Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Background | Habermas | IV 191 Background/Habermas: is a knowledge inventory of unproblematic beliefs that are shared and assumed to be guaranteed, from which the context of communication processes forms, in which the participants use proven situation definitions or negotiate new ones. >Conventions, >LIfeworld. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. The participants of communication find the connection between objective, social and subjective world, which they are facing, already interpreted in terms of content. If they overwrite the horizon of a given situation, they could not step into the void; they immediately find themselves in another, now updated, but preinterpreted area of the culturally self-evident. New situations also emerge from a lifeworld built on an ever-trusted inventory of cultural knowledge. The actors cannot take an extramundane position in relation to this lifeworld, just as they cannot take an extramundane position in relation to language as the medium of the processes of communication through which the lifeworld is maintained. >Standpoint, >Observation, >Perspective. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Aristotle | Fraassen Vs Aristotle | I 130 Asymmetry/Explanation: is solved by our other result: contextual relevance. The interest of the questioner will play a role. I 131 Aristotle: (FN 35) ("Posterior Analytics" I, 13): develops a typology of 4 explanation factors, the "four causes". Fraassen: then there may be two (relative to the background information) equivalent propositions A and B that describe the factors of various types. Then it is possible that A, but not B, contains the relevant factor or vice versa. Lantern E.g./Aristotle: (PA II, 11) shows that he already knew the problem. E.g. a father asks his son: "Why is this yard light on?" Then there are two possible answers: a) because the circuit was closed by my turning the switch and..." Background: the house is being re-electrified. b) because I’m still expecting a visit." Other background. FraassenVsAristotle: his division into four is certainly oversimplified. Asymmetry/Explanation/(s): consists in that the event actually provides all the information, but the explanation requires only a certain piece of information. I 132 Asymmetry/Fraassen: Solution: it must at least sometimes be possible to reverse it by a change of context. Thus, the salient factors become clear. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Bennett, J. | Avramides Vs Bennett, J. | Avra I 17 Avramidis Bennett: Bennett/Avramidis: (Griceans, modified): Proposes a community of speakers who use a communication system that does not rely on Grice’ intentions and beliefs: the "Plain Talk" ("direct speech", "simple speech", "candid speech"). Def Plain Talk/Bennett: the speakers rely on the listener, they believe in the form of a generalization: whenever an utterance U is uttered, a particular proposition p is true. This is how they can do without a speaker’s intention. BennettVsGrice: if this simpler analysis is true, we do not need the more complicated one. (65). BennettVsVs: but Bennett himself believes that the Gricean is capable of withstanding this: GriceVsVs: Solution: "Background fact": if the speaker did not want to transmit p, the utterance U would have been inappropriate under the generalization that whenever U is uttered, p is true. (Bennett 1976 p.172). I 18 This saves the introduction of complex propositional attitudes in the analysis. Modification: the audience is presented with "intention dependent evidence for the proposition". AvramidesVsBennett: the modification is not necessary, it is already covered by Grice’ original analysis. Avra I 18 Communication/LoarVsBennett: Not only is this kind economy unnecessary, the elimination of the intentions removes something essential. The fact that intentions, expectations and beliefs should be simple in ordinary communication and personal relationships, seems to me so improbable that it surprises me why this should be a more realistic view. (70). I 121 Def Register/Bennett: A theoretical expression that stands for whatever in relation to an animal, and that validates predictions about its behavior (evaluates it, rates it yes/no) based on facts about its environment. (Bennett 1976, p.52). Avramides: Registering is necessary but not sufficient for belief. E.g. cruise missiles with thermal infrared equipment: can be described as reacting but not as learning. Belief/Bennett: We achieve sufficient conditions, if we add the ability to learn to registering. (see Bennett 1976, p 84). DavidsonVsBennett: Instead distinction subjective state/objective world. AvramidesVsDavidson: one could argue that the awareness of this distinction is the possession of the concept of belief. Davidson: this awareness is belief about a belief. Scaring/Davidson: only reaction to a stimulus. AvramidesVsDavidson: then there is certainly still room between the act of being surprised and the possession of the concept of belief. This allows, for example: the ability to learn that Bennett propagates. DavidsonVsBennett: rejects his approach, because his (Davidson’s) concept of awareness (of the distinction subjective / objective) is very strong. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Brandom, R. | Searle Vs Brandom, R. | Searle III 153 Background: There is a parallelism between the functional structure of the background and the intentional structure of social phenomena. >Background/Searle. Rule/Searle: 1. the rules never interpret themselves 2. they are never exhaustive 3. actually we just know in many situations, what to do, how to deal with the situation. We apply the rules of neither conscious nor unconscious! (SearleVsBrandom: Rules here also not unconsciously!) >Rules/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Burge, T. | Davidson Vs Burge, T. | I (d) 74 Burge: Two types externalism: a) Social: Meaning depends on social practices (community - b) on the causal history of the person. DavidsonVsBurge: a) our intuition does not suggest that the meaning of a speaker is determined by other speakers. b) Which group should be outstanding? c) an unconscious elite in the background is problematic. Cf. >externalism, >internalism. Burge: in order to have a thought about water, you just have to be in contact with water, you don’t have to prove anything. DavidsonVsBurge: even a false thought about water is one about water. - VsBurge: Community not causally involved Burge: radiation patterns or physically described stimuli make everything infinitely complicated. DavidsonVs: Complicated for whom? It is us humans who make all these classifications and groupings! We group according to similarities that are obvious to ourselves. I (e) 116 DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he focuses so strongly on the everyday situation through the triangulation sets him apart from the externalism of Putnam and Burge. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect interpretable in principle (via causal hypotheses). Glüer II 167 Burge and Dummett think that what speakers mean by their words depended very much on how the community used those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Complete nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time. Frank I 665 Contents/Thoughts/Externalism/Burge/Davidson: Content is not determined by what is happening in the person, or by what is easily accessible for them through careful reflection. (E.g. incorrectly used terms, information gaps). DavidsonVsBurge: I’m not sure how these assertions are to be understood, because I’m not sure how serious talk of a "direct acquaintance" with a content is to be taken. But the first person authority is seriously compromised by that. Therefore, I must reject one of the premises of Burge. 1) I agree that content is not only determined or "fixed" by what is going on inside me. 2) VsBurge: Vs representation of the way in which social and other external factors control the contents. Fra I 665/666 DavidsonVsBurge: His characteristics are not as relevant as he makes them look: E.g. Suppose I believe that "arthritis" is only used for calcium-induced arthritis. My friend Arthur knows better. We both say honestly to Smith: "Carl has arthritis’. Burge: Then our words mean the same thing, we mean the same and express the same belief. My mistake is irrelevant for what I thought on this occasion. Reason: that’s what everyone (who is not tainted by philosophy) would say about Arthur and me. DavidsonVsBurge: I doubt that he is right, but even if he were right, it would not prove his point: Ordinary attributions of meanings and attitudes are based on far-reaching and vague assumptions about what speaker and listener have in common. If some assumptions are not confirmed, we can change the words we used often change drastically. We usually choose the easy way: we take a speaker by his word, even if that does not fully account for one aspect of his thought. E.g. if Smith informs a third party about what Arthur and I both believe about arthritis, then he may mislead its listeners! Fra I 667 If he is careful, he would add, "But Davidson thinks arthritis is calcium-induced". The fact that this addition is necessary shows that the simple attribution was not right. BurgeVs: could reply that the report is literally correct ((s) because also the wrong-believer sincerely believes that it is arthritis). DavidsonVsBurge: That overlooks the extent to which the contents of a belief depend on of the contents of other beliefs. Therefore, there can be no simple rigid rule for the attribution of a single thought. Burge: social determination of contents also leads to the fact that we usually mean what others mean in the community. "certain responsibility towards the group practice". DavidsonVsBurge: I do not deny it, but that does not show what is supposed to show: a) It is often reasonable to make people responsible for ensuring that they know the meaning of their words. But this has nothing to do with what they want to say! b) As a good citizens, we want to increase the opportunities for communication, but that only explains our "legalistic" attribution of meanings and beliefs. ((s) that the meanings are not so). c) A speaker who wants to be understood, must have the intention that his words are interpreted in a certain way, and consequently the way others do. And vice versa, the listener wants to interpret the words as the speaker does. This has moral weight, but it has no necessary connection with the determination of what anyone thinks. I 667/668 Externalism/Social community/Meaning/Meaning/DavidsonVsBurge: We are not forced to give the words of a person the meanings that they have in their language community. It is also not true that we cannot help but to interpret their propositional attitudes on the same basis. Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441 -4 58 Frank I 710 Self-knowledge/Burge: Error excluded (immune), because reflection in the same act. DavidsonVsBurge: that only shows that you cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents. It does not show why you cannot be wrong about the existence of the attitude. Worse: Burge cannot show that the two kinds of knowledge (1st and 2nd order) have the same subject. As long as the asymmetry is not explained by recourse to the social situation (relationships between the speakers), I doubt that a non-skeptical solution is possible. I 711 Representation/Perceptual knowledge/Burge: It cannot generally be wrong that the representations represent that from which they usually originate and to which they are applied. DavidsonVsBurge: I have long been of this view, but I do not understand why Burge is of this view. How do we decide where representations usually originate? Circular: "from what they represent." But which of the many possible causes is the right one? Incidents in the nervous system, stimulation patterns of nerve endings, or a little further out? (proximal/distal). Burge: We should be watch out for the relation of different observers: they have similar perceptions. Perception is "impersonal". DavidsonVsBurge: But that is exactly what should be proved! We need not only causal interaction between different observers and the same objects, but the right kind of causal interaction. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Nominalism Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Frank I 260 Universals/VsChisholm/Heckmann: he represents an extreme Platonic universals realism. Thus he brings himself into a contradiction to both the moderate Aristotelian universals and to the ontological nominalism. I 261 Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contradiction to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the importance of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but that's no approach to universalism of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first and then express with a predicate. Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate can use it in compliance with the rules. I 262 Nominalism/Utility Theory/VsChisholm: the meaning of predicates and sentences cannot be explicated mentalistically (by resorting to intentional performance) >(Humpty Dumpty Theory). MentalismVsNominalism/Chisholm: everything semantic has its origin in the mind. Direct Attribution/Attribution Theory/VsChisholm: E.g. an infant recognizes his mother, but not by first judging that it recognizes the mother and then attributing this state to himself. (Chisholm: must actually assume that the mother is only an indirect object of attribution). I 263 Consciousness/Chisholm: emerges from an act of direct consideration of a self-presenting property. VsChisholm: this ignores a fundamental trait of any type of consciousness or fails to make it understood: the self-disclosure of the self-translucency of consciousness. Consciousness should be acquainted and familiar with itself whenever it occurs, and that in a pre-reflective and irreflexive way. (Frank, >Sartre). E.g. I have direct knowledge of my pain, not only by reflection and subsequent direct attribution. (That would be of a higher level). Consciousness/HeckmannVsChisholm: there is a third between the self-presenting and self-presented: the self present: the which has always been disclosed, known and familiar by pre-attributive knowledge. (>Background). Roderick M. Chisholm (1981): The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, Brighton 1981 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Cognition Theory | Searle Vs Cognition Theory | I 8 SearleVsCognition Psychology: Black Box, the cognitive scientists repeat the worst mistake of the behaviorists: they insisted to examine only objectively observable phenomena. So they left the essential characteristics of the mind aside. In the big black box they only found a lot of small black boxes. I 217 cognition theory: Here it is claimed, we would have drawn a conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognition theory: On the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. The background is not a control system. I 222 SearleVs Cognitive Science/VsCognition: the basic assumptions of cognitive science are wrong. Cognitive Science: neither the examination of the brain nor the study of consciousness is of interest or value. Although the cognitive mechanisms are actually in the brain, and some of them refer to the awareness a superficial expression, but we are interested in the intermediate level, where actual cognitive processes happen, which are inaccessible to the consciousness. These processes are not only factually special principle unconsciously. Typical representatives: Chomsky, Marr, Fodor. I 256 Explanation/SearleVsCognitivism: Thesis: many of our cognitive science explanations do not have the explanatory power, we attach to them. To save them, we will have to make a reversal of its logical structure: as it took place during the transition from pre-Darwin biology to the biology à la Darwin. I 256/257 The brain produces states of consciousness, and that is all. As for the mind, this is already the whole story. There are the blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness, otherwise however there is nothing. No rule-following, no mental information processing, no unconscious inferences, no mental models, no original drafts, no two and a half dimensional images, no language of the mind, and no universal grammar. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Conceptual Relativism | Davidson Vs Conceptual Relativism | Glüer II 134 Conceptual Relativism/DavidsonVsConceptual Relativism/Glüer: his rejection of conceptual relativism applies only to the level of whole languages. There cannot be "global" relativisms for fundamental considerations. Glüer: but "local" relativisms are only possible at all against this backdrop, which assures understanding. Davidson's anti-relativistic arguments provide the background for different perspectives. Cf. >skepticism, >perspective. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Davidson, D. | Fodor Vs Davidson, D. | IV 68 Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like! IV 69 Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well. Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side. QuineVsDavidson: Davidson shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: e.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. x is white and LT). This could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof". This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem. E.g. assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a truth theory (WT), which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives. That seems to be a holistic consequence. Vs: but that is premature. Language/radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation! I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct truth theory (WT) by that evidence which observation allows. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all! Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior: 1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible. IV 74 Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of a truth theory is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, it is therefore not in the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation. It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions. From the perspective of the radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist (> hermeneutic circle). These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc. IV 84 Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Davidson's idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W-sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language! IV 98 "Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true! IV 100 Principle of Charity/radical interpretation/RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that: 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions, 2) are syntactically atomistic. The interpretation of such expressions cannot be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts. IV 101 We do not know whether such forms exist, e.g. maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable. > Behavior/wish IV 120ff. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Davidson, D. | McDowell Vs Davidson, D. | I 42 McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.) I 41 McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)). I 168 Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so. I 172 Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control. I 86 Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs). I 124 The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) Spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such. McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable. I 216 McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons. Rorty VI 205 McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible. Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson). VI 206 McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good. VI 207 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world. Rorty VI 213 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world. Rorty VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education"). To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom. Rorty VI 217 McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Definition Theory | Newen Vs Definition Theory | NS I 159 Predicate/Extension/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "cardioid": set of all creatures with kidneys Intention/Predicate/Carnap: in contrast the property of being a creature with kidneys. Formal: a function of possible worlds on the set of all creatures with kidneys. Intention: is the contribution to the sentence content that makes the difference between the sentences "Peter is a creature with kidneys" and "... with heart". Predicate/Meaning/Concept/Newen/Schrenk: we assume the background assumption that the meanings of predicates are concepts. Concepts/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: are then determined as properties with him. Property/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: for him it is fixed by what extension they have in a possible world. Problem: this is not sufficient for all mathematical predicates. E.g. "equilateral" and "equiangular" applies to the same sets of triangles. However, this is part of the basic question of what the meanings of predicates are. Definition Theory/Concepts/Criteria/Newen/Schrenk: classical theory: thesis: the meaning of a predicate is specified by a definition that provides necessary and sufficient conditions of use. VsDefinition Theory: Problem: 1) for most concepts we do not find such definitions and our everyday concepts do not have limits as sharp as definitions would require. 2) We usually only have partial knowledge or partially false knowledge about what we associate with an expression. NS I 160 3) typicality effects: i.e. some objects are typical examples of things that fall under a concept, others are less typical, even if they are both unambiguously subsumed under the concept. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Descartes, R. | Evans Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 497 EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas. I 522 Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Donnellan, K. | Searle Vs Donnellan, K. | IV 160 Referential/attributive/reference/regard/referring/Donellan: two different uses of descriptions. >Attributive/referential. Most philosophers VsDonnellan: both are referential in the sense that is spoken to them about objects, the only difference is the extent to which this intention is made explicit. Def attributive/tradition: specifies truth conditions laid only against a background of assumptions. IV 162 SearleVsDonellan: even after his own account is not correct, because there are counter-examples: E.g. Smith died of natural causes, but was recently attacked, and the trail of destruction leave us to call the "murderer of Smith" insane. Then we can say that the finding was true, although no descriptions were met (but that would have been a (possible) attributive use, and thus the distinction is threatened). DonellanVsVs: in such cases is "near miss", but that it still had something else as truly referential uses. It goes just nearly wrong when the single thing was a little misdescribed. Only in referential cases it may "go wrong for miles." IV 165 Reference/SearleVsDonnellan: how is it at all possible for speakers to talk about objects? Reference can be made by a variety of syntactic means: descriptions, proper nouns, pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, etc. The point is that the speaker has a certain relationship to them. He must have some linguistic representation. This representation may represent the object from one or another aspect. IV 166 Then under any aspect the speaking is always done. In the absence of knowledge it can then be that the term does not express the aspect exactly. (E.g. that he thinks Smith will be pronounced "Schmidt"). But that must be distinguished from a real confusion. Distinction Meaning/To Mean. Donnellan's cases are quite simple: under any aspect you have to speak, but you are only choosing exactly this aspect. In indirect speech acts they say even a bit more. It is only necessary that the speaker and hearer can identify the subject because of the aspect. (That even works if both think the aspect is incorrect! IV 168 E.g. Both speak of the "king" although they consider him an usurper). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Dretske, F. | Lehrer Vs Dretske, F. | Brendel I 218 Knowledge/Externalism/Internalism/Lehrer/Brendel: (Lehrer 1990b. 252) Thesis: LehrerVsInternalism, LehrerVsExternalism: Both answers to the question of what needs to be added to true conviction in order to obtain knowledge are wrong. (Lager) Solution/Lehrer: Thesis: Connection of internalism and externalism: Def Knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Is a rational connection of subjective states and truth, of mind and world. [ist eine rationale Verbindung subjektiven Zuständen und Wahrheit, zwischen Geist und Welt.] Three conditions: 1. Knowledge must be distinguished from accidental true conviction 2. It must be "articulable" in principle 3. The epistemic subject must know and must be able to recognize the difference between information and misinformation. Metaknowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: The third condition makes it necessary to have the term "metaknowledge". LehrerVsExternalism: Cannot represent metaknowledge (to recognize misinformation in light of my knowledge of information). LehrerVsDretske: Creating information is not a sufficient condition for knowledge; It also needs to know that the information is correct, e.g. defective measuring instruments do not lead to knowledge. I 219 Important argument: the temperature can coincidentally match the one indicated on the display of the defective measuring instrument. Solution/Lehrer: We need background information (e.g. barn facades) LehrerVsReliability theory: There would not be knowledge there as well. Reliability theoryVsVs: this is only valid for causal theories, die die r.th. selber ablehnt. Causal Theory/c.th.Lehrer/Brendel: It exceeds c.th. if Lehrer demands that the subject can recognize wrong information. LehrerVsExternalism/Brendel: By recognizing misinformation any variety of externalism must be rejected as well. |
Lehr I K. Lehrer Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Dummett, M. | Brandom Vs Dummett, M. | I 202 BrandomVsDummett: if he see the problematic aspect of the concept "boche" in that it causes a non-conservative extension of the remaining language, it is not right. The non-conservativity merely shows that the concept has a substantial content which was not already included in other concepts. E.g. Temperature: was introduced with certain criteria, with the introduction of new measurement methods, the complex inferential definition developed that determines the significance of today (> Measuring). Introduction: it is not to be asked if the conclusions were already accepted, but whether this conclusion is one that should be accepted! The problem with "boche" and "nigger" is not the novelty, but the unwanted conclusions. Brandom II 173 But there are other ways of justification than showing that we’ve already been on them determined implicitly, even before the term was introduced. Background of material inferential practices. Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: this disregards the specific nature of the sentences of being able to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregian power). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dummett, M. | Schiffer Vs Dummett, M. | I 221 Verificanistical semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-theoretical): verification conditions instead of truth conditions. Dummett: (like Davidson): we must ask what form a meaning theory (m.th.) would have to take to find out what meaning is. This M.Th. should be able to specify the meaning of all words and propositions. (Dummett 1975, p. 97). Dummett: pro compositionality (with Wittgenstein): no systematic meaning theory is possible without explaining the understanding of infinitely many sentences. Therefore one must, like Chomsky and Wittgenstein, accept that we have an implicit capture some general principles. (Dummett 1978, p. 451). DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain any truth theory (tr.th.). Verification condition/verification conditions/Dummett: (for propositions) the verification conditions are also recursively specified. Schiffer: but that does not follow that a compositional truth-theoretic semantics does not exist as well. I 222 Dummett: with the specification of the verification conditions the meaning theory could at the same time specify the truth conditions (Dummett 1978 Foreword). Verification conditions/SchifferVsDummett: it is not clear how the verification conditions should look like. Relation theory/meaning theory/Schiffer: when I argued VsRelation theory, I had a standard meaning theory in mind. The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics (tr.th.sem.). Otherwise, it would be true!. Verificationist meaning theory/Verif. m.th./relation theory/Dummett/Schiffer: with a verificationist meaning theory could the relation theory maybe also be true?. I 225 Use theory/Dummett/Schiffer: for Dummett the point of use theory is: "the meaning of a word is uniquely determined by the observable characteristics of its linguistic use". (Dummett 1976, 135). SchifferVsDummett: but what counts as "observable characteristic" and what as "openly shown" ?. Does Dummett think that a description of the use in purely behavioral, non-semantic and non-psychological terms would be sufficient that a word has a specific meaning? That would be too implausible as that Dummett would accept that. Still, he notes that the description should not use any psychological or semantic terms. Meaning/Dummett/Schiffer: should therefore also become understandable for beings who have no semantic or psychological concepts themselves! So even for Marsians. (Also McDowell understands him like this, 1981, 237). McDowellVsDummett: according to Dummett it must be possible to give a description of our language behavior that is understandable for extraterrestrials. That does not work, because the intentional "(content-determining) is not reducible to the non-intentional. Content/McDowellVsDummett/SchifferVsDummett: is not detectable for extraterrestrials. ((s) Not "speechless", but only those who do not share our intentional vocabulary). I 226 Ad. 4: ("To know which recognizable circumstances determine a proposition as true or false"). Schiffer: that means how do we get from behaviorism to anti-realism?. Manifestation/SchifferVsDummett: this one makes do here even with pronounced psychological terms!. 1. Recognizing (that the conditions are met) is itself a form of knowledge, which in turn contains belief. You cannot describe that non-psychologically. 2. How can one then achieve the further conclusion that a purified attribution should ascribe a skill that can only be "openly shown"? (The showing understood behavioristically). Behaviorism/Dummett/Schiffer: However, I am not ascribing any behaviorism to Dummett, I ascribe him nothing, I just wonder what his position is. meaning theory/m.th./Dummett: thinks that natural languages have a m.th.! Their core will be recursively definable verif. cond.. Anti-Realism/Schiffer: here Dummett is uncertain whether the m.th. should have falsification conditions, but that will not affect my subsequent criticism. 1. Whether the knowledge that a state of affair exists, counts as verification of a proposition. I 227 Could depend on extralinguistic knowledge and not by the understanding of the proposition! We usually need background information. Understanding/SchifferVsDummett: then it should not be about verification conditions!. Direct verification conditions/Dummett: has to exist for each single proposition!. QuineVsDummett/Schiffer: (Quine 1953b): direct verification conditions cannot exist for every proposition. ((s) ~Theories are not verifiable proposition by proposition). 2. Surely there are meaningful propositions that have no recognizable conditions that would turn out this proposition as true or false. Dummett/Schiffer: insists, however, that a proposition must be shown as true or false and in fact "conclusively" (conclusive verifiability). (1978, 379). This leads to anti-realism. ((s) Def anti-realism/Dummett/(s): is exactly to demand that the verification must be performed in order to understand a proposition. The realism would waive the verification.) Anti-realism/Dummett: you still should not rely too heavily on the anti-realism! Because often a "conclusive verification" is not to obtain!. Schiffer: so Dummett itself holds the verification conditions contestable!. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett quotes Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behaviors can be refuted. (Dummett 1978, S. XXXV) SchifferVsDummett: then the m.th. needs contestable criteria as well as contestable conditions!. Problem: this applies to most empirical judgments E.g. "That is a dog". 3. We know what kind of semantic values we must attribute to the non-logical constants (predicates and singular term) in the conditional sentences in a truth-theoretic semantics. But how shall that look like in the alternative with verification conditions instead of truth conditions?. Solution/Dummett: the verificationist semantics will make every predicate an effective means available, so that it can be determined for each object whether the predicate applies to the object or the singular term references to the object. I 230 Relation theory/SchifferVsDummett: the by me disapproved relation theory for propositional attitudes (belief as a relation to belief objects) seems inevitable for Dummett. ((s) because of the relation of predicates to objects to which they must apply verifiable). Problem: that can only happen in a finite theory, and for propositional attitude it would have to be infinite, because for each prop the VB would have to be found individually. Relation theory/Schiffer: has to assume propositional attitude as E.g. "believes that Australians drink too much" as semantically primitive - namely, 2-figure predicate between believer and content). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Empiricism | Dummett Vs Empiricism | DummettVsEmpiricism, British: Saussure:.. "... A term triggers in the brain a particular sound. This is a psychological phenomenon which in turn is followed by a physiological process, the brain initiates a pulse on to the vocal organs, then the sound waves to the ear of the other to be transmitted, a purely physical process. I 117 DummettVsSaussure: This representation of the understanding process is obviously untenable. It mimics the equation of the British empiricists of idea and concept. (Vs). Terms are represented as mental images (ideas). Content of consciousness: private: fragrance, melody, name "idea" (no background necessary) - But not: ideas, thoughts, sense (public) - (VsBritish Empiricists: "ideas" are not terms). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Empiricism | Goodman Vs Empiricism | IV 17 Empiricism claims that knowledge depends on experience. GoodmanVs: this can be misleading: because the dependence is mutual: experience also depends on knowledge. Routine often goes unnoticed. Beliefs and expectations provide category systems. Background knowledge is almost always necessary. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Evans, G. | Verschiedene Vs Evans, G. | Frank I 571 Background/VsEvans: Question: is the following not unnecessarily involved? 