Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communicative Action | Habermas | III 128 Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. >Agreement, >Language/Habermas. III 143 Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved. III 157 In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. >World/thinking, >Reality. III 158 Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. >Observation, >Method, >Interpretation, >Practice. III 385 Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. >Situations. III 395 Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. III 396 Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. III 397 HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. >Meaning/Intending. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. >Understanding. III 457 Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 223 Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives. >Cultural tradition, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| False-Belief Task | Happé | Slater I 151 False-Belief Task/Happé: Happé (1993)(1) compared the understanding of literal and non-literal statements such as: “Caroline was so embarrassed. Her face was like a beetroot,” which is literally understandable and “Ian was very clever and tricky. He really was a fox,” which is literally false. She argued that “just as in the false belief situation (but not the true belief case) the actor’s mental state (belief) is crucial, and reality alone is no guide to action, so in metaphor (but not [literal language]) the speaker’s mental state (intention) is vital, and working with “reality” in the form of the literal meaning of the utterance is not sufficient for comprehension” (p. 104). Similarly, researchers went on comparing the ability to understand seeing vs. knowing, deception vs. sabotage, false photographs vs. false beliefs, the recognition of basic vs. complex emotions, and soon (for a review, see Baron-Cohen, 2000)(2). >Autism/Baron-Cohen, >False Belief Task/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/ToM/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/Dennett. 1. Happé, F. (1993). Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of relevance theory. Cognition, 48, 101—119. 2. Baron-Cohen, S. (2000). Theory of mind and autism: A 15-year review. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg & D. J. Cohen (Eds), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from developmental cognitive neuroscience (pp. 3—21). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Implicature | Schiffer | I 279 Conversation implicature/Grice/Schiffer: must emerge from inferences, in the premises of which enters the literal meaning. - But that does not work in the case of Floyd: Floyd believes that a) Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent can fly - and b) Lois does not know that Superman can fly refers to the same proposition. >Proposition, >Literal meaning, >Inferences. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Interpretation | Luther | Gadamer I 178 Bible/Interpretation/Sacred Scripture/Luther/Gadamer: The position of Luther(1) is approximately the following: Sacred Scripture is sui ipsius interpres. It does not require tradition to acquire the right understanding of it, nor does it require an art of interpretation in the style of the ancient doctrine of the fourfold sense of scripture; rather, the text of the Scripture has an unambiguous sense that can be determined from it itself, the sensus litteralis. The allegorical method in particular, which previously seemed indispensable for the dogmatic unity of biblical teaching, is only legitimate where the allegorical intention is given in the Scripture itself. Thus it is in place in the parable discourses. The Old Testament, on the other hand, must not gain its specifically Christian relevance through an allegorical interpretation. >Allegory. One has to understand it literally, and just by understanding it literally Gadamer I 179 and recognizing in it the position of the law, which is canceld out by the act of grace of Christ, it has a Christian meaning. The literal meaning of the Scriptures, of course, is not in every place and at any moment clearly understandable. For it is the whole of Holy Scripture that guides the understanding of the individual, just as, conversely, this whole is only acquired from the understanding of the individual that is carried out. Gadamer: Such a circular relationship between whole and part is nothing new in itself. This was already known in ancient rhetoric, which compared perfect speech with the organic body, the relationship between the head and the limbs. Luther and his successors transferred this image known from classical rhetoric to the process of understanding and developed as a general principle of text interpretation that all the details of a text are to be understood from the contextus, the context, and from the unified sense at which the whole is aimed, the scopus. >Circular reasoning, >Hermeneutic Circle, >Hermeneutics, >Context, >Understanding. Problem/GadamerVsLuther: 1. In invoking this principle for the interpretation of Holy Scripture, Reformation theology, for its part, remains caught in a dogmatically founded premise. It makes the precondition that the Bible itself is a unity. Gadamer I 180 GadamerVsLuther: 2. (...) the theology of the Reformation does not even appear to be consistent. By finally using the Protestant faith formulas as a guide for understanding the unity of the Bible, it too abolishes the principle of the Scriptures in favour of a, however, short-term Reformation tradition. Not only the counter-reformatory theology has argued against this but also Dilthey(2). >Reformation, >W. Dilthey. 