard: The key problem in utility theory, neglected by the mathematical writers, has been the size of the unit. Under the assumption of mathematical continuity, this is not a problem at all; it could hardly be when the mathematically conceived unit is infinitely small and therefore literally sizeless. In a praxeological analysis of human action, however, this becomes a basic question. The relevant size of the unit varies according to the particular situation, and in each of these situations this relevant unit becomes the marginal unit. There is none but a simple ordinal relation among the utilities of the variously sized units. >Utility/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Jevons. Rothbard III 308 The error in reasoning on the basis of "indifference" is the failure to appreciate the fact that a problem important in the field of psychology may have no significance in the realm of praxeology, to which economics belongs. Psychology deals with the problem of how or why the individual forms value scales, and for this question it is relevant to consider whether the individual is decisive or inclined to be "indifferent" between various alternatives. >Indifference curve/Rothbard. Praxeology, however, is a logical science based on the existence of action per se; it is interested in explaining and interpreting real action in its universal sense rather than in its concrete content. Its discussion of value scales is therefore a deduction from the nature of human action and not a speculative essay on the internal workings of the mind. It is consequently irrelevant for praxeology whether a man, in having to decide between alternatives A and B, makes a choice firmly and decisively, or whether he decides by tossing a coin. This is a problem for psychology; praxeology is concerned only with the fact that he chooses (…). Behaviorism/Rothbard: Neither is praxeology based on behaviorist psychology. In fact, in so far as praxeology touches on psychology, its principles are the reverse of those of behaviorism. >Behaviorism/Philosophy. 1. Cf. G.J. Schuller, "Rejoinder," American Economic Review, March, 1951, p. 188. For a reply, see Murray N. Rothbard, "Toward a Reconstruction ofUtility and Welfare Economics" in Mary Sennholz, ed. on Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 19 5 6), p. 227. Also see Boris Ischboldin, "A Critique of Econometrics," Review ofsocial Economy, September, 1960, pp. 110—27; and Vladimir Niksa, "The Role of Quantitative Thinking in Modern Economic Theory," Review ofSocial Economy, September, 19 59, pp. 151-73. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Price | Leontief | Kurz I 18 Price/relative prices/Leontief/Kurz: „In the general circular flow scheme, income from ownership is of course considered alongside other cost items without the slightest direct reference to how it originates (the phenomenon of ownership). It is the task of the theory of interest to investigate these fundamental relationships.“ (Leontief 1928 [p. 196] p. 600)(1). Leontief’s argument resulted in setting up price equations that reflect not only the socio-technical conditions of production, but also the rule that fixes the distribution of the surplus product. This rule is the second key to a determination of relative prices. Only if both the system of production and the sharing out of the surplus between different claimants in terms of wages, profits Kurz I 19 (or interest) and rents is known, can relative prices be determined. Two ‘keys’ are required in order to solve the problem of value and distribution. >Value, >Distribution. „One may vary at will the exchange proportions and consequently the distribution relationships of the goods without affecting the circular flow of the economy in any way“ ([p. 194] pp. 598–599). In other words, the same physical input–output schema can accommodate different price systems reflecting different distributions of income. He related this finding to the classical economists who are explicitly said to have advocated a ‘surplus theory’ of value and distribution ([p. 209] p. 619). Hence the exchange ratios of goods reflect not only ‘natural’, that is, essentially technological, factors, but also ‘social causes’. For example, assuming free competition, as the classical economists did in much of their analysis, the surplus is distributed in terms of a uniform rate of return on capital across all industries of the economy. With this specification, the general rate of profit together with relative prices can be determined in terms of the system of production in use and given real wages. ‘But this is the “law of value” of the so-called objective value theory’ ([p. 196] p. 601), Leontief insisted. 1. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Leontief I Wassily Wassilyevich Leontief Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 1928 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Privacy | Elshtain | Gaus I 280 Privacy/Elshtain/Mottier: Whereas feminists agree on the necessity of democratizing the private sphere, they disagree as to the political solutions. Pateman(1), for example, argues for the abandoning of the distinction between public and private spheres in favour of more politicization of the private sphere. Other authors think that it is essential to maintain clear boundaries between the two spheres. ElshtainVsPateman: Jean Bethke Elshtain (1981(2)), in particular, vehemently rejects Pateman's position. She considers the assimilation of both spheres to be 'totalitarian' since it would not leave any areas of life outside of politics. Political sphere/privicy/Elshtain: [Elshtain] considers the assimilation of both spheres to be 'totalitarian' since it would not leave any areas of life outside of politics. According to Elshtain, the liberalist rigid separation of the spheres leads to the removal from the political sphere of family values, solidarity and care. The public sphere becomes a space regulated only by the principle of individualistic, rational pursuit of egoistic self-interests. Consequently, the political sphere becomes emptied of its more central values. Elshtain thus argues that the application of principles of the public sphere to the private sphere let loose the most negative tendencies of the modern world. Family/Elshtain: The family, she argues, should be protected against the destructive effects of politicization by rigorous maintenance of clear boundaries between the two spheres. 1. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 2. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981) Public Man, Private Women: Women in Social and Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Privacy | Philips | Gaus I 280 Privacy/Anne Philips/Mottier: for [Anne Phillips (1991)(1)] (...) 'the private is political' means primarily that it is necessary to extend the notion of 'the political'. For political science in particular, this means that it is necessary to integrate the private sphere into the analysis, rather than to restrict the analytical focus to the public sphere, as traditional political scientists tend to do. Democracy: In order to show the necessity of taking into account the private sphere, Phillips focuses on the concept of democracy. She argues that to conceptualize democratic participation without taking into account the constraints of the private sphere entails too narrow a view of democracy. >Democracy/Philips, >Privacy /Political philosophy, >Family/Feminism, cf. >Democratic theory/Pateman, >Participation/Pateman, >Inequalities/Okin, >Privacy/Pateman. Political sphere/Privacy/PhilipsVsElsthain: For Phillips (1991)(1), (...), the idea of a private sphere independent from the political sphere is meaningless. Cf. >Privacy/Elshtain. She points out that relations within the private sphere are regulated by the state, economics, and the subordination of women. Consequently, 'these relations are already politicized, whether we want it or not' (1991)(1): 106). Despite this disagreement, Phillips rejoins Elshtain in arguing for maintaining a separation between the public and the private, but for different reasons: whereas Elshtain(2) argues for the protection of family values from the intervention of the state, Phillips bases her argument on the necessity to preserve areas within which the principle of individual decision and privacy is maintained, and she uses here the example of abortion. On this point, Phillips's position is close to that of Okin and Iris Marion Young (1987(3); see also Petchesky, 1986(4): 108). PhilipsVsOkin: However, Phillips goes one step further than Okin in arguing for the degendering of the distinction public/private: she argues for detachment of the definition of the spheres from the definition of gender roles. In other words, the distinction between public and private spheres should be detached from gender differences, and based instead on the criterion of the right to privacy. 1. Phillips, Anne (1991) Engendering Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. 2. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1982) 'Antigone's daughters'. Democracy in the world, 2:48-59. 3. Young, Iris Marion (1987) 'Impartiality and the civic public'. In Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds, Feminism as Critique. Cambridge: Polity, 56—76. 4. Petchesky, Rosalind (1986) Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom. London: Verso. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Probability | Schurz | Def Conditional probability/Schurz: the probability of A assuming that B exists: P( A I B) = p(A u B)/p(B). (pB) must be >0. B: conditional event, antecedent. A: conditional event, consequent. In the statistical case, p(A I B) coincides with the rel.frequ. of A in the finite set of all B's. Or with the limit of rel.frequ. in an infinite random sequence of B's. >Bayesianism. Non-monotonicity/non-monotonic/conditional probability /Schurz: conditional probabilities are non-monotonic: i.e. from p(A I B) = high does not follow that p(A I B u C) = high. >Monotony. Objective probability /type/predicate/Schurz: statistical probabilities always refer to a repeatable event type, expressed in a predicate or an open formula. Subjective probability: refers to an event token, expressed in a sentence. E.g. that it will rain tomorrow: tomorrow exists only once. >Subjective probability. Subjective/objective/probability /Reichenbach: Principle for the transfer from objective to subjective probability: I 101 Principle of narrowest reference class/Reichenbach: the subjective probability of a token Fa is determined as the (estimated) conditional probability p(Fx I Rx) of the corresponding type Fx, in the narrowest reference class Rx, where a is known to lie. (i.e. that Ra holds). E.g. Whether a person with certain characteristics follows a certain career path. These characteristics act as the closest reference class. Ex Weather development: closest reference class, the development of the last days. Total date/carnap: principle of: for confirmation, total knowledge. Subjective probability: main founders: Bayes, Ramsey, de Finetti. Logical probability theory/Carnap: many authors Vs. Mathematical probability theory/Schurz: ignores the difference subjective/objective probability, because the statistical laws are the same. I 102 Disjunctivity/ probability: objective. The extension of A u B is empty subjective: A u B is not made true by any admitted (extensional) interpretation of the language. Probability/axioms/Schurz: A1: for all A: p(A) > 0. (Non-negativity). A2: p(A v ~A) = 1. (Normalization to 1) A3: for disjoint A, B: p(A v B) = p(A) + p(B) (finite additivity). I.e. for disjoint events the probabilities add up. Def Probabilistic independence/Schurz: probabilistically independent are two events A, B. gdw. p(A u B) = p(A) times p(B) . Probabilistically dependent: if P(A I B) is not equal to p(A). >Conditional probability, >Subjective probability. I 109 Def exhaustive/exhaustive/Schurz: a) objective probability: a formula A with n free variables is called exhaustive, gdw. the extension of A comprises the set of all n tuples of individuals b) subjective: gdw. the set of all models making A true (=extensional interpretations) coincides with the set of all models of the language considered possible. I 110 Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. >Probability theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Probability Conditional | Lewis | V 133f Conditional/Probability/Lewis: thesis: the probability of conditionals is the conditional probability. - (VsStalnaker). Logical form: P(A->C) and P(C I A) - But not for the truth-functional conditional ⊃ (horseshoe). - Because here they are only sometimes equal. Therefore, the indicative conditional is not truth-functional. We call it probability conditional. Problem: then the probability of conditionals would hint at the relation of probability of non-conditionals. - That would be incorrect. >Conditional, >Probability/Lewis. Solution: assertibility is not possible with not absolute probability in the case of the indicative conditionals. >Assertibility. V 135 Conditionalisation/Lewis/(s): E.g. conditionalisation on B: P(A) becomes P(A I B) the probability A given B. Cf. >Bayesianism. V 135f Probability conditional/prob cond/Lewis: here the probability of the antecedent must be positive. - A probability conditional applies to a class of probability functions - universal probability conditional: applies to all probability functions (Vs). >Probability function. V 137 Right: C and ~ C can have both positive values: E.g. C: even number, A: 6 appears. - Then AC and A~C are both positive probabilities. - Important argument: A and C are independent of each other. - General: several assumptions can have any positive probability if they are incompatible in pairs. - The language must be strong enough to express this. - Otherwise it allows universal probability conditionals that are wrong. V 139 Indicative conditional/Probability/Conditional probability/Lewis: because some probability functions that represent possible belief systems are not trivial - (i.e. assigns positive probability values to more than two incompatible options). The indicative conditional is not probability conditional for all possible subjective probability functions. - But that does not mean that there is a guaranteed conditionalised probability for all possible subjective probability functions. - I.e. the assertibility of the indicative conditional is not compatible with absolute probability. Assertibility is normally associated with probability, because speakers are usually sincere. - But not with indicative conditionals. - Indicative conditional: has no truth value at all, no truth conditions and therefore no probability for truth. V 144 Conditional/Probability/Lewis/(s): the probability of conditionals is measurable - antecedent and consequent must be probabilistically independent. - Then e.g. if each has 0.9, then the whole thing has 0.912. V 148 Probability/conditional/Lewis: a) picture: the picture is created by shifting the original probability of every world W to WA, the nearest possible worlds - (Picture here: sum of the worlds with A(= 1) or non-A(= 0) - This is the minimum revision (no unprovoked shift). - In contrast, the reverse: b) conditionalisation: it does not distort the profile of probability relations (equality and inequality of sentences that imply A). - Both methods should achieve the same. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Process/Flux | Simons | I 124f Flux/Heraclitus/ChisholmVsQuine: Quine needs spatial and temporal extension on the same level Chi: not every sum of flux stages is a flux process. We have to say what conditions a sum must satisfy to be a flow process. >Mereological sum. Problem: that in turn presupposes continuants: shore, observers, absolute space or an introduction of "is co-fluvial with". >Continuants. This could only be explained circularly by "is the same river as". Thus, the four-dimensionalism has not eliminated all singular or general terms that denote continuants. SimonsVsQuine: one does not bath in a flux stage but in the whole flux. Error: it is wrong trying to change the subject to leave the predicate unchanged. I125 Time-stage/flux-stages/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: stages can be misleading: e.g. a Philip stage is not drunk, but the whole man. One does not bath in a flux stadium. A consequent description in four-dimensionalism is only achieved by higher beings. For us, this is not decidable. Terminology: process ontology equals four-dimensionalism here. Simons: this is not impossible, only the language is different. >Four-dimensionalism. I 127 SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: four-dimensionalism is a convenient representation of the Minkowski-space, but representation is not an ontological argument. >Minkowski-space. I 126 Process/Geach/Simons: a process has all its properties timeless, that means, what has different properties, are the temporal parts and not the whole process. Hence, there is no change, e.g. like the poker which is hot on one end and cold at the other. >Timelessness. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Productivity | Rothbard | Rothbard III 423 Rate of return/productivity/Rothbard: Why does a particular investment yield any net monetary return at all? The usual answer is that each dose of new investment has a “marginal value productivity,” such as 10 percent, 9 percent, 4 percent, etc., that naturally the most productive investments will be made first and that therefore, as savings increase, further investments will be less and less value-productive. This provides the basis for the alleged “businessman’s demand curve,” which slopes to the right as savings increase and the interest rate falls. The cardinal error here is an old one in economics - the attribution of value-productivity to monetary investment. There is no question that investment increases the physical productivity of the productive process, as well as the productivity per man hour. Indeed, that is precisely why investment and the consequent lengthening of the periods of production take place at all. But what has this to do with value-productivity or with the monetary return on investment, (…)? >Demand/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard. Suppose, for example, that a certain quantity of physical factors (and we shall set aside the question of how this quantity can be measured) produces 10 units of a certain product per period at a selling price of two gold ounces per unit. Now let us postulate that investment is made in higher-order capital goods to such an extent that productivity multiplies fivefold and that the same original factors can now produce 50 units per period. The selling price of the larger supply of product will be less; let us assume that it will be cut in half to one ounce per unit. The gross revenue per period is increased from 20 to 50 ounces. Does this mean that value-productivity has increased two and a half times, just as physical productivity increased fivefold? Certainly not! For (…) producers benefit, not from the gross revenue received, but from the price spread between their selling price and their aggregate factor prices. Rothbard III 424 The increase in physical productivity will certainly increase revenue in the short run, but this refers to the profit-and-loss situations of the real world of uncertainty. The long-run tendency will be nothing of the sort. The long-run tendency, (…) is toward an equalization of price spreads. How can there be any permanent benefit when the cumulative factor prices paid by this producer increase from, say, 18 ounces to 47 ounces? This is precisely what will happen on the market, as competitors vie to invest in these profitable situations. The price spread, i.e., the interest rate, will again be 5 percent. Thus the productivity of production processes has no basicvrelation to the rate of return on business investment. This rate of return depends on the price spreads between stages, and these price spreads will tend to be equal. The size of the price spread, i.e., the size of the interest rate, is determined (…) by the time-preference schedules of all the individuals in the economy. For RothbardVsNeoclassical economics see >Loans/Neoclassical Economics, >Interest rates/Rothbard. Rothbard III 577 Productivity/labour/Rothbard: there is danger in using a term such as “productivity of labor.” Suppose, for example, we state that “the productivity of labor has advanced in the last century.” The implication is that the cause of this increase came from within labor itself, i.e., because current labor is more energetic or personally skillful than previous labor. This, however, is not the case. Marginal productivity: An advancing capital structure increases the marginal productivity of labor, because the labor supply has increased less than the supply of capital goods. This increase in the marginal productivity of labor, however, is not due to some special improvement in the labor energy expended. It is due to the increased supply of capital goods. The causal agents of increased wage rates in an expanding economy, then, are not primarily the workers themselves, but the capitalist-entrepreneurs who have invested in capital goods. The workers are provided with more and better tools, and so their labor becomes relatively scarcer as compared to the other factors.(2) >Marginal productivity. 1. For brilliant dissections of various forms of the “productivity” theory of interest (the neoclassical view that investment earns an interest return because capital goods are value-productive), see the following articles by Frank A. Fetter: “The Roundabout Process of the Interest Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1902, pp. 163–80, where BöhmBawerk’s highly unfortunate lapse into a productivity theory of interest is refuted; “Interest Theories Old and New,” pp. 68–92, which presents an extensive development of time-preference theory, coupled with a critique of Irving Fisher’s concessions to the productivity doctrine; also see “Capitalization Versus Productivity, Rejoinder,” American Economic Review, 1914, pp. 856–59, and “Davenport’s Competitive Economics,” Journal of Political Economy, 1914, pp. 555–62. Fetter’s only mistake in interest theory was to deny Fisher’s assertion that time preference (or, as Fisher called it, “impatience”) is a universal and necessary fact of human action. For a demonstration of this important truth, see Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 480ff. 2. It should be understood throughout that when we refer to increases in wage rates or ground rents in the expanding economy, we are referring to real, and not necessarily to money, wage rates or ground rents. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Progress | Rousseau | Höffe I 270 Progress/Rousseau/Höffe: Rousseau neither denies the enormous progress of science nor its contribution to work facilitation, material prosperity and life extension. For the well-being of the peoples, however, the morals are ultimately at stake, and for them scientific progress proves to be perishable simply because of its specialization. In his First Treatise(1), Rousseau emphasizes the consequential burdens of progress and, in a "negative optimism of progress" approaching a secularized version of the biblical fall: "Luxury, debauchery and slavery are the punishment for the ambitious efforts that were to lead us out of the happy ignorance into which eternal wisdom had directed us”. >Natural State, >Natural State/Rousseau, >Society. 1. Rousseau, Premier Discours sur les sciences et les arts, 1750 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 265 Psychology/evolutionary psychology: Although evolutionary psychologists agree that evolution is relevant to all psychological mechanisms, there has been very little research done on personality from an evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary psychologists have generally been interested solely in what Tooby and Cosmides (1992)(1) have termed the psychic unity of mankind. Therefore, they have been primarily concerned with human nature rather than individual differences. Consequently, much of evolutionary personality psychology research has focused on universally-shared psychological mechanisms that result in phenotypic plasticity due to varying environmental input without regard to genetic variability or heritable traits. >Personality/evolutionary theories. However, the vast behavioural genetics literature on personality traits indicates strong genetic components for differences in all of the >Big Five personality traits (Loehlin, McCrae, Costa and John 1998)(2). The genetic variability of such traits is dismissed or explained by some evolutionary psychologists as selectively neutral or as genetic ‘noise’ (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(3). >Personality traits/evolutionary psychology. 1.Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1992. The psychological foundations of culture, in J. Barkow, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby (eds.), The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, pp. 19–136. New York: Oxford University Press 2. Loehlin, J., McCrae, R., Costa, P. and John, O. 1998. Heritabilities of common and measure-specific components of the Big Five personality factors, Journal of Research in Personality 32: 431–53 3. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Quantification | Kamp | Cresswell I 172 Quantification/Kamp: there are cases where the quantifier can be changed from the existence qu. to universal qu. If it does not bind any variable in the consequent, we have as a logical equivalence: I 173 (x) (Fx> P) ↔ (ExFx> P) (s) bracket!) - N.B./(s): the existential quantifier extends only to the Fx, i.e. on the reverse reading, it then extends not to the consequence (left hand side of the equivalence). Ex (x) ((donkey x and Pedro has x)> Pedro proposes x - Problem: x here binds a variable in the consequent - Solution/Kamp: analyzed indefinite phrases (descriptions) as predicates (see above) - the universal quantifikation is part of the meaning of "if". >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >branched quantifiers, >Quantifiers. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Ramsey Sentence | Schurz | I 213 Ramsey-sentene/RS/Theoretical Terms/Schurz: Here Theoretical Terms are not eliminated completely, but existentially quantified over them. Given a theory , which we now take to be a single theorem T(τ1,...τn,) (the conjunction of all axioms of T. Theoretical terms: τ1,...τn. Moreover, there are various non-theoretical terms π which are not written on separately. Then the Ramsey theorem of T is: (5.8 1) R(T): EX1,...Xn: T(X1,...Xn) Everyday language translation: there are theoretical entities X1,..Xn which satisfy the assertions of the theory. Pointe: an empirical (not theoretical) proposition follows from T exactly if it follows from R(T). ((s) It follows from the theory if it follows from the Ramsey theorem of the theory, i.e., from the assumption that the theoretical entities exist.) Thus, it holds: (5.8 -2) E(R(T)) = E(T) Notation: E(T): empirical proposition that follows from theory T. Schurz: i.e. a theory and its Ramsey theorem have the same empirical content. >Carnap-sentence/Schurz, >Empirical content. Ramsey-sentence: Here no more theoretical terms occur! Instead of it: "theoretical" variables. Therefore many, including Ramsey, saw the Ramsey theorem as an empirical theorem (not as a theoretical one. Ramsey theorem: should thus be the sought empirically equivalent non-theoretical axiomatization of the theory. HempelVs/MaxwellVs/Schurz: this is problematic because the RS asserts the existence of certain entities that we call "theoretical". Ramsey theorem/interpretation/realism/instrumentalism/Schurz: the interpretation of the RS as theoretical or non-theoretical depends on whether one interprets 2nd level quantifiers realistically or instrumentally. (a) instrumentalist interpretation: here one assumes that the range of individuals D consists of empirically accessible individuals, and runs the variables Xi over arbitrary subsets of D. (There are no theoretical individuals here). >Instrumentalism/Schurz. Whether these extensions correspond to certain theoretical real properties or not is inconsequential. (Sneed 1971(1), Ketland 2004(2), 291) I 214 Ramsey-sentence/instrumentalism: is then model-theoretically an empirical theorem! Because the models that determine the truth value of R(T) are purely empirical models (D, e1,...em). " ei": extensions of the empirical terms, pi: empirical terms of T. Structuralism: calls these empirical models "partial" models (Balzer et al. 1987(3),57). Empirical model/Schurz: is easily extendible to a full model (D, e1,...em, t1,..tn), ti: are the extensions of the theoretical terms. Pointe: this does not yet mean that R(T) is logically equivalent to E(T). Because R(T) is a 2nd level proposition and E(T) contains 1st level propositions. >Structuralism/Schurz. Def Ramsey-eliminable: if there is a 1st level empirical proposition equivalent to a RS L, then the theortical term is called Ramsey-eliminable. (Sneed 1971(1), 53). b) Realist interpretation: (Lewis, 1970(4), Papineau 1996(5)): assumes that the existence quantified variables denote real theoretical entities. The models are then no longer simple realist models: >Realism/Schurz. 1. New theoretical individuals are added to the individual domain. New: Dt. 2. not every subset of Dt corresponds to a real property. En. Ex In the simplest case, one must assume a set Et of extensions of "genuine" theoretical properties over which 2nd level variables run. Realism/Ramsey-sentence: new: now not every empirical model of instrumentalistically interpreted RS is extensible to a model of realistically interpreted Ramsey-sentence, because the quantifiers (Exi) of R(T) can have satisfactions in the power set of Det but no satisfactions in Et. In philosophical words: an empirical model, which fulfills the RS instrumentalistically, cannot be read off whether the respective theoretical entities, whose existence is postulated by R(T), are merely useful fictions or real existing entities. Instrumentalism: Proposition: Theoretical entities are useful fictions. Realism/Ramsey Theorem: here R(T) contains more than just the empirical content of a theory, it also contains the total synthetic content: if we assume that the meaning of Theoretical Terms is not determined by anything other than this theory itself, then the assertion that T makes about the world seems to be precisely that of R(T): there are unobservable entities X1,...Xn that satisfy the total assertion of the theory T(X1,...Xn). >Carnap-sentence/Schurz. 1. Sneed, J. D. (1971). The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. Dordrecht: Reidel. 2. Ketland, J. (2004). "Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification", British Journal for the Philosoph y of Science 55, 287-300. 3. Balzer, W. et al (1987). An Architectonic for Science. Dordrecht: Reidel. 4. Lewis, D. (1970). "How to definie Theoretical Terms", wiederabgedruckt in ders. Philosophical Papers Vol I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Papineau, D. (1996). "Theory-dependent Terms", >Philosophy of Science 63, 1- 20. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Rate of Return | Rothbard | Rothbard III 423 Rate of return/productivity/Rothbard: Why does a particular investment yield any net monetary return at all? The usual answer is that each dose of new investment has a “marginal value productivity,” such as 10 percent, 9 percent, 4 percent, etc., that naturally the most productive investments will be made first and that therefore, as savings increase, further investments will be less and less value-productive. This provides the basis for the alleged “businessman’s demand curve,” which slopes to the right as savings increase and the interest rate falls. The cardinal error here is an old one in economics - the attribution of value-productivity to monetary investment. There is no question that investment increases the physical productivity of the productive process, as well as the productivity per man hour. Indeed, that is precisely why investment and the consequent lengthening of the periods of production take place at all. But what has this to do with value-productivity or with the monetary return on investment, (…)? >Demand/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard. Suppose, for example, that a certain quantity of physical factors (and we shall set aside the question of how this quantity can be measured) produces 10 units of a certain product per period at a selling price of two gold ounces per unit. Now let us postulate that investment is made in higher-order capital goods to such an extent that productivity multiplies fivefold and that the same original factors can now produce 50 units per period. The selling price of the larger supply of product will be less; let us assume that it will be cut in half to one ounce per unit. The gross revenue per period is increased from 20 to 50 ounces. Does this mean that value-productivity has increased two and a half times, just as physical productivity increased fivefold? Certainly not! For (…) producers benefit, not from the gross revenue received, but from the price spread between their selling price and their aggregate factor prices. Rothbard III 424 The increase in physical productivity will certainly increase revenue in the short run, but this refers to the profit-and-loss situations of the real world of uncertainty. The long-run tendency will be nothing of the sort. The long-run tendency, (…) is toward an equalization of price spreads. How can there be any permanent benefit when the cumulative factor prices paid by this producer increase from, say, 18 ounces to 47 ounces? This is precisely what will happen on the market, as competitors vie to invest in these profitable situations. The price spread, i.e., the interest rate, will again be 5 percent. Thus the productivity of production processes has no basicvrelation to the rate of return on business investment. This rate of return depends on the price spreads between stages, and these price spreads will tend to be equal. The size of the price spread, i.e., the size of the interest rate, is determined (…) by the time-preference schedules of all the individuals in the economy. For RothbardVsNeoclassical economics see >Loans/Neoclassical Economics, >Interest rates/Rothbard. Rothbard III 794 Rate of return/Rothbard: Suppose that [someone] normally purchases original factors for 100 and then sells the product for 120 ounces two years later, for an interest return of 10 percent per annum. Now suppose that a decrease in the demand for money or an increase of money stock propels a general upward movement in prices and that all prices double in two years' time. >Production factors/Rothbard, >Production structure/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Then, just because of the passage of time, an entrepreneur who purchases factors for 100 now will sell for 240 ounces in two years' time. Instead of a net return of 20 ounces, or 10 percent per annum, he reaps 140 ounces, or 70 percent per annum. Problem: It would seem that a rise in prices creates an inherent tendency for large-scale profits that are not simply individual rewards for more accurate forecasting. Rothbard III 795 Solution: However, more careful analysis reveals that this is not an extra profit at all. For the 240 ounces two years from now is roughly equivalent, in terms of purchasing power, to 120 ounces now. Rate of return: The real rate of net return, based on money's services, is the same 10 percent as it has always been. It is clear that any Iower net return would amount to a decline in real return. A return of a mere 120 ounces, for example, would amount to a drastic negative real return, for 100 ounces would then be invested for the equivalent gross return of only 60 ounces. It has often been shown that a period of rising prices misleads businessmen into thinking that their increased money profits are also real gains, whereas they only maintain real rates of return. Replacement costs: Consider, for example, "replacement costs" - the prices which the businessmen will now have to pay for factors. The capitalist who earns 240 ounces on a 100-ounce investment neglects to his sorrow the fact that his factor bundle now costs 200 ounces instead of 100. Businessmen who under such circumstances treat their monetary profits as real profits and consume them soon find that they are really consuming their capital. >Profit/Rothbard, >Rate of profit/Rothbard, >Natural rate of interest/Rothbard, cf. >Market interest rate/Fisher, >Pure rate of interest/Rothbard. 1. For brilliant dissections of various forms of the “productivity” theory of interest (the neoclassical view that investment earns an interest return because capital goods are value-productive), see the following articles by Frank A. Fetter: “The Roundabout Process of the Interest Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1902, pp. 163–80, where BöhmBawerk’s highly unfortunate lapse into a productivity theory of interest is refuted; “Interest Theories Old and New,” pp. 68–92, which presents an extensive development of time-preference theory, coupled with a critique of Irving Fisher’s concessions to the productivity doctrine; also see “Capitalization Versus Productivity, Rejoinder,” American Economic Review, 1914, pp. 856–59, and “Davenport’s Competitive Economics,” Journal of Political Economy, 1914, pp. 555–62. Fetter’s only mistake in interest theory was to deny Fisher’s assertion that time preference (or, as Fisher called it, “impatience”) is a universal and necessary fact of human action. For a demonstration of this important truth, see Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 480ff. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Reference | Strawson | Meggle I 297 According to Hungerland: Strawson: reference rules - rules of presupposition of expressions such as e.g. "the President of the United States is ... years old". Meggle I 297 Strawson: Lies are no correct use of language. Meggle I 310f Reference rules/Strawson: 1. To refer does not mean that you say you refer to something. 2. The thing must stand in a certain relation to the speaker. 3. The correct reference is not part of the utterance, in the sense in which a proper description is part of what is asserted by the utterance. E.g. "This is black and that is white." Here is the fact that "this" is closer to me than "that" not part of the statement!, Not part of what I said about the two objects. Meggle I 311 Reference/Strawson: not saying that one "refers to something" - R is not part of the utterance as the correct description of the statement is. Meggle I 312 Hungry country, "this" is closer to me than "that", but not part of the statement - "S" does not require that there is only one, but that I am only referring to one. --- Schulte III 436 Reference/Strawson: a) clearly referring expressions: the fulfillment of the conditions is not stated but implied b) descriptive terms: here the fulfillment of the conditions is also stated by the use. --- IV 68 Reference/Strawson: on particular without reference to properties possible. --- VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel twice in swimming through it". - It has the (wrong) appearance, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same mistake as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression - E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Regression Theorem | Rothbard | Rothbard III 267 Reggression theorem/money regression/cirularity/Rothbard: The seller’s marginal utility (..) depends on the previous existence of money prices for the various goods in the economy. Similarly, for the laborer, landowner, investor, or owner of a capital good: in selling his services or goods, money has a marginal utility of addition, which is a necessary prior condition to his decision to sell the goods and therefore a determinant in his supply curve of the good for money. And yet this marginal utility always depends on there being a previous array of money prices in existence. Rothbard III 269 Solution/Mises/Rothbard: The solution of this crucial problem of circularity has been provided by Professor Ludwig von Mises, in his notable theory of the money regression.