1. a knowledge of what it means that any item is F, and 2. a knowledge of what it means that any object is a. The second would be a piece of knowledge of exactly the same kind as the first. So you may not have to assume that there are singular thoughts that somehow more closely contain the exercise of this knowledge and consequently you need not to have a notion of basic identification! EvansVsVs: a knowledge of what it means that something is F is a knowledge of how it is that any element of the objective order is F, and correspondingly for a. I.e. even if one were to drop the idea of basic identification, the overall picture of "I" thinking, "here" thinking and "this" thinking would be fundamentally similar: the role that the notion of the basic level played in this book would instead have been taken over by the notion of the objective or impersonal conception of the world, whereby the mastery of such thinking would be dependent upon an understanding of how it relates to the objectively viewed world. But it is not easy to tell exactly what that means: what it means to know exactly that any element is or is here or I am any element of the objective order! It is not clear what we want at all with this demand, if we do not assume that the subject formulates the truth of such statements Fra I 572 and can make decisions under favorable circumstances. It also seems that we could not make such an assumption at all: (Section 6.3 (not in this file): "Reference system": Reference System/Evans: such a thinking mode will not be able to reach a higher degree of impersonality. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Everett, H. | Putnam Vs Everett, H. | I (i) 225/226 Many Worlds Interpretation/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Everett/Putnam: should restore the "perspective of God." The universe evolves deterministically, there is no "reduction of the wave packet" (no "collapse of the wave equation"). Putnam: as a philosopher I am fascinated by that as a cultural phenomenon. I (i) 228 The space-time structure is the one of relativistic physics (hence it is so attractive for cosmologists). The logic is classical logic. Only problem: the whole speech of the "many worlds" is just a picture. I (i) 251 Another problem: how the concept of probability is to interpret if all the worlds are "equally possible". I (i) 229 PutnamVsMany worlds interpretations/PutnamVsEverett: requires signals that are faster than light. But instead of considering a "conflict between realism and locality", I'd rather go back to Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation. Realism/Quantum Mechanics/Putnam: although the debate in the past decade has been staring at the locality and Bell's Theorem, you look at these things best as the technical background of the problem. Paradox is the result, the need to recognize a cut between observer and system. I (i) 229/230 This seems paradoxical, because the old dream of the independent reality must be abandoned. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Evolution Theory | Luhmann Vs Evolution Theory | AU Cass 14 Theory of Evolution / system theory/ST / Luhmann: e. th. takes the chance to explain the totality, which ST can not. Selection / Luhmann: is not provided in the system, but arises from the context. Therefore, conceptually weak concept - becaus e.th. uses statistics instead of causality. Explanation / theory / Luhmann: other theories explain the background noise ("order from noise") as a matter for a transformation into order within the system. LuhmannVs: here is not said exactly how this is done. This is the idea that information is a native product. But how the transformation happens is not explained. Therefore we need Structural coupling. (Cass.6) Double contingency: > theory of evolution: Parallel: somehow there is a split between variation and selection and thus structural changes are encouraged, evolution suggests itself to the establishment of order. And that can not be explained from the primordial soup or "initial conditions" (also not from language or social order) alone. (No "initial conditions." This is double contingency, the invention of a reference problem for rational analysis. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Field, H. | Putnam Vs Field, H. | Field IV 405 Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam. 1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects. 2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all. Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language. Field IV 406 Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.). One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms. Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory. 3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things. VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects). Field IV 429 Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world. Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory. PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses? However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3. I: is a definite set of individuals. Williams II 430 P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P. This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism). Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique. Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory. PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then? Field/Putnam: could cover two positions: 1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or. 2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective. Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc. Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general? Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible. Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth. If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification. --- Putnam III 208 Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description". --- Putnam V 70 Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume: (1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y. Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions. Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world. V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth). ---- Putnam I (c) 93 PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Fodor, J. | Searle Vs Fodor, J. | FN I 283 SearleVsFodor: another incredible view (but with different phil. roots) states that each of us has at his birth all the terms, that can be expressed by any words of any language. Then e.g. A Cro-Magnon-man would have terms that are expressed by the word "carburetor" or "cathode-ray". (Fodor 1975)(1) III 139 Def background/Searle: Skills, like ability, dispositions, trends and causal structures in general. Ability/Searle: causal ability: E.g. when I say that I am able to speak German, I speak of a causal ability of my brain. There is no reason to identify them without knowing the details of their neurophysiological realization. (SearleVsFodor). To enable: should therefore be a causal concept. Intentional states/Searle: are not a problematic concept here. III 142 Background: Nietzsche saw with horror that the background does not have to be as it is. Cf. >Background/Searle. 1. J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York 1975 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Foucault, M. | Searle Vs Foucault, M. | I 217 Cognitive theory: here it is claimed that we would have drawn the conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognitive theory: on the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. >Background/Searle. The background is not a control system. SearleVsFoucault: that was the weakness of Foucault's concept of discourse formation (Foucault 1981)(1). He believed just as Bourdieu that rules are of such phenomena, as we discuss here. Searle: the rules interpret not themselves, to function they really need a background. >Rules/Searle, >Cognition/Searle. 1.M. Foucault Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 |
| Frege, G. | Dummett Vs Frege, G. | Brandom II 74 Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them. Brandom II 173 Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force). Dummett I 15 Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift)(1). I 51 DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference. Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply. Dummett I 61 DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color. I 63. Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker. I 64 Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises. I 79 Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained. I 90 ++ - Language/Thinking/Perception I 93 + - DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation". I 104 - Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. I 106 Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally) I 122 - DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module. I 124 + DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Friedman, M. | Fraassen Vs Friedman, M. | I 109 Theory/Fraassen: it could be argued that a theory as a whole needs to have more properties than just acceptability. Local Property/Theory/Friedman: E.g. that a theory explains a particular fact Global Property/Theory/Friedman: Science teaches more a global than a local understanding, it’s not about understanding individual phenomena. (FN 15). Explanation/Friedman: relation "theory T explains phenomenon P": in general regularities, which are represented by law-like sentences. I 110 K: is a set of law-like sentences (background theory) S: a candidate for an explanation (law, theory, hypothesis) of P P: can itself be represented by law-like sentences. Def Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff. P is a consequence S, relative to K, and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. Def Relative Consequence/Friedman/Fraassen: A is a consequence of B relative to K iff. A is consequence of a B and K together. FraassenVsFriedman: he has to modify the concept "reduces" in the following, and then he does not do anymore what Friedman needs. (FN 16). Explanation/Friedman/Fraassen: interesting about his approach: we evaluate an explanandum relative to a background K. 1) Suppose a theory contained additional information that is not law-like, E.g. the age of the universe (boundary condition), but of course it cannot contain all our knowledge. 2) relative to K implies that P (the sentence about the phenomenon) is true. I suppose that Friedman wants to weaken this Hempel-like condition in the sense of Salmon (The probability does not have to be high). 3) Problem: it is the character of K plus additional information, considered as a complex theory, that determines whether we have an explanation. ((s) I.e. it would depend on accidental previous knowledge or the age of the universe, if something is an explanation). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Grice, P.H. | Searle Vs Grice, P.H. | Bennett I 186 SearleVsGrice: Convention not the same as circumstances! Grice I 31 Searle E.g. An American Soldier in World War II is captured by Italian troops. He wants to believe the Italians do it was a German officer and expresses the single German sentence which he has kept from school yet, "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn?" ((s) Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom?, Goethe). - His captors do not understand any German at all. Searle: It would nevertheless be wrong to say that he meant by "Do you know the land...": "I am a German officer." SearleVsGrice: wants to show with by this example that something missing in Grice s explication: H should recognize that the uttered sentence is expressed conventionally to bring about a certain effect. Searle II 204 Grice : a speaker intends with an utterance, to achieve certain effects. SearleVsGrice: he then uses intention, wish and conviction unanalyzed. Searle V 68 Meaning/Grice: connects meaning to intention and recognizing the intention. V 69 SearleVsGrice: insufficient: 1., it is not determined to what extent the meaning depends on rules or conventions. 2. does not differentiate this definition between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. E.g. Searle. Lemons Example V 70 ... + ... An American soldier gets into Italian war captivity... Searle IV 53 SearleVsConversational postulates/SearleVsGrice. A shared background is sufficient. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Hanson, N.R. | Fraassen Vs Hanson, N.R. | I 127 Single Case/Single Case Causation/Explanation/Qua/Fraassen: single cases are never explained, they are only explained qua event of a certain type. Qua: E.g. we explain the disintegration of this uranium atom qua the disintegration of uranium atoms, but not qua disintegration at this moment. ((s) form: single case qua "specimen of a species" "as"). Problem: Why is one alternative preferred over another? That’s hard to explain. Solution/B. Hanson: A is a good answer to (Why P in contrast to X?) iff. the probability of P given A is higher than the average probability of elements of X (the contrast-class) given A. FraassenVsHanson: Problem: This does not preclude irrelevance: E.g. Vitamin C (see above, you also get better without it). According to Hanson, "Vitamin C" would still be a good answer. Asymmetry/Explanation/FraassenVsHanson: is still a problem: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast, E.g. Barometer/Storm according to Hanson it would be a good answer to say: "... because the barometer fell" as an answer to "Why is there a storm?". I 129 Even against a background of contrast class. Contrast Class/Fraassen: solves many of our problems, but not all. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Heidegger, M. | Habermas Vs Heidegger, M. | I 165 Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology. I 178 HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one. I 179 HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence. I 180 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence. The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation). I 182 HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason. I 183 HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Hempel, C. | Nagel, E. Vs Hempel, C. | Schurz I 93 Law of Nature/LoN/Schurz: strict spatio-temporally unlimited universal sentences are candidates for LoN. If they were true, they would express real LoN. They are called lawlike. I 94 Lawlike/Schurz: spatio-temporally unlimited E.g. All objects attract each other ((s) only true if protons, electrons, etc., are not objects.) E.g. All living things must die spatio-temporally limited: E.g. mammals in polar regions have - compared with their counterparts in warmer areas - a more rounded shape (Germann's law). Scientific/Schurz: depends on the size of the area in this case. Universal Sentence/Schurz: to avoid differences of degree they were called fundamental and derived universal sentences Def Fundamental Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: does not contain any individual constants and no spatio-temporal limitations. Def Derived Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: can be derived from background knowledge from other universal sentences together with singular starting conditions. I 95 Ernest NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsHempel: according to this, no accidental universal sentence can be a derived law: E.g. "All screws on Smith's car are rusty". Solution/Nagel: only fundamental universal sentences can be laws. Hempel: admitted this, thus the lawlikeness remains gradual! Lawlike/Statistics/Schurz: even here there is lawlikeness: E.g. 50% of all cesium-137 atoms have decayed after 30 years. E.g. 80% of all lung cancer patients used to be heavy smokers. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Holism | Millikan Vs Holism | I 10 Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning. I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism. properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world. MillikanVsNominalismus. I 13 MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed. For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories. Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid, I 14 most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not. I 67 conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other. MillikanVsHolismus. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However: Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels. I 298 Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify. Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens. I 318 Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used. I 321 Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hume, D. | Black Vs Hume, D. | III 80 Deduction/Hume/Naturalistic fallacy/Black: the core of the argument is that in a deduction nothing can follow that is not already contained in the premises. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume: but there is a way how new evaluative or normative material can appear in a valid conclusion: E.g. premise: you cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. (This can be seen as factual) But it follows now: Conclusion: if you want to make an omelet, eggs should be broken. Hume/Black: What he means is that no categorical or unconditional "should" follows. BlackVsHume: that seems convincing at first glance. But: Problem: the absence of the word "should" is not a reliable criterion. E.g. the fact that murder is a sin implies the conclusion that you should not kill. But how are we to judge based on the mere linguistic form that the premise is non-normative. Now one could say that the sentence about murder is unverifiable. III 81 Behind this are difficult questions about how we are to understand the objectives and procedures of science. Science/Black: should we see it as a special way of approaching truth, or as a discipline that shares the objectives of the whole spectrum of activities which are after the truth? BlackVsHume: his argument is circular: Thesis: I believe that certain categorical sentences with "should" have a truth value! I.e. they can be recognized as true without reference to hopes and wishes. Then Hume is mistaken if he assumes them to be different from scientific principles. Knowledge/Values/Standards/Black: Thesis: in a broader sense (beyond the narrow sense of science) knowledge can be understood in a way that some normative and evaluative sentences can be known to be true. If that is the case, Hume’s argument caves in. Then moral and practical questions can no longer be easily separated logically from scientific truths. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume/VsHume: many contemporary authors reject his argument (of the separation of science from moral sentences). III 81 Ethics/Morals/Values/Standards/Black: Thesis: regardless of whether Hume’s criticism of the naturalistic fallacy is valid, we are entitled to assume that human beings can agree on certain fundamental ethical principles regardless of their religious background. We must assume that in order for a rational discourse becoming possible at all. III 82 BlackVsNaturalistic fallacy: Then even in the case of a logical separation of factual and normative or evaluative sentences it is the introduction of certain generally acceptable non-factual premises that would enable the derivation of normative conclusions. In addition: (see below): every representation that regards scientific propositions as isolated, is one-sided. The biggest problems of neutrality are not affected by the assumed gap between the factual and the normative. If we look at science as something concrete, things look different. BlackVsNaturalistic fallacy: is one of the great half-truths or popular mistakes of Western culture. We should be wary of the following syllogism: 1) Science is a good thing 2) Science is necessarily neutral 3) Therefore scientific neutrality is a good thing. This might well be true for "bad" instead of "good". |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Evans Vs Hume, D. | Frank I 531 EvansVsHume: We have discarded the background for the perception metaphor on which Hume founds his argument. We have nothing that could be construed as a "stumbling" over perceptions. The internal states are indeed no "objects". E.g. What we become aware of when we see the tree is nothing but the tree itself. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Searle Vs Hume, D. | II 101 Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it. >Perception/Searle. II 102 Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow. II 103 Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself). II 104 Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. >Causality/Hume. ((s) Ultraviolet cannot be hallucination. But one can imagine a sunburn.) II 156 Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience! SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power. II 170 Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world. II 171 I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background. >Regularity/Hume. II 173 SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity. II 174 There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the action-causation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Internalism | Lehrer Vs Internalism | Brendel I 38 Internalism/Knowledge/Brendel: Thesis: It is demanded that there is a connection - known to the subject- to truth-producing facts. VsInternalism: Was sacrificed in Gettier's examples. I 219 LehrerVsInternalism/Brendel: But the internalist consistency of information with background information is also not yet sufficient for knowledge, e.g. evil demon. I 220 Demon/Internalism/Brendel: Thesis: The subject is justified to believe in simulation by a demon that the object (which is only simulated) stands before him. LehrerVsInternalism: E.g. suppose the demon forgets to manipulate the subject's brain cells for a moment: Internalism: Thesis: At that moment, the subject has knowledge. Lehrer: No, the subject does not have knowledge since it needs to recognize the situation. Solution/Lehrer: The background system must not contain any false assumptions. Externalism/Lehrer/Brendel: this is Lehrer's externalist component. Def Knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Unrefuted justification. 4 Adequacy Conditions: 1. p is true 2. S accepts p 3. S is fully justified to accept p 4. S is fully justified to accept p in a manner that is not based on any false statement. Coherence/Lehrer/Brendel: Thesis: The central term for Lehrer is the coherence with a system of acceptance. |
Lehr I K. Lehrer Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Kamp, H. | Stalnaker Vs Kamp, H. | II 104 Possible worlds semantics//KampVsPossible worlds semantics/KampVsStalnaker: the approach is not rich enough to represent all differences. Kamp (1988)(1) adopts an example by Barbara Partee: Example Pronoun/pronouns/anaphora/presupposition: (2) a. Exactly one of 10 balls is not in the bag b. It is under the sofa (3) a. Exactly 9 of 10 balls are in the bag b. It is under the sofa. Kamp: Suppose the discourse takes place in the same initial context. That means 1. statement: changes the context. 2. statement: is made in the changed context. II 105 Important argument: the first statements of the two pairs (2a) and (3) are truth conditionally equivalent. – that means they are true in exactly the same set of poss.w.. Context/possible world/poss.w./Kamp: if context are now sets of poss.w. and if assertions add only the truth conditional content to the context, the context will later be the same. But the contexts on the other side must surely be different in both cases because although (2b) and (3b) are the same sentence it must express different propositions in both cases. "In the second case it cannot refer to "the ball". KampVsPossible worlds semantics: if the sentences are truth conditionally equivalent no two different sets of poss.w. can be distinguished here. StalnakerVsVs: it is true that our abstract approach does not predict this difference, namely, because it says nothing about how pronouns function. Two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: is no meaning theory. StalnakerVsKamp: it is not correct that you have to conclude from the fact that the former contexts are identical that the later contexts are also identical. By this you ignore the first way how a speech act changes the context (see above II 102 above). That a statement was made at all is sufficient, together with any information that follows from it, along with a permanent background information on conventions. Thus one can distinguish two later contexts, relative to which (2b) and (3b) are interpreted. Pronoun/Stalnaker: "it" apparently requires a context in which a particular individual is prominent. II 106 Context/possible worlds semantics/StalnakerVsKamp/Stalnaker: solution: as long as the minimal assumption makes that information to determine the content may be relevant only if it is assumed by the speaker that this information is also accessible to the listener, we can be sure that the set of poss.w. that defines the presuppositions is sufficient to represent a context. An assertion changes the context already alone by the fact that it is made! (1) Kamp, Hans (1988): Comments on Stalnaker, Belief Attribution and Context. In Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (Eds.): Contents of Thought: Proceedings of the 1985 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. Tucson, University of Arizona Press. pp. 156-181. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kant | McDowell Vs Kant | I 69 Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito. McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality. I 69 Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other. I 109/110 Second Nature/(s): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education/McDowell. I 111 Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. I 122 Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world. I 123 McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background. I 126 Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm. I 127 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Kaplan, D. | Searle Vs Kaplan, D. | II 275 Indexicality/SearleVsKaplan: we need to show that the statements made by an indexical expression can have a "completing >Fregean sense". By this, however, no >third realm is postulated. We restrict ourselves to respect participating indexicals: me, you, this, that, here, now, he, she, etc .. The phenomenon of indexicality is however very general and not limited to such expressions. II 276 Background: meets the indexical function. It is in fact relative to our world. If it turned out that 80 billion years ago someone already had invented glasses, that would not affect my background. II 285 SearleVsKaplan: Hume's and Heimson's statements are self-referential. They express different intentional contents. The use of indexical expression defines the conditions under which it is true. >Heimson example. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Karttunen, L. | Stalnaker Vs Karttunen, L. | II 56 Def factive verbs/Lauri Karttunen/Stalnaker: e.g. to know, to regret, to discover, to see. non-factive verbs: e.g. to assert, to believe, to intend, faktive verbs: if V is a factive verb then x' presupposes V-en that P (and I would say also includes (entails)) that P. factive verbs/Karttunen: a) Def fully factive: here it is not only the assertion or denial of the proposition x V-t that P requires the presupposition but also the assumption (supposition) of this proposition in an antecedent or the assertion that the proposition could be true. E.g. to regret, to forget, to resent. b) Def semi-factive/Karttunen: here it is only the assertion or the denial of the proposition that requires the presupposition. E.g. Sam regrets that he voted for Nixon. If Sam regrets that he voted for Nixon he is an idiot. (fully factive). E.g. to regret something: here is strongly presupposed E.g. semi-factive: to discover, to recognize: here the presupposition is not as strong. Def strong presupposition/Karttunen/Stalnaker: if P is made necessary II 57 By MQ and M~Q then Q strongly presupposes P. Def weak presupposition/Karttunen/Stalnaker: corresponds to the normal presupposition. Strong/weak presupposition/factive/semi-factive/StalnakerVsKarttunen: I deny the theoretical approach and the clarity of the examples. E.g. When Harry discovers that his wife is making out, he will be upset. If Harry had discovered that his wife making out, he would have been upset If Harry would understand.... Explanation/StalnakerVsKarttunen: surely here is always a presupposition in play. But difference: a) if the speaker strictly assumes something ((s) explicitly) then he does not presuppose it. b) if something is questionable for the speaker he cannot assume that he already knows it. E.g. Karttunen: Did you regret - understand - note that you did not tell the truth? II 58 Pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here the restrictions on the presuppositions can be changed without the truth conditions (tr.cond.) changing so we can see differences between statements of the first and second person or between such of a third person and postulate questions without different semantic types of propositions. That means despite the differences we can say that the statements have the same semantic content. StalnakerVsSemantic approach: here we cannot say that. II 59 Compound propositions/complex sentence/presupposition/Stalnaker: how do the presuppositions behave that require a conditional to the presuppositions that are demanded by the parts of the conditional? Conjunction/conditional/presupposition/Karttunen: thesis: S be a proposition of the form A and B or of the form if A then B. a) Conjunction: S presupposes that C iff either A presupposes that C or B presupposes that C and A includes (entails) not semantically that C. That means the presuppositions of a conjunction are those that are required by one of the conjuncts minus any other presupposition that are semantically included by the other conjunct (entailment). ((s) Entailment: is truth-functional (truth-conditional)). b) Conditional: the presuppositions of the conditional are those that are either demanded by the antecedent or the consequent minus those that are required by the consequent while semantically being included by the antecedent (entails). E.g. "Harry is married and Harry's wife is a great cook". Conjunction: here the reversal of the order is not acceptable. Moreover, the second conjunct can also stand alone. Conjunction/Karttunen/Stalnaker: when we interpret his analysis semantically (truth-functional) then we have to say that this conjunction is not truth-functional because the truth values (tr.v.) depend on the entailment between the conjunction. This implicates that this "and" is not symmetrical. A and B may be wrong, while B and A is no truth value. StalnakerVsKarttunen: that would implicate more complicated rules. II 60 Solution/Stalnaker: pragmatically interpreted we need neither ad hoc semantics nor pragmatic rules Explanation: after a proposition was asserted the speaker can reasonably assume it for the rest of the conversation. That means after A has been pronounced it became part of the background before B was pronounced. Even if A was not initially presupposed, one can assert A and B, because at that time, when you come to B, the context has changed and thus A was presupposed. Conditional/pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here we must distinguish explicit assumption (supposition) of presuppositions. If-proposition: is explicit. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Searle Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 30 Names/Understanding/Searle: to understanding belongs the knowledge of one or more descriptions. Extreme case: simply identify the object. Intentional relationship. SearleVsKripke: ignores the intentionality. Searle: Use of names is "mental reference" in a network of other intentional states and against a background of practice and pre-intentional assumptions. Searle II 292 SearleVsKripke: the representation of the baptism is completely descriptive. It gives us either an intentional content in spoken form (description) or provides us ostensively with the intentional content of a perception. II 293 By the way Kripke's theory does not use any causal link between the referring use of names and the named objects. The causal chains are not pure, every speaker must also have a intentionalistic member and intend to talk about the object. SearleVsKripke: Baptism should probably not be a cause, otherwise we would declare a successful reference to a chain of successful references. That would be circular. II 294 Names/Donnellan:(similar to Kripke) postulates a "historically correct explanation", and secondly, "who that is, from whom" the speaker wants to predicate something. This requires an omniscient observer. E.g. "Socrates had a snub nose". According to Donnellan owes this obviously no fact at all, which is about us, except for the causal chain. But for what keeps the omniscient observer looking for? Searle: surely for intentional causation and content. There are always counterexamples of names that do not work this way at all. II 295 Names/Rorty: Causal theory only needs "ordinary physical causation". Names/Gareth Evans: E.g. Madagascar originally referred to a part of continental Africa. The causal chain is thus a dissenting. Why does the name then today refer to the island? II 296 Names/description/SearleVsKripke: E.g. Concise Biographical Dictionary ". Ramses VIII is a Pharaoh of a series of pharaohs in ancient times, about whom nothing is known." In reality, the example shows that a lot of him is known. Yes, he is almost from an ideal case for the most naive version of the description theory. II 346 A perfect identifying description. It is parasitic to other speakers, but it is sufficient. SearleVsCausal theory/VsKripke: it exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. Perception: is nailed to each point of the world. By causal self-referentiality of the intentional content. II 297 But with names that kind of causation does not exist (also of intentional causation). The conditions for successful use of a name can be met, even without causal connection. II 298 E.g. tribe with the taboo of talking about the dead, and baptism of newborn babies, in which all must participate. Meets descriptive theory. II 346 The teaching of names defines an intentional content, but no definition. II 300 E.g. meteorologists can predict storms. They also assign names. But the future events cannot cause the name uses. Searle IV 179 KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction speaker reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation can go to something other than that of which he speaks. IV 179/180 Searle: However, that is not quite correct: E.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfils the description. Kripke: in a given idiolect the semantic relation is determined (without indexical shares) through a general intention of the speaker. The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention. SearleVsKripke: this is precisely where the approach is stuck: in the sense, as I have general and specific intentions, I have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them. E.g.(without index): "The man who eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building on 17/06/53 at 10 am." According to Kripke in my idiolect this is determined by my general intention. IV 181 Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would be if it would be correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: More than that, no general intentions are necessary. There are an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intent. Stalnaker I 173 SearleVsKripke: (Searle 1969 (1)) it is wrong to assume that there could be a class of logically proper names, that means names that consist solely to have a certain reference for an object. It is fundamentally wrong to assume that there are signs that have only denotation without connotation I 174 SearleVsKripke/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969(2)) (like Frege): describes an axiom of identification: "a generalization of Frege's dictum that every referring expression must have a sense". I 175 And it was also an attempt to say what the skills of the speaker are. Mill/Kripke/Stalnaker: do not seem to answer that. Competence/skills/FregeVsMill/Stalnaker: Mill does not explain the speaker's skill to pick his object. Stalnaker: but that can only be reviewed seriously, if the two issues are separated (see above). 