Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 36 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brains in a Vat | Poundstone | I 318 Brains in the Vat/Poundstone: each object then means electrical pulses (only different sequence), then also "brain" - then the reference of "I'm a brain in a vat" also electrical pulse sequence and not the brain. >Reference, >Meaning, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Skepticism. So the sentence is wrong, because we are not pulses. Poundstone/Solution: "I am what they call a "Brain in the vat" in lab speak". Problem: "Lab speak" is metaphysical. >Levels/order, >Description Levels, >Metalanguage, >Theory Language. I 340 The theory of brains in a vat has no predictive power. - As little as the cipher "iii..." - because everything depends on electrical pulses. >Code. The next apple may fall upwards; because it is moved by an electrical pulse and not by gravity. >Induction, >Causation. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Bridge Laws | Field | III 9 "Bridge laws"/Mathematics/Physics/Field: bridge laws connect purely abstract entities and physical objects - so they contain mathematical and physical vocabulary. >Vocabulary, >Observation language, >Theory language, >Theoretical entities. III 10 If the theory (not about unobserved objects) T contains the covering laws, one can use it to establish new claims about observables. >Observation, >Method. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Causal Theory of Reference | Field | Williams II 490 Field early: per Harman: there is a single causal relation in the world. >Correspondence Theory -> Physicalism -> Causal theory of reference. No non-physical connection between words and the world. Williams II 491 Field/M. Williams: metaphysical approach: how semantic properties fit in a physical world. LeedsVsField: Talk about truth cannot be physically explained. Solution: truth must not play any explanatory role. - Otherwise we are back to the problems with acceptability and justification. >Justification, >Theory language, >Theoretical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Concepts | Ghiselin | Mayr I 364/365 Concepts/Ghiselin: Concepts can only be defined, details can only be described. >Definitions, >Definability, >Concepts, >Terms, >Theoretical terms, >Observation language, >Theory language, >Words, >Word meaning, >Description, >Description dependence. |
Ghis Michael T. Ghiselin Metaphysics and the Origin of Species New York 1997 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Conceptual Role | Field | II 75 Def "Wide Conceptual Role"/Harman/Field: (Harman 1982)(1): includes causal connections with the environment. It may be part of the conceptual role of "There is a rabbit" that this is typically triggered by rabbits being around. Problem: this is also true then for e.g. "phlogiston is leaking from the cylinder." This could typically be caused by oxygen entering into the cylinder. Field: this shows that this does not introduce any representational properties (reference, truth conditions). >Truth conditions, >Reference, >Truth, >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language. II 76 Conceptual Role/"Not"/Truth Function/Representation/Field: a representational semantics will regard e.g. "not" as a function which reflects the truth on falsehood, and vice versa. Negation/Conceptual Role/Not/Field: but that is not a fact about the conceptual or functional role of "not". >Negation. Conceptual role: is easy to specify here: it is largely given in the inference rules. - But the specification of the conceptual role says nothing about the truth functions. >Truth functions. While there is a sort of supervenience of the representational properties (truth conditions, reference, etc.) on the property of the conceptual role in the logic connections. - But conceptual role and representation cannot be equated. >Representation. II 93 Conceptual Role/Negation/Fact/Field: the fact by virtue of which "it is not the case that" obeys the truth tables, are facts about its conceptual role. II 108 Conceptual Role/Field: includes the verification conditions, but even more, e.g. rules for probability and conceptual consequences that arise from a belief. - But the conceptual role is not enough: it is internalistic and individualistic. - I.e. it does not refer to the outside world and the language community. - We have no "externalist" and no "social" aspects. >Language community. Solution/Field: we could make the (hopefully harmless) assumption that a language user believes something in his own language. Or at least internal analogues thereof without ambiguities. And we assume that this belief relation is possible without a presupposed concept of content. >Content, >Beliefs, >Relation-theory. Deflationism: can agree with that. - Also computational role: describes how beliefs, desires, etc. arise in time. >Computation/Field. II 112 We can say that the conceptual role and the indication relations of the beliefs of other people are relevant to the content of my belief state. - The conceptual role of logic connections is not explained by the truth table. Solution: Reliability: is higher if "or" has the role that corresponds to the truth table. >Reliability theory. Conceptual Role/Logical Operators/Connections: the conceptual role semantics (CRS) can here assume facts or the absence of facts, deflationism cannot. >Deflationism 1. Harman, Gilbert. 1982. "Conceptual Role Semantics". In: Notre dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23, pp. 242-56 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Criteria | Hacking | I 238 Criteria/Hacking: complicated terms require application criteria. Cf. the destiction Criterion/definition, >Definitions, >Theoretical terms, >Observation language, >Theory language. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Demarcation Criterion | Schurz | I 14/15 Demarcation criterion/Schurz: in relation to metaphysics. Problem: principles that have no empirical consequences when considered in isolation may have new empirical consequences when considered together with other theoretical propositions. >Metaphysics, >Principles, >Method, >Theoretical terms, >Theory language, >Ontology, >Additional hypotheses. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Designation | Hacking | I 142 Naming/Hacking: there can be no complete theory of naming. >Naming, >Proper names, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language, >Unobservables, >Descriptions, >Theory of Descriptions, >Causal theory of names, >Denotation, >Reference, >Completeness, >Incompleteness. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Electron Example | Electron example: a representative for thought experiments related to unobservable entities and consequences of unobservability for the construction of theories. See also theories, observation terms, observation language, unobservable, theoretical terms, theoretical entities, theory language. |
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| Empiricism | Barrow | I 36 Empiricism/positivism/Barrow: both empiricism and positivism claim that there are only individual facts, not universals. EmpirismusVsUniversals; PositivismVsUniversals. >Universals, >Facts, >Individuals, >Individuation, >Identification, cf. >Individual causation, >Causality, >Causation. I 42 Both Vsoperationalism/Vsinstrumentalism: theories can only be discovered, they cannot be invented. >Operationalism, >Instrumentalism, >Theories. I 39 VsEmpiricism/Barrow: a theory of elementary particles is more than a mere list of their properties. - It excludes useful terms because they are not observable. - So that it forbids any law of nature! >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Observability, >Unobservables, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language, >Concepts. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Identity | Genz | II 15 Identity/elementary particles/individuation/identification/quantum mechanics/Genz: atoms and particles are without individuality. Two particles of the same type are absolutely identical. For example electrons, atoms or quark gluons. They derive their reality from theory. It does not depend on whether we declare it real or not. >Theories, >Reality, >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Theory language, >Description. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Intensionality | Cresswell | I 54 Intensional Language/Intensional/Cresswell: we need them to be able to talk about whether our physical theory is about our world - or whether our theory T is talking about the same world we are talking about. >Reference, >Theories, >Observation language, >Theory language, >Theoretical terms. I 55 VsAtomism: this one believed in translatability in theory language. Cresswell: we keep the everyday language - (in the first order of theory). >Everyday language. Intensional model: with N-operator - expresses the fact that some truths are necessary. ((s) N = necessary. I 56 The main motive for this was that we want to embed the intensional model of the theory T into an intensional language without assuming more basic entities than T assumes. >Theoretical entities, >Ontology. I 92 Predicate/intensional interpretation: here a predicate is a function of things on sets of possible worlds. ((s) This makes it possible for someone not to believe synonym expressions as synonymous). >Predicates, >Predication, >Possible worlds. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Knowledge | Vollmer | I 206 Knowledge / VollmerVsKant: according to Kantians, we can in fact know only what is given by the senses. >I Kant. Then we can not know, for instance that the earth moves - E.g. that the space is non-Euclidean; e.g. then quarks and black holes should never be objects of empirical science, because they are not vivid. >Empiricism, >Science, >Evidence, >Provability, >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Theory language, >Theories, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Language | Genz | II 29 Base sentence/theory language/Genz: base sentences can be derived from the theory language, but not vice versa. II 30 Theory language/Genz: theory language is a product of human imagination that has to prove itself in base sentences. >Theory language. Concept/Einstein/Genz: a concept is logically independent of the sensory experience. They do not behave like soup and beef, but like coat check number and coat. >Concepts, >Experience, >Perception, >Measurement. Freedom: there is freedom here, but not as strong as for the poet, but as for the person who solves a word puzzle. He/she can suggest any word, but in the end there is only one correct word. >Freedom, >Determinism. II 31 Theory language/reality/Genz: to what extent do sentences and terms of the theory language play a role in reality? >Reality. Concepts: if terms could be defined by base sentences, and the sentences of the theoretical language could be derived from observations that can be expressed by base sentences, then the status of the theoretical language would be the same as that of the base sentences. >Definitions. Solution/Genz: the theory language does not only summarize observations, but also generalizes them (by natural laws). >Observation, >Generalization. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Laws | Newton | Kanitscheider I 116 NewtonVsKepler: wrong explanatory approach based on Aristotelian dynamics: Kepler's laws used by Newton as the starting hypothesis. Newton: introduces new, abstract dynamic terms, which do not themselves refer to the observable movement of particle paths, but use invisible forces of the masses as the cause of the movement. Î 117 Transition from empirical hypotheses to a closed theory. >Predictions, >Abstract terms, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Mathematics | Neumann | Weizenbaum I 203 Mathematics/Neumann, J. von: (J. von Neumann 1958)(1): when we talk about mathematics, then perhaps we are discussing a secondary language based on the primary language that is actually used by the central nervous system. Thus, the external forms of our mathematics are not absolutely relevant when it comes to judging which mathematical or logical language is actually used by the central nervous system. >Theory language, >Language of theought, >Mathematical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >World/thinking, >Thinking without language, >Central nervous system. 1. J. von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain, New Haven, 1958, S. 82. |
NeumJ I J. v. Neumann The Computer and the Brain New Haven 2012 Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Natural Laws | Bigelow | I 113 Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. I 114 Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. I 214 Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction. Atomism: Representative: Lucrez: Little astronomical knowledge yet. Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos. I 215 Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws. Instead, here are some examples from biology: Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions). I 216 It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. I 217 Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws. Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things: a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand b) less than a regularity without exception. It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it. Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal. Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. >Generality, >Generalization. I 220 Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round. Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon. Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth. N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory! I 221 VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity). I 221 Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977(1), Tooley 1977(2), Armstrong 1978(3), 1983(4)) >Possibilia, >Counterfactual conditional. Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983(5), Hacking 1983(6)). I 222 Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.) >Understanding. Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Bigelow, >Actual world. Natural Law/Laws of nature/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity. >Regularities, >Regularity theory, >Modalities, >Theory language. Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as (x)(Fx > Gx). Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). >Universal generalization. But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. >Universal generalization. >Generality, >Generalization We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form: I 223 natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects. I.e. in addition to regularity (x)(Fx > Gx) it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!) Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level: (x) Fx would be > would be Gx) we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition natN (x)(Fx > Gx) (see above). >Truthmakers. Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend. LewisVsBigelow: (Lewis, 1979)(7) the theory is circular. >Natural laws/Lewis. I 226 Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. >Necessity, >Necessity/Bigelow, >Necessity/Hume. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws! Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments. >Modalities. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. 1. Dretske, F.I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 248-68 2. Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosphy 7, pp. 667-98. 3. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. 4. Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press. 5. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 6. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press. 7. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Observability | Peacocke | I 90 Observability/Peacocke: Thesis: Observability is a property of certain terms and not of other terms. - The phenomena that are crucial to the concept of observability, are the ones corresponding to the individuation of Fregean thoughts and their constituents: the phenomena of cognitive significance and the epistemic possibility. - That has nothing to do with the correct use of the word "observe". >Observation, >Fregean thoughts, >Cognitive significance. I 103 Observability / PeacockeVsQuine: does not depend on the sophistication and training of the observer nor with the level of science - ((s) because of Peacockes stronger emphasis on the perceptual component.) >Theoretical Terms, >Theoretical Entities, cf. >Theory language, >Observation language, >Terms, >Unobservables, >Method, >Knowledge, >Theory ladenness. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Observation | Popper | Schurz I 15 Theory-ladenness/Popper: observational propositions are not merely fallible, but also theory-laden. I 16 Pointe: Thus the border between observation terms and theory terms can no longer be sharply drawn. Problem: with this one moves towards a relativism. >Observation language, >Theoretical terms, >Theory language. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Observation Language | Tetens | Te I 74 Observation language / Tetens: not strictly separated from ordinary language: naturalistic terms are integrated into everyday language. >Everyday language, cf. >Theory language, >Observation, >Concepts. Colors: colors are not causally associated as "experience" with the wavelengths. >Experience, >Colour. Everyday language is no closer to "reality", but oriented in communicating what is relevant. >Relevance, >Reality. |
Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Observation Sentences | Field | I 264 Observation sentences/Field: Observation sentences include mathematical entities. >Mathematical entities, >Ontology, >Theory language, >Theoretical entities, >Measurements. I 265 We have no means for a non-modal and non-Platonic formulation of observation sentences. >Platonism, >Modal logic. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Observation Sentences | Genz | II 32ff Observation Sentences/Hume/Genz: by analysing observation sentences we cannot learn anything that goes beyond immediate experience. Genz ditto. >Experience/Hume, >Observation, >Empiricism. II 29 Base sentence/theory language/Genz: base sentences can be derived from the theory language, but not vice versa. >Theory language. II 30 Theory language/Genz: theory language is a product of human imagination that has to prove itself in base sentences. >Observation language, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theories. Term/Einstein/Genz: a term is logically independent of the sensory experience. >Experience, >Sensory impressions. Freedom: there is freedom here, but not as strong as for the poet, but as for the person who solves a word puzzle. He/she can suggest any word, but in the end there is only one correct word. >Freedom, >Free will. II 31 Theory language/reality/strength: to what extent do sentences and terms of the theory language play a part in reality? Terms: if they could be defined by base sentences, and the sentences of the theory language could be derived from observations that can be expressed by base sentences, then the status of the theory language would be the same as that of the base sentences. >Protocol sentences, >Sentences, >Definitions, >Definability. Solution/Genz: the theory language not only summarizes observations, but also generalizes them (by natural laws). >Generalization, >Natural laws. II 37 Base sentences/Genz: base sentences summarize sensory data and do not require interpretation. They already form a complex system. Theory: a theory establishes relationships between base sentences. >Sense data, >Interpretation. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Positivism | Genz | II 113 Logical Positivism/Mach/Genz: logical positivism evolved from Mach's notions of not trying to get "behind the apparitions". II 114 Theoretical Terms/TT/PositivismVsTheoretical Terms/positivism/Genz: thesis: terms must correspond to things. >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language, >Reality, >Observation, >Observability, >Unobservables. II 116 Positivism/Genz: positivism only regained momentum with the Copenhagen interpretation. >Copenhagen Interpretation. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Protocol Sentences | Genz | II 114 Terms/Popper/Genz: terms no longer have to be definable by base sentences. Weaker: instead: the terms are required to derive base sentences. >Concepts, >Definitions, >Theoretical terms, >Theory language, >Derivation, >Derivability. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Realism | Barrow | I 45 VsRealism/Barrow: ignores the limitations of our mind. - e.g. The limit of a sequence often has properties that no term of the sequence has. - E.g. Someone may be realist in terms of the existence of the muon, but hemust describe its properties pragmaticclly and anti-realistically. >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theories, >Theory language, >Description. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Representation | Field | II 55 Representations/Field: if they were only related to public language, why then internal? - Solution: distinction type/token. - Question: why then referring to public language: because one can only speak with respect to types of tokens. >Type/Token, >Everyday language, >Observation language, cf. >Theory language. II 58 Representations: their syntax can be determined without regard to the meanings - if we have laws for body movements from wishes, etc. (narrow psychological theory). >Syntax, >Meaning, >Behavior, >Desire, >Explanation. II 58 Semantics/Representation: We can make truth superfluous: if we have 1. laws of beliefs from stimuli 2. laws for body movements from beliefs and desires. That would be the "narrow psychological theory": then we do not need to assume meanings in representation. II 59 But if representation should be true, it must be correlated with meanings. >Presentation. II 60 Representation without meaning: E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1 > S2] and desires S2, then he also wants S1. Field: Meanings is not needed because the believed sentences can all be wrong. - E.g. Radical Interpretation: the native raises his rifle: a reason to believe that a rabbit is nearby - (even if he is deceived). >Gavagai, >Radical interpretation. II 61 Representation/semantics/psychology: for their psychological explanations, we do not need the semantic notions like "true" and "refers to", which usually sets sentences in relation