Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 71 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility | Wright | I 26ff It is not the case that P is T iff it is not the case that P is T. This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left. Assertibility is naturally weaker. >Asymmetry, >Equivalence, >Implication. I 26 Justified Assertibility/Negation: Ignorance: P is not justifiably assertible, but neither is its negation. >Negation, >Justification. Truth/Ignorance: something may very well be true, even though nothing is known about it. >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. Truth/Justified Assertibility: E.g. snow is white: the decision about truth and assertibility may diverge here. I 51 Deflationism: "true" only means of affirmation, therefore not a standard different from assertibility. >Truth, cf. >Redundancy theory. A statement can be justified without being true and vice versa. >Conventions, cf. >Language use, >Language community. --- Field II 120 Assertibility/Wright/Putnam: is the only substantial property. - Because truth is not a property. - Field: both do go next to each other, because they diverge - truth goes deeper. Wright I 35 Justified Assertibility/Assertibility/Negation: E.g. it is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T - This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left - in case of ignorance, the negation is not assertible either. I 52ff Truth: timeless - justified assertibility: not timeless. >Timelessness. I 68ff Def Super-Assertibility: a statement is super-assertible if it is justified or can be justified and if its justification survived both any scrutiny of its descent and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Cf. >Justified assertibility. Ideal Circumstances/Putnam: are timeless. Super-Assertibility is no external standard, but our own practice. It is metaphysically neutral. I 81ff Super-Assertibility/Wright: Thesis: comic and moral truths can be considered as varieties of super-assertibility. - ((s) Because everything we can learn in the future comes from our own practice, we are immune to fundamental surprises.) I 102f Super-Assertibility/Wright: suitable for discourses whose standards are made by us: morals, humor. >Morals. I 115ff Super-Assertibility/Field/Mackie: the T predicates for mathematics or morality cannot be interpreted in terms of the superassertibility. - Therefore, the super-assertible need not be true in discourse. - The difference Ssuperassertibility/truth goes back to this. >Mathematics, >Truth, >Discourse. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Assertions | McDowell | II 52 Assertion/McDowell: what is said with the assertion, cannot deviate from what is said about it in a systematic theory of language that includes it. >Expression, >Assertion, >Meta language, >Object language, >Statement, cf. >Redundancy theory. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Assertive Force | Geach | I 262 Assertive force/assertoric force/Geach: assertive force is demonstrated by the fact that a sentence is not included in a longer one. Cf. >Brandom: free-standing content. The assertion stroke adds no idea - so it should not be confudes with "it’s true that .."; ("true"can occur even in a not assertive sentence without changing its meaning). >Truth value, >Truth predicate, >Redundancy theory, >Assertion stroke. Error: to infer from this that "exist" adds no concept. (GeachVsHume). >Existence predicate. The sssertion stroke is a indefinable basic concept, cannot be explained. VsAttribution-theory: the predicate "poor" has no more claiming force than any other predicate, namely, none. >Predicates/Geach, >Predication/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Basic Concepts | Lorenzen | Thiel I 80 Formula language for logic: Paul Lorenzen: "prototype approach": rule system for producing linearly composed figures composed of 0 and +. "A" represents such figures as a schematic letter): Rules: (1) > + (2) A > A 0 (3) A > + A +. According to this "calculus" e.g. the figure ++ 00 + can be produced: (1), 2 times (2), then (3). I 80/81 Each figure that can be created must either have a 0 on the right or a + on the left. Test figure 0++ does not work therefore. If we introduced the additional rule: (4) A > 0 A + It would be producible. On the other hand, the following rule would not allow for new figures: (5) A > + + A. This is called "redundancy" (in meta-mathematics "admissibility") Such rule systems can also be referred to as "operative logic". I 83 They can serve the introduction of junctors (I 82 e.g. v) Protologics is therefore still before the logic. >Logic, >Dialogical logic, >Rules, >Rule systems, cf. >Axioms, >Junctions, >Connectives. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Bayesian Networks | Norvig | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). > Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bayesian Networks | Russell | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). >Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bivalence | Dummett | II 103 Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth. - And that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences. - It goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be. >Decidability. II 103f Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) The meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice. III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: Explanation of sense by truth conditions. - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances...". >Truth conditions, >Circumstances. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: For that one must already know what the statement that P is true means. Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained. VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. >Redundancy theory. III (b) 74 Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. >unicorns, >Goldbach’s conjecture). But Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence. III (b) 76 Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value. >Semantic Value. Cf. >Multi valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Causal Explanation | Cartwright | I 10 Causal Explanation/Cartwright: Here, truth is critical - (but explanatory power does not guarantee truth). - But it's only the truth of deeply settled causal principles and phenomenological laws. >Explanation, >Description, >Truth, >Causality, >Causal laws, >Physics. I 82 Causal Explanation/Important Argument/Cartwright: in causal explanations we do not have to assume redundancy (possibility of alternative explanation or alternative causes) as with the mathematical (theoretical) explanation - theoretical explanation: can be justified by inference on the best explanation - causal explanations not - instead: they have an independent test for their truth: the controlled experiment. >Experiments. I 89 Declaration/Fraassen: the truth of an explanation cannot be inferred from its success. - E.g. Ptolemaic astronomy - ultimately not on the existence of theoretical entities. Duhem: truth is an external feature of explanations. >Truth/Duhem, >Explanation/Duhem. I 91 Different: in causal explanations, truth is inherent - a false cause makes the causal explanation false. >Causes. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Causation | Inwagen | Lewis V 195 Individuation/redundant causation/Peter van Inwagen: thesis: an event that happens as a product of multiple causes could not have happened without being the product of these causes. The causes could not have caused any other event. Analogy to the individuation of objects and human beings by their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. This would ruin my analysis of analyzing causation in concepts of contrafactual dependency. (s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable and it would not be applicable to contrafactual conditionals). >Causation/Lewis. 2. It is prima facie implausible: I can legitimately make alternative hypotheses about how an event (or an object or a human being) has been caused. But by that, I am assuming that it was the same event! Or that one and the same event might have had different effects. (Even Inwagen himself assumes that.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: a plan implies even more impossible: either my whole plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities, or they are not at all about a particular event. Redundant causation/Lewis: important argument: if these are two "different deaths", then there is no redundancy! >Effect, >Plan. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Causation | Lewis | V 36 Causation/counterfactual analysis/Lewis: (elsewhere) 1) relation cause/effect depends on the causal chain. 2) causal chain is a particular type of counterfactual dependencies 3) No reverse causation. >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, cf. >Causal dependence/Lewis, >Causality/Lewis, >Cause/Lewis, >Causal explanation/Lewis. --- V 181 Causation/Lewis: E.g. assuming two redundant systems, one produces the effect with lower probability - I switch to that one. - Then I have caused the effect nevertheless. - Wrong: to assume that there would be several ways of how the world could be. (Various counterfactual conditionals). - Lewis: That would be a metaphysical burden. - It is not about a hidden property that might be present or not. V 183 There is only one way the world is. - Both counterfactual conditionals are true or false by an arbitrary resolution of semantic indeterminacy. - But that is not a property of the world. >Possible world/Stalnaker. V 195 Redundant causation/Lewis: (multiple causes, which would also have been sufficient individually). - It is hard to decide whether the effects would have been different events. - Definition fragile: is an event that would have been different if it had been e.g. at a different time. - Events must not be too fragile. - Otherwise we have normal causation in redundant cases. - Whether redundancy is present may also depend on the standards of fragility. - Undecidable: E.g. whether a suspended performance is the same. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Competence | Katz | Cresswell I 12 Competency/linguistic/linguistic competence/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 - 15): the discussion continues to this day (1974). Definition linguistic competency: is an ability underlying the linguistic activity. It is about the class of sentences that the speaker finds grammatically acceptable. Semantic competency/Cresswell: (that is what I am concerned with here): I prefer a truth-conditional semantics (> truth conditions). I would like to distinguish between two things: A) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminology/KF/Cresswell: "KF" (Katz/Fodor semantics): is incomplete, if not incorrect. B) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsTactual Theory: is rather a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. --- Cresswell I 12 Definition Competence/linguistic competence/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz and Nagel, 1974): explains the ability of a speaker to make judgments about the following properties: synonymy, redundancy, contradictoryness, entailment, ambiguity, semantic anomalies, antonymy and superordination. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Connectives | Thiel | I 83 Introduction of connectives: from Proto Logic/Lorenzen: control system for the production of linear composite figures. "Admissibility": Formulas that do not create new characters (redundancy). >Introduction, >Definitions, >Definability, >Junctions, >Calculus, >Formalization. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Correspondence Theory | Searle | III 163 Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with correspondence theory. Realism is not at all a truth theory and does not imply any truth theory. >Realism/Searle, >Realism. III 211 Correspondence/Searle: we need a verb to name the variety of ways in which sentences refer to facts. And this verb is "corresponding" among others. Correspondence theory/Searle: the correspondence theory is not an attempt to define "true". III 211 Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: Strawson is considered to have won this debate. >Correspondence theory/Strawson, >Correspondence theory/Austin. Strawson: the correspondence theory does not have to be purified, it has to be eliminated. III 212 It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth represents a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic entities. (This goes back to the Tractatus image theory.) >Fact, >Picture theory. III 215 StrawsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence theory makes the false assertion that facts are non-linguistic entities. >Fact/Strawson. III 216 Deflationist truth theory/deflationism/minimalist truth theory: "true" is not a property or relation. The entire content of the concept of truth consists in quoting. Def redundancy theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). >Deflationism, >redundancy theory. III 217 These two theories are usually considered incompatible with correspondence theory. III 220 Correspondence theory/citation cancellation: because of the definitory connections between fact and true statement, there can be no incompatibility between the correspondence criterion of truth and the citation cancellation criterion. The citation simply indicates the form of what makes any statement true, simply by repeating the statement (Tarski). We do not need additional correspondence as confirmation. Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege, was used by Quine against modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory. >Slingshot argument. III 230 Slingshot argument: if a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact. Therefore, the concept of correspondence is completely empty. Example final form: "the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVs: this is ultimately irrelevant. III 235 Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Correspondence Theory | Sellars | II 22 Correspondence/Sellars: the relation of linguistic and non-linguistic entities is an activity. It is reflecting projection. All true statements are true in the same sense (like Frege). They differ in that they construct in different ways a projection of the world in the subjects. >World/thinking, >Reality, >World, >Truth, >Statements, >Correspondence relation. Projection/Sellars: but the projection belongs more to the realm of thought acts than to the statements. >Thinking/Sellars, >Language and thought. --- II 334 Summary 1) The correspondence that we were looking for is limited to elementary statements. 2) It is about the fundamental role that actual statements (or thought acts) play. Like the pawns in chess: e.g. "Chicago is big." 3) All true statements are "true" in the same sense, but they differ in their roles: 2 + 2 = 4 plays a different role than "this is red". The role consists in constituting a projection in the language users of the world they live in. >Language use, >Language game, >Language community, >Meaning, >Truth value, >Fregean meaning. Sellars: pro redundancy theory: if the picture corresponds, you are convinced that "this is green" is true, so you are convinced: this is green. >Redundancy theory. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Deflationism | Dummett | Brandom I 471 Redundancy Theory/Dummett/Brandom: Redundancy theory presupposes the content of the non-semantic assertion in view of which the semantic assertion ("it is true that ...") is redundant. DummettVsDeflationism: Deflationism therefore cannot explain the propositional content by truth conditions (although everything has truth conditions). >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Deflationism | Wright | I 26ff Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory). Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation. I 46 Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations. Tarski: disquotation is sufficient. Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. >Goldbach's conjecture. Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use. Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g. "Everything he said is true". VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis. I 47 ff Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard. b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True"). I 293 Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: truth is no property). --- I 27 Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property. - Disquotation is enough. - "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. The content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use. Thesis: the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative. I 33ff Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility. >Assertibility. I 51 WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", > I 97 Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally. - Then the disquotation scheme can play no central role. - >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotation. Therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>realism/Wright). --- Rorty I 38ff Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely determined. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Chalmers | I 150 Epiphenomenalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: Question: when consciousness only supervenes naturally (but not logically) on the physical, there is apparently no causality involved. Then consciousness would only be a side effect and would not exist at all. (Huxley (1874) (1)) argues thus. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers. ChalmersVs: the causal unity of our physical world looks only like epiphenomenalism. I 151 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: a strategy against it would be to deny the causal unity of the physical world. We should not do that. There are better ways that assume more appropriate assumptions of metaphysics and causation. 1. Regularity-Based Causation/Chalmers: Instead of causality, we could assume regularity with Hume. Then one could argue that the behavior itself would have been the same without phenomenological consciousness. >Regularity, >Consciousness, >Behavior, >Causation. ChalmersVs: there are many systematic regularities between conscious experiences and later physical events, each of which leads us to conclude a causal link. >Causality. I 152 2. Causal overdetermination: one might assume that a physical and a phenomenal state, although completely separated, might cause a later physical state. Problem: causal redundancy. Solution: Tooley (1987) (2): we could assume an irreducible causal connection between two physical and one separate irreducible causal connection between a phenomenal and a physical state. This is a non-reducible view of causation. >Reducibility, >Irreducibility. ChalmersVsTooley: it is not easy to show that there is something wrong with it. I do not pursue this, but it has to be taken seriously. 3. Non-supervenience of the causation: facts about consciousness and those about causation are the only facts which do not logically supervene on certain physical facts. Chalmers: it is quite natural to speculate as to whether these two kinds of non-supervenience have a common root. Rosenberg: (1966) (3) has developed this. Rosenberg Thesis: Experience recognizes causation or some aspects of it. After that, causation needs recognition by someone or something. ChalmersVsRosenberg: this is, of course, very speculative, and leads among other things to panpsychism. >Panpsychism, >Aspects. I 153 In addition, the zombie problem would persist. >Zombies. 