1. According to K. Roll, the hermeneutical principles of the Lutheran Bible explanation have been thoroughly researched, especially by G. Ebeling. (G. Ebeling, Evangelienauslegung. Eine Untersuchung zu Luthers Hermeneutik [1942] and Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik [ZThK 48, 1951 , 172 -230] and more recently the Word of God and hermeneutics [ZThK 56, 1959]). 2. Cf. Dilthey II, 126 Note 3 the criticism of Flacius by Richard Simon. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Kafka | Eco | I 37 Kafka/Eco: trial, castle, expectation, condemnation, illness, transformation and torture are not situations that should be understood in their immediate literal meaning. But unlike the allegorical constructions of the Middle Ages, however, the resonating meanings here are not unambiguously pre-determined, are not guaranteed by any encyclopaedia and are not based on any order of the world. >Allegory. The various existentialist, theological and psychoanalytic interpretations of Kafka's symbols cannot exhaust the possibilities of the work at all. >Psychoanalysis, >Theology, >Existentialism, >Symbols, >Interpretation, I 38 It remains inexhaustible and open precisely because of this ambiguity, that is, because a world based on ambiguity has taken the place of a world structured according to general laws. >Ambiguity, >Literature, >Art. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Lemons Example | Bennett | I 190 Lemon-Example/Searle/Bennett: Grice: Conditional (intend p) > (mean p) SearleVsGrice: it is possible to (intend p) and ~(mean p). BennettVsSearle: Searle has not refuted Grice. - The antecedent is not satisfied. - S does not literally mean what he/she says. >Meaning, >Literal meaning, >Meaning/intending, >Reference, >Sense, >Utterances, >Speech acts, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Linguistic View | Field | II 159 Linguistic view/Field: does not assume any meanings as mind-independent entities - but assigns the words of a speaker to interpreter's words. - The relations are based on other characteristics - that is, on inferences that contain that word. - This is what I call "meaning-characteristic" - e.g. II 160 ChurchVsLinguistic view/Translation/Field: (Church 1950)(1): ("translation argument"): allegdly says: that if the word "lapin" means [rabbit], then it says that "lapin" means the same as "rabbit", then its German translation should be: ""lapin" means [rabbit]"" instead of ""lapin" means [Kaninchen]"" (Kaninchen, sic). ChurchVs: but this disagrees with the purpose and normal use of translations. Schiffer dito: E.g. two monolingual German speakers: Karl is told that Pierre said something in French that is equivalent to "Schnee ist weiß" (german, sic) - Fritz : ... equivalent to "snow is white". Problem: absurd: then Karl thinks rather than Fritz that Pierre said that Schnee ist weiß (sic, german) - but only because of the linguistic view. FieldVsVs: the linguistic view only has to be formulated more cautiously. Solution: >quasi-translation or > quasi-meaning. II 162 Leeds/linguistic view/LeedsVsChurch/Meaning/Extension/Field: (Leeds, 1979)(2): literal meaning/Leeds: E.g. the German word "bedeutet" means literally not the same as the English word "means": it does not even have the same extension. N.B.: (hereinafter "Hund", sic) "means" refers to "Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund", but not to "dog". - "Means": "dog" refers to "dog" and "Hund" to "dog" but not to "Hund". But: "bedeutet" and "means" are nevertheless in an important homology relation: Homology/meaning/Field: E.g. following two predicates are extensively different: a) "the temperature-in-Fahrenheit of x is r" and b) "the temperature-in-celsius of x is r". Solution: this homology makes it sensibly to translate "bedeutet Hund" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important. We cannot get it. Field dito. DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument. >Michael Dummett. II 165 Linguistic view: Alternative to it: a) to assume that that-sentences do not denote and "means that" are "believes that" operators - E.g. inference of "Susan believes that E = mc²" to "Susan believes Einstein's theory". Then the first is only the abbreviation of the second. - Then that-sentences are still singular terms. b) That-sentences and parentheses refer to intentional entities. 1. Church, Alsonzo, 1950. On Carpa's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief. Analysis 10, pp. 97-9. 2. Leeds, Stephen, 1979. Church's Translation Argument. Canadian Journal of PHilosophy 9, 43-51 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning | Leeds | Field II 162 Leeds/linguistic perspective/LeedsVsChurch/meaning/extension/Field (Leeds 1979)(1): - literal meaning/Leeds : e.g. the German word "bedeutet" literally means not the same as the English " means" : it does not even have the same extension - N.B. " bedeutet" refers "dog " to " Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund" , but not to "dog". "Means ": maps "dog" on "dog" and "Hund" on "dog" but not to "dog" but "bedeeutet" and "means" nevertheless stand in a homology relation: Homology/Meaning/Field: Example The following two predicates are extensional different : a) "The temperature in Fahrenheit of x r" b ) "The temperature in Celsius of x r". Solution : this homology makes it sensible to translate "means dog" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important! We can not even get it. Field ditto. DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument. >Translation, >Reference, >Translation/Field, >Meaning/Field. 