to the world. Belief/truth: nothing compels me to assume of a person that she has believes that are true of rabbits. - ((s) It is enough when he lifts his rifle.) Truth (of internal representations): we only need this if we assume that they are reliable indicators about the world. - E.g. a child behaves guiltily - For example, if a mathematician believes in a theory, it is a reason for me to believe it, too. >Reliability. II 66 Language/representation/Schiffer: early: (Schiffer, 1972)(1): The meaning of a sentence can be explained only by the notions of believe and desire. For example, to know the meaning of "Caesar was egoistic," one must know that the proposition is conventionally correlated with believe that Caesar was egoistic. >Representation/Schiffer. Everything goes through inner representations and these can be explained without further reference to language. FieldVsSchiffer: the symbols in my representation system have gained their role by appropriation of e.g. a name in the public language. >Language use, >Language community. Animals/Field: although they are likely to have representations, meanings and therefore truth cannot be applied to them. >Animal language, >Animals. II 69 Representation/Field: one could also assume this as neither linguistic nor pictoral: E.g. "light bulb model" - that would be uninterpreted and could not explain behavior. II 77f Representation: representative terms can replace properties. - Most psychology can do without them. Advantages: Intentional terms are projective. E.g.: "He raised his rifle ...". - The truth conditions do not matter then. - The advantage of representations lies in the combination of explanation and predictions. >Truth conditions, >Predictions. II 94 Representation/StalnakerVsField: the basic relation is between words rather than between sentences or "morphemes". Not even between whole states. >Words, cf. >Word meaning. Field: that could be correct. II 154 Representation/truth conditions/translation: one can accept representation without translation and without truth conditions: solution: one accepts reactions to his believe and a corresponding threshold for his reaction. Crazy cases: e.g. the person believes that something quite different is represented . Solution: the role cannot be specified exactly, but the objective core is that there is a role. Explanation 2nd order: "sufficient similarity to our own representation" E.g. "Khrushchev blinked" as an explanation for Kennedy's action. Problem: our own representations are not objective. Deflationism: for it this is not a problem. >Deflationism. Truth conditions: we only need them if we do not know how the details of the explanation are. 1. Schiffer, St. 1972. Meaning. New York, NY, USA: Oxford, Clarendon Press |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Science | Feynman | I 325 Science/Feynman: the difficulties of science are to a large extent the difficulties of names, units, and all the other artificialities invented by man, not by nature. >Conventions, >Theory, >Method, >Measure, >World/Thinking, >Nature, >Observation, >Theory Language, >Observation Language, >Theoretical Entities, >Theoretical Terms. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Systems | Schurz | I 188 System/Theory/Schurz: System character of theories means that one cannot understand single of their law hypotheses in isolation. >Theories/Schurz, >Concepts/Schurz, >Theorical terms, >Theory language, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Hypotheses, >Holism. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theoretical Terms | Schurz | I 14 Theoretical terms/Schurz: Theoretical terms are not definable by observational terms. >Definitions, >Definability, >Theoretical Entities, >Theory language, >Method, >Empiricism. I 186 Def Theoretical Terms/Schurz: A term is called T-theoretical iff. from T follows at least one relevant assignment law for τ. >Relevance. SchurzVsSneed: There may also be other theories that provide an relevant assignment law for a given term. >Assignment. I 187 Theoretical terms/TT: Broad sense: neither empirical nor pre-theoretical. Narrow sense: all terms of theory T which are neither empirical nor pre-theoretical in T. For T-theoretic terms, T itself provides an assignment law. I 212 Theoretical terms /Reference/Laudan/Carrier/Schurz: (Laudan 1997(1), 121f, Carrier 2003(2),§ 7) There are examples of theories which made qualitatively new empirical predictions, although their theoretical terms are complete fictions from today's point of view (not referenced). VsWonderargument: Ex phlogiston, Ex potassium (heat substance). SchurzVsVs: Solution: if a later theory T* with a different theoretical superstructure replaces an empirically successful theory T, there must be a term in the theoretical superstructure of T which is in a bridge relation to a possibly complex TT of T*, and therefore has indirect reference. >Reference. I 213 Phlogiston/Schurz: then one can understand Bsp the absorption of phlogiston in modern chemistry as an indirect reference to the donation of electrons to the binding partner. Cf. >Analogies/Field. 1. Laudan, L. (1997) "A Confuation of Convergent Realism" In: Panieau, D. (ed. 1997), 107-138. 2. Carrier, M. (2003). "Experimental Success and the Revelation of Reality: The Miracle Argument for Scientific Realism", In: P. Blanchard et al (eds), Science, Society and Reality. Heidelberg: Springer. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theories | Kosslyn | Münch III 267 Linguistic theory/Kosslyn/Pomerantz: propositional (not figurative) theories may be too strong: too little restriction. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Propositions, >Theories, >Theory language. Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 |
