Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 77 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Field | III 48 Absolute Point of Rest/Newton/Field: Newton considers absolute rest possible and necessary to define absolute acceleration (bucket experiment). Absolute Acceleration/Newton: uses the laws of mechanics for explanation - acceleration can only be explained by absolute speed. For this we need an absolute point of rest. FieldVs: that does not work, because the theory itself cannot pick out a reference system. >Reference systems. III 49 MachVsNewton: theory change, does not need a resting point. FieldVsMach/FieldVsTheory Change: better: define acceleration without numerical speed and resting point. FieldVsTensors: they are arbitrary. Solution/Field: simultaneity. Point: sameness of place over time is absolute rest. Vs: that does not work within Newton's theory! Solution: concept of space without structure (intrinsic). Solution: affine geometry - (this also for Newton). IV 419 Relativism/Absolute/Field: statements about justification relative to a system are absolutely true or false. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Analogies | Waismann | Friedrich Waismann Suchen und Finden in der Mathematik 1938 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 77 Analogies/Science/Mathematics/Searching/Finding/Waismann: The mathematician who searches proceeds through analogies: 78 1. He thinks of his usual constructions of other regular figures. 2. A figure, whose sides are actually equal in length, is in his mind. Important: the connection with the empirical and the mathematical figure exists, but is an outer-mathematical! They are, therefore, outer-mathematical aspects which are the leading stars of mathematical research. The question in mathematics does not give the investigation an objective, but only a direction. >Discoveries. E.g. Brouwer's question whether there is in the development of the number π a place where the digits 0123456789 follow one another. The term "development of the number π" does not help me with the question. Suppose we gain the possibility to answer the question by finding a formula which indicates the digits of π. Thus, we lead the question whether this sequence exists, back to another question. 79 Then we believe that it is still the same concept. It is believed that we have sought each time in the same space, namely in the development of π. The misconception is that a strip passes us, on the other hand, the idea of the strip has led to the direction of this whole investigation. Suppose, for example, that a law on the distribution of the prime numbers is found with the help of the theory of function. Then one believes that one has discovered a new property in the previous concept of the prime number. One does not see that the term has been inserted into a new context, that is, has created a new prime number concept! The two prime number terms, however, are about in the same relation as the concept of the cardinal number to that of the positive whole real number. They do not coincide, they only correspond to each other. >Meaning change, >Theory change. E.g. After the discovery of the North Pole we have not two earths, one with and one without the North Pole, but after discovering the law of the prime number distribution we have two types of prime numbers. >Numbers. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Danto | I 238 QuineVsAnalyticity: one does not anticipate, at which time we must change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no stopping point. >Analyticity/Quine, >Word meaning, >Language use, >Reference, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Argumentation | Toulmin | Habermas III 46 Argumentation/Toulmin/Habermas: St. Toulmin relies on J. A. Blair: R. H. Johnson (Eds) Informal Logic, Inverness, Cal. 1980, X. Toulmin: A. On the one hand, Toulmin criticizes absolutist views that attribute theoretical knowledge, moral-practical insights and aesthetic evaluations to deductively compelling arguments or empirically compelling evidence. As far as arguments in the sense of logical reasoning are compelling, nothing substantially new is revealed; and, if they have substantial content at all, they are based on evidence and needs that can be interpreted differently with the help of several descriptive systems and in the light of changing theories and therefore do not provide an ultimate basis. >Content, >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Interpretation. Habermas III 47 B. On the other hand, Toulmin also criticizes very relativistic views which do not explain the peculiarly casual constraint of the better argument and cannot live up to the universalistic connotations of claims of validity, such as the truth of proposition or the correctness of norms. According to B. R. Burleson (1), Toulmin argues that neither of the two positions is reflexive, i. e. none of them can claim "rationality" within their own framework. The absolutist cannot rely on a first principle, the relativist must assert that his/her own position is above the relativity of judgments. >Relativism, >Judgments, >Principles, >Rationality, >Conceptual schemes. Habermas: we have to ask instead: how can reasons be criticised? Three aspects can be distinguished in the argumentative speech. See Argumentation/Habermas. Habermas III 58 At the procedural level, Toulmin distinguishes between conflict- and consensus-oriented patterns of the organization(2) and at the process level between functionally specified contexts of action. Habermas III 59 Five representational fields: Law, morality, science, management and art criticism.(3) The same argumentation scheme is always used. >Morality, >Science/Toulmin, >Law, >Institutions. III Habermas III 60 By this, however, he does not mean timeless abstract ideals, but rather "open" and historically changeable notions of what the respective companies are supposed to achieve. 1.B. R. Burleson, On the Foundations of Rationality in: Journ. Am. Forensic Assoc. 16, 1979, 113. 2. St. Toulmin, R. Rieke, A. Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, N.Y. 1979, p.279ff 3. ibid. p. 200 |
Toulmin I St. Toulmin The Uses of Argument Cambridge 2003 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Assertibility | Rorty | I 195 Assertiveness/Rorty: if assertions are justified by community, not by the character of the inner episodes, it makes no sense to want to isolate privileged ideas. >Truth, >Experience, >Convention. I 196/197 Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm, and many others intend to make truth more than this humble approach. >Dewey, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Quine, >Chisholm, >Pragmatism. I 306 Reasonable assertiveness/Putnam/Rorty: if you withdraw to it, you can say that "X is gold" could be claimed in Archimedes' time in a well-founded way and today it is no longer possible to claim it in a well-founded way. But the statement that X was in the extension of gold should be rejected as senseless, as should the statement that "X is gold" was true. >de re/ >de dicto. I 329 Assertiveness/Brandom/Rorty: in addition to the term "assertiveness" we need "true" for the pure philosophy of language. This is for understanding how language works, as opposed to understanding how it spreads to the world. VI 72 Justifiable/assertiveness/RortyVsState of affairs: the majority can surely also be wrong. So that it might turn out later that something was not true. But therefore not justified? >Theory change, >Meaning change. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Beliefs | Quine | I 365 Beliefs and quotes can be understood as all sorts of different things (vagueness). I 372 Paul and Elmer: belief does not produce sentences like legends. The following cannot be decided: that Paul believes true and Elmer does not. If the truth value does not matter, believing is no relative term. W believes x is no predicate - w believes p: p is not a term. >Truth Value/Quine. VII (h) 142 Belief/Quine: there is no relation. Belief is related to the false sentence. Instead Church argues that belief and knowledge just resemble quotes - (>Opaque contexts, >Opacity). XII 34 Belief/Quine: E.g. Thomas believes that Tullius wrote the Ars Magna - in fact, he confuses Tullius with Lullus. There are two options: a) Tom does not believe that Cicero (Tullius) wrote the Ars Magna, he just confuses the names, i.e. he knows who wrote the Ars Magna - here Tullius does not purely appear in a referential way. b) He believes something wrong: then Tullius is purely indicative. Stroud I 228 Belief/Knowledge/Quine: knowledge is not part of belief - nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge. >Knowledge/Quine. Brandom I 790/791 Relational Belief/Quine: relational belief brings along a special epistemic access to or contact with objects and de re-attributions which include existence stipulations. Quine I 146 To the same extent that radical translation is underdetermined by the totality of dispositions to linguistic behavior, our theories and beleifs are underdetermined forever and ever. II 55 Stimulus/Quine: a stimulus does not make statements true, but leads to documented beliefs. IV 413 Quine Two Dogmas: Thesis: "The totality of our so-called knowledge and/or our beliefs - from the most incidental things of geography to the most fundamental laws even of mathematics and logic - is a material knitted by humans, which meets experience only at its edges. The totality of science is like a force field whose boundary conditions are experiences." VI 20 Change/Theory Change/Quine: If we change our beliefs, many sentences must be spared, also because they are simply irrelevant! But if we reject beliefs, we have to track down all sentences that contain them. "Maxime of Minimal Mutilation". VI 92 Belief/Quine: Example "x believes that p" is itself a permanent sentence, because a belief is a state. VI 94 Belief/Quine: can always be common to a plurality of subjects. Moreover, perceptions are always perceived veritatively, beliefs are not perceived this way. ((s) One cannot perceive something wrong.) VI 100 Perception/Belief/Quine: Every perception is in principle completely describable using strictly neurological terms. However, this does not apply to beliefs. >Perception/Quine. XIII 18 Belief/Quine: believing is thinking in a certain limited sense. To believe something is to think it. "Think like this" and "believe like this" are interchangeable and also "think that" and "believe that". But they differ elsewhere. Thinking/Quine: for example we can think intensely, but we cannot believe intensely. For example we can believe something, but not think something. Grammar forbids this. Belief/Thinking/Action/Disposition/Quine: Belief is a disposition - thinking is an activity. Thinking can make us tired, belief cannot. XIII 19 We also do not sit there and believe something. Only the White Queen from Alice in Wonderland does that: before breakfast she believes 6 impossible things. Wrong: e.g. a young man in love believes what his lover believes - Example William James' "Will to believe": Example Pascal's bet, Example Tertullian: credo quia absurdum: these are distortions of the concept of belief. Belief/Disposition/Quine: what then is the believer disposed for? A good test is to ask someone to use money for what he/she is pleading for. XIII 20 Problem: this is only possible with decidable questions, not with the question whether beauty is truth. Beauty/Truth/Belief/Keats/Quine: one also wonders whether Keats really believed that. Maybe he just wanted to create a bit of beauty himself, like e.g. Morning Star: "just for the rhyme". >Beauty/Quine. Belief/Quine: belief comes mostly in bundles of dispositions. It is remarkable that this can lead to such different actions as, for example, booking a cruise, or tidying up the room. Thesis: these extremely different mental states (mental state, internal state) have nothing in common. XIII 21 The only thing in common is linguistically: the "that". ((s) > propositional attitudes). Problem: the constant form of "x believes that p" lets us assume that the rest of the sentence is also in order. But this changes from case to case, so that it is difficult to draw a line here. Belief/Paradox/Quine: to believe something is to believe that it is true. So a person believes that all his/her beliefs are true. But experience shows that some beliefs are wrong, as this person knows very well. Problem: So a rational person believes that every one of his/her beliefs are true and yet some are false. I would have expected something better from rational people. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Causality | Fried | Putnam II 195f Causality/Charles Fried: causality is not a physical relationship (Putnam ditto). It was formerly erroneously assumed that it is a functional property. Later: physical states of a higher level, reference: functional property. - (Today Vs). >Functional property, >States, >Levels/oder, >Reference. Putnam today: causality is a more flexible and interest-bound concept. >Interest, >Description, >Theories, >Theory change, >Internal realism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Concepts | Baudrillard | Blask I 104 Concepts/Baudrillard: Baudrillard propagates the revaluation of old concepts. >Revaluation, >Concepts, >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Meaning, >Reference, >Language, >Language use, >Tradition, >Culture, >Culture shift, cf. >Values/Nietzsche, cf. >Deconstruction. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Electron Example | Rorty | Rorty VI 198/99 We get paradoxical consequences if one denies that there were truths in terms of photons before the appearance of the word "photon". Example: chain of inferences: 1 Five million years ago there were photons 2 It was then the case that there were photons 3 It is true that it was the case at that time that there were photons 4 It was true then, that there were photons. Rorty: because there is of course nothing wrong, but there were philosophers who criticized it: Heidegger: "before Newton Newton's laws have been neither true nor false." Cf. >Bruno Latour. >Meaning change >Theory change >Reference >Observation language >Observation sentence >Theoretical terms >Theoretical entities cf. >Incommensurability. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Elimination | Eliminate, Elimination, philosophy: the replacement of a linguistic expression by another in the case of a theory revision. The elimination is usually done either by a definition or by merging various observations under a common concept. See also reduction, reductionism, eliminative materialism, eliminative reductionism, meaning change, theory change, incommensurability. |