1. Stephen Leeds (1979). Church's Translation Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43 - 51 |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphors | Davidson | Rorty III 44 Metaphor/Davidson: having a meaning means having a place in a language game. Metaphors have no place per definition. Metaphors interrupt a conversation. They do not convey any message. Metaphors cannot be paraphrased Rorty III 73 Metaphor/Davidson: a new metaphor does not express what has been there before, although it is caused by it. Glüer II 168 Davidson (in conversation with Joachim Schulte): there are no metaphors, only literal meaning: human rat: meaning: contemptible fur animal, not contemptible man. Metaphors/Davidson: are causes, but not reasons for a change of beliefs. Metaphor/Davidson: For example, if I call someone a "rat", the meaning is "little fur animal" etc. - not "contemptible person". Someone who wants to understand the metaphor must know what a rat is. - ("First meaning") - "Rat" is not ambiguous. Solution/Davidson: new: two intentions simultaneously. >Meaning, >Ambiguity, cf. >Analogies. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Metaphors | Goodman | III 73 Metaphor/Goodman: "high note" is not a frozen metaphor. The ownership of properties is something factual. No abridged comparison: everything is somehow similar to everything - one side of the comparison is unmetaphorical. >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Analogies. III 81 Max Black: in some cases, it is more illuminating to say that the metaphor produces the resemblance, than to say that it expresses a previously existing similarity. III 82 The question why predicates apply metaphorically in a certain way and not in a different way, is almost equivalent to the question of why they are literally true. Actually this is not a real question. Why things are as they are, can be left to the cosmologists. >Literal truth. III 82 The truth standards are pretty much the same, whether the scheme is transmitted or not. --- IV 145 Metaphorical use: "Wilbur is a workhorse" prohibits the derivation: quadruped. IV 146 It cannot be maintained that the metaphorical meaning is together with the literal meaning in the lexicon. Because there is a potentially infinite number of applications of an expression. A metaphor is not a "deviating" use. This view is understandable, even if it is wrong. >Meaning, >Lexicon. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Metaphors | Ricoeur | II 46 Metaphor/Ricoeur: (...) the relation between the literal meaning and the figurative meaning in a metaphor is like an abridged version within a single sentence of the complex interplay of significations that characterize the literary work as a whole. >Connotation/Ricoeur. II 47 The theory of metaphor comes down to us from the ancient rhetoricians, but this theory will not fulfill the role we expect of it without one important revision. This revision, briefly stated, shifts the problem of metaphor from the semantics of the word to the semantics of the sentence. >Rhetoric/Ricoeur. II 49 Metaphor/Tradition: (1) Metaphor is a trope, a figure of discourse that concerns denomination. (2) It represents the extension of the meaning of a name through deviation from the literal meaning of words. (3) The reason for this deviation is resemblance. (4) The function of resemblance is to ground the substitution of the figurative meaning of a word in place of the literal meaning, which could have been used in the same place. (5) Hence the substituted signification does not represent any semantic innovation. We can translate a metaphor, i.e., replace the literal meaning for which the figurative word is a substitute. In effect, substitution plus restitution equals zero. (6) Since it does not represent a semantic innovation, a metaphor does not furnish any new information about reality. This is why it can be counted as one of the emotive functions of discourse. I.A. RichardsVsTradition/Ricoeur: The first presupposition [that no new information is involved] to be rejected is that a metaphor is simply an accident of denomination, a displacement in the signification of words. With this presupposition classical rhetoric limited itself to the description of an effect of meaning that is really the result of the impact on the word of a production of meaning that takes place at the level of a complete utterance or sentence. II 50 Ricoeur: The metaphor is the result of the tension between two terms in a metaphorical utterance. (...) [this] tension in a metaphorical utterance is really not something that occurs between two terms in the utterance, but rather between two opposed interpretations of the utterance. The metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal interpretation which self-destructs in a significant contradiction. It is this process of self-destruction or transformation which imposes a sort of twist on the words, an extension of meaning thanks to which we can make sense where a literal interpretation would be literally nonsensical. II 51 Resemblence/Tradition: It is now possible to return to the third presupposition of the classical rhetorical conception of metaphor, the role of resemblance. This has often been misunderstood. Often it has been reduced to the role of images in poetic discourse, so that for many critics, especially the older ones, studying an author‘s metaphors meant discussing the nomenclature of the images used to illustrate his ideas. RicoeurVsTradition: But if metaphor does not consist in clothing an idea in an image, if it consists instead in reducing the shock engendered by two incompatible ideas, then it is in the reduction of this gap or difference that resemblance plays a role. What is at stake in a metaphorical utterance, in other words, is the appearance of kinship where ordinary vision does not perceive any relationship. Trope/Tradition: For classical rhetoric (...) a trope was the simple substitution of one word for another. But substitution is a sterile operation, whereas in a live metaphor the tension [is] between the words (...). II 52 RicoeurVsTradition: within a tension theory of metaphor, however, such as we are here opposing to a substitution theory, a new signification emerges, which embraces the whole sentence. In this sense, a metaphor is an instantaneous creation, a semantic innovation which has no status in already established language and which only exists because of the attribution of an unusual or an unexpected predicate. Metaphor therefore is more like the resolution of an enigma than a simple association based on resemblance; it is constituted by the resolution of a semantic dissonance. Two conclusions: 1. Real metaphors are not translatable. 