Kosslyn I Stephen M. Kosslyn James R. Pomerantz "Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Theories | Mates | I 231 Theory / Mates: is always determined by the set of its tenets - ((s) because they contain all the non-logical vocabulary.) >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Method, >Formal language, >Theory language. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Theories | Pomerantz | I 267 Linguistic theory/Kosslyn/Pomerantz: propositional (not figurative) theories may be too strong: there are too little restrictions. >Propositions, >Propositional knowledge, >Knowledge, >Language, >Theory language, >Method, >Science, >Images, >Imagination, >Presentation, >Systems, cf. >Picture theory, >Representation, >Information processing. |
Pomerantz I James R. Pomerantz Stephen M. Kosslyn "Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 |
| Theories | Sellars | I XXII/XXIII Theory/SellarsVsQuine: the database itself is part of the theory. Sensory impressions or sense stimulations are quasi-theoretical entities of an everyday theory of perception. >Impressions/Sellars, >Sensations/Sellars, >Everyday language, cf. >Folk psychology. I XLIII Theory/language: the language of the scientific world view must preserve the basic structures of the everyday world view. For example, colors are homogeneous properties. (But not according to the scientific image). So Sellars later creates the concept of Sensa, which only occurs in sentient organisms. Where the ordinary human perceives something blue, on the side of science occurs the sensum. Sensa themselves are not colored, just as the states of feeling are. Colored alone are the objects of the everyday world. Also not the physical objects. Otherwise one would have to isolate a colored surface and ask for its thickness, which leads to contradictions: I 74 Reification of the methodological distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical discourse, incorrect substantive distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical existence. >Reification. I 85f Theory/tradition: thesis a theory explains laws by deriving theoretical correlations of these laws from a small amount of postulates about hidden entities. - SellarsVsTradition: the assumptions of a theory are not formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model. ((s) uninterpreted: because supported by unobservable.) Def Model/Sellars: the description of a range of known objects that behave in the usual way. - A model gets a comment. - This restricts analogies. Sellars: continuous transition to the everyday world. >Models/Sellars, >Model theory, >Analogies. I 87 SellarsVs logistical picture of forming theories: most explanations did not arise from the head of the theorists as a finished product. Between science and everyday life, there is a continuous transition. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the terms of inner episodes. >Theory language, >Observation language. I 100 The entities imported from the theory are states of the perceiving subject, not a class of individual objects. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Understanding | Schütz | Habermas III 176 Understanding/Sociology/Schütz/Habermas: Schütz thesis: we make at least three preliminary methodological decisions by choosing basic concepts of action theory: 1. We describe social reality in such a way that it is conceived as a construction of the everyday world that emerges from the interpretative achievements of the participants.(1) Habermas III 177 2. The scientist has to ask which model of an individual being can be constructed and which typical contents are to be assigned to it.(2) 3. The theoretical concepts must follow the pre-theoretical concepts in which the members interpret their situation.(3) >Action theory, >Theories, >Theory language, >Observation language, >Method, >Models. 1. A. Schütz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, Wien 1932, S. 6. 2. Ibid. p. 49f. 3. Ibid. p. 50. |
Schütz I Alfred Schütz Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt Wien 1932 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Verification | Field | I 60 Observational conditional/(s)/Definition Test/Physics/Field: physical theories are tested, in which consequences are derived via observables from premises via observables. - Sure, we also refer to the unobservable. >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Unobservables, >Reference, >Theory language. I 66 Verification/Axiom/Theory/Field: E.g. "verifiable" is part of a theory that does not yet have the new axiom. --- II 104 Verification conditions/Verification/Verificationism/Field: Verfication conditions (perhaps via stimuli) are given without that-clauses. - So without propositional content. >Content, >Propositional content. Then we have classes of verification conditions instead of proposition. >Verification conditions. Inflationism: would say that these are not proper propositions because these must include truth conditions. >Inflationism. InflationismVsVerificationism. >Verificationism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Vocabulary | Field | II 237 Deflationism/VsDeflationism: is it possible that most of our present scientific concepts have less power in a deflationist perspective? >Deflationism, >Concepts, >Observation, >Explanation, >Theory language. Field: perhaps this is so: deflationism shows that there is no best translation of Newtonian terms into modern language. >Theory change, >Meaning change. New Vocabulary/Field: can often be captured with old vocabulary plus higher-order quantification. This is e.g. a Ramsey sentence. >Conservativity, >Ramsey