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| Elimination | Lewis | IV 33 Elimination/eliminate/Lewis: e.g. singular terms must be eliminated before translation into another theory - after that they can be introduced again - e.g. descriptions before they are eliminated, they must get a range - ((s) Whether rigid or non-rigid) - various ranges provide non-equivalent translations. Cf. >meaning change, >theory change. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Evidence | Sokal | I 117 Evidence/knowledge/validity/Latour/Sokal: E.g., B. Latour(1): In 1976, following an investigation into the mummy of Ramses II. french scientists noted that his death (approximately 1213 BC) was due to tuberculosis. Latour asks: "How could he have died from a bacterium discovered by Robert Koch in 1882?" - Why is this not an anachronism? Existence/Discovery/Invention/History/Ontology/Latour/Sokal: then Latour averts to the assertion: "In front of Koch the bacillus has no real existence." Discovery: the objection that Koch has only discovered something existing is dismissed as "only seemingly reasonable". >>Discovery/invention, >Reference, >Existence, >Ontology, >Theory change, >Meaning change. SokalVsLatour: of course, in the rest of the article he does not make any argument for his thesis. He fluctuates between extreme banalities and blatant errors. 1. B. Latour „Ramsès II est-il mort de la tuberculose?“. La Recherche 307 (March) S. 84-85, siehe auch NR 308 (April) errata S. 85 und Nr. 309 (Mai) S. 7. |
Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Experience | Galilei | Feyerabend II 15 Experience/Galileo/Feyerabend: Galileo separates theory and experience (he upgrades reason). New correspondence rules have not only not been introduced, but could not been introduced, because one needs time to develop instruments and interpretations that no longer use the everyday experience. >Theories/Feyerabend, >Theory Change. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Forces | Russell | B. Russell, ABC of Relativity Theory 105 Power/Relativity Theory/Russell(1): is no longer fundamental concept of dynammics - more like "Sunrise". - The same force applied to a heavy body, does not cause as much acceleration as a light one. II 149 Power/Relativity Theory/Russell: There are no - "force fields". ((s) Instead: space is curved around a body - ((s) force fields would be a distance effect). >Relativity theory, >Meaning change, >Theory change. 1.Russell, Bertrand. ABC der Relativitätstheorie, Frankfurt, 1989 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Forms of Thinking | Rorty | Examples of forms of thinking in Rorty's works I 130 The 17th century "misunderstood" the mirror of nature or the inner eye as little as Aristotle the natural movement or Newton the gravitation. One could not misunderstand them, because one invented them. >Meaning, >Definition, >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Reference. I 135 "Rightly held to be true" is not the same as "true". >Context dependence. I 139 One can hardly say, "mental" means something in reality "that could turn out to be something physical", as well as one cannot say, e.g. "criminal behavior" means in reality something like "behavior that can turn out to be innocent". >Physical/psychic. I 258 Abstract/concrete: the distinction must also be relativized to a given data base, such as the distinction of the complex and the simple. >Abstractness, >Simplicity, >Complexity. I 261 Doubling: Rorty: the action, that templates led as Lockean ideas to a doubling of the explanandum, is like the claim, the particles of the Bohr-atom would double the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. However, it turns out that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. ((s)Vs: problem: other forces act in the atomic nucleus.) I 273 The language of thought or any code, can have no honor status, (not even for Fodor) because a mere code is not a means to distinguish the truth from falsehood. >Language of thought, >Fodor, >Code. --- II (b) 33 RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that one must first demonstrate X as a special case of Y to treat X as Y. As if one could not simply handle X as Y, to see what happens. >Habermas. --- III 169 ff Contingency: contingencies in literary narratives are meaningful only in retrospect. >Contingency. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Hermeneutics | Schelling | Bubner I 87 Plato/Schelling/Bubner: the early Schelling himself related impartially Plato's cosmology of ideas to the reconciliation interests of early idealism between subjectivity and the world. >Ideas/Plato, >Plato, >Ideas, >Idealism, >Idealism as author, >Subjectivity, >World, >World/thinking. Plato/Idealism/Bubner: for reasons of economy in the introduction of new concepts, platonic ideas were also reformulated transcendental-philosophically. >Metaphysics, cf. >Conservativity. KantVsSchelling/Bubner: Here, in passing, Kant discovers the hermeneutical maxim that it applies to understand an author better than he understood himself. >Understanding, >Meaning change, >Theory change, cf. >Interpretation/Rorty. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| History | Bubner | Bubner I 7 History/Bubner Thesis: Instead of continuity: makes breaks visible. Philosophy/History/Bubner: Thesis: one has to put aside the instilled methodological competence in favor of calling and expanding problem awareness. I 9 "Strategic alienation". Misunderstanding of possible adaptation to the scientific methodological ideal. >Method. I 10 Feyerabend/Bubner: since him (as well as Popper and Kuhn), it is no longer just as legitimate to trace back the state of knowledge reached at a given moment to the past. >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Interpretation, >Incommensurability, >K. Popper, >Th. Kuhn, >P. Feyerabend, >Historiography. I 14 History/Philosophy/Interpretation/Bubner: Philosophical history proceeds differently than other history. Neither one wants to know what an author "really" meant beyond all interpretation, nor does one assume of him what he should have said "from today's point of view". Development/History/Aristotle: already he has a principle for the development of truth through historical stages of error. >Progress. History/Philosophy/Bubner: the beginnings are due to an overweight which cannot be gained anymore by any reflection. >Reflection. I 111 History/Bubner: one should not artificially enlarge existing and estimable time intervals. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| History | Lakatos | Hacking I 207 External history/Lakatos: external history is the framework condition of research. Internal history/Lakatos: what people have believed is irrelevant, history of anonymous and autonomous research programs. (HackingVs). >Progress, >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Incommensurability, >Theory, >Paradigms. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Incommensurability | Hempel | Feyerabend I 330 Incommensurability/Feyerabend: the meaning of sentences is only incompletely understood. Hempel: Hempel wants to acknowledge incommensurability only after the concept of sense is explained. >Sense, >Meaning, >Theories, >Explanations, >Hypotheses, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Incommensurability | Rorty | IV 20 f Kuhn / Rorty: 1. Different scientific vocabularies can not be translated - but they can be learned. 2. i.e. you can not argue in a vocabulary against the other 3. So both have to be considered true. 4. Beliefs are made true by the world 5. The beliefs of Aristotle and Galileo cannot be made true by the same world. >Truthmakers. Therefore there must be several possible worlds. >Meaning Change, >Theory Change, >Vocabulary, |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Indeterminacy | Field | II IX Indeterminacy/Correspondence/Lewis/Kit Fine/Field: Indeterminacy is not a big problem for the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory. Solution: Supervaluation for vague languages. >Supervaluation. On the other hand: indeterminacy is a problem for deflationism (within one's own language) (Quine). >Deflationism. Some authors VsQuine: the assertion of an indeterminacy within one's own language is incoherent. Indeterminacy/mathematics/Field: indeterminacy exists in quantity theory, but not in number theory. >Number theory, >Quantities, >Quantities (Physics). II 180 Indeterminacy/reference/conceptual change/theory change/Field: Thesis: "Mass" was undefined and still is today. Two textbooks of the Special Relativity Theory can differ by understanding mass as "eigen mass" or "relativistic mass". Then this is either the same or different in all reference systems. >Relativity theory, >Theoretical terms, >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Reference. II 192 Indeterminacy/theory/Quine: scientific terms are meaningless outside their theory. >Immanence of truth. Truth always only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. An objective (non-relative) concept of truth could only be attempted in terms of denotation and signification, but this cannot be done if these concepts are relative to a reference system. FieldVsQuine: Denotation is a perfectly objective relation that exists between expressions and extra-linguistic objects. >Denotation. Referential indeterminacy/Field: only shows that denotation is not well-defined in certain situations. II 271 ff Incorrect translation/Brandom/Field: E.g. Root - 1 not "i" and "-i". (+) >Reference/Brandom. II 355 Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: = Having non-standard models. Solution: Extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". FieldVs: that is cheating. >Expansion/Field. New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. >Vocabulary, >Conservativity. Cheating: If it was to be assumed that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Still FieldVsIndeterminism) II 359 Indeterminacy/translation/system/Field: For example, assuming two speakers have different assumptions about natural numbers. Then the one must ultimately assume that the other has a wider concept than he himself. Problem: Asymmetry: A foreign concept, which is assumed to be a further, cannot be translated back into its own language. - ((s) There might be an unintended interpretation.) Field: we also have indeterminacy of the reference on each side. >Inscrutability. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intentions | Skinner | Rorty VI 357 Purpose/intention/Quentin Skinner/Rorty:Skinner thesis: one can only attribute a purpose, if the actor would endorse. RortyVs: Problem: we would have to ask what would Aristotle has said about the moons of Jupiter? >Intention, >Attribution, >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Knowledge, >Meaning, >Assertibility. |
SkinnerBF I B. F. Skinner Science And Human Behavior 1965 SkinnerQ I Qu. Skinner The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences Cambridge 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Interpretation | Ayers | Rorty VI 360 Interpretation/Bennett: Thesis: we can only understand Kant today by clearly indicating with the help of today's concepts what his problems were, which are still problems today, and what Kant did for their solution. >Meaning Change, >Theory change, >Translation, >Hermeneutics. VI 361 M. AyersVsBennett: that means that it is impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own conceptuality. Ayers: Thesis: We should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling as he himself did. RortyVsAyers: one does not get far with this, if one no longer believes in terms like "mental capacity", etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" terms. >R. Rorty. |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Interpretation | Pocock | Gaus I 410 Interpretation/Pocock/Weinstein: By the 1970s, the Cambridge school of political thought, led by Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, John Dunn and Richard Tuck, began challenging such interpretive strategies, countering that the meanings of past political philosophical texts could only be recovered with difficulty by historically contextualizing them (...). Skinner: According to Skinner, we should first ascertain the range of possible meanings available to an author Gaus I 411 when writing a piece of text, and next deploy 'this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer' (1969(1): 49). Pocock: For his part, Pocock (1985)(2) insists that proper interpretation depends more on discovering the discourse paradigms that inform political philosophical texts than on trying to discover their authors' intentions. In his view, discourse paradigms function hegemonically, structurally infusing texts with often-contested yet related core meanings. Hence, we must first sensitize ourselves to the debates and secondary literature contextualizing any text and then map these core meanings back into them. Moreover, discourse paradigms are dynamic, evolving with each new 'spin' that canonical works impart to their inheritance. And subsequent readings of these texts spin them again, making each reader, in part, a new author. Interpretation is inherently open-ended and unstable. >Meaning change, >Theory change. Language: Language paradigms 'impose upon actors in subsequent contexts the constraints to which innovation and modification are the necessary but unpredictable responses' (1985(2): 7). 1. Skinner, Quentin (1969) 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas'. History and Theory, V Il: 3-53. 2. Pocock, J. G. A. (1985) Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Interpretation | Rorty | III 213 Interpretation/Derrida/Rorty: nothing ever speaks on its own - that is because notthing has the originality - the non-relational, absolute character - for which the metaphysicists are looking. - Nevertheless, we cannot help but want to create something that speaks like this. >Derrida, >Metaphysics. VI 361f Interpretation/Reconstruction/Philosophy/Change in meaning/theory change/Rorty: E.g. Plato reconstructs: that he believed all the words were names. >Names, >Words, >Concepts, >Plato. Problem: Plato would never have accepted this - then he also did not mean it. Rational reconstruction: alleges what the author had actually meant (re-education) - in contrast, historical reconstruction: according to Quentin Skinner: what the author himself would have accepted. VI 363 But here it is not once about "thinking" and once about "truth". >Meaning(Intending). VI 376 Interpretation/Reconstruction/Philosophy/Doxography/Topics/Rorty: Error: presenting all authors as if they were talking about the same issues. VI 363F Meaning/Rorty: who wants to find out what a deceased person meant, must determine how the expressions match his general linguistic pattern and other behavior! He must determine what the other person would have responded to questions about his statements. That intended content differs, depending on who asks these questions. >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Interpretation | Skinner | Gaus I 410 Interpretation/Quentin Skinner/Weinstein: By the 1970s, the Cambridge school of political thought, led by Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, John Dunn and Richard Tuck, began challenging such interpretive strategies, countering that the meanings of past political philosophical texts could only be recovered with difficulty by historically contextualizing them (...). >J.G.A. Pocock. Skinner: According to Skinner, we should first ascertain the range of possible meanings available to an author Gaus I 411 when writing a piece of text, and next deploy 'this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer' (1969(1): 49). >Meaning/Intending, >Intention/Quentin Skinner, >Theory change, >Meaning change. Pocock: For his part, Pocock (1985)(2) insists that proper interpretation depends more on discovering the discourse paradigms that inform political philosophical texts than on trying to discover their authors' intentions. >Interpretation/Pocock. 1. Skinner, Quentin (1969) 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas'. History and Theory, V Il: 3-53. 2. Pocock, J. G. A. (1985) Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