1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 93 2. Ibid. p. 80 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Lakoff, G. | Searle Vs Lakoff, G. | IV 199 Conversational Postulates/To mean/Gordon/Lakoff: SearleVs: represents the phenomena that require explanation is as if they themselves were already the explanation. Problem: how can the speaker say something and still mean something else? (to mean) IV 201 Conversational Postulates: shall additional rules be known in addition to the three rules (the introduction, the seriousness and the propositional content): for example, to conclude from one speech act to another. Searle: they assume that the patterns are the solution itself. IV 202 They reveal a pattern, according to which for example a speaker asks the listener for something, by asking the listener if he can do something. E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?". To explain this, they simply give a new description, they say, the speaker knows a rule. Searle: as with Ross, an unnecessary assumption is made to explain the data. It is completely ad hoc to say, in addition to all the knowledge conversational postulates would still have to exist. In reality, it would then be such conversational postulates that would have to be explained. IV 203 Searle: what the listener needs is speech act theory, a theory of conversation, background information and rationality and reasoning skill. Each of these components is independently motivated, that means apart from whatever theory of indirect speech acts, we have evidence that the speaker/listener has these features. IV 204 SearleVsGordon/SearleVsLakoff: their rules do not work that way! They call it "failed" that no question is meant. (E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?"). Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: is often said following Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Its unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we come from sounds to acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Linguisticism | Field Vs Linguisticism | II 163 Vs Quasi-Translation/Truth Conditions/tr.cond./Truth/Linguistic View/Field: One could argue that you need additional premises to say that "snow is white" means that it is true that snow is white. But this will be trivial for our own sentence and it will not imply that our own sentence is only true if snow is white. Therefore, it could be argued that the linguistic point of view leaves out a key feature in the attribution of meanings: the truth conditions! Equally it can be said that the attribution of meaning to singular terms or predicates, which does not rely on the conditions under which he or it refers at all, leaves out something important. FieldVsVs: I do not see why the uncontested background assumption. II 164 That "snow is white" is true iff snow is white should not be sufficient. But even if not: Solution/Field: disquotational truth (+ disquotational reference, etc.): according to this view, the Tarski scheme expresses no contingent empirical truth. (accordingly for reference): E.g. "teacher of Alexander" only refers to something if the person was a teacher of Alexander. This is not an empirical coincidence. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Modal Logic | Quine Vs Modal Logic | Chisholm II 185 QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants). --- Lewis IV 32 QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description. QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic. LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial. --- I 338 But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic. Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity. --- I 339 (1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows: (2) "9 > 4" is analytically. It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction: "If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)" if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional. C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication". Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable. --- I 339 Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator. If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all. --- I 340 An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate? --- I 341 It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4 Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque. The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other. Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent. (4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw). --- I 342 (This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p". Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is: (5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x as (6) x = y and x exclusively then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6): (7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y) However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p. --- I 343 The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. --- I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret (8) [9 > 4] is necessary (Brackets for class) and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction. One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible. --- I 344 Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9. This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets". This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say (§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II). But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object. E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified? Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary. --- I 344 Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent. Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.) --- I 345 But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality. There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define "P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))". Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties. But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic. --- VI 41 Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators. Quine: without modal operators: E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future." ((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx). Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators. --- VI 102 Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. --- VI 103 Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence). --- VI 104 QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. --- XI 52 QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. --- XI 53 Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity. 2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p" 3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Moore, G.E. | Searle Vs Moore, G.E. | III 191 SearleVsMoore: the existence of the outside world is a truth condition of the statement that I have two hands. Difference: between truth conditions and conditions of intelligibility .. There intelligibility conditions of discourse. They are essential to our way of thinking and our language. We cannot give them up, as the idea that the earth is flat. (> Conditions of understanding, understanding condition). III 193 Similarly, the external realism is not a hypothesis, but a condition of the intelligibility of other theories. It creates a space of possibilities. Background/SearleVsMoore: we keep it for granted that his hands are in a certain relation to the rest of his body. You are not in a safe deposit box. We simply take this for granted. >Certainty, >Moore's Hands, >skepticism. III 195 The joke is that we keep a lot in our normal understanding for granted, but many of the conditions of our normal understanding cannot be conceived without substantial distortion as truth conditions of the utterance. These are the kinds of conditions that will help us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. They themselves are not part of this truth conditions. V 264 naturalistic fallacy/SearleVsMoore: the being may well be derived from the ought: a statem 1. Jones expressed, "I hereby promise you, Smith, to pay $ 5." Jones is obliged - Jones has to...Cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Neutrality | Black Vs Neutrality | III 84 Neutrality/Science/BlackVsNeutrality/BlackVsValue freedom: if science is considered to be rational in the sense of neutral, it runs the risk of becoming inhuman. It must instead be regarded as a human action. III 84 Neutrality/Robert L. Heilbroner: (sociologist, NY Times Magazine, 19 Jan 1975 p. 14f.): Brings an example by Adam Smith: Adam Smith: E.g. why would a person with a humanistic background, when facing the choice of seinding one million Chinese to death in order to save his little finger, let the Chinese live? (BlackVsSmith: Actually, why Chinese, why not Scots?) Heilbroner/Black: remains remarkably neutral! He believes that there is "no rational answer" to that! One cannot apply a logical calculus to it. BlackVsHeilbroner: Apparently, he did not read the very differentiated magazine in which he had the opportunity to publish carefully. Could anyone be in doubt about giving a human life for the salvation of a little finger?. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Operationalism | Putnam Vs Operationalism | V 50 Operationalism: clumsy agreement: when the needle of the voltmeter is deflected, current flows. PutnamVsOperationalism: 1. The connections between theory and experience (read) are probabilistic and cannot be properly formalized as perfect correlations. (Background noise, etc.). 2. Even these probabilistic connections are not simple semantic correlations but depend on the empirical theory, which is exposed to the revision. According to the naive operationalism the terms undergo each time a change of meaning when a new test procedure is developed. There is an operational notion after which theories are tested sentence after sentence. --- V 51 Solution: one can formulate the class of permissible to be accepted interpretations so that the sentence S is mostly true. (Attenuation). The ideal set of operational preconditions is what we gradually approach in the course of empirical research, and not something that we just agree on. E.g. a "permissible interpretation" is such that different effects always have different causes. --- V 70 Re-interpretation/language/PutnamVsOperationalism: the whole problem only arises when the permissible interpretations are only picked out by operational or theoretical preconditions. The embarrassing thereto is that operational plus theoretical preconditions represent the natural process. What remains is the looseness of the relationship between truth conditions and reference. --- V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not useful. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be a relation in each permissable model and it will nothing contribute to reduce the number of permissable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: but this cannot necessarily be expressed in that you simply pronounce (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wants to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view, whereby is it then made true? How is a particular correspondence R discarded? It appears, the fact that R is really the reference, should be a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if reference to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke 'metaphysically necessary' truth). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Operationalism | Kanitscheider Vs Operationalism | I 218f Theory/Kanitscheider: the preparation of empirical data requires a considerable theoretical background. Operationalism/Definition/Measuring/KanitscheiderVsOperationalism: the so-called operational definitions do not actually exist, because a measuring rule can only be described by a series of sentences, but never by a single term! I 220 Def Measuring/Def Definition/Kanitscheider: Measuring is a theory-supported, empirical process while defining is a conceptual activity performed within a theory. The meaning of a theoretical term can only be elucidated by a semantic investigation. The measurement already assigns numerical values to metric quantities with factual reference, which are represented by a certain function. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Popper, K. | Hacking Vs Popper, K. | I 209 HackingVsPopper: I prefer the texts in which he called the "Third World" the world of libraries stored in books and magazines - the tables, data and computer memories. These are non-platonically real. Hacking: Not independent of the grading by experts. Not autonomous. I 265 HackingVsPopper: E.g. Davy: if he had said: "Aha, so that s oxygen", it would have been an interpretation, but he did not say it! E.g. the discovery of the background radiation was made while they sought something else (or nothing specific). Penzias and Wilson have not refuted a different theory, but simply explored the universe! |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Popper, K. | Schurz Vs Popper, K. | I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: the subjective probabilities must agree with them when the objective probabilities are known. Lewis: (1980): singular principal principle: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear which property a singular propensity should correspond to at all. Solution/de Finetti: you can also accept the objective probability concept at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on any experience date E(b1...bn) about other individuals b1,...bn it is important to derive two further versions of the principal principle: 1. Principal Principle for random samples used for the subjective justification of statistical likelihood intuition 2. The conditional principal principle, for the principle of narrowest reference class and the inductive statistical specialization conclusion is subject. Principal Principle: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r Principal Principle for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk mal (1 r)n-k. Conditional Principal Principle: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,…bn)) = r. Principal Principle: is only useful for subjective a priori probabilities. I.e. belief degrees of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual Belief Degree/Belief Degree: the principle does not apply generally for it: for example if the coin is already showing head (=Fa) the belief degree of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. Apriori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedens of a conditional probability statement w( - I W). actual: = personalistic. apriori probability: connection with updated probability function: Strict Conditionalization/Schurz: w0 is the a priori probability or probability to t0 and w1 the current probability. I 116 Wt is the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A applies: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Narrowest reference class/n.r.c./Principle/Schurz: can be justified as follows: for a given event Fa, the individual can belong to a great many reference classes that assign very different probabilities to Fx. Then we got contradictory predictions. Question: but why should the appropriate reference class be the narrowest? Because one can prove that it maximizes the frequency value of true predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Positivism | Feyerabend Vs Positivism | I 364 Vienna Circle: one finds the empirical content of a theory by looking into how much of it can be translated into an ideal language whose empirical properties are easily recognizable. FeyerabendVsIdeal Language: An ideal language is not achieved easily. Even the first steps lead to problems which are unknown in physics. I 366 Experiment: why should there be a terminology in which one can say that the same experiment confirms one theory and refutes the other? II 80 Vienna Circle/"Formal Speech"/Translation: E.g. question Is the world finite or infinite? In the "translation" we no longer speak of a property of the world, but of a property of sequences of explanations. So either one fundamental explanation or a never-ending sequence of explanations. FeyerabendVs: If one forgets the cosmological background (and that happens easily with philosophers) - then the matter is already decided: there are no "fundamental or ultimate" explanations. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Putnam, H. | Searle Vs Putnam, H. | Searle passim Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself. Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind. I 34 SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena. II 91 Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command. II 92 SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes: 1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit. 2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation. Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality. 1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions. 2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions. 3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background). II 93 Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background. (...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different? II 97 TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them! The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality). II 250 SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to. II 251 SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension! SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension. Searle: it is for the experts to decide. Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge. II 257 SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure. II 257/258 SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong. Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions. II 259 Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions. Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending). III 173 SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations. 