(1) >Regression theorem/Mises, >Regress/Philosophy. Rothbard III 270 Rothbard: If prices today depend on the marginal utility of money today, the latter is dependent on money prices yesterday. Thus, in every money price in any day, there is contained a time component, so that this price is partially determined by the money prices of yesterday. This does not mean specifically that the price of eggs today is partially determined by the price of eggs yesterday, the price of butter today by that of yesterday, etc. On the contrary, the time component essential to each specific price today is the general array of yesterday’s money prices for all goods, and, of course, the subsequent evaluation of the monetary unit by the individuals in the society. If we consider the general array of today’s prices, however, an essential time component in their determination is the general array of yesterday’s prices. Rothbard III 271 This time component is purely on the money side of the determining factors. In a society of barter, there is no time component in the prices of any given day. When horses are being exchanged against fish, the individuals in the market decide on the relative marginal utilities solely on the basis of the direct uses of the commodities. These direct uses are immediate and do not require any previously existing prices on the market. Therefore, the marginal utilities of direct goods, such as horses and fish, have no previous time components. The case is different in a monetary economy. Solution/Rothbard: Now the question may be raised: Granted that there is no circularity in the determination of money prices, does not the fact that the causes partially regress backward in time simply push the unexplained components back further without end? If today’s prices are partly determined by yesterday’s prices, and yesterday’s by those of the day before yesterday, etc., is not the regression simply pushed back infinitely, and part of the determination of prices thus left unexplained? The answer is that the regression is not infinite, and the clue to its stopping point is the distinction just made between conditions in a money economy and conditions in a state of barter. Rothbard III 272 Money utility: the utility of money consists of two major elements: the utility of the money as a medium of exchange, and the utility of the money commodity in its direct, commodity use (such as the use of gold for ornaments). In the modern economy, after the money commodity has fully developed as a medium of exchange, its use as a medium tends greatly to overshadow its direct use in consumption. The demand for gold as money far exceeds its demand as jewelry. However, the latter use and demand continue to exist and to exert some influence on the total demand for the money commodity. The determination of money prices (gold prices) is therefore completely explained, with no circularity and no infinite regression. The demand for gold enters into every gold price, and today’s demand for gold, in so far as it is for use as a medium of exchange, has a time component, being based on yesterday’s array of gold prices. Rothbard III 273 This time component regresses until the last day of barter, the day before gold began to be used as a medium of exchange. On that day, gold had no utility in that use; the demand for gold was solely for direct use, and consequently, the determination of the gold prices, for that day and for all previous days, had no temporal component whatever.(2)(3) >Gold/Rothbard. 1. See Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953 and 1957. Reprinted by Liberty Fund, 1995. pp. 97-123 , and Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 405-08. Also see Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press, [1954] 1996. p. 1090. This problem obstructed the development of economic science until Mises provided the solution. Failure to solve it led many economists to despair of ever constructing a satisfactory economic analysis of money prices. They were led to abandon fundamental analysis of money prices and to separate completely the prices of goods from their money components. In this fallacious course, they assumed that individual prices are determined wholly as in barter, without money components, while the supply of and the demand for money determined an imaginary figment called the "general price level." Economists began to specialize separately in the "theory of price," which completely abstracted from money in its real functions, and a "theory of money," which abstracted from individual prices and dealt solely with a mythical "price level." The former were solely preoccupied with a particular price and its determinants; the latter solely with the "economy as a whole" without relation to the individual components - called "microeconomics" and "macroeconomics" respectively. Actually, such fallacious premises led inevitably to erroneous conclusions. It is certainly legitimate and necessary for economics, in working out an analysis of reality, to isolate different segments for concentration as the analysis proceeds; but it is not legitimate to falsify reality in this separation, so that the final analysis does not present a correct picture of the individual parts and their interrelations. 2. As we regress in time and approach the original days of barter, the exchange use in the demand for gold becomes relatively weaker as compared to the direct use of gold, until finally, on the last day of barter, it dies out altogether, the time component dying out with it. 3. It should be noted that the crucial stopping point of the regression is not the cessation of the use of gold as “money,” but the cessation of its use as a medium of exchange. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Relative Price | Rothbard | Rothbard III 281 Relative Price/Rothbard: The available goods are ranked, along with the possibility of holding the money commodity in one’s cash balance, on each individual’s value scale. Then, in accordance with the rankings and the law of utility, the individual allocates his units of money to the most highly valued uses: the various consumers’ goods, investment in various factors, and addition to his cash balance. Rothbard III 282 The law of the interrelation of consumers' goods is: The more substitutes there are availablefor any given good, the more elastic will tend to be the demand schedules (individual and market)for that good. By the definition of "good," two goods cannot be "perfect substitutes" for each Other, since if consumers regarded two goods as completely identical, they would, by definition, be one good. All consumers' goods are, on the other hand, partial substitutes for one another. When a man ranks in his value scale the myriad of goods available and balances the diminishing utilities of each, he is treating them all as partial substitutes for one another. A change in ranking for one good by necessity changes the rankings of all the other goods, since all the rankings are ordinal and relative. A higher price for one good (owing, say, to a decrease in stock produced) will tend to shift the demand of consumers from that to other consumers' goods, and therefore their demand schedules will tend to increase. >Demand/Rothbard, >Supply/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Conversely, an increased supply and a consequent Iowering of price for a good will tend to shift consumer demand from other goods to this one and Iower the demand schedules for the other goods (for some, of course, more than for others). It is a mistake to suppose that only technologically similar goods are substitutes for one another. The more money consumers spend on pork, the less they have to spend on beef, or the more money they spend on travel, the less they have to spend on TV sets. Suppose that a reduction in its supply raises the price of pork on the market; it is clear that the quantity demanded, and the price, of beef will be affected by this change. Elasticity: If the demand schedulefor pork is more than unitarily elastic in this range, then the higher price will cause less money to be spent on pork, and more money will tend to be shifted to such a substitute as beef. The demand schedules for beef will increase, and the price of beef will tend to rise. >Elasticity/Rothbard. Inelasticity: On the other hand, if the demand schedule for pork is inelastic, more consumers' money will be spent on pork, and the result will be a fall in the demand schedule for beef and consequently in its price. Rothbard III 283 Consumer goods: (…) consumers' goods, in so far as they are substitutes for one another, are related as follows: When the stock of A rises and the price of A therefore falls, (1) if the demand schedule for A is elastic, there will be a tendency for a decline in the demand schedules for B, C, D, etc., and consequent declines in their prices; (2) if the demand schedule for A is inelastic, there will be a rise in the demand schedules for B, C, D, etc., and a consequent rise in their prices; (3) if the demand schedule has exactly neutral (or unitary) elasticity, so that there is no change in the amount of money expended on A, there will be no effect on the demands for and the prices of the other goods. Rothbard III 285 While all consumers’ goods compete with one another for consumer purchases, some goods are also complementary to one another. These are goods whose uses are closely linked together by consumers, so that movements in demand for them are likely to be closely tied together. Rothbard III 286 This discussion of the interrelation of consumers’ goods has treated the effect only of changes from the stock, or supply, side. The effects are different when the change occurs in the demand schedule instead of in the quantity of stock. (…) the demand schedules are determined by individual value scales and that a rise in the marginal utility of a unit of A necessarily means a relative fall in the utility of the other consumers’ goods. >Marginal utility/Rothbard, >Stock keeping/Rothbard, >Comparative Advantage, >Durable goods. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Relative Price | Sraffa | Harcourt I 135 Relative price/Sraffa/Harcourt: The following quote from Sraffa [1960](1), pp. 12-13, is a splendid intuitive example of why relative prices are now constant and independent of r. Sraffa: „Starting from the situation in which the whole of the national income goes to labour, we imagine wages to be reduced: a rate of profits will thereby arise. The key to the movement of relative prices consequent upon a change in the wage lies in the inequality of the proportions in which labour and means of production are employed in the various industries. It is clear that if the proportion were the same in all industries no price-changes could ensue, however great was the diversity of the commodity-composition of the means of production in different industries. For in each industry an equal deduction from the wage would yield just as much as was required for paying the profits on its means of production at a uniform rate without need to disturb the existing prices. For the same reason it is impossible for prices to remain unchanged when there is inequality of 'proportions'. Suppose that prices did remain unchanged when the wage was reduced and a rate of profits emerged. Since in any one industry what was saved by the wage-reduction would depend on the number of men employed, while what was needed for paying profits at a uniform rate would depend on the aggregate value of the means of production used, industries with a sufficiently low proportion of labour to means of production would have a deficit, while industries with a sufficiently high proportion would have a surplus, on their payments for wages and profits. >Reswitching/Economic theories, >Labour, >Value theory. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Religion | Rousseau | Höffe I 378 Religion/Rousseau/Höffe: {Rousseau represented a] functional state religion, called "religion civile". As with Spinoza, it focuses on the moral core of natural religion, but unlike Spinoza, it does not recognize revelation as an also-legitimate approach. RousseauVsSpinoza, RousseauVsBelief in Revelation. Belief: The core of the civil religion is a (civic) creed with which Rousseau rejects the two extremes: atheism and Christian-ecclesiastical dogmatism. State Religion/Rousseau pro Hobbes: As with Hobbes, whom Rousseau praises for combining secular and spiritual power, the confession is determined by the sovereign and consists of a "spirit of togetherness, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen and a Höffe I 279 faithful subject"(1). Admittedly, the sovereign cannot commit anyone to this faith. Banishment: But anyone who rejects it may be banished, for in accordance with his understanding of the common will, Rousseau declares that whoever inhabits the territory of the state submits to the sovereignty that reigns there. One is banished not because one is godless, but because one "resists to be with one another"(2). >Death Penalty/Rousseau. Dogmas: For the dogmas of bourgeois or civil religion, Rousseau demands simplicity, small numbers and clear formulations. HöffeVsRousseau: Although he undoubtedly fulfills these conditions, his creed is very demanding and difficult for purely secular citizens to accept. Belief/Community/Dogmas/Rousseau: It is necessary to acknowledge the existence of a deity, and to attribute omnipotence, omniscience and charity to it. One must believe in the future life, in which the righteous are happy while the wicked are punished. The social contract and the laws flowing from it must be considered sacred. Negative dogma: prohibition of intolerance. HöffevsRousseau: But because the positive dogmas may be excluded from this, tolerance is kept within limits. Civil Religion/Rousseau/Höffe: [it should] a) (...) exclude any theological claim to sole representation, since this holds too high a potential for conflict. Now the claim to exclusivity results from an - allegedly - divine revelation and its authoritative interpretation on the part of a religious community. Consequently, the civil religion must do without any revelation. (RousseauVsRevelation Religion). b) Its positive task is the foundation of political unity. The civil religion is supposed to create the inner coherence of a community, at least strengthen it and thus preserve it. VsRousseau: The criticism associated with the civil religion Höffe I 280 of the Christian Church has led to condemnations of Rousseau and his expulsion. HöffeVsRousseau: Concerns also arise systematically. For the civil religion tolerates neither atheists, whom Locke already denied the ability to be good citizens, nor the deism spread in the Age of Enlightenment, for example by Voltaire, according to which there is a deity, but he is not a person and does not intervene in the course of nature. Neutrality/RousseauVsSpinoza: Spinoza's position of a religiously neutral state is perhaps not considered by Rousseau because he doubts its ability to achieve stable internal unity. >Religion/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, >Constitution/Spinoza. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762, IV, 8 2. Ibid. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Religious Belief | Ancient Philosophy | Adorno XIII Religious Belief/Antiquity/Adorno: the more unconditioned the violence of the great states gets, that is, first the Alexandrian in Hellenism and then the Roman Empire, the more is the privacy left to the arbitrariness of the individual, as far as it does not directly influence the state. The substantial unity between the objective religion and the consciousness-contents of the individual is already torn in this period, and consequently forms a problem for all thinkers of that epoch. E.g. >Epicurus. --- Taureck I 43 Religion/Antiquity: According to Athenian law, the person who worshiped gods other than those of the city was already considered to be an atheist. >God/Plato, >God/Aristotle. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Representation (Presentation) | Freud | Ricoeur I 108 Presentation/presenting/Freud/Ricoeur: Freud considers the preference for representation in dream work to be the hallucinatory revival of a primal scene that really belonged to perception. Cf. >Regression/Ricoeur. There is no doubt that Freud, when he interprets the infantile scene as a real memory, must confuse fantasy with the memory image of a real perception; the topical regression is then a regression to perception, and the actual dimension of the imaginary is missed (...) the formal regression, which characterizes the "representation", i.e. the regression of the logical to the pictorial, [poses] a problem analogous to condensation and displacement: the representation is also a "distortion", consequently an inhibition of direct expression, the forced substitution of one mode of expression by another. In all three cases - condensation, displacement and presentation - the dream is therefore a work. Therefore, the interpretation corresponding to them is also a work which, in order to become a theme, requires a mixed language, neither purely linguistic nor purely energetic. >Symbol/Freud. Ricoeur I 112 Dream/Freud: (...) the representation is problematic, and Freud has created a whole metapsychology of >regression to accommodate it; symbolisation is not problematic because in symbolism the work has already been done elsewhere; the dream uses symbolism, it does not elaborate it. >Symbol/Freud. We now understand why the dreamer finds no memory in his typical dreams: in his dream he has used only, as a common saying, symbolic fragments that have become commonplace, worn out by use, phantoms that he has animated for a moment; (...). |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Republic | Montesquieu | Gaus I 170 Republic/Montesquieu/Dagger: A prudent republic will (...) be a small one. That, at least, has been the conclusion - or presumption - of many republicans throughout the centuries. Montesquieu: 'In a large republic,' Montesquieu explained in The Spirit of the Laws, 'the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. In a small one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive and consequently less protected' (1989(1): 124 [Book VII], ch. 161). United states/Dagger: So widespread was this view in the late eighteenth century that the American authors of the Federalist found it necessary to point out that Montesquieu had also allowed for the possibility of a 'federal' or 'CONFEDERATE' (Federalist 9) republic. Even then, the debate over the proposed Constitution often turned on the question of whether the United States would become a 'federal' or a 'compound' republic - that is, a republic comprising 13 or more smaller republics - or whether it would become a 'consolidated' republic that could not long preserve its republican character. >State, >Constitution/Montesquieu. 1. Montesquieu, C. (1989 Il 7481) The Spirit of the Laws, eds and trans. A. Cohler, B. Miller and H. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Federalist 9 Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Monte I Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu De l’esprit des lois, Paris 1748 German Edition: Vom Geist der Gesetze Stuttgart 2011 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Resource-using Activities | Rothbard | Rothbard III 944 Government Services/Rothbard: "Free" services are particularly characteristic of government. Police and military protection, firefighting, education, parks, some water supply come to mind as examples. The first point to note, of course, is that these services are not and cannot be truly free. A free good (…) would not be a good and hence not an object of human action; it would simply exist in superabundance for all. >Goods/Rothbard, >Action/Rothbard. VsResource-using activities: If a good does not exist aplenty for all, then the resource is scarce, and supplying it costs society other goods forgone. Hence it cannot be free. The resources needed to supply the free governmental service are extracted from the rest of production. Payment/taxation: Payment is made, however, not by users on the basis of their voluntary purchases, but by a coerced levy on the taxpayers. A basic split is thus effected between payment and receipt of service. This split is inherent in all government operations. Rothbard III 945 Police/school system: Many grave consequences follow from the split and from the "free" service as well. As in all cases where price is below the free-market price, an enormous and excessive demand is stimulated for the good, far beyond the supply of service available. Consequently, there will always be "shortages" of the free good, constant complaints of insuffciency, overcrowding, etc. An illustration is the perpetual complaints about police insuffciency, particularly in crime-ridden district, about teacher and school shortages in the public school system(…). Free market/Rothbard: In no area of the free market are there such chronic complaints about shortages, insuffciencies, and Iow quality service. In all areas of private enterprise, firms try to coax and persuade consumers to buy more of their product. Efficiency/Public sector/Rothbard: Where government owns and operates, on the other hand, there are invariably calls on consumers for patience and sacrifice, and problems of shortages and deficiencies continually abound.(1) Price/market: The same is true, to a lesser extent, wherever the price is under the free-market price. >Free market/Rothbard, >Government policy/Rothbard. >Rothbard III 950 Prices: Many "criteria" have been offered by writers as guides for the pricing of government services. Marginal cost: One criterion supports pricing according to "marginal cost." RothbardVs: (:..) this is hardly a criterion at all and rests on classical fallacies of price determination by costs. "Marginal" varies according to the period of time surveyed. >Marginal cost/Rothbard. Costs: And costs are not in fact static but flexible; they change according to prices and hence cannot be used as a guide to the setting of prices. Equilibrium: Moreover, prices equal average costs only in final equilibrium, and equilibrium cannot be regarded as an ideal for the real world. The market only tends toward this goal. Finally, costs of government operation will be higher than for similar operations on the free market.(2) Competition/efficiency: The ineffciencies of government operation are compounded by several other factors. (…) a government enterprise competing in an industry can usually drive out private owners, since the government can subsidize itself in many ways and supply itself with unlimited funds when desired. In cases where it cannot compete even under these conditions, it can arrogate to itself a compulsory monopoly, driving out competitors by force. This was done in the United States in the case of the post office.(3) >Competition, >Efficiency. Rothbard III 952 Calculation: (…) one cartel or one firm could not own all the means of production in the economy, because it could not calculate prices and allocate factors in a rational manner. >Calculation/Rothbard, >Factors of production/Rothbard. No government enterprise could be established on a "business basis" even i fthe desire were present. Thus, any governmental operation injects a point of chaos into the economy; and since all markets are interconnected in the economy, every governmental activity disrupts and distorts pricing, the allocation of factors, consumption/investment ratios, etc. Utility: Every government enterprise not only Iowers the social utilities ofthe consumers by forcing the allocation of funds to other ends than those desired by the public; it Iowers the utility of everyone (including the utilities of some government offcials) by distorting the market and spreading calculational chaos. 1. See Murray N. Rothbard, "Government in Business" in Essays on Liberty (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1958), IV, 186 ff. It is therefore characteristic of government ownership and "enterprise" that the consumer becomes, not a "king" to be courted, but a troublesome fellow bent on using up the "social" product. 2. Various fallacious criteria have been advanced for deciding between private and state action. One common rule is to weigh "marginal social costs" and benefits against "marginal private costs" and benefits. Apart from other flaws, there is no such entity as "society" separate from constituent individuals, so that this preferred criterion is simply meaningless. 3. See the interesting pamphlet by Frank Chodorov, The Myth of the Post ofice (Hinsdale, 111.: Henry Regnery Co., 1948). On a similar situation in England, see Frederick Millar, "The Evils of State Trading as Illustrated by the Post Offce" in Thomas Mackay, ed., A Plea for Liberty (New York: D. Appleton Co., 1891), pp. 305-25. For a portrayal of the political factors that have systematically distorted economic considerations in setting postal rates in the United States, see Jane Kennedy, "Development of Postal Rates: 1845-1955 Land Economics, May, 1957, pp. 93-112; and Kennedy, "Structure and Policy in Postal Rates," Journal of Political Economy, June, 1957, pp. 185-208. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Responsibility | Singer | I 220 Historical Responsibility/Climate Change/P. Singer: is the principle of "the polluter pays" applicable in the case of climate change? In the case of pollution, it surely is: a chemical company that emits toxins must be held accountable. In the case of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, it can be observed that it is still present after a century. In this case, however, the polluter is not easily identified on an individual basis. >Climate Change, >Climate Costs, >Justice. I 221 However, it is possible to assign percentages of pollution to countries. >Emission permits, >Emission permits trading. Problem: when it comes to centuries, states are not to be regarded as constant individuals because the political map has changed. >Generational justice. One argument: one sometimes hears the argument that industrialisation has helped the whole world to increase prosperity, why should one not also bear the environmental damage together? >Progress, >History, >Technology. Vs: the concomitant rise in international trade, however, had made greater use of the industrialized nations. >Trade, >Markets, >World Economy. I 222 Argument: one sometimes hears the argument that the nations that caused them were not aware of the harmful effects. >Nations. Singer: That's true, before the 1970s, global warming was not seriously investigated. I 223 Singer: one has to take into account the size of the population. Even if we can only apply the principle of "You destroyed it, you have to fix it" when the biggest polluter knows about it, it remains that the United States and Europe must do most to repair the damage. I 231 Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. I 232 Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: in this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. >Consequentialism. Rule Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit an offence or not to put up with any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable. >Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism/David Lyons: (D. Lyons 1965(1)): Thesis: In such cases, Rule Utilitarianism coincides with Action Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions. R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right (> categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to utilitarianism.(2) I 233 Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker 2000)(3)): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly if we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. >Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics/Glover, J. 1. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965. 2. R. M. Hare, „Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?“ Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16. 3. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000). |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Retribution | Social Psychology | Parisi I 141 Retribution/law/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Two prevalent normative theories of punishment in the legal literature are retribution (or "just deserts") and utilitarianism (specific or general deterrence, as well as incapacitation and rehabilitation) (Hart, 2008(1); Ten, 1987(2)). (...) only recently have researchers systematically investigated the psychological influence of deterrence and retribution motives on people's punishment judgments. Psychology: The results indicate an interesting division: in the abstract, people explicitly endorse utilitarian goals (e.g. successful deterrence leading to crime reduction), but when presented with a specific scenario, they consistently choose to impose retributive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008)(3). >Utilitarianism. Retribution: This evidence suggests that people are intuitive retributivists, making judgments based on intuitions about just deserts, though these intuitive judgments can sometimes be overridden by more reasoned considerations (see Carlsmith and Darley, 2008(4) for a review). Morality: At the same time, the reasoning process itself may be oriented toward retribution: when an array of different information is made available, participants are more likely to choose to obtain information about moral severity and other retributive factors, rather than information relevant to utilitarian aims (Carlsmith, 2006(5); Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002(6)). >Morality. Consequentialism: Indeed, certain consequentialist moral decisions, despite being socially approved, give rise to the inference that the agent making or carrying out the decision is of inferior moral character (Uhlmann, Zhu, and Tannenbaum, 2013)(7). >Consequentialism. Example: e,.g., deciding to sacrifice one life to save multiple lives can lead to negative character inferences about the agent, even though the decision is regarded as morally correct (Uhlmann et al., 2013)(7). Restoration: Restorative justice goals are also intuitively appealing in some cases. In contrast with retribution, restorative justice aims to repair the harm that was caused through processes in which the offender, victim, and perhaps community members determine an appropriate reparative sanction (Bazemore, 1998;(8) Braithwaite, 2002(9)). This justice goal is compatible with retribution; when given a choice, even for severe crimes, most participants choose a consequence with both retributive and restorative components over consequences that fulfill only one ofthose goals (Gromet and Darley, 2006)(10). >Justice, >Equality. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (2008). Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Ten, C. L. (1987). Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Carlsmith, K. M. (2008). "On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions." Social Justice Research 21 (2): 119-137. doi:10.1007 /sl 1211-008-OOO-X. 4. Carlsmith, K. M. and J. M. Darley (2008). "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," in Mark P. Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, 193-236. San Diego: Academic Press. 5. Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). "The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Pun- ishment." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42(4): 43 7—451. doi: 10.1016/ j.jesp.2005.06.007. 6. Carlsmith, K. M., J. M. Darley, and P. H. Robinson (2002). "Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Desserts as Motives for Punishment." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.103 7/0022-3514.83.2.284. 7. Uhlmann, E. L., L. (Lei) Zhu, and D. Tannenbaum (2013). "When It Takes a Bad Person to Do the Right Thing." Cognition doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.005. 8. Bazemore, G. (1998). "Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration." American Behavioral Scientist 41(6): 768-813. doi:10.1177/0002764298041006003. 9. Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. 10. Gromet, D. M. and J. M. Darley (2009). "Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals." Law and society Review 43(1): 1-38. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Rights | Consequentialism | Gaus I 107 Rights/Consequentialism/Gaus: L. W. Sumner (1987)(1) presents an especially influential consequentialist case for rights. Sumner recognizes the paradoxical air of a thoroughly consequentialist argument for rights: in so far as the consequentialist seeks to maximize achievement of a certain goal, and rights are a constraint on the ways goals are achieved, it looks as if the consequentialist must argue that the best way to achieve the goal is to constrain our efforts to achieve it. The key to resolving this paradox, says Sumner, is to distinguish consequentialism as a theory of moral justification from the preferred theory of moral decision-making (1987(1): 179) or, we might say, consequentialism as a theory of evaluation from a theory of deliberation. This argument for rights consequentialism (or, more generally, rule consequentialism) argues that there is no easy transition from the claim that the right action is that which maximizes good consequences to the claim that the best decision procedure is to perform that action which one thinks has the best consequences. Sidgwick: This type of argument was advanced by Sidgwick (1962(2): 489), who accepted that utilitarianism may be self-effacing, in the sense that it could instruct us not to encourage its use as a theory for making decisions. It may be better, he argued, if many people are guided by common sense morality. >Rights/Utilitarianism. VsSidgwick/VsSumner: Two problems confront such a view. 1) First, it is often not realized that rule utilitarianism puts more, not less, computational burdens on those devising the system of rules. 2) Second, by divorcing utilitarianism as a standard of evaluation from its role as a standard of deliberation, we invite the sort of moral elitism that attracted Sidgwick: perhaps hoi polloi should be restricted to non-utilitarian reasoning, but the class of excellent calculators may be able to better promote utility by employing utilitarianism as a method of deliberation (1962(2): 489ff). Drawing inspiration from Sidgwick, Robert E. Goodin (1995(3): ch. 4) has recently defended ‘government house’ utilitarianism, which casts utilitarianism as a ‘public philosophy’ to be employed by policy-makers, rather than a guide to individual conduct. 1. Sumner, L. W. (1987) The Moral Foundations of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Goodin, Robert E. (1995) Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rights | Sumner | Gaus I 107 Rights/Consequentialism/Sumner/Gaus: L. W. Sumner (1987)(1) presents an especially influential consequentialist case for rights. Sumner recognizes the paradoxical air of a thoroughly consequentialist argument for rights: in so far as the consequentialist seeks to maximize achievement of a certain goal, and rights are a constraint on the ways goals are achieved, it looks as if the consequentialist must argue that the best way to achieve the goal is to constrain our efforts to achieve it. The key to resolving this paradox, says Sumner, is to distinguish consequentialism as a theory of moral justification from the preferred theory of moral decision-making (1987(1): 179) or, we might say, consequentialism as a theory of evaluation from a theory of deliberation. This argument for rights consequentialism (or, more generally, rule consequentialism) argues that there is no easy transition from the claim that the right action is that which maximizes good consequences to the claim that the best decision procedure is to perform that action which one thinks has the best consequences. Sidgwick: This type of argument was advanced by Sidgwick (1962(2): 489), who accepted that utilitarianism may be self-effacing, in the sense that it could instruct us not to encourage its use as a theory for making decisions. It may be better, he argued, if many people are guided by common sense morality. >Rights/Utilitarianism. VsSidgwick/VsSumner: Two problems confront such a view. 1) First, it is often not realized that rule utilitarianism puts more, not less, computational burdens on those devising the system of rules. 2) Second, by divorcing utilitarianism as a standard of evaluation from its role as a standard of deliberation, we invite the sort of moral elitism that attracted Sidgwick: perhaps hoi polloi should be restricted to non-utilitarian reasoning, but the class of excellent calculators may be able to better promote utility by employing utilitarianism as a method of deliberation (1962(2): 489ff). >Utilitarian Liberalism/Goodin. 1. Sumner, L. W. (1987) The Moral Foundations of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rights | Utilitarianism | Gaus I 106 Rights/Utilitarianism/Gaus: Utilitarians, or more broadly, consequentialists, have spent a good deal of effort investigating in what ways personal rights might enter into a utilitarian system. Sen (1990)(1) offers a version of consequentialism that takes rights satisfaction as part of the utility of a state of affairs (cf. Scanlon, 1977(2); Nozick, 1974(3): 166). Mill’s complicated utilitarianism – which seems to integrate rules into the concept of a morality – has often been used as a model for utilitarian rights (Lyons, 1978(4); Frey, 1984(5)) (...). Russell Hardin (1988(6); 1993) has advocated an ‘institutional utilitarianism’ that takes account of knowledge problems in designing utilitarian institutions, which he offers as an alternative to both act and rule utilitarianism. According to Hardin, ‘[w]e need an institutional structure of rights or protections because not everyone is utilitarian or otherwise moral and because there are severe limits to our knowledge of others, whose interests are therefore likely to be best fulfilled in many ways if they have substantial control over the fulfillment.’ Gaus I 107 That, he adds, ‘is how traditional rights should be understood’ (1988(6): 78). >Rights/Consequentialism. 1. Sen, Amartya K. (1990) ‘Rights consequentialism’. In Jonathan Glover, ed., Utilitarianism and its Critics. London: Macmillan, 111–18. 2. Scanlon, Thomas (1977) ‘Rights, goals and fairness’. Erkenntnis, 11 (May): 81–95. 3. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic. 4. Lyons, David (1978) ‘Mill’s theory of justice’. In A. I. Goldman and J. Kim, eds, Values and Morals. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1–20. 5. Frey, R. G. (1984) ‘Act-utilitarianism, consequentialism and moral rights’. In R. G. Frey, ed., Utility and Rights. Oxford: Blackwell, 61–95. 6. Hardin, Russell (1988) Morality within the Limits of Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 601 Rights/Utilitarianism: for utilitarianism, maximising the overall well-being is the central objective. Rights, for example in the form of ownership guarantees, can also benefit the overall welfare. It can never be excluded that sacrificing fundamental individual interests of individuals or groups could increase the overall benefit. DworkinVsUtilitarianism: Rights always protect the individual with reference to fundamental and central interests.(1) >Utilitarianism/Dworkin, >Utilitarianism. 1.cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Robustness | Minsky | I 194 Robustness/resilience/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: Most machines that people build stop working when their parts break down. Isn't it amazing that our minds can keep on functioning while they're making changes in themselves? How could anything be so robust? Here are some possibilities: Duplication: It is possible to design a machine so that every one of its functions is embodied in several duplicated agents, in different places. Self-Repair: Many of the body's organs can regenerate — that is, they can replace whichever parts are lost to injury or disease. However, brain cells do not usually share this ability. Consequently, healing cannot be the basis of much of the brain's robustness. ((s) Cf. >Brain/McGinn: the brain has a theory of the brain.) Distributed Processes: It is possible to build machines in which no function is located in any one specific place. Instead, each function is spread out over a range of locations, so that each part's activity contributes a little to each of several different functions. Accumulation: Consider any learning-scheme that begins by using the method of accumulation — in which each agent tends to accumulate a family of subagents that can accomplish that agent's goals in several ways. Later, if any of those subagents become impaired, their supervisor will still be able to accomplish its job, because other of its subagents will remain to do that job, albeit in different ways. >Software-Agents/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Satisfiability | Tarski | Berka I 482 Satisfiability/Tarski: depends only on those terms of the sequence from which (with respect to their indices) correspond to the free variables of propositional functions. >Sequences/Tarski, >Propositional functions. In the case of a statement (without free variables) the satisfiability does not depend on the properties of the links. >Statements. Each infinite sequence of class satisfies a given true statement - (because it does not contain free variables). >Free variables, >Bound variables. False statement: satisfied by no sequence - variant: satisfiability by finite sequences: according to this view, only the empty sequence satisfies a true statement (because this one has no variables). Berka I 483 Satisfiability/sequences/statements/Tarski: (here: by finite sequences): E.g. the statement (not propositional function) L1U2l1,2. i.e. "PxlNPxllNIxlxll" according to Definition 22 (satisfiability) satisfies the propositional function L1,2 those and only those sequences f of classes for which f1 Being satisfied/satisfiability/Tarski: previously ambiguous because of relations of different linking numbers or between object and classes, or areas of different semantic categories - therefore actually an infinite number of different satisfiability-concepts - Problem: then no uniform method for construction of the concept of the true statement - solution: recourse to the class calculus: Satisfiability by succession of objects.(1) >Truth definition, >Truth theory, >Class calculus. 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Say’s Law | Say | Rothbard II 27 Say’s Law of markets/Say/Rothbard: ‘Overproduction’ means production in excess of consumption: that is, production is too great in general compared to consumption, and hence products cannot be sold in the market. If production is too large in relation to consumption, then obviously this is a problem of what is now called ‘market failure’, a failure which must be compensated by the intervention of government. Intervention would have to take one or both of the following forms: reduce production, or artificially stimulate consumption. The American New Deal in the 1930s did both, with no success in relieving the alleged problem. Production can be reduced, as in the case of the New Deal, by the government's organizing compulsory cartels of business to force a cut in their output. >Interventions. Say understandably reacted in horror to this analysis and to the prescription.14 In the first place, he pointed out, the wants of man are unlimited, and will continue to be until we achieve genuine general superabundance - a world marked by the prices of all goods and services falling to zero. But at that point there would be no problem of finding consumer demand, or, indeed, Rothbard II 28 any economic problem at all. There would be no need to produce, to work, or to worry about accumulating capital, and we would all be in the Garden of Eden. Thus Say postulates a situation where all costs of production are at last reduced to zero: ‘in which case, it is evident there can no longer be rent for land, interest upon capital, or wages on labour, and consequently, no longer any revenue to the productive classes’.(1) What will happen then? But if there can be no general overproduction short of the Garden of Eden, then why do businessmen and observers so often complain about a general glut? In one sense, a surplus of one or more commodities simply means that Rothbard II 29 too little has been produced of other commodities for which they might exchange. Looked at in another way, since we know that an increased supply of any product lowers its price, then if any unsold surplus of one or more goods exists, this price should fall, thereby stimulating demand so that the full amount will be purchased. There can never be any problem of ‘overproduction’ or ‘underconsumption’ on the free market because prices can always fall until the markets are cleared. Rothbard II 30 Costs/SayRothbard: A rise of factor productivity means a lowering of cost. But this means that an increase in output will not only lower selling price; it will also lower costs, so there is no reason to assume grievous losses or even a lessening of profit if prices fall. Rothbard II 33 Say’s Law/KeynesVsSay/Rothbard: Keynes made a denunciation of Say's law the centrepiece of his system. In stating it, Keynes badly vulgarized and distorted the law, leaving out the central role of price adjustments*, and had the law saying simply that total spending on output will equal total incomes received in production**. * By leaving out three important sentences in his quotation from John Stuart Mill's summary of Say's law, Keynes omits any hint of the price system as equilibrating force. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p. 18. On this point, see Hazlitt, op. cit., note 14, p. 23. 18. **Keynes also summed up Say's law as holding that ‘supply creates its own demand’ – a formulation followed by virtually all economists since Keynes, including Schumpeter, Mark Blaug, Thomas Sowell and Axel Leijonhufvud. As Professor Hutt writes, in correcting this distortion: ‘But the supply of plums does not create the demand for plums. And the word “creates” is injudicious. What the law really asserts is that the supply of plums constitutes demand for whatever the supplier is destined to acquire in exchange for the plums under barter, or with the money proceeds in a money economy’. W.H. Hutt, A Rehabilitation of Say's Law (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974), p. 3 and 3n. 1. Say, Jean-Baptiste. Traité d’Economie Politique, Paris 1803. Mause I 41 Say's Law/Jean-Baptiste Say: Say became known above all by "Say's Law" that was named after him.(1) Say thesis: Supply and demand inevitably balance each other out: In particular, there can be no oversupply, as each supply creates its own demand through the income generated by production. Any imbalances within individual sectors would be quickly compensated by the pressure of competition and did not pose a fundamental problem. Above all, this "law" served for more than one hundred years to justify the abstinence from economic theory and economic policy. >Supply, >Demand, >Equilibrium, >Markets, >Economic cycle, >Interventions. 1. Say, Jean-Baptiste. Traité d’Economie Politique, Paris 1803, S. 153. |