4. The intrinsic nature of the physical: thesis: a physical theory characterizes above all the relations of its entities, i.e. its propensities to interact with other elements. >Propensity, >Intrinsic. Problem: what is it that causes all these relations of causation and combinations? Russell (1927) (4): This is what the physical theory is silent about. Solution: to adopt an intrinsic nature of the physical elements. Chalmers: the only class of such intrinsic properties would be the class of phenomenal properties. >Phenomena. I 154 There must be no panpsychism following from this. Instead, we can assume proto-phanomenal properties. >Proto-phanomenal. I 159 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: Arguments against it fall into three classes: 1. Those which concern the relations of experience to normal behavior, 2. Those which concern the relations of experience to judgments about normal behavior, 3. Those which concern the overall picture of the world, which provokes the acceptance of epiphenomenalism. Ad 1. VsEpiphenomenalism: For example, the intuitions about why I withdraw my hand from a flame are strong, on the other hand, we can clarify these intuitions by assuming regularities. We simply perceive experiences more directly than the corresponding brain states. Ad 2. VsEpiphenomenalism: It seems to be extremely counterintuitive that our experiences could be irrelevant to the explanation of our behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Experience, cf. >Subjectivity. I 160 Ad. 3. VsEpiphenomenalism: the image of the world which is drawn by it is implausible because there should be nomological appendages which are not integrated into the system of other natural laws. Epiphenomenalism/Chalmers: I do not describe my own position as epiphenomenalism. The question of the causal relevance of experience remains unanswered. >Relevance. 1. T. Huxley, On the hypothesis that animals are automata. In: Collected Essays, London 1987, pp. 1893-94. 2. M. Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach, Oxford 1987 3. G. H. Rosenberg, Consciousness and causation: Clues toward a double-aspect theory, Ms Indiana Universwity, 1996. 4. B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, London 1927 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Equivalence | Field | l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are platonist (E.g. "Direction1 = direction2") and nominalistic statements (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? >Platonism, >Nominalism. Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first. - They are only equivalent within a directional theory. Cf. >Definition/Frege, >Consequence. Solution/Field: one can regard the equivalences as important, even if the theories are wrong. Problem: for the meaning one should be able to accept truth. >Meaning. Solution: conservative extension (does not apply to the ontology) - this is harmless for consequences that do not mention directions. >Conservativity/Field, >Mention. I 228 Def cognitively equivalent/Field: equivalent by logic plus the meaning of "true". >Truth. Disquotational true/Deflationism: means that the propositions in the Tarski scheme should be cognitively equivalent. - ((s) Plus meaning of true here: the same understanding of true.) >Disquotationalism/Field, >Deflationism. --- II 16 Extensional equivalence/Field: Problem: if we assume extensional equivalence and abstract it from the size, there are infinitely many entities to which a simple theory, such as the chemical valences applies: For example, the number 3 not only applies to molecules but also to larger aggregates etc. >Reference classes. II 106 Redundancy theory/Field: an utterance u and the assertion that u is true (as the speaker understands it) are cognitively equivalent. >Redundancy theory, >Utterance. N.B.: the assertion that an utterance is true, has an existential obligation (ontological commitment): there must be something that is true. >Ontological commitment. While the utterance u itself does not provide an ontological obligation. Therefore, the two are not completely cognitively equivalent. Relatively cognitively equivalent: here: u and the assertion of the truth of u are cognitively equivalent relative to the existence of u. II 106 E.g. "Thatcher is so that she is self-identical and snow is white" is cognitively equivalent to "snow is white" relative to the existence of Thatcher - the verification conditions are the same. N.B.: we do not need any truth conditions. >Verification conditions, >Truth conditions. II 252 Material Equivalence/Field: means that A > B is equivalent to ~ A v B. Problem: most authors do not believe the conclusion of e.g. "Clinton will not die in office" on "When Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito becomes President". Therefore equivalence does not seem to exist. Solution/Lewis: the truth conditions for indicative conditionals must be radically index-dependent to maintain the surface logic. >Conditionals. Lewis: thesis: the surface logic should not be respected. Lewis: thesis: E.g. Clinton/Vito: truth-maintaining despite absurdity. Solution: probability function: P (Vito I Clinton). >Probability function. II 253 In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always presupposed. Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. >Conditional/Adams. Problem: then they will say less about the world. >Empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Equivalence Principle | Dummett | II 77 Equivalence Principle/Dummett: = redundancy theory - provides the basis for use of the predicate "true" within a language. >Redundancy Theory/Dummett. Language learning: The concept of truth is not achieved by the equivalence principle - otherwise we would have to assume that we learn much of the language already without the concept of truth. II 77ff Equivalence Principle/Redundancy Theory/Dummett: the use of "true" in the meaning theory goes beyond the equivalence principle. - (The equivalence principle reigns only in the truth theory). >Truth Theory/Dummett. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Everything he said is true | Ramsey | III 71 Particularisation/Ramsey: instead of "what he said is true": e.g. "The things that are considered as standing in a certain relation, actually stand in this relation".((s) This is still general.) N.B.: then the "true" disappears. ((s)> Quine: truth serves the generalization). Problem/Ramsey: that does not work in everyday language. >Everyday language. Solution/Ramsey: we need a pro-sentence ((s) at the point at which otherwise a pronoun stands). >Prosentential theory. Pro-Sentence/everyday language: "Yes", "No". |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Explanation | Schurz | I 30 Explanation/Schurz: Explanation concerns only facts that have already occurred. Otherwise it refers to a prediction. Both have the form of deductive or probabilistic arguments. >Facts, >States of affairs, >Prediction, >Probability, >Deduction. I 92 Notation: II- : "follows logically". Explanation scheme/logical form/explanation/Schurz: strict all proposition & singular proposition II- singular proposition. All A are K and a is A II- a is K. Falsification scheme/falsification/logical form/Schurz: FS I: singular proposition falsifies strict universal sentence. singular sentence II- negation of strict universal sentence a is A and not K II- not all A are K FS II: existence sentence falsifies strict all proposition There is an A that is not a K II- not all A are K. >Universal sentence. I 225 Explanation/law/Schurz: More important than explanation of events is explanation of laws by higher-level theories. Problem: irrelevance and redundancy. Therefore Hempel considered laws only implicitly. Logical form: "T U A / G" (U: union). T: is a set of laws or axioms of theories, all of which are essentially quantified and some of which are essentially general. A: (antecedent) is a (possibly empty) set of sing propositions or localized existential propositions. G: an essentially general proposition. Ex Theoretical explanation of planetary orbits Ex Theoretical explanation of Piaget's law of development. I 227 Causality/explanation/causal explanation/Schurz: problem: Ex "If A, then E will be the case": is L equivalent with its contraposition. "If Not E, then Not A was the case". Problem: "Not E" cannot be a cause of Not A! >Causal explanation/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Formal Language | Thiel | Thiel I 80 Formal Language of Logic/Lorenzen/Thiel: Paul Lorenzen: "protological approach": rule system for the production of figures linearly composed of 0 and + . "A" represents such figures as schematic letter. Rules: (1) > + (2) A > A 0 (3) A > + A +. According to this "calculation" e.g. the figure ++00+ can be produced: (1), 2 times (2), then (3). I 80/81 Each figure that can be made must either have a 0 on the right or a + on the left. Test figure 0++ therefore does not work. We introduced the additional rule: (4) A > 0 A + it would be producible. On the other hand, the following rule would not allow new figures: (5) A > + + A. This is called "redundancy" (in meta mathematics "admissibility"). Such control systems can also be described as "operational logic". I 83 They can be used to introduce punctors (I 82 Example v) Proto logic is therefore still ahead of logic. >Junctions, >Logic, >Introduction, >Calculus, >Formalization, >Systems. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Forms | Eco | I 150 Definition "Good Form"/Gestalt Psychology: the "good form" is the model that requires the least information and possesses the greatest redundancy. I 152 "Good form"/Eco: this means that the term "good form" loses all ontological necessity. It does not imply an already defining structure of the perceptual processes. The subject can renounce the good form in favour of other possibilities. So good form is no longer a matter of course for our expectations. Good form depends on culture. And it encourages the expectation of the average person. >Taste. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Gestalt Psychology | Eco | I 134 Gestalt Psychology/Eco: Gestalt Psychology means that in perception, a configuration of stimuli is immediately captured that already possesses an objective organisation of its own. These are recorded thanks to a fundamental isomorphism of the structures of the object and the physio psychological structures of the subject. VsGestalt Psychology: everything that has been said so far about the possibility of an "open work of art" emerges from a criticism of Gestalt Psychology. I 150 Definition "Good Form"/Gestalt Psychology: "good form" is the model that requires the least information and possesses the greatest redundancy. I 152 "Good form"/Eco: this means that the term "good form" loses all ontological necessity. It does not imply an already defining structure of the perceptual processes. The subject can renounce the good form in favour of other possibilities. So good form is no longer a matter of course for our expectations. Good form depends on culture. And it encourages the expectation of the average person. >Taste, >Convention. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Gestures | Flusser | Rötzer I 70 Gesture/Flusser: gestures, however, can be carried out better and more creatively by robots and machines than by humans. The technically and theoretically produced images are highly redundant and provide tremendous behavior but rather poor experience models. >Images/Flusser, >Redundancy, >Robotics, >Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Artificial Consciousness, >Understanding. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991 |
| Inserting | Logic Texts | II 133 Insertion/substitution/identity/truth preservation: Logical equivalence is (...) a weakening of the identity of statements. Logically equivalent statements are not the same in all properties, but only in logical terms. If one statement is logically true, so is the other and vice versa. If a certain statement follows logically from one, then it follows logically from the other and vice versa. >Substitution, >Substitution (Insertion), >Equivalence, >Logical truth. Insertion Theorem: Let FA be a propositional logical formula which contains a partial form A. Let FB be a formula which results from FA when A is replaced by a propositional formula B, (not necessarily everywhere). If A is now ≡ B, then FA ≡ FB applies. II 134 Logically equivalent formulas have the same inference sets. Logically equivalent formulas can be inferred from the same prerequisites. Redundancy Theory/Hoyningen-Huene: therefore, in propositional logic one does not really have to distinguish between "A" and "It is true that A". (In propositional logic such properties are abstracted from). >Redundancy theory, >Propositional logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Meaning | Eco | I 168 Meaning/information/Eco: meaning is also a picturesque configuration that transmits a certain sum of syntactic relationships rather than semantic references. It is constituted in proportion to the order, the conventionality and thus the redundancy of the structure. It is all the more clear and unambiguous the more I adhere to probability rules and an organizational law that are pre-determined. >Semantics, >Rules, >Systems, >Symbols, >Syntax, >Information, >Meaning, >Language, >Order, >Code. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Painting | Eco | I 154 Painting/open artwork/Eco: a painting is a "field" of interpretative possibilities. I 154 Structure/Eco: an intrusion into the structure itself can already be found in Tintoretto. I 154 Futurism/Cubism/Eco: new mobility is made possible by the stability of the original forms, which are confirmed again in negation by deformation and dissolution! I 155 Informal, abstract expressionism: abstract expressionism is not a movement, because the picture is there. It is about the viewer's movement. I 168 Meaning/information/Eco: a picturesque configuration that transmits a certain sum of syntactic relationships rather than semantic references also has a meaning. It is constituted in proportion to the order, the conventionality and thus the redundancy of the structure. It is all the more clear and unambiguous the more I adhere to probability rules and an organizational law that are pre-determined. >Semantics, >Rules, >Systems, >Symbols, >Syntax, >Convention, >Structures, >Information, >Meaning. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Particularization | Ramsey | III 71 Particularization/Ramsey: instead of "what he said is true": E.g. "things that were viewed as standing in a certain relation actually stand in this relation". - ((s) But that s still in general.) >"Everything he said is true". N.B.: then we can do without "true". - ((s) > Quine: Truth is used for generalization.) Problem/Ramsey: that will not do so in everyday language. >Everyday language Solution/Ramsey: we need a pro sentence (where else is a pronoun used). >Propositional theory. Pro sentence in everyday language: "Yes", "No". |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Prosentential Theory | Prosentential Theory, philosophy: the prosentential theory is a variant of the theory of truth presented by D.L. Grover, J. Camp and N. Belnap (“A prosentential theory of truth, Philosophical Studies”, 27, 73-124, 1975). Instead of the truth predicate "true", a whole sentence "that is true" is accepted, through which a questionable sentence could be supplemented theoretically in order to reaffirm its truth. The decisive point here is that in this way truth is not attributed as a property of sentences. See also redundancy theory, theory of truth, paratactic analysis, deflationism, inflationism, disquotationalism. |
||
| Prosentential Theory | Brandom | I 436 Definition pro-sententional theory of truth/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Brandom: is the result if you consider "is true" to be a syncategorematic part of pro-sentences. Analogy to pronouns. Savings - has the same semantic content as its anaphoric predecessor - recognizes its predecessor - e.g. "She stopped." Predecessor: Maria stopped. E.g. "for all you can say is true: if the policeman said it, then it is true". Cf. >Anaphora, >Truth theory. Four Conditions for pro-sentences (analog to pronouns): 1) They must occupy all the grammatical positions (embedded and freestanding) 2) They are generic: every clause of statement may be the predecessor of a pro-sentence, e.g. He is standing, he is his F. 3) They can be used quantificatorily 4) The class of the admissible substituent determines the significance of the pro-sentence - the anaphora is a relation between Tokenings. "This is true" is a response to a Tokening of "I am hungry". - E.g. "everything he said is true" is not accessible for simpler redundancy and quote redemption approaches. I 438 Per: it can explain complicated sentences: E.g. "Something that Hans said is either true, or it was said by Fritz". Cf. >Everything he said... I 441 Prosentential Theory/Brandom: "refers to" is a pro-sentence forming operator. - E.g. "The one Kissinger referred to as "almost third-rated mind" understood as a pronoun whose anaphoric predecessor is a particular quote by Kissinger - nominalization of sentences - ((s) Instead of describing a sentence: the name of a sentence). >Quote/Quotation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Rate of Return | Economic Theories | Harcourt I 159 Rate of return/Economic theories/Harcourt: Pasinetti(1) distinguishes two meanings of Fisher's(2) 'rate of return on sacrifice' or 'rate of return over cost'. a) The first is the rate of interest at which two techniques (options, projects, going concerns, economic systems) are equi-profitable, i.e. that rate of interest which when used as the discount factor equalises the present values of two alternative streams of expected receipts (Fisherian incomes) and expenditures - call it RF1. >Irving Fisher. b) The second relates to the ratio of the expected increase in perpetuity in the production of a commodity to the withdrawal from consumption or other uses of the present annual flow of the commodity, the withdrawal or sacrifice being needed to make the investment that will make the increase in production possible. (RF2) >Rate of return/Fisher, >Rate of return/Pasinetti. Harcourt I 162 Pasinetti compares, one with another, stationary states in which commodities are produced by commodities and labour in given technical proportions in any one technique and its activities. The relative prices of commodities and of one or other of the factor prices in this system are indeterminate until either r or w is given exogenously. Can either of Fisher's concepts supply the missing link and close the system? When we come to RF2, which essentially is to tell us whether or not to go over from one system to another, the extra outputs which are to be gained and the capital stocks with which they are to be associated (and in which, in general, there will be more of some commodities and less of others, the latter becoming redundant), have to be valued at a set of prices in order that RF2 may be computed. Harcourt I 163 So, in general, RF2 is not independent of r and the accompanying set of relative prices. If we arbitrarily choose a value of r we may calculate RF2 and solve the problem of the choice of technique by seeing whether RF2 <= r. In general, RF2 not equal to RF1, though there are cases where their values coincide (including Solow's examples in Solow [1967(3), 1970(4)]), namely, in a onecommodity model, or when we consider an individual producer operating under perfectly competitive conditions, or at a switch-point. In the present context of stationary state comparisons, they coincide 1) if RF1 exists, 2) if RF2 is calculated in terms of the relative price system corresponding to the value of RFi and, 3) if there is no redundancy of the commodities in the means of production when the transition is made from one state to the other (see Pasinetti [1969](1), p. 515). It is clear that in these special circumstances RF2 will be equal to RF1 (…). Harcourt I 164 Pasinetti/Harcourt: If the number of techniques (economies) tends to infinity, switch points become irrelevant for now there always exists another more profitable technique in between two equi-profitable ones. Thus each rate of profits will be associated with a unique technique (and economy). (This is the basis of Pasinetti's contention that the traditional definition of the marginal product of capital is associated with situations in which only one technique is the most profitable at any given rate of profits (…). We thus arrive at an inverse monotonic relationship between a physical rate of return - RF2 - and an increasing quantity of (physical) capital. Moreover, it is an inverse relationship which permits 'an extension to the rate of profits of the marginal theory of prices' in which prices are 'indexes of scarcity' - as indeed they are here, for the smaller, i.e. the more scarce, is the existing quantity of corn, the higher is the physical rate of return (and of profits) to more savings. Harcourt I 165 The upshot of the argument is that RF2 is intended to form the basis in a realistic heterogeneous capital-goods model of a function which relates amounts wanted - values - to scarcity prices. The proof (for the discrete case) is very simple. The malleability assumption means ((s) that technical equipment and thus progress can be seen as malleable as a construction kit) that there are no discarded capital goods when one system supersedes another, so that RF2 = σ = p(r)(Qβ-Qα) / p(r)(Kβ – Kα) where p is the vector of prices corresponding to the rate of profits (r) and the Qs and Ks are collections of heterogeneous goods treated as outputs and inputs respectively. But the 'unobtrusive postulate' implies that there can be only one switch point between any two techniques and that there is a definite ordering on either side of the switch-point techniques, properties associated with the physical rate of return (…). >Rate of return/Harcourt. 1. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 2. Fisher, Irving [1930] The Theory of Interest (New York: Macmillan). 3. Solow, R. M. [1967] 'The Interest Rate and Transition between Techniques', Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth, Essays presented to Maurice Dobb, ed. by C. H. Feinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 30-9. 4. Solow, R. M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Rate of Return | Harcourt | Harcourt I 167 Rate of return/technical progress/Harcourt: „Malleability“ ((s) that technical equipment and thus progress can be seen as malleable as a construction kit)…. 'Malleability' - no redundancy – gets rid of D. H. Robertson's grumble, see Robertson [1949](1); all existing capital goods may be used and workers may remain, if they wish, teetotal. >Marginal product of labour/Robertson. The high number of techniques confines the distance which p may move away from r*. And, most striking of all, if we let the techniques become very many, approaching an infinite number, so that the change in the magnitude of r needed to go from one to another becomes infinitesimally small then, due to the 'unobtrusive postulate', the differences in values of capital goods and outputs per man likewise become smaller and smaller. ((s) the 'unobtrusive postulate': the 'unobtrusive postulate' implies that there can be only one switch point between any two techniques and that there is a definite ordering on either side of the switch-point techniques, properties associated with the physical rate of return (…).) Harcourt: In the limit, both change instantaneously, the switch point becomes irrelevant (as in the artificial case) and 'at any level of the rate of profits, there always is one technique which is the most profitable one . . . at the same time any change in the rate of profits, no matter how small, always causes a change in the most profitable technique', Pasinetti [1969](2), p. 521. Such, perhaps, is the post- (technical) revolution which lies behind Irving Fisher's pre-revolution investment-opportunity schedules, as brought into the modern era by Hirshleifer [1958](3). I add 'perhaps' because Fisher's examples are always for individuals. It does, however, seem-and this is confirmed by Stigler [1941](4) -that the early neoclassicals were after bigger game than a partial analysis of an individual firm or industry and the scope of the questions examined by Dewey [1965](5) in the book he is pleased to call Modern Capital Theory confirms that this view still appeals to some. What Marshall was after we can never really be sure; for, characteristically, he always shied away from openly committing himself. (Keynes [1933](6), pp. 223-4, though, had no such scruples in his assessment of Marshall's stand - except on the subject of French letters, for which see Holroyd [1968 (7)], pp. 514-15, n1.) But the results of the reswitching and capital-reversing debate show that there is no justification at all for the 'unobtrusive postulate', for we know that in a heterogeneous capital-goods model (where capital goods are really so and not just jelly in disguise), a lower rate of profits may well be associated with a lower output per head, with a lower value of capital per head and with a lower net output-capital ratio. Harcourt I 168 Rate of profit: Moreover, the same technique may be the most profitable at two widely separated rates of profits. Technical progress: Nearness of techniques as assessed by the rate of profits at which they are most profitable may tell us nothing at all about how close (or far apart) are their values of capital or outputs per head. And - most damaging of all for RF2 as a surrogate for a well-behaved physical rate of return, i.e. a marginal product which declines as the value of capital increases - the difference (r - p(r)) may become indifferently positive or negative at any level of the rate of profits, so losing the properties of a physical rate of return. >Surrogate production function, >Rate of profit, >Rate of return/Economic theories. 1. Robertson, D. H. [1949] 'Wage Grumbles', Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution (American Economic Association), S. 221-36. 2. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 3. Hirshleifer, J. [1958] 'On the Theory of Optimal Investment Decision', Journal of Political Economy, LXVI, S. 329-52. 4. Stigler, George J. [1941] Production and Distribution Theories: The Formative Period (New York: Macmillan). 5. Dewey, Donald [1965] Modern Capital Theory (New York: Columbia University Press). 6. Keynes, J. M. [1933] Essays in Biography (London: Macmillan). 7. Holroyd, Michael [1968] Lytton Strachey: a Critical Biography. Vol. 11 The Years of Achievement (1910-1932) (London: Heinemann). |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Realism | Boyd | Horwich I 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: Horwich I 493 Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? >Realism, >Internal Realism/Putnam, >Truth. Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. >Method, >Reliability. Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods. >Theory dependency. Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism. >Positivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles. >Observation Language. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts". >Science/Kuhn. Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner". >Theory ladenness. N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation. >Observation. Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism. Ad. 3. Vs: Horwich I 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept. BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism. Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Cf. >Redundancy theory. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth. >Deflationism. Horwich I 494 Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true. M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically. Horwich I 495 Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community >Literal truth, >Bare truth. M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today. Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism. >Constructivism. Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths. >Empiricism, >Correspondence. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Redundancy theory: comprises the thesis that nothing is added to a true sentence when it is said that it is true. In other words, each sentence asserts its own truth; the appending of the truth predicate "is true" would thus be redundant. See also judgment, truth theory, truth definition, deflationism, minimalism, disquotationalism, all that he said is true, predication. |
||
| Redundancy Theory | Armstrong | Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
|
| Redundancy Theory | Austin | I 234 AustinVsRedundancy theory: the statement that A refers to the world outside - i.e. something outside this statement itself. - The statement that the statement is true refers to the world including the statement that A refers to the world. >Description levels. That only makes sense if the statement has already been made and verified. - The relationship between the statement that A refers to the world and the world whose existence claimed by the statement that A refers to the world is true, is purely conventional. >World, >Reality. A statement that says of itself that it is true is just as absurd as the one that says that it was wrong. >Paradoxes, >Self-reference. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Redundancy Theory | Ayer | I 276 Redundancy theory/Ayer: shows that it is problematic to take truth to be a property. >Truth theories. Redundancy theory: "p is true" refers differently to p as p refers to itself. >Truth, >Truth predicate, >Description levels, >Self-reference. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Black | IV 152 Redundancy Theory/Tarski/VsRedundancy theory/BlackVsRedundancy theory: eliminates the separation of object language/meta language - truth is stripped of its dignity. >Truth, >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Description levels. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Brandom | I 433f Redundancy theory/Brandom: VsPragmatism: has not recognized that the significance of the corresponding assertions must be the same - VsRamsey: E.g. "Goldbach’s Conjecture" is not equivalent to "the Goldbach's Conjecture is true". - Solution: Originally posted eradication > set of sentences. VsRamsey. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Redundancy Theory | Dummett | Brandom I 471 Redundancy theory/Dummett/Brandom: The redundancy theorypresumes the content of the non-semantic assertion against which the semantic assertion ("it is true that ...") is redundant - DummettVsDeflationism: therefore deflationism cannot explain the propositional content through truth conditions - (although everything has truth conditions). >Truth conditions, >Propositional content. III (a) 13 Truth/Redundancy Theory/Dummett: The singular term which appears in P, has its indirect reference object in "It s true that P, i.e. its meaning. >Sense/Dummett. - ((s) E.g. "A unicorn has one horn": without truth value - but "It is true that a unicorn has one horn": false - divergence of "P" and "It is true that P".) III (a) 17 Redundancy Theory/Dummett: The redundancy theory indicates that our explanation states the whole meaning of "true and" false". - Problem: if we accept the redundancy theory, the explanation is obstructed by the truth theory - ((s) because it requires a bivalent logic.) III 226 Redundancy Theory: The thesis, that the equivalence thesis provides an exhaustive explanation of the truth concept. Equivalence thesis: "P is true" comes out at the same thing as "p". DummettVs: It does not explain the understanding of linguistic meaning, there must be something that goes beyond this, because we understand the special meaning of "is true". |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Redundancy Theory | Foucault | II 115ff Statement/Foucault: at first sight the statement appears as the last, indissociable element, which can be isolated and can enter into a play with other elements. A point without surface. Problem: if the statement is the elementary unity of the discourse, what is it then? What are their distinguishing traits? What limits do you have to recognize? >Statement, >Utterance, >Proposition, >Truth, >Truth value, >Description level. For example redundancy theory: the question of whether in logic "A" and "it is true that A" are interchangeable. Foucault: as statements they are not equivalent and not interchangeable. (FoucaultVsRedundancy Theory). They cannot be in the same place in the discourse. E.g. the present King of France is bald: can only be analyzed by recognizing in the form of a single statement two different propositions, each of which can be true or false. (Strawson: utterance, point of time). E.g. "I am lying": can only be true in a relation to a claim at a lower level. The criteria for the identity of a proposition do not apply to the description of the particular unit of a statement. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Redundancy Theory | Frege | II 49 Redundancy theory/Frege: (was anticipated by Ramsey): the assertion of the truth lies in the form of the declarative sentence. >Assertions, >Assertive force. Assertive power/Frege: the assertive power is missing, e.g. in the theater; actor: here the thought is the same, but without truth value. >Truth value gaps, >Theory of force/Dummett, >Judgment stroke. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Redundancy Theory | Geach | I 263 Geach per redundancy theory - "it is true that p" is hardly different from "p". >Levels/Order, >Description levels. VsGeach: see >Redundancy theory/Logic texts. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Redundancy Theory | Grover, D. L. | Horwich I 319 Redundancy TheoryVs/VsProsentential Theory/CGB/Camp, Grover, Belnap: problem: index words: John: "I'm greedy." Mary: "This is true". Here it is not clear if Mary utters a mere repetition. Problem: "every word of Mark could be true": there is no verb for "could". I 342 Redundancy Theory/Prosentential Theory/CGB: GroverVsRedundancy Theory/CGBVsRedundancy Theory: the Prosentential Theory does not show that "is true" is redundant! Not as long as it is involved in prosentences, but rather when it is isolated. >Truth predicate, >"Everything he said is true". >Prosentential theory. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 56 E.g. "The house is beautiful" is about a house - B. "It is true that the house is beautiful" does not speak of a house, but of a statement (Hoyningen-HueneVsRedundancy Theory). >Levels (Order), >Description level, >Object language, >Meta language. --- Read III 40 Redundancy theory VsCorrespondence theory: denies that truth is a predicate. Truth is redundant, it says, inasmuch as the predication of truth from a statement says no more than the assertion of that statement itself. "It is true that A" is the same as "A". >Correspondence theory, >Fact. It does not need a theory of truth, because there is no such thing as truth. Tarski's theorems are true because the right and left sides are essentially identical. They differ only by their notation. Redundancy Theory Vs Metaphysical Object. Thesis: Truth is not a property. VsRedundancy Theory: "is true" is grammatically required, truth is more than repetition: it is force and universality. Truth is not a property - true statements have no common characteristic. >Truth criterion. The truth-predicate adds universality to the fact. >Truth predicate, >Truth. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Redundancy Theory | Meixner | I 89 MeixnerVsRedundancy theory: Compared to the redundancy theory, the standard ontological analysis provides another entity: Ex. Regensburg lies on the Danube here we get three names instead of two: except Regensburg and Danube as third: "lies on": the needed universal. >Universals, >Expressions/Meixner, >Names of expressions. Ontological standard analysis: >Ontology/Meixner, >Ontology/Chisholm. ChisholmVs. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Redundancy Theory | Prior | I 11 Ramsey/Prior: "No Truth theory": it is simply a fact that grass is green. >Facts, >Predication, >Reality, >World/thinking, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Metalanguage, >F. P. Ramsey. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Redundancy Theory | Putnam | Field IV 407 PutnamVsRedundancy Theory: the redundancy theory does not explain our understanding. >Understanding/Putnam. --- Putnam VII 430 Redundancy Theory: truth is not a property. cf. >Deflationism, >Disquotationalism, >Disquotation. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Quine | VII (i) 164 Redundancy Theory/Quine: it is doubtful whether the connection of "Fa" with "Fa is true" is analytic. XIII 214 Redundancy Theory/QuineVsRedundancy Theory/truth/Quine: the truth has been said to disappear, because the truth of the sentence is simply the sentence. ("Disapearance theory of truth") This is wrong: the quotation marks must not be taken lightly. We can only say that the adjective "true" is dispensable if it is applied to sentences that explicitly lie before us. Truth-predicate/true/generalization/Quine: is necessary to say that all sentences of a certain form are wrong. Or For example, a sentence that is not literal (not literally passed down) is true or false. Or E.g. that the slander paragraphs cannot be applied to true sentences or E.g. that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. N.B.: if you translate such sentences into the predicate logic, the subject of the truth- predicate is not a quotation, but a variable. These are the cases where the truth-predicate is not superfluous. Disquotation/truth/definition/Quine: the disquotational approach may still be useful when it comes to defining truth. Truth-Definition/truth/Quine: it identifies all discernible truths that the truth of the sentence is communicated by the sentence itself. But that is not a strict definition; it does not show us who could eliminate the adjective "true" XIII 215 from all contexts in which it can occur grammatically. It only shows us where we can eliminate it in contexts with quotations. Paradox/Quine: we have seen above (see liar paradox) that definability can contain a self-contradiction. It is remarkable how easily definable we found truth in the present context. How easy it can be and at the same time possibly fatal. Solution/Tarski: Separation object language/meta language. Recursion/Tarski/Quine: shows how the truth-term is first applied to atomic sentences and then to compositions of any complexity. Problem: Tarski could not yet define truth because of the variables. Sentences with variables can be true in some cases and false in others. (Open Sentences). Only closed sentences (where all variables are bound by quantifiers) can be true or false. Fulfillment/Recursion/Tarski/Quine: what Tarski recursively defines is fulfillment of a sentence by an object; is not truth. These objects are then the possible values of the free variables. After that, truth trivially results as a waste product. Def Truth/Fulfillment/Tarski: a closed sentence is true if it is fulfilled by the sequence of length 0, so to speak. Liar Paradox/Tarski/Quine: Tarski's construction is masterly and coherent, but why doesn't it ultimately solve the paradox? This is shown by the translation into symbolic logic when the sentence is formulated in object language (see paradoxes above, last section). Paradox/logical form/liar/Quine: the word "true" has the context "x is true" in the explicit reconstruction where "x" is the subject of quantifiers. Problem: the recursive definition of truth and fulfillment does not show how to "fulfill x". XIII 216 or "x is true" is eliminated. Solution: this only works if "x is true" or "fulfilled" is predicated by an explicitly given open or closed sentence. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Redundancy Theory | Searle | III 216 Def Redundancy Theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). III 217 These two theories are believed to be usually incompatible with the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory. III 219 Disquotation/Searle: disquotation tells us only for each individual case, what it is what makes statements true. >Disquotation. III 223 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: the illusion of redundancy arises from the fact that at disquotation the left side looks like the right. III 227 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: "true" is not redundant, we need a metalinguistic predicate to evaluate the success. >Metalanguage. III 223ff SearleVsRedundancy Theory: there is the illusion that in the disquotation the right side looks as the left. "Is true" is an evaluation of statements. > Rorty: "is true" is a "compliment". >Truth/Rorty. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Redundancy Theory | Strawson | II 264 Redundancy theory/StrawsonVsAustin: it is not true that with "true" something is said about a statement - (Strawson per redundancy theory). Cf. >Logic texts VsRedundancy theory. II 265 Solution: simply checking if the cat is on the mat. >Ostension), >Pointing. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Redundancy Theory | Tugendhat | I 252 Redundancy theory / Tugendhat: there is a surplus in the expression ’p’ incomparison to the incomplete expression ’that p’ - it is this plus that the addition of ’is true’ expressed - that is not at all trivial. - It would be trivial if one presupposes that one already understands the use of assertoric sentences. - "True" can be eliminated - (Tugendhat per redundancy theory) I 266 TugendhatVsredundancy theory: if truth is necessary for determining the meaning of a sentence (by truth conditions), then "true" should not be eliminable. >Truth conditions, >Understanding, >Meaning. I 315 Redundancy theory / Tugendhat: presupposes that the difference between ("it is said") "that p" and "p" is already understood. Cf. >That-sentences, >Levels, >Description levels, >Truth. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Redundancy Theory | Wittgenstein | Dummett I 159 Wittgenstein: Truth is a shallow concept: "It is true that A" means exactly the same as "A". (Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory). >Truth. IV 54 Wittgenstein per redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442) a proposition cannot possibly say of itself that it is true. >Paradoxes, >Circular reasoning. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Signals | Deacon | I 32 Signals/Sign language/Signal language/Non-human language/Deacon: Characteristics: a language-like signal should have a combinatorial structure with distinguishable elements, which in turn must be able to occur in new combinations. It should enable creative production of new outputs with little redundancy. Although there are a large number of possible combinations, most of these combinations would be excluded. Cf. >Language, >Words, >Signs, >Symbols, >Syntax, >Meaning. I 466 Note Signal language: Some languages based on signs are not based on the human language, but differ considerably from it (see Bellugi and Klima, 1982)(1). I 32 The correlations between signals and events and objects should not be a simple 1:1 mapping. >Reference, >Objects, >Events. I 33 These correlations should be radically but systematically different from case to case. These characteristics have a syntax, even if it is no syntax that corresponds to human language. Games, mathematics and even cultural habits have such characteristics. >Play. However, an extraterrestrial signal with such features would still not be decipherable. Animal signals: since they are isolated or little organised, they are described in summary rather than through formal rules. It is highly unlikely that an existing system would have been overlooked here, especially in the case of cosmic signals. Cf. >Language rules. Non-human communication/Deacon: Conclusion: it is not about the fact that human communication is somehow better, but about the fact that it is simply not comparable. >Communication. Social communication: does not simply replace words with gestures. >Gestures. 1. U. Bellugi und E.S. Klima (1982). From gesture to sign: Deixis in a visual gestural language in context. New York: John Wiley, 297-313 |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Speech Act Theory | Austin | Husted III 240ff Speech Act Theory: expressive function. >Accuracy, >Adequacy. VsRedundancy Theory (p = "it is true that p"). >Redundancy theory. Speech Act/Austin: Def lokutionary act: enunciation - E.g. you give an example of the meaningful sentence "the bull is going". perlocutionary: effect by using the statement - E.g. warning with this sentence. >Perlocutionary acts. illocutionary: you frighten the listener. >Illocutionary acts. III 245 In addition: fulfilling conditions as a "plus" to the statement: the warranty given by the speaker -> Brandom, >Score keeping. II 247 Speech act theory -VsLogical Positivism: more than just the two functions a) description of reality, b) expression of emotions Speech acts belong to neither of these two categories. >Positivism. III 248 AustinVsWittgenstein: per continuous similarity - Speech act theory: shows its strength here. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Statements | Foucault | II 115ff Statement/Foucault: at first sight the statement appears as the last, indissociable element, which can be isolated and can enter into a play with other elements. A point without surface. Problem: if the statement is the elementary unit of the discourse, what is it then? What are their distinguishing traits? What limits do you have to recognize? For example, the question of whether the logic "A" and "it is true that A" are interchangeable. Foucault: as statements they are not equivalent and not interchangeable. (FoucaultVsRedundancy Theory). They cannot be in the same place in the discourse. >Sentence, >Utterance, >Assertion, >Proposition, >Discourse/Foucault. For example, the bald king can only be analyzed by recognizing in the form of a single statement two different propositions, each of which can be true or false. (Strawson: utterance, point of time). E.g. "I am lying": can only be true in a relation to a claim at a lower level. The criteria for the identity of a proposition do not apply to the description of the particular unit of a statement. Statement/Foucault: As an example, which is not a statement, could I doodle a few letters? For example, would the letters in a case-room be reasonably regarded as statements? The two examples are not on the same level. The series of letters Q W E R T Z on a typewriter is not a statement. But the same in a textbook for machine-writing is a statement. It will not require a regular linguistic constellation for a statement. On the other hand, there is not enough material accumulation. Statement: is thus an existence function, which is a characteristic of the signs. There are no structural unitary criteria, but one function. This function is not a unit. Statement: cannot have its own character, is inappropriate for an adequate definition. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Symbolic Communication | Deacon | I 334 Symbolic communication/Deacon: there has never been a proto-language with simpler structures than e.g. the distinction between subject and predicate, which deals with symbols instead of pure indices at all. >Index/Deacon, >Symbol/Deacon. These forms were present from the very beginning, when symbolic communication was born. Deep structure: there are no characteristics for it so it that would be effective beyond language boundaries, such as sentence position, melody or specific words. >Deep structure, >N. Chomsky, >VsChomsky. It is therefore reasonable that Chomsky should withdraw from Darwinian explanation. I 335 Language/Brain/Deacon: the specific neuronal processes necessary to overcome the attention threshold depend on processes taking place in the prefrontal cortex. Here we have a common ground between individual brains and a point of attack for Baldwin's evolution. >Baldwin's Evolution, >Evolution/Deacon. I 353 Symbolic communication/evolution: symbolic communication has developed over 2 million years. It was not always the case that speaking is the essential part of everyday communication and the transmission of our language to children, as is the case today. >Communication, >Language development. I 354 Non-verbal communication may have been in competition with verbal communication for a long time. Cf. >Gestures, >Animals, >Animal language. I 362 Symbolic communication/gestures/articulation/language/Deacon: due to the untrained vocal abilities of early humans, early symbolic communication should not have been just a simpler language, but should differ from language in many ways. Some authors suspected that early language such as chains of words were without specific syntax or grammar. DeaconVs: paradoxically, the limitation of the vocal apparatus may have resulted in a greater complexity of earlier languages. >Syntax. I 363 A smaller repertoire of sound differences leads to longer chains. Such languages are then more prone to errors. In addition, the short-term memory is used to a greater extent. In order to avoid errors, an increased level of redundancy is likely to have been appropriate. >Redundancy. I 368 Language development: it is a common mistake to infer primitive language from the primitive use of tools of early peoples. It is also problematic to infer anything from the lack of evidence. I 370 While stone tools were similar in different regions of the world (their use was universal) the early symbolic communication of distant peoples will not have been similar to the same extent. I 372 Neanderthals had a fully developed modern brain from a neurological point of view. I 373 The main reason for the decline of former peoples were introduced diseases, not cultural inferiority. The rapid changes in the paleolithic age do not correspond to biological changes. >Extinction. I 378 Why has symbolic communication developed? It was useful for coordination in hunting, sharing knowledge about tool use and much more. But none of them can serve as an explanation, since it always requires a certain symbolic communication. The first beginnings were probably only a small part of social communication and not better developed than the communication of modern apes. Problem: Learning symbols requires much more indirect association than what is normally used for associations in other organisms than humans. These more indirect associations are not of any use at all at first, and are therefore inefficient and detrimental to survival. >Association. I 378-381 From an evolutionary point of view, the most important information is that which the female can obtain about the abilities of the male and which the male is able to deliver to the female. It must be possible to exclude erroneous information and distinguish information from other behaviours. I 382 Communication between males must be more complex when it comes to assessing the strengths of a rival without risking a direct battle. I 384 Human Communication/Deacon: Thesis: The development of more complex (symbolic) means of communication is probably designed to regulate the unavoidable conflict between sexual reproduction and social cooperation. I 385 A special characteristic of human versus animal communities is the long-term sexual bonding. Weddings establish a greater number of rights and obligations within a community. Marriage rules determine who can or cannot marry whom. Most communities are aware of an incest prohibition. Cf. >C. Lévi-Strauss. I 388 Characteristic for human communities is a relatively stable mating of parents and at the same time care for the rearing of offspring within a larger social association. The reason why this is rare in evolution is that such structures tend to undermine themselves. I 392 Coexistence in groups and simultaneous male brood care can only be maintained if access to reproduction is limited and unambiguous, which is the case only in carnivorous communities. Replacement for nursing care is only provided by relatives. A special feature is that we humans are particularly poorly equipped to steer social behaviour through smells. I 396 Females must have a guarantee that their offspring will be provided with meat by males. The males have to be sure that they only care for their own offspring. I 397 The problem of setting up a social structure that makes this possible can be solved by using symbols. I 401 In the context of marriage rules, reciprocity and altruism are at stake. It must be possible to represent past and possible future actions. Indexical communication is not enough. However, quite simple symbols are enough. >Altruism. Abstract reference: Reference to the absent was practiced and achieved through ritualization. I 403 Abstractness: a problem that is particularly difficult to symbolize is peace or its creation. This is due to the high cost of possible deception. >Deception, >Peace. I 405 Negation: to distinguish war and peace, negation or symbolic representation of negation is used. In addition, one needs generalization in order to understand peace as the absence of all conflicts. >Negation, >Generalization. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Terminology | Goodman | I 88 Art: There are characteristics to define a mode of symbolization that indicates whether something is a work of art. 1. Syntactic density: syntactic density is, where certain minimal differences serve to distinguish symbols, e.g. a scale free thermometer (in contrast to a digital instrument.) 2. Semantic density: semantic density is, where symbols are available for things that differ only by minimal differences from each other, e. g. not only the scale free thermometer mentioned above, but also common German, as long as it is not syntactically dense. 3. Relative fullness: relative fullness is, where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant, e. g. the drawing of a mountain of Hokusai consisting of a single line, in which every property such as line, thickness, shape, etc. counts. Contrary to the same curve as a depiction of the stock market trend of a day, in which only the height of the values above the basis counts. 4. Exemplification: in the exemplification, a symbol, whether or not it is denoted, is symbolized by the fact that it serves as a sample of properties which it possesses literally or metaphorically. 5. Multiple and complex reference is also possible, where one symbol fulfils several related and interacting reference functions, some direct and others mediated by other symbols. --- III 128 Definition symbol scheme: a symbol scheme consists of characters. Definition characters: characters are certain classes of utterances or inscriptions. Characteristic of the character in a notation is that its elements can be freely interchanged without any syntactic effects (class of marks). Score requires character separation. A character in a notation is an abstraction class of character indifference among inscriptions. Definition inscriptions: inscriptions include statements. An inscription is any brand visually, auditively, etc. that belongs to a character. An inscription is atomic if it does not contain any other inscription, otherwise it is compound. For example, a letter is considered atomic, including spaces. In music, the separation in atomic/together cannot always be recognized immediately, it is more complex. The atoms are best sorted into categories: key sign, time sign, pitch sign. III 128/129 Definition mark: a mark is an individual case of a character in a notation and it includes inscriptions. Actual marks are rarely moved or exchanged. All inscriptions of a given brand are syntactically equivalent. And this is a sufficient condition that they are "genuine copies" or replicas of each other, or are spelled in the same way. No mark may belong to more than one character (disjunctiveness) a mark that is unambiguously an inscription of a single character is still ambiguous, if it has different objects of fulfillment at different times or in different contexts. Definition type (opposite: use, Peirce): the type is the general or class whose individual cases or elements are the marks. Goodman: I prefer to do without the type altogether and instead name the cases of use of the type replica. Definition case of use: the case of use the replica of a type ("genuine copy"). There is no degree of similarity necessary or sufficient for replicas. Definition genuine copy: a genuine copy of a genuine copy of a genuine copy... must always be a genuine copy of "x". If the relation of being a genuine copy is not being transitive, the whole notation loses its meaning (see below: strictly speaking, a performance may not contain a single wrong note). Score requires character separation. Definition Notation: 1. Condition is character indifference among the individual cases of each character. Character indifference is a typical equivalence relation: reflexive, symmetrical, transitive. (No inscription belongs to one character to whom the other does not belong). 2. Demand to notation: the characters must be differentiated or articulated finally. For every two characters K and K' and every mark m that does not actually belong to both, the provision that either m does not belong to K or m does not belong to K' is theoretically possible. 3. The (first) semantic requirement for notation systems is that they must be unambiguous. Definition ambiguity: ambiguity consists of a multitude of fulfillment classes for one character. Definition redundancy: redundancy consists of a multitude of characters for one fulfillment class. III 133 Definition syntactically dense: a schema is syntactically dense if it provides an infinite number of characters that are arranged in such a way that there is always a third between two. Such a scheme still has gaps. For example, if the characters are rational numbers that are either less than 1 or not less than 2. In this case, the insertion of a character corresponding to 1 will destroy the density. Definition consistently dense: if there is no insertion of other characters at their normal positions, the density is destroyed. Definition ordered syntactically: e. g. by alphabet Definition discreetly not overlapping: note how absurd the usual notion is that the elements of a notation must be discreet: first, characters of a notation as classes must be rather disjoint! Discretion is a relationship between individuals. Secondly, there is no need for inscriptions of notations to be discreet. And finally, even atomic inscriptions only need to be discreet relative to this notation. Definition disjunct/disjunctiveness: no mark may belong to more than one character. The disjunctiveness of the characters is therefore somewhat surprising since we do not have neatly separated classes of ordered spheres of inscriptions in the world, but rather a confusing mixture of marks. Semantic disjunctiveness does not imply the discreetness of the objects of fulfillment, nor do syntactic disjunctiveness of the characters imply the discreetness of the inscriptions. On the other hand, a schema can consist of only two characters that are not differentiated finally. For example, all marks that are not longer than one centimeter belong to one character, all longer marks belong to the other. III 213 Definition fullness: the symbols in the picturial schema are relatively full, and fullness is distinguished from both the general public of the symbol and the infinity of a schema. It is in fact completely independent of what a symbol denotes, as well as the number of symbols in a scheme. Definition "attenuation": for the opposite of fullness I use attenuation. Definition density: e.g. real numbers, no point delimitation possible. The opposite of dense is articulated. III 232 ff Syntactic density, semantic density and syntactic fullness can be three symptoms of the aesthetic. Syntactic density is characteristic for non-linguistic systems; sketches differ from scores and scripts. Semantic density is characteristic of representation, description and expression through which sketches and scripts differ from scores. Relative syntactic fullness distinguishes the more representational among the semantically dense systems from the diagrammatic ones, the less from the more "schematic" ones. Density is anything but mysterious and vague and is explicitly defined. It arises from the unsatisfactory desire for precision and keeps it alive. III 76ff Def scheme: a scheme implicit set of alternatives. III 128 Def symbolic scheme: a symbolic scheme consists of characters. >Symbols. III ~ 140 Def symbol system: a symbol system is a symbol diagram, which is correlated with a reference region. III 76 A description does not work in isolation, but in its belonging to a family. III 195 The text of a poem, a novel or a biography is a character in a notation scheme. As a phonetic character with comments as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to an approximately notational system. >Systems. III 195 As a character with objects as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to a discursive language. >Satisfaction. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Truth | Austin | StrawsonVsTarski, AustinVsTarski: truth is no property - Tarski: Truth is a property. >Truth/Strawson, >Truth/Tarski. I 20 Def truth/Austin: statements are true, if they are connected to things, events, etc. of the type of a given situation by descriptive conventions concerning the words (sentences). >Correspondece theory, >Conventions. Austin: per correspondence theory, but with convention. I 230 A state of affairs must be similar to certain other state of affairs, so that a statement can be true. >Facts, >States of affairs. I 237 "True"/Austin: is not logically superfluous as well as "vague". >Redundancy theory. I 240 Truth/Austin: "true" is used when talking about statements, not sentences. (Strawson ditto). >Statements, >Sentences. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Truth | Ayer | I 21 Truth/Circle/Ayer: true statements are determined by relation to facts - facts determined with true statements - Circle: broken by actions and observations - Ayer separates between truth definition and truth criterion. >Criteria, >Circular reasoning, >Truth definition, >Actions, >Observation. I 297 VsCorrespondence Theory: confuses a method for interpreting the symbols with a truth criterion. >Correspondence theory. I 276 Truth/AyerVsTarski: should not be property of sentences but of propositions (statements expressed by sentences) - E.g. time ratio is relevant. >Propositions. I 278 Truth/Tarski/Ayer: analysis of use (use, no criterion of truth). >Use. III 101 Truth/Ayer: adds nothing to a statement. >Redundancy theory. Truth/Falsehood: their function is to replace negation and assertion signs. >Negation. I 102 They themselves are not real concepts. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Peacocke | II 185 Truth/Peacocke: two versions: (i) which is expressed in English by "what he said" when you know that the other person was telling the truth (ii) in the sense how one can claim that ""it is boring" it is true" if someone expresses it at a time when he is bored. ad (ii): can be expressed in existential quantification: "there is a sentence" ad (i): cannot be expressed by (ii). >Sense, >Proposition, >Meaning, >Sentence, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Translation, cf. >Redundancy theory. Solution: saying and truth (plus adequacy) must be defined in terms of the actual language. >Language use, >Conventions/Lewis. Problem: that involves semantic vocabulary. (Chess: Winning must be defined externally; >Dummett), >Semantics. II 187 Truth/Tarski/actual Language/Peacocke: the concept of truth in this sentence schemes is not the general notion of truth (like e.g. the general concept of winning in the chess game). cf. >Truth in L, cf. >Chess. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Truth | Ramsey | III 67 Truth/Ramsey: we cannot distinguish truth from falsehood if we only know what the word "true" means - true: we use the word a) for mental states b) for statements c) for "propositions" (as objects of belief). >Propositions, >Belief objects, >Thought objects. III 68 Truth/Ramsey/(s): Truth is not a property of sentences, but of meanings of sentences - (ultimately states of consciousness). >Sentences, >Utterances, >Meaning/Intending, >Speaker Intention, >Speaker Meaning, >Mental States, >Beliefs, >Beliefs. III 70 Truth/Ramsey: does not have to be well-founded or comprehensive. For example, true belief: the name of the Prime Minister starts with B - that is correct, even if false belief that Lord Birkenhead is the Prime Minister. Problem: the propositional reference of beliefs can be arbitrarily complex. We must avoid a list of truth definition for all individually - Solution: formalization: "p": a variable sentence - "A", "B": variable words (terms). Def true/Ramsey/logical form/Russell: B is true ⇔ (Ep)(B is a belief that p & p). Vs: Problem: "p" does not seem to contain a verb, but it should - Wrong solution: "is true" to add: circular. III 71 Solution/Ramsey. In reality, "p" contains a verb: e.g. "A is B". III 73 Truth/Ramsey. Example 1. the earth is round. 2. it is true that the earth is round, are equivalent, but 1 does not involve the idea of truth. Cf. >Redundancy theory. III 74 Truth without reference/Ramsey: Example "Belief at 10 o'clock": such a belief cannot yet be called true or false. >Sentences, >Statements. III 75 Truth/Ramsey: truth must be defined by reference, not vice versa. >Reference, >Truth definition. III 77 There cannot be any other kind of reference for true or false beliefs. Otherwise the future would be readable, from example "False reference" on tomorrow's rain. Therefore reference is simple, even if not unanalysable. Truth and reference are not independent expressions. >Simplicity, >Analysis, >Basic concepts. Truth must be defined by reference, not vice versa. >Dependence. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Tarski | Glüer II 22 Truth theory/Davidson: the defined T-predicate (truth predicate) in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination of the true can be restored. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. Object language and metalanguage should contain the predicate true. >Homophony. Davidson, however, can evade the dilemma by not giving a definition. He calls it a definition of truth in Tarski's style, hereafter referred to as T-theory. --- Rorty IV (a) 22 True/Tarski: the equivalences between the two sides of the T-sentences do not correspond to any causal relationship. >Tarski scheme, >Equivalence. Davidson: there is no way to subdivide the true sentences so that on the one hand they express "factual", while on the other side they do not express anything. Cf. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. --- Berka I 396 Truth/Tarski: we start from the classical correspondence theory. I 399 We interpret truth like this: we want to see all sentences as valid, which correspond to the Tarski scheme - these are partial definitions of the concept of truth. - Objectively applicable: is the truth definition, if we are able, to prove all the mentioned partial definitions on the basis of the meta language.(1) 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 --- Berka I 475 Truth-Definition/truth/Tarski: wrong: to assume that a true statement is nothing more than a provable sentence. - This is purely structural. Problem: No truth-definition must contradict the sentence definition. N.B.: but this has no validity in the field of provable sentences. - E.g. There may be two contradictory statements that are not provable. - All provable statements are indeed content-wise true. Nevertheless the truth definition must also contain the non-provable sentences. >Provability, >Definitions. Berka I 482 Definition true statement/Tarski: x is a true statement, notation x ε Wr iff. x ε AS (meaningful statement) and if every infinite sequence of classes satisfies x. >Satisfaction/Tarski. That does not deliver a truth criterion. >Truth criterion. No problem: nevertheless the sense of x ε Wr (x belongs to the class of true statements) gets understandable and unambiguous. I 486 Relative Truth/accuracy in the range/Tarski: plays a much greater role than the (Hilbertian) concept of absolute truth, which was previously mentioned - then we modify Definition 22 (recursive fulfillment) and 23 (truth). As derived terms we will introduce the term of the statement that a) in a domain of individuals with k elements is correct and b) of the statement that is true in every domain of individuals.(2) 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 --- Horwich I 111 Truth/Tarski: is a property of sentences - but in the explanation we refer to "facts". - ((s) Quotation marks by Tarski). >Facts. Horwich I 124 Truth/true/eliminability/Tarski: truth cannot be eliminated with generalizations if we want to say that all true sentences have a certain property. E.g. All consequences of true sentences are true. Also not eliminable: in particular statements of the form "x is true": E.g. the first sentence that Plato wrote, is true. Because we do not have enough historical knowledge.(3) ((s) The designation "the first sentence..." is here the name of the sentence. This cannot be converted into the sentence itself. Eliminability: from definition is quite different from that of redundancy.) >Elimination, >Eliminability, cf. >Redundancy theory. 3. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 --- Skirbekk I 156 Definition Truth/Tarski: a statement is true when it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false. Skirbekk I 158 Truth/Tarski: with our definition, we can prove the (semantic, not the logical) sentence of contradiction and the sentence definition. - The propositional logic does not include the term true at all. Truth almost never coincides with provability. All provable statements are true, but there are true statements that cannot be proved. - Such disciplines are consistent but incomplete. >Incompleteness/Gödel). There is even a pair of contradictory statements, neither of which is provable.(4) 4. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Truth | Williams | II 494 Truth/M. Williams: has no substantial role. No explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success through truth of theory or through theory itself. (per deflationism). >Deflationism, >Success, >Theory, >Redundancy theory. |
EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Conditions | Dummett | II 72 Truth Conditions/Dummett: Truth conditions are assumed to be given. - But only for each type of speech act. - A theory of >force must then distinguish between question, command, etc. Being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct). II 95 Truth Conditions/Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger. - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (the truth conditions for the attribution of skills are needed). II 100 Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know them if you cannot tell when they are satisfied. --- III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: An explanation of sense has to be given by truth conditions. - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: Under which circumstances is a sentence true... >Sense, cf. >Fregean sense. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that "P is true" means. Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained. >Meaning. VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. III (c) 122 Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! Problem: the truth conditions are not always recognizable, even if met. Solution: to think that something is true requires only knowledge of the truth conditions, not knowing whether they are fulfilled. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Truth Definition | Tarski | Berka I 403 Truth-Definition/Tarski: in artificial languages: not solvable if they contain variables of an arbitrarily high order. >Levels, >Variables, cf. >Type theory. Solution: truth-concept as undefined basic concept - it can be used in a "deductive discipline".(1) Berka I 477 Truth/Truth-Definition/language/Tarski: would the language be finite, it took just a list to fill in the scheme.(2) 1. A.Tarski, „Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den Sprachen der deduktiven Disziplinen“, in: Anzeiger der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Klasse 69 (1932) pp 23-25 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 --- Horwich I 119 Truth-Definition/Tarski: has other interesting consequences: we can use it to prove the semantic sentence of contradiction and the semantic sentence of contradiction - but not the corresponding logical sentences, because these contain the term "true". (They belong to the propositional calculus). >Semantics, >Logic, >Excluded Middle, >Truth predicate, >Semantic closure, >Metalanguage, >Provability, >Propositional logic, >Propositional calculus. Also, it is shown that truth never coincides with provability - because there are true statements that are not provable.(3) 3. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 --- Skirbekk I 156 Truth/Tarski: we get the truth-definitions simply because of the definition of fulfillment: Definition fulfillment/Tarski: fulfillment is a relationship between any object and propositional function - an object satisfies a function when the function is a true statement, when replacing the free variable with the name of object - Snow satisfies the propositional function "x is white" - Vs: that is circular, because "true" occurs in the defintion of fulfillment - Solution: fulfillment itself must be defined recursively - if we have the fulfillment, it relates by itself on the statements themselves - a statement is either satisfied by all objects, or by none. Skirbekk I 162 Truth Definition/Tarski: not circular, because the conditions under which statements of the form "if ... then" are true, are extralogical. Skirbekk I 163 Truth-Schema/Tarski: correct: (T)X is true if and only if p. - wrong: (T") X is true if and only if p is true ((s) Vs: here 'true' occurs twice) - Tarsk: Confusion of name and object) statements and their names) - ((s) p is the statement itself, not assertion of its truth.) >Redundancy theory. Skirbekk I 169 Truth-Definition/Tarski: "actually" does not occur, because it does not concern the content - also no assertibility condition because the definition is not epistemologically - epistemologically would be "snow is white" not true.(4) 4. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Truth Predicate | Cresswell | II 37 Truth predicate/T-predicate/Cresswell: the truth predicate turns a that-clause into a standard sentence. >That/Cresswell, >That-clause, >Sentences. Because it is also an identity function, that produces exactly the same list as the meaning of "that" - But for propositional attitudes the redundancy theory is wrong. >Redundancy theory, >Propositions. T-predicate: can be ambiguous: a) as a predicate of sentences: thhen paradoxes-forming. b) as a predicate of propositions: then harmless. >Paradoxes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Verification | Horwich | I XII Verification/Horwich: verification shows truth, if we assume a priori that "p" and "the proposition that p is true" are equivalent. >Truth, >Propositions, >a priori, cf. >Redundancy theory. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| World/Thinking | Sellars | Rorty I 323 Sellars/Rorty: Sellars wants to consider the human research so that the determination to "necessary final agreement" is described as a causal process which results in the creation of self-portraits of the universe. Cf. >Anthropic Principle. Roroty: this meets with the idealistic metaphysics of the late Peirce of the evolutionary love. >Pragmatism, >Peirce. --- Sellars II 318 Language/world/Sellars: Vs temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo-entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" are in another sense linguistic entities themselves. >Concepts/Sellars, >Facts/Sellars, >Psychological Nominalism. Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has made, or must be established, as a relation (but not redundancy). >Redundancy theory. --- II 334 1. The correspondence, we were looking for, is limited to elementary statements. 2. It is about the fundamental role that actual statements (or act of thought) play. As pawns in chess: e.g. "Chicago is large." 3. All true statements are in the same sense "true", but they differ in their roles: "2 + 2 = 4" plays a different role than "this is red". The role is to constitute a projection for the users of language of the world in which they live. Sellars: pro redundancy theory: if the picture corresponds, one is convinced that "this is green" is true, so one is convinced that this is green. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences, >Correspondence/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Best Explanation | Cartwright Vs Best Explanation | I 4 VsBest Explanation/BE/Cartwright: the falsity of the fundamental laws is a direct consequence of their explanatory power. And that is precisely what speaks against the conclusion regarding the best explanation (CartwrightVsAbduction/CartwrightVsPeirce, CartwrightVsBest Explanation). Tradition by BE: skepticism, idealism, positivism. I 89 Theoretical entities/Best explanation/BE/Cartwright: arguments VsBE have no effect on the assumption of theoretical entities, for explanations which assume theoretical entities are causal explanations. BE: are not causal explanations, but theoretical explanations. I 90 Redundancy/Explanation/Truth/Duhem: (see above) because there are always alternative explanations, truth must be independent from the satisfaction through explanations. Duhem/Cartwright: his argument is sometimes read epistemically: we cannot know which ones of several alternative laws are true, yet they are ultimately incompatible. CartwrightVs: this is a misreading. Because this is a general characteristic of our knowledge and does not reflect the specialty in Duhem’s attack DuhemVsBest Explanation. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Black, Max | Thomson Vs Black, Max | Horwich I 161 Material Equivalent/T-Schema/Thomson: "material equivalent" is itself defined in terms of truth! "Principle of Definition"/PdD/Black/Thomson: we must not confuse it with what we understand when we understand the T-scheme! Also not with a general T-Def, which cannot be formulated. A "principle of definition" probably). Tarski/Black: "we only seem to see that the assertion of a proposition is true, logically equivalent to the assertion of the proposition itself". (see above redundancy theory). ThomsonVsBlack: he makes a mistake when he says this is pointless. It is simply wrong! (Group: ThomsonVs Redundancy Theory? BlackVs Redundancy Theory?). For example, suppose we do not know anything about number theory and someone tells us: (5) 43 ε prime ⇔ any number that divides 43 is either 43 or 1 (ε: epsilon, is element of) Now we could think, either 43 is a prime number and... or 43 would not be a prime number and.... But we would definitely think that (5) is the consequence of some definition of "prime number" (whatever that would be). And then we would say that (5) shows an equivalence between "43 ε prime" and "any number...". And we would not say that this is a coincidence, that 43 and the class of prime numbers are mentioned on the left and 43 again on the right, but not the class of prime numbers. For if it were a coincidence, perhaps we could also get the following: (6) 43 ε Prime ⇔ Ramanujan is dead Thomson: but here we would not assume that there would be a general formula from which this is a consequence. Now we could assume that the rule that is fulfilled in the case of (5) and not in (6) is also fulfilled for (1) and the other T-sentences. And that the T-sentences exemplify a relation of logical equivalence. (see below: but do not make explicit!). Thomson: but this is wrong! Example in (1) "London is a city" is true ⇔ London is a city are right: London and the class of cities (mentioned) left: one sentence and the class of true sentences (mentioned). Thomson: why do we accept (1) as true? Because we assume that "London is a city" is used as the name of the phrase "London is a city". (> name of sentence). And we assume this because we assume that the sentence mentioned to the left is the same sentence, Horwich I 162 that is needed on the right. And that is almost certainly what we are supposed to understand. Problem: whoever expresses (1) cannot tell us what we should assume here! In other words: We assume that (1) is a sentence of the meta-language for which there is a designation rule that states that "London is a city" is the name of the sentence "London is a city". N.B.: (1) itself does not tell us that this rule exists! ((s) because it needed a sentence in meta meta language). |