SkinnerBF I B. F. Skinner Science And Human Behavior 1965 SkinnerQ I Qu. Skinner The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences Cambridge 2008 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Interpretation | Strauss | Gaus I 24 Interpretation/Leo Strauss/Ball: Straussians – followers of the late Leo Strauss (1899–1973) – claim that a canon of works by Plato and a handful of other authors contains the Whole Truth about politics, a truth which is eternal, unchanging, and accessible only to the fortunate few (...). Gaining access to this truth requires a special way of reading and of interpreting what one reads. >Truth, >Plato. StraussVsLiberalism: (...) Strauss saw the history of modern Western liberal political thought as a story of degeneration and enfeeblement. He and his followers contrasted the vigour of classical Greek and Roman political thought with the resigned ennui of slackminded modern liberal thinkers. >Liberalism, >VsLiberalism. Modern liberalism is a philosophy without foundations. Having eschewed any grounding in nature or natural law, modern liberalism, from Hobbes to the present, is reduced to a spineless relativism and is therefore without the normative foundations and philosophical resources to resist the winds of twentiethcentury fanaticism blowing from both right and left. >Liberalism/Hobbes, >Th. Hobbes. StraussVsHistoricism: The present being bankrupt, students of political philosophy must look to the past for guidance; they must be historians but not ‘historicists’. >Historicism. Knowledge and guidance of the sort we require are not easy to come by, however. They require that we read these ‘old books’ aright - that we decipher Gaus I 25 the real meaning of the messages encoded by authors fearful of persecution and wishing to communicate with cognoscenti through the ages (Strauss, 1952)(1). >Theory change, >Meaning change. StraussVsLocke/StraussVsHobbes: To communicate with the great thinkers of antiquity is to appreciate how far we have fallen. The rot began in the seventeenth century, with the advent of modern liberalism, and that of Hobbes and Locke especially (Strauss, 1953)(2). >Liberalism/Locke, >J. Locke. They disavowed the ancient wisdom and the older idea of natural law, favouring instead a view of politics founded on security and self-interest. The ancient ‘philosophical’ quest for the good life was transmuted into the modern ‘scientific’ search for safety, security, and the accommodation of competing interests. 1) VsStrauss: Straussian interpretations have been criticized on a number of reasons. One is that they rely on the sort of supposed ‘insider’s knowledge’ that is available only to those who have been initiated into the mysteries of Straussian interpretation (and who in turn conveniently dismiss criticisms by non-Straussian outsiders as being hopelessly ignorant and uninformed). >Knowledge, >Understanding. 2) VsStrauss: Another is that they assume, without argument or evidence, that the ‘real’ text does not correspond, point for point, to the written and publicly available ‘exoteric’ text; the real or ‘esoteric’ text remains hidden from public view, its meaning inaccessible to the uninitiated and unworthy. >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Texts, >Literature. 1. Strauss, Leo, 1952. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe, IL: Free. 2. Strauss, Leo, 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
StraussDFr I David Friedrich Strauss Der alte und der neue Glaube Hamburg 2012 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Interpretation | Taylor | Gaus I 65 Interpretation/Charles Taylor/Forbes: Charles Taylor (1971)(1), the classic plea for interpretation in the social sciences, argued that political phenomena should be regarded as analogous to obscure texts, in need of translation or interpretive explication. >Translation, >Truth transfer. As with texts, so with political phenomena: we do not understand them until we understand their meanings. >Understanding, >Meaning. Forbes: Opinion polls and other surveys (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963)(2) may be some help, but since the relevant meanings are not just ‘subjective’ (and more or less widely shared) but also ‘intersubjective’ (and thus not normally topics for discussion or even reflection), direct answers to direct questions will often be unrevealing. The deeper meanings we seek can be brought to light only by the kind of ‘thick description’ exemplified in Clifford Geertz’s famous (1973)(3) analysis of Balinese cockfighting. Perhaps the best label today for what Taylor and Geertz represent is the title of this section, ‘intentional analysis’. It avoids the unhelpful breadth of ‘interpretation’, the novelty and obscurity of ‘thick description’, the distracting associations of ‘hermeneutics’, and the misleading suggestion, implicit in the old contrast between explanation and understanding (von Wright, 1971)(4), that the clarification of intentions is not explanatory. It puts the emphasis squarely on the purposive character of individual actions and social institutions and clearly suggests the need for careful analysis, since the relevant purposes may not be obvious or easily stated. >Meaning change, >Theory change. 1. Taylor, Charles (1985 [1971]) ‘Interpretation and the sciences of man’. In his Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 15–57. 2. Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Geertz, Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic. 4. Von Wright, Georg Henrik (1971) Explanation and Understanding. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Forbes, H. Donald 2004. „Positive Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Introduction | Putnam | I (c) 83 Introduction/Feyerabend: someone who introduces a concept, accepts certain laws as necessarily true. These laws are then the definitions of the reference object. Consequence: the meaning of "electron" is different in different theories. PutnamVs: as Bohr assumed, the electrons have mass and charge fairly well. Therefore, it is the particle of which he has spoken. >Theory Change, >Meaning Change. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Knowledge | Putnam | McGinn I 180 Theories of domestication of knowledge: newer version: the theories of domstication of knowledge refer to the externalism with respect to the content of consciousness: mind and world can be as divergent as the skeptics would accept. >Terminology/McGinn. >Knowledge/Davidson. --- Putnam I (a) 31 Knowledge/Putnam: Franklin had the same knowledge about electricity as we. Here, no intension must be shared. There are different causal chains. >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Intension. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Knowledge | Vollmer | I 206 Knowledge / VollmerVsKant: according to Kantians, we can in fact know only what is given by the senses. >I Kant. Then we can not know, for instance that the earth moves - E.g. that the space is non-Euclidean; e.g. then quarks and black holes should never be objects of empirical science, because they are not vivid. >Empiricism, >Science, >Evidence, >Provability, >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Theory language, >Theories, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Laws | Baudrillard | Blask I 60 Laws/Reversibility/Baudrillard: every law can be reversed. Blask I 104 Concepts/Baudrillard: Baudrillard propagates the revaluation of old concepts. >Revaluation, >Concepts, >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Meaning, >Reference, >Language, >Language use, >Tradition, >Culture, >Culture shift, cf. >Values/Nietzsche, cf. >Deconstruction. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Rorty | VI 357 Intention/Quentin Skinner: we cannot say about an acting person that she had intended or done something what she could under no circumstances accept as a true description of what she intended or did. Interpretation/Rorty: if we accept that, we can go ahead and ask: What would Aristotle said about the moons of Jupiter or about Quine’s anti-essentialism? >Meaning Change, >Theory Change, >Vocabulary. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Meaning Change | Meaning change/semantic change: this is about the question whether the meaning of the terms of a theory change in the light of new knowledge. If they do, problems with incommensurability may arise. See also reference, incommensurability, progress, comparisons. |
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| Meaning Change | Adorno | Rorty III 103 Meaning Change/Adorno/Dialectic of Enlightenment: Adorno thought that concepts were subject to historic change! Period provides the right concepts for each case. Dissolution of these concepts deprives the period of the right to further existence. >History/Adorno, >Concepts, >Texts/Adorno, >Theory change. Meaning Change/Adorno: E.g. "general validity in contrast to the relative validity" "morality in contrast to intelligence." Even the concepts of the mind, the truth, even of the Enlightenment itself have become animistic magic. (Ricouer: "hermeneutics of suspicion"). >P. Ricoeur, >Mind, >Truth, >Hermeneutics. --- XIII 208 Meaning Change/Theory Change/SchopenhauerVsFichte/Schopenhauer/Adorno: it is sometimes the case that strictly identical motifs assume completely different meanings. For example, Schopenhauer's philosophy of will is not so far away from the philosophy of action. Nevertheless, even the same concepts, for instance, the absolutely self-imposed principle, which in Fichte is called the subject, and in Schopenhauer will, mean in both truths exactly the opposite. Therefore all the categories that arise from it have a completely different meaning. >A. Schopenhauer, >J.G. Fichte. XIII 237 Meaning Change/Theory Change/Adorno: To do justice to a thinker always means doing wrong to him at the same time. The philosophies require the reflections (...) so that they may come to their own right or possibly to their own wrong. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Meaning Change | Carnap | IX 93/4 Term change, change of meaning: it is not just that previously recognized records are later rejected, but for certain propositions - regardless of whether true or false - there can not be formed in the new language in general a corresponding sentence. >Theory change, >Incommensurability, >Paradigm change. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Meaning Change | Field | II 173 Meaning Change/Meaning/Field: E.g. the expression "has the same temperature" has changed - because one now knows that differently warm objects can feel equally warm. N.B.: "means that" cannot change. - It is empirically irrevidable. Solution: "Temperature" is an explanatory term. Meanings (also as intentional entities as "mere shadows") should not be interpreted as explanatory. >Explanations. Then the attribution should be kept, no matter what discoveries we make. >Theory change. On the other hand: meaning-characterization: is explanatory - namely causal. II 177 Meaning change/Field: Thesis: with the change of theories the reference of scientific terms (TT) is indeterminate. - There is no fact that decides. - E.g.: For Newton, and in the Special Relativity Theory, "mass" had no definite denotation. >Relativity theory, >Denotation, >Indeterminacy. II 183 Theory change/meaning change/change of concept/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1962(1), 101) Thesis: The referents of Einstein's terms are never identical with those of the Newtonian terms, which bear the same name. Newton's mass remains intact, Einstein's mass is convertible against energy. FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, Einstein has shown that there is no "Newtonian mass" - Newton's concept meant something else, I do not deny that - but this does not apply to reference or denotation. Today's terms refer to a subset of what the Newtonians referred to. >Reference. FieldVsKuhn: something like "Newton's mass" has never existed - so Newton himself can never have referred to it. Problem: then the sentences are wrong. Solution: E.g. "Acceleration needs more force when the mass is larger." - This is not completely lacking denotation. The reference is simply indeterminate. II 194 Meaning change/change of concept/theory change/Putnam: thesis: the reference usually survives in scientific revolutions. >Meaning change/Putnam. 1. Thomas S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1962. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning Change | Foucault | II 183 Meaning Change/Concept Change/Discourse/Foucault: e.g. Buffon and Linné speak of "the same thing" by placing themselves at the "same level" or "at this distance", by developing "the same conceptual world" and meeting one another on "the same battlefield". On the other hand: e.g. Darwin and Diderot do not speak of the same thing! The analysis and the positivity of the discourse helps to distinguish this. Positivity of the discourse: the tenacity and backwardness of topics and re-discovered meanings. Thus positivity plays the role of a historical a priori. Not a validity condition for judgments, but reality condition for statements. No formal a priori. >Discourse/Foucault. Def Archive/Foucault: instead of seeing how, in the great mythical book of history, words are juxtaposed with each other, transforming ideas that have been formed before and elsewhere, we have systems in the density of discursive practices that introduce the statements as events and things. All these statements (events and things) are the archive. The archive is at first the law of what can be said. It also means that all these things that have been said do not accumulate infinitely, and do not form a seamless linearity, nor disappear even in accidental external circumstances. Instead that they arrange themselves into distinct figures and connect with one another on the basis of manifold relationships. This causes them not to go back the same step with time, but like stars, can shine most brightly when the furthest away. Archive: defines the system of expressability, the system of functioning. This cannot be described in its totality. Human: our diagnosis establishes that we are differences, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history is the difference of times, our ego is the difference of masks. Scattering, not origin! Def Archeology: describes the discourses as specified practices in the element of the archive. It is necessary, because the right of the words does not coincide with that of the philologists. But it's not about the search for any beginning. >Archeology/Foucault, >Theory change. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Meaning Change | Kanitscheider | I 145 Change of meaning/conceptual change/Newton/Einstein/Kanitscheider: the semantic differences are serious: with Newton gravity is active force in passive space with Einstein gravity is the activity of space-time. With Newton the cosmic forces of distant matter are indeterminate or extinguish each other or are in equilibrium, in relativity each point is specific and has specific dynamic properties. Now a subrange can be distinguished where the velocities are small and the gravitational fields are weak, where the two theories give comparable statements. Thus the theories are not separated by an insurmountable semantic gap. >Theory change, >Fragments. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Meaning Change | Kuhn | I 115 Change of concept/Change of meaning/Kuhn: There is an obligation to alter the meaning of fixed and familiar concepts. I 140 Change of meaning/Change of concept/Change of theory/Kuhn: Before Copernicus, the sun was also called "planet". - Then they did not only learn the meaning of "planet" or what the sun was, but the meaning of "planet" changed - in a way that they could continue to make a useful distinction. I 142 The same procedures now give evidence of very different aspects. I 210 Meaning change/change of concept/Kuhn: Because the vocabularies of discussions about new theories consist mainly of the same expressions, some of these expressions must be applied differently to nature - hence the superiority of one theory over another cannot be proven in discussion. >Incommensurability, >Theory change, >Paradigms. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Meaning Change | Lyotard | Sokal I 158 Meaning Change/Lyotard/BricmontVsLyotard/SokalVsLyotard/Lyotard: Lyotard(1) speaks of a "postmodern science" which develops the theory of its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic. It is "not to be corrected". It suggests a legitimation model that is by no means that of the best performance, but that of difference understood as paralogy. >Postmodernism. SokalVsLyotard: The theories quoted by Lyotard naturally produce new knowledge, but they do not change the meaning of the word. (Note: with one limitation: meta theorems in mathematical logic such as Gödel's theorem or independence theorems in set theory have a logical status that is slightly different from conventional mathematical theorems.) >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Theories, >Science, >Knowledge. For the correct use of the concepts of physics and mathematics see >Sokal/Bricmont, >Feynman, or >Thorne. 1. J. F. Lyotard, Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien, 1993, p. 172f. |
Lyo I J. F. Lyotard Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud Lyotard II J.F. Lyotard Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien 1993 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Meaning Change | Newton | Kanitscheider I 145 Meaning Change/semantic change/term transformation/Newton/Einstein/Kanitscheider: Newton’s gravitational force is active in passive space. For Einstein, gravity is the activity of spacetime. Newton: cosmic forces are indefinite or cancel each other. Einstein: every point is specific with dynamic properties. >Gravitation, >Space-time, >Gravitation/Einstein Punch line: There can be a partial area of the theory characterized, in which the theories are comparable. >Local/global, >Comparisons, >Comparability. Kanitscheider I 405 Meaning Change/semantic change/term transformation/theory change/Shapere/Kanitscheider: Thesis: not the meaning of the terms changes, but the knowledge of the speakers is changing. >Theory change, >Reference, >Meaning. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Meaning Change | Rorty | I 293f Meaning Change/Rorty: Question: Did the Greeks refer to prudence with the expression Sophrosyne? >Reference. Rorty: This question can be rejected with the hint that there is for expectation; in a completely different culture this expression would be implantable; no particular reason. We have to make ourselves familiar with the exotic language game. >Relativism, >Cultural relativism, >Context dependence. In the case of science, however, such an attitude seems unnatural. Here we want to say that out there is something, laws to which one should refer or at least one has referred to. Rorty: "whiggistic" winner perspective: tells us, Aristotle spoke in reality of gravity, when he spoke of a natural settling movement, sailors would have, when they spoke of unicorns, referred to the horns of narwhals in reality, "heat flow" is a misleading description of the energy transfer between dancing molecules. >Theory change. I 301 Meaning/truth/existence/Change of Theories/Meaning Change/Quine/Rorty: Quineans would say, the question, whether they meant the same back then, is not raised. - It's more about the truth values. >Truth values, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning/Intending, >Assertibility. Rorty: a) Aristotle said something wrong about movement, or b) He said something true, but that was not movemnt. RortyVsAyers: with this, one will not get far if one does no longer believe in concepts like intellectual property etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between our and his concepts. I 315 ff Semantic change/change of theory/reference/Rorty: solution: the functioning of an expression should be better seen as the picking out of objects, than as the description of reality. - So either a) reference as a basis, or b) also accepting reference as conventional. - Searle-trawson-Criterion: "What would make most of his opinions true." I 318 Solution: distinction reference: a) philosophical - b) "Speaking about" (common sense) - Rorty: it is only about existence. - Therefore, no criterion for reference possible. I 321 RortyVsReference Theory/Theory of Reference: 1. Semantic search for the objects is hopeless. - 2. Hopeless: to strive for an epistemological refutation of skepticism. >Skepticism. --- III 103 Meaning change: Adorno/Horkheimer/Rorty: pro - PutnamVs. --- IV 131 Term/Meaning change/Conceptual change/Change of theories/Rorty: terms that got a new twist through a thinker: E.g. Aristotle: ousia Descartes: res Hume: impression. Wittgenstein: game Einstein: simultaneity. Bohr: Atom. >Theory Change, >Incommensurability. --- VI 361 Interpretation/Rorty: in such approximation efforts, the procedure is obviously anachronistic. But when that happens consciously, there is no objection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Metaphors | Sokal | I 27 Metaphors/Science/Sokal/Bricmont: we criticize the use of scientific terms by authors who have not understood the scientific meaning of these terms themselves. This is not, as some have assumed, a metaphorical use of expressions by these authors. Finally, a metaphor is usually used to illustrate something unknown by relating it to something known, not the other way around. >Analogies, >Understanding, >Explanations, >Concepts, >Theories, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Natural Kinds | Rorty | IV 29 Natural kind/science/Rorty: Realism asserts science is a natural kind - (RortyVs). >Science/Rorty, >Realism/Rorty. VI 376/377 Def science as a "natural kind"/Rorty: a science defined in this way always asks the same questions. ((s) "By their fruits you shall know them": they shall also give the same recognizable results.) RortyVs: instead, we should not see ourselves as responding to the same stimuli as our ancestors, but as beings who have independently created new and more interesting stimuli. We then also claim to ask better questions. >Science, >Progress, >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Discoveries. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Natural Laws | Kuhn | I 90 Natural law/Kuhn: Its validity is a logical fact within the theory. See also >Theory Change, >Theories/Kuhn, >Laws/Kuhn. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Natural Sciences | Latour | Sokal I 114 Science/Latour/SokalVsLatour/BricmontVsLatour/Bricmont/Sokal: e.g. (B. Latour, Science in Action, Cambridge 1987, p. 94ff): Latour makes fun of invoking nature as a way to solve scientific controversies, as in the case of solar neutrinos: Sokal I 115 Latour: "Let's see for ourselves in which camp the sun can actually be found. Somewhere, the natural sun with its true number of neutrinos will silence the dissenters and force them to accept the facts, no matter how well formulated their essays may have been." (p. 95). Sokal: why is Latour getting ironic here? It is actually difficult to determine how many neutrinos are emitted by the sun. We can hope that the question will be resolved one day, but not because "the natural sun silences those who think differently", but because there is enough good empirical data to be obtained. >Method, >Science, >Theories, >Theory change, >Measuring. |
Lat I Bruno Latour Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society Cambridge, MA 1988 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Nominalism | Hacking | I 185 Nominalism/Hacking: nominalism does not affect the existence, but the classification. It is not only due to our way of thinking that we distinguish between grass and straw. The boundaries are not given by nature, the categories are given by the mind, not by nature. >Categories, >Categorization, >Nature, >Reality, >World/thinking. Rorty: we cannot divide nature at the joints. That does not mean to deny the existence of material objects. Idealism: idealism concerns the existence. >Idealism, >Ontology. Nominalism, traditional/Hacking: traditional nominalism believes that categories are a product of the human mind, but not changeable. KuhnVs: categories are very much changeable. Idealism: idealism concerns the objects. >Theory change, >Meaning change, cf. >Incommensurability. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Observation Language | Stroud | Feyerabend I 363 Observation/observational language/ Stroud/Feyerabend: (similar to Carnap): a supposedly new possibility must fit or translate into our present conceptual or linguistic system. >Conceptual schemes, >Language use, >Conventions, >Meaning, >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Concepts, >Observation, >Observation sentences. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Philosophy | Rorty | III 102 Philosophy/Hegel/Rorty: Philosophy paints grey in grey: i.e. Story is old. - Rorty: Newton did not know that his purpose was the advanced technology. - Operating theory: Problem: the purpose of the language is not fixed yet - unlike tools. --- VI 355 History of Philosophy/interpretation/reconstruction/past/Meaning Change/Conceptual Change/Rorty: dilemma: either a) We impose on the dead in anachronistic fashion enough problems and vocabulary of our time b) We let them appear less foolish by putting them in their own historical context. >Vocabulary, >Meaning change, >Theory change, cf. >Incommensurability. Rorty Thesis: We can do both, if we separate it consciously. --- VI 376f Rorty: Philosophy is not a natural kind - that means, it does not always give the same answers to the same questions. - We should not present us as if we respond to the same stimuli as our ancestors. >Natural kinds. We have created new stimuli - therefore we also ask better questions. N.B.: philosophy still has nothing to do with "meta-questions". >Metaphysics. III passim Philosophy/Hegel/Dewey/Rorty: no approach to fixed things but self-creation. The future is more productive than the past. >New description/redescription. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Prediction | Putnam | I (a) 49 Theory/calculus/positivism/Putnam: in a calculus (if you identify a theory with it), the predictions are contained. Theory Meaning/concept meaning/meaning change/Putnam: if it were true that the theory determines the meaning of the concepts, and the theory has additional hypotheses like "there is no tenth planet", then the term "gravity" would change its meaning if a 10th planet were discovered. I 50 In fact, the theory dependence demanded by the positivists is not only one of laws, but also of additional assumptions, because if these do not belong to theory, the scheme of theory and prediction collapses. >Theory, >Concept/Putnam. V 157 Theory change/meaning change/predictions/Putnam: to be able to judge whether the predictions of another theory are true, I need to be able to translate the languages of both theories into each other. >Meaning change, >Theory change. V 245 Logical positivism/empiricism/Putnam: logical positivism always has the tendency to majority thought (of verification). Central for positivism since Comte: predictions are seen as the goal of science. >Positivism, >Explanation/Comte. V 261 Evolution theory/prediction/Putnam: The evolution theory is one of the most successful theories at all. However, it does not imply any predictions. >Evolution/Putnam, >Evolution. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Principle of Charity | Putnam | I (b) 56 Principle of Charity/N. L. Wilson: e.g. in a possible world electrons could be twice as heavy and neutral. These other particles, according to Wilson, would then be the electrons! >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms. I (b) 57 Principle of Charity/Wilson: e.g. someone who is erroneously using a name wrong, still refers to the one, he/she really meant. >Meaning/Intending), >Reference, >referential/attributive. PutnamVsWilson: the principle should only apply to real situations. Also beliefs should be distinguished by relevance. >Relevance. I (b) 58 Phenomena have priority during the reference, that means, if there were Bohr electrons in the other half of the universe, Bohr would nevertheless refer to our electrons. Contribution of the environment: it follows that XYZ (on twin earth) just looks like water, but it is not water. I (b) 58 Principle of Charity/PutnamVsWilson: the principle of charity is too numeric! Truths range from extremely trivial to important. There are also many dimensions. You cannot count beliefs! Reference/possible world/Putnam: e.g. electron, Bohr: suppose there were particles that had the properties falsely assumed by Bohr ("selectrons") but they only existed in the other half of the universe. Then Bohr would still not have referred to "selectrons" but to our electrons. Reason: the primacy of phenomena. His theory was to explain his phenomena, and these are also our phenomena. Principle of trust advance/meaning/knowledge/imagination/Putnam: I can know the meaning of "gold" without even having a clear idea! The principle of trust forbids us to assume that baptizing must be experts. It also forbids accepting omniscience. >Omniscience, >PutnamVsWilson. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Proofs | Waismann | Friedrich Waismann Suchen und Finden in der Mathematik 1938 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 84 Proof/meaningful/senseless/Waismann: e.g. how is the statement "This man died five hours ago" to be proved? The application of a medical discovery is called the proof that it is so. This discovery does not alter the meaning of the sentence "This man died five hours ago". The discovery discovered that a particular hypothesis is true. In mathematics it is different: the mathematical proof could not be described before it was found. >Discoveries, >Constructivism, >Senseless. 85 "Soluble" means a structure that cannot be described without knowing it. E.g. the method of decomposition introduces something completely new, just as the negative numbers are something entirely new. Suppose we had only explained the multiplication, then terms such as "dividend" "divisor", etc. would have no meaning at all and the question about them would be misplaced. 86 E.g. if we are looking for an Easter egg in the room, the question about the concept of the Easter egg does not make any sense, because we can describe the Easter egg almost arbitrarily exactly. For example, in the case of the threefold division of the angle, one cannot speak of possibility or impossibility as far as precise concepts are concerned. >Method, >Sense, >Meaning. Suppose, for example, in an arithmetic in which only the multiplication is known, one can ask "Is this number decomposed?", i.e. have we carried out a multiplication in which it emerged as a product? On the other hand one cannot ask: "Is it decomposable?" >Ideology/Quine. 87 The other question must be answered only when we go over to the next calculus of the division. But even here it is not really meaningful to speak of a possibility, but of a rule. To say, we cannot disassemble the number, makes the wrong impression, we would try and then encounter an obstacle. In reality, we are expanding our system and are not seeing new possibilities, but have new rules. >Rules. If one wants, one can continue to search with a circle and a ruler, which is not wrong in itself and is not forbidden by the proof. It just does not mean anymore what it used to mean. >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Lyotard | Sokal I 156 Quantum Mechanics/Lyotard/SokalVsLyotard/Sokal: Lyotard uses macroscopic terms, as do other authors who do not come from the natural sciences, and mix them with findings from quantum mechanics of which they have heard, but which refer to the microscopic domain, where other laws apply.(1) SokalVsLyotard: Lyotard strikes a subjectivistic tone that is not justified. >Subjectivity, >Objectivity, >Science, >Reference, >Meaning change, >Theory change. Sokal I 157 E.g. density of gases: Lyotard asserts that the knowledge about the density of air dissolves into a multitude of statements...which can only be made compatible if they are relativized in relation to the scale chosen by the statement. (p. 165). Sokal I 157 Sokal: Of course, the truth or falsity of any statement depends on the meaning of the words used. And if the meaning of these words (such as density) depends on the scale, the truth or falsity of the statement also depends on the scale. For the correct use of the concepts of physics and mathematics see >Sokal/Bricmont, >Feynman, or >Thorne. 1. J. F. Lyotard, Das Postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien, 1993. |
Lyo I J. F. Lyotard Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud Lyotard II J.F. Lyotard Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien 1993 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Realism | Loar | Schiffer I 222 Realism/Loar/Schiffer: (Loar 1987)(1): realism is a consequence of the accepted science and our capacity of receiving information. - I.e. realism is dependent on contingent facts. >Science, >Progress, >Meaning change, >Theory change. 1. Brian Loar (1987). Subjective intentionality. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124 |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Reference | Hacking | I 146f Reference/extension/theory/meaning change/Putnam: e.g. acid: today, we mean something different when we use the word "acid". >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Meaning (intending). Putnam: yet we are talking about the same thing. >Reference. HackingVsPutnam: e.g. Lavoisier held all views which are accepted today plus the wrong one that all acids contain oxygen. In spite of the mistake he spoke of the same acids. Today: normal acids and Bronsted-Lovry acids cover all acids but they are mutually exclusive. Only in special cases it is necessary to know which one you mean. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Revolution | Flusser | Rötzer I 60 Revolution/Art/Flusser: the Bishop set the fair value on the market, e.g. for a pot. With the revolt of the craftsmen, which we call the Renaissance or Humanism, the same has changed from the field to the workshop as an author. >Renaissance, >Humanism, >Market, >Emancipation. First of all, the craftsmen had to create a free market, i. e. remove art critics from the market So far, the Bishop had the insight into the eternal and supreme values, Plato: theoria. >Plato. The revolutionary craftsmen now claimed that they would no longer imitate the eternal idea, but that they would invent new and better ones and therefore also more true pots. This called into question the difference between discovering and inventing. Approaching the idea could only bring a certain imperfect discovery, and thus error and deception. Rötzer I 61 But the new craftsmen claimed to be inventors. Thus the contempt for art-making turned into admiration. Old theory: the shapes are neatly superimposed: the higher ones contain the lower ones, e. g. the pot contains the ball. This made philosophy a climbing uphill. New view: no longer conclude from one form to another, but make another. Rötzer I 61 New theory/Flusser: Development of ever better models. Theory changes from the cathedral to the workshop and contradicts in two ways what is done there. 1. The theoretical view must adapt to the circumstances and 2. models are handed over and you have to see what the result is. Double contradiction between observation and theory on the one hand and experiment and theory on the other. > Modern science and technology. In the workshops in question, people no longer talked about art, but about technology, and a writer is no longer sought in vain. >Technology, >Art, >Authorship. Rötzer I 64 Revolution/Flusser: a) Previously, it was pointless to differentiate between the goodness of a plough and that of an image of saints ontologically, both of which served to save people from the valley of tears. Techne is the equivalent of ars, so one and the same. >The good, >Techne. b) Afterwards there is not only a difference, but the image of saint became superfluous, perhaps even disturbing, which distracted ideologically attention from the work. >Labour. That is why the art had to be separated from the technology. >Art. Rötzer I 70 Cultural Revolution/Flusser: is the reluctance not to want to recognise all these images and sounds as art, since they do not correspond to the modern art term. Rock music, for example, has a great influence on our behaviour, such as car gears. >History, >Progress, >Culture. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991 |
| Science | Boyd | Fraassen I 8 Science/Theory/Richard Boyd/Putnam: (attributed to him by Putnam): 1. The terms of a mature science typically refer. 2. Accepted theories in mature science are typically approximately true. 3. The same term can refer to the same in different theories. >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Theories/Boyd. Fraassen: all of these are not definitions. Truth/realism/Fraassen truth must, according to these statements, play an important role for the formulation of the realistic position. After that we can tentatively define: Definition scientific realism/Fraassen: Science aims to deliver a literally true story of how the world is. >Literal truth, >Realism. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Seeing | Kuhn | I 131 Paradigm/Vision/Seeing/Science/Kuhn: e.g. pendulum/Aristotle: he regarded it as a fall - Galileo: he regarded it as a repetition of movement. Arguments for the independence of weight and rate of fall - but not through better observation. See also >Incommensurability, >Interpretation/Kuhn, >Theories/Kuhn, >Theory Change. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Sentences | Field | II 190 Structure/sentence structure/Field: is useful to give a semantics of indefinite expressions: Structure m for a sentence is a function that maps each name or mass term of the sentence to an object or quantity, and each predicate to a set. >Mapping, >Analysis, >Structures, >Singular terms, >General terms, >Predicates, >Predication, >Attribution, cf. >Quantification. Structure m corresponds to the sentence if any name, any mass term and each predicate partially denotes the thing, m attributes to it. >Partial denotation. Definition of truth by structure-truth: E.g. mass: both times regardless of the reference frame, but once relativistic mass, once dead weight. Then the proposition that mass is independent of the reference frame is once true, once false. >Truth/Field, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Similarity | Hacking | I 230 Equality/Hacking: the term "equality" depends on the presentation method. >Methods, >Meaning, >Concepts, >Meaning change, >Theory change. I 233 Illustration/representation: likeness ("Ebenbildlichkeit") is something independent: there is no relationship, no relation, but it actually creates its relations! First, there is likeness, then equality with respect to this or that. Similarity needs the terms x, y, z: "similar with respect to y but not to z". Likeness/conformity/"Ebenbildlichkeit": likeness eyists without these terms ((s) Vs: then they must abstract from physical objects, otherwise there are always aspects.) >Aspects. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Technology | Wu | Morozov I 57 Technology/IT/Internet/Tim Wu/Morozov: Tim Wu's book "The Master Switch" (1) is an annoying example of Internet centrism: he tries to compare all sorts of technologies with each other: Telegraphy, telephone,... I 58 ...Radio, cinema, television etc. In doing so, one should be aware of how difficult it is to grasp the past with one's own concepts and not to understand everything from the past as something quasi-factual that could be useful for the interpretation of practically everything in the present. >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Incommensurability. Wu thesis: there is something specific to the information industry, namely that it is dominated by "information conquerors" like Steve Jobs. These conquerors create a "cycle" by negotiating with and receiving protection from the government. I 59 Solution/Wu: One should prohibit these technology companies from structuring themselves vertically - in other words, prohibiting companies that produce information from owning or creating the infrastructure for its dissemination, and vice versa. Wu thesis: the influence of governments was mostly harmful to the development of the information industry. Both big business and government should stay out of the information industry. MorozovVsWu: it is another one of those theory with which one can explain everything. Wu neglects those information industries - such as letterpress - in which no "information conquerors" have developed. There is also enough evidence outside the United States that such conquerors have also done good things. >Letterpress printing, >Progress, >Theories. 1. Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, reprint ed. (New York: Vintage, 2011). |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Theories | Field | I 249ff Theory/object level/Field: we assume a theory here instead of the truth of the theory. Problem: the theory requires mathematical entities. >Mathematical entities, >Truth, >Description levels. I 262 Physics/theory/Language/ontology/Field: Thesis: in the typical physical language, sentences are essential for the description of observations that contain mathematical entities. Then a theory without mathematical entities does not allow any inference about distances and masses. >Physics, >Ontology. Solution: new (comparative) predicates: For example, the distance between x and y is r-times the distance between z and w, etc. - For example, the velocity of y relative to y multiplied by the time difference between z and w is r-times spatial distance between u and v (Definition acceleration without numbers). - r: is a rational number. This distinguishes the predicates in the family. >Predicates. NominalismVs: these are too many predicates. >Nominalism. --- II 46 Theory/truth/Field: it is the assertion that the axioms of the theory are true of their objects at certain points of time (or at all times) - not the theory itself. >Axioms. Variables: We leave it out here very often, but they must be understood as implicitly existing. >Variables. Instead of "pain has that and that causal role" we must say: "For every t and every c (organism) of type S to t, pain has that and that causal role in c to t". II 187 Ideal theory/Quine/Field: (Quine 1960(1), 23-4): Suppose there is an ideal theory (in the future) that could be considered as completely true: problem: this ideal theory could not correct the truth values of our actual (present) individual sentences. >Reference, >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Idealization. Reason: there is no general sense in which one can equate a single sentence of a theory with a single sentence of another theory. Quine/(s): there is no inter-theoretical translatability. - Thus there is no Truth-predicate for single sentences of a theory. - Falsehood is distributed to the whole theory. - There is no fact that distributes falsehood onto single sentences. FieldVsQuine: therefore the sentences are not "intertheoretically meaningless"! Solution/Field: "partial denotation": Newton's mass partially denoted. >Partial denotation. FieldVsKuhn/FieldVsIncommensurability: denotational refinement: (later only partial quantity) means no incommensurability. >Incommensurability. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Theories | Flusser | Rötzer I 61 New theory/Flusser: development of ever better models. >Models. Theory changes from the cathedral to the workshop and contradicts in two ways what is done there. 1. the theoretical view must adapt to the circumstances and 2. models are handed over and you have to see what the result is. Double contradiction between observation and theory on the one hand and experiment and theory on the other. > Modern science and technology. >Observation, >Method, >Measurement, >Technology, >Experiment. In the workshops in question, people no longer talked about art, but about technology, and a writer is no longer sought in vain. --- Rötzer I 62 Art without theory/Flusser: (experiment, model) leads to the conclusion that art-makers appoint themselves authors and claim to possess their own criteria. >Criteria. I 62/63 Two types of workshops: 1. type: provides models for world change, 2. type: provides models for easy viewing. These models have been called art ever since. This separates the culture into a hard, scientific and a soft, artistically humanistic branch, but not without problems. The models of art are experience models: aistheta. The ones of technology behavioural models: ethos. The theoretical foundation makes technology models much more creative. Just compare the phone to a painting of Picasso. At present, qualities can be quantified and vice versa. >Quantities/Flusser. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991 |