EconSay I Jean-Baptiste Say Traité d’ Economie Politique Paris 1803 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Self-Love | Aristotle | Höffe I 59 Self-love/Aristoteles/Höffe: In the course of the detailed treatise on friendship, Aristotle addresses the question of who one should love most, oneself or another.(1) Only at first glance is the answer surprising: the good man should love himself, the bad man should not. For Aristotle's argument is convincing: because the good man acts morally, he benefits himself and others at the same time; he stands up for his friends and his community; he sacrifices money, if necessary, even his life. The evil one, on the other hand, follows his bad passions, thereby harming both himself and his neighbor. Consequently, only with the good man does one's own happiness form a unity with the happiness of others, and the friend becomes an "other self". At the same time, Aristotle solves a basic problem of Eudaimonism, like someone who commits himself to the principle of happiness but is nevertheless able to be an altruist: He can because he makes friendships Höffe I 60 "in the name of happiness" that go far beyond his own benefit. >Friendship/Aristotle, >Community/Aristotle, >Oikos/Aristotle, >Family/Aristotle. 1.Nicomachian ethics, VII and IX. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Significance | Beck-Bornholdt | I 47 Def Significance/Statistics/Beck-Bornholt: a result is considered to be significant if the probability that it is an incidental finding is not greater than 5% - arbitrary (but internationally recognized). - The threshold should be lowered -> four-field test: Determines how likely it is that we suspect differences where none exist. I 48 The chase after significance leads to new errors. - Significant results may be inconsequential. - Error: testing until a desired result comes out. I 116 Those who do not find a significant difference do not prove that there is no difference. >Disctinctions. I 113 Statistics/Clinical Trials/Number/Significance: in a study with few patients major differences can only be confirmed or refuted. >Statistics, >Probability, >Probability theory. I 114 Problem: with a high caseload in the end everything is significant, but not necessarily interesting. >Relevance. I 237 Significance/Statistics/Beck-Bornholt: the fixed level of significance should depend on what consequences a possible error has - e.g. an umbrella with 95% reliability is okay, a parachute is not. |
Beck-B I Hans-Peter Beck-Bornholdt Hans-Hermann Dubben Der Hund, der Eier legt. Erkennen von Fehlinformation durch Querdenken Reinbek 2001 |
| Society | Singer | I 5 Society/relativism/ethics/P. Singer: Thesis: Ethics is not dependent on the society in which we live. It is true, though, if we accept the consequentialism that actions can be assessed differently in one situation than in another because of their consequences. But this does not open the door to any relativism. The overriding goal is "Do what increases happiness and reduces suffering". >Utilitarianism, >Preferential utilitarianism, >Ethics, >Consequentialism, >Relativism, >Culture, >Cultural relativism. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Sociology of Knowledge | Habermas | IV 210 Sociology of knowledge/Habermas: The reproduction of the lifeworld essentially consists in a continuation and renewal of tradition, which moves between the extremes of the mere continuation of, and a break with traditions. In the phenomenological tradition that goes back to Husserl and Alfred Schütz, the theory of society, which is based on such a culturally shortened concept of the world of life, consequently merges into the sociology of knowledge. >Cultural tradition, >Tradition. This applies, for example, to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. >Life world, >E. Husserl, >Phenomenology. IV 211 Sociology of knowledge/Berger/Habermas: Berger and Luckmann declare their theory "of the social construction of reality" as follows: Thesis: Reality is socially constructed and sociology of knowledge has to investigate the processes in which this happens.(1) HabermasVsSociology of Knowledge/HabermasVsBerger/HabermasVsLuckmann: the one-sidedness of the culturalist concept of life becomes clear as soon as we take into account that communicative action is not only a process of understanding, that the actors, by communicating about something in a world, simultaneously participate in interactions, thereby forming, confirming and renewing their belonging to social groups and their own identity. Communicative actions are not only processes of interpretation in which cultural knowledge is exposed to a "test of the world"; they also mean processes of social integration and socialization. The world of life is "tested" in a completely different way: these tests are not directly measured by claims to validity that can be criticized, not by standards of rationality, but by standards for the solidarity of relatives and for the identity of the socialized individual. While the communication participants (...) reproduce the cultural knowledge (...), they simultaneously reproduce their belonging to collectives and their own identity. >Rationality. 1.P.L.Berger und Th. Luckmann, Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit, Frankfurt, 1969, S. 1. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Specialization | Rothbard | Rothbard III 96 Specialization/division of labour/Rothbard: It is clear that conditions for exchange, and therefore increased productivity for the participants, will occur where each party has a superiority in productivity in regard to one of the goods exchanged - a superiority that may be due either to better nature-given factors or to the ability of the producer. (…) the inferior producer benefits by receiving some of the products of the superior one. The latter benefits also, however, by being free to devote himself to that product in which his productive superiority is the greatest. Example: A doctor who is an excellent gardener may very well prefer to employ a hired man who as a gardener is inferior to himself, because thereby he can devote more time to his medical practice.(1) Rothbard: This important principle - that exchange may beneficially take place even when one party is superior in both lines of production - is known as the law of association, the law of comparative costs, or the law of comparative advantage. >Comparative Advantage, >Division of labour/Rothbard. Rothbard III 153 Stock keeping/production/market/Rothbard: The size of the stock of any good depends on the rate at which the good has been and is being produced. And since human wants for most goods are continuous, the goods that are worn out through use must constantly be replaced by new production. An analysis of the rate of production and its determinants is thus of central importance in an analysis of human action. (…) while any one individual can at different times be both a buyer and a seller of existing stock, in the production of that stock there must be specialization. The initial sales of any new stock will all be made by original producers of the good. The old stock will be sold by: Rothbard III 154 (a) original producers who through past reservation demand had accumulated old stock; (b) previous buyers who had bought in speculative anticipation of reselling at a higher price; and (c) previous buyers on whose value scales the relative utility of the good for their direct use has fallen. Demand: The market demand schedule at any time consists of the sum of the demand schedules of: (a) Buyers for direct use, (b) Speculative buyers for resale at a higher price. Goods: Since the good consists of equally serviceable units, the buyers are necessarily indifferent as to whether it is old or new stock that they are purchasing. If they are not, then the “stock” refers to two different goods, and not the same good. Rothbard III 155 Stock: The only reason for a producer to reserve, to hold on to, any of his stock is speculative - in anticipation of a higher price for the good in the future. (In direct exchange, there is also the possibility of exchange for a third good (…). Rothbard III 156 Value/use value: If the speculative elements are also excluded from the demand schedule, it is clear that this schedule will be determined solely by the utility of the good in direct use (as compared with the utility of the sale-good). The only two elements in the value of a good are its direct use-value and its exchange-value, and the demand schedule consists of demand for direct use plus the speculative demand in anticipation of reselling at a higher price. Rothbard III 157 If we exclude the latter element (e.g., at the equilibrium price), the only ultimate source of demand is the direct use-value of the good to the purchaser. If we abstract from the speculative elements in a market, therefore, the sole determinant of the market price of the stock of a good is its relative direct use-value to its purchasers. Entrepreneurship/Rothbard: The key consideration is that the demand schedules, and consequently the future prices, are not and can never be definitely and automatically known to the producers. They must estimate the future state of demand as best they can. 1. Kenneth E. Boulding, Economic Analysis (Ist ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1941), p. 30; also ibid., pp. 22-32. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Spinoza | Höffe | Höffe I 238 Spinoza/Höffe: If one pays attention to the first reactions, one must consider Spinoza's advocacy for freedom a failure. Höffe I 239 The author is even accused of the greatest spiritual crime of the time: atheism. "Consequently", its dissemination is (...) prohibited. LeibnizVsSpinoza: Even the "prince of the Enlightenment", Leibniz, in a letter to the law teacher and philosopher Christian Thomasius, considers the book to be "unbearably free-thinking", but before he knows who the author is. After-effect/History of Effects: Beginning with Lessing, then Herder, Goethe and Mendelssohn, German authors appreciate Spinoza, but will base their work primarily, often even exclusively, on ethics. Both Kant and German idealism deal intensively with Spinoza. The high esteem with which the post-idealists Schopenhauer and Nietzsche regarded Spinoza continues among the great German sociologists at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) and Georg Simmel (1858-1918), as well as Werner Sombart (1863-1941). Cf. entries for >Spinoza. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Spirit | Idealism | Adorno XIII 79 Spirit/idealism/Adorno: the spirit is limited in the Kantian formulation, but absolute in the following idealists. This difference is so much a matter of the whole that every single concept, which occurs in these philosophies, changes. >I. Kant, >Absolute Mind, >G.W.F. Hegel, >Spirit/Fichte. Given/idealism/Adorno: in the case of the consequent idealists, the given, which is actually given by Kant, is itself derived. >Given. Infinite/idealism/Adorno: these idealists have ultimately taken the infinite into philosophy, with the immense consequence that the thinking of the finite human being, assuming itself as a thinking of the Infinite, presumed to be able to set the Absolute out of itself and to derive it from itself. >Infinity, >Absoluteness. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| State (Polity) | Gender Theory | Gaus I 278 State/Gender theory/Mottier: Initially, as Waylen (1998)(1) points out, gender theorists tended to view the state in primarily negative terms. Socialists: Socialist feminists in particular integrated the oppression of women within the Marxist perspective. They consequently saw the state as an instrument of domination in the hands of the ruling class, and emphasized the importance of the role of women in the reproduction of the workforce within the family for the development of capitalism. Radical feminism: like socialist feminists, radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon also conceptualized the liberal state as a monolithic entity which institutionalizes the interests of dominant groups, particularly through the law; only this time the latter were not the bourgeois classes described by Marxist theorists but the category of male citizens. The liberal legal system, mainstream politics and the state were seen as instruments of the subordination of women to men, and of the legitimization of male interests as the general interest. As MacKinnon put it, 'liberal legalism is thus a medium for making male dominance both invisible and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the same time as it enforces that view on society' (1989(2): 237). Institutionalization: within these approaches, the state was perceived above all as a patriarchal instrument which institutionalizes and reproduces male domination. From the late 1980s, such an understanding of the state has been challenged by a number of alternative perspectives. The latter question, 1) (...) whether the impact of the state on gender relations should be conceptualized in negative terms only; and 2) (...) whether the state is adequately theorized as a homogeneous actor. Ad 1): >Welfare state/Gender theory, Ad 2): >State/Poststructuralism. 1. Waylen, Georgina (1998) 'Gender, feminism and the state: an overview'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 1—17. 2. MacKinnon, Catharine (1989) Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Hegel | Mause I 47 State/society/Hegel: Hegel reconstructs the relationship between the social order of the market and the political order of the constitutional-monarchical state within the framework of a theory of modern "morality" (1), which he describes on the basis of the three institutionalized spheres of socialization and action of "family", "bourgeois society" and "state"(2). I 48 Bourgeois society/Hegel: Hegel describes this as the "state of need and understanding"(3), which he distinguishes from the "state" as the "reality of the moral idea"(4), that is, from the "state" of the third section of morality.(5) HegelVsRousseau: Hegel reconstructs the monarchical-constitutional state as a supraindividual moral communication and meaning context and thus reconstructs the Republican primacy of politics over the economy. MarxVsHegel, State/Marx. Brocker I 794 State/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: instead of understanding the moral sphere of the state as an intersubjective relationship of reciprocal acts of recognition, Hegel treats the state in his later writings as if it were always an existing entity before all interaction. >Intersubjectivity/Hegel. Consequently, it is only the vertically conceived relationships that the individuals maintain "to the higher authority of the state" as "the embodiment of the mental", "which in its approach suddenly assume the role that certain, highly demanding forms of mutual recognition should have played in a concept of moral recognition theory".(6) Solution/HonnethVsHegel: this results in the task of replacing Hegel's speculative categories with concepts of empirical science and thus making them Brocker I 795 "empirically controllable". (7) 1. G. W. F. Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 292. 2. Ibid. p. 307. 3. Ibid. p. 340 4. Ibid. p. 389 5. Cf. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 1986, S 261-264. 6. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 98 7. Ibid. p. 150 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 331 State/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel develops his system of political thought, the philosophy of law and state, against the background of his now expanded philosophical system(1). HegelVsKant: Against the - allegedly threatening in Kant - the danger of a purely through thought Höffe I 332 conceived construction of normative claims, the subject area of the philosophy of law and state is considerably expanded. Instead of being content with a normative theory, an a priori theory of law and justice, Hegel also focuses on motivational, social, and above all institutional factors (...). Philosophical Philosophy of Law/Hegel: "(...) the idea of the law, (...) the concept of the law and its realization becomes the object"(2). State: (...) [is the] "moral universe," [which] is to be understood as something reasonable. Freedom: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. From it Hegel wants to show how, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, he gradually attains his full, alienation-absorbing reality. >Freedom/Hegel, >Morals/Hegel, >Customs/Morality/Hegel. Höffe I 336 The culmination of morality, its synthesis, at the same time the summit of Hegel's entire philosophy of law, is the state as a "mediated by itself", which is now far more than just a state of necessity and understanding. As a community in the literal sense it is the public institution responsible for the common good, the "reality of the moral idea". Because in it freedom attains its perfect form, it is not "something arbitrary" but "supreme duty," i.e. again a categorical imperative, for man to be a member of a State. [This is a] modern, namely no longer eudaimony-based, but freedom-based way (...). Only in the living together of free and equal people can [the human] complete both his/her rational nature and his/her nature based on right and justice. >Society/Hegel. Höffe I 337 From abstract law to morality, the "idea of free will in and for itself" finally develops into the unity and truth of both moments. In it, in morality, Hegel in turn advances from the natural spirit, the "family," through the stage of separation, the "bourgeois society," to objective freedom, the "State. Within the section "the State," however, there is surprisingly, instead of a further stage, now a regression. For the opposition to free will, the full legal relations and the moral whole, is achieved already at the first stage, the "internal constitutional law". On the second stage, however, the "external constitutional law," the moral whole is exposed to chance. And the last stage is determined ambivalently with respect to free will. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 2. Ibid. § 1 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Hobbes | Höffe I 209 State/justification/legitimation/Hobbes/Höffe: Hobbes justifies the domination character of the state with the Höffe I 210 thought of the social contract: that a rule can only be legitimized by each person concerned. In his political thinking he seeks to fulfil the civilisational-political hope of the epoch, the state as guarantor of inner peace. As the inner form of the state, he believes he should justify absolute sovereignty. Problem: A state power that is not committed to either the separation of powers or fundamental rights cannot convince either argumentatively or politically. >Legitimacy, >Social contract, >Law, >Governance. VsHobbes: Consequently, Hobbes provokes sharp criticism from his contemporaries. Courtyards I 212 Philosopher’s Rule: The philosopher Hobbes does not want to rule himself. But he does expect the ruler to adopt his political views. Problem: [The] politically highly ambitious project turns out (...) to be a grandiose failure. Hobbes' first political writing, the initial reasons, predictably fuel the war. For instead of being a philosophy Höffe I 213 above the parties, it sides with the crown and against the opposing parliament. In addition, Hobbes defends the Anglican state church against both the Catholics and the Protestants who oppose a state church. [Responsible for the failure] is (...) a 'biased' diagnosis that does not see the causes of the civil war in the violation of ancestral rights. [Hobbes] goes to Paris, where he spends eleven years in exile from November 1640. >Social Contract/Hobbes, >Governance/Hobbes. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Locke | Mause I 36 State/Locke: For Locke, the purpose of the state is the protection of property. This theoretically presupposes that Locke, unlike Hobbes, already has property rights in their natural state and the latter is not per se a state of war, so that the state established by contract is preferable to the state of nature and legitimate only if the property in it is better protected than before; and this also means in particular that it must be protected from interference by the state itself under all circumstances. Höffe I 248 State/Liberalism/Locke/Höffe: Like Hobbes, Locke establishes the state from the consent of free people, from a social contract. However, he attaches importance to more than just securing peace. He also attaches importance to the separation of powers and, above all, to the three basic goods mentioned above: "life, liberty and property". In the sense of a concretising expansion, health also appears occasionally. LockeVsHobbes/LockeVsAbsolutism: Without the additional tasks of securing peace, explains Locke against Hobbes' absolutism, one would "consider people so foolish that they try to prevent what martens or Höffe I 249 foxes could do, but are happy, indeed consider it safe to be devoured by lions" (§ 93)(1). Governance/Locke: Because of its superior rank, Locke's basic goods ("life, liberty and property") could be considered basic and human rights. It is true that in the natural state everyone is entitled to them, but they are not secured there. Locke emphasizes again and again that the necessary violence for the state community that is necessary for this is ceded to a strong majority, but not to distributive and collective ones. Consequently, it is not excluded what contradicts the idea of a veritable basic and human right: that the majority of a minority restricts the rights and, as in Locke's letter of tolerance, refuses tolerance to Catholics and atheists. See >Tolerataion/Locke. Höffe I 251 Pre-contractual state: Among the obligations that prevail in Locke's pre-contractual natural state is the right, in the absence of a public authority, to punish the violation of the relevant divine and natural commandments itself. Locke sees the only way out of leaving the natural state in the establishment of a political or civil society(2). It consists in a "political body", i.e. a state-like community that receives its legitimation by the free consent of its members, rational beings, i.e. by a social contract. >Natural State/Locke, >Social Contract/Locke. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90 2. Ibid. Chap. VII |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Marsilius of Padua | Höffe I 177 State/Marsilius/Höffe: VsTwo-Kingdom-Doctrine: In a clarity and sharpness that was unknown before, (...) Marsilius not only rejects the Pope's multiple abuse of power, but far more fundamentally all his worldly claims to power and the doctrine of the two kingdoms that underlies them. Two-Kingdom-Doctrine: More than eight centuries [before Marsilius' Defensor pacis, 1324] Pope Gelasius I distinguished in his doctrine of two powers the spiritual from the worldly authority and claimed for himself as pope the primacy that no ruler conscious of himself and his office can recognize. Consequently, neither in political theory nor in political practice a coexistence free of competition and conflicts can be expected, at least a coexistence that is free of conflicts. Marsilius: The corresponding conflict especially between Ludwig of Bavaria and Pope Gregory VII will dominate Marsilius' life and thinking. Although Marsilius is no clergyman, nor does he defend papal claims, but rather rejects them to a large extent, (...) Höffe: (...) and although he deliberately renounces theological arguments in the justification of a political community, he is wise enough, to allude Höffe I 178 in the title of his writing to a name of honour, to Christ, to the Prince of Peace (princeps pacis). Community/MarsiliusVsAristotle: according to Aristotle, the community [is] ultimately [concerned with] the good life, whereas according to Marsilius, here in the Augustinian tradition, which is already indicated by the title [defensor pacis, defender of peace], it is peace that counts. >Governance/Marsilius. Höffe I 180 Form of State/Marsilius/ Höffe: Only in a monarchy can law be effectively enforced - for Marsilius, again with Aristotle, the rule of laws is more important than that of persons - and peace can be maintained. Similar to al-Farabi and Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius, however, advocates an elective monarchy without succession(1). For it allows to determine the best regent in each case, namely one who is distinguished by prudence and moral virtues, especially justice(2). Cf. >Governance/al-Farabi, >Governance/Thomas Aquinas, >State/al-Farabi. 1. Marsilius. Defensor pacis, Chap. 9 and 15—16 2. Ibid. Chap. 14, § 10 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Morris | Gaus I 197 State/Morris: Morris thesis: (...) political theorists take states too much for granted. The world was not always organized as a system of states, and it is helpful to recall the ways the world was before the development of states. (...) it is a mistake to identify the Greek polis and the Roman civitas with our modern state as if nothing had changed. Medieval Europe: 'Political' organization in medieval Europe, in summary, was complex, and 'political' power highly fragmented and decentralized. Allegiances were multiple and largely personal, and no clear hierarchy of political authority was discernible. Governance was not territorial; it was largely rule over persons, qua individuals or qua Christians. Modern state: In the modern world, governance is territorial. Modern polities for the most part have definite and distinct territories. The territorialization of governance is not compatible with the personal nature of political relations. And it is not compatible with power being understood as the personal possession of rulers. (...) the polity, that is, the state, comes to be understood as an order distinct from its agents and institutions (...).'government'. The modern use of 'state' to refer to a public order distinct from both ruled and ruler, with highly centralized institutions wielding power over inhabitants of a defined territory, seems to date back no earlier than the sixteenth century (see Skinner, 1978(1): vol. 2, 352ff; 1989(2): 90-131; Dyson, 1980(3): 25ff; Vincent, 1987(4): 16—19). >State/Skinner. Gaus I 198 Government/rule: In the modern world rule comes to be direct; each and every subject is governed by the sovereign or the state, without mediation (see especially Tilly, 1990)(5). The development of direct rule in this sense is a late development, and it is related to the 'penetration' of society by the state stressed by Michael Mann and others: 'the modern state added routine, formalised, rationalised institutions of wider scope over citizens and territories. It penetrates its territories with both law and administration as earlier states did not' (1986(6): vol. 11, 56-7). >Sovereignty/Morris, >Authority/Morris. Gaus I 199 (...) we may think of the state in terms of a number of interrelated features (Morris, 1998(7): ch. 2): 1) Continuity in time and space: (a) The modern state is a form of political organization whose institutions endure over time; in particular, they survive changes in leadership or government. (b) It is the form of political organization of a definite and distinct territory. 2) Transcendence: the modern state is a particular form of political organization that constitutes a unitary public order distinct from and superior to both ruled and rulers, one capable of agency. 3) Political organization: the institutions through which the state acts - in particular, the govemment, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the police - are differentiated from other political organizations and associations; they are formally co-ordinated one with another, and they are relatively centralized. Relations of authority are hierarchical. 4) Authority: the state is sovereign, that is, the ultimate source of political authority in its territory, and it claims a monopoly on the use of legitimate force within its territory. Gaus I 200 5) Allegiance: the state expects and receives the loyalty of its members and of the permanent inhabitants of its territory. >Authority/Morris, >Legitimacy/Morris, >Coercion/Morris, >Law/Morris, >Authority/Hart, >Sanctions/Morris. Gaus I 203 State/Morris: What must a state do to be just? A just state presumably is first of all one that respects the constraints of justice. Justice imposes constraints on the behaviour (and intentions) of persons and, presumably, institutions. We may suppose that many of these constraints take the form of (moral) rights and duties. States, then, must respect the (moral) rights of individuals and fulfil duties owed to individuals. Gaus I 204 States typically claim sovereignty and exclusive rights to use force. Individuals are not supposed to use force without the state's permission. It is often argued that states have the particular task of ensuring that we do not individually need to use force (e.g. to protect ourselves). If this is true then states may consequently have the provision of justice as one of their main tasks. We may then require of states that they respect and provide justice. Suppose that we say that a state is justified in so far as it is just (and efficient). Problem: Now it may be that no state is, or could be, thereby justified. 'Individuals have rights So strong and farreaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. How much room do individual rights leave for the states?' (Nozick, 1974(8): ix). It may be that the constraints of justice are such as to fill up all of moral space or at least leave no room for the state's exercise of its functions or even for its existence. >Natural justice. 1. Skinner, Quentin (1978) The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Skinner, Quentin (1989) 'The state'. In T. Ball, J. Farr and R. Hanson, eds, Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90_131. 3. Dyson, Kenneth H. F. (1980) The State Tradition in Western Eumpe. New York: Oxford University Press. 4. Vincent, Andrew (1987) Theories of the State. Oxford: Blackwell. 5. Tilly, Charles (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European states, AD 990-1990. Oxford: Blackwell. 6. Mann, Michael (1986) The Sources of Social Power, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Morris, Christopher W. (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Poststructuralism | Gaus I 278 State/Poststructuralism/Gender Theory/Mottier: poststructuralist research. Feminists who draw on poststructuralist (especially Foucauldian) theories argue that it is problematic to consider the state as an homogeneous, unitary entity which pursues specific interests. They consider the state as a plurality of arenas of struggle, rather than as unified actors (...). Consequently, poststructuralist analyses of the state introduce less dichotomous perspectives which take into account the local, diverse and dispersed nature of sites of gender power (see, for example, Pringle and Watson, 1992)(1). They consider feminist attempts to define what 'women's interests' might be by authors such as Virginia Sapiro (1981)(2) and Irene Diamond and Nancy Hartsock (1981)(3) as problematic, since these treat as pre-given both the state and the notion of interests. Drawing on poststructuralist theory, R. Pringle and S. Watson point out that the analytical focus needs to shift instead to the discursive practices which construct specific interests, including Gaus I 279 those by femocrats. Comparative research has similarly led to scepticism towards a vision of the state and its role in structuring gender relations that is too unilateral. Comparative analyses of welfare states suggest that the impact of the state on gender relations varies greatly from one welfare regime to another, and importantly allow for the universalizing of the experience of individual states to be avoided (Sainsbury, 1994(4); Lewis, 1997(5); Fraser and Gordon, 1994(6)). >State/Gender Theory, >State/Feminism, >Welfare state/Gender Theory. It is important to recognize that relations between the state and gender are not intrinsically positive or negative. Feminist analyses of the state need to take into account its historical complexity, its variations within different political contexts such as liberal democracy, colonialism or state socialism, and its dynamic relationship to gendered power relations (Waylen, 1998(7): 7). 1. Pringle, R. and S. Watson (1992) '"Women's interests" and the poststructuralist state'. In Michele Barrett and Anne Phillips, eds, Destabilising Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates. Cambridge: Polity, 53—73. 2. Sapiro, Virginia (1981) 'When are women's interests interesting? The problem of political representation of women'. The American Political Science Review, 75 (3): 701-16. 3. Diamond, Irene and Nancy Hartsock (1981) 'Beyond interests in politics: a comment on Virginia Sapiro's "When are interests interesting? The problem of political representation of women'". The American Political Science Review, 75: 717-21. 4. Sainsbury, Diane (1994) 'Women's and men's social rights: gendering dimensions of welfare states'. In Diane Sainsbury, ed., Gendering Welfare States. London: Sage, 150—69. 5. Lewis, Jane (1997) 'Gender and welfare regimes: further thoughts'. Social Politics, 4 (2): 160-77. 6. Fraser, Nancy and Linda Gordon (1994) 'A genealogy of dependency: tracing a keyword of the U.S. welfare state'. Signs, 19 (2, Winter): 309-36. 7. Waylen, Georgina (1998) 'Gender, feminism and the state: an overview'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 1—17. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Republicanism | Gaus I 170 State/republicanism/Dagger: A prudent republic will (...) be a small one. That, at least, has been the conclusion - or presumption - of many republicans throughout the centuries. Montesquieu: 'In a large republic,' Montesquieu explained in The Spirit of the Laws, 'the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. In a small one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive and consequently less protected' (1989(1): 124 [Book VII], ch. 161). United states/Dagger: So widespread was this view in the late eighteenth century that the American authors of the Federalist found it necessary to point out that Montesquieu had also allowed for the possibility of a 'federal' or 'CONFEDERATE' (Federalist 9) republic. Even then, the debate over the proposed Constitution often turned on the question of whether the United States would become a 'federal' or a 'compound' republic - that is, a republic comprising 13 or more smaller republics - or whether it would become a 'consolidated' republic that could not long preserve its republican character. Vs: Some scholars have taken disagreements about the proper size of a republic to mark one way in which modern republicans have diverged from the path of classical republicanism. According to this view (Pangle, 1988(3); Rahe, 1992(4); Zuckert, 1994(5)), the truly classical republicans of ancient Greece saw civic virtue as desirable because it protected and preserved the polis in which the highest virtues could be cultivated (....). VsVs: By contrast, modern republicans, who stem from Machiavelli, are willing to accept representative government and large polities because of their conception of virtue, which allows for commerce and acquisitiveness, and their concern for natural rights. >Republic/Political Philosophy. 1. Montesquieu, C. (1989 Il 7481) The Spirit of the Laws, eds and trans. A. Cohler, B. Miller and H. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Federalist 9 3. Pangle, Thomas (1988) The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Rahe, Paul (1992) Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 5. Zuckert, Michael (1994) Natural Rights and the New Republicanism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Strength of Theories | Nozick | II 207 stronger/weaker/Nozick: the negation of the consequent is much stronger than the negation of the antecedent. >Stronger/weaker. II 270 Stronger/weaker: the weaker the hypothesis, the stronger the negation. >Hypotheses, >Negation. II 271 Strongest form of an assertion: at the same time the most neneral. ((s) i.e. that it covers most cases, but not that it ascribes the most predicates.) >Predication, >Ascription, >Identification, >Generality, >Generalization. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Superhuman | Nietzsche | Ries II 60/61 Superhuman/Nietzsche: turns the night of the darkness of God into the sun. The doctrine of the superhuman is the prerequisite for the doctrine of eternal return, because only the human who has overcome himself can want the eternal return of all who exist! The superman is the great justification of existence. Karl Löwith: Overcoming Nihilism. >Eternal return/Nietzsche, >Nihilism/Nietzsche. --- Danto III 238 Superhuman/Nietzsche/Danto: The historical Zoroaster regarded the world as the scene of a violent conflict between the cosmic powers of good and evil. Because Nietzsche was 'beyond good and evil', he did not believe in this cosmology of Zend-Awesta. But since Nietzsche's Zarathustra was the first to mistakenly understand moral values as objective characteristics of the world, he should also be the first to correct the error and speak out in favour of the new philosophy.