ThomsonJF I James F. Thomson "A Note on Truth", Analysis 9, (1949), pp. 67-72 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 ThomsonJJ I Judith J. Thomson Goodness and Advice Princeton 2003 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Soames Vs Carnap, R. | 478 Set Theory/Truth-Definition/Tarski/Soames: ["snow is white" is T] and "snow is white" are necessarily equivalent in elementary set theory. ((s) > Redundancy Theory). Truth-Predicate/Tarski/Soames: Tarski would not accept a predicate as a truth predicate if [ a is T] would not be material equivalent I 480 to any meta-linguistic paraphrase of the object-language sentence named by a. On this basis, Tarski can be interpreted as implicitly assuming that instances of (19) are necessary or a priori. (Soames pro). (19) If "T" is a truth-predicate for L and "S" in L means that p, then "S" is T iff p. Soames: but this is quite different from claiming that "T" in (20) is replaced by a T-predicate for L, that then the resulting instances of the scheme would be necessary and a priori: (20) If "S" in L means that p, then "S" is T iff p. Soames: but this is what it takes to claim (17) and (18)! PutnamVsTarski/Soames: used the contrast (17/17 Tarski). DummettVsTarski/Soames: used the contrast (18/18 Tarski). Putnam/Dummett/Soames: both show that Tarski's truth definition has nothing to do with understanding or semantic interpretation. Davidson/Soames: is best understood as not trying to analyze meaning in terms of truth, but to eliminate the concept of meaning in favor of the concept of truth. Then the defender of Davidson of "Truth and Meaning" would have the following instead of (i): (i) If x knows that what is expressed by the relevant instance of "S" is true in L iff p, for each sentence of L, then x is a competent speaker of L. Soames/Problem: if now "true in L" is understood as an abbreviation for the definition provided by Tarski, then (i) is as absurd as (18Tarski). SoamesVsCarnap: exactly this kind of absurdity lies in the following (which would allow Tarski's definitions to be the central concept in a meaning theory): (T) S is T iff p. Carnap/Soames: this occurs in Carnap in Meaning and Necessity p. 5/6 and section 7 of his Introduction to Semantics). Meaning Theory/M.th./Soames: must not appeal to other semantic terms. Truth-Predicate/Soames: the concept of truth does not play an ostensible role in our original problem. The refinement of the problem leads to the view that an adequate meaning theory must characterize a predicate that fulfills certain conditions. Soames: it was a discovery that it applies exactly to the true propositions. ((s) That all true propositions have in common). |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Correspondence Theory | Read Vs Correspondence Theory | Read III 42 Correspondence theory: according to it the truth predicate is a substantial predicate that assigns a relational property to statements. True sentences have a real property that distinguishes them from false statements. Redundancy theory Vs correspondence theory: denies that. truth is redundant, it says, so far as the predication of truth of a statement says no more than the assertion that statement itself "it is true that A" is the same as "A". It needs no theory of truth, because such a thing as truth does not exist. Tarski: sentences are true, because the right and left sides are substantially identical. They differ only in their notation. |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Correspondence Theory | Redundancy Theory Vs Correspondence Theory | Horwich I 405 RedundanztheorieVsKorrespondenztheorie/Field: These: Redundanz ist genug, dann braucht man keine zusätzliche Korrespondenz mehr. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Leeds Vs Field, H. | Field II 304 Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership. LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory. Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility). Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed. The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.) Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context. Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth. II 305 Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class" and ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language. Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language. Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation. FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found. Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language. Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30). Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear. FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms! e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two". FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.) Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) : II 306 e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true. Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value). Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation. 1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory. 2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true. FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum. The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness. FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better. I 378 Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) . Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable. (LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField). Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....) Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness! Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction! Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language. Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end. LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable? I 379 This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way. Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction. Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English. Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list. Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English. Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law. LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory). And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization. Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)). Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction. I 386 Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted. I 380 Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important. Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world. Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation! The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world". I 381 We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard. Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic. LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI: a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned). Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation! This is an elder form of the correspondence theory. I 491 He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt. Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world. If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it. LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order. Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability). |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Inflationism | Ramsey Vs Inflationism | Horwich I XIII Truth/Tradition/Inflationism/Horwich: acknowledges Tarski's idea, but considers it insufficient. Example PragmatismVsTarski: this does not explain the usefulness of truth. Inflationism/Horwich: requires attributing truth to additional attributes: "X is true iff X has the attribute P". With this one should be able to specify what truth is. (e.g. usefulness). RamseyVsInflationism: (> Redundancy TheoryVsInflationism): (Chapter 4, AyerVsInflationism, Chapters 8 and 15, StrawsonVsInflationism Chapter 13): Truth needs no additional specification. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Putnam, H. | Brendel Vs Putnam, H. | I 70 Truth-Definition/WT/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is contraintuitive from the start: this also applies to the model-theoretical variants. They do not do justice to our intuitive concept of "true". I 71 His truth concept is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" is itself quite unclear. I 105 Disquotation Theory/Disquotation Theory/Disquotationalism/Putnam/Brendel: Thesis: is only a variant of redundancy theory. BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: this is an error: because redundancy theory assumes an operator and a concept of truth based on disquotation theory cannot be a propositional operator and thus not a redundancy theory. I 278 Brains in a vat/BIV/PutnamVsSkepticism/Putnam: Thesis: the statement that we are brains in a vat cannot turn out to be true because representations have no intrinsic connection to their representatives ("magic reference") - is independent of causation. I 279 SkepticismVsPutnam/Brendel: Skepticism does not have to be impressed. It can classify Putnam's argument as a transcendental argument: it refers to the premises of the possibility of formulating the sentence "We are brains in a vat". StroudVsPutnam/Brendel: such transcendental arguments already presuppose certain verificationist assumptions. I 280 Problem: one cannot yet conclude from this that the world actually exists. One would also have to assume that principles constituting knowledge necessarily describe the world as it actually is. StroudVsTranscendental Argument/Brendel: petitio principii. I 281 BrendelVsStroud: Solution: Semantic Truth/Brendel: the skeptical hypothesis is not a meaningful truthful statement in the sense of semantic truth. Brains in a vat/BIV/Putnam/Brendel: Putnam himself admits that brains in a vat is physically possible. But what does that mean, except that there is such a possible description? I 282 BrendelVsPutnam: no physical possibility is shown at all, only a black box. (David WardVsPutnam Ward, 1995, 191f). He should show the possibility or impossibility of thinking. ((s) Because he himself ultimately proceeds from an argument of the impossibility of thinking (impossibility of reference). Thought experiment/Brendel: that something is physically possible is not yet an argument for the legitimacy of thougt experiment either. I 283 Conceptual Analysis/Brendel: can only be confirmed or refuted by conceptual possibilities. I 284 BrendelVsPutnam: the world of brains in a vat is not so closed to us, we have an idea of what it would be like. I 285 Understanding/Skepticism/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: therefore the skeptical hypothesis is not incomprehensible to us at all. And then also truthful. "Everything different"/Brendel: but this is where the limits of our imagination come in. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Field Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 129 Nominalism/Philosophy of Science/FieldVsQuine-Putnam Argument: An argument to show that nominalistic resources are adequate for good science would be: (E) For each Platonic scientific theory there is a nominalist theory to which the Platonic one is a conservative extension. But this is trivial if there are no restrictions regarding which sets of sentences that have been completed under a logical entailment count as theories. Of course, any Platonic theory T is a conservative extension of the "theory" which consists of nominalistic inferences from T. We have to reinforce (E) so that uninteresting nominalistic theories are excluded. Science Without Numbers: here I did not argue with (E). (E) or any amplifying extension is an existence assertion of a sufficiently wide variation of nominalist theories, and that goes beyond the assertion of the conservatism of mathematical theory. I 241 Conservatism/Mathematics/Field: Truth does not require conservatism! True empirical theories are obviously not conservative! But conservatism is certainly also recognized by most realists for mathematics. For they say that good mathematics is not only true, but necessarily true! Conservatism/Field: (see above) conservative mathematics has the properties of necessary truth, without having to be true itself! Quine: is a realist in terms of mathematics. He wants to nip talk of mathematical necessity in the bud. But for that he needs conservatism. FieldVsQuine: for that he would have to make a major renovation to his thesis that mathematics continuously flows into the rest of the other sciences. Logic/Empiricism/Quine: Thesis: logic could be empirically refuted. Conservatism/Field: The fact that mathematics is empirically refuted is consistent with that, while the logic remains intact. IV 407 Internal Realism/IR/Existence/Ontology/Property/Putnam: what kind of objects exist can only be decided within a theory, according to the IR. FieldVsPutnam: I’m not sure I understand what he means. I suppose he thinks there are several correct theories that answer the question of ontology differently. But this is too trivial. sharper: (Put p 72 74.) two equally correct theories may have different ontologies. PutnamVsRedundancy Theory: does not offer an explanation of our understanding. FieldVsPutnam: this implied neither mind-independence nor theory-dependence, however! And it does not refute the correspondence theory. E.g. you can explain the behavior of electrically charged bodies with or without the assumption of fields. Ontology/Existence/Field: most of us would say that there is more than we are forced to assert. FieldVsQuine: E.g. is rarely critical to assert the existence of unseparated rabbit parts in addition to the existence of rabbits. FieldVsPutnam: if this is clear, then you can hardly draw anti-realistic conclusions from the fact that two equally good theories may differ in ontology. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Grover Vs Ramsey, F. P. | Horwich I 319 VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: the first two objections assume that the data base is too narrow, i.e. that there are cases that are not covered by the theory. (See Redundancy Theory). I 320 1) Index words: (Here: repetition of indices): (14) John: I’m greedy - Mary: That is true Problem: here no mere repetition, or else she would say "I am,..." Problem: there is no general scheme for such cases. 2) Modification: Here, a translation is absolutely impossible: (here with indirect reference and quantification): (15) Every thing that Mark said could be true Problem: there is no verb for "could". Similar: (16) Something that Charlie said is either true or not true. (17) Everything that Judith said was true then, but none of it is still true today. Of course you can try: (15’)(p) Mark said that p > It could be the case that p) or (15’)(p) (Mark said that p > that might p exist) Vs: "being the case" and "existing" are variations of "being true". This would make the redundancy theory a triviality. In this case, Ramsey’s "direct" theory would be wrong. CGBVsRamsey: we improve the redundancy theory by we let by not only allowing propositional quantification for the target language, but also an indeterminate field of links, such as M (for "might"), "P" (for past tense), "~" for negation, etc. I 321 The reader has likely already assumed that we have introduced the negation long ago. But that’s not true. Then: (16’)(p) (Mark said that p > Mp) (17’)(Ep) (Charlie said that p & (p v ~p)) (17’)(p) (Judith said that p > (Pp & ~p)) Redundancy Theory/Ramsey/CGB: it is this variant of the theory of Ramsey, enriched by the above links and propositional quantification, which we call redundancy theory (terminology) from now on. The thesis is that "true" thus becomes superfluous. Thesis this allows translations in Ramseyan sense to be found always. VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey: 3) "About"/Aboutness/Accuracy of the Translation/CGB: some authors: argue that "snow is white" is about snow, and "That snow is white, is true" is about the proposition. And that therefore the translation must fail. CGB: this involves the paradox of analysis. We do not directly touch upon it. ((s) Paradox of analysis, here: you’d have to act more stupid than you are in order not to realize that both sentences are about snow; to be able to name the problem at all (as the opponents do) you need to have it solved already.) 4) PragmatismVsRedundancy Theory: even if the translation preserves the alleged content, it neglects other features which should be preserved. Case of recurrence: E.g. (3) Mary: Snow is white. John: That is true. (3’) Mary: Snow is white. John: Snow is white. Is that supposed to be a good translation?. I 322 Strawson: "true" and "not true" have their own jobs to do!. Pro-Sentence/Pronoun/Anaphora/"True"/CGB: "that is true" presupposes that there is an antecedent. But that is not yet taken into account in Ramsey’s translation (3’). So Ramsey’s translation fails in pragmatic terms. VsPropositional Quantification/PQ/VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/CGB: 4) redundancy: at what price? Propositional quantification is mysterious: it is not consistent with everyday language. It is not shown that "is true" is superfluous in German, but only in a curious ad hoc extension. 5) Grammar: (already anticipated by Ramsey): variables need predicates that are connected with them, even if these variables take sentence position. CGBVsRamsey: unfortunately, Ramsey’s response is not convincing. Ramsey: (see above) "p" already contains a (variable) verb. We can assume the general sentence form as aRb here, then. I 232 (a)(R)(b): If he says aRb, then aRb). Here,"is true" would be a superfluous addition. CGBVsRamsey: We must assume an infinite number of different sentence forms ((s)> language infinite). Redundancy Theory/CGB: But that does not need to worry us. 1) Propositional quantification can be set up formally and informally proper. 2) Variables which take sentences as substituents do not need a verb that is connected to them. That this was the case, is a natural mistake which goes something like this: E.g.