2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS). Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two. SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Einstein Vs Quantum Mechanics | Esfeld I 256 Incompleteness/Quantum Mechanics/QM/EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics: For example, suppose two electrons are emitted from one source and move away with opposite spin in opposite directions. Overall state: singlet state. Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen/EPR: if the result of a measurement of the location or momentum of one system is given, then we can predict with certainty the result of the measurement of the same observables of the other system. (without intervention) I 257 Consequence: the quantum mechanics is incomplete. There is therefore an element of reality that corresponds to this physical quantity regardless of whether the second measurement is actually performed. This exists before the first measurement. The quantum mechanics is incomplete because it makes everything dependent on the measurement and therefore does not recognize this element. To justify this one needs the two principles of separability and local effect. Local Effect: to exclude that there is an interaction between the measurement on the first system and the reality on the second system. Separability: to exclude that the determination of the local properties depends on something other than the state the system is in. Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics: further conclusion: quantum systems simultaneously have a definite numerical value of two or more incompatible observables. I 258 For example, an experimenter only decides clearly after the emission which observable he wants to measure. Separability and local effect imply that this decision is irrelevant. Nevertheless, once the decision has been made, we can predict the value of the corresponding observable for the other system. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: therefore the two systems must have a definite value of all observables between which the experimenter can choose. Einstein did not consider this conclusion to be self-evident because it is based on the assumption of separability and the local effect. I 271/272 Metaphysics/Science/Esfeld: Separability and local effect are metaphysical principles in the sense that they are a precise formulation of assumptions that are at the center of our everyday view of nature. I 271/272 The question of whether quantum mechanics is complete also seems to be a metaphysical question. It depends on whether we underline separability and local effect as the foundation of science. Bell's inequality/Bell/Esfeld: Bell has eliminated the seemingly clear distinction between physics and metaphysics! Metaphysics: Einstein's realism shows that metaphysics has predictable consequences that can be tested. "Experimental Metaphysics"/Shimony: (Ferdinand Gonseth, 1948, Michele Besso, 1948): are similar to Quine's position: rejection of the separation between mathematics, science, and philosophy. Every element of our knowledge can be subject to revision. I 273 Thesis: metaphysical questions cannot be decided by experiments! On the contrary: EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics must be understood in the sense of the Quine-Duhem-Thesis: no separation between metaphysics and physics in quantum mechanics. For example, Bell's experiments can be seen as a test of two hypotheses, namely the conjunction of parameter independence and result independence. But the point is: what you think is what the Bell experiments confirm or disprove depends on what background assumptions you base yourself on. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 216 Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics/EPRVsQM/Genz: incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics: Spin has an element of reality. Since quantum mechanics can only consider one of these elements of reality, it is incomplete. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument/Version Bohm: For example, a part of it rests in the laboratory and decays in a time interval into an electron and a positron. (There is no such thing, but it does not matter). (In the real experiment (Aspect) photons were assumed). If Gretel detects the electron, she can be sure that Hänsel has the positron. From a quantum mechanical point of view, the particle pair is a single system. VIII 216 The angular momentum of the particle decaying in its resting system is zero, since the conservation law applies to the angular momentum, it is also zero for the decay products. If, however, only the spins of the particles contribute to their total angular momentum, the law of conservation becomes a conservation law for the sum of the spins. Consequently, the two spins remain coupled. But now the coupling of the spins to the total spin zero guarantees more: that the sum of the settings of the spins in any direction is zero. If the total spin were not zero, it could be that it is zero in x direction, but not in y direction. VIII 217 Example Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bohm: Problem: Gretel can align her star Gerlach apparatus as she wants. The alignment of the device determines which component of the spin of the entering particle should have a "sharp" value with spin 1/2. Hänsel and Gretel choose directions for x or y (perpendicular to the direction of propagation z). Since the two particles fly apart, the chirality is different! Both now want to measure "transversal" spins perpendicular to the extension. VIII 218 Gretel: measures in x direction plus or minus. If she turns the apparatus by 90°, she measures in y direction, again plus or minus. N.B.: Hänsel always measures the opposite. If Gretel has the apparatus in the same direction as Hänsel, she measures the opposite of his spin. If she now turns it in y direction, she has to measure the opposite again, even if Hänsel has not turned his apparatus. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: now claim that Gretel can use it to determine Hänsel's spin in both the x and y directions without disturbing Hänsel's positron in any way. Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: actually it is not the case according to quantum mechanics. Before the measurement it is pointless to speak of a state at all. VIII 219 Bertlmann's Socks/Genz: are not particularly exciting. Corresponds to the "glove correlation": if I find one, I know that I have lost the other. VIII 220 Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: also the spin operators of the positron do not exchange with each other, but a statement about the "sum" is valid: σxσy - σyσx = 2iσz. Translated into the formalism of quantum mechanics, the conclusion of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen is that the state | > of the positron must be both an eigenstate of σx and of σy for certain eigenvalues mx and my. But the quantum mechanics does not know such a state! Unlike the product of operators, the product of eigenvalues is independent of the order! 0 = (mxmy - mymx) | ψ > = (σxσy - σyσx) | ψ > = 2iσz | ψ >, so that | ψ > of σz would have to be destroyed (σy | ψ > = 0). But because σz, just like σx, and σy can have only 1 and -1 but not 0 as eigenvalue, there can be no such state! But the contradiction is one between the formalism of quantum mechanics and the demands of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and none with experimentally verifiable statements. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Esfeld I 62 FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both. Fodor II 114 Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar. Fodor/Lepore IV 54 Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely: IV 52 Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.). IV 76/77 Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note IV 237 13> IV 157 o Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!. IV 218 Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson I 55 CreswellVsQuine: he had a realm of reified experiences or phenomena facing an unexplored reality. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III) Kanitscheider II 23 Ontology/language/human/Kanitschneider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism. KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology more as a research programme. Quine VI 36 VsQuine: I've been told that the question "What is there?" is always a question of fact and not just a linguistic problem. That is correct. QuineVsVs: but saying or assuming what there is remains a linguistic matter and here the bound variables are in place. VI 51 Meaning/Quine: the search for it should start with the whole sentences. VsQuine: the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation leads directly to behaviorism. Others: it leads to a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's own behaviorism. VI 52 Translation Indeterminacy/Quine: it actually leads to behaviorism, which there is no way around. Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology one still has the choice whether one wants to be a behaviorist, in linguistics one is forced to be one. One acquires language through the behavior of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation. It literally does not matter what other kind psychological life is! Semantics/Quine: therefore no more will be able to enter into the semantic meaning than what can also be inferred from perceptible behaviour in observable situations Quine XI 146 Deputy function/Quine/Lauener: does not have to be unambiguous at all. E.g. characterisation of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V so that both the objects of U and their substitutes are included in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be represented as background theory within which their own ontological reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is no reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we can assume U for the duration of the argument. (>Ontology/Reduction). Lauener: this brings us to ontological relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires an overcountable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. For this one needed a much stronger frame theory, which then could no longer be discussed away as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. Quine X 83 Logical Truth/Validity/Quine: our insertion definitions (sentences instead of sets) use a concept of truth and fulfillment that goes beyond the framework of object language. This dependence on the concept of ((s) simple) truth, by the way, would also concern the model definition of validity and logical truth. Therefore we have reason to look at a 3rd possibility of the definition of validity and logical truth: it gets by without the concepts of truth and fulfillment: we need the completeness theorem ((s) >provability). Solution: we can simply define the steps that form a complete method of proof and then: Def Valid Schema/Quine: is one that can be proven with such steps. Def Logically True/Quine: as before: a sentence resulting from a valid schema by inserting it instead of its simple sentences. Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the propositions, X 84 namely those that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods generate true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the sentence generated by these proofs. 1st VsQuine: this tends to trigger protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of evidence" is uninteresting in itself. It is interesting only because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth! 2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by referring to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its ground. It becomes empty of content. QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: The sentence of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all! Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place. Equivalence/Quine: important are theorems, which state an equivalence between quite different formulations of a concept - here the logical truth. Which formulation is then called the official definition is less important. But even mere terms can be better or worse. Validity/logical truth/definition/Quine: the elementary definition has the advantage that it is relevant for more neighboring problems. 3. VsQuine: with the great arbitrariness of the choice of the evidence procedure it cannot be excluded that the essence of the logical truth is not grasped. QuineVsVs: how arbitrary is the choice actually? It describes the procedure and talks about strings of characters. In this respect it corresponds to the sentence. Insertion definition: it moves effectively at the level of the elementary number theory. And it stays at the level, while the other definition uses the concept of truth. That is a big difference. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Russell, B. | Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a space-time order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Searle, J.R. | Davidson Vs Searle, J.R. | Davidson I (b) 36 John Searle: It is incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to interpret one and the same thought or utterance of a person properly. I (b) 36 DavidsonVsSearle: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. I (b) 37 The threat which Searle and Fodor believe to recognize is a completely different one: one with regard to the condition according to which the meanings intended for the identification of thoughts used entities are somehow "captured" by consciousness so that they themselves would have to point out the thoughts as different, as long as these entities are different. DavidsonVsSearle: E.g. as if the difference between 1 meter and 100 centimeters was a difference in tape measure itself. Searle II 149 Causality/Searle: From this follows that causal laws express contingent truths!. DavidsonVsSearle: therefore, it depends only on the description whether events are logically linked or not. Searle IV 98 Metaphor/Searle: Problem: that with some metaphors such as: E.g. "Sally is a block of ice" we know exactly what is meant, but for others E.g. "Sally is a prime number 17-23" we know it less. Question: how can speakers saying something if they do not say what they mean? And why do some metaphors work and others do not?. Divergence of utterance meaning and word meaning. Recognized by speaker and listeners. (DavidsonVsSearle). IV 99 Even the relation between word and sentence meaning plays a role. Metaphorical meaning is always the utterance meaning. IV 116 Metaphor/Cavell: E.g. "Juliet is the sun": the day begins with Juliet: Searle: here, background knowledge about the work is necessary. Similarity/Searle: meaningless predicate: all objects are similar in one respect or another. IV 117 There are many metaphors in which similarity does not play a role at all: sun gas ball, block of ice human Nevertheless, E.g. "Sally is a bonfire" is a very different statement than "She’s a block of ice". IV 118 Comparison theoryVsSearle: "cold" is also metaphorical. SearleVsVs: this does not sting, the difficulty is that there are apparently no literal similarities between unfeeling humans and cold objects. IV 120 The sole fact that theory is so difficult to explain makes it implausible. Nevertheless, it is no difficulty for a native speaker to understand "Sam is a pig". It does not help to say that sweet things and sweet people are pleasant. IV 107 SearleVsComparison theories: allegedly, metaphors contain a comparison or a similarity between objects which is alluded to. IV 109 Searle: absurd question: E.g. "With which block of ice do you compare Sally?". IV 110 Searle: although similarity plays a role in understanding, the metaphor is not a finding about a similarity. A metaphor can remain true, even if the similarity turns out to be wrong. (for example, because gorillas are gentle). IV 111 Solution: The statement is only about Richard. The truth conditions are not helpful either if gorillas are gentle and Richard is cold. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Rorty Vs Searle, J.R. | VI 109 Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty. VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element. Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality. VI 121 Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic. VI 140 RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling"). Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. VI 157 RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity"). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Skepticism | Searle Vs Skepticism | II 105 VsSkepticism: we can know how the world is, but our concept of how it is, is even relative to our nature and our causal transactions with it. (background). Realism/Searle: even our concept of how things themselves are is relative to our ability to receive causal effects of a world that mostly exists regardless of how we represent it. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Steady State Theory | Verschiedene Vs Steady State Theory | Kanitscheider I 359 Steady State Theory/SST/Bondi/Kanitscheider: Thesis: Priority of cosmology over local physics. Bondi's Thesis: the unclear complexity of the phenomenon world is only one property of the mesocosm. I 360 VsSST: incompatible with our empiricism: a static universe has long been in thermodynamic equilibrium. All development would already have reached its final state. It would no longer be possible to determine the direction of the time flow. Of the two types of motion allowed by Perfect Cosmological Principle, expansion and contraction, contraction is already eliminated because the necessary excess of radiation in relation to matter is lacking. For expansion, however, the steady state theory now needs the assumption of constant additional generation of matter. But this overrides the important principle of hydrodynamic continuity! I 361 However, at the current values for density and recession constant (distance movement of galaxies from each other), the origin of matter would only be one H atom per litre every 5x10 exp 11 years. Conservation of Matter/BondiVsVs: he even believes he can save the conservation of matter. He says that in a certain, observable area, seen globally, the observable amount of matter does not change, i.e. that in a constant eigenvolume matter is preserved, in contrast to the relativistic models, where the conservation applies rather to the coordinate volume. The Def Eigenvolume is the part of space that is fixed by a fixed distance from the observer, while the Def coordinate volume is given by the constancy of the com mobile coordinates. I 362 Steady State Theory/SST: here there is always the same amount of matter within the range of a certain telescope, while here the relativity theory assumes a dilution, i.e. the matter remains the same in the expanding volume. At the SST, the new formation ensures that the total amount of all observable matter remains the same. Observer/SST: when investigating motion, each observer can perceive a preferred direction of motion apart from local deviations, whereby he determines the constant relationship between velocity and distance completely symmetrically within a small range. In relativistic cosmology this was the starting point for the Weyl principle. Def Weyl-Principle: Postulate: the particles of a substrate (galaxies) lie in spacetime on a bundle of geodesists that start from a point in the past (Big Bang) and never intersect except at this point. From this follows the existence of a family of hyperplanes (t = const) orthogonal to these geodesists and the only parameters possessing cosmic time. I 362/363 Bondi/SST/Steady State Theory: doubts now that in view of the scattering of the fog movement these hyperplanes exist secured. Because of its stationary character, SST does not need Weyl's postulate and can define homogeneity without cosmic time. Thermodynamic imbalance/universe/SST: Explanation: a photon emanating from a star has a very long free path and reaches areas with strongly changed local motion. This shifts its frequency to red. However, the thermal energy it gives off on its way to the surrounding matter is only a very small part of that lost by its original star. Thus the universe represents a kind of cosmic sink for radiant energy. According to the Perfect Cosmological Principle, sources must exist that make up for the loss. Perfect Cosmological Principle: is logically compatible with three types of universes: 1. Static, without new creation of matter, 2. Expanding, with new development I 364 3. Collapsing, with destruction of matter SST/Bondi: believes in the strict relationship between distance and speed R'(t)/R(t) = 1/T. This results in R as an exponential function and the metric of the SST takes the form of the line element of de Sitter. (see above). Already the self-similarity of the scale function shows the basic metric properties of this model. It is not possible for us to recognize at which point of the curve R = et/T we are. The universe has no beginning and no end. I 365 Age/Universe/SST: Advantage over relativistic theories where the inverse Hubble constant led to a too low age. Metric/SST: while the de Sitter metric is unusable in Einstein's representation because it can only be reconciled with vanishing matter, this problem does not occur in the SST: here there is no necessary connection between physical geometry and matter content of space! According to the de Sitter structure, the world has an event horizon, i.e. every clock on a distant galaxy follows in such a way that there is a point in its history after which the emitted light can no longer reach a distant observer. If, however, a particle has formed within the range that can in principle be reached with ideal instruments, then it can never disappear from its field of view. I 367 Perfect Cosmological Principle: Problem: lies in the statistical character, which applies strictly on a cosmic scale, but not locally, whereby the local environment only ends beyond the galaxy clusters. Steady State Theory/SST/Hoyle: starts from the classical field equations, but changes them so strongly that all Bondi and Gold results that they have drawn from the Perfect Cosmological Principle remain valid. Hoyle/SST: Thesis: In nature a class of preferred directions can obviously be observed in the large-scale movements, which makes a covariant treatment impossible! Only a preferred class of observers sees the universe in the same way. I 368 Weyl Principle/Postulate: defines a unique relationship of each event P to the origin O. It cannot be a strict law of nature, since it is constantly violated in the local area by its own movements! Hoyle: (formula, tensors, + I 368). Through multiple differentiation symmetric tensor field, energy conservation does not apply, matter must constantly arise anew. Matter emergence/SST/Hoyle: there is an interpretation of matter origin caused by negative pressure in the universe. It should then be interpreted as work that this pressure does during expansion! VsSST: the synchronisation of expansion and origin is just as incomprehensible from theory as the fact that it is always matter and not antimatter that arises. (...+ formula, other choice of the coupling constant I 371/72). I 373 Negative Energy: it has been shown to cause the formation rate of particle pairs to "run away": infinite number in finite region. VsSST/Empiricism: many data spoke against the SST: excess of distant and thus early radio sources, redshift of the quasars indicating a slowdown of expansion, background radiation. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Swinburne, R. | Mackie Vs Swinburne, R. | Stegmüller IV 405 Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed? The data have to be taken from background knowledge. IV 406 Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses: a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe b) That there is a God. Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe. Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not. proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely". A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely! If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God. IV 407 proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity. MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities. 2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world? 3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities). IV 408 4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence". Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more. IV 425/426 Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious. Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation! 1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation. 2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism 3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Theory Ladenness | Wright Vs Theory Ladenness | I 204 Fashionable Thought/Realism/Theory/Science/WrightVs: every observation is "theory laden". Perception/Theory: 1. Observation equals perception, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensory perception, because it is conceptually coined. (McDowell pro). This now provides a good basis for the view that the conceptual equipment of the subjects is different. I 205 2. Every pre-philosophical utterance about the material world reaches beyond experience in an infinite number of ways. 3. The coverage of terms does not consist merely in classifying. They contain the possession of beliefs. (e.g. that things form a species at all). WrightVs: that is certainly all right. The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not, however, be to question the opposition between data and theory. I 206 Concept/Wright: a) Beliefs should not be assumed a priori for the concepts. This is not appropriate. Concepts are constantly in danger of being refuted by experience. b) The everyday content of experience is not an obstacle for pre-theoretical data. It can always happen that one agrees to an experience pattern against his background beliefs, even if this can be cancelled later again. Theoreticity of Contemplation/Theory/Wright: 4. The kind of theory ladenness needed to get the distinction data/theory into difficulties is rather the following(see above): It must be shown that the conditions for assertion (assertibility) are necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experiences, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs. I 207 WrightVsTheoreticity of Observation/VsTheory Ladenness/Wright: if all observation theory is laden, there are no statements to which any subject is obliged to agree. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section). Wright: the justified assertiveness is rather a four-digit relation between: Statement - Subject - Course of Experience - Background Assumptions. I 208 Theory/Observation: Example A and B disagree on the stature of a theory Ho based on the observation Oo. B evaluates the same observations under a theory H1. A agrees that if H1 is accepted, his experience does not give enough reasons to accept Oo. Then it is not about vagueness, it is about status. This status question continues now, if it is about H1 instead of Ho: B accepts H1 because of O1, but A represents a theory H2...(I 209+) about O1. I 209 The other agrees that, if the other theory applies, the reaction of the other is appropriate. Divergence on each point, but agreement on conditional acceptability. I 210 We determine that the respective observation reports are correct in terms of experience and background theory. If everyone works with incorrect data, the result is that they create their reports in the context of an incorrect background theory. If he works with materially incomplete data, he necessarily works with a true background theory, which he does not agree with! Problem: can it be certainly considered a priori that there are nevertheless cognitive deficits regarding the theoretical background obligations? (Can only mean that one accepts a wrong theory). Evidence: whether a theory is erroneous or flawless must now (see above) at least in principle be recognizable! Such a confirmation, however, could ultimately only be provided by independently credible data. (VsTheory-ladenness of observation). I 211 However, the example shows the possibility that this remains undecidable. Vs: the relationship between experience and observation reports can plausibly be described as that of a "positive presumption". I.e. it is not as if experience tends to confirm or refute a report only in the context of appropriate empirical background beliefs, there is rather a Def default relation of confirmation between experiences and statements. Example "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification insofar as it concerns the color. An appropriate justification by experience can be overridden in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but is otherwise presumably valid. ((s) As long as nothing else "appears"). Question: can one now assume cognitive deficiency after all? A theorist who accepts O n 1 may either do so because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or he may prejudice the validity of the evidence. If now there is no other support for Hn, the assumption of Hn by the first theorist remains unjustified, and the denial in law. I 212 VsVs: this does not take into account that the regress of theories can interlock backwards. Therefore, one cannot claim that both theorists are to blame either for defending unsupported theories or for being cognitively deficient. Problem: Evidence/Theory/Observation: if the truth is limited by evidence and all observation is theory laden, then differences of opinion cannot certainly be traced back to cognitive deficiencies. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Tradition | Putnam Vs Tradition | Nozick II 261 Proof/hypotheses/Nozick: the connection is conditional (subjunktivisch), and thus a real relation in the world. Tradition instead sees a logical connection therein. That is, if it exists at all, it is of necessity. PutnamVsTradition: such a view assumes (unrealistically) that proof is assessed by an ideal theory. Nozick: whether e is a testament to h, depends on what other theories we accept that relate e and h. II. 262 Can't we simply treat "evidence of" as a formal logical relation by making the background theories explicit? Vs: 1. It is not clear whether the background theories include the counterfactual conditionals. 2. where are they to be installed? If into the proof, then there will be an e' etc. (recourse). Also, if the background theories apply and thus the relations between e and h are secured, the background theories may in turn be embedded in a wider context ... (FN 90). Contingency: counterfactual conditional is not adequately treated by the two relativities of inductive logic: 1. that probability is relative to the evidence, and 2. that there must be a principle of total evidence, which is applied to the probability statements. Def evidence/Nozick: Another attempt made by inductive logicians: the data e are proof for what they explain. (FN 91). NozickVs: there are many examples of evidence relations that are not explanatory. Ex lightning is a proof that the bang of thunder will follow, but none explains the other. Ex a symptom of a particular disease is evidence of the presence of other symptoms, but none explains the other. Each is explained by a third. II 263 Nevertheless, if there is a statistical law, then each is evidence of the other. Nozick: but that does not depend on the formal properties of e, but on deeper theories. But aren't there very general contingent truths, by virtue of which conditional or statistical relations between statements apply? Ex Keynes' principle of limited variance or principles of the uniformity of nature can be viewed as an attempt to establish something like that. (FN 92). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Tradition | Searle Vs Tradition | II 28 Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation. II 49 SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience! SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength. II 190 Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski. II 191 This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained. II 192 They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently! The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states. II 228 Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. " II 231 According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.) II 232 SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name. II 233 E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical). II 246 de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states. III 165 Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true! Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects). V 176 Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology. IV 155 Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of background assumptions without being ambiguous. ((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation). IV 156 SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence. IV 157 There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Cartwright Vs Various Authors | I 79 Mathematical explanation/Quantum damping/Agarwal: Important argument: There are six different approaches here with six different equations! (>Redundancy, alternative explanation). I 80 For example, There are various versions of the Schroedinger equation. I 81 Equation/Theoretical explanation/Laws/Cartwright: Thesis: these (alternative, redundant) explanations do not determine any objective laws. Equations/CartwrightVsAgarwal: the alternative equations are in competition with each other. They offer a variety of laws for the same phenomenon. AgarwalVsCartwright: he thinks that different approaches serve different purposes. That means they do not compete. I 94 Laws/Include/Explanation/Laws of Nature/LoN/Grünbaum: ("Science and Ideology", The Scientific Monthly, July 1954, p 13-19): while a more comprehensive law G contains a less comprehensive law L, and thus provides an explanation, it is not the cause of L. Laws are not explained by showing that the regularities which they assert arise from a causation, but that their truth is a special case of a more comprehensive truth. CartwrightVsGrünbaum: In this, it is assumed that the fundamental laws make the same assertions as the concrete ones which explain them. I 95 This then depends on the phenomenological laws being derived from the fundamental ones (>deduction >deductive) if the situation is specified. If the phenomenological laws are right, then the fundamental ones are too, at least in that situation. Problem: there is still a problem of induction: do the fundamental laws make correct generalizations about situations? Explanatory laws/Explanation/Cartwright: the explanatory laws are to explain the phenomenological ones and therefore a variety of other phenomenological laws in other situations. But they are much more economical (because they do not need to specify the special situations). Measuring/Reality/Realistic/Real/Cartwright: if we want to know which properties are real in a theory, we must look for the causal role. I 182 Measuring/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Problem: the static values of dynamic variables have no effect. Only if systems exchange energy, momentum or another conserved quantity, something happens in the QM. E.g. knowing the position of a particle, does not say anything about his future conduct. The detector only responds to a change in energy. Measuring/QM/Henry Margenau/Cartwright: (Margenau, Phil.of Science 4 (1937) p 352-6): Thesis: all measurements in QM are ultimately position measurements. Cartwright: but position measurements themselves are ultimately registrations of interactions at the destruction. This is inelastic, that is, the energy is not conserved in the particles. That means the detector absorbs the energy of the particle. This causes the detector to be ionized. Transitional prob/CartwrightVsMargenau: Solution: So it’s about the prob that the ionization of the detector takes place. Problem: there could be background radiation which causes the ionization without particles. Or, conversely, the disc could be ineffective, so that the energy of the particle is not registered. I 183 Problem/Cartwright: Another problem: the energy must be adequate. This could lead to inconsistencies. Soret effect: here we only need to assume simple linear additivity in our law of action, and we obtain a cross-over effect by adding a thermal diffusion factor to Fick’s law. Unfortunately this does not work for any random influences in the "Transport Theory" (heat transfer, etc.). I 65 Cross-over effect/Cartwright:. There is only one failed attempt to establish general principles for cross-over effects: by Onsager, 1931, further developed in the 1950s. But this was merely a Procrustes-like attempt that explains nothing new. VsOnsager: His principles are empty because they have to be interpreted once in one way and another time in a different way. They may not be followed literally, too much of it is up to the physicist’s imagination. Principle: is empty if it has to be interpreted differently on different occasions. I 174th Schroedinger equation/CartwrightVsSchroedinger equation: Problem: according to it, the electron in the accelerator has neither a particular direction nor a particular energy - SE is refuted daily by reducing the wave packet - not by measurement, but by preparation. I 75 Science/Explanation/Cartwright: the framework of modern physics is mathematical and good explanations will always allow precise calculations. Explanation/Rene Thom: (1972, p 5): Descartes: his vortexes and atom chains explained everything and calculated nothing. Newton: calculated everything and explained nothing. CartwrightVsThom: in modern science we have to keep causal and theoretical explanation apart as well, but they work differently: If we accept Descartes’ causal story, we must accept his assertions of linked atoms and vortexes as true. But we do not assume Newton’s law on the inverse square of the distance to be true or false. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Winograd, T. | Searle Vs Winograd, T. | III 169 Winograd: E.g. "There is water in the fridge": relative to different backgrounds one can make statements that are true or false. From this he concludes that the reality is not independent of our representations. SearleVsWinograd: genetic fallacy as Maturana: Mistakes our image (background) with the reality. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Brandom Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 92 Wittgenstein: the fact that there is a conception of a rule is not the interpretation, it manifests itself from time to time what we call "following the rules" and what we call "acting against it". That means there must be something like practice-implicit standards. I 94 BrandomVsWittgenstein: worrying that the normative attribution here requires a range of regularities of behavior and dispositions. Moreover, that the existence of these regularities is not part of what is asserted by such attributions. An analogy to length measurement assumes the rigidity of the world. But we learn practically immediately to apply new concepts. I 820 BrandomVsWittgenstein: W. had insisted that explicit standards are intelligible only before a background of practice-implicit standards. (see above regress - prevention). II 26/27 Brandom: He was wrong to say that this principle is incompatible with understanding the discursive practice in a way that it involves interpretation at every level (in his sense), including the most basic one. Double score keeping: an assertion is seen in the face of further determinations assigned by the score keeper as well as the stipulations entered into by himself. BrandomVsWittgenstein: the inferential identification asserts that the language has a center. Assertions are not just things that can be done with language. Rather, they are that by which thinking and intellectual ability are made possible at all. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Searle Vs Wittgenstein | Bennett I 192 SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention. Searle I 24 Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria". SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it? I 156 SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world. I 169 Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised. I 170 SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are. Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general? I 171 Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible. Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states. I 172 As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other. II 76 Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use". SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects. Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein). E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents. II 193/194 Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk. Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule. III 112 Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance). III 113 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!). III 150 Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays. V 35 Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean. V 36 Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance. SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case. Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations. SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts. V 190/191 Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.- V 245 SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change. Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names! Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet). IV 50 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games. IV 89 Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie. Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement). IV 90 E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Wittgenstein | Sellars Vs Wittgenstein | II 318 Mapping/image/world/thinking/language/Sellars: question: is there no mapping relationship between language and the world, which is essential for meaning and truth? Def image/Tractatus: relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand. II 319 Language/world/Sellars: Vs Temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" in another sense are linguistic entities themselves. Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has created, or must establish, as a relation. (But not redundancy). Fact/statement/Sellars: one can say something "about a fact" in two different ways: a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact". b) it contains a fact statement, that means the name of a fact instead of a statement. K depicts y. Here K is a complex natural language subject. This assumes the meta-linguistic status of facts. However, the form of: that p depicts y: II 321 Fact/object/statement/Sellars: here statements about complex objects would be statements "about facts" in the sense that they contained fact statements. "K" would therefore apparently refer to a complex natural language subject but in reality to the statement that describes its complexity! Statement/world/SellarsVsWittgenstein: Statements, according to which natural language objects are images of other natural objects, would only refer to seemingly natural language objects, but in reality to statements, including the assumed about the statement conception of norms and standards. Another consequence would be that only simple non-linguistic objects could be depicted when complex objects were facts, which would lead to the well-known antinomy, that there must be atomic facts that would be the condition that language can depict the world, for which no example could be given if one asked a speaker to. Solution/Sellars: Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). SellarsVsWittgenstein: weakened the momentum of the idea that language enables us to depict the world by connecting it too closely to the model fact depicts fact. There are in any case n-digit configurations of reference expressions. Question: what of them leads them to the fact that they say of special reference objects that they are in this particular n-digit relation to each other? One is tempted to say: Convention. II 322 Maps/Wittgenstein: Configurations are to be found in the map, but it is not necessary that e.g. spatial structures are reproduced through spatial configurations. ((s) E.g. contour lines) The only essential characteristic: that n-digit atomic facts are formed by n-digit configurations of proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein : The analogy may even be extended. Maps are only in a parasitic sense a logical picture. Wittgenstein himself emphasized that a logical picture can exist as such only in the domain of truth-operations. E.g. map: the fact that a certain point is there is linked to the statement, for example, that Chicago is located between Los Angeles and New York. Moreover, even if we would have a country map language of spatial relationships, and truth functions could be applied directly to them, only as a small part of a comprehensive Universe of discourse existed. Problem: has the function of elementary statements generally something in common with that of cartographic configurations which is not expressed in the slogan that n-digit configurations of proper names represent n-digit configurations of objects? II 323 Natural linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: Natural linguistic objects are to be seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). II 324 One can speak of them as "proper names". That takes up Wittgenstein's understanding that elementary statements must be constructed as in a particular way occurring proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein: in my view, however, is the way in which the "proper names" occur in the "image" not a conventional symbol of the way in which objects occur in the world! I believe instead that the position of proper names in an image is a projection of the position of objects in the world. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Reference |
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| Idealism | Pro | Graeser I 137 Cassirer / Graeser: Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Search for the phenomenon of meaningfulness: Thesis: the worlds of art, science, religion, etc. are realities of their own right. Late work: essay on man: Def man: animal symbolicum. We are able to create worlds thanks to a symbol-creating force (> Goodman). Cassirer before idealist (Hegelian) background - LangerVsIdealism (as her teacher Whitehead). |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cognitivism | Black, Max | III 81 BlackVsHume: his argument is circular: Thesis: I believe certain categorical sentences with "should have a truth value"! I.e. they can be recognized as true, without reference to hopes and desires. Then Hume is wrong when he assumes them to be different from scientific propositions. Knowledge/Values/Norms/Black: Thesis: in a broader sense (further than the narrower sense of science) knowledge can be understood in such a way that some normative and evaluative propositions can be known as true. Ethics/Morality/Values/Norms/Black: Thesis: regardless of whether Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy is correct, we are entitled to assume that human beings can agree on certain fundamental ethical principles regardless of their religious background. We must assume this in order for a rational discourse to become possible at all. |
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| Understanding | Black, Max | I 77 Black thesis: in complex situations, the background equally can not be seen when the core is not understood. (Eg Bazaar, eg foreign languages, eg gestures, eg Aboriginal). |
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| Metaphysics | Esfeld, M. | I 273 ~ Metaphysics: Quine Two Dogmas: m. and science are interwoven - Quqntum mechanics / Esfeld: separability and locality are metaphysical principles, because they are a precise formulation of our commonplace picture of nature - Bell: eliminates clear separation between physics and m. - what you think is confirming or refuting the Bell experiments, depends on the background assumptions. |
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| Meaning | Grice, P.H. | Avramides I 10 Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Thesis: We begin with speaker meaning in a situation and deliver an analysis in terms of psychic states of the speaker and listener. We then reconstruct these terms as timeless meaning, word meaning and sentence meaning. I 11 The following sentence form is assumed as fundamental: "S means in a situation that p". To mean/Avramides: Grice has sufficiently clarified the concept of "meaning". I 43 Meaning/Speaker-Meaning/Grice: Thesis: "x means something" (in a situation) is roughly equivalent to: "S means something (in a situation) with x". (Grice 1957). I 46 Non-natural meaning/Grice: thesis: is never sufficient for an utterance to have a tendency to evoke a specific response. The utterance must be produced with a certain intention. I 95 Def Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Grice's access to meaning is precisely that that thesis meaning is a particular configuration of belief and intentions. Fod/Lep IV 166 Grice: thesis: meanings are inherited from contents of propositional attitudes. Meggle I 7 Thesis Grice: x means something (time-independent), S means something with x (time-independent). In explication from "means the same" follows "understands". I 19 Thesis: The speaker-situational meaning can be explained with recourse to speaker intentions. Time independent meaning and applied meaning can be explained with recourse to the concept of speaker-"situation"-meaning. Newen/Schrenk I 77 Meaning/Grice/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: the crucial feature is the speaker's subjective meaning (intention). He does not elaborate on the background assumption that this can ultimately be reduced naturalistically to brain states. 5 stages of the treatment of speech behavior: 1. A description of the behaviour of the members of a linguistic community. 2. Psychological theory about the members, attribution of desires, beliefs, etc. thus a theory of propositional attitudes. I 78 3. Theory of subjective meanings a) for the listener, b) for the speaker. This leads to an interpretative meaning theory. 4. Intersubjective meaning, the so-called conventional meaning of utterance. Problem: Grice has no theory about conventions. I 79 5. Sentence meanings of complex sentences are deduced from the meanings of the parts. (>Compositionality). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Second Nature | McDowell, J. | I 109f Second Nature / (s): Background of internalized norms borrowed from nature were-I 114 McDowell: our educational updates some of the potentials with which we were born - but that is not adding to our animal nature - no admixture - I 118 there are rules of nature, whether one is sensitive to it or not - this is the result of proper education - "naturalism of second nature" - "naturalized Platonism" I 118 Second Nature / McDowell: there are rules of nature, whether you are susceptible to them or not. This is the result of proper education. "Naturalism of second nature", "naturalized Platonism". |
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| Background | Searle, J.R. | I 198 Compared to my earlier books, there are significant changes. The thesis of the background originally referred to the meaning meant by the speaker, even to all forms of intentionality, linguistically or not linguistically. It says the following: intentional phenomena such as meaning, to mean, understanding, believing, desiring and experiencing function only in interaction with a set of background abilities that are themselves not intentional. I 200 The thesis of background is now a very strong assertion: 1. Intentional states do not function autonomously. 2. A network of other intentional states is required. 3. Even the network is not sufficient. It only works in conjunction with a lot of background capabilities. 4. These abilities are not further intentional states or components of any intentional state. 5. The same intentional content may lay down different fulfilment conditions. Example background: think of Wittgenstein's example with the picture of the man walking uphill. It could be interpreted as a picture of a man sliding downhill. Nietzsche may not have been the first, but he was aware that the background does not have to be as it is. Bourdieu's concept of the Habitus (1979) is closely related to my concept of background. I 214 Thesis from the background: new: all conscious intentionality: thinking, perceiving, understanding, etc. establishes truth conditions only in relation to certain abilities which neither belong nor could belong to the respective state of consciousness. The actual intentional content in itself is not sufficient to determine the conditions of fulfillment. New as old: still a lot of background ability is needed to interpret thoughts, belief etc.. But new: such a network has no real existing reality! VI 142 Searle Thesis: the concept of literal meaning has at all only relative to a set of background assumptions an application VI 147 if certain background assumptions are missing, the sentence has no certain truth conditions that is a weaker thesis than that of the freedom of context of literal meaning. |
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| Causality | Searle, J.R. | II 286 Searle s thesis: for our language causality is only relevant, by its influence on the brain. And those agents are required to cause the intentionality, including network and background. |
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| Understanding | Searle, J.R. | VI 69 Meaning/ to mean / understanding / Searle: has to do with the background (knowledge) but not with special syntactic forms. |
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