(1) >Terminology/Nietzsche. Consequently, Nietzsche chose him as his 'son' and as the literary persona through which his philosophy should be articulated. Zarathustra proclaimed the relativity of all values and morals, claiming that so far each people has given themselves their own tabular chart of goods according to their own living conditions. Zarathustra: "I teach you the superhuman! The superhuman is the sense of the earth."(2) Danto III 239 With the exception of the Zarathustra, the idea of superhumans is rarely found in Nietzsche. Not even in the Zarathustra is a more detailed description offered. Superhuman: is opposed to what Nietzsche calls the 'last human', who should and wants to be as much as possible like everyone else, and if he is happy, then only for the sake of being happy: We have invented happiness, say the last people and blink.(3) Zarathustra: opposes the notion of the alleged immutability of human nature. The human is something that must be overcome. Danto III 240 Danto: Nietzsche's sister, ((s) Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche) assured Hitler that he was what her brother had in mind as a superhuman. Danto III 241 Superhuman/Nietzsche: it is pointless to look for examples in the past. >History/Nietzsche. Danto III 242 Danto: his hints say nothing else but that we should control our affective as well as our intellectual life and not deny one thing for the sake of the other, and that we should not be petty and 'merely' human. It is not without irony that Nietzsche proves least originality where he was most influential. Superhuman/Nietzsche/Danto: is not the blonde giant who dominates his inferior companions. He is merely a joyful, innocent and unbound human being who has his instinctive, not overwhelming instincts in his power. In addition, from Nietzsche can seldomly be heard concrete words. When he writes in Ecce homo, he would rather be found in Cesare Borgia than in Parsifal(4), then he does not say that Cesare Borgia was a superhuman. There is also something of Nietzsche's critique of Wagner (NietzscheVsWagner). >Music/Nietzsche, >Art/Nietzsche. Danto III 243 Superhuman/Darwinismus/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche seems to have believed that the ideal of superhumanity is not achieved or realized by itself, through the natural course of events. In this respect, his doctrine is anything but Darwinian. 1. F. Nietzsche Ecce homo, KGW VI. 3, p. 236. 2. F. Nietzsche Zarathustra, I, KGW VI, 1, p. 8. 3. Ibid. p. 13. 4. F. Nietzsche Ecce homo, KGW VI. 3, p. 298. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Symmetries | Feynman | L 159 Def Symmetry/Weyl: a thing is symmetrical, if it can be subjected to a certain operation and it then appears as exactly the same as before. Symmetry/Physics/Laws/Feynman: For example, if we move a machine, it will still work. I 726 Symmetry Operations/Physics/Feynman: Translation in space - translation in time - rotation around a fixed angle - constant speed in a straight line (Lorentz transformation) - time reversal - reflection of space - exchange of the same atoms or particles - quantum mechanical phase Matter antimatter (charge conjugation). >Time reversal. I 728 Asymmetry/Scale/Scale Change/Feynman: in the case of scale changes, the physical laws are not symmetrical! Question: will an apparatus which is re-built five times larger work in the same way? - No! E.g. The light wavelength, e.g. emitted by sodium atoms in a container, is the same when the volume quintuples. It is not made five times longer by that Consequently, the ratio of the wavelength to the size of the emitter changes. E.g. Cathedral made of matches: if it were built on a real scale, it would collapse, because enlarged matches are not strong enough. We might think that it is enough to take a larger earth (because of the same gravitation). But then it would become even worse! I 730 Symmetry/Law/Conservation Law/Quantum Mechanics: in quantum mechanics there is a corresponding conservation law for every symmetry! This is a very profound fact. The fact that the laws of translation are symmetrical in time means, in quantum mechanics, that the energy is conserved. Invariance in rotation corresponds to the conservation of the angular momentum. (In quantum mechanics). I 731 Symmetry/reflection of Space/Right/Left/Direction/Space Direction/Feynman: a clock whose every part was mirror symmetrical, would run the same way. If this was correct, however, it would be impossible to distinguish between "right" and "left" by any physical phenomenon, just as it is impossible to define an absolute speed by a physical phenomenon. The empirical world, of course, need not be symmetrical. We can define the direction in geography. But it does not seem to violate the physical laws that everything is changed from right to left. E.g. right/left: If you wanted to find out where "right" is, a good method would be to buy a screw in a hardware store. Most have legal threads. It's just a lot more likely. >Convention. I, 732 E.g. right/left: next possibility: Light turns its polarization plane when it penetrates sugar water. So we can define "right-turning". But not with artificially made sugar, only with that from living creatures. >Monod, molecular structure, right-turning/left-turning. I 733 Feynman: it looks as if the phenomena of life (with much more frequent molecules in a certain direction) allow the distinction between left/right. But that is not the case! The Schrödinger equation tells us that molecules rotating right and left behave the same physically. Nevertheless, there is only one direction in life! I 734 Conservation Law: there is no preservation of the number of right-sided molecules. Once started, evolution has increased their number and we can further multiply them. We can assume that the phenomena of life do not violate symmetry but, on the contrary, demonstrate the universal nature and the ultimate origin of all living creatures. I 737 Mirror Symmetry: is fulfilled by the laws of: electricity, gravitation, magnetism, nuclear forces. They cannot be used to define right/left! But there is a violation of symmetry in nature: the weak decay (beta decay): (1954): there is a particle, a certain cobalt isotope, which decays into three π mesons, and another one that decays into two. I 738 Def South Pole: can only be defined by cobalt isotopes: it is such that the electrons in a beta decay prefer to lead away from it. This is the only way to explain right/left unambiguously to the Martian: he gets building instructions for a beta decay in a cooled system. I 739 Parity/Law of Violation of Parity Conservation/Asymmetry/Symmetry/Feynman: only unsymmetrical law in nature: the violation only occurs with these very slow reactions: the particles that bear a spin (electron, neutrino, etc.) come out with a left-tending spin. The law combines the polar vector of a speed and the axial vector of a rotational momentum, stating that the rotational momentum is more likely to be opposite to the velocity than being parallel to it. I 742 Symmetry/Nature/Feynman: where does it come from? We don't know. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Terminology | Grice | II 36 Def M-intention/Grice: "that H intends to do this-and-that" instead of "that H does such-and-such." This is an intentional act. II 38 The candidate means that Waterloo was in 1815, but he does not intend that the teacher believes that II 44 Def #-psi/terminology/Grice: #-psi is a mode indicator that is correlated with the propositional attitude psi from a given range of propositional attitudes. H is to actively "psi" that p - Exceptions: "Do not go past the border": H himself should have the intention. III 102 R-correlation stands for: referential correlation. D-correlation stands for: denotational correlation. III 103 Difference reference/denotation: Peter's dog is an R-correlate of "Fido". Every thing with long fur is a D-correlate of "shaggy". Resulting method: for S "Fido is shaggy" means the same as "Peter’s dog has long fur". III 104 Problem: the "designated pair" between Fido/Peter's dog (not cat). What is the meaning of "designated"? III 105 The situation may be brought about accidentally where sentences mean something else - this complementary relationship can only be eliminated by the condition of the intention to make a difference. Cohen I 395 Def conversationalist hypothesis/CH/Grice: the meaning of the logical particles "~", "u", "v" and ">" is not different from the particles used in natural language. "And", "or", "if, then" and "not": where they appear inconsistent, this appearance is due to the different assumptions with which natural language utterances are usually understood. Cohen I 395ff Def semantic hypothesis (Cohen): many occurrences of logical particles in natural conversation differ from their meaning in formal contexts - although there are cases where they are consistent. Cohen I 402 Thesis: everyday languange meaning is richer than truth functional meaning. Cohen I 410 Image: "that is a tree". Assumption: it is a painted tree. Cohen I 412 Conversationalist hypothesis/Cohen: the conversationalist hypothesis assumes that the conversation implicature transmits that the antecedent is true only if the consequent is true. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Terminology | Lanier | I 29 FN Definition Noosphere/noosphere/Terminology/Lanier: a collective brain consisting of all people connected to each other on the Internet. We should resolutely oppose this idea. >Social networks, >Social media, >Internet, >Internet Culture, >Internet Law, >Internet Protocol, >Internet Security, >World Wide Web. I 30 Definition Digital Maoism/Definition Cybernetic Totalitarianism/Lanier: the victorious technological subculture. It includes people from the world of open culture, creative commons, members of the Linux community, representatives of the Artificial Intelligence approach and others. Their most popular blog are Boing Boing, Tech-Crunch and Slashdot. Their message in the old country is the magazine Wired. I 31 Their followers have no evil intentions. I 40 Definition Grey slime: tiny computers built by computers that will eat up the earth. Further development of the idea of >singularity in science. I 44 "The highest meta": Race for the highest meta: previous aggregation layers are aggregated again and again (automatically read and summarized). Cf. >ChatGPT, >Artificial Intelligence. I 89 Casual anonymity/Lanier: an effortless, inconsequential, transient anonymity at the service of an objective such as promoting an opinion that has nothing to do with one's own identity or personality. >Anonymity. I 110 Digital Maoism: does not reject hierarchies in principle. It rewards only an outstanding degree a very specific, preferred hierarchy, which is the digital meta-level, according to which a mash is more important than the sources from which the mash was squeezed. A blog from blogs is higher than a simple blog. In the cloud,"meta" is synonymous with power. Cf. >Facebook, >Blogs, >E. Morozov, >Y. Benkler, >E. Pariser, >J. Zittrain, >L. Lessig. |
Lanier I Jaron Lanier You are not a Gadget. A Manifesto, New York 2010 German Edition: Gadget: Warum die Zukunft uns noch braucht Frankfurt/M. 2012 |
| Terminology | Ryle | Geach I 94 Namely rider/Ryle/GeachVsRyle: the namely rider does not help if a sentence does not designate: e.g [The only one who has ever stolen a book of Snead] (namely Robinson) made a lot of money by selling it. We memorize from that: Robinson made a lot of money by selling it. Geach I 255 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code-style": it is misleading that p does not have to be alleged. E.g. "if p then q, but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are not statements. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. Ryle: here the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p", as the "code style" suggests, but rather a "final ticket", a "license for the conclusion": "p", therefore q. Solution/Geach: to take propositions, not allegations. --- Ryle I 58 E.g. semi disopsitional/semi episodicall: "careful", "unswerving", etc. do not have anything extra - they are a manner. I 93ff Voluntary/Ryle: the use of "voluntary" is too extended. Laughter cannot be intentional - "Voluntary" is not "responsible" for punctual schoolwork. I 97 Wrong: to define voluntariness as the child of voluntary acts. But being fully committed in the matter with the mind. I 174 f Success words: healing, proving, recognizing, knowledge, observation, can, win, solve, find - these cannot be performed incorrectly. The tendency to disease is different than habit - preference is unlike investment: (you would leave it if you would get the money like this). I 178 Belief/Ryle: belief is a motivational word. Corresponding predicates are: "stubborn", "naive" and "temporarily". These predicates are not extendable to the object but extendable to certain nouns: like e.g. "confidence", "instinct", "habit", "jealousy", "attachment" and "aversion". Knowledge: is an ability word. I 195 Mix-categorical/Ryle: e.g. act obediently, e.g. bird moves south. I 199ff Power words/task words: difference: travel/arrive - treat/heal - grab/hold - search/find - see/catch sight of - listen/hear - aim/meet - the performance here may be accidental. I 245ff Thoughtless speech/Ryle: is not frankness but that which we are most interested in. It is also not a self-explanation and does not contribute to our knowledge. I 248 One cannot answer "How do you know?". I 297 Mix-categorical: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. --- Flor I 261 Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states. Flor I 267 Defintion theme-neutral/Flor: statements are theme-neutral in which words such as "anything" or "anyone", "someone", or "something" are used. --- Sellars I 53 Defintion mixed-categorical-hypothetical/mix-categorical/Ryle: mixed-categorical are manifestations of associative connections of the word object- and of the word-word type. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Thinking | Danto | I 179 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. >I think/Kant. It would completely miss the structure of thinking to say that the various assumptions are purely coincidentally associated in his mind. Cf. >Apperception, >Apprehension, >Thinking, >Subject, >I, Ego, Self. I 307 Pavlov: associations are only external, ideas are not necessarily comboined. >Association, >Ideas, >Representation. Consequently, there are the logical links in addition to what can be causally associated with it. >Logical connectives, >Causal relation. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Third Way | Giddens | Brocker I 866 Third Way/Giddens: The theory of the "third way" unfolded in the book is conceptually, politically, and in its direction of thrust intimately linked to the politics of Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister of the time for many years, who in turn took up impulses and concepts that the Democratic President of the USA, Bill Clinton, had already introduced into the worldwide political public in the first half of the 1990s. ...It is about the consequent overcoming of the Marxist social democratic orthodoxy, which at that time still dominated and paralyzed the Labour Party (more than other social democratic parties in Europe) programmatically and in the thinking of influential parts of the membership, but also about the overcoming of the neoliberalism of the Reagan-Thatcher era, which was still dominating at that time. >Neoliberalism, >Liberalism, >Socialism, >Capitalism, >Politics, >Public sphere. I 869 He makes it clear that (...) the old socialist dogma that leftist economic policy must find its alternatives beyond the market and private property has now been completely refuted... As a consequence, social democracy of the "third way" should in future replace its old guiding concepts of equality and social justice with emancipation and inclusion. >Economic policies. Four strategies for a modern social democratic policy: 1. a policy of inclusion, 2. a new understanding of the state as a social investor, 3. a considerable enhancement of the role of civil society and 4. a cosmopolitan expansion of its political understanding as a whole. His thesis of the state as a social investor is that it should no longer (as in many milieus of traditional social democracy) realize only a weakly defined idea of equality through redistribution. Instead, through targeted social investments, he is to develop the abilities of all, especially the weaker, in a variety of ways. >Social Policy, cf. >New Social Movements. Thomas Meyer, „Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Time Reversal | Feynman | I 657 Time Reversal/Movement Reversal/Reversibility/Feynman: E.g. A movie played backwards: here entropy is not as high as you might think, since all elements have exactly the right speed to return to their starting point. >Symmetries/Feynman. Reversibility/Irreversibility/Physics/Time Inversion/Feynman: E.g. retarded electric field: t: time, r: distance from the charge: field corresponding to the acceleration at the time t r/c and not t + r/c. Consequently, it appears that the law of electricity is not reversible. Vs: but in fact Maxwell's equations are reversible! In addition, we could take the advanced field instead of the retarded field and everything goes the same way. This also means that an oscillating charge in a closed container (black body) will lead to an equilibrium. >Equations. I 729 Time Reversal/Time/Backward Movement/Film/Reversibility/Feynman: e.g. movie playing backwards: if we were able to see the individual molecules, we could not see if the machine was moving forward or backward. Nothing contradicts the physical laws. On the other hand, if we do not see all the details, it will be clearly detectable, e.g. as a forward movement. For example, if we looked at the individual atoms of an egg, we could not determine whether the egg was bursting or assembling. At the level of the individual atoms the laws look completely reversible. >Atoms/Feynman, >Natural laws. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Trade Unions | Rothbard | Rothbard III 565 Labour/unions/Rothbard: (…) there is no difference in kind between “workers” and “management.” The vice president of a company, if hired by its owners, has exactly the same amount of justification, or lack of justification, for joining a union as does a hired mechanic. Unions/Rothbard: For some reason, even the most ardent union advocate thinks absurd the idea of unionizing the vice presidents. Yet if there is no real dichotomy and all employees are labor, then our views on unions must be altered accordingly. Rothbard III 703 Labour Unions/Rothbard: It might be asserted that labor unions, in exacting higher wage rates on the free market, are achieving identifiable monopoly prices. >Monopoly price/Economic theories. For here two identifiable contrasting situations exist: (a) where individuals sell their labor themselves; and (b) where they are members oflabor unions which bargain on their labor for them. Furthermore, it is clear that while cartels, to be successful, must be economically more effcient in serving the consumer, no such justification can be found for unions. >Cartels/Rothbard. Productivity: Since it is always the individual laborer who works, and since effciency in organization comes from management hired for the task, forming unions never improves the productivity of an individual's work. >Productivity/Rothbard. Monopoly price: It is true that a union provides an identifiable situation. >Observation/Rothbard. However, it is not true that a union wage rate could ever be called a monopoly. For the characteristic of the monopolist is precisely that he monopolizes a factor or commodity. To obtain a monopoly price, he sells only part of his supply and withholds selling the other part, because selling a Iower quantity raises the price on an inelastic demand curve. >Elasticity/Rothbard. It is the unique characteristic of labor in a free society, however, that it cannot be monopolized. >Labour. Each individual is a self-owner and cannot be owned by another individual or group. Therefore, in the labor field, no one man or group can own the total supply and withhold part of it from the market. Each man owns himself. Cf. >Person/Philosophy, >Monopoly price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 705 Def Restrictionist price/wages/Rothbaard: If a union, in one way or another, achieves a higher price [wage] than its members could command by individual sales, its action is not checked by the loss of revenue suffered by the "withheld" laborers. If a union achieves a higher wage, some laborers are earning a higher price, while others are excluded from the market and lose the revenue they would have obtained. Such a higher price (wage) is called a restrictionist price. A restrictionist price, by any sensible criterion, is "worse" than a "monopoly price." Since the restrictionist union does not have to worry about the laborers who are excluded and suffers no revenue loss from such exclusion, restrictionist action is not curbed by the elasticity of the demand curve for labor. For unions need only maximize the net income of the working members, or, indeed, of the union bureaucracy itself.(1) Rothbard IIII 707 Laobur market/RothbardVsUnisions: Consequently, at best, a union can achieve a higher, restrictionist wage rate for its members only at the expense oflowering the wage rates of all other workers in the economy. Production efforts in the economy are also distorted. But, in addition, the wider the scope of union activity and restrictionism in the economy, the more diffcult it will be for workers to shift their locations and occupations to find nonunionized havens in which to work. And more and more the tendency will be for the displaced workers to remain permanently or quasi-permanently unemployed, eager to work but unable to find nonrestricted opportunities for employment. The greater the scope of unionism, the more a permanent mass of unemployment will tend to develop. >Unemployment. Degree of organisation: Unions try as hard as they can to plug all the "loop-holes" of nonunionism, to close all the escape hatches where the dispossessed workmen can find jobs. This is termed "ending the unfair competition of nonunion, Iow-wage labor." Rothbard: A universal union control and restrictionism would mean permanent mass unemployment, growing ever greater in proportion to the degree that the union exacted its restrictions (see below). Rothbard III 708 Membership: It is a common myth that only the old-style "craft" unions, which deliberately restrict their occupational group to highly skilled trades with relatively few numbers, can restrict the supply of labor. They often maintain stringent standards of membership and numerous devices to cut down the supply of labor entering the trade. This direct restriction of supply doubtless makes it easier to obtain higher wage rates for the remaining workers. Labour supply/Industrial unions: But it is highly misleading to believe that the newer-style "industrial" unions do not restrict supply. The fact that they welcome as many members in an industry as possible cloaks their restrictionist policy. Minimum wage: The crucial point is that the unions insist on a minimum wage rate higher than what would be achieved for the given labor factor without the union. By doing so, (…) they necessarily cut the number of men whom the employer can hire.(2,3) >Labour market. Ergo, the consequence of their policy is to restrict the supply of labor, while at the same time they can piously maintain that they are inclusive and democratic, in contrast to the snobbish "aristocrats" of craft unionism. Industrial unionism/Mises/Rothbard: In fact, the consequences of industrial unionism are more devastating than those of craft unionism. For the craft unions, being small in scope, displace and Iower the wages of only a few workers. The industrial unions, larger and more inclusive, depress wages and displace workers on a large scale and, what is even more important, can cause permanent mass unemployment.(4) >Strike action/Rothbard, >Economic ethics/Rothbard, >Free Market/Rothbard. Rothbard III 713 Costs/production costs/restrictionist wage: (…) a restrictionist wage raises costs of production for the firms in the industry. This means that the marginal firms in the industry - the ones whose entrepreneurs earn only a bare rent - will be driven out of business, for their costs have risen above their most profitable price on the market - the price that had already been attained. Productivity: Their ejection from the market and the general rise of average costs in the industry signify a general fall in productivity and output, and hence a loss to the consumers.(5) Unions/Rothbard: Unions are not producing organizations; they do not work for capitalists to improve production.(6) Rather they attempt to persuade workers that they can better their lot at the expense of the employer. Consequently, they invariably attempt as much as possible to establish work rules that hinder management's directives. These work rules amount to preventing management from arranging workers and equipment as it sees fit. In other words, instead of agreeing to submit to the work orders of management in exchange for his pay, the worker now sets up not only minimum wages, but also work rules without which he refuses to work. The effect of these rules is to Iower the marginal productivity of all union workers. The Iowering of marginal value-product schedules has a twofold result: (1) it itself establishes a restrictionist wage scale with its various consequences, for the marginal value product has fallen while the union insists that the wage rate remain the same; (2) consumers lose by a general Iowering of productivity and living standards. Restrictive work rules therefore also Iower output. All this is perfectly consistent with a society of individual sovereignty, however, provided always that no force is employed by the union. Rothbard III 715 Wages: Whereas wage rates on the nonunion labor market will always tend toward equilibrium in a smooth and harmonious manner, its replacement by collective bargaining leaves the negotiators with little or no rudder, with little guidance on what the proper wage rates would be. Even with both Sides trying tofind the market rate, neither of the parties to the bargain could be sure that a given wage agreement is too high, too Iow, or approximately correct. Wages/unions: Almost invariably, (…) the union is not trying to discover the market rate, but to impose various arbitrary "principles" of wage determination, such as "keeping up with the cost of living," a "living wage," the "going rate" for comparable labor in other firms or industries, an annual average "productivity" increase, "fair differentials," etc.(7) Rothbard III 715 Trade Unions/Economic theories/Rothbard: Arguments in favour of unions(8): Indeterminacy of wage rates: „(…) Wage rates are determined by marginal productivity in a zone rather than at a point; and within that zone unions have an opportunity to bargain collectively for increased wages without the admittedly unpleasant effects of unemployment or displacement of workers to poorer jobs." RothbardVs: It is curious that many writers move smoothly through rigorous price analysis until they come to wage rates, when suddenly they lay heavy stress on indeterminacy, the huge zones within which the price makes no difference, etc. (RothbardVsTrade unions). 1) (…), the scope of indeterminacy is very small in the modern world. We have seen above that, in a two-person barter situation, there is likely to be a large zone of indeterminacy between the buyer's maximum demand price and the seller's minimum supply price for a quantity of a good. >Barter/Rothbard, >Exchange/Rothbard, >Market/Rothbard. Within this zone, we can only leave the determination of the price to bargaining. However, it is precisely the characteristic of an advanced monetary economy that these zones are ever and ever narrowed and lose their importance. >Price/Rothbard, >Economy/Rothbard. The zone is only between the "marginal pairs" of buyers and sellers, and this zone is constantly dwindling as the number of people and alternatives in the market increase. Growing civilization, therefore, is always narrowing the importance of indeterminacies. 2) (…) there is no reason whatever why a zone of indeterminacy should be more important for the labor market than for the market for the price of any other good. Rothbard III 716 3) (…) suppose that there is a zone of indeterminacy for a labor market, and let us assume that no union is present. This means that there is a certain zone, the length of which can be said to equal a zone of the discounted marginal value product of the factor. This (…) is far less likely than the existence of a zone for a consumers' good, since in the former case there is a specific amount, a DMVP (discounted marginal value product) , to be estimated. But the maximum of the supposed zone is the highest point at which the wage equals the DMVP. Now, competition among employers will tend to raise factor prices to precisely that height at which profits will be wiped out. In other words, wages will tend to be raised to the maximum of any zone of the DMVP. Wages: Rather than wages being habitually at the bottom of a zone, presenting unions with a golden opportunity to raise wages to the top, the truth is quite the reverse. Assuming the highly unlikely case that any zone exists at all, wages will tend to be at the top, so that the only remaining indeterminacy is downward. Unions would have no room for increasing wages within that zone. Rothbard III 717 Monopsony and oligopsony: It is often alleged that the buyers of labor—the employers—have some sort of monopoly and earn a monopoly gain, and that therefore there is room for unions to raise wage rates without injuring other laborers. However, such a "monopsony" for the purchase of labor would have to encompass all the entrepreneurs in the society. If it did not, then labor, a nonspecific factor, could move into other firms and other industries. And we have seen that one big cartel cannot exist on the market. Therefore, a "monopsony" cannot exist. >Cartels/Rothbard, >Monopolies/Rothbard, >Monopoly price/Rothbard. Oligopsony: the "problem" of "oligopsony" - a "few" buyers of labor - is a pseudo problem. As long as there is no monopsony, competing employers will tend to drive up wage rates until they equal their DMVPs. The number of competitors is irrelevant; this depends on the concrete data of the market. Rothbard III 718 Competition/elasticity: Briefly, the case of "oligopsony" rests on a distinction between the case of "pure" or "perfect" competition, in which there is an allegedly horizontal - infinitely elastic - supply curve oflabor, and the supposedly less elastic supply curve of the "imperfect" oligopsony. >Competition/Rothbard, >Elasticity/Rothbard. Actually, since people do not move en masse and all at once, the supply curve is never infinitely elastic, and the distinction has no relevance. There is only free competition, and no other dichotomies, such as between pure competition and oligopsony, can be established. The shape of the supply curve, furthermore, makes no difference to the truth that labor or any other factor tends to get its DMVP (discounted marginal value product) on the market. >Supply/Rothbard. Efficiency/unions/Rothbard: One common prounion argument is that unions benefit the economy through forcing higher wages on the employers. At these higher wages the workers will become more effcient, and their marginal productivity will rise as a result. RothbardVs: If this were true, however, no unions would be needed. Employers, ever eager for greater profits, would see this and pay higher wages now to reap the benefits of the allegedly higher productivity in the future. As a matter of fact, employers often train workers, paying higher wages than their present marginal product justifies, in order to reap the benefits of their increased productivity in later years. >Ricardo effect/Rothbard. Ricardo effect: This doctrine holds that union-induced higher wage rates encourage employers to substitute machinery for labor. This added machinery increases the capital per worker and raises the marginal productivity of labor, thereby paying for the higher wage rates. RothbardVsRicardo/RothbardVsHayek/RothbardVsUnions: The fallacy here is that only increased saving can make more capital available. >Saving/Rothbard. Capital investment is limited by saving. Union wage increases do not increase the total supply of capital available. Rothbard III 719 Innovation/technology/efficiency: A related thesis is that higher wage rates will spur employers to invent new technological methods to make labor more effcient. Here again, however, the supply of capital goods is limited by the savings available, and there is almost always a sheaf of technological opportunities awaiting more capital anyway. Furthermore, the spur of competition and the desire of the producer to keep and increase his custom is enough of an incentive to increase productivity in his firm, without the added burden of unionism.(9) 1. A restrictionist, rather than a monopoly, price can be achieved because the number of laborers is so important in relation to the possible variation in hours of work by an individual laborer that the latter can be ignored here. If, however, the total labor supply is limited originally to a few people, then an imposed higher wage rate will cut down the number of hours purchased from the workers who remain working, perhaps so much as to render a restrictionist price unprofitable to them. In such a case it would be more appropriate to speak of a monopoly price. 2. Cf. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 764. 3. See Charles E. Lindblom, Unions and Capitalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 78 ff., 92–97, 108, 121, 131–32, 150–52, 155. Also see Henry C. Simons, “Some Reflections on Syndicalism” in Economic Policy for a Free Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 131 f., 139 ff.; Martin Bronfenbrenner, “The Incidence of Collective Bargaining,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1954, pp. 301–02; Fritz Machlup, “Monopolistic Wage Determination as a Part of the General Problem of Monopoly” in Wage Determination and the Economics of Liberalism (Washington, D.C.: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1947), pp. 64–65. 4. Cf. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprintd by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 764. 5. See James Birks, Trade Unionism in Relation to Wages (London, 1897), p. 30. 6. See James Birks, Trades’ Unionism: A Criticism and a Warning (London, 1894), p. 22. 7. On the nature and consequences of these various criteria of wage determination, see Ford, Economics of Collective Bargaining, pp. 85–110. 8. See Ford, Economics of Collective Bargaining, See the excellent critique by Hutt, in: Theory of Collective Bargaining, passim. 9. On the Ricardo effect, see Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 767–70. Also see the detailed critique by Ford, Economics of Collective Bargaining, pp. 56–66, who also points to the union record of hindering mechanization by imposing restrictive work rules and by moving quickly to absorb any possible gain from the new equipment. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Truth | Lewis | V 164 Definition Counterfactual Conditional/Truth/Lewis: a >counterfactual conditional is untrivially true if and only if it requires less deviation from actuality to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it needs to make to the antecedent true without the consequent. In short: A w>>w C is true if C is true in all next A-worlds. Explanation/(s): "A w>>w C": "If A were the case, C would be the case". --- Schwarz I 64 Modal truth/Lewis/Schwarz: Thesis: unlike logical truths it is about specific objects and their properties. Cf. >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Unemployment | Rothbard | Rothbard III 581 Unemployment/Neoclassical economics/Keynesianism/Rothbard: The Keynesians, in the mid-1930’s, inaugurated the fashion of declaiming: Neoclassical economics is all right for its special area, but it assumes “full employment.” Since “orthodox” economics “assumes full employment,” it holds true only so long as “full employment” prevails. If it does not, we enter a Keynesian wonderland where all economic truths are vitiated or reversed. “Full employment” is supposed to be the condition of no unemployment and therefore the goal at which everyone aims. Rothbard III 582 In the first Place, it should be emphasized that economic theory does not "assume" full employment. Economics, in fact, "assumes" nothing. The whole discussion of alleged "assumptions" reflects the bias of the epistemology of physics, where "assumptions" are made without originally knowing their validity and are eventually tested to see whether or not their consequents are correct. The economist does not "assume"; he knows. He concludes on the basis oflogical deduction from self-evident axioms, i.e., axioms that are either logically or empirically incontrovertible. Now what does economics conclude on the matter of unemployment or "full employment"? In the first place, there is no "problem" involved in the unemployment of either land or capital goods factors. (The latter condition is often known as "idle" or "unused capacity.") We have seen above that a crucial distinction between land and labor is that labor is relatively scarce. As a result, there will always be land factors remaining unused, or as a further result, labor factors will always befully employed on thefree market to the extent that laborers are so willing. There is no problem of "unemployed land," since land remains unused for a good reason. Indeed, if this were not so (and it is conceivable that some day it will not be), the situation would be most unpleasant. If there is ever a time when land is scarcer than labor, then land will be fully employed, and some labor factors will either get a zero wage or else a wage below minimum subsistence level. This is the old classical bugbear of population pressing the food supply down to below-subsistence levels, and certainly this is theoretically possible in the future. >Unemployment/Keynesianism. Rothbard III 584 But what of the able-bodied worker who “can’t find a job”? This situation cannot obtain. In those cases, of course, where a worker insists on a certain type of job or a certain minimum wage rate, he may well remain “unemployed.” But he does so only of his own volition and on his own responsibility. But while this is true in the general labor market, it is not necessarily true for particular labor markets, for particular regions or occupations (…). Rothbard III 583 Wages/unemployment/Keynesianism/Rothbard: RothbardVsKeynesianism: (…) the whole modern and Keynesian emphasis on employment has to be revalued. For the great missing link in their discussion of unemployment is precisely the wage rate. To talk of unemployment or employment without reference to a wage rate is as meaningless as talking of “supply” or “demand” without reference to a price. And it is precisely analogous. The demand for a commodity makes sense only with reference to a certain price. In a market for goods, it is obvious that whatever stock is offered as supply, it will be “cleared,” i.e., sold, at a price determined by the demand of the consumers. No good need remain unsold if the seller wants to sell it; all he need do is lower the price sufficiently, in extreme cases even below zero if there is no demand for the good and he wants to get it off his hands. The situation is precisely the same here. Here we are dealing with labor services. Whatever supply of labor service is brought to market can be sold, but only if wages are set at whatever rate will clear the market. >Free market/Rothbard. The problem, then, is not employment, but employment at an above-subsistence wage. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Utilitarian Liberalism | Gaus | Gaus I 105 Utilitarian Liberalism/Gaus: Utilitarian moral theories hold that we can possess knowledge of both the good and the right; pace Rawls, these are not matters of ‘reasonable pluralism’. The most straightforward versions of utilitarianism maintain that the good is either pleasure, happiness or preference satisfaction, and the right is the overall maximization of the good. Bentham: Bentham, interestingly, did not think that the principle of utility could be proven; he did, though, contend that it could not reasonably be denied (1987(1): ch. 11, s. 11). Any reasonable person would see that pleasure is the ultimate end: consequently the principle of utility was beyond reasonable dispute. Whether or not the principle of utility could be established by reason was and is, though, a matter of dispute. Mill: Mill, famously, advanced a proof (1963c(2): ch. 4). SidgwickVsMill: Sidgwick, in contrast, insists that basic intuitions must be drawn upon in any argument for utilitarianism; in the end, Sidgwick appeared to accept that one could be an egoist and yet not irrational (1962(3): 418–22). Gaus I 106 Whether utilitarianism underwrites liberal politics and economics (...) turns on economic theory, public choice, theories of institutional design (Goodin, 1996)(4), and so on. In that sense liberal utilitarianism is indeed a partially comprehensive theory, with various theories of economics and politics being part of the case for liberal utilitarianism. >Markets/McCulloch, >Markets/Utilitarianism. Many philosophers are apt to reject liberal utilitarianism just because it turns on empirical claims; these anti-utilitarians often advance fanciful ‘what if’ examples, showing that under strange circumstances, utilitarianism might lead to strange results. In contrast, utilitarians typically have high confidence in these theories, and see no reason to suppose that our theory of political right should be independent of our best empirical theories of economics and politics (Goodin, 1982)(5). >Utilitarianism/Gaus, >Utilitarianism/Chapman. 