| Theories | Kuhn | Hacking I 22 Kuhn: Thesis: No sharp distinction between observation and theory - is not deductive, concepts are not precise. >Observation. KuhnVsPopper: context of justification is inseparable from the context of discovery. >Justification, >Discoveries. --- Kuhn I 22 Theory/Fact/Kuhn: scientific fact and scientific theory cannot be separated strictly. I 94 Theory/Proof/Kuhn: Applications are not proof of the validity of a theory. >Proof, >Validity. I 111 New Theory/Special case/Kuhn: arguing that the old theory is a special case of the new, any old theory could be immunized against criticism. - A new theory does not have to include the old. - Can Newton be deduced from Einstein then? Substituting the parameters of Einstein in other equations, they are still Einstein's space, time and mass! - Mass/Newton: remains. - Mass/Einstein: is convertible into energy. Newton's laws are not a special case of Einstein's because the fundamental structural elements change as well. I 116 In order to be considered a special case, the old theory must be transformed. >Theory change, >Paradigms/Kuhn. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Theories | Pocock | Gaus I 354 Theories/discourse/theory change/Pocock/Whelan: J. G. A. Pocock, a practitioner of [the ‚linguistic turn‘], explains that it involves a shift from the 'history of political thought' to the 'history of discourse', making reference or alluding to methodologists such as Saussure, Gadamer, and Kuhn, as well as Skinner, who have influenced his work (1985(1): ch. l; cf. Pocock, 1987)(2). >F. Saussure, >H.G. Gadamer, >Th. Kuhn, >Q. Skinner, >Linguistic turn. The objective, he argues, is 'the recovery of an author's language no less than of his intentions, toward treating him as inhabiting a universe of langues that give meaning to the paroles he performs in them'. >Parole. Thus a given thinker may draw upon several distinct languages, shifting from one to the other or combining them in creative ways. >Theory change, >Meaning Change. The research of Pocock and various associates on the Anglophone eighteenth century, for example, has touched upon the distinctive discourses of republicanism, 'ancient constitutionalism', 'politeness', natural and common law jurisprudence, Anglicanism, and political economy, among others. This approach is exemplified by - and indicated in the very titles of- works such as Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (1993)(3) and Anthony Pagden (1987)(4). >Discourses, >Discourse theory. 1. Pocock, J. G. A. (1985) Virtue, Commeme, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Pocock, J. G. A. (1987) 'The concept of a language and the métier d 'historien: some considerations on practice'. In Anthony Pagden, ed., The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Phillipson, Nicholas and Quentin Skinner, eds (1993) Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Pagden, Anthony, ed. (1987) The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. Whelan, Frederick G. 2004. „Political Theory of the Renaissance and Enlightenment“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Theories | Putnam | VI 389 Theory/Putnam: earlier theories are limiting cases of later theories. This is convergence and that explains also why theoretical terms retain their reference. >Convergence, >Theoretical terms, >Reference, >Theory change, >Meaning change. VI 392 Ideal Theory/Putnam: if we can see the fulfillment-relation as unintended, it is useless to say that even the ideal theory "in reality" could be wrong. >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. --- I (a) 49 Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the meaning. Otherwise, the term gravity would change if a 10th planet was discovered. In addition, the positivists demand that the theory is dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. I (b) 63 Theory/Putnam: two theories do not have to have equivalent terms, but only the same reference. I (c) 97 Truth/logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives are not determined by their formal logic. -> Holism/Quine: the distinction between the whole theory and meanings of each statement is useless. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Theory of Relativity | Feynman | I 117 Relativity Theory/Einstein/Feynman: every thing that has energy also has mass. Mass in the sense that it is subject to the gravitational effect. Even light that has energy, has a "mass". I 217 Def Relativity Principle/Newton: "The movements of objects within a given space are the same in relation to one another, whether the space is at rest or whether it moves constantly on a straight line." I 218 Feynman: the Newtonian laws appear to be the same in a uniformly moving system. Cf. >Theory change, >Meaning change. I 235 Twin Paradox/Feynman: one might think: If by the movement of one twin that one ages more slowly, that because of the relative movement of the two to each other both should actually "become younger"? Cf. >Relativity theory/Bergson. FeynmanVs: there is an asymmetry in the twin paradox: the man who experiences the acceleration at the start and at landing is the one who ages more slowly. The other one is in a completely different situation. Only the one who has moved can come back. That is a difference between them in an absolute sense and it is also true. >Absoluteness. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Time | Russell | Russell, Bertrand. ABC der Relativitätstheorie, Frankfurt, 1989 II 38 Time/Concurrence/Relativity Theory/Russell: concurrence only has a meaning with respect to an observer. - Each clock measures its own time correctly. - The own time does not provide a measure of bodies moving relative to it. - From the perspective of accelerated electrons their own mass remains equal. - For them, the observer becomes thicker or thinner. - Russell: We must look at the distances between events, not between bodies. >Relativity theory, >Observation. II 55 Concurrence/Russell: comes into play in relation with congruence. >Simultaneity. II 55f Time/Place/Relativity Theory/Russell: There is no same time for different observers. - That is why we always need to provide the time and place for an event. - Event instead of body: is an observed body. II 65 Time/Time Dilatation/Relativity Theory/Special Relativity Theory/Russell: events towards which the traveler is moving seem to him like things of the past. - The events lying behind him seem to be in the future. - For the observer standing on the railway line they seem to be in the present. II 105 Power/Relativity Theory/Russell: is no longer a fundamental concept of dynamics - more like "sunrise". The same force applied to a heavy body does not cause as much acceleration as a lighter one. >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Absoluteness. II 121 "During"/Relativity Theory/Physics/Logical Form/Russell: multiplication with time. - ((s) Division: E.g. speed: would not be referred to as "during" - In contrast, "during": E.g. Maintained speed times a time - result: distance traveled -> acceleration. sec2: here multiplication comes in again. - the fact that a particle follows a geodesic is then the "principle of least effect". >Principles/Feynman. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Translation | Kuhn | I 214 Translation/Language/Kuhn: What people can do within a communication is to recognize each other as members of different language communities and to become translators. >Incomensurability, >Theories/Kuhn, >Theory Change. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Translation | Lewis | IV 33 Elimination/Eliminate/Translation/Lewis: E.g. singular terms must be eliminated prior to the translation into another theory. - Afterwards they can be introduced again. - E.g. descriptions: before being eliminated, they must get a domain - various domains provide non-equivalent translations. Cf. >singular terms, >rigidity, >theory change, >meaning change. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Translation | Vendler | Grewendorff/Meggle Linguistik und Philosophie Weinheim 1995 (German) I 259 Translation/Vendler: "Could I say the same thing in Chinese?" Problem: "the same" here is incomprehensible. However possible: Angle sum of the Euclidean triangle in the Riemannian geometry. >Comparison, >Comparability, >Identity, >Meaning, >Theory change, >Meaning change. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Use Theory | Sellars | Rorty III 193 Vs theory of use: Sellars, Bernard Williams: physics has a priority over other discourse constituents. (HeideggerVs). >Meaning, >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Science, >Physics, >Truth, >Theoretical language, >Everyday language, >Use theory, >Language use, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Vagueness | Williamson | Field II 283 Vagueness/Williamson Puzzles/WilliamsonVsNonfactualism/Field: (Williamson 1994): thesis: for any question there is a simple argument for the conclusion that it has a specific, objective, factual answer. - E.g. Joe is rich or Joe is not rich. - Then there is in each case a fact if he is rich or if he is not rich. Then E.g. Verdi/Bizet is pointless for Williamson. ((s) Bizet/Verdi/Explanation/(s): in what world would Bizet and Verdi have been countrymen? - In a world in which Verdi would have been French or Bizet Italian. - Problem: which of the two worlds is closer to our world? - This shows that you can't specify a similarity metric.) >Similarity metrics. FieldVsWilliamson: E.g. then there must be an inaccessible fact which decides whether the pre-Newtonians mean mass or weight: implausible. >Theory change, >Meaning change. II 284 Quantum mechanics: here the Nonfactualism is different. >Facts, >Non-factualism, >Quantum mechanics. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Verificationism | Putnam | VII 440 VsVerificationism: verificationism must say that we understand sentences about the past by asking how we will verify them in the future. >Meaning Change, >Theory Change, >Confirmation. V 145 Verificationism/Putnam: the methods of verification have been institutionalized by modern society. >Convention. I 52 Def meaning/Price: the meaning of a mental view is identical to the sum of its practical consequences. Putnam: this leads to verificationism. >Meaning, >Content. I 53 Argument of the open question/Putnam: what does an expression mean if it means more than that we will have certain experiences (position of verificationism)? PutnamVs: the verificationist talks here as if he/she had succeeded in translating our everyday language into a special sensualist language. But one should not demand that every word of the thing speech (thing language) has the same meaning in the sensual language. Verificationism/Putnam: verificationism is a phenomenalism at its core. >Phenomenalism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Vocabulary | Field | II 237 Deflationism/VsDeflationism: is it possible that most of our present scientific concepts have less power in a deflationist perspective? >Deflationism, >Concepts, >Observation, >Explanation, >Theory language. Field: perhaps this is so: deflationism shows that there is no best translation of Newtonian terms into modern language. >Theory change, >Meaning change. New Vocabulary/Field: can often be captured with old vocabulary plus higher-order quantification. This is e.g. a Ramsey sentence. >Conservativity, >Ramsey sentence, >Quantification, >Description levels, >Levels (Order). II 267 Applying/Explaining/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - This explains why some non-standard models are unintended. >Satisfaction, >Reference, >Unintended models, >Models, >Model theory. II 355 Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: = Having non-standard models. Solution: Extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". FieldVs: that is cheating. >Expansion/Field. New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. Cheating: If it was to be assumed that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Yet FieldVsIndeterminism) --- III 9 Pure Mathematics/Application/Field: E.g. Number theory: is not applicable to the world. - For example, set theory: must allow primordial elements for the application. Solution: "impure mathematics": Functions that map physical objects to numbers - Then the comprehension axioms must also contain non-mathematical vocabulary. E.g. instances of the separation axiom. >Comprehension. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Words | Heidegger | Cardorff II 68 Words/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's etymological derivations are controversial. >TugendhatVsHeidegger. E.g. Originally, "place" means "the tip of the spear". .. "The place gathered together into the highest and the utmost, the gathering decomposes and permeates everything, the place, the gathering, brings in to itself. Cf. >Word meaning, >Concepts, >Words, >Meaning, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Field Vs Carnap, R. | I 118 FieldVsCarnap: although my approach is similar to that of Carnap in Meaning and Necessity, 1) it does not refer to meaning at all. I.e. no "meaning relations between predicates" ((s)> meaning postulates). 