sentence, >Quantification, >Description levels, >Levels (Order). II 267 Applying/Explaining/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - This explains why some non-standard models are unintended. >Satisfaction, >Reference, >Unintended models, >Models, >Model theory. II 355 Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: = Having non-standard models. Solution: Extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". FieldVs: that is cheating. >Expansion/Field. New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. Cheating: If it was to be assumed that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Yet FieldVsIndeterminism) --- III 9 Pure Mathematics/Application/Field: E.g. Number theory: is not applicable to the world. - For example, set theory: must allow primordial elements for the application. Solution: "impure mathematics": Functions that map physical objects to numbers - Then the comprehension axioms must also contain non-mathematical vocabulary. E.g. instances of the separation axiom. >Comprehension. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Avramides, A. | Grice Vs Avramides, A. | Avramides I 164 GriceeansVsAvramides: The analysis in question was that propositional attitudes are relations to sentences in the theory language. This allows seeing semantics and psychology as interdependent and simultaneously attribute thoughts to speechless beings. GriceansVsAvramides: would look at the matter the other way around: the apparent entailment of ontological asymmetry to conceptual asymmetry should be taken as evidence that this type of analysis of propositional attitudes is fundamentally wrong. Because if you can attribute thinking without language (Thw/oL) in a sensible way, then it would seem as if our psychological concepts are independent of semantic ones. Avramides: No side has more than prima facie evidence. Anti-reductionism: can claim conceptual symmetry without being limited to ontological symmetry. And it can accept thinking without language. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Feyerabend, P. | Putnam Vs Feyerabend, P. | V 156 Incommensurability/PutnamVsFeyerabend: PutnamVsIncommensurability thesis: it refutes itself. It states that the term E.g. "temperature" from the 17th century cannot be equated with ours in terms of meaning or reference. This thesis should apply for the observation language as well as for the so-called "theory language." >Incommensurability, >observation language. Feyerabend/language: our normal language is nothing more than a false theory. PutnamVsFeyerabend: we could not translate other languages or earlier stages of our own language, if this hypothesis was really true. V 156/157 According to Feyerabend (and Kuhn when he is in particularly incommensurable mood) we could conceptually grasp the members of other cultures, including the scientists of the 17th century only as living beings that respond to stimuli (and that utter sounds that are similar to English or Italian in an oddly way). So more or less animals. PutnamVsFeyerabend/VsKuhn: it is totally inconsistent, if one wants to make us believe Galileo's concepts are "incommensurable", and then goes on to describe them in detail. Smart pro Feyerabend: it is certainly a neutral fact that we need to aim with our telescope above this treetop here to see the Mercury, and not, as predicted by the Newtonian theory, above this chimney there. However, Feyerabend could allow that we use Euclidean geometry and a non-relativistic optics for our theory of the telescope. He would say, although this is not the real truth about our telescope, the tree and the chimney, but it is still legitimate to do so. PutnamVsSmart/PutnamVsFeyerabend: the difficulty is that you need to understand the language of Euclidean non-relativists at least partially, to be able to say that the predictions are the same. How can I translate the logical particle ("if then", "no", etc.) from Italian of the 17th Century if I cannot find a translation manual? --- V 158 Translation/Quine/Davidson: (VsKuhn, VsFeyerabend): first, it has to be admitted that we can find a translation scheme, what is the point then in this context, to say that the translation does not "really" capture meaning and reference of the original? The claim that the scheme does not exactly capture the meaning or reference of the original, can be understood in the light of the admission that one could find a better translation scheme. But it is only seemingly reasonable that all possible schemes should fail to capture the "real" meaning or reference. V 160 Convergence/Putnam: is totally rejected by Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to that we do not increase our knowledge, the science is only making instrumentally "progress". (Technology). We are getting better in "transporting people from one place to another". PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: that too is incoherent: we can only understand the idea of the instrumental (technological) progress when such terms as "transport people from one place to another" maintain a certain degree of permanent reference. --- I (c) 83 Electron/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: E.g. Bohr's electron refers according to the two to nothing. And only that because not all of Bohr's assumptions have been confirmed. PutnamVs. I (c) 84 Principle of leap of faith/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: there is nothing that corresponds exactly to Bohr's electron, but they have mass and charge, and that is pretty much so. We must give leap of faith and treat Bohr as someone who refers to these particles. ((s) in order for scientists to able to engage in dialogue and to