1. Bentham, Jeremy (1987) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 2. Mill, John Stuart (1963c) Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. X, 203–59. 3. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4. Goodin, Robert E., ed. (1996) The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Goodin, Robert E. (1982) Political Theory and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utilitarian Liberalism | Goodin | Gaus I 106 Utilitarian Liberalism/Goodin/Gaus: Whether utilitarianism underwrites liberal politics and economics (...) turns on economic theory, public choice, theories of institutional design (Goodin, 1996)(1), and so on. In that sense liberal utilitarianism is indeed a partially comprehensive theory, with various theories of economics and politics being part of the case for liberal utilitarianism. >Markets/McCulloch, >Markets/Utilitarianism. Many philosophers are apt to reject liberal utilitarianism just because it turns on empirical claims; these anti-utilitarians often advance fanciful ‘what if’ examples, showing that under strange circumstances, utilitarianism might lead to strange results. In contrast, utilitarians typically have high confidence in these theories, and see no reason to suppose that our theory of political right should be independent of our best empirical theories of economics and politics (Goodin, 1982)(2). >Utilitarianism/Gaus, >Utilitarianism/Chapman, >Rights/Utilitarianism, >Rights/Consequentialism. 1. Goodin, Robert E., ed. (1996) The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Goodin, Robert E. (1982) Political Theory and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utilitarianism | Singer | I 2/3 Utilitarianism/P. Singer: When it comes to achieving happiness for the largest number of individuals, consideration is given to what suffering or misfortune could be caused by enforcement. Utilitarianism is therefore not unrealistic. E.g. lies can be assessed in some circumstances as bad, in others however as good, depending on its consequences. >Suffering, >Realism, >Justice, >Equality, >Inequality, >Consequentialism. I 10 Utilitarianism/Bentham/P. Singer: Bentham thesis: "Everyone counts as one and nobody as more than one". >Utilitarism/Bentham. I 13 Utilitarianism/P. Singer: my version is not that of the classic utilitarians like Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick. Their utilitarianism is called "hedonist utilitarianism", which is about the multiplication of happiness. > Preference utilitarianism. >Utilitarism/Mill, >Utilitarism/Sidgwick, >Hedonism. I 77 Death/Hedonist Utilitarianism/P. Singer: since there are no needs for the future after death, according to hedonistic utilitarianism there is no direct relevance of the term "person" (with a sense of the future) in relation to the falsehood of killing. Indirectly, however, there is: in relation to the fears that I can have as a living being. >Person, >Future, >Planning. I 78 Care for one's own future is now what distinguishes the person from other living beings. >Humans, >Animals. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Utility | Bailey | Rothbard II 113 Value/Subjective utility/Bailey/BaileyVsRicardo/Rothbard: Bailey demonstrates that value is not inherent in goods at all, but is rather always a process of subjective evaluation in the minds of individuals. Value, as Bailey pointed out, ‘in its ultimate sense, appears to mean the esteem in which any object is held. It denotes strictly speaking, an effect produced on the mind...’. Value is purely a ‘mental affection’. Furthermore, he profoundly states that value is not only a subjective estimation, but also that valuation is necessarily relative among various goods or objects; value is a matter of relative preference. Thus Bailey: When we consider objects in themselves, without reference to each other; the emotion or pleasure or satisfaction, with which we regard their utility or beauty, can scarcely take the appellation of value. It is only when objects are considered as subjects of preference or exchange, that the specific feeling of value can arise. When they are so considered, our esteem for one object, or our wish to possess it, may be equal to, or greater or less than our esteem for another... BaileyVsRicardo/Rothbard: But if value is subjective and relative (or relational) valuation, it follows that it is absurd for Ricardo to hanker after an invariable measure of value. In a scintillating and telling passage, Bailey displays the inner contradictions and absurdities of any objective, absolute theory of value, and specifically of the Ricardian quantity of labour variant. The Ricardians had lost sight of the relative nature of value, and... consider it as something positive and absolute; so that if there were only two commodities in the world, and they should both from some circumstance or other come to be produced by double the quantity of labour, they would both rise in real value, although their relation to each other would be undisturbed. According to this doctrine, everything might at once become more valuable, by requiring at once more labour for its production, a position utterly at variance with the truth, that value denotes the relation in which commodities stand to each other as articles of exchange. Real value, in a word, is on this theory considered as being the independent result of labour; and consequently, if under any circumstances the quantity of labour is increased, the real value is increased. Hence, the paradox, [quoting from the devoted Ricardian Thomas De Quincey] ‘that it is possible for A continually to increase in value – in real value observe – and yet command a continually decreasing quantity of B’; and this though they were the only commodities in existence. |
Bailey I Samuel Bailey Money and its vicissitudes in value; as they affect national industry and pecuniary contracts: with a postscript join-stock banks London 1837 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Values | Jonas | Brocker I 614 Values/Moral/Jonas: Jonas represents a moral realism for which there is objective value recognition. Axiology is part of his ontology (1. according to which there are values in nature that commit us directly. The "should" is founded "in the being" of nature itself (2). The "call," according to Jonas, comes from the outside, not - as with Kant - from (pure practical) reason (3). The human is consequently "placed under a duty to be, as a mandatary, so to speak, of a will of nature" (4). See Ethics/Jonas, Teleology/Jonas, Being/Jonas. Brocker I 617 VsJonas: where would the limit be drawn if one wanted to determine the value of a good to be preserved? In insects? In bacteria? In cancer cells? See Duties/Jonas. 1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 153 2. Ibid. p. 8 3. Ibid. p. 164, 168-171 4. Hans Jonas, Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung, Frankfurt/M. 1985. Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Values | Putnam | V 232f Value/values/Max Weber: there is a distinction between facts and values (VsObjectivity of value judgments) "Non-judgmental understanding": ideal type: is the understanding of rational "instrumental" actions. Karl-Otto Apel: these can be reconstructed as transpositions of if-then rules. Sociology: does not have to prove that maximum demands are fulfilled, but only that it was rational for the actor, how he/she has fulfilled his/her objectives. PutnamVsWeber, VsApel: this is only operationalist and too instrumentalist, to understand rationality only from purposes. >Operationalism, >Instrumentalism, >Rationalism, >Teleology, >Purposes. --- I (d) 217 Facts/values/Putnam: facts are not separated. Parisi I 311/312 Facts/values/economic theories/Putnam: In an economic analysis of law, disputes and conflicts between parties are often framed as disagreements as to facts. When facts are in dispute the parties can undertake further investigation and they can recalculate their choices and reassess their optimal course of action. The focus on factual disagreement lends itself to the objective and rational point of viewlessness that grounds the claim that economics is a science. In law, however, disputes are frequently about something more than a disagreement as to facts; they involve disagreements as to values (Putnam, 2002)(1). These value-based disagreements shape the facts as people understand them, and influence the relative importance attributed to any given fact by any particular party. Value disputes are not easily resolved by appeal to economic analysis. At best, economics can only offer some indirect input on factors to consider in a given situation, but in the end law must operate to make a judgment—a value choice between and among competing claims that are often based on emotion, culture, and other human characteristics that are not easily subject to an economic calculus. Consequently, when economic analysis is applied to law, it often functions to redirect attention away from a conflict involving deeply held values and translates the disagreement into one of competing facts. The problem with this move is that it may function to “mask” what the law is really doing and can undermine the traditional role of law in working to mediate tensions among competing and deeply held values in our system of democratic governance (Noonan, 1976)(2). 1. Putnam, Hilary (2002). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Noonan, Jr., John T. (1976). Persons and Masks of the Law. Berkeley: University of California Press. Driesen, David M. and Robin Paul Malloy. “Critics of Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Velocity of Circulation | Fisher | Rothbard III 840 Velocity of Circulation/Fisher/Rothbard: Equation of Exchange/RothbardVsFisher: It is evident that PT, in the total equation of exchange, is a completely fallacious concept. While the equation E = pQ for an individual transaction is at least a trivial truism, although not very enlightening, the equation E = PT for the whole society is a false one. Neither P nor T can be defined meaningfully, and this would be necessary for this equation to have any validity. We are left only with E = pQ + p'Q', etc., which gives us only the useless truism, E =E.(2) >Equation of Exchange/Fisher. Equation of exchange: MV = PT. M - Money supply V - Velocity of circulation P – Price level T (or Q) - Expenditures Cf. >Price level/Fisher. Velocity: Let us consider the other side of the equation, E = MV, the average quantity of money in circulation in the period, multiplied by the average velocity of circulation. V is an absurd concept. Even Fisher, in the case of the other magnitudes, recognized the necessity of building up the total from individual exchanges. He was not successful in building up T out of the individual Q's, P out of the individual p's, etc., but at least he attempted to do so. But in the case of V, what is the velocity of an individual transaction? Velocity is not an independently defined variable. Fisher, in fact, can derive V only as being equal in every instance and every period to E/M. If I spend in a certain hour $ 10 for a hat, and I had an average cash balance (or M) for that hour of $200, then, by definition, my V equals 1/20. I had an average quantity of money in my cash balance of $200, each dollar turned over on the average of 1 /20 of a time, and consequently I spent $ 10 in this period. RothbardVsFisher/RothbardVsVelocity of circulation: But it is absurd to dignify any quantity with a place in an equation unless it can be defined independently of the other terms in the equation. Fisher compounds the absurdity by setting up M and V as independent determinants of E, which permits him to go to his desired conclusion that if M doubles, and V and T remain constant, p - the price level - will also double. But since V is defined as equal to E/M, what we actually have is: M x (E/M) = PT or simply, E = PT, our original equation. Thus, Fisher's attempt to arrive at a quantity equation with the price level approximately proportionate to the quantity of money is proved vain by yet another route. >Price level/Fisher. Solution/Pigou/Robertson: A group of Cambridge economists - Pigou, Robertson, etc. - has attempted to rehabilitate the Fisher equation by eliminating V and substituting the idea that the total supply of money equals the total demand for money. RothbardVsPigou/RothbardVsRobertson: However, their equation is not a particular advance, since they keep the fallacious holistic concepts of P and T, and their k is merely the reciprocal of V, and suffers from the latter's deficiencies. Cf. >Neo-Fisher-Effect. Rothbard: In fact, since V is not an independently defined variable, M must be eliminated from the equation as well as V, and the Fisherine (and the Cambridge) equation cannot be used to demonstrate the "quantity theory of money." And since M and V must disappear, there are an infinite number of other "equations of exchange" that we could, with equal invalidity, uphold as "determinants of the price level." Thus, the aggregate stock of sugar in the economy may be termed s, and the ratio of E to the total stock of sugar may be called "average sugar turnover," or U. This new "equation of exchange" would be: SU = PT, and the stock of sugar would suddenly become a major determinant of the price level. Or we could substitute A = number of salesmen in the country, and x = total expenditures per salesman, or "salesmen turnover," to arrive at a new set of "determinants" in a new equation. And so on. >Quantity theory. |
F.M. Fisher I Franklin M. Fisher Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics (Econometric Society Monographs) Cambridge 1989 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Vocabulary | Kuhn | I 209 Change of meaning/Concept change/Kuhn: Since the vocabularies of discussions about new theories consist predominantly of the same terms some of these expressions must be applied differently to nature. - Consequently, the superiority of one theory over another is not to be proven in the discussion. >Observation language, >Incommensurability. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Wages | Say | Rothbard II 24 Wages/Say/Rothbard: Turning to wages and the labour market, Say pointed out that wages will be highest relative to the price of capital and land, where labour is scarcest relative to the other two factors. This will be either whenever land is virtually unlimited in supply; and/or when an abundance of capital creates a great demand for labour. Furthermore, wage rates will be proportionate to the danger, trouble, or obnoxiousness of the work, to the irregularity of the employment, to the length of training, and to the degree of skill or talent. As Say puts it: ‘Every one of these causes tends to diminish the quantity of labour in circulation in each department, and consequently to vary its’ wage rate. In recognizing the differences of natural talent, Say advanced far beyond the egalitarianism of Adam Smith and of neoclassical economics since Smith's day. >Capital/Say. |
EconSay I Jean-Baptiste Say Traité d’ Economie Politique Paris 1803 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Welfare State | Habermas | IV 510 Welfare State/Habermas: the social, i.e. initially private consequential burdens of the class conflict cannot be kept away from the political public. Thus the welfare state becomes the political content of mass democracy. This shows that the political system cannot emancipate itself from the utility value orientations of the citizens without trace; it cannot produce mass loyalty to any extent, but must also make verifiable offers of legitimacy with the social state program. Tariff policy: the legal institutionalisation of collective bargaining has become the basis of a reformist policy that has led to pacification of the class conflict by the welfare state. IV 511 Problem: Social policy faces the dilemma that is expressed at the fiscal level in the zero-sum game of public budgets for social policy tasks on the one hand and for tasks of economic and growth-promoting infrastructure policy on the other. Both the direct negative effects of the capitalist employment system and the dysfunctional side effects of economic growth controlled by capital accumulation on the lifeworld must be absorbed. The welfare state must not violate the conditions of stability and mobility requirements, because corrective interventions generally only do not trigger reactions on the part of the privileged groups if they do not affect vested rights. This means that not only the scope of welfare state services, but also the nature and organisation of services of general interest must be adapted to the structure of the exchange regulated by money and power IV 512 between the formally organised areas of action and their environments. The accumulation process must only be guarded by state intervention and must not be changed in any way. Austromarxism: interprets this as the result of a class compromise. Representatives: Otto Bauer, Karl Renner. HabermasVsAustromarxism: Rather, the social opposition with its institutionalization loses its structuring power for the lifeworld of social groups. IV 515 Democracy/social state/Habermas: mass social state democracy is an arrangement that makes the class antagonism still built into the economic system harmless under one condition, namely that the growth dynamics guarded by state interventionism does not slacken. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Zeno | Russell | Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 13 RussellVsZenon: Zenon only made the mistake of drawing the conclusion (if he drew any conclusions at all) that because there is no state of change, the world would be in the same state at any given time. But this conclusion cannot be drawn according to Weierstrass. 15 Time: The banishment of the infinitely small quantities has peculiar consequences: e.g. there is no longer anything like a next moment. (> Time/Russell). If there are to be no infinitely small quantities, no two moments follow one another directly, but there are always other moments inbetween. Consequently there must be an infinite number of additional moments between two arbitrary moments. If the number were finite, then one would be closer to the first of the two moments and so would be the next! This is precisely where the philosophy of the infinite begins. 19 Zenon/Russell: Everyone who attacked Zenon was not right about it, because they allowed his premisses. Zenon probably invoked the assumption that the whole has more elements than a part. 20 Then Achilles must have been in more places than the turtle. And it followed that he could never catch up with them. If we allow the axiom that the whole thing has more elements than a part, Zeno's conclusion fits perfectly. The retention of the axiom leads to other paradoxes of which I call one: the paradox of Tristram Shandy. It is the reversal of the Zenonian paradox and says that the turtle can get everywhere if you give it only enough time. Tristram Shandy needed two years to list the course of the first two days of his life and complained that the material accumulated faster than he could capture it. Russell: I assert now that if he had lived his life that way further on, he would not have missed any part of his biography. For the hundredth part is written in the thousandth year, and so on. >Zeno, >Commentaries on Zeno. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antirationalism | Black Vs Antirationalism | III 33 Cause/Reason/Rationality/Black: Reasons must also be applied correctly! They must be "good reasons". Irrationality/Anti-Rationality/Black: the punishment for it can be damage, injury or extinction. III 34 VsAnti-Rationalism/Black: Just because our Skepticus is still alive we can now assume that he applies at least proto-rationality. Canonical form: (of this argument): "You should respect fundamental reasons, because otherwise you expose yourself to frustration, pain or death." Skepticus/Black: has the choice to "imitate" an animal with its reflexes. Namely, by trusting his own reflexes. VsAnti-Rationalism/Black: consequently, he would have to be completely weak-willed, and distrust all social ties. He would be without friends! Circularity/Black: so far, there is nothing circular about our argument. Reasoning/Black: for us here the first step (the assumption of proto-rationality) is of extreme importance. We can then infer on wider rationality. ((s)VsBlack: Why actually, animals also stop after quasi-rationality? His argument therefore leads to the difficulty of distinguishing humans and animals or finding a reason why intelligent life has developed.) BlackVsVs: for expansion we assume social skills. III 35 That means that something is involved in his dealings with others. III 36 Rationality/Black: As a child you had no choice of wanting to be rational or not, but as an adult you do. VsAnti-Rationality/Black: the price for this is high, but: one would have to become the pet of someone else. Cleansing oneself of reason would lead to a catatonic (apathetic) state. You would only live in the immediate present. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ayers, M. | Rorty Vs Ayers, M. | VI 408 Philosophy/Rorty: we have distinguish clear clearly between questions of the tasks of philosophy and content-related topics such as e.g. knowledge, and express ourselves as clearly as possible about their mutual relationship. Philosophy/Rorty: the following theses tend to be represented by the same people 1) Realism/Anti-Realism important distinction 2) Dummett is right: these Antirealism/Realism struggles have been decisive in the history of philosophy. >Antirealism, >Realism. VI 409 3) Wilson was right to express doubts about the contingency of problems. 4) Ayers is right to say that we must allow our own metaphysical and epistemological views to be influenced by our politics and morals. 5) Color: the problem of the "essence of color" is not solvable. The same is true, consequently, for the body-mind problem. 6) Descartes' >skepticism is ahistorical. 7) Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the senses merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: revival of empiricism. 8) self-identity is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, non-relational features. Some terms are rigid. 9) Recognition of the unspeakable is laudable intellectual modesty. 10) Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding`" is not a guide, but a work that is yet to be studied and still holds not yet articulated truths. RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I represent diametrically opposed views. VI 410 Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the 10 theses. VI 411 "Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: battle cry of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot it must be established in language before a plausible reference to the taste of onions is at all possible. VI 412 This includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". >Cartesianism. This includes the notion of "consciousness" - (As 17th century notion). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Boghossian, Paul | Wright Vs Boghossian, Paul | I 270 Boghossian: let us consider a non factualism exclusively related to meaning (not truth): there is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. Since now the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism regarding meaning necessarily requires a non-factualism regarding truth conditions. Then it results: (5) For all S,P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional. after disquotation: (4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional. "Fascinating consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of meaning: a global non-factualism. And this is precisely where a non-factualism of meaning differs from a non-factualism with reference to any other object... I 271 WrightVsBoghossian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but there is nothing against the use of the word alone. Global Minimalism/WrightVsBoghossian: Problem: 1. Can the required notion of substantial truth be completely understandable if there are no examples of it at all? ((s) Because that is just denied by the thesis). 2. The status of the justification is even more difficult. Does an advocate not have to demand that the reasoning be valid? Such a justification, however, must at least show cognitive coercion and thus exceed minimalism. I 273 WrightVsBoghossian: with the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true, we can go over to it: (iv) It is not the case that S is true and then, by using (i) - the premise of reasoning - for S (v) It is not the case that (i) is true. From this follows the "disquotation properties": (vi) It is not the case that it is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition. But is this a reductio ad absurdum of (i)? This is not a stupid question! If truth is understood as substantial, and contrasted with an inferior surrogate, then the denial of truth is not necessarily inconsistent with the assertion of its correctness. A correct reductio should show that (i) is not even correct. Boghossian is thus faced with a dilemma: a) if it is a reductio of (i), it shows that the minimalism of meaning is incoherent, I 274 b) if it is not reductio - if the negation in (vi) rejects a substantial truth and not merely negates correctness - then (iii) can no longer be an expression of global minimalism (meaning and truth), for (iii) is consistent with the correctness of the assertion that certain propositions possess substantial truth conditions. (iii) Can at most require that any statement that can only be correct cannot itself be considered correct. WrightVsBoghossian: the "fascinating consequence" is nowhere in sight. 1. Minimalism of meaning does not cancel itself out. 2. There is also not logically necessary a minimalism regarding the distinction between discourses that are suitable for substantial truth and those that are not. Problem: that Boghossian has to work with different truth predicates ("true" and "correct"). Of course, this is important for his differentiation, but it has a potential effect on the disquotation, which is so important for him. Wright: "strong need": a philosophy that distinguishes between the substantially true and the merely correct must itself be substantial. I 275 WrightVsBoghossian: the details: the move from (ii) to (iii) is a modus tollens on the right left section of the disquotation scheme (DS): (I) A > "A" is true. Question: can we safely assume that this principle is at least correct when both truth and correctness are involved? No: if A is just correct, the claim that "A" is true will at best reflect its status incorrectly! Decisive: for the transition from (ii) to (iii) is the relevant substitute for "A": "S" has the truth condition that "P" is a sentence which, according to minimalism of meaning, allows only correctness and not truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict notion of the former negation. Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will generally be conservative. WrightVsVs: but now there are problems to be found elsewhere: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct. The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. I 277/278 WrightVsBoghossian: Conclusion: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the citation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), If, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The sentence is incorrect). Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argument at all. I 293 Deflationism: any significant sentence (i.e. a sentence with a truth condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsehood. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: Truth is not a property). WrightVsBoghossian: his problem is that he must reconcile both. Is the reasoning not simply a game of "refers to a property"? (to avoid truth as property.) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Bolzano, B. | Tarski Vs Bolzano, B. | Berka I 8 Consequential Relation/Consequence/Bolzano: for Bolzano, M,N,O.. follows from A,B,C.. only if 1. Every (semantic) model of A,B,C... is also a model of M,N,O... I.e. if each of the final sentences M,N,O, from the premises A,B,C... is individually derivable. And: 2. The premises are the reason(s) for the final sentences. Berka: this is a very strong concept of inference. TarskiVsBolzano: for him it is enough if the 1. condition is fulfilled. GentzenVsBolzano: for Gentzen it is sufficient if at least one of the final clauses can be derived from the set of premises. Special case: If the receivable quantity contains only one final sentence, the Bolzano and Gentzen systems are identical. Conclusion/Bolzano: additional condition: you must be able to decide which terms are logical terms.(1) 1. B. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, Sulzbach 1837 (gekürzter Nachdruck aus Bd. II S. 113-115, S. 191 – 193; § 155; §162) |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Burge, T. | Davidson Vs Burge, T. | I (d) 74 Burge: Two types externalism: a) Social: Meaning depends on social practices (community - b) on the causal history of the person. DavidsonVsBurge: a) our intuition does not suggest that the meaning of a speaker is determined by other speakers. b) Which group should be outstanding? c) an unconscious elite in the background is problematic. Cf. >externalism, >internalism. Burge: in order to have a thought about water, you just have to be in contact with water, you don’t have to prove anything. DavidsonVsBurge: even a false thought about water is one about water. - VsBurge: Community not causally involved Burge: radiation patterns or physically described stimuli make everything infinitely complicated. DavidsonVs: Complicated for whom? It is us humans who make all these classifications and groupings! We group according to similarities that are obvious to ourselves. I (e) 116 DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he focuses so strongly on the everyday situation through the triangulation sets him apart from the externalism of Putnam and Burge. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect interpretable in principle (via causal hypotheses). Glüer II 167 Burge and Dummett think that what speakers mean by their words depended very much on how the community used those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Complete nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time. Frank I 665 Contents/Thoughts/Externalism/Burge/Davidson: Content is not determined by what is happening in the person, or by what is easily accessible for them through careful reflection. (E.g. incorrectly used terms, information gaps). DavidsonVsBurge: I’m not sure how these assertions are to be understood, because I’m not sure how serious talk of a "direct acquaintance" with a content is to be taken. But the first person authority is seriously compromised by that. Therefore, I must reject one of the premises of Burge. 1) I agree that content is not only determined or "fixed" by what is going on inside me. 2) VsBurge: Vs representation of the way in which social and other external factors control the contents. Fra I 665/666 DavidsonVsBurge: His characteristics are not as relevant as he makes them look: E.g. Suppose I believe that "arthritis" is only used for calcium-induced arthritis. My friend Arthur knows better. We both say honestly to Smith: "Carl has arthritis’. Burge: Then our words mean the same thing, we mean the same and express the same belief. My mistake is irrelevant for what I thought on this occasion. Reason: that’s what everyone (who is not tainted by philosophy) would say about Arthur and me. DavidsonVsBurge: I doubt that he is right, but even if he were right, it would not prove his point: Ordinary attributions of meanings and attitudes are based on far-reaching and vague assumptions about what speaker and listener have in common. If some assumptions are not confirmed, we can change the words we used often change drastically. We usually choose the easy way: we take a speaker by his word, even if that does not fully account for one aspect of his thought. E.g. if Smith informs a third party about what Arthur and I both believe about arthritis, then he may mislead its listeners! Fra I 667 If he is careful, he would add, "But Davidson thinks arthritis is calcium-induced". The fact that this addition is necessary shows that the simple attribution was not right. BurgeVs: could reply that the report is literally correct ((s) because also the wrong-believer sincerely believes that it is arthritis). DavidsonVsBurge: That overlooks the extent to which the contents of a belief depend on of the contents of other beliefs. Therefore, there can be no simple rigid rule for the attribution of a single thought. Burge: social determination of contents also leads to the fact that we usually mean what others mean in the community. "certain responsibility towards the group practice". DavidsonVsBurge: I do not deny it, but that does not show what is supposed to show: a) It is often reasonable to make people responsible for ensuring that they know the meaning of their words. But this has nothing to do with what they want to say! b) As a good citizens, we want to increase the opportunities for communication, but that only explains our "legalistic" attribution of meanings and beliefs. ((s) that the meanings are not so). c) A speaker who wants to be understood, must have the intention that his words are interpreted in a certain way, and consequently the way others do. And vice versa, the listener wants to interpret the words as the speaker does. This has moral weight, but it has no necessary connection with the determination of what anyone thinks. I 667/668 Externalism/Social community/Meaning/Meaning/DavidsonVsBurge: We are not forced to give the words of a person the meanings that they have in their language community. It is also not true that we cannot help but to interpret their propositional attitudes on the same basis. Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441 -4 58 Frank I 710 Self-knowledge/Burge: Error excluded (immune), because reflection in the same act. DavidsonVsBurge: that only shows that you cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents. It does not show why you cannot be wrong about the existence of the attitude. Worse: Burge cannot show that the two kinds of knowledge (1st and 2nd order) have the same subject. As long as the asymmetry is not explained by recourse to the social situation (relationships between the speakers), I doubt that a non-skeptical solution is possible. I 711 Representation/Perceptual knowledge/Burge: It cannot generally be wrong that the representations represent that from which they usually originate and to which they are applied. DavidsonVsBurge: I have long been of this view, but I do not understand why Burge is of this view. How do we decide where representations usually originate? Circular: "from what they represent." But which of the many possible causes is the right one? Incidents in the nervous system, stimulation patterns of nerve endings, or a little further out? (proximal/distal). Burge: We should be watch out for the relation of different observers: they have similar perceptions. Perception is "impersonal". DavidsonVsBurge: But that is exactly what should be proved! We need not only causal interaction between different observers and the same objects, but the right kind of causal interaction. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Causal Theory | Evans Vs Causal Theory | I 320 VsCausal Theory/Names/Generic Term/Evans: there are not two mechanisms at play, one for baptism and for the preservation of reference. Generic Terms, unlike names, can change their meaning! E.g. Madagascar: Marco Polo misunderstood the report by Malayan seafarers and transferred the mangled name for an area of the mainland to the island. I 321 EvansVsCausal Theory: It must also be improved for E.g. swapped babies. The man who bears the name bears it, because another baby was given that name! E.g. Suppose Bible scholars argued today that another than Goliath had slain David: Elhannan the Bethlehemite. David is said to have killed another Philistine. Now, if an entire speech community linked no other information than that Goliath was the man who was slain by David, that does not mean, however, that "Goliath" referred to that man in this community. I 334 EvansVsCausal Theory/EvansVsKripke: E.g. a young man A leaves his village in the Scottish Highlands to make his fortune. 50 years later, a man B comes to the village and lives as a hermit behind the hills. Three or four villagers of that time are still alive and mistakenly believe it is the villager who left the place and whom they consequently call "turnip". This name comes into use in the village community. If the error is discovered, they are more likely to express the sentence "It was not Turnip, after all" than to absurdly express the phrase: "it looks as if Turnip did not come from the village". Evans: they had used the name of A to say false things about him. E.g. Should the elderly die, the way would be open for a new use of the name. Evans: It is important that the information that the old villagers give to the young. (E.g. "He was a beautiful type for women"). I 335 As rich, coherent and important for these could be that A might be the predominant source of their information. In this case they could then say "the man is not Turnip, after all". Alternative: "respectfully" the young villagers could continue to use the name respectfully towards the old villagers: Turnip, "whoever it may be". Name/Reference/Evans: reference is determined by sets of information and not by fitting! Nevertheless, the importance of causality is preserved. Also, the logic is not contradicted: identity statements are necessary! Information is individuated by its origin. If A is the source of a set of information, it could have been nothing else. I 336 Consequently, nothing else could have been this a. EvansVsCausal Theory: false hope to be able to leave the intention of the speaker completely aside. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Causal Theory | Searle Vs Causal Theory | II 303 SearleVsCausal Theory: the causal chain is simply a characterization of parasitic cases from the outside standpoint. II 304 The descriptivist Theory allows a baptism at the beginning. Kripke's theory is merely a variant of descriptivist. The causal chain does not matter at all! The only chain that matters, is the passing of the intentional content! E.g. chain having ten members. No additional intentions, omniscient observer. But what he observed, are not the features that secure the reference! II 305 Reference is for Kripke only and solely secured by descriptive content! E.g. Miss 7 decides a change, consequently 8 9 and 10 do not speak about a mountain, but about a poodle. II 308 Causal theory: intentionality transmission in the chain is the very essential. Descriptivism: merely casual act. II 309 E.g. Suppose I only knew roughly about what "Structuralism" is, yet I could ask: "Are there any structuralists in France?", "Is Pierre structuralist?" Descriptivism: finds it implausible that only thing that will be passed in the communication chain, was the intention to speak on the same subject. In real life much more is passed on, among other things the type of a particular thing. II 310 Whether something is a mountain or a man, is even in the parasitic cases connected to the name. SearleVsKripke: E.g. I talk about Socrates' philosophy of mathematics, but bring everything up and think Socrates is the name of a number. "I believe that Socrates is not a prime number, but can be divided by 17". That meets Kripke causal theory, but I do not succeed to talk about Socrates. SearleVsKripke: its view has the absurd consequence that it does not contain any restrictions on what may turn out to be the name reference. E.g. Aristotle could be a bar stool in Joe's Pizza Place, 11957 in Hoboken. Even if it is a metaphysical de re necessity that Aristotle had these parents, this tells us nothing about how the name refers to these people and not to a bar stool. II 311 Descriptivism: adheres to the intentional content first stage, and considers the parasitic cases as less important. Causal theory: emphasizes the parasitic cases, especially if we are not directly aware of the objects. Cf. >causal theory of names, >causal theory of reference, >causal theory of knowledge. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Meixner Vs Chisholm, R.M. | I 49 Def continuant/Meixner: temporal, singular individuals that have at most spatial parts. No temporal parts! Therefore no accidentals. Temporal Parts/Meixner: but many individuals have temporal parts, the accidentals! Individual/Modern Ontology/Meixner: (VsChisholm?) many modern ontologists however support the thesis that all existing individuals have temporal parts. According to this, a material individual is not at the same time in two different places, but also not as a whole at different times in the same place! ((s) The individual then changes constantly, from one point in time to another point in time, i.e. it is not the same in two consecutive moments. (>Lewis: "fragile"). "Four-Dimensionalism"/Meixner: the thesis that individuals consist of three spatial and one temporal dimension. MeixnerVs. Irrespective of dimensions one can also say: all individuals have spatiotemporal parts, this applies in every reference system! And in each reference system, spatiotemporal parts can again be divided into spatial and temporal parts. I 49/50 Theory of relativity: merely suggests four-dimensionalism, but by no means implies it! Temporal Parts/Meixner: we as individuals have no temporal parts! Only our life stories have temporal parts. We do not say "he stretched from... to," but "he lived from... to..." We do not say "an earlier phase of me was a craftsman"; but "in an earlier phase of my life I was a craftsman". When we die, we die as whole individuals, it is not just the last temporal phase that dies. For example, the object X exists to t1 and is F. But this is not an identity of X and F, but the exemplification of F by X. ((s) have/be: having a property is not identity with the property.) And X also exists to t2, but not F. VsMeixner: If now the three-dimensionalism would be correct, then both, X to t1 and X to t2 would be identical with X. Consequently, X to t1 and X to t2 would be identical with each other! But they are not identical, because X is F at one time and not F at the other. MeixnerVs: Solution: from the assumption of three-dimensionalism it does not follow that X is identical with X to t1 or X to t2 would be identical! Although X is present as an individual as a whole, it is different from X to t1 as well as from X to t2, because these entities do not exist differently than X at several points in time. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Churchland, P. | Pauen Vs Churchland, P. | Pauen I 99 Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories. I 100 VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis. All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though. I 101 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states). On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true. Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology. VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved. I 102 Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits... PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level: The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design. In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all. I 103 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry. In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro). I 104 3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object. I 105 This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination. VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts. He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness. I 188 Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories. Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness": I 189 forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology. Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge. Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other. I 191 Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible! The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Therefore, our methods must fail. I 192 Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties: Levine: then there is a two-stage process: I 193 1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are. I 194 This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Consequentialism | Nagel Vs Consequentialism | III 71 Def Consequentialism: (the view that it is about what should happen objectively, not what we do). DeontologyVsConsequentialism: is often challenged with two particular types of reasons which each seem to have the relative form, and whose existence apparently is independent of neutral values: 1) Reasons of autonomy: desires, obligations, personal relationships. 2) Claims of others not to be mistreated. (Not neutral, though, but derived from the relative claim of every individual, not to be mistreated themselves). Def Deontology/Nagel: restricts what we are allowed to do in the service of both neutral and autonomous values. (Nagel pro). Problem: deontology can be explained with relative reasons, but it is precisely that which allows doubts about the existence of these reasons. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Deontology | Mackie Vs Deontology | Stegmüller IV 227 Deontology/Stegmüller: does not lead to objectivism! DeontologyVsconsequentialism: Moral imperatives may not be of the form: "Act so that you will achieve a specific outcome" ((s) without regard to the means). MackieVsDeontology: no morality can do without consequentialist considerations. IV 228 Morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: gives up the nowadays customary separation between the morally good and the non-morally good. "moral fairness". IV 230 When it comes to the introduction of principles that curtail the negative consequences of the limits of human sympathy, then these principles should be eligible to be endorsed by any position. Even if no agreement on the content of ideals can be achieved, what should be achievable is an agreement on the method of the settlement of differences. IV 266 Rights/Mackie: difference. 1. viewed from the outside: securing spaces of freedom. 2. viewed from the inside: results in a diversity of objectives, choice. MackieVsTeleology/MackieVsDeontology: both unsatisfactory. Morality/ethics/Mackie: Thesis: primacy of rights over duties and objectives. IV 267 Ethics/life/Mackie: there is no "fix life plan". There is a right to a flexible behavior of choice. Rights/Mackie: cannot be absolute, since they may conflict with each other. Rights prima facie need not be identical to those that evolve over time. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Dummett, M. | Quine Vs Dummett, M. | I 426 ff QuineVsDummett: "make true": takes facts as something concrete Facts: tendency (though not for those who regard facts as true propositions) to imagine facts as something concrete. Facts are what makes sentences true. Ex "King's Lane is one kilometer long" and "King's Lane is 50 meters wide" are true. In this case, they describe two different facts, but the only physical object that plays a role here is King's Lane. We do not want to split hairs here, but the meaning of concreteness in which facts are "concrete" does not make facts look particularly good. Facts: also the same difficulty in terms of the scale of identity. The two sentences about King's Lane are true, because King's Lane exists, because it was built like that, and because we use our words in a certain way. VI 131 Anti-Realism/Law of Excluded Middle/Dummett/Quine: Dummett turns against the law of excluded middle with epistemological arguments. (Brouwer, too): No sentence is true or false as long as no method for determining the truth value is known. Anti-Realism/Legitimate Assertibility/QuineVsDummett: holistic considerations make us unsure which sentences at all should be considered candidates for truth or falsity. It certainly seems pointless to look for a critical difference between contenders for truth and candidates for said uncertainty if you do not want to either draw the line with the observation sentences themselves or at the other end. You might as well just exclude those sentences at no time ever become part of the inferential quantity which ensures the implication of categorical observation sentences, and consequently that at no time have empirical content. Quine: Truth is therefore one thing, and legitimate assertibility (justified belief) another. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Pauen Vs Epiphenomenalism | Pauen I 67 Property Dualistic Variants/Epiphenomenalism: recently: advantage: the renunciation of interactions is obvious from the perspective of property dualism, because this position then also becomes acceptable for physicalism and complies with multiple realizability. Multiple Realizability/Pauen: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. split brain: takeover by other areas). This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism. I 68 Property-Dualistic Variants/Epiphenomenalism/Pauen: E.g. we are repeatedly dealing with events in everyday life that are by far not causally effective with all their properties. It is not the sound of the ball that destroys the window pane. Explanation/Epiphenomenalism: then come only neuronal, not mental properties can be considered here. Epiphenomenalism Pauen: is, unlike the identity theory, not forced to assume that consciousness is "nothing but" electrochemical processes. I 69 VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: 1) The experiments by Libet are not without controversy. 2) Libet himself admits that there might still be a conscious veto even after the build-up of the potential. 3) Nothing else speaks against the act of will being identical with the neural process. It might not have an effect, but it might leave traces in the memory. 4) PopperVsEpiphenomenalism: theory of evolution: without effect the consciousness would have no selective advantage. I 70 EpiphenomenalismVsVs: certain intelligent processes can possibly only occur together with consciousness. But there is no independent evidence for this. There are also no theoretical arguments for the necessity to combine mental and neural properties. Empirically recognized relations would not indicate the necessity. However, it would be possible that certain neural activities that are de facto linked to consciousness, could also occur without consciousness. Insofar, epiphenomenalism has no argument against the evolutionary objection. VsEpiphenomenalism Pauen: 5) violates the deeply rooted intuition that mental states are causally effective. E.g. We believe that our feelings are the cause for us to speak of sensations. E.g. That beliefs are responsible for ensuring that we act according to our beliefs. VsEpiphenomenalism Pauen: the absence of consciousness remains completely inconsequential. I 71 Test/Evidence/Proof/Experiment/VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: it is questionable whether empirical evidence of a stable psychophysical correlation under the premises of epiphenomenalism could actually preclude the possibility of a disintegration of mental and neural processes. Test: trivially, a test can only confirm a hypothesis if it was negative as long as the hypothesis was wrong. An experiment that always yields a positive result, regardless of the accuracy of the hypothesis, cannot be a real test. E.g. normally, we would take the statement of a subject that they feel severe pain as evidence of the mental state. Under the premise of epiphenomenalism we cannot do this, though: here, the statement solely depends on neuronal processes. Now that we want to verify whether mental states are involved, it can precisely not be assumed that they (according to epiphenomenalism) usually are involved as a side effect. What would happen now if the hypothetical case occurred and the mental processes failed to take place? I 72 Since they are causally irrelevant, their absence cannot have an effect. I.e. the subject would also speak of their pain if they lacked the experience! Therefore, empirical tests are not suitable to preclude a dissociation of neural and mental states. This does not only affect the perspective of the third, but even that of the first person: the installation of memory traces is causally caused by the event; therefore, the process cannot be affected by the absence of causally irrelevant mental properties. Then I would have to believe to remember an experience that I never had. E.g. The epiphenomenalist should not even be irritated if a device indicates a state of pain that he does not feel. I 73 The reason is always the same: since mental states are causally irrelevant, their absence is, too. VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: with this, he jeopardizes our beliefs about the existence of mental states (which he actually does not deny). E.g. If there is no causal difference between pain and happiness, we could not distinguish them in memory and behavior either! I 109 Identity TheoryVsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: makes the causal efficacy of mental processes without effort, because they simply are always physical processes as well. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Epistemology | Ryle Vs Epistemology | I 53 RyleVsEpistemology: demands, often wrongly, that dispositions express themselves similarly. Since they have realized that "knowledge" and "belief" are dispositional, they think that consequently there would have to be intellectually uniform processes. E.g. Someone who believes that the earth was round, would have to recognize and judge this repeatedly from time to time. I 174f Success Words/Ryle: absurd, pointless to say: that someone finds a treasure in vain, unsuccessfully wins a race, solves a puzzle wrong, a proves sentence invalidly. For this inability is a logical inability, it says nothing about human abilities, but only that winning unsuccessfully is a contradictory expression. RyleVsEpistemology: we will see later that the longing a guaranteed error-free observation is partly stirred by the fact that we do not recognize that observation is a success verb, so that a "faulty observation" is a contradictory expression like "contradictory evidence" or "unsuccessful healing"(correct would be: unsuccessful treatment), also "inconclusive observation" or futile observation are possible. Difference: whether it is a "search" word, or a "find" word. I 177 Deception/Ryle: we call feigned motives frauds or hypocrites, feigned inclinations are called charlatans and incompetents. Synonymous with the difference of ability and inclination. Knowledge/Belief/Ryle: epistemologists like to engage their readers in the distinction between knowledge and belief. Some say the difference is merely gradual, others that knowledge contains an introspective portion which belief lacks, or vice versa. (RyleVsEpistemology). In part, their confusion is because they consider "knowledge" and "belief" incident names. I 178 But even if they are recognized as a dispositional verbs, you also have to realize that they are dispositional verbs of entirely different kind. "Knowledge" is an ability word. The person can bring something in order or condition. "Belief", on the other hand, is a tendency verb and does not mean that something is ordered or produced. I 395 VsEpistemology/Ryle: epistemologists like to compare theoretical constructions with an act of seeing through, or similar to the teaching of a theory. RyleVs: as if Euclid had been equipped beforehand for what he was equipped for after acquisition of the theory. Conversely, epistemologists describe what Euclid did in teaching his theories as something that would be a revival of the original theory work (but is not). They describe path usage as if it were path construction. I 400 ff (+) Epistemology/Mental Processes/Event/Mental State/RyleVsEpistemology: wrong question, pointless: have you made two or three premises between breakfast and lunch? Have drawn one conclusion during dessert or more? Absurd. How long does a conclusion take? Epistemology/Mental States/Assets/RyleVsEpistemology: a realization is not an episode in the life of an explorer. A special division ability or squaring ability would have been expected of epistemology. It is certainly true, because tautological, that correct expressions have their meaning, but that does not entitle to ask where and when these meanings occur. The mere fact that an expression exists to be understood by anyone, says that the meaning of an expression cannot be marked as if it were an event, or as if it belonged to an event. (...) I 409 Processes end with judgments, they are not made of them. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Evans, G. | Davidson Vs Evans, G. | I (b) 20 ff Gareth Evans: Demonstrative identification is the only possible psychological relationship that provides "fundamental identification" (> ostensive definition). If someone thinks they are thinking a thought with singular reference, while they are actually using a name with no reference (>non-existence), no proposition is given for them to think about, and consequently there is no thought for them to think in the first place. If they use a sentence that contains a name with no reference, they express no thoughts at all. DavidsonVsEvans: Cartesian pursuit of knowledge, which is guaranteed to be immune against failures. If it is assumed that all knowledge is given by a mental connection with the object, objects must be found in respect to which errors are impossible. As objects that are necessarily what they seem to be. DavidsonVsDescartes: there simply are no such items. Not even appearances are all that which they are thought to be! Even the aspects of the sense data can not be protect against misidentification, unless they are really objects. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evans, G. | Verschiedene Vs Evans, G. | Frank I 571 Background/VsEvans: Question: is the following not unnecessarily involved? 1. a knowledge of what it means that any item is F, and 2. a knowledge of what it means that any object is a. The second would be a piece of knowledge of exactly the same kind as the first. So you may not have to assume that there are singular thoughts that somehow more closely contain the exercise of this knowledge and consequently you need not to have a notion of basic identification! EvansVsVs: a knowledge of what it means that something is F is a knowledge of how it is that any element of the objective order is F, and correspondingly for a. I.e. even if one were to drop the idea of basic identification, the overall picture of "I" thinking, "here" thinking and "this" thinking would be fundamentally similar: the role that the notion of the basic level played in this book would instead have been taken over by the notion of the objective or impersonal conception of the world, whereby the mastery of such thinking would be dependent upon an understanding of how it relates to the objectively viewed world. But it is not easy to tell exactly what that means: what it means to know exactly that any element is or is here or I am any element of the objective order! It is not clear what we want at all with this demand, if we do not assume that the subject formulates the truth of such statements Fra I 572 and can make decisions under favorable circumstances. It also seems that we could not make such an assumption at all: (Section 6.3 (not in this file): "Reference system": Reference System/Evans: such a thinking mode will not be able to reach a higher degree of impersonality. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Dummett Vs Frege, G. | Brandom II 74 Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them. Brandom II 173 Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force). Dummett I 15 Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift)(1). I 51 DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference. Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply. Dummett I 61 DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color. I 63. Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker. I 64 Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises. I 79 Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained. I 90 ++ - Language/Thinking/Perception I 93 + - DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation". I 104 - Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. I 106 Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally) I 122 - DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module. I 124 + DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Frege, G. | Waismann Vs Frege, G. | Waismann I 77 Frege: Definition of the number in two steps a) when two sets are equal. b) Definition of the term "number": it is equal if each element of one set corresponds to one element of the other set. Unique relation. Under Def "Number of a Set"/Frege: he understands the set of all sets equal to it. Example: the number 5 is the totality of all classes of five in the world. VsFrege: how shall we determine that two sets are equal? Apparently by showing such a relation. For example, if you have to distribute spoons on cups, then the relation did not exist before. As long as the spoons were not on the cups, the sets were not equal. However, this does not correspond to the sense in which the word equal is used. So it is about whether you can put the spoons on the cups. But what does "can" mean? I 78 That the same number of copies are available. Not the assignment determines the equivalence, but vice versa. The proposed definition gives a necessary, but not sufficient condition for equal numbers and defines the expression "equal number" too narrowly. Class: List ("school class") logical or term (mammals) empirical. With two lists it is neither emopirical nor logical to say that they can be assigned to each other. Example 1. Are there as many people in this room as in the next room? An experiment provides the answer. 2. Are 3x4 cups equal to 12 spoons? You can answer this by drawing lines, which is not an experiment, but a process in a calculus. According to Frege, two sets are not equal if the relation is not established. You have defined something, but not the term "equal numbered". You can extend the definition by saying that they can be assigned. But again this is not correct. For if the two sets are given by their properties, it always makes sense to assert their "being-assignment", (but this has a different meaning, depending on the criterion by which one recognizes the possibility of assignment: that the two are equal, or that it should make sense to speak of an assignment! In fact, we use the word "equal" according to different criteria: of which Frege emphasizes only one and makes it a paradigm. Example 1. If there are 3 cups and 3 spoons on the table, you can see at a glance how they can be assigned. I 79 2. If the number cannot be overlooked, but it is arranged in a clear form, e.g. square or diamond, the equal numbers are obvious again. 3. The case is different, if we notice something of two pentagons, that they have the same number of diagonals. Here we no longer understand the grouping directly, it is rather a theorem of geometry. 4. Equal numbers with unambiguous assignability 5. The normal criterion of equality of numbers is counting (which must not be understood as the representation of two sets by a relation). WaismannVsFrege: Frege's definition does not reflect this different and flexible use. I 80 This leads to strange consequences: According to Frege, two sets must necessarily be equal or not for logical reasons. For example, suppose the starlit sky: Someone says: "I don't know how many I've seen, but it must have been a certain number". How do I distinguish this statement from "I have seen many stars"? (It is about the number of stars seen, not the number of stars present). If I could go back to the situation, I could recount it. But that is not possible. There is no way to determine the number, and thus the number loses its meaning. For example, you could also see things differently: you can still count a small number of stars, about 5. Here we have a new series of numbers: 1,2,3,4,5, many. This is a series that some primitive peoples really use. It is not at all incomplete, and we are not in possession of a more complete one, but only a more complicated one, beside which the primitive one rightly exists. You can also add and multiply in this row and do so with full rigor. Assuming that the things of the world would float like drops to us, then this series of numbers would be quite appropriate. For example, suppose we should count things that disappear again during counting or others emerge. Such experiences would steer our concept formation in completely different ways. Perhaps words such as "much", "little", etc. would take the place of our number words. I 80/81 VsFrege: his definition misses all that. According to it, two sets are logically necessary and equal in number, without knowledge, or they are not. In the same way, Einstein had argued that two events are simultaneous, independent of observation. But this is not the case, but the sense of a statement is exhausted in the way of its verification (also Dummett) Waismann: So you have to pay attention to the procedure for establishing equality in numbers, and that's much more complicated than Frege said. Frege: second part of the definition of numbers: Def Number/Frege: is a class of classes. ((s) Elsewhere: so not by Frege! FregeVs!). Example: the term "apple lying on the table comes to the number 3". Or: the class of apples lying on the table is an element of class 3. This has the great advantage of evidence: namely that the number is not expressed by things, but by the term. WaismannVsFrege: But does this do justice to the actual use of the number words? Example: in the command "3 apples!" the number word certainly has no other meaning, but after Frege this command can no longer be interpreted according to the same scheme. It does not mean that the class of apples to be fetched is an element of class 3. Because this is a statement, and our language does not know it. WaismannVsFrege: its definition ties the concept of numbers unnecessarily to the subject predicate form of our sentences. In fact, it results the meaning of the word "3" from the way it is used (Wittgenstein). RussellVsFrege: E.g. assuming there were exactly 9 individuals in the world. Then we could define the cardinal numbers from 0 to 9, but the 10, defined as 9+1, would be the zero class. Consequently, the 10 and all subsequent natural numbers will be identical, all = 0. To avoid this, an additional axiom would have to be introduced, the Def "infinity axiom"/Russell: means that there is a type to which infinitely many individuals belong. This is a statement about the world, and the structure of all arithmetic depends essentially on the truth of this axiom. Everyone will now be eager to know if the infinity axiom is true. We must reply: we do not know. It is constructed in a way that it eludes any examination. But then we must admit that its acceptance has no meaning. I 82 Nor does it help that one takes the "axiom of infinity" as a condition of mathematics, because in this way one does not win mathematics as it actually exists: The set of fractions is dense everywhere, but not: The set of fractions is dense everywhere if the infinity axiom applies. That would be an artificial reinterpretation, only conceived to uphold the doctrine that numbers are made up of real classes in the world (VsFrege: but only conditionally, because Frege does not speak of classes in the world). Waismann I 85 The error of logic was that it believed it had firmly underpinned arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are floodable by our thinking, but not movable." WaismannVsFrege: only the expression "justify" the arithmetic gives us a wrong picture, I 86 as if its building were built on basic truths, while she is a calculus that proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system that rests on nothing. We can only describe arithmetic, i.e. give its rules, not justify them. Waismann I 163 The individual numerical terms form a family. There are family similarities. Question: are they invented or discovered? We reject the notion that the rules follow from the meaning of the signs. Let us look at Frege's arguments. (WaismannVsFrege) II 164 1. Arithmetic can be seen as a game with signs, but then the real meaning of the whole is lost. If I set up calculation rules, did I then communicate the "sense" of the "="? Or just a mechanical instruction to use the sign? But probably the latter. But then the most important thing of arithmetic is lost, the meaning that is expressed in the signs. (VsHilbert) Waismann: Assuming this is the case, why do we not describe the mental process right away? But I will answer with an explanation of the signs and not with a description of my mental state, if one asks me what 1+1 = 2 means. If one says, I know what the sign of equality means, e.g. in addition, square equations, etc. then one has given several answers. The justified core of Frege's critique: if one considers only the formulaic side of arithmetic and disregards the application, one gets a mere game. But what is missing here is not the process of understanding, but interpretation! I 165 For example, if I teach a child not only the formulas but also the translations into the word-language, does it only make mechanical use? Certainly not. 2. Argument: So it is the application that distinguishes arithmetic from a mere game. Frege: "Without a content of thought an application will not be possible either. WaismannVsFrege: Suppose you found a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is for pleasure only. Would it not express a thought anymore? Why cannot one make use of a chess position? Because it does not express thoughts. WaismannVsFrege: Let us say you find a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is just for fun. Would it notexpress a thought anymore? Chess: it is premature to say that a chess position does not express thoughts. Waismann brings. For example figures stand for troops. But that could just mean that the pieces first have to be turned into signs of something. I 166 Only if one has proved that there is one and only one object of the property, one is entitled to occupy it with the proper name "zero". It is impossible to create zero. A >sign must designate something, otherwise it is only printer's ink. WaismannVsFrege: we do not want to deny or admit the latter. But what is the point of this assertion? It is clear that numbers are not the same as signs we write on paper. They only become what they are through use. But Frege rather means: that the numbers are already there somehow before, that the discovery of the imaginary numbers is similar to that of a distant continent. I 167 Meaning/Frege: in order not to be ink blotches, the characters must have a meaning. And this exists independently of the characters. WaismannVsFrege: the meaning is the use, and what we command. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Frege, G. | Newen Vs Frege, G. | I 209 Physicalism/Identity Theory/New: because of the possibility that mental phenomena could be realized in different ways (functionalism) token physicalism was abandoned in favor of type physicalism. (VsToken Physicalism) Functionalism/Newen: Problem: we do not know what the possibly physical states have in common ((s) on a mental level). Mental Universals/Newen: are needed then. Bieri: Problem: either a theory about mental universals seems empirically implausible. Or it is empirically plausible, then it does not tell us what we want to know. (Bieri: Anal. Ph. d. Geistes, p. 41). Functional State/Newen: similar to dispositions in that it can be characterized by hypothetical relations between initial situations and consequent states. I 211 VsFunctionalism/Newen: qualia problem FunctionalismVsVs: zombie argument: I 212 There need be no qualia to explain behavior. Mental Causation/Newen: is still an open question. NS I 90 Descriptions/Theory/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: the objective is to overcome two problems: 1) identity statements: need to be informative 2) negative existential statements or statements with empty descriptions must be sensible. Names/Personal Names/Russell: Thesis: names are nothing but abbreviations for decriptions. Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1) There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion). 2) There is not more than one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) 3) Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content). This is about three possible situations where the sentence may be wrong: a) nobody wrote Waverley, b) several persons did it, c) the author is not a Scot. NS I 91 Identity/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: if the identity of Cicero with Tullius is necessary (as self-identity), how can the corresponding sentence be informative then? Solution/Russell: 1) There is at least one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 2) There is not more than one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 1*) There is at least one author of "De Oratore" 2*) There is not more than one author of "De Oratore" 3) whoever denounced Catiline is identical with the author of "De Oratore". Empty Names/Empty Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Solution: 1) There is at least one present king of France 2) There is not more than one present king of France 3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. Thus the sentence makes sense, even though the first part of the statement is incorrect. Negative Existential Statements/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: assigning a sensible content. It is not the case that 1) there is at least one flying horse 2) not more than one flying horse. Thus, the negative existence statement "The flying horse does not exist" makes sense and is true. RussellVsFrege/RussellvsFregean Sense/Newen/Schrenk: this is to avoid that "sense" (the content) must be assumed as an abstract entity. Truth-Value Gaps/RussellVsFrege: they, too, are thus avoided. Point: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, however, now become general propositions about the world. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Karttunen, L. | Stalnaker Vs Karttunen, L. | II 56 Def factive verbs/Lauri Karttunen/Stalnaker: e.g. to know, to regret, to discover, to see. non-factive verbs: e.g. to assert, to believe, to intend, faktive verbs: if V is a factive verb then x' presupposes V-en that P (and I would say also includes (entails)) that P. factive verbs/Karttunen: a) Def fully factive: here it is not only the assertion or denial of the proposition x V-t that P requires the presupposition but also the assumption (supposition) of this proposition in an antecedent or the assertion that the proposition could be true. E.g. to regret, to forget, to resent. b) Def semi-factive/Karttunen: here it is only the assertion or the denial of the proposition that requires the presupposition. E.g. Sam regrets that he voted for Nixon. If Sam regrets that he voted for Nixon he is an idiot. (fully factive). E.g. to regret something: here is strongly presupposed E.g. semi-factive: to discover, to recognize: here the presupposition is not as strong. Def strong presupposition/Karttunen/Stalnaker: if P is made necessary II 57 By MQ and M~Q then Q strongly presupposes P. Def weak presupposition/Karttunen/Stalnaker: corresponds to the normal presupposition. Strong/weak presupposition/factive/semi-factive/StalnakerVsKarttunen: I deny the theoretical approach and the clarity of the examples. E.g. When Harry discovers that his wife is making out, he will be upset. If Harry had discovered that his wife making out, he would have been upset If Harry would understand.... Explanation/StalnakerVsKarttunen: surely here is always a presupposition in play. But difference: a) if the speaker strictly assumes something ((s) explicitly) then he does not presuppose it. b) if something is questionable for the speaker he cannot assume that he already knows it. E.g. Karttunen: Did you regret - understand - note that you did not tell the truth? II 58 Pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here the restrictions on the presuppositions can be changed without the truth conditions (tr.cond.) changing so we can see differences between statements of the first and second person or between such of a third person and postulate questions without different semantic types of propositions. That means despite the differences we can say that the statements have the same semantic content. StalnakerVsSemantic approach: here we cannot say that. II 59 Compound propositions/complex sentence/presupposition/Stalnaker: how do the presuppositions behave that require a conditional to the presuppositions that are demanded by the parts of the conditional? Conjunction/conditional/presupposition/Karttunen: thesis: S be a proposition of the form A and B or of the form if A then B. a) Conjunction: S presupposes that C iff either A presupposes that C or B presupposes that C and A includes (entails) not semantically that C. That means the presuppositions of a conjunction are those that are required by one of the conjuncts minus any other presupposition that are semantically included by the other conjunct (entailment). ((s) Entailment: is truth-functional (truth-conditional)). b) Conditional: the presuppositions of the conditional are those that are either demanded by the antecedent or the consequent minus those that are required by the consequent while semantically being included by the antecedent (entails). E.g. "Harry is married and Harry's wife is a great cook". Conjunction: here the reversal of the order is not acceptable. Moreover, the second conjunct can also stand alone. Conjunction/Karttunen/Stalnaker: when we interpret his analysis semantically (truth-functional) then we have to say that this conjunction is not truth-functional because the truth values (tr.v.) depend on the entailment between the conjunction. This implicates that this "and" is not symmetrical. A and B may be wrong, while B and A is no truth value. StalnakerVsKarttunen: that would implicate more complicated rules. II 60 Solution/Stalnaker: pragmatically interpreted we need neither ad hoc semantics nor pragmatic rules Explanation: after a proposition was asserted the speaker can reasonably assume it for the rest of the conversation. That means after A has been pronounced it became part of the background before B was pronounced. Even if A was not initially presupposed, one can assert A and B, because at that time, when you come to B, the context has changed and thus A was presupposed. Conditional/pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here we must distinguish explicit assumption (supposition) of presuppositions. If-proposition: is explicit. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Lakatos, I. | Hacking Vs Lakatos, I. | I 191 LakatosVsKuhn: "mob psychology". Vs reduction of the history of science to sociology. That leaves no room left for the sacrosanct values truth, objectivity, rationality and reason. HackingVsLakatos: contributes nothing to what you should reasonably believe. Is exclusively turned backwards. I 202 Degenerative/Lakatos: poor research programs: E.g. Instead of malnutrition a viral disease of the population was erroneously assumed. Instead of beriberi epidemic. Malnutrition through new methods of steam peeling of rice. Degenerative/Lakatos: any modification of the theory has not been made before but only after observations (!)