2) my treatment of free variables does not require the introduction of "individual concepts" and is consistently anti-essentialist. (FieldVsEssentialism): no formula of the form "MB" is true in a model with view to an attribution function if it is not also true in the model in relation to any other attribution function. Nino Cocchiarella/Carnap/Field: Cocchiarella: ("On the Primary and Secondary semantics of logical necessity"): an approach similar to Carnap: FieldVsCocchiarella/FieldVsRamseyFieldVsCarnap: leads to Ramsey’s bizarre conclusion that E.g. "it is possible that there are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 objects" is logically false if the world happens to contain fewer objects (empirical). FieldVsCarnap: 3) his idea that modal concepts are derived from semantic concepts should be modified, Field: Just the other way around! (QuineVsField). II 186 Referential Indeterminacy/Reference/Theory Change/Reference Change/Semantic Change/Field: we now have all the components for the indeterminacy of reference: Only (HR) and (HP) remain, but are mutually exclusive. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. In fact there is no fact on the basis of which you could opt for one of two. Vs: it could be argued that we only lack additional information. FieldVsVs: but then it should be possible already to say what kind of information that is supposed to be. And we have already found that there can be no fact here. "Mass"/Newton/Denotation/Reference/Field: the issue is not that we do not know what Newton’s "mass" denotes, but that Newton’s word was referentially indeterminate. (Because we do not know which of the two, HP or HR should be excluded.) II 187 The truth and falsity of (4R) and (5P) cannot be explained on the basis of what Newton referred to. FieldVsReferential Semantics/FieldVsCarnap: this is excluded by this indeterminacy of reference. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Empiricism | Quine Vs Empiricism | IV 397 British Empiricism: based on ideas in the mind. These are of course not intersubjectively observable. That means the foundation is private, not public. QuineVsBritish Empiricism: VsMentalistic approach: in the Quine's eyes not consistent. One should stick to what openly observed is true to anyone. Language is nothing private, but something social. IV 398 The language: a social skill that is acquired through the observation of the social use. The externalization of empiricism leads to behavioral access to meaning. (Behaviorism). IV 402 QuineVsBritish Empiricism: Is based on the assumption of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical mentalism. Too simple picture of the experiential reference of languages and theories. VI 11 "Linguistic Turn"/Quine: that was good, but not good enough: the distinction between observation sentences and theoretical propositions was only made derivatively, no theoretical terms should appear. Therefore Reichenbach used "bridge sentences" to connect the two sentence types. (VsBritish Empiricism). Observation/Quine: we do not start with objects (we eliminate them), but with sentences! This allows us to define the observation sentence, without bothering about whether it is theory-free or not! We also no longer need to decide which objects the words should designate! (Without reification). Instead of objects stimulus meaning: the willingness to agree to a sentence. VI 11/12 Singular Term/Singular Terms/Ontology/Existence/Quine: if we had assumed terms instead of sentences, we would have skipped the whole issue of objectification and always conceded object-relation from the hollow gut. Meaning Theory/M.Th./Quine: must be empirical. QuineVsLogical Empiricism: neither the analytical truths nor the observation base resists the skeptical attack. V 189 Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look like at best? We want as many as possible and good predictions. Guiding principles: simplicity and conservatism. V 190 Both are in a dialectical relation! (To use an expression by my students). An strong oversimplification can justify a relatively large deviation. Between the two, we need a compromise. Conservatism/Quine: among other things, caused by our lack of imagination. But also prudence when it comes to hypotheses. Simplicity/Conservativeness: both are already at work in language learning. Language Learning/Quine: occurs in leaps and bounds. Is always based on similarities and analogies. V 191 Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def Relative Empiricism/Quine: do not stray further from sense data than necessary. Quine pro: That keeps theory changes low. QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope to reduce talk of objects to talk of sense data. Important argument: that requires us to stick with the substitutional quantification over abstract objects. This speaks to the nominalistic mind. It manifests itself in relative empiricism, for both are the same. Nominalism: must not overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of sQ. In general, we can say the values of variables determine the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates. Stalnaker I 3 QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: when it comes to accepting or not accepting a whole language, along with a theory that is formulated in this language, then it is not certain that there is a base for a distinction which are the language rules (rules), and what are the judgments about the world. There is no theory-neutral way to separate factual questions from semantic ones. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Feyerabend, P. | Rorty Vs Feyerabend, P. | Rorty I 300 Semantic Change/Criterion/Rorty: the search for a criterion for semantic change was disastrous. It became clear that Feyerabend had put forward his own argument wrong when he spoke of semantic change. Meaning/PutnamVsFeyerabend: for Feyerabend, meaning depends on the entire theory. If we were to assume that empiricism changed the meaning of an expression, it would be the same as abandoning the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact. >Meaning Change, >Theory Change. To say that the semantic rules of German cannot be distinguished from the empirical opinions of its speakers would be to throw the notion of a semantic rule of German overboard. Any appearance of sensation would be lost, for "sensation" depends on the fact that you are constantly moving back and forth between an unusual and the traditional conception of meaning. V 19 VsFeyerabend/Rorty: Putnam's and Davidson's criticism can at most do something against a few careless points in some early writings by Feyerabend. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Field, H. | Putnam Vs Field, H. | Field IV 405 Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam. 1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects. 2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all. Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language. Field IV 406 Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.). One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms. Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory. 3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things. VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects). Field IV 429 Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world. Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory. PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses? However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3. I: is a definite set of individuals. Williams II 430 P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P. This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism). Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique. Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory. PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then? Field/Putnam: could cover two positions: 1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or. 2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective. Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc. Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general? Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible. Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth. If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification. --- Putnam III 208 Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description". --- Putnam V 70 Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume: (1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y. Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions. Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world. V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth). ---- Putnam I (c) 93 PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Field Vs Kuhn, Th. | II 183 Theory Change/Semantic Change/Reference/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1962.101): The references of Einsteinian concepts are never the identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. Newton’s mass is maintained, Einstein’s can be converted to energy. FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, because Einstein showed that there is no "Newtonian mass"! Semantic Change/Kuhn/Field: I do not deny that Newton’s "mass" meant something else, but I also do not deny Kuhn’s assertions about meaning, but about reference or denotation. Kuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts have a different meaning and therefore no reference at all. FieldVsKuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts do have different meanings, but they refer to a set of objects where the present terms only refer to a subset of these objects. (see below). II 184 FieldVsKuhn: I deny that there ever was such a thing as "Newtonian mass" or ever will be. And therefore Newton himself can never have referred to "Newtonian mass". Therefore, no further positive analytic hypotheses are possible other than merely (HP) and (HR). (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. Problem: now we have to consider the negative (HA): that Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing, just as "Nicholas" denotes nothing. (HA) Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing at all. Problem: then we have to attribute false truth values to Newton’s (indisputable) sentences (sentence tokens). Nicholas/Unicorn/Solution/Frege: Some phrases have truth value gaps. Newton/Field: E.g. undeniably true statement by Newton with which every physicist agrees: (7) In order to accelerate a body uniformly between any pair of various speeds more force is required if the mass of the body is greater. That certainly seemed to be true in Newton’s time. And the RT agrees with him (both for net mass and relativistic mass). II 195 Theory Change/Denotation/FieldVsKuhn: one should not say that Newton’s "mass" did not denote anything. In that case, a sentence like E.g. "The mass of the Earth is less than that of the Sun" would not have been literally true if Newton had expressed it. Solution/Field: you should at least speak of a "conveyance of information". (Also FieldVsLanguage Rules). |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Rorty Vs Kuhn, Th. | IV 20 Kuhn: (according to Rorty) Theses (1) While there is no way to translate the Aristotelian vocabulary into the definition of Galileo, each of the two could learn the vocabulary of the other! IV 21 (2) Accordingly, there is no way to argue against the views of Aristotle on the basis of beliefs formulated in Galileo's vocabulary, nor vice versa. (3) So both have to be considered true. Therefore, the use of the expression "true" must be relativized depending on vocabulary. (4) convictions are made true by the world. (5) but it is not possible that the beliefs of Aristotle and of Galileo are made true by one and the same world. Therefore, there must be different worlds. RortyVsKuhn: this can be refuted by either questioning the step from (2) to (3) or by disputing (4). >Incommensurability, >Theory Change, >Meaning Change, >Vocabulary. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Leeds, St. | Field Vs Leeds, St. | II 281 Indeterminacy/Own Language/Theory Change/Leeds/Field: (Leeds, Steven 1997), Section IV) LeedsVs indeterminacy within a theory (within one language): Field: Leeds view seems to be disquotational, i.e. the reference of our own expressions should be determined according to the following scheme: (R) if b exists, then "b" refers to b and nothing else. Foreign Language/Theory Change: In this case, it only makes sense relative to a correlation between the concept of the two theories. More Moderate View/Field: we might as well have an unrelativized concept of reference that extends beyond our own concepts, this will, however, be very vague. FieldVsLeeds: it seems very reasonable to assume that the concepts of our currently best theories are vague. Simply because many aspects still have room for improvement. E.g. Ricci tensor: will probably not just refer directly to something, but it will not be without any reference either. Falseness/Theory/False Theory/Field: E.g. "mass"/"weight" makes it clear that if a theory is false, it is often because of the vagueness of terms. Correctness/Translation/Theory/Field: the concept of a "correct translation" is nonsense: E.g. root -1, "i"/"-i" "/" / "" (see above). This is not about an epistemic limitation. There is no "subtle fact" that we cannot know, it is rather the case that there is no certain fact that makes a difference. The example is interesting in the context of Leeds: it seems as if also our own terms "i" and "-i" would be indeterminate, because: Chauvinism/Theory/Theory Change/Asymmetry/Field: it would be chauvinistic to assume that our own theory is determined if we attest indeterminacy to the other theory. FieldVsLeeds: he cannot avoid the accusation of chauvinism, because he denies our own theory indeterminacy. II 282 Solution: In the process of language acquisition (learning, use) we learn to accept (R) and that creates no connection between "refers" as applied to "/" and "i". Asymmetry/Chauvinism/Field: we get this asymmetry without chauvinism: our term "i" is as indeterminate as the foreign term "/", it is just that the indeterminacy is "hidden" in our normal semantic statements, because these semantic concepts contain a compensating indeterminacy! (f..o.th. compensation). Indeterminacy/FieldVsLeeds: this dissolves the doubts regarding the indeterminacy of our own language. The fact that "i" refers to i does not show that "i" is determined, it is therefore compatible with the fact that "i" and "refers disquotationally" are both indeterminate. Caution: This only shows how a prior indeterminacy of "i" would lead to an indeterminacy of "refers disquotationally". Indeterminacy/Own Language/FieldVsLeeds: the possibility of indeterminacy of our own language can also be shown regardless of the theory of reference, and thus also of disquotationality: surely, vagueness is a kind of indeterminacy, and that is everywhere. Vagueness: it can also be problematic itself: Vagueness/Williamson’s Riddle/Field: (Williamson 1994): there are people who consider the riddle to be so serious that it would be doubtful whether II 283 the phenomenon of vagueness (or, more generally, of indeterminacy) would be a real phenomenon. |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Malcolm, N. | Putnam Vs Malcolm, N. | IV 171 Theory Change/PutnamVsMalcolm, Norman: the new meaning is not given to the words. The sentence simply had no use previously. Meaning change/term change: some authors: you should not confuse the meaning change with a change of distribution (distribution) of a word. E.g. "go around the earth" can be a normal sentence, but no circumstances can be imagined in which the assertion of the identity of physical and mental states would not have got different. PutnamVs: this idea is not a good argument: for primitive people, it was inconceivable that the Earth would have been around. 