(4’) (p)(John says p > p). If we use pronouns that simplify the connected variable: For each sentence, if John said it, it then it. Heidelberger: (1968): such sentences have no essential predicate!. Solution/Ramsey: (4’) For each sentence, if John said that it is true, then it is true. T-Predicate/CGB: "T": reads "is true". (4’) (p) (John said that Tp > Tp) Problem: because "T" is a predicate, and "Tp" is a sentence, "p" must be a term of the language, i.e. it must take a nominal position. I.e. the quantifiers bind individual variables (of a certain type), and not variables about sentences. I 335 Disappearance Cases/Pro-Sentence: some of them can be regarded as a translation in Ramsey language. Def Ramsey Language/CGB/(s): Language in which "true" is entirely superfluous. English*/CGBVsRamsey: for the purpose of better explanation. E.g. (26) It is true that snow is white, but in Pittsburgh it rarely looks white. (27) It is true that there was unwarranted violence by the IRA, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. T-Predicate/CGB: used in (25) and (26) to concede a point in order to determine afterwards by "but" that not too much emphasis should be placed on it. English*. I 336: E.g. (26’) There was unwarranted violence by the IRA, that’s true, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. These are all disappearance cases. I 342 VsProsentential Theory/Spurious Objections/CGB: I 343 Index Words: Laziness pro-sentences refer to their antecedent. Therefore, the theory must be refined further when it comes to indexical expressions. Otherwise E.g. John: "I’m lazy." Mary: "That’s true." Is not to say that Mary means "I (Mary) am lazy". CGB: but that’s a common problem which occurs not only when speaking about truth: E.g. John: My son has a wart on his nose. Bill: He is the spitting image of his father. E.g. Lucille: You dance well. Fred: That’s new to me. Pragmatics/CGBVsRamsey: our approach represents it correctly, in particular, because we exclude "plagiarism". Ramsey’s theory does not. I 344 Quote/VsPro-Sentence Theory/VsCGB: The pro-sentence theory is blamed to ignore cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences, is expressed. E.g. (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: We could say with Ramsey, that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: that obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become more apparent when we use a foreign language translation. E.g. (28) If "snow is white" is true, then... Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then or If snow is white, then... CGB: There are several possible reasons for this. It may be that we want to make clear that the original sentence was said in German. Or it is possible that there is no elegant translation, or we are not sufficiently familiar with German grammar. Or E.g. "snow is white" must be true, because Fritz said it, and everything Fritz says is true. I 345 Suppose, English* had a possibility to present a sentence formally: E.g. "consider __". (29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work just like "Snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: it could be argued that this requires a reference on sentences or expressions, because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation Marks/CGB: we depart from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. I 353 Propositional Variable/Ramsey: Occupies sentence position. (Quantification over propositions). CGBVsRamsey: Such variables are of pro-sentential nature. Therefore, they should not be connected to a T-predicate. ((s) otherwise, "true" appears twice). T-Predicate/Ramsey/Redundancy Theory/CGB: this answers the old question of whether a Ramsey language has to contain a T-predicate: see below. Our strategy is to show how formulas can be read in English*, where there is no separable T-predicate. E.g. (4’) For each proposition, if John says it is true, then it is true. CGB: in this case,propositional variables and quantificational pro-sentences do the same job. Both take sentence position and have the cross-reference that is required of them. Important argument: (4’) is just the candidate for a normal English translation of (4’). Problem: this could lead to believing that a Ramsey language needs a T-predicate, as in (4’) (p)(John said that Tp > Tp). ((s) then, "true" implicitly appears twice). I 354 But since (4’) is perfect English, there is no reason to assume that the T-predicate is re-introduced by that. Or that it contains a separately bound "it" (them). |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Realism | Duhem Vs Realism | Cartwright I 76 DuhemVsRealism: uses the argument of redundancy: also PutnamVsRealism: for every explanation of any amount of data, there is always an alternative. Cartwright: both do not distinguish between causal explanations and theoretical explanations. Cartwright. I 95 Nature/Duhem/Cartwright: Duhem thesis: the phenomena of nature disintegrate roughly in natural species. DuhemVsRealism: there is no unification. It’s just a raw fact that some things can sometimes behave like certain other things. And that can be an indication of the behavior of other things. Explanation/Duhem: draws up a scheme that allows the use of these indications. Unification/Duhem/Cartwright: is only fictional: E.g. It’s easier for us to postulate Maxwell’s four laws and an electromagnetic field in order to display both light and electricity as a manifestation of a single property, but the unification itself does not exist. The phenomena are also completely different! Truth/Explanation/Duhem/Cartwright: We cannot expect to find a explanatory law for two different phenomena, which is also true. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Redundancy Theory | Austin Vs Redundancy Theory | I 19 AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement has other functions than just being true or false. Statements, not propositions (as in Tarski), are candidates for the predicates "true" and "false". "Is true" describes a satisfactory relationship between words and the world. (StrawsonVs). --- I 234 AustinVsRedundancy theory: it has been argued that saying that an assertion is true is not another assertion. It is logically redundant. Austin: but that’s not true. DAdA refers to the world outside of dAdA. That is, to everything except this statement itself! DAdAW refers to the world including dAdA, although the statement itself, i.e. dAdAW, in turn is excluded! DadAW is appropriate only if one imagines that dAdA is already made and verified. --- I 236 AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement that says that it is true is just as absurd as one with the content that it is wrong itself! The crreation of hierarchies formation is not a solution either. --- Strawson II 263 AustinVsRedundancy Theory: AustinVsRamsey and StrawsonVsRamsey: we contradict the thesis that the expression "is true" is logically superfluous. "True" has its own tasks. When we use it, we do not simply assert that something is so, we assert it as we could not do it if certain conditions were not fulfilled. We can also grant, deny, confirm something etc. StrawsonVsAustin: but that does not mean the assumption of the thesis that we assert something about a statement by the use of "true". It is not a new assertion at all! II 265 By looking ((s) by pointing) one can also determine whether a statement is true without the performative use of "true". E.g. someone reported, "he saw that the statement was true". What does he report? He reports that I've seen a cat on the mat. But only in certain circumstances. This also means that one has heard such a statement. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Redundancy Theory | Black Vs Redundancy Theory | IV 155 Truth/Tarski/Philosophy/Everyday language/Black: then one could say that "true" is an "incomplete symbol", a part of the assertion stroke "I-". Redundancy theory/BlackVsRedundancy theory: with that truth will lose its dignity. One might tend to call "true" "redundant". IV 156 Redundancy/Definition/Black: in this sense, every defined character is redundant (eliminable). Truth/Everyday language/Black: We do not need to fear that the paradoxes occur again, because we can always stratify (distinguish semantic types). Truth/Everyday language/Philosophy/Tarski/Black: Thesis: a "philosophical t-theory will bring little more than platitudes and tautologies". |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Brandom Vs Redundancy Theory | I 434 E.g. Vsredundancy theory "Goldbach s conjecture is true". I 438 This sentence is not interchangeable with "Goldbach s conjecture".VsRamsey. E.g. »everything the oracle says is true," is not open to simpler approaches of redundancy and disquotation. I 468 Brandom: "true" expresses a pro-sentence-forming operator. Its syntax and grammar is very different from that of a predicate. Just as "no" is not the necessary grammatical form to pick out a person . |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Redundancy Theory | Dewey Vs Redundancy Theory | Brandom I 418 Dewey: the assertion that "I assert that p" and "it is true that p" have the same force can easily be misunderstood as if the expressed facts were the same. (Vsredundancy theory). (> Wright). |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Redundancy Theory | Fodor Vs Redundancy Theory | I 138 Reduction/Fodor: since it is asymmetrical, it should turn out that physics is the fundamental science. FodorVsReductionism: so it will turn out that reductionism is too strong a basis for the unified science. Fodor pro token physicalism. I 141 Def Reductionism/Fodor: the assumption that every natural kind is a physical natural kind or coextensive with it. (Every natural kind is a physical natural kind if bridge laws express characteristic identity). I 142 Vs: a) interesting generalizations could be made about events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common. b) often it is irrelevant whether physical descriptions have something in common. c) the individual sciences deal primarily with generalizations of this kind. Reductionism/Fodor: more precarious: he asserts that the coextensions are nomologically necessary. Bridge laws are laws. FodorVs. (Davidson ditto) I 143 FodorVsReductionism: the assumption that every mental event is a physical event does not guarantee that physics can provide a suitable vocabulary for psychological theory. I 147 Psychology/Neuroscience/Fodor: Of course we can provide evidence that neural events, that otherwise form a heterogeneous mass, have a kind of properties in common. Such correspondences can now justify token physicalism as well as type physicalism. FodorVsReductionism: but if this is true, the arguments which infer from token physicalism to reductionism must be wrong. I 154 + Reductionism/Tradition: if x and y differ in the descriptions which make them subject to the actual laws of physics, they must also differ in the descriptions by which they fall under any laws. FodorVs: why would we believe that? Two entities may differ physically and still converge in an infinite number of properties. (> description dependent >Davidson?). Fodor: why should there not be some among these properties whose lawful correlation supports the generalizations of the individual disciplines? |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Redundancy Theory | Hofstadter Vs Redundancy Theory | II 512 Explanation: no explanation of macroscopic reality successfully comes by saying that it is a result of microscopic X-unity (VsReductionism, Emergence). Heisenberg: if atoms are really supposed to explain the origin of color and smell, then they cannot have properties like color and smell. |
Hofstadter I Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid German Edition: Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017 Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Kant Vs Redundancy Theory | Metz II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be explored, it can only be thought of in the most abstract concepts of "transcendental apperception". DamasioVsKant: We have a more secure foundation in our body with its skin, its bones, its muscles, the joints, the internal organs, etc. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Redundancy Theory | McGinn Vs Redundancy Theory | I 89 VsReductionism/McGinn: The concept of a person were not reducible. VsIrreducibility: not informative! VSVS: that's just the joke about the theory of irreducibility. The world is not obliged to appear interestingly. I 119 From not being able to make out a fact does not follow that that fact doesn't exist. Vagueness: it is not as if the meaning meant were objectively undetermined, but that whatever determines it is not part of our knowledge. Vagueness/blurriness/(S): Ex When one takes away the object that one sees blurred, it is not as if the blurriness remains. To mean sth./McGinn: Problem: different levels of description. The levels are clearly in systematic relations with each other, but we are unable to explain this relationship sufficiently. (Similar to consciousness). |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Redundancy Theory | Read Vs Redundancy Theory | Read: In welchem Sinn ist die Wahrheit also redundant? Es ist nicht so, dass alles, was mit dem Wahrheitsprädikat getan werden kann, auch ohne es getan werden kann. In diesem Sinn ist es nicht redundant. Es ist grammatisch als Platzhalter für ein Verb erforderlich. Nach Ramsey können wir partiell verallgemeinern: »wahre Aussagen der Form »aRb« sind diejenigen, für die gilt: aRb.« Alles was er sagte/VsRedundanztheorie: Können wir nicht einfach sagen: wahre Aussagen, p, sind diejenigen, für die gilt. .... »-p?« Nein, das können wir nicht. Es ist ungrammatisch: »ist wahr« muss hinzugefügt werden, als Ersatzverb. Die Redundanztheorie heilt uns von der Suche nach einer objektlastigen Metaphysik, der Suche nach einer wirklichen Eigenschaft wahrer Aussagen. Aber Wahrheit ist mehr als pure Wiederholung. Das zeigt die Bemerkung über Allgemeinheit. Die Wiederholung dessen, was ein anderer gesagt hat, lässt den Aspekt der Unterstützung gänzlich unberücksichtigt. Logik III 44 |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Redundancy Theory | Searle Vs Redundancy Theory | III 216 Def Redundancy Theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). III 217 These two theories are believed to be usually incompatible with the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory. III 219 Disquotation/Searle: disquotation tells us only for each individual case, what it is what makes statements true. >Disquotation. III 223 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: the illusion of redundancy arises from the fact that at disquotation the left side looks like the right. III 227 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: "true" is not redundant, we need a metalinguistic predicate to evaluate the success. >Metalanguage. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Redundancy Theory | Tugendhat Vs Redundancy Theory | III 196 Truth/Tugendhat: but one cannot completely do without verification. Of course a judgement is also true if it is not recognized as true. But what the truth of a judgment means can of course only be determined with regard to the way we recognize it. We would not know how to ask for the truth. Thus the word "truth" would lose all meaning! TugendhatVsRedundancy Theory: if the meaning of "true" is exhausted in that we replace "p" is true" by "p", then any question about the truth of judgments is irrelevant. We would only have the judgments themselves, and would not understand what it would mean to ask beyond them. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Redundancy Theory | Verschiedene Vs Redundancy Theory | HH II 56 Hoyningen-HueneVsredundancy theory: The statement A and "it is true that A" are different. Example A 1 and "it is true that A" here are different combinations played out. Result: there are two different connectives linked to the same truth table. This shows that the tables do not specify the connectives clearly. Example A: "The house is beautiful" is about a house - B. "It is true that the house is beautiful", is not of a house but of a statement! |
|
| Redundancy Theory | Cresswell Vs Redundancy Theory | II 37 Redundancy theory/Reference/T-predicate/Cresswell: according to the redundancy theory "it is true that a" has the same referee as "a". CresswellVsRedundancy theory: is wrong here! (because of the propositional attitude). The redundancy theory cannot be applied to sentences that attribute prop propositional attitude. that: is used independently because of other predicates that are also included in the sentence, apart from "is true". T-predicate: "is true" is used because other complementary sentences may occur as well. Ex (9) What Helen said is true. ((s) "All he said"). Redundancy/Cresswell: arises only if one connects the two predicates. ((s) taken for itself in each particular case, redundancy is not a context-independent phenomenon). T-predicate/Cresswell: is then ambiguous itself: Then there are two possibilities: a) as paradox-forming: as a predicate of sentences. b) as harmless predicate of propositions. ad (9) we assume here - like most authors - that the meaning of (9) is unclear, as long as we do not know which T-predicate exists here. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Redundancy Theory | Meixner Vs Redundancy Theory | I 89 MeixnerVsRedundancy Theory/Meixner: is a mere triviality: the sentence "Fritz is a human" is true, "because Fritz is a human to t". In contrast, ontological standard analysis certainly provides an analysis and a further entity: I 90 Example Regensburg, the Danube, and as a further entity "situated at". Thus three names occur! The needed universal. ((s) ChisholmVs: "situated at" is not a property.). |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Redundancy Theory | Ramsey Vs Redundancy Theory | Horwich I 213 Redundancy Theory/RamseyVsRedundancy Theory/Ramsey: (Foundations of Mathematics, p. 142f)(1): there are statements from which we cannot eliminate "true" and "false" in everyday language. (143).(2) 1. F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 2. L. Jonathan Cohen, "Mr. Strawson's Analysis of Truth", in Analysis 10, (1950), pp. 136-40, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Cohen Vs Strawson, P. F. | Horwich I 214 Paradoxes/true/Strawson/Cohen: occur under the assumption that the words "true" and "false" can be used to make claims of 1st level. Solution: (formal). The paradoxes are formally solved by declaring that "true" and "false" may only be used in level 2 claims. Paradoxes/Strawson: disappear under the much more radical thesis that "true" and "false" are not used at all to make claims. True/Redundancy Theory/CohenVsStrawson: that is unsatisfactory. It is also not only a "descriptive use" done by "true" and "false". ((s) Redundancy theory is not really the issue here). For example, a judge might interpret a lawyer's remark "What the policeman said is true" as an assertion about the character of the policeman. And then there could be empirical evidence about the character. CohenVsStrawson: but this claims much more than the presupposition that the policeman made a statement at all. The judge would set up a formula ((s) scheme) to indirectly verify a number of further statements. But the verification would not consist of confirming the presupposition "The policeman made a statement". Cohen: You do not have to assume that "true" here works as a logical predicate to describe the policeman's statements. CohenVsStrawson: but the sentence cannot be paraphrased by "The policeman made a statement, I confirm it," as Strawson assumes. I 215 Because this is not a statement about the character of the policeman. VsCohen: one could argue that it is only a summary of some statements like e.g. "the defendant was riding 50 on the wrong side", "the plaintiff was riding his bike on the right side", etc. Then one could say that it is these statements that are indirectly verified by empirical evidence on the character of the policeman Strawson/Cohen: could then say that the lawyer said: e.g. "I confirm what the policeman said, the defendant was riding...". CohenVsStrawson: this does not work, 1. if the content is unknown 2. if the number of statements made is indefinite ((s) or infinite). ((s) >"Everything he said".) For then "what he said is true" cannot be replaced by a set of auxiliary statements confirmed by the reporter. He seems to make a single complete assertion: For example, "Smith's observation reports are always true" and he can do that without having read all his reports. Cohen: I had suggested that this be verifiable by evidence of the character of the person concerned. Then you could also say that conclusions can be drawn from it. And this leads to paradoxes. This often occurs in journalism, in historical and scientific research and in jurisprudence. I 216 Redundancy Theory/paradoxies/everything he said/Ramsey/Cohen: Ramsey's solution of eliminating "true" and "false" from such contexts has the price of introducing logical jargon. RamseyVsStrawson/Cohen: but he still assumes that the sentence is used as a statement (assertion). Example "For all p, if the policeman claims that p, then p". Problem/Cohen: here again we can get paradoxes, analog to the truth paradox. For example "Every statement I claim is false". Logical Form: (p): (x).phi(p . x) >. ~p. Logical Form/everyday translation: phi(p, x): "The statement that ... is made by ..." ((s) in brackets one point, one comma). "Is true"/Truth/Logical Form/Question/(s): not "wx" or "wp" (for P is true") but better "x is a statement and x" or p is a statement and p": (Ex)(Ae . x) or (Ep) (Ap . p). But that means "there is a true statement" and not: "the statement p is true"?). Paradox/Logical Form/Cohen: can occur when in (p): (x). phi (p . x) >. ~p. this expression as a whole can occur as value of p. Solution/Cohen: you can even take "all my statements are wrong" as a statement about the character. Then you do not get a paradox. CohenVsStrawson: but if that amounts to "the policeman is a reliable witness" then that is more a recommendation than a description! Solution: I should specify the type of statement I classify as unreliable. I 217 Strawson/Cohen: may still be right that "true" is not used as a logical predicate: Logical Predicate/Cohen: Example Analysis as description: here it is "true statements maker". Analysis as recommendation: here "true" is not a logical predicate. Analysis as verification: "true" can be eliminated here. (But not in everyday language). |
Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Verschiedene Vs Tarski, A. | Eigen VII 303 v. WeizsäckerVsTarski: for the description of the meta language one needed again a meta language. Recourse. Sainsbury V 180 Tarski: the ordinary everyday concept of truth is incoherent: it must be replaced by a hierarchical series of predicates of truth. The object language must not contain a predicate that applies exactly to its true sentences. SainsburyVsTarski: some authors think that our everyday language is not really deficient, but already contains the required hierarchy. e.g. with turns like "What you just said isn't true." It seems too radical to reject our ordinary concept of truth. On the other hand, it is probably not correct to assume that our everyday concept already contains the whole separation. Reinforced LiarVsTarski : (L2: "L2 is not true"). Despite Tarski we could formulate: LN: LN is not trueN Version 1: If that is flawed because it does not respect the separation of levels, then it is not trueN. But that is what it says, it has to be trueN! Version 2: A sentence that breaks through the levels is semantically flawed and therefore not true. So you can always construct an amplified liar sentence to disprove an approach about levels! Horwich I 122 Truth Definition/T-Def/VsTarski: Objections about alleged lack of correctness are directed against the semantic T-concept in general. VsTarski: the T-Def is circular, because in the form "p iff q" truth occurs implicitly: namely, because the equivalence applies when either both sides are true or both sides are false. TarskiVsVs: if this objection would be valid, there would be no formally correct T-Def at all, because we cannot form a composite sentence without the help of connections and other logical terms defined with their help. I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (truth value tables). I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (Truth-value-tables). Horwich I 127 VsTarski: because of his scheme, which obliges him to facts, he is committed to realism. (GonsethVsTarski). TarskiVsVs: that the expression ... Snow is "actually" white...was wrongly inserted by my critics. Truth conditions/T-Def/Tarski: the reference to facts is deliberately missing in the T-scheme! It is not about truth conditions. T-Schema/Tarski: only implies that if we use the sentence (1) Snow is white we claim or negate that we then also have the correlated sentence (2) The sentence "snow is white" is true we have to claim or negate it. I 128 N.B: with it we can keep our respective epistemological attitude: we can remain realists, idealists, etc., if we have been before. Realism/Tarski: the semantic T-concept does not commit us to naïve realism. ((s) If truth is disquotation, then the "disciplines" must be distinguishable by sentences that are disquotationally true instead of "immanently true"). TarskiVsVs: reductio ad absurdum: if there were another T-concept (according to the will of these critics, then it would have to be somehow different and then it would ultimately come out that "snow is white" is true, iff snow is not white! Otherwise it would not be another T-concept but the same T-concept! Nevertheless, such a "new" T-concept would not necessarily be absurd. In any case, any T-concept that is incompatible with the semantic T-Def would have such consequences. Tarski I 160 VsTarski: Question: Is the semantic conception of truth the only "right" one? TarskiVsVs: I must confess that I do not understand this question because the problem is so vague that no clear solution is possible. I 162 VsTarski: in the formulation of the definition, we necessarily use statement links like "if..., then...", "or" etc.. These occur in definitions. However, it is well known that the meaning of propositional connections in logic is explained by the words "true" and "false". (Circle). TarskiVsVs: it is undoubtedly the case that a strictly deductive development of logic is often preceded by certain statements that explain the conditions under which statements of the form "if, then..." are true or false. However, these findings are outside the system of logic and should not be regarded as a definition of the terms in question! I 163 These findings influence in no way the deductive development of logic. Because here we do not discuss the question whether a statement is true, but whether it is provable! (Truth/Proofability). I 163 Logical Connection/Statement/Tarski: the moment we are in the deductive system of logic (or semantics based on logic), we treat the propositional connections either as undefined terms, or we define them with the help of other propositional connections. However, we do not define the connections using terms such as "true" or "false". (p or q) exactly when (if not p, then q). This definition obviously does not contain semantic terms. Error: the schema (T) X is true exactly when p. for a definition of truth! VsTarski: a critic, who commits this mistake, considered this alleged definition to be "inadmissibly short", i.e.: "incomplete". I 164 It is not necessary to decide whether 'equivalence' means a logical formal relationship or a non-logical relationship. He suggests to add: (T') X is true exactly when p is true. ((s) Vs: here "true" occurs twice). (T'') X is true exactly when p is the case. TarskiVsVs: this is a misunderstanding regarding the nature of the statement connections. (Confusion of name and subject matter/confusion of statements and their names, mention/use). ((s) p (right) is the statement itself, not the assertion of its truth. This has nothing to do with the correctness of redundancy theory). I 168 VsTarski: but the formal definition of truth has nothing to do with the "philosophical problem of truth". It gives necessary and sufficient conditions, but not the "essence" of this concept. TarskiVs: I am not able to understand what the "essence" of a term should be. ((s) FregeVsTarski: Terms have necessary characteristics.) I 172 Criterion/criterion of truth/VsTarski: some argue that definitions do not provide us with general criteria for deciding whether an object falls under the defined terms. And the term "true" is of this kind, since no universal criterion of truth emerges directly from the definition. (> criterion of truth). ((s) RescherVsTarski). Tarski: this is completely correct, but it does not distinguish the term from many terms of science such as theoretical physics. (> term). I 174 Semantics/Tarski: Semantic terms are actually contained in many areas of the sciences and especially empirical sciences. |
Eigen I M. Eigen Ruth Winkler Laws of the Game : How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance, Princeton/NJ 1993 German Edition: Das Spiel München 1975 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
| Various Authors | Cartwright Vs Various Authors | I 79 Mathematical explanation/Quantum damping/Agarwal: Important argument: There are six different approaches here with six different equations! (>Redundancy, alternative explanation). I 80 For example, There are various versions of the Schroedinger equation. I 81 Equation/Theoretical explanation/Laws/Cartwright: Thesis: these (alternative, redundant) explanations do not determine any objective laws. Equations/CartwrightVsAgarwal: the alternative equations are in competition with each other. They offer a variety of laws for the same phenomenon. AgarwalVsCartwright: he thinks that different approaches serve different purposes. That means they do not compete. I 94 Laws/Include/Explanation/Laws of Nature/LoN/Grünbaum: ("Science and Ideology", The Scientific Monthly, July 1954, p 13-19): while a more comprehensive law G contains a less comprehensive law L, and thus provides an explanation, it is not the cause of L. Laws are not explained by showing that the regularities which they assert arise from a causation, but that their truth is a special case of a more comprehensive truth. CartwrightVsGrünbaum: In this, it is assumed that the fundamental laws make the same assertions as the concrete ones which explain them. I 95 This then depends on the phenomenological laws being derived from the fundamental ones (>deduction >deductive) if the situation is specified. If the phenomenological laws are right, then the fundamental ones are too, at least in that situation. Problem: there is still a problem of induction: do the fundamental laws make correct generalizations about situations? Explanatory laws/Explanation/Cartwright: the explanatory laws are to explain the phenomenological ones and therefore a variety of other phenomenological laws in other situations. But they are much more economical (because they do not need to specify the special situations). Measuring/Reality/Realistic/Real/Cartwright: if we want to know which properties are real in a theory, we must look for the causal role. I 182 Measuring/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Problem: the static values of dynamic variables have no effect. Only if systems exchange energy, momentum or another conserved quantity, something happens in the QM. E.g. knowing the position of a particle, does not say anything about his future conduct. The detector only responds to a change in energy. Measuring/QM/Henry Margenau/Cartwright: (Margenau, Phil.of Science 4 (1937) p 352-6): Thesis: all measurements in QM are ultimately position measurements. Cartwright: but position measurements themselves are ultimately registrations of interactions at the destruction. This is inelastic, that is, the energy is not conserved in the particles. That means the detector absorbs the energy of the particle. This causes the detector to be ionized. Transitional prob/CartwrightVsMargenau: Solution: So it’s about the prob that the ionization of the detector takes place. Problem: there could be background radiation which causes the ionization without particles. Or, conversely, the disc could be ineffective, so that the energy of the particle is not registered. I 183 Problem/Cartwright: Another problem: the energy must be adequate. This could lead to inconsistencies. Soret effect: here we only need to assume simple linear additivity in our law of action, and we obtain a cross-over effect by adding a thermal diffusion factor to Fick’s law. Unfortunately this does not work for any random influences in the "Transport Theory" (heat transfer, etc.). I 65 Cross-over effect/Cartwright:. There is only one failed attempt to establish general principles for cross-over effects: by Onsager, 1931, further developed in the 1950s. But this was merely a Procrustes-like attempt that explains nothing new. VsOnsager: His principles are empty because they have to be interpreted once in one way and another time in a different way. They may not be followed literally, too much of it is up to the physicist’s imagination. Principle: is empty if it has to be interpreted differently on different occasions. I 174th Schroedinger equation/CartwrightVsSchroedinger equation: Problem: according to it, the electron in the accelerator has neither a particular direction nor a particular energy - SE is refuted daily by reducing the wave packet - not by measurement, but by preparation. I 75 Science/Explanation/Cartwright: the framework of modern physics is mathematical and good explanations will always allow precise calculations. Explanation/Rene Thom: (1972, p 5): Descartes: his vortexes and atom chains explained everything and calculated nothing. Newton: calculated everything and explained nothing. CartwrightVsThom: in modern science we have to keep causal and theoretical explanation apart as well, but they work differently: If we accept Descartes’ causal story, we must accept his assertions of linked atoms and vortexes as true. But we do not assume Newton’s law on the inverse square of the distance to be true or false. |
CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Wittgenstein | Sellars Vs Wittgenstein | II 318 Mapping/image/world/thinking/language/Sellars: question: is there no mapping relationship between language and the world, which is essential for meaning and truth? Def image/Tractatus: relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand. II 319 Language/world/Sellars: Vs Temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" in another sense are linguistic entities themselves. Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has created, or must establish, as a relation. (But not redundancy). Fact/statement/Sellars: one can say something "about a fact" in two different ways: a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact". b) it contains a fact statement, that means the name of a fact instead of a statement. K depicts y. Here K is a complex natural language subject. This assumes the meta-linguistic status of facts. However, the form of: that p depicts y: II 321 Fact/object/statement/Sellars: here statements about complex objects would be statements "about facts" in the sense that they contained fact statements. "K" would therefore apparently refer to a complex natural language subject but in reality to the statement that describes its complexity! Statement/world/SellarsVsWittgenstein: Statements, according to which natural language objects are images of other natural objects, would only refer to seemingly natural language objects, but in reality to statements, including the assumed about the statement conception of norms and standards. Another consequence would be that only simple non-linguistic objects could be depicted when complex objects were facts, which would lead to the well-known antinomy, that there must be atomic facts that would be the condition that language can depict the world, for which no example could be given if one asked a speaker to. Solution/Sellars: Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). SellarsVsWittgenstein: weakened the momentum of the idea that language enables us to depict the world by connecting it too closely to the model fact depicts fact. There are in any case n-digit configurations of reference expressions. Question: what of them leads them to the fact that they say of special reference objects that they are in this particular n-digit relation to each other? One is tempted to say: Convention. II 322 Maps/Wittgenstein: Configurations are to be found in the map, but it is not necessary that e.g. spatial structures are reproduced through spatial configurations. ((s) E.g. contour lines) The only essential characteristic: that n-digit atomic facts are formed by n-digit configurations of proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein : The analogy may even be extended. Maps are only in a parasitic sense a logical picture. Wittgenstein himself emphasized that a logical picture can exist as such only in the domain of truth-operations. E.g. map: the fact that a certain point is there is linked to the statement, for example, that Chicago is located between Los Angeles and New York. Moreover, even if we would have a country map language of spatial relationships, and truth functions could be applied directly to them, only as a small part of a comprehensive Universe of discourse existed. Problem: has the function of elementary statements generally something in common with that of cartographic configurations which is not expressed in the slogan that n-digit configurations of proper names represent n-digit configurations of objects? II 323 Natural linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: Natural linguistic objects are to be seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). II 324 One can speak of them as "proper names". That takes up Wittgenstein's understanding that elementary statements must be constructed as in a particular way occurring proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein: in my view, however, is the way in which the "proper names" occur in the "image" not a conventional symbol of the way in which objects occur in the world! I believe instead that the position of proper names in an image is a projection of the position of objects in the world. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redundancy Theory | Versus | Horwich I 161 ThomsonVsRedundancy Theory? BlackVsRedundancy Theory?). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Versus | Horwich I 430 Redundancy Theory: truth is not a property - correspondence theory VsRedundancy Theory. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Correspondence Th. | Field, Hartry | II 201 Correspondence Theory / Field: Thesis: for "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" to be true, there must be objects x and y and a relation (in extension) R , so that "Caesar", denotes x, Rubicon, denotes y, "crossed" signifies R and R x has to y. Horwich I 405 Redundancy theory Vs correspondence theory / Field: Thesis: redundancy is enough, then you do not need additional correspondence. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy | Harman, G. | Horwich I 430 Redundancy theory / metaphysical realism / Field: thesis: one can be a metaphysical realist and at the same time accept the redundancy theory. One can be a m.r. and still not accept the correspondence theory. Redundancy theory: truth is not a property. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy | Strawson, P.F. | Horwich I 213 True/Everyday Language/Redundancy/Strawson: (Analysis Vol 9, No. 6) thesis "true" and "false": all their non-technical functions can be performed without the use of "true" and "false" themselves. You can make a statement without using "true". CohenVsStrawson: there is at least one important non-technical function where this is not possible. I 213 True/Everyday Language/Redundancy Theory/Strawson: Thesis: For example "It is true that the sun shines": here we can replace "It is true" by performative expressions like "I confirm", "I admit", "I guarantee", etc. without a special change of meaning. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| |||