!. HackingVsLakatos: does not help to choose new programs without proof of previous performance. E.g. Is the attempt to identify cancer viruses progressive or degenerative? We will know that later. I 205 Objectivity/Knowledge/Lakatos: only with hindsight! The only fixed point is that knowledge increases. His philosophy ignores the representation problem. Lakatos Thesis: regardless of our views on the truth and "reality" we can simply see to it that knowledge grows. HackingVsLakatos: there is nothing that has increased more steadily and strongly over the centuries than the comments on the Talmud. These comments are the most thoroughly thought through texts that we know! They are far better thought out than almost all the texts of the scientific literature. Is that a rational activity by Lakatos?. I 206 Instead of increasing the knowledge he should say: increasing the number of theories!. I 207 External History/Lakatos: marginal conditions of research. Internal History/Lakatos: what people have believed, is inconsequential, story of anonymous and autonomous research programs. (HackingVs). I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: falsificationism cannot be right, because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. HackingVsLakatos: These assumptions have now been ridiculed for 15 years, but Lakatos’ reasoning is superficial. He only has one E.g.: Galilei’s observation of sunspots through a telescope: Seeing/Lakatos. this could not have been merely seeing. Experiment/Proof/Lakatos: no factual statement can ever be proved by an experiment. Assertions cannot be proved on the basis of experience. That is a logical principle. HackingVsLakatos: that is shadow-boxing with the word "prove". |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Field Vs Lewis, D. | I 233 Knowledge/Belief/Explanation/Mathematics/Lewis: consequently, since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem. FieldVsLewis: at least 4 points, why this does not exclude the epistemic concerns: 1) not all the facts about the realm of mathematical antities apply necessarily. But suppose it were so, then there are still facts about the mathematical and non-mathematical realm together! E.g. (A) 2 = the number of planets closer to the Sun than the Earth. (B) for a natural number n there is a function that depicts the natural numbers smaller than n on the set of all particles in the universe ((s) = there is a finite number of particles). (C) beyond all sp.t. points there is an open region, for which there is a 1: 1 differentiable representation. I 234 of this region on an open subset of R4 (space, quadruples of real numbers). (D) there is a differentiable function y of spatial points on real numbers, so that the gradient of y indicates the gravitational force on each object, as measured by the unit mass of that object. Field: these facts are all contingent. But they are partly about the mathematical realm (mathematical entities). Explanation/FieldVsLewis: There remains the problem of the explanation of such "mixed" statements. (Or the correlation of these with our beliefs). Solution: You can divide these statements: an a) purely mathematical component (without reference to physical theories, but rather on non-mathematical entities, E.g. quantities with basic elements, otherwise the condition would be too strong). Important argument: this component can then be regarded as "necessarily true". b) purely non-mathematical component (without reference to mathematics). I 235 2) FieldVsLewis: even with regard to purely mathematical facts, Lewis’ answer is too simple. Necessary Facts/Mathematics: to what extent should they be necessary in the realm of mathematics? They are not logically necessary! And they cannot be reduced to logical truths by definition. Of course they are mathematically necessary in the sense that they follow from the laws of mathematics. E.g. Similarly, the existence of electrons is physically necessary, because it follows from the laws of physics. FieldVsLewis: but in this physical case, Lewis would not speak of a pseudo-problem! But why should the fact that numbers exist mathematically necessary be a pseudo-problem?. Mathematical Necessity/Field: false solution: you could try to object that mathematical necessity is absolute necessity, while physical necessity is only a limited necessity. Metaphysical Necessity/Field: or you could say that mathematical statements. I 236 Are metaphysically necessary, but physical statements are not. FieldVs: It is impossible to give content to that. I 237 3) FieldVsLewis: he assumes a controversial relation between Counterfactual Conditional and necessity. It is certainly true that nothing meaningful can be said about E.g. what would be different if the number 17 did not exist. And that is so precisely because the antecedent gives us no indication of what alternative mathematics should be considered to be true in this case. I 238 4) FieldVsLewis: there is no reason to formulate the problem of the explanation of the reliability of our mathematical belief in modal or counterfactual expressions. II 197 Theoretical Terms/TT/Introduction/Field: TT are normally not introduced individually, but in a whole package. But that is no problem as long as the correlative indeterminacy is taken into account. One can say that the TT are introduced together as one "atom". E.g. "belief" and "desire" are introduced together. Assuming both are realized multiply in an organism: Belief: because of the relations B1 and B2 (between the organism and internal representations). Desired: because of D1 and D2. Now, while the pairs (B1, D1) and (B2, D2) have to realize the (term-introductory) theory. II 198 The pairs (B1, D2) and (B2, D1) do not have to do that. ((s) exchange of belief and desire: the subject believes that something else will fulfill its desire). FieldVsLewis: for this reason we cannot accept its solution. Partial Denotation/Solution/Field: we take the TT together as the "atom" which denotes partially as a whole. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Locke, J. | Quine Vs Locke, J. | I 411 ff Properties/Quine: question: whether properties are analogous to the (already accepted) sensory qualities (accepted in the common sense like the elementary particles). We can invoke continuity here, analogous to the particles. This shows the widespread preference for properties. (QuineVsProperties) I 412 For lack of curiosity any non-sensuous properties are projected analogous to sensory qualities, consequently as recurring features of subjective scenes that take place in our mind. Another reason: Some are tempted by the object-oriented patterns of our thinking to see the main content of each sentence in the things about which the sentence is. So a predicative sentence is less understood as a sentence on the object than about the object and a property. Locke: took the view that general terms are names of general ideas QuineVsLocke/QuineVsIdeas: fallacy of subtraction: tendency to extract too much from "about" or "talks about". Such a person will be of the opinion that any general term for physical objects such as "round" and "dog" simultaneously symbolizes a property. But then (he will think) any argument for physical objects assuming utility has to speak even more for properties! Because these terms neatly symbolize a single property while they do not correspond so seamlessly with the indefinite number of objects to which they apply. V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be of this or that nature, but words are out there, where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve the transmission of ideas! (>NominalismVsLocke). Quine: it is probably true that in language learning we learn how words are to be connected to the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Armstrong Vs Mackie, J. L. | Arm III 50 Induction/Counterfactual conditional/Co.co./Regularity theory/Mackie: if it is very likely that all Fs are Gs, and we look at an a of which we believe or know that it is not an F or that it does not exist: Assuming that a is an F, it is nevertheless inductively very likely that a is a G. Therefore we are entitled to the Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be a G. Armstrong: that is neutral in itself and can now be used to show that Humeean uniformities could also support counterfactual conditionals. And that is simply because of induction. Then the Counterfactual conditional is justified. III 51 Vs: 1) then it must be possible to solve the problem of induction, even if assuming that the laws of nature (LoN) are mere LoN. But I believe that the reg. th. is committed to skepticism regarding induction (see above). Vs: 2) a) If law statements support Counterfactual Conditional, then they would also have to inherit the uncertainty of induction! E.g. assuming all Fs are Gs, but there are doubts as to whether that is a law. Then the evidence is likely, but not certain. The corresponding Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be highly probable that it would be a G. The consequence of this Counterfactual Conditional would be a probability statement. ArmstrongVsMackie: but we would not establish this Counterfactual Conditional Either it is a law that Fs are Gs or it is not. If it is not, the Counterfactual conditional is simply wrong. b) it appears logically possible that a being could know the content of all laws, but this knowledge or belief are not acquired inductively. Couldn’t this being use GA just like us to support Counterfactual Conditional? That seems possible. Nevertheless: how would it be possible if the assertion of Counterfactual Conditional was based on an inductive inference from antecedent to consequent? (As demanded by Mackie). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Materialism | Functionalism Vs Materialism | Danto2 I 272 FunctionalismVsMaterialism: functionalism has created serious problems for materialist theories of the mind. One cannot say that the mind is nothing other than the brain, and consequently nothing more than this material system, when the mind itself can be defined functionally, when something is given that supports all its features, but otherwise is different from the brain. How can the mind be equated with the brain and with the computer, if on the other hand the computer and the brain cannot be equated with each other? Identity is transitive. That would not be fulfilled here. Avra I 148 Holism/Avramides: therefore one sometimes says that behaviorism does not manage to find an access to the holism of the mental. Solution: Functionalism: was specially designed to take this holism into account. FunctionalismVsMaterialism: has in relation to holism an advantage over the old materialism, which is sometimes called "central state materialism". (e.g. Smart 1969, Place 1969). Def Central State Materialism/Avramides: (is a type of physicalism). Mental states and mental events can be reduced to physical states and events. Problem: then certain beings cannot have a mind because of the certain form of their inner structure. Solution: Functionalism: now allows "variable realization" of states of mind. Thus it identifies mentality not with a property of the 1st level, but with a property of the 2nd level (property of property). Property 2nd level of systems. Functional property: is a property of a property. I.e. even beings without grey matter in their skulls can still be characterized as sensitive, cognitive beings. (Variable Realization). Variable Realization/Functionalism: can assume variable realization, because it does not refer to certain structure or matter, but to inputs and outputs. Thus he can avoid the problems of reductionism and Cartesianism. He still refers to behavior. AvramidesVsFunctionalism: but it is still independent of "normal evidence" (normal behavior). At first the attribution must not refer to the irreducible mental (otherwise circular). But this is not yet certain with the reference to input/output. I 149 Solution/Lewis: his version of functionalism (1972,83a,83d)). |
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| Modal Logic | Quine Vs Modal Logic | Chisholm II 185 QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants). --- Lewis IV 32 QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description. QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic. LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial. --- I 338 But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic. Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity. --- I 339 (1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows: (2) "9 > 4" is analytically. It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction: "If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)" if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional. C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication". Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable. --- I 339 Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator. If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all. --- I 340 An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate? --- I 341 It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4 Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque. The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other. Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent. (4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw). --- I 342 (This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p". Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is: (5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x as (6) x = y and x exclusively then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6): (7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y) However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p. --- I 343 The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. --- I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret (8) [9 > 4] is necessary (Brackets for class) and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction. One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible. --- I 344 Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9. This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets". This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say (§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II). But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object. E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified? Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary. --- I 344 Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent. Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.) --- I 345 But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality. There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define "P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))". Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties. But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic. --- VI 41 Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators. Quine: without modal operators: E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future." ((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx). Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators. --- VI 102 Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. --- VI 103 Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence). --- VI 104 QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. --- XI 52 QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. --- XI 53 Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity. 2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p" 3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Modal Realism | Verschiedene Vs Modal Realism | Schwarz I 61 VsModal Realism/VsLewis/Ontology/Schwarz: (many authors: he mistakes the essence of modality, creates a basis for skepticism, nihilism and moral decay.) Real existence of all these "parallel universes" is completely implausible. LewisVsVs: the problem with common sense is to be taken seriously, but the methodological advantages of theory prevail. (1986e(1): vii) Solution/Lewis: Limitation of quantifiers: because we limit ourselves to our world, it is right to say that there are no talking donkeys. VsLewis: his possible worlds (poss. w.) are epistemically inaccessible. How do we know they exist? In principle, we could never learn anything about them! LewisVsVs: the objection presupposes that knowledge is acquired causally (causal theory of knowledge) ((s) that possible worlds are not researched logically). If that were correct, we would have no mathematical knowledge either. (1986e(1):109). Schw I 62 VsLewis: this applies only to mathematical Platonism (Group: Lewis: mathematical Platonist - FieldVsLewis). Sv I 64 Modal Realism/Possible World/VsLewis/Schwarz: some: Lewis' possible world should be part of reality, because "world" and "reality" are synonymous expressions for the totality of all things. (Plantinga 1976(2), 256f Lycan 1979(3), 290): the idea of real things outside the world is simply inconsistent. Reality/World/LewisVsVs: Lewis distinguishes between world and reality: "real world" refers only to a small part of all things (reality includes world, world only part of reality). Thus the contradictions dissolve. Schwarz: this is a neutral formulation of modal realism. Question: what should the reality of maximum objects in space-time have to do with modality? Modality/van InwagenVsLewis/Schwarz: this is about what our world could have been like, not about what any of our isolated things are like. (1885(4), 119,1986(5), 226, Plantinga 1987(6)). LewisVsVs: Modal operators are quantifiers about such things. Van InwagenVsLewis: the objection goes deeper: For example, suppose there are exactly 183 spatiotemporal maximum objects. This is not analytically wrong. There is also no rigid designator. Schw I 65 So it might be true or it might not. Lewis seems to claim that there can be as many space-time maximum items as there are sets. VsLewis: with it the whole of the worlds has become contingent! Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: he has to avoid this, because he wants to analyze contingency over possible worlds. ((s) i.e. contingency means that there are deviating possible worlds, i.e. not first the set of the Possible World (= maximum objects in space-time) and then say that this is the contingency, because then the contingency is not contingent, because it would be a non-contingent limit, if there are only 183 possible worlds. (van InwagenVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis). ((s) if it were contingent, one could not simply say "there are 183 possible worlds". In other words: "how many possibilities there are depends on the possibilities": circular - but: e.g. "how long it takes depends on the possibilities: e.g. how many attempts you make. Different and also correct: e.g. how many possibilities there are, depends (not on the possibilities) but on the properties, e.g. how wearable the object is. (Lewis ditto). Contingency/Schwarz: means that there are different possible worlds. But the totality of all possible worlds does not exist in single worlds. Therefore the totality itself cannot be different than it is! (s) The totality is not the object of consideration in a possible world.) Totality/Modal Logic/Lewis/Schwarz: unrestricted statements about possible worlds are unrestricted modal statements ((s) shift of the range then not possible! see above). Schwarz: as such, they elude the influence of modal operators: Example: "There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak" is equivalent to "there is a possible world in which donkeys can speak": "N There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak". And with "M There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak." (s) Logical form: Mp > NMp. (S5). Mp > MMp. (neither T nor S4, reduction law, > Hughes/Cresswell(7) p. 34)). Modal Realism/VsLewis/Schwarz: Problem: how the non-contingency of the possible world fits with its characterization as parallel universes. Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: either we talk about the totality of reality: then the number of the possible worlds is not contingent - or we talk about reality ((s) Real World), then there is necessarily only one universe (because in every world there is only one, the world itself). Contingency/Schwarz: empirical problem: according to the relativity theory, two universes could be connected by a wormhole. But it is contingent whether this occurs. LewisVs: that is absolutely impossible! ((s) Problem: one would have to claim before the wormhole that there are two universes that can be connected, and that would be a statement about (further) reality and not about (narrower) reality (=Real World) (in which there can only be one universe). (1986e(1):71f) Note: this is the "island universe" (Richards 1975(8),107f, Bigelow/Pargetter 1987(9)). Island Universes/Bricker: (2001(10),35 39): (completely different version: recombination principle: there is a possible world w, which contains a duplicate of the mereological sum of Hume and Lewis and nothing else - also no space-time between the Hume duplicate and the Lewis duplicate. Consequently, w contains two spatially isolated parts. SchwarzVsBricker: this assumes that space-time relations necessarily require substantial space-time. ((s) >Substantivalism). Solution/Lewis/Schwarz: (1986e,72) Replacement Possibility: his theory allows worlds in which several four-dimensional universes are connected only along an additional fifth dimension, but are isolated in the four normal dimensions. If this is not possible, we must loosen the criterion of spatio-temporal connectedness. Schwarz I 66 Two alternatives: (1986f(11), 74f) a) Worlds are connected by relations analog to space-time relations. b) The inhabitants of a possible world stand in any perfectly natural external relation to each other. Schwarz: However, the spatial-temporal distance is the only clear example of this. SchwarzVsLewis: that does not solve the general problem: that things (totality of the possible worlds) could also be different. Schwarz I 68 VsModal Realism/Schwarz: ontological overload. Alternatives: a) "ersatz worlds" - b) fictionalism. Def ersatz world/Ersatzism/Terminology/Lewis: tries to replace possible worlds with sentence sets or facts. Def Fictionalism/VsModal Realism/Schwarz: here no special entities come into play when interpreting sentences about (possible worlds). 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979] 3. William G. Lycan [1979]: “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”. In [Loux 1979]: 274-316 4. Peter van Inwagen 1985]: “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity”. In James Tomberlin und Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel 5. Peter van Inwagen [1986]: “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9. In [van Inwagen 2001] 6. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 7. Hughes, G. E., and M. J. Cresswell. (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic. New York, NY: Routledge. 8. Tom Richards [1975]: “The Worlds of David Lewis”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 53: 105–118 9. John Bigelow und Robert Pargetter [1987]: “Beyond the Blank Stare”. Theoria, 53: 97–114 10. Phillip Bricker [2001]: “Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality”. In [Preyer und Siebelt 2001], 27–55 11. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Plato | Aristotle Vs Plato | Bubner I 23 AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king. Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects. Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge. I 120 Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé. I 164 Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology, 2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology. The relationship between the two is problematic. AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development. I 165 Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good. Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities. "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which. I 184 Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". --- Kanitscheider II 35 Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe. Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position). "Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number". II 36 Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement. First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified. World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time. AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius: Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help". Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum. II 37 Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Prior, A. | Belnap Vs Prior, A. | Brandom I 198 BelnapVsPrior: if you introduce logical vocabulary, you must restrict such definitions by the condition that the rule does not allow inferences containing only old vocabulary. This means that the new rules must extend the repertoire conservatively. > Example "boche". Brandom: if these rules are not inferentially conservative, they allow new material inferences and thus change the contents associated with the old vocabulary. The expressive concept of logic requires that no new inferences containing only old vocabulary be made appropriate. Conservativity/Conservative Extension/Dummett: if a logical constant is introduced by introduction and elimination rules, we can call this a conservative extension of language. Brandom II 93 For example, this could apply to Belnap's "tonk": introduction rule of the disjunction and elimination rule of the conjunction: Def "tonk"/Belnap: 1. Rule: licenses the transition from p to p tonk q for any q. 2. Rule: licenses the transition from p tonk q to q. With this we have a "network card for inferences": any inference is allowed! Brandom II 94 PriorVsBelnap/PriorVsGentzen: this is the bankruptcy of definitions in Gentzen's style. BelnapVsPrior: if you introduce logical vocabulary, you can restrict such definitions by the condition that the rule does not allow inferences with only old vocabulary that were not allowed before the introduction of the logical vocabulary. Such a restriction is necessary and sufficient. Brandom: the expressive analysis of the logical vocabulary now gives us a deep reason for this condition: only in this way can the logical vocabulary perform its expressive function. The introduction of new vocabulary would allow new material inferences without the restrictive condition (conservatism) and would thus change the contents correlated with the old vocabulary. ((s) retroactive change, also of the truth values of established sentences). Read: meaning: the meaning, even the logical connections, must be independent of and prior to the determination of the validity of the consequent structures. Logic III 269 Belnap: came to the aid of the view of "analytical validity". What it lacks, he said, is any proof that there is such a connection as "tonk" at all. This is a problem for definitions in general. One cannot define into existence. First of all you have to show that there is such a thing (and only 1). Example "Pro-Sum" of two fractions. (a/b)!(c/d) is defined as (a+c)/ (b+d). If you use numbers, you will quickly come to results that produce completely wrong results. Although it is easy to find originally matching numbers, they cannot be shortened.(> Dubislav). Logic III 270 Belnap: we have not shown, and cannot show, that there is such a connection. The same applies to "tonk". Read: one problem remains: why is there any analogy at all between definitions and links? One problem remains: why is there an analogy between definitions and links at all. It cannot always be wrong to extend a language with new links. One could imagine calculation rules for "conservative" extensions of languages. The old rules must continue to exist. |
Beln I N. Belnap Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World Oxford 2001 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Einstein Vs Quantum Mechanics | Esfeld I 256 Incompleteness/Quantum Mechanics/QM/EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics: For example, suppose two electrons are emitted from one source and move away with opposite spin in opposite directions. Overall state: singlet state. Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen/EPR: if the result of a measurement of the location or momentum of one system is given, then we can predict with certainty the result of the measurement of the same observables of the other system. (without intervention) I 257 Consequence: the quantum mechanics is incomplete. There is therefore an element of reality that corresponds to this physical quantity regardless of whether the second measurement is actually performed. This exists before the first measurement. The quantum mechanics is incomplete because it makes everything dependent on the measurement and therefore does not recognize this element. To justify this one needs the two principles of separability and local effect. Local Effect: to exclude that there is an interaction between the measurement on the first system and the reality on the second system. Separability: to exclude that the determination of the local properties depends on something other than the state the system is in. Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics: further conclusion: quantum systems simultaneously have a definite numerical value of two or more incompatible observables. I 258 For example, an experimenter only decides clearly after the emission which observable he wants to measure. Separability and local effect imply that this decision is irrelevant. Nevertheless, once the decision has been made, we can predict the value of the corresponding observable for the other system. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: therefore the two systems must have a definite value of all observables between which the experimenter can choose. Einstein did not consider this conclusion to be self-evident because it is based on the assumption of separability and the local effect. I 271/272 Metaphysics/Science/Esfeld: Separability and local effect are metaphysical principles in the sense that they are a precise formulation of assumptions that are at the center of our everyday view of nature. I 271/272 The question of whether quantum mechanics is complete also seems to be a metaphysical question. It depends on whether we underline separability and local effect as the foundation of science. Bell's inequality/Bell/Esfeld: Bell has eliminated the seemingly clear distinction between physics and metaphysics! Metaphysics: Einstein's realism shows that metaphysics has predictable consequences that can be tested. "Experimental Metaphysics"/Shimony: (Ferdinand Gonseth, 1948, Michele Besso, 1948): are similar to Quine's position: rejection of the separation between mathematics, science, and philosophy. Every element of our knowledge can be subject to revision. I 273 Thesis: metaphysical questions cannot be decided by experiments! On the contrary: EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics must be understood in the sense of the Quine-Duhem-Thesis: no separation between metaphysics and physics in quantum mechanics. For example, Bell's experiments can be seen as a test of two hypotheses, namely the conjunction of parameter independence and result independence. But the point is: what you think is what the Bell experiments confirm or disprove depends on what background assumptions you base yourself on. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 216 Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics/EPRVsQM/Genz: incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics: Spin has an element of reality. Since quantum mechanics can only consider one of these elements of reality, it is incomplete. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument/Version Bohm: For example, a part of it rests in the laboratory and decays in a time interval into an electron and a positron. (There is no such thing, but it does not matter). (In the real experiment (Aspect) photons were assumed). If Gretel detects the electron, she can be sure that Hänsel has the positron. From a quantum mechanical point of view, the particle pair is a single system. VIII 216 The angular momentum of the particle decaying in its resting system is zero, since the conservation law applies to the angular momentum, it is also zero for the decay products. If, however, only the spins of the particles contribute to their total angular momentum, the law of conservation becomes a conservation law for the sum of the spins. Consequently, the two spins remain coupled. But now the coupling of the spins to the total spin zero guarantees more: that the sum of the settings of the spins in any direction is zero. If the total spin were not zero, it could be that it is zero in x direction, but not in y direction. VIII 217 Example Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bohm: Problem: Gretel can align her star Gerlach apparatus as she wants. The alignment of the device determines which component of the spin of the entering particle should have a "sharp" value with spin 1/2. Hänsel and Gretel choose directions for x or y (perpendicular to the direction of propagation z). Since the two particles fly apart, the chirality is different! Both now want to measure "transversal" spins perpendicular to the extension. VIII 218 Gretel: measures in x direction plus or minus. If she turns the apparatus by 90°, she measures in y direction, again plus or minus. N.B.: Hänsel always measures the opposite. If Gretel has the apparatus in the same direction as Hänsel, she measures the opposite of his spin. If she now turns it in y direction, she has to measure the opposite again, even if Hänsel has not turned his apparatus. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: now claim that Gretel can use it to determine Hänsel's spin in both the x and y directions without disturbing Hänsel's positron in any way. Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: actually it is not the case according to quantum mechanics. Before the measurement it is pointless to speak of a state at all. VIII 219 Bertlmann's Socks/Genz: are not particularly exciting. Corresponds to the "glove correlation": if I find one, I know that I have lost the other. VIII 220 Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: also the spin operators of the positron do not exchange with each other, but a statement about the "sum" is valid: σxσy - σyσx = 2iσz. Translated into the formalism of quantum mechanics, the conclusion of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen is that the state | > of the positron must be both an eigenstate of σx and of σy for certain eigenvalues mx and my. But the quantum mechanics does not know such a state! Unlike the product of operators, the product of eigenvalues is independent of the order! 0 = (mxmy - mymx) | ψ > = (σxσy - σyσx) | ψ > = 2iσz | ψ >, so that | ψ > of σz would have to be destroyed (σy | ψ > = 0). But because σz, just like σx, and σy can have only 1 and -1 but not 0 as eigenvalue, there can be no such state! But the contradiction is one between the formalism of quantum mechanics and the demands of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and none with experimentally verifiable statements. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Reductionism | Avramides Vs Reductionism | Avra I 112 Avramides Reductionism: Reductionism/Avramides: can deny to be committed to attributing thinking without language to a being. Antireductionism/Avramides: might be uncomfortable with the implausible thesis (attribtuted to him) of having to deny thinking without language. Solution/Avramides: ontological asymmetry Vs ontological symmetry: Ontological asymmetry/Avramides: one could argue that my deep epistemic asymmetry (EA) contained ontological implications. If there is to be a deep EA, there would have to be an ontological one. This conditional could be interpreted as follows: Antireductionism: discards the antecedent and thus must reject the consequent. Therefore it is set to ontological symmetry. Reductionism: can assume ontological asymmetry. And with that he seems to be committed to epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVs: that only seems like that! Because the controversy between ReductionismVsAntireductionism runs above that of ontological SymmetryVsAsymmetry. Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that. AvramidesVs: but the flaws in these arguments are obvious. Antireductionism/Avramides: (formal errors aside) how can he accept thinking without language? What exactly is the relationship between epistemic and ontological asymmetry? We will now examine that. I 112 Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language - Antireductionism: must deny it. I 168 Reductionism/Grice/Epistemic/Ontological/Avramides: the controversy over reductionism or antireductionism is not about ontological but epistemological questions. The reductive follwer of Grice accepts deep epistemic asymmetry, Antireductionist: denies it. AvramidesVsReductionism: so he has nothing to do with interpretation and understanding anymore. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Russell, B. | Ryle Vs Russell, B. | Read III 33 Russell fell into the trap in his account of universals: according to his opinion, atomic statements consists of a number of individuals and a universal. E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido-theory of the Fido, it must get its meaning through the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to "being-a-dog" or the universal, dog. (>RyleVsCarnap). Statement/Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals. This is an unjustified step. --- Read III 296 "Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: reference equals meaning. --- Read III 34 > Various AuthorsVsRussell: >statements, >facts. Russell: believed that predicate expressions, verbs, and adjectives related to universals, "is president" refers to presidency, "runs" to what is common to all things that are going. But many philosophers deny that the concept of the object reference can be applied to such parts of speech. Meaning: Russell and others simply identify meaning and object reference. (>reference/VsRussell). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Russell, B. | Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a space-time order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Ryle, G. | Verschiedene Vs Ryle, G. | Lanz in Metz I 279 VsRyle: his analysis is not convincing for elements of conscious experience as feelings or perceptions or mental images or thoughts that are currently occurring. E.g. pain: here something is present to the the consciousness when it is neither recognized thorugh behavior nor verbal utterances. Hare II 142 Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: we may know something without being able to say what we know. For example, how a certain word is used, or a certain dance is danced. HenleVsRyle: but you should not extend that to speech situations. II 143 It is by no means clear that one can always know how a word is used here, even if one cannot say how it is used. Knowledge/Saying/HareVsHenle: but in language it may be clearer than anywhere else. For example, when we explain the use of an expression, we do not have to use it ourselves. Consequently, we can fully know its use in all contexts, even without being able to say how it is used. For example, a child may have learned to use the word "father" and use it correctly, but may not be able to say how it is used because it has not yet learned to use "to mean"! Henle confuses the ability "To decide for logical reasons" whether a statement is true or not with the ability to use the expression "the statement is logically true". Confusion Mention/Use. (doing without knowledge). Hare: who does not know how to use the expression "logically true" could do the former, but not the latter. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Skepticism | Kant Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 129 Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable! Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept. "Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism. Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all. I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors. Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard. Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition! KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition. KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it. World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)). immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371). Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375). DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable. Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation. KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge. I 132 At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable. Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives! I 140 Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects. I 141 Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible! Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion. Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes. Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects). I 142 We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge). I 146 Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations). I 147 Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases. Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion). KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions. I 148 Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible: no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us. Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism. KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge. Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena. KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false. Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life. I 159 Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things. I 168 Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Skepticism/Carnap). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework). KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Nozick Vs Skepticism | II 197 Skepticism/Nozick: we do not try to refute the skeptic. VsSkepticism: other authors: 1) when he argues against knowledge, he already presupposes that it exists. 