speak of the same entity.) |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Tradition | Sellars Vs Tradition | I 57 Meaning/Sellars: false: to regard it as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity. There is then the danger that one perceives this relation as a type of association. ((s) >tags, Myth of the museum). Meaning/relation/SellarsVsTradition: misleading that predicates would associated with objects. E.g. it is wrong that the semantic statement, ""red" means "rot" in German" would assert "red" would associated with red things. This would mean that this semantic statement would so to speak be a defining symbol of a longer statement on associative connections. That is not the case. (Here: difference of use and mention). (> Association). I 62 Report/act/Sellars: who supplies a report, does something. (SellarsVsTradition). Epistemology/tradition: a proposition token can play the role of a report, a) without that this is a public language implementation, and b) without speaker/listener! Sellars: here the accuracy of confirmations is supposed to correspond to the correctness of actions. This is not true, moreover, not every Ought is a Doing-Ought. I 65 Knowledge/SellarsVsTradition: Observational knowledge does not stand on its own two feet! It presupposes language acquisition. (Elsewhere: we cannot perceive a tree, without the concept of a tree.) But at the time of earlier perceptions you do not necessarily have to have had the concept. Long history of acquiring linguistic habits. Myth of the Factual/Sellars: thesis: that observation is constructed by self-authenticating, not linguistic episodes whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi linguistic full executions. I 84 Thinking/language/tradition: Thesis: Thoughts are possible without verbal ideas. I 88 SellarsVsTradition: Categories of intentionality are semantical. I 86 Theory/classic explanation/science/tradition/Sellars: the construction of a theory is to develop a system of postulates that is tentatively correlated with the observation language. SellarsVsTradition: this creates an extremely artificial and unrealistic picture of the actual procedure of scientists. I 87 Theory/Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are not normally formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model (Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects that behave in the usual way). A model is distinguished primarily by the fact that it is provided with a comment which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors comply with the postulates of the logistical image of theorizing. SellarsVs logistical image of theorizing: most explanations did not come readily from the theorists' minds. There is a continuous transition between science and everyday life. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the concepts of inner episodes. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Various Authors | Evans Vs Various Authors | EMD II VIII Meta Language/Theory Language/Evans/McDowell: often mentioned conditions: 1) if S is meaningful and unambiguous, there is exactly one sentence of L which is registered for S. 2) if S is n times ambiguous, there are n different sentences of L which are registered for S. 3) if S has no meaning, there is no sentence of L which is registered for S. 4) If S entails another sentence S’, there is an effectively decidable relation which is valid between the sentence of L that is registered for S or for S’. Problem/Seuren: the 4th condition leads to a conceptual collapse!. EMD II VIII/IX E.g. "John is a bachelor" entails "John is unmarried". According to the semantic representation, the simple "bachelor" cannot be the same as the complex "unmarried man". Evans/McDowellVsSeuren: this whole thing can be challenged, not because it revives the controversial distinction analytic/synthetic or because the "conceptual collapse" would go on without end, but because we, if we got ourselves into it, would put ourselves into a position where we would be unable to do what we are doing. And that would be that we set up something that, if someone knew about it, would put him into a position to speak and understand a language. It would be unfair to imply that the theorists are unaware of the speaker listener competence. Evans/McDowellVsSeuren: he suggests to people that if they "broke through circle", it would lead to the impossibility of determining the meaning of sentences "outside the language", i.e. "without using language". Vs: there is a fallacy in that: surely we cannot determine meanings without using words. But it does not follow that if we specify the sentence meaning of S using the sentence S’. EMD II X we thus determine a relation between S and S’!. Solution: S is mentioned, and S’ is used. (Use/Mention, T sentence). E.g. (5) "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white does not constitute relation which has the sentence has to itself, but rather constitutes under these circumstances a semantic property of the sentence by using it. This is an exemplification, with which we may well express our belief that snow is white. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theory/Observ. Language | Versus | Fraassen I 56 FraassenVsRamsey-Satz/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig - Vs distinction observation language/ theory language irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntatical interpretation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Theory/Observ. Language | Separation of theory language and observation language, theoretical terms, etc. > Ramsey sentence, Carmap sentence> Language dependence |
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