2. A metaphor is not anornament of discourse. It has more than an emotive value because II 53 it offers new information. >Symbol/Ricoeur. II 66 Metaphor/model/Max Black/Ricoeur: The theory of metaphor can (...) be extended in a third way in the direction of the most specific traits of symbols. Numerous authors have remarked upon the kinship between metaphors and models. This kinship plays a decisive role, for example, in the work of Max Black, which is even entitled Models and Metaphors .(1) And from his side, the English theologian Ian Ramsey has attempted to elucidate the function of religious language by revising Max Black's theory in an appropriate fashion.(2) Such a rapprochement between models and metaphors allows us to develop the theory of metaphor in a direction (...) of the referential dimension. II 67 Ricoeur: Let us apply this concept of model to metaphor. The guideline here is the relation between the two notions of a heuristic fiction and the redescription that occurs through the transference of this fiction to reality. It is this double movement that we also find in metaphor, for "a memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate for the one as a lens for seeing the other. . . Thanks to this detour through the heuristic fiction we perceive new connections among things. The basis of this transfer is the presumed isomorphism between the model and its domain of application. It is this isomorphism that legitimates the "analogical transfer of a vocabulary" and that allows a metaphor to function like a model and "reveal new relationships“.(3) II 68 In the case of metaphor, [the] redescription is guided by the interplay between differences and resemblances that gives rise to the tension at the level of the utterance. It is precisely from this tensive apprehension that a new vision of reality springs forth, which ordinary vision resists because it is attached to the ordinary use of words. The eclipse of the objective, manipulable world thus makes way for the revelation of a new dimension of reality and truth. Copula/metaphor/Ricoeur: [in the metaphor] „is" signifies both is and is not. The literal "is" is overturned by the absurdity and surmounted by a metaphorical "is" equivaThus poetic language does not tell how things literally are, but what they are like. ((s) DavidsonVsRicoeur: cf. Metaphor/Davidson). Symbol/metaphor/Ricoeur: (...) we must accept two contrary propositions concerning the relationship between metaphors and symbols. On one side, there is more in the metaphor than in the symbol; on the other side, there is more in the symbol than in the metaphor. >Symbol/Ricoeur. 1. Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, 1962. Cornell University Press. 2. lan Ramsey, Models and Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Models for Divine Activity (London: S.C.M. Press, 1973); Religious Language (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957). 3. Max Black op. cit. P. 238. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Metaphors | Searle | II 189 Metaphor/Searle: there is no algorithm to decide whether one is present. It is about non-representational mental skills and similarity between extensions is often not critical. --- IV 98 Metaphor/Searle: why do some metaphors work and others do not? E.g. Sally is a block of ice, but not a prime number. Solution: a block of ice is not insensitive. There must be clear rules - metaphorical meaning is always an utterance condition. SearleVsAll other authors: the literal meaning is not sure. IV 103 Truth conditions are clear. IV 107 Metaphor is not a comparison - this is absurd: "with which block of ice do you compare him?" Similarity: is nevertheless important for understanding. Solution: it is only about Sally. IV 111 VsInteraction theory: there is no interaction between the ice block and Sally: you can use someone else. Meaning (like Davidson): in the metaphor no meaning changes its expression. >Metaphor/Davidson. IV 113 Negation: the negation is metaphorical as well. >Negation. IV 122 Metaphor/Searle: VsComparison Theory: there is indeed no resemblance asserted: e.g. "father of the country" - instead: you have to get behind the principles: what are the relevant similarities? Similarity itself is an empty predicate. IV 134 The basic principle is that only possible values of the metaphorically used expression can be the actual values that determine the possible properties of the object - metaphor needs no convention (irony neither). >Comparison, >Convention, >Similarity. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ontological Relativity | Esfeld | I 116 Ontological Relativity/Quine: in the native language we can avoid indeterminacy if we understand the meanings literally. >Literal meaning, >Language dependence, >Indefiniteness, >Theories, >Ontology, >Translation. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Quotation Marks | Sellars | Field II 162 Non-literal meaning/point quotation marks/Sellars/Field: if Sellars thus (with his special point-quotation marks) attributes meanings and settings, then this is not a linguistic point of view. Field: pro linguistic perspective: meaning characteristic stems from inferences in the language. - And meaning characteristic plays a role in psychology. --- Frank I 388 Quotation Marks/Sellars: "point quotation marks": indicates the role of tokens of this type in the behavioral economics of speakers - E.g."red" refers to the same part (of a sentence) as "rouge". Castaneda: not realistic in terms of translations. Predicate in point quotation marks: names an attribute. >Predicates, >Attributes, >Behavior/Sellars. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sentence Meaning | Armstrong | I 129 Sentence meaning/Armstrong: the literal meaning remains, even if the implications are meant. ((s) Cf. >Metaphors). I 132 Meaning/Armstrong: the meaning of utterances is a function of what they signify (or imitate or designate) and what they describe is a complex mental state of the speaker. ((s) >Mental states). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Sentence Meaning | Searle | I 205 Sentence meaning/truth condition/Searle: thesis: the sentence meaning leaves the content of what is said radically underdetermined, e.g. "I had breakfast/had measles": does not say that I had measles today. Wrong: to say, that the truth conditions would be determined only with respect to a background. >Terminology/Searle. Correct: the literal meaning fixes the truth conditions absolutely, but is itself vague and always incomplete, e.g. the assumption that the object can be cut, is not part of the literal meaning of "to cut". >Background/Searle, >truth conditions. VII 436 Sentence meaning/Searle: the sentence meaning consists in the speech act potential. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Symbols | Eliade | Ricoeur I 44 Symbol/Cosmic symbolism/religious belief/Eliade/Ricoeur: In his Traité d'histoire des religions(1), Mircea Eliade shows very well that the power of cosmic symbolism lies in the involuntary bond between the visible sky and the order it reveals: he speaks of the wise and the just, of the immeasurable and ordered, thanks to the analogous power that connects the sense with the sense (>Sense/Ricoeur). The symbol is bound, in a double sense: bound to and bound by. The symbol is bound, in a double sense: bound to and bound by. On the one hand, the sacred is bound to its primary, literal, sensual meanings: this is what makes it opaque; on the other hand, the literal meaning is bound by the symbolic meaning that lies within it. Ricoeur: that is what I have called the revealing power of the symbol, which, despite its opacity, is its power. And it is precisely this that brings it in contrast to the technical sign, which designates nothing more than what is set in it, and which for this reason can be emptied, formalized and reduced to a simple calculating object. Only the symbol gives what it says. >Interpretation/Ricoeur, >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur, >Symbol/Ricoeur. 1. Eliade, M. 1953. Traité d’histoire des religions. Paris: Payot |
Eliade I Mircea Eliade mages et symboles. Essais sur le symbolisme magico-religieux German Edition: Images and Symbols. Studies in Religious Symbolism New York 1969 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Terminology | Habermas | IV 188 Reference context/terminology/Habermas: In a sense, the world to which the communication participants belong is always present, but only in such a way that it forms the background for a current scene: the context of reference. IV 189 Lifeworld/Habermas: If we give up the basic concepts of consciousness philosophy in which Husserl deals with the problem of the life world, we can think of the life world represented by a culturally handed down and linguistically organised inventory of patterns of interpretation. Then the context of reference must no longer be explained in the context of phenomenology and psychology of perception, but as IV 190 a connection of meaning between a communicative utterance, the context and the connotative horizon of meaning. Reference contexts go back to grammatically regulated relationships between elements of a linguistically organized inventory of knowledge. IV 209 Def Culture/Habermas: I call culture the inventory of knowledge from which the communication participants provide themselves with interpretations by communicating about something in a world. Def Society/Habermas: I call society the legitimate orders through which communication participants regulate their affiliation to social groups and thus ensure solidarity. Def Personality/Habermas: By personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, i.e. repairing, participating in processes of communication and thereby asserting one's own identity. Semantics/Habermas: the semantic field of symbolic contents form dimensions in which the communicative actions extend. Medium/Habermas: the interactions interwoven into the network of everyday communicative practice form the medium through which culture, society and person reproduce themselves. These reproductive processes extend to the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. We must differentiate between the preservation of the material substrate of the lifeworld. IV 260 Norm/Terminology/Habermas: Norm = generalized behavioral expectation. Principles: = higher-level norms. IV 278 Form of communication/terminology/Habermas: Structural violence is exercised through a systematic restriction of communication; it is anchored in the formal conditions of communicative action in such a way that the connection between objective, social and subjective world is typically prejudiced for the communication participants. For this relative a priori of understanding I would like to introduce the concept of the form of communication in analogy to the a priori of knowledge of the form of object (Lukács). IV 413 Def Control Media/terminology/Habermas: are those media that replace language as a mechanism for action coordination . Def communication media/Habermas: are such media that merely simplify over-complex contexts of communication-oriented action, but remain dependent on language and on a lifeworld. IV 536 Def Legal Institution/Terminology/Habermas: I call legal institutions legal norms, which cannot be sufficiently legitimized by