40 years ago, the advances in modern science may have been unimaginable. The point is another: --- IV 172 Theoretical Identification: "is": (2) light is electromagnetic radiation (of this and this wavelength). (3) water is H2O. To (2): before the identification, there were two separate theoretical disciplines: optics and the theory of electromagnetic fields. It was a decision to define light as "electromagnetic radiation", justified by the following considerations: 1. it allowed to derive laws of optics from "more fundamental" laws of physics. 2. it allowed the derivation of new predictions in the reduced discipline (Optics). E.g. that the laws of geometrical optics would not apply in certain cases. (See Duhem: reduction of Kepler's laws to Newton's). For the identification of mental states with physiological states we needed not mere "correlates" of subjective states, but we needed something more far-reaching: --- IV 172/173 We must know physical states, with which we could not only predict, but also causally explain human behavior. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Metaphysical Realism | Putnam Vs Metaphysical Realism | VI 390 Truth/metaphysical realism/Putnam: thesis: truth is not radically epistemic. Because we could all be brains in a vat, even the most beautiful and most ideal, simplest and most conservative theory could be wrong. Verification/metaphysical realism: then "verified" implies not "true". Peircean Realism/Putnam: thesis: there is an ideal theory (weaker: than a regulative idea that is presupposed by the terms "true" and "objective"). PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: I criticize precisely the characteristic that distinguishes it from Peirce's realism. E.g. T1: is an ideal theory as we understand it. We imagine that it has any property except for objective truth; e.g. it is complete, consistent, predicts observations accurately (as we see and meets all "operational restrictions", it is "beautiful", "simple", etc. Putnam: thesis: T1 may still be wrong. E.g. WORLD/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Suppose, it can be divided into an infinite number of parts. And T1 says that there are infinitely many parts in it, so that it is "objectively correct" in this regard. T1: is consistent (by hypothesis) and has only finite models. Completeness Theorem: according to it, T1 has a model for every infinite cardinality. M: is a model with the same cardinality as the WORLD. (This is finite.) The particulars of M are mapped one to one to the parts of the WORLD. We use this mapping to define the relations of M directly in the WORLD. SAT: is then the result of it: a fulfillment relationship, a "correspondence" between the terms of L and sets of parts of the WORLD. ((s) sets because of the predicates). Truth: the theory results then in "true" when we interpret "true" as "TRUE(SAT)". (I 403 thereby SAT is of the same logical type as "satisfied" and TRUE(SAT) is defined in terms of SAT like "true" is defined in terms of "satisfied" with Tarski). VI 391 TRUE(SAT): is then the property of the truth, determined by the relation SAT. ideal theory: Question: what becomes of the claim that even the ideal theory could be wrong" in reality"? Solution: It may be that SAT is not the intended correspondence relation (unintended model). "Intended"/Putnam: what does it mean in this case? T1 meets all operational limitations. E.g. if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" belongs to T1, VI 392 then that will naturally appear true when there is a cow in front of me. But SAT is a true interpretation of T. Definition operational conditions/Putnam/(s): that a sentence can be falsified if the object does not have the properties that the sentence attributes to it. T1 is TRUE(SAT). Thus, the sentence is "true" in this sense, in the sense of TRUE(SAT). On the other hand: if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" is operationally "wrong" (falsified), then the sentence is FALSE(/ SAT). Reference: thus, it meets the "operational conditions". theoretical conditions: the interpretation of "reference" as SAT meets all theoretical conditions for reference. N.B.: so the "ideal" theory T1 becomes true. ((s) Problem: We wanted to ask how it can be wrong according to the metaphysical realism). unintended: question: what additional conditions are there for reference, that could SAT pick out as "unintended" and a different interpretation as intended? Putnam: thesis, the assumption that even an "ideal" theory could be wrong "in reality", should then be incomprehensible. Causal theory/reference/metaphysical realism/Putnam: a causal theory of reference would not help here, because how "cause" should clearly refer, is, according to the metaphysical realism, as much a mystery as "cow" can clearly refer. VI 393 Reference/anti-realism/verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/anti-realism/Dummett: thesis, the theory of understanding should be operated in terms of verification and falsification. DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (for example, sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses truth-conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood. Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence is to know what would be its verification. Analogy: for the intuitionism: knowing the constructive proof, is to understand a mathematical proposition. Assertibility condition/assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified. Verification/Dummett/Putnam. N.B.: we say the sentence is verified when it is pronounced > Firth: Definition self-affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirmative. It is thus verified when it is pronounced. This does not mean that it is incorrigible. It also does not have to be completely determined (bivalent). Facts/Dummett/Putnam: thesis: in this sense (the "self-affirmation of observation sentences" (Firth)) all facts are "soft". VI 394 N.B.: thereby, the realistic terms of truth and falsity are not used. N.B.: the problem how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise. Because the term "reference" is not used. Reference: can we introduce it à la Tarski, but then ""cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and understanding this sentence needs no metaphysical realism. Facts/verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: one should not operate the verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither the one of sense data). Otherwise you could repeat all objections VsMetaphysical Realism on the level that the meta language gets incomprehensible (which would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein's private language argument). (?). Solution/Dummett: we need to apply the verificationism also in the meta language and the meta-meta language etc. Understanding/truth condition/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible vice-versa in what this knowledge should be. Meaning/meaning theory/PutnamVsDummett: but I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (with a theory of reference, not meaning theory). Realism/Putnam: then it is not wrong per se, but only the metaphysical, which was just a picture anyway. (So you could say at least). Solution: Internal realism is all we need. Problem: that is not the whole story: Peirce: the metaphysical realism collapses at a certain point, and this point tells us something, because it is precisely this point at which the metaphysical realism claims to be distinguishable from Peirce's realism . (That is, from the proposition that there is an ideal theory). PeirceVsMetaphysical realism/PutnamVsPeirce: is mistaken when he says that the metaphysical realism collapses at this exact spot. And I, myself, was already wrong in this point. > E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism/PutnamVsPeirce: the metaphysical realism is incoherent elsewhere: E.g. Suppose, the WORLD is merely a straight line. Then you can tell 2 stories about the WORLD: Story 1: there are points. That is, the line has segments which can be infinitely small. The same relation "part of" is valid between points and segments that contain it VI 396 and between segments and large segments. Story 2: there are no points. Line and all segments have expansion. Thus, it is not claimed that story 1 would be wrong, points are simple logical constructions of segments. Speech about points is derived from speech about segments. VI 397 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Problem: when you cannot say how the WORLD theory is independent, the speech of all these descriptions will be empty. Putnam: Quine says that in "Ontological Relativity". E.g. Theory: if we have a complete theory, we can define an equivalence relation (AER): "provable co-extensiveness", with the property that if two terms belong to different equivalence classes (Aeki), no model of the theory refers to the referent, while, if they belong to the same equivalence class, they have the same referent in each model. We take advantage of that. Now, if our view is correct, VI 399 then there is a unique reference maintaining "translation", which connects the two languages. Problem: it is known that there are often not equivalent interpretations of a theory within another theory. Story 1 can be interpreted in Story 2, namely in many different ways. E.g. "points" can be understood as sets of segments with negative power of two. Or sets of segments whose lengths are negative powers of 3. VsMetaphysical Realism/problem: if that was so, there ought to be a fact about which translation "really" contains the reference. Putnam: now we can make the picture again more complicated in order to also address the second objection: we allow that the language has more than one way, how it can be applied to the WORLD. (> way of use). Problem: we can no longer hold onto the image itself. If that, what is a unique set of things within a correct theory, could be "in reality" no definite set, then we have no picture anymore. Internal realism/Putnam: why is it not refuted by all of these? VsInternal Realism: E.g. he might ask, "how do you know that "cow" refers to cows"? After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language). VsVs: E.g. Suppose, God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory. Problem: there would still be infinitely many possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the sentence ""cow" refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then, that it is true in this sense of "true" that there is a unique "intended" interpretation? "How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a certain set of things as opposed to a certain set of things in each accessible interpretation?" Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the reverse direction. Reference/internal RealismVsVs: that "cow" refers to cows, follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism would be wrong. Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth. not revisable: but it is not absolutely unrevisable that "cow" refers to cows, but to revise it you would have to reject the whole theory. Metaphysical RealismVs: The question is therefore not answered: ""cow" refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question. VI 401 Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism/Putnam: the metaphysical realism makes it a mystery how there can be truths a priori, even in the contextual sense, even as a limiting case. An a priori truth must be given by a mysterious intuition. Even E.g. "bachelors are unmarried" would only be a priori due to an intuition. But if it is a "verbal" truth ((s)> "analytical", true because of the meaning of the words) then this is an abbreviation for E.g. "All unmarried men are unmarried. And that is an instance of "all AB are A". And why is that true? VI 404 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism is doomed to a) consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believed, myself) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or b) he must see the logic as a priori in the sense, which cannot be explained by the term of convention. --- Field IV 414 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (Reason, Truth and History pp 135f, 142f, 210f): Thesis metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. And this leads to relativism and the relativism refutes itself. --- VII 440 Theory Change/truth value/Putnam: not every sentence changes the truth value when it changes from an acceptable theory in another acceptable theory. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: but to set off an image, it suffices to show that his project of a complete description of the world without such sentences that change truth values, is impracticable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Structuralism | Luhmann Vs Structuralism | Kass. 14 Structure/System Theory/Luhmann: the strictly operative system theory changes the concept of structure again: systems consist of operations and only as long as these operations can be repeated. Structures are only real if they are used. They are not "ideas" above the world. Reality/Luhmann: are only the operations themselves! The question is then, how one operation comes to the next, and there lies the function of structures. How does an operation find a suitable next one, or how does it generate itself in a starting position. Whereby one has already passed, the other is only the future. However, the reality of the structure is not a "long-term mode". But the reality of the structure corresponds to being "quoted": being used. If they are used, they exist. Kass.14 Structure/Process/System Theory/Luhmann: this has the consequence that one takes the system theory out of the division of structure/process. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Indeterminacy | Field, Hartry | II 196 Indeterminacy / Field: (of meaning) should be separated from the theory of reference. II 235 Referential ambiguity / vagueness / theory change / Field: e.g. the problem with Newton s term mass is similar to the problems with vague terms such as "bald". |
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| Convergence | Putnam, H. | Horwich I 389 Convergence / theory / Putnam: Thesis: earlier theories are special cases (borderline cases, limiting cases?) of later theories. This makes it possible to understand theoretical terms (TT) as retaining their reference beyond the theory change. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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