2) to accept it would be unreasonable, because it is more likely that his extreme conclusions are wrong than that all its premises are true. NozickVs. We do not have to convince the skeptic. We want to explain how knowledge is possible, therefore it is good to find hypotheses which we ourselves find acceptable! II 198 Skepticism/Nozick: Common Variant: claims that someone could believe something even though it is wrong. Perhaps caused by a demon or because he is dreaming or because he is a brain in a vat. But how do these possibilities adopted by the skeptic show that I do not know p? (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p (as above). If (3) is a necessary condition for knowledge that shows the possibility of the skeptic that there is no knowledge. Strong variant: R: Even if p were false, S would still believe that p II 199 This conditional with the same antecedent as (3) and contradictory consequent is incompatible with (3). If (3) is true, R is false. But R is stronger than skepticism requires. Because if (3) were wrong, S could still believe that p. The following conditional is weaker than R, it is merely the negation of (3): T: Not (not p > not (S believes that p)). ((s) >Range: weaker: negation of the entire conditional stronger: the same antecedent, opposite of the consequent ((s) not necessarily negation of consequent) Here: stronger: ".... would have to believe ..." - weaker.. "... could ...") Nozick: While R does not simply deny (3), it asserts its own conditional instead. The truth of (3) is not incompatible with a possible situation (here not possible world) where the person believes p, although p is false. (3) does not cover all possibilities: (3) not p > not (S believes p) That does not mean that in all situations where not p is true, S does not believe that p. Asserting this would mean to say that not p entails not (S believes p) (or logical implication) ((s) >Entailment). But subjunction (conditional) differs from entailment: So the existence of a possible situation in which p is wrong and S still believes p does not show that (3) is false. (? LL). (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where not p and S believes that p. (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. Not every possible situation where p is false is the situation that would prevail if p were false. Possible World: (3) speaks of the ~p world closest to our actual world. It speaks of the non-p neighborhood. Skepticism/SK/Terminology/Nozick: SK stands for the "possibilities of the skeptic": II 200 We could dream of being misled by an evil demon or being brains in a vat. These are attempts to refute (3): (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. But these only attempts succeed if one of these possibilities(dream, vat, demon) prevails when p is false. I.e. only in the next non-p worlds. Even if we were in the vat, (3) could be true, i.e. although - as described by skeptics - p is false and S believes p. ((s) E.g. p: "I am in the Café": false, if I'm in the vat. But I would not believe to be the vat. That is what the skeptic means. If I do not believe the truth (that I am in the vat) and do not know, then my belief is wrong. But then p means "I'm not in the vat."). NozickVsSkepticism: when the skeptic describes a situation SK that would not prevail (sic), even if p were wrong, then this situation SK (vat) does not show that (3) is wrong and does not undermine our knowledge. (see below) ((s) i.e. from the perspective VsSkepticism: the skeptic asserts that all beliefs are wrong, but that is not yet the situation that we are all in the tank). This is just the preliminary consideration, the expected one follows in the next paragraph). Condition C: to exclude skeptical hypothesis: C: not-p > SK (vat situation) does not exist ((s) That is what the skeptic denies!). That excludes every skeptical situation that fulfills C. ((s) it is only about n-p cases). Skepticism: for a vat situation to show that we do not know that p, it must be a situation that could exist if p did not exist, and thus satisfies the negation of C: Negation of C: -not (not p > SK (vat situation) does not exist) Although the vat situations of the skeptic seem to show that (3) is wrong, they do not show it: they satisfy condition C and are therefore excluded! SkepticismVs: could ask why we know that if p were wrong, SK (vat) would not exist. But usually it asks something stronger: do we know that the vat situation does not exist? And if we do not know that, how can we know that p? ((s) reverse order). This brings us to the second way in which the vat situatios could show that we do not know that p: Skeptical results Knowledge/Nozick: according to our approach, S knows that the vat situation does not exist iff II 201 (1) vat situation does not exist (2) S believes that vat situation does not exist (3) If the vat situation existed, then S would not believe that the vat situation did not(!) exist. (4) If the vat situation did not exist, then S would believe that it does not exist. (3) is the necessary condition for knowledge! It follows from it that we do not know that we are not in the vat! Skepticism/Nozick: that is what the skeptic says. But is it not what we say ourselves? It is actually a feature of our approach that it provides this result! Vat/Demon/Descartes/Nozick: Descartes would say that proof of the existence of a good God would not allow us to be in the vat. Literature then focused on whether Descartes would succeed to obtain such evidence. II 202 Nozick: could a good God not have reasons to deceive us? According to Descartes his motives are unknowable for us. Cogito/Nozick: can "I think" only be produced by something existing? Not perhaps also by Hamlet, could we not be dreamed by someone who inspires "I think" in us? Descartes asked how we knew that we were not dreaming, he could also have asked whether we were dreamed about by someone. Def Doxastically Identical/Terminology/Nozick: is a possible situation for S with the current situation, if S believed exactly the same things (Doxa) in the situation. II 203 Skepticism: describes doxastically identical situations where nearly all the believed things are wrong. (Vat). Such possible worlds are possible, because we possess our knowledge through mediation, not directly. It's amazing how different doxastically identical worlds can be. What else could the skeptic hope for? Nozick pro skepticism: we agree that we do not know that "not-vat". II 204 But that does not keep me from knowing that I'm writing this! It is true, I believe it and I would not believe it if it were not true, and if it were true, I would believe it. I.e. our approach does not lead to general skepticism. However, we must ensure that it seems that the skeptic is right and that we do not know that we are not in the vat. VsSkepticism: we must examine its "short step" to the conclusion that we do not know these things, because either this step is wrong or our approach is incoherent. Not seclusion II 204 Completed/Incompleteness/Knowledge/Nozick: Skepticism: (wrongly) assumes that our knowledge is complete under known logical implication: if we progress from something known to something entailed, we allegedly do not leave the realm of knowledge. The skeptic tries the other way around, of course: if you do not know that q, and you know that p entails q, then it should follow that you do not know that p. E.g. ((s) If you do not know that you are not in the vat, and sitting here implies not being in the vat, then you do not know that you're sitting here, if you know that the implication exists. (contraposition).) Terminology: Contraposition: knowledge that p >>: entails Then the (skeptical) principle of closure under known implication is: P: K(p >> q) & Kp > Kq. II 205 Nozick: E.g. if you know that two sentences are incompatible, and you know that the first one is true, then you know that the negation of the second one is true. Contraposition: because you do not know the second one, you do not know the first. (FN 48) Vs: you could pick on the details and come to an iteration: the person might have forgotten inferences etc. Finally you would come to KK(p >> q) & KKp Kq: amplifies the antecedent and is therefore not favorable for the skeptics. II 206 NozickVsSkepticism: the whole principle P is false. Not only in detail. Knowledge is not closed under known logical implication. (FN 49) S knows that p if it has a true belief and fulfills (3) and (4). (3) and (4) are themselves not closed under known implication. (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. If S knows that p, then the belief is that p contingent on the truth of p. And that is described by (3). Now it may be that p implies q (and S knows that), that he also believes that q, but this belief that q is not subjunktivically dependent on the truth of q. Then he does not fulfill (3') if q were wrong, S would not believe q. The situation where q is wrong could be quite different from the one where p is wrong. E.g. the fact that they were born in a certain city implies that they were born on the earth, but not vice versa. II 207 And pondering the respective situations would also be very different. Thus the belief would also be very different. Stronger/Weaker: if p implies q (and not vice versa), then not-q (negation of consequent) is much stronger than not-p (negation of the antecedent). Assuming various strengths there is no reason to assume that the belief would be the same in both situations. (Doxastically identical). Not even would the beliefs in one be a proper subset of the other! E.g. p = I'm awake and sitting on a chair in Jerusalem q = I'm not in the vat. The first entails the second. p entails q. And I know that. If p were wrong, I could be standing or lying in the same city or in a nearby one. ((s) There are more ways you can be outside of a vat than there are ways you can be inside). If q were wrong, I would have to be in a vat. These are clearly two different situations, which should make a big difference in what I believe. If p were wrong, I would not believe that p. If q were wrong, I would nevertheless still believe that q! Even though I know that p implies q. The reason is that (3) is not closed under known implication. It may be that (3) is true of one statement, but not of another, which is implied by it. If p entails q and we truthfully believe that p, then we do not have a false belief that q. II 208 Knowledge: if you know something, you cannot a have false belief about it. Nevertheless, although p implies q, we can have a false belief that q (not in vat)! "Would not falsely believe that" is in fact not completed under known implication either. If knowledge were merely true belief, it would be closed under implication. (Assuming that both statements are believed). Because knowledge is more than belief, we need additional conditions of which at least one must be open (not completed) under implication. Knowledge: a belief is only knowledge when it covaries with the fact. (see above). Problem: This does not yet ensure the correct type of connection. Anyway, it depends on what happens in situations where p is false. Truth: is what remains under implication. But a condition that does not mention the possible falseness, does not provide us covariance. Belief: a belief that covaries with the facts is not complete. II 209 Knowledge: and because knowledge involves such a belief, it is not completed, either. NozickVsSkepticism: he cannot simply deny this, because his argument that we do not know that we are not in the vat uses the fact that knowledge needs the covariance. But he is in contradiction, because another part of his argument uses the assumption that there is no covariance! According to this second part he concludes that you know nothing at all if you do not know that they are not in the vat. But this completion can only exist if the variation (covariance) does not exist. Knowledge/Nozick: is an actual relation that includes a connection (tracking, traceable track). And the track to p is different from that to q! Even if p implies q. NozickVsSkepticism: skepticism is right in that we have no connections to some certain truths (we are not in the vat), but he is wrong in that we are not in the correct relation to many other facts (truths). Including such that imply the former (unconnected) truth that we believe, but do not know. Skepticism/Nozick: many skeptics profess that they cannot maintain their position, except in situations where they rationally infer. E.g. Hume: II 210 Hume: after having spent three or four hours with my friends, my studies appear to me cold and ridiculous. Skepticism/Nozick: the arguments of the skeptic show (but they also show only) that we do not know that we are not in the vat. He is right in that we are not in connection with a fact here. NozickVsSkepticism: it does not show that we do not know other facts (including those that imply "not vat"). II 211 We have a connection to these other facts (e.g. I'm sittin here, reading). II 224f Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world where pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - I.e. I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! - And because it does not vary, it shows me that h ("he is in pain") is true. VsSkepticism: in reality it is not a question that is h not known, but "not (e and not h)" II 247 NozickVsSkepticism: there is a limit for the iteration of the knowledge operator K. "knowing knowledge" is sometimes interpreted as certainly knowing, but that is not meant here. Point: Suppose a person knows exactly that they are located on the 3rd level of knowledge: K³p (= KKKp), but not k4p. Suppose also that the person knows that they are not located on the 4th level. KK³p & not k4p. But KK³p is precisely k4p which has already been presumed as wrong! Therefore, it should be expected that if we are on a finite level Knp, we do not know exactly at what level we are. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Field Vs Stalnaker, R. | II 35 Proposition/Mathematics/Stalnaker: (1976, p 88): There are only two mathematical propositions, the necessarily true one and the necessarily false one. And we know that the first one is true and the second one is false. Problem: The functions that determine which of the two ((s) E.g. "This sentence is true", "this sentence is false"?) is expressed by a mathematical statement are just sufficiently complex to doubt which of the two is being expressed. Solution/Stalnaker: therefore the belief objects in mathematics should be considered as propositions about the relation between sentences and what they say. FieldVsStalnaker: it does not work. E.g. "the Banach-Tarski conditional" stands for the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the set theory with the axiom of choice (AoC) and whose consequent is the Banach-Tarski theorem (BTT). Suppose a person doubts the BTT, but knows the rule of language which refers sentences of the language of the ML to propositions. By Stalnaker, this person would not really doubt the proposition expressed by the BT conditional, because it is a logical truth. Field: what he really doubts is the proposition that is expressed by the following: (i) the language rules connect the BT conditional with necessary truth. Problem: because the person is familiar with the language rules for the language of the ML, he can only doubt (i) even if he also doubted the proposition expressed by the following: (ii) the language rules __ refer the BT conditional to the necessary truth. wherein the voids must be filled with the language rules of the language. Important argument: FieldVsStalnaker: the proposition expressed by (ii) is a necessary truth itself! And because Stalnaker supposes coarse sets of possible worlds, he cannot distinguish by this if anyone believes them or not. ((s) because it makes no difference in the sets of possible worlds, because necessary truth is true in every possible world). FieldVsStalnaker: the rise of mathematical propositions to metalinguistic ones has lead to nothing. Proposition/FieldVsStalnaker: must be individuated more finely than amounts of possible worlds and Lewis shows us how: if we accept that the believing of a proposition involves an attitude towards sentences. E.g. Believing ML is roughly the same thing as believing* the conjunction of its axioms. The believed* sentences have several fine-grained meanings. Therefore (1) attributes different fine-grained propositions to the two different persons. II 45 Representation/Functionalism/Field: 1) Question: Does an adequate belief theory need to have assumptions about representations incorporated explicitly?. Functionalism/Field: does not offer an alternative to representations here. By that I mean more than the fact that functionalism is compatible with representations. Lewis and Stalnaker would admit that. Representation/Lewis/Stalnaker/Field: both would certainly admit that assuming one opened the head of a being and found a blackboard there on which several English sentence were written, and if, furthermore, one saw that this influenced the behavior in the right way, then we would have a strong assumption for representations. This shows that functionalism is compatible with representations. Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/FieldVsLewis: I’m hinting at something stronger that both would certainly reject: I think the two would say that without opening the head we have little reason to believe in representations. II 46 It would be unfounded neurophysiological speculation. S-Proposition/Stalnaker: 2 Advantages: 1) as a coarse-grained one it fits better into the pragmatic approach of intentional states (because of their ((s) more generous) identity conditions for contents). 2) this is the only way we can solve Brentano’s problem of the naturalistic explanation of mind states. II 82 Belief/Stalnaker: Relation between the cognitive state of an acting person and S-propositions. II 83 FieldVsStalnaker. Vs 1) and 2) 1) The whole idea of E.g. "the object of", "the contents of" should be treated with caution. In a very general sense they are useful to determine the equality of such contents. But this is highly context-dependent. II 84 2) Stalnaker does not only want to attribute entities to mind states as their content, but even. Def intrinsically representational entities/iR/Field: in them, it is already incorporated that they represent the real universe in a certain way. 3) Even if we attribute such intrinsically representational entities as content, it is not obvious that there could be only one type of such iR. Fine-grained/Coarse/FieldVsStalnaker: for him, there seems to be a clear separation; I believe it is not so clear. Therefore, it is also not clear for me whether his S-propositions are the right content, but I do not want to call them the "wrong" content, either. Field: Thesis: We will also need other types of "content-like" properties of mind states, both for the explanation of behavior and for the naturalistic access to content. Intentionality/Mind State/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker represents what he calls the pragmatic image and believes that it leads to the following: 1) the belief objects are coarse. Def Coarse/Stalnaker: are belief objects that cannot be logically different and at the same equivalent. 2) StalnakerVsMentalese/StalnakerVsLanguage of Thought. Mentalese/Language of Thought/Stalnaker/Field: apparently, Stalnaker believes that a thought language (which is more finely grained) would have to lead to a rejection of the pragmatic image. FieldVsStalnaker: this is misleading. Def Pragmatic Image/Intentionality/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker Thesis: representational mind states should be understood primarily in terms of the role they play in the characterization of actions. II 85 StalnakerVsLinguistic Image: Thesis: Speaking is only one type of action. It has no special status. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Superassertibility | Verschiedene Vs Superassertibility | Wright I 68/69 Def Superassertibility/Wright: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrarily accurate verification of its ancestry and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear". Superassertibility/Content: the opponents of the superassertibility would have to refute the simple notion that the content of the claim that P does not include the claim that P is justified, nor that P is believed. The thought that neither the principle the proposition that P is justified if and only if P, nor the principle It is believed that P, if and only if P ((s)) is absurd) applies a priori. Superassertibility: their representatives must justify the validity of (Es) (Es) It is superassertible that P, if and only if P. I 72 Negation: this problem will be solved if it applies: (DSS) "P" is superassertible if and only if P. From this follows, as we have seen, the negation equivalence: It is not the case that "P" is superassertible if and only if it is not the case that "P" is superassertible. Here we can distinguish between propositions and sentence when it comes to negation. Then the validity of DSS depends on Es. ("It is superassertible that P...) VsEs/VsSuperassertibility: one could object that Es cannot be valid since it mixes the validity of certain high-level evidence for P with the validity of fact. For example, the Goldbach conjecture may be undetectably true and therefore not be superassertible. For example a superassertible proposition (brains in a vat) can be undetectably wrong. Since Es can be victim of counterexamples at any time, it cannot be true a priori. Therefore, superassertibility does not claim to be a truth predicate (T-predicate). I 73 VsSuperassertibility: the critics claim that the following equivalence cannot be established: (because of counterexamples): (F) It is true that it is ∏ that P if and only if it is true that P (F) However, contains two occurrences of a truth predicate that must be understood as distinct from the superassertibility. ((s) "∏" should be replaceable by "superassertible", but then allegedly does not guarantee equivalence). "∏" is more neutral than "true", which can mean true or assertible. Example: It is possible that the Goldbach conjecture is true without it being true that it is superassertible (provable), but it is certainly not evident that the conjecture could be superassertible without it being superassertible that this is the case. Pluralism: if, as minimalism thinks, there can be a pluralism of predicates of truth, then it is to be expected that the illusion of failure can be created if each occurrence of "true" is interpreted differently. It is as if someone wanted to prove that physical necessity cannot qualify as a real concept of necessity because the concept does not satisfy the following principle: Necessary (AB) |= Necessary(A) Necessary (B) ((s) right side weaker) I 74 and would then try to support his thesis by interpreting the last occurrence of "necessary" in the sense of logical necessity. ((s) There is no "logical necessity" of any object "B"! If we want to know if there are counterexamples to (Es), the right question is not whether F is fulfilled, but whether it is, which arises when the two tendentious occurrences of "true" are replaced by those of "∏". (G) It is ∏ that it is ∏ that is P, if and only if it is ∏ that is P. (Wright pro). G: Truth without limitation by evidence. F: Superassertibility. So whether it is in fact always when it is superassertible that P is also superassertible that this is the case and vice versa. Problem: if any true predicate of truth can fulfill the equivalence scheme a priori, its two possible forms (true and assertible, claimable) must be a priori coextensive. Thus, no predicate F can obviously function like a T-predicate if it has to function alongside another predicate G, which is already assumed to both fulfil the equivalence scheme and potentially diverge extensionally from F. (e.g. Goldbach's conjecture). (Since it cannot apply a priori that (P is if and only if of P F) if a priori that P applies then and only if P is G, but not a priori that (P is G if and only if P is F). (s) So coextension needs equivalence (concordance in both directions), and not only concordance in one direction. This weakens the original objection. It applies only to the following extent: if it is shown that a discourse is dominated by a truth concept - G - not restricted by evidence, then it is shown that superassertibility - F - is not a predicate of truth for this discourse. (For, trivially, if P is superassertible, evidence for P must be available.) But this does not justify a global conclusion. I 75 Oversimplification: (Gs) It is superassertible that it is superassertible that P is, if and only if it is superassertible that P is. Correct: given the equivalence scheme (see above), only the cases are counterexamples for (Es) in which (Fs) also fails: (Fs) It is true that it is superassertible that P is if and only if it is true that P. So if (Gs) applies, we know that there are no counterexamples to (Es) and consequently (Es) applies. But only provided that there are no competing predicates of truth besides superassertibility! I 76 Question: So is (Gs) unrestrictedly valid? It should be shown that the existence of an entitlement for P means that there is also an entitlement for the assertion that P is superassertible (showable in the future). For example, suppose the possession of an authorization for A also means possessing an authorization for B, and vice versa, but that for a reductio A is superassertible, B on the other hand is not! Then a total state of information I entitles to A and also all its improvements I' and hypothetically also to B. But: since B is not superassertible, there must be some improvement of I supporting A, but not B. This shows that (i) the coincidence of the assertibility conditions is sufficient for (ii) both statements of a pair to be superassertible if this is true for either of them. I 77 Superassertibility: it is less clear that the possession of an authority for the assertion also means the possession of the authority to view the statement as superassertible. Question: Can the authority to claim P coexist with the lack of authority to view P as a superassertible? ((s) Can something be assertible without being superassertible?) Assertiveness/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional view offers "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he/she uttered the sentence". |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Tarski, A. | Prior Vs Tarski, A. | I 98 Truth/Falsity/PriorVsTarski: the concepts of truth and falsity discussed in the last chapter are not the concepts of Tarski. Prior: ours could be described as properties not of sentences, but of propositions. I.e. quasi-properties of quasi-objects! Not adjectives "true", "false", but rather adverbs "correctly" (accurate, truthful, rightly) and "falsely". I 99 PriorVsTarski: (A) If someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully iff. snow is white. Tarski: (B) The sentence "snow is white" is true iff. snow is white. The truth of all true sentences of a language can be derived from Tarski's definition with normal logic. And that is for him the criterion of satisfiability of the truth definition. Quotation Marks/Truth/Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski: for me there are no quotation marks. But in Tarski, these belong more to informal preparation than to strict theory. Use/Mention/Tarski/Prior: left: the sentence is mentioned (by the name of the sentence) right: used. Prior: in my version () there is no mention, only use. (A) is not about sentences from start to finish, but about snow. (B) is about the sentence "snow is white". Self-Reference/Foreword Paradox/Tarski/Paradox/Prior: it remains the case that it looks as if self-reference were involved when we speak about people and what they say, think, fear, etc., which seems to exclude Tarski's semantics. But we must take a closer look: In Tarski, the predicates "true" and "false" do not belong to the same language as the sentences by which they are stated. I 103 PriorVsTarski: we say instead "x says something true if..." Or: "x says during the interval t t'that __" If we abbreviate this last phrase as "Sx!, "Sxp", then we could insert it in theorems like: CSx∑pKSxpNp∑pKSxpNp. Problem: (see above) If I says that he says something wrong between t and t', then it cannot be the only thing he says. This is a problem for very short intervals. How about if poor old x had to express theorems, and only had such a short time available for it? To the above theorem he would also have to express the consequent ∑pKSxpNp, and for that he might not have time! Above all, it may be that I will not do it ex hypothesi! Metalanguage/Point: this means that the language in which these theorems are expressed cannot be the same language that is used for that at some other occasions! |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Tradition | Ryle Vs Tradition | Lanz I 275 Ryle: psychological statements are hypothetical statements. They are also verifiable from the perspective of the third person. It is not about causes, but about criteria and standards for skills and achievements. I 276 They denote behavioral dispositions and non-internal events that would be the causes of behavior. Intelligence/Tradition: intelligent action: rule or method knowledge, so to know a set of positions. That is, intelligent action would be action with an intelligent cause. (RyleVs). Intelligence/Ryle: there are many examples of intelligent action without consideration: E.g. quick-witted replies, spontaneously correct deciding (fast chess) practically clever behavior in games, in sports and others. I 277 RyleVsTradition: Regress: if intelligent action was the application of intelligence, then this application would again be an action for which intelligence would be necessary, ad infinitum. Definition Intelligence/Ryle: action with a certain level, with a certain quality. The actor possesses corresponding ability and uses them. Ryle I 373 Memory/Presentation/RyleVs trace theory: their followers should try to imagine the case in which someone has a melody stuck in his head. Is this a reactivated trace of auditory sensation, or a series of reactivated traces of a series of auditory sensations? Ryle I 66 Mental state/mind/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: even if there were the mythical inner states and activities assumed by some, one could not draw any likelihoods of their occurrence among others. --- I 84 VsVolition/VsActs of will/act of will/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress) It has been proposed for the avoidance that the act of will can be neither described as voluntary nor as involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous", "vicious", "good" or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. I 85 In short: the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. I 86 RyleVsTradition: some well-known and truly occurring events are often confused with acts of will: people are often in doubt what to do. The final choice is sometimes referred to as an act of will. But equality is untenable, for most voluntary actions do not come from a state of indifference! Weakness of will/akrasia/Ryle: it is also known that someone can decide, but the action is not carried out becacuse of weakness of will. Or he does not carry it out because of new circumstances. RyleVsTradition: Problem: According to the theory of acts of will, it would be impossible for them to sometimes not lead to results. Otherwise all new executed operations would have to be postulated which explains that voluntary actions are sometimes actually carried out. If a choice was called voluntary, it must have been preceeded by another choice, ad infinitum. Ryle I 87 If the action is not carried out, according to the theory (tradition) there is also no act of will. Ryle I 182 Introspection/Attention/RyleVsTradition: In the case of an inspection, one would have to ask again whether it is attentive or inattentive. (Regress) Vs: That also pretends that there is a difference in having an irritation of the throat and the statement that one has it. Not only is attention far from being a kind of inspection or listening, but inspecting and listening are themselves specific ways of exercising attention. Whether metaphorically or literally, a viewer can always be attentive or inattentive. To do something with attention is not to link an activity with a bit of theorizing, exploring, inspecting, or knowing. Otherwise, any action done with attention would involve an infinite number of activities. VsIntellectualist tradition: as if the exercise of theory is the essential function of mind and contemplation the essence of this activity. Ryle I 215 Consciousness/Tradition/Ryle: According to the traditional theory, soul processes are not aware in the sense that we can report about them later, but that the opening up of their own incident is a feature of these incidents and cannot come after them. I 216 Tradition/Ryle: these alleged revelations would be expressed in the present and not in the past, if they were dressed in words at all. At the same time as I discover that my watch stands still, I also discover that I discover it. RyleVsTradition: this is a myth! 1. We usually know what we are doing. No "phosphorescence" theory is necessary. 2. That we know it does not imply that we are constantly thinking about it. 3. It does not imply that when we know something about ourselves, we encounter some ghostly phenomena. RyleVsTradition: The basic objection against the traditional theory which claims that the mind must know what it does because mental events are consciously or metaphorically "self-luminous" is that there are no such events. I 217 There are no events that take place in a world of any other kind. Consequently, there is also no need for such methods to make the acquaintance of inhabitants of such a world. RyleVsTradition/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: No one would ever want to say that he had gained some knowledge "out of his consciousness". It is a grammatical and logical abuse of the word "knowing" that the consciousness of my mental states is that I know them. It is nonsense to say that someone knows this thunderstorm, this colored surface or this act of concluding. This is just the wrong accusative for the verb "to know". The metaphor of light does not help here. Ryle I 388 Intellect/mind/use of symbols/Ryle: in practice, we do not regard every expression as an intellectual, but only the one understood as work. Border problems do not pose a problem for us. Some problem solving is intellectual, searching for the thimble is not, bridge is in the middle. Thinking/mind/intellect/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: for us, this is important: it means that both theories are wrong, the old with the special, occult organ, and the newer ones, which speak of particular intellectual processes such as judgments, conceptual perception, assumption, thinking through, etc. They pretend to have identification signs for things they cannot always identify in reality. Ryle I 391 Theory/Theories/Ryle: Nothing would be gained with the assertion that Einstein, Thucydides, Newton, and Columbus were concerned with the same activity. Sherlock Holmes's theories have not been constructed by the same means as those of Karl Marx. Both agreed, however, that they wrote theories in didactic prose. Theory/Tradition: To have a theory means to have learned one and not to forget it. To be at the place of destination. It does not mean doing something yourself. Theory/RyleVsTradition: Having a pen is to be able to write with it. Having a theory or a plan means being ready to communicate or apply it when the opportunity arises. Difference: the intelligent listener then acquires a theory, if he is wise, has understood it, he does not have to accept it at all. But we do not set up a theory primarily to be able to put it into words. Columbus did not go on journeys to increase the material for geographic studies. Definition having a theory/Ryle: is the ability to solve additional tasks. To be a Newton follower would not only mean saying what Newton had said, but also to do the same and say what he had said. --- Flor I 263 Can, to be able to/RyleVsTradition: "Legend": that an action can only be carried out intelligently if it is based on or accompanies a theoretical, intellectual performance. (Dualistic). Division in private, theoretical part of the activity and a practical, public. Can, to be able to: (know-how): cannot be determined by theoretical insight! (Knowing that this or that applies). Theoretical insight is itself a form of practice and cannot itself be intelligent or not intelligent! It is not plausible that any action, in which intelligence or its deficiency can be demonstrated, should include the consideration of theoretical statements, norms, or rules. There are also many actions for which there are no formulated rules or criteria for intelligent executio Flor I 264 Regress/Ryle: according to the dualistic notion, an intelligent action presupposes that there has been a theoretical consideration of statements, norms, or rules by which the activity is then carried out. This consideration, however, is itself an action that can be more or less intelligent. This leads to regress. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Use Theory | Armstrong Vs Use Theory | Armstrong II (c) 92 Evan Fales: locates vagueness in the law of probability as only dependent on the irreducible probability character which has nothing to do with one result coming out instead of another. But in the Martin E.g. you don’t need a probability law!. ArmstrongVsFales: he misunderstands the role of the case of the disjunctive probability law in this case:. II (c) 93 It was to be shown that there are cases where a counterfactual conditional can be asserted to be true, but where the consequent of the Counterfactual Conditional is undefined between different results and it is not plausible that there was a truth about a fact that resolves the ambiguity. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Utilitarianism | Nagel Vs Utilitarianism | III 109 Ethics/Nagel: dispute between consequentialist conceptions (among others, utilitarianism: thesis: the consequences an action ultimately has in the world are important, not what it is like for the actor) and on the other hand the question of: "what to do". VsUtilitarianism/Nagel: criticism of the external standpoint (what is best for the state of the world) wants to give the individual a certain margin, to lead their own life (Nagel's internal position from which alone we can lead our lives). Common good as only justification for action does not leave any own desires unaccounted for. III 110 ((s) consequentialism/(s): ethical position which takes into account only the consequences (for the "world state", not for the actor)). NagelVs: it is about the permission to lead our own lives! III 110 /! 11 NagelVsUtilitarianism/Objectivity: we are not only dealing with a conflict between inter-personal and individual values, but: Someone who does not accept the consequentialist commandments, because they claim dominance over his own internal standpoint, will naturally transfer this objection to others as well. So this takes you more to an alternative ethics than to the rejection of ethics in general! |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Utilitarianism | Verschiedene Vs Utilitarianism | Stegmüller IV 200 Utilitarianism/Stegmüller: only considers the consequences of the actions. (>Nagel: "Consequentialism") - "This is good for me" is already assumed - the consequences are judged - only basic moral norm: principle of utility. IV 202/203 MackieVsUtilitarianism: 1. Conceptual bases: demarcation to animals, future generations, etc. Problem of quantitative measurement of pain, etc. IV 204 2. Distribution Problem: also RawlsVsUtilitarianism: wrong summation. Wrong analogy of society with a "great human". This ultimately leads to disregard for the individual. IV 207 Rawls/Stegmüller: the "veil of ignorance" goes back to J. Harsanyi. VsUtilitarianism: the subjective preferences are not known at first. IV 209 VsUtilitarianism/Mill: (himself a utilitarianist) admits that utilitarian theories often fail because of the vagueness and diversity of views on justice. Mill: nevertheless, the same sanctions are available to the principle of utility as to all other moral norms. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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| Deontology | Pro | III 71 Ethics / Nagel:. Per deontology: restricts what is allowed to do in the service of both neutral and autonomous values - NagelVs consequentialism / NagelVsHare - consequentialism: only the results are important. |
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| Frege Sense/Meaning | Pro | Stechow I 102 Montague: consequently applies Frege s distinction between sense and meaning. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conditional | Adams, R. | Lewis V 133 Indicative Conditional/Probability/Adams (1965): Thesis: Here, assertibility rather seems to be linked with the conditional (contingent) subjective probability of the consequent when the antecedent is given. Lewis: Adams convinced me: Thesis: The indicative conditional A -> C is closely associated with the subjective probability P (C I A). But why? Why not rather the absolute probability P(A ->C)? Explanation: ultimately, assertibility is indeed linked to absolute probability, indicative conditionals are no exception to this. But precisely the same way also P (C I A) is possible, because the meaning of "->" is to guarantee that P(A -> C) and P(C I A) are always the equal (if the latter is defined). Short: Probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Thought | Dummett, M. | I 61 DummettVsFrege: that does not show that the theory is wrong, that the sense (thought, see above) is not a content of consciousness, but rather that its reasoning is not entirely accurate, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity. I 62 Today is Frege s thesis regarding the "objective meaning" commonplace. No one would deny any more that the use of color terms is subject to generally applicable criteria and can be assessed. |
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