the positivistic reference to procedures. E.g. the foundations of constitutional law, the principles of criminal law and criminal procedure. As soon as they are questioned, the reference to their legality is not sufficient. They require material justification because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld itself and, together with informal norms of action, form the background of communicative action. IV 539 Def Inner colonization/Habermas: this thesis states that as a result of capitalist growth, the subsystems of economy and state become more and more complex and penetrate deeper and deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 548 The thesis makes it possible to analyze processes of real abstraction, to which Marx had an eye, without using an equivalent of value theory (see Value Theory/Habermas). III 144 Def Action/Habermas: Actions are only what I call such symbolic expressions with which the actor, as in teleological, norm-regulated and dramaturgical action, makes a reference to at least one world (the physical, the consciousness or the mentally divided world) but always also to the objective world. From these I distinguish between body movements and secondary operations. III 70 Def Critique/Habermas: I speak of criticism instead of discourse whenever arguments are used, without the participants having to assume that the conditions for a speech situation free of external and internal constraints are fulfilled. Aesthetic critique is about opening the eyes of participants, i. e. leading them to an authenticating aesthetic perception. III 412 Def Meaning/Communicative Action/Habermas: within our theory of communicative action, the meaning of an elementary expression consists in the contribution it makes to the meaning of an acceptable speech action. And to understand what a speaker wants to say with such an act, the listener must know the conditions under which he can be accepted. III 41 Def rationality/culture/Habermas: we call a person rational who interprets his or her nature of need in the light of culturally well-coordinated value standards, but especially when he or she is able to adopt a reflexive attitude towards the standards of value that interpret needs. IV 251 Def Productive Forces/Marx/Habermas: According to Marx, productive forces consist of a) the labour force of those working in production, the producers; b) the technically usable knowledge, insofar as it is converted into productivity-increasing work tools, into production techniques; c) organisational knowledge, insofar as it is used to set workers in motion efficiently, to qualify workers and to effectively coordinate the division of labour cooperation of the workers. IV 252 The productive forces determined the degree of possible availability of natural processes. IV 252 Def Relations of Production/Marx/Habermas: relations of production are those institutions and social mechanisms that determine how the labour force, at a given level of productive forces, is combined with the available means of production. The regulation of access to the means of production or the way in which the socially used workforce is controlled also indirectly determines the distribution of socially generated wealth. Relations of production express the distribution of social power; they prejudice the structure of interests that exists in a society with the distribution pattern of socially recognized opportunities of the satisfaction of needs. IV 203 Def Situation/Habermas: the situation includes everything that can be seen as a restriction for (...) action initiatives. While the actor retains the environment as a resource for communication-oriented action, the restrictions imposed by the circumstances of the implementation of his plans are part of the situation. III 400 Def Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. From the speaker's perspective, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions of his/her illocutionary success. Acceptability is not defined in an objective sense from the perspective of an observer, but from the performative attitude of the communication participant. IV 270 Def Knowledge/Habermas: I use "knowledge" in a broader sense that covers everything that can be acquired through learning as well as through the appropriation of cultural tradition, which extends to both cognitive and social integrative, i.e. to expressive and moral-practical elements. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Terminology | Sellars | Field II 162 non-literal meaning/point quotation marks/Sellars/Field: if Sellars thus attributes meanings and settings, then this is not a linguistic point of view. Field: per linguistic point of view: meaning-characteristic of inferences in the language - and a role in their own psychology. Frank I 388 Quotes / Sellars: Point-quotes: indicate the role of tokens of this type in the behavioral economics of the speaker. - E.g. red denotes the same role as rouge. - Castaneda: not realistic in terms of translations - predicate in Point-quotes: renames the attribute. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 Sellars I XLIII Theory/language: the language of the scientific world view must preserve the basic structures of the everyday world view. For example, colors are homogeneous properties. (But not according to the scientific image). So Sellars later creates the concept of Sensa, which only occurs in sentient organisms. Where the ordinary human perceives something blue, on the side of science occurs the sensum. Sensa themselves are not colored, just as the states of feeling are. Colored alone are the objects of the everyday world. Also not the physical objects. Otherwise one would have to isolate a colored surface and ask for its thickness, which leads to contradictions. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Truth Conditions | Searle | II 87 Truth conditions/Searle: there are a) certain fulfilment conditions and b) certain phenomenal properties of the experience. Fulfilment conditions: that there is a yellow wagon, and that this wagon causes the experience. Phenomenal properties: phenomenal properties determine the fulfilment conditions - so the experience determines the conditions. --- IV 101 Truth condition/Searle: truth conditions have a literal meaning - but only against background assumptions. >Terminology/Searle, >Truth/Searle, >Fullfillment condition/Searle, >Fullfillment/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Understanding | Habermas | III 152 Understanding/action/sociology/Habermas: there is a problem of rationality when understanding actions, because the different types of action (teleological, dramaturgical and communicative action) presuppose different relations of the actor to the world. >Actions/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. III 159 Sociology must seek an understanding approach to its field of objects, because it contains processes of understanding through which the field of objects has in a way already constituted itself. The social scientist encounters symbolically pre-structured objects; they embody the structures of pre-theoretical knowledge with the help of which subjects capable of speech and action have produced these objects. The waywardness of this pre-structured reality (...) is contained in the generation rules according to which the subjects produce the social context of life directly or indirectly. Examples are acts of speech, purposeful activities, cooperations and sediments of these utterances such as texts, traditions, documents, works of art, theories, goods, techniques, etc. Speaking and acting are the unexplained basic concepts. >Basic terms, >Method. III 160 In order to understand the lifeworld, the social scientist, who has no access to it other than the layman, must be able to participate in its production in general. >Lifeworld. III 170 Communicative actions cannot be interpreted in two steps, i. e. first of all to be understood in their factual course of events and then compared with an ideal-typical course of events. III 171 Instead, the interpreter must assume a divided basis all the time, which he/she has in common with the one to be judged. III 173 If we assume that there is a possibility of mutual criticism between the observer and the actor,... III 174 ...the distinction between descriptive and rational interpretation becomes meaningless. The rational interpretation is here the only way to open up the factual process of communicative action. >Hermeneutics/Habermas. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. From the speaker's perspective, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions of his/her illocutionary success. Acceptability is not defined in an objective sense from the perspective of an observer, but from the performative attitude of the communication participant. III 403 We need to broaden our perspective to the context of interaction so that we can identify fulfillment conditions under which the listener can connect his actions to the actions of a speaker. However, knowledge of the "fulfillment conditions" is not sufficient to know when an expression is acceptable (see Acceptability/Habermas). For this we still need knowledge of the conditions for an agreement. III 404 Imperative: in the case of imperatives involving a claim to power of the speaker, i.e. a possible sanctioning, we must know the sanction conditions. IV 400 Understanding/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Thesis: Understanding as a mechanism for coordinating action can be expanded, organizationally mediated and rationalized, but not replaced and thus mechanized by media in the areas of life that primarily fulfil functions of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization. >Agreement/Habermas. Gaus I 157 Understanding/Habermas/Bohman: 'Formal pragmatics' is Habermas's term for a general account of the capacity of a speaker to use and understand speech acts correctly: 'the know-how of subjects who are capable of speech and action, who are attributed the capacity to produce valid utterances, and who consider themselves capable of distinguishing (at least intuitively) between valid and invalid expressions' (1990(1): 31). Bohman: the intuitive knowledge of a competent speaker permits them to engage in second-order evaluation in asking for justification or reasons for various sorts of validity claims that are implicit in utterances; to understand an utterance is to know its 'acceptability conditions'. While validity claims may remain implicit so long as communication is unproblematic and ongoing, competent speakers may also demand that the implied warrant be redeemed and demand explicit justification in second-order communication (communication about communication, or 'discourse' proper) in order to reach an understanding. Critical function/Bohman: such a reconstruction of implicit know-how may have a critical function in so far as it can specify when speakers violate the conditions of rationality implicit in communicatively successful utterances. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utterances | Searle | IV 141 Sentence/statement/Searle: some authors: an utterance is a token, a sentence is a type. SearleVs: 1. one can distinguish utterance meaning and sentence meaning. 2. Category mistake: to assume that an utterance of an incident is the same as the incident. 3. It is also wrong to assume, the meaning would change, e.g. a stop sign remains the same. IV 147 If certain background assumptions are missing, then the sentence has no certain truth conditions. >Truth condition. This is a weaker thesis than that of the context of freedom of the literal meaning. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Frege, G. | Dummett Vs Frege, G. | Brandom II 74 Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them. Brandom II 173 Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force). Dummett I 15 Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift)(1). I 51 DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference. Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply. Dummett I 61 DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color. I 63. Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker. I 64 Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises. I 79 Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained. I 90 ++ - Language/Thinking/Perception I 93 + - DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation". I 104 - Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. I 106 Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally) I 122 - DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module. I 124 + DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Ordinary Language | Dummett Vs Ordinary Language | Dummett (e) III 185 Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl. III (e) 196 Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either! However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. III (e) 196/197 Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin). Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained. III (e) 198 DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances. According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct. III (e) 199 DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist. |
Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Various Authors | Mackie Vs Various Authors | Stegmüller IV 399 "Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds! MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy. IV 400 Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason? 2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable! God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems: 1. Has God simply emerged with the time? 2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced! 3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again. Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume: a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable. IV 401 Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not. a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses. b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself! Stegmüller IV 447 Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole. MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act. IV 472 Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive. Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent. MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all. IV 271 Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic. Stegmüller IV 502 Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition! When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe. Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life. IV 503 Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct. Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld. The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing. IV 504 According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume. Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions. Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense. IV 504/505 Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes! PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements. MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood! IV 506 MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism. Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference! |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Background | Searle, J.R. | I 198 Compared to my earlier books, there are significant changes. The thesis of the background originally referred to the meaning meant by the speaker, even to all forms of intentionality, linguistically or not linguistically. It says the following: intentional phenomena such as meaning, to mean, understanding, believing, desiring and experiencing function only in interaction with a set of background abilities that are themselves not intentional. I 200 The thesis of background is now a very strong assertion: 1. Intentional states do not function autonomously. 2. A network of other intentional states is required. 3. Even the network is not sufficient. It only works in conjunction with a lot of background capabilities. 4. These abilities are not further intentional states or components of any intentional state. 5. The same intentional content may lay down different fulfilment conditions. Example background: think of Wittgenstein's example with the picture of the man walking uphill. It could be interpreted as a picture of a man sliding downhill. Nietzsche may not have been the first, but he was aware that the background does not have to be as it is. Bourdieu's concept of the Habitus (1979) is closely related to my concept of background. I 214 Thesis from the background: new: all conscious intentionality: thinking, perceiving, understanding, etc. establishes truth conditions only in relation to certain abilities which neither belong nor could belong to the respective state of consciousness. The actual intentional content in itself is not sufficient to determine the conditions of fulfillment. New as old: still a lot of background ability is needed to interpret thoughts, belief etc.. But new: such a network has no real existing reality! VI 142 Searle Thesis: the concept of literal meaning has at all only relative to a set of background assumptions an application VI 147 if certain background assumptions are missing, the sentence has no certain truth conditions that is a weaker thesis than that of the freedom of context of literal meaning. |
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