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Best Explanation | Wright | I 146 Best Opinion/Wright, Crispin: The best opinion is an optimal judgment. - It forms a conceptual basis of truth. - Then the best opinion is necessarily true.- Then follows: Projectivism/Wright: projectivism is committed to the basic equation: e.g.: "Square" only when noted under standard conditions by standard observers. >Standard conditions. Contrary to this: Detectivism: here, the best opinion only reflects: Then it should be possible that certain best opinions are not causally properly come about. - Then the basic equations are only contingently true. >Beliefs, >Theories, >Observation, >Method, >Truth, >Assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
Concepts | Psychological Theories | Corr I 96 Concepts/psychological theories/Allport/Carr/Kingsbury/Deary: Allport’s (Allport 1931)(1) was not a lone voice in the inter-war years’ thinking about the conceptual nature of traits. >Concepts/Allport, >Lexical studies, >Lexical hypothesis. Carr and Kingsbury (1938)(2) recognized that there were trait names in everyday life, that we knew what we meant by them in practical terms, and that they had been introduced to psychology. They opened up by attempting a definition (p. 497): ‘A trait is a conceptual attribute or definition of the reactive nature of the individual. The nature of the individual is defined on the basis of certain observable behaviour characteristics.’ These characteristics, lexically, were nicely described: how an adverbial description of a response (acting persistently), can become a characteristic adjective if it is observed consistently (a persistent person), and how these can become abstracted from people as trait nouns (persistence). Conceptual nature of traits/Carr/Kingsbury: If we knew the ‘organic conditions’ underlying traits we should probably define traits in those terms; but we don’t, so we use ‘behavioural correlates’.(3) Deary: Carr and Kingsbury understood that some trait terms were universal, nomothetic. They saw that people could be located on a dimension made up from antagonistic trait names. They saw similarities in groups of trait words that would allow for groups of similar trait names. >nomothetic/idiographic. For the philosophical discussion cf. >projectivistic/detectivistic, >Euthyphro. 1. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72 2. Carr, H. A. and Kingsbury, F. A. 1938. The concept of traits, Psychological Review 45: 497–524 3. Ibid. p. 510 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Ethics | Moore | Stegmüller IV 172 Objectivity/Ethics/Mackie: However, there is a level of objectivity in the question of what are generally accepted measures of value. >Objectivity, >Values, >Noncognitivism/Cognitivism, >Acceptability. Stegmüller IV 173 This corresponds to a second-level subjectivism. This is supported by: 1. Relativity argument: we meet different moral rule systems in the world. Objectivism would have to characterize all but one as an error. >Subjectivism, >Objectivism, >Subjectivity, >Emotivism, >Relativism. Stegmüller IV 175 2. Peculiarity argument: whoever believes in objective values and norms must take this belief seriously. This leads to peculiar entities such as "shouldbedone", "shouldnotbedone", etc. >Norms. Representatives: Moore: Values are "nonnatural qualities". They demand a special ability of insight. (Detectiveism, "Euthyphro", intuitionism).> >Euthyphro, >Detectivism. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
Euthyphro | Euthyphro: (goes back to Plato's homonymous dialogue) This is about the question whether something is good because it pleases the gods or whether it pleases the gods because it is good. See also projectivism, detectivism, attribution, properties, justification, circularity. |
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Euthyphro | Wright | I 108 Definition Euthyphro/Plato ("Eutyphro contrast") Realist, Socrates: certain actions are liked by gods because they are pleasing to God. The gods have the ability to recognize the property, the property of Godliness is one thing, to track it another. This is the "detectivistic" version. Extension falls apart. Contrary to this: Anti-realist, Eutyphro: certain actions are pleasing to god because they are liked by gods This is constitutively dependent on the opinion of the gods, not to explore epistemically, not independent of the opinions. The "because" here is conceptual, "projectivistic". Extension: coincides here. Realist/Dummett: certain statements (in the questioned discourse) are super-asserting, because they are true. (Constitutive independence of truth of the super-assertibility). >Assertibility. Anti-realist: such statements are true because they are super-assertible. >Superassertibility, >Antirealism. I 142 Euthyphro/Plato: Certain actions are pleasing to God, because the gods like them (awarding of a predicate, projection). Counter position: Realism: they are liked, because they are pleasing to God: Here something is detected, there is an ability, it is "detectivistic". Color/Johnston: shape is read detectivistically, color projectivistically. I 143 Euthyphro/Wright: basic equation: For all S, P: P if and only if (CS, then RS) S: each actor "P": all the judgments of a very broad class of judgments; "RS": expresses that S shows a certain relevant reaction; "CS": fulfillment of certain optimality conditions for that particular reaction. The fulfillment of the conditions C through S ensures that no other circumstances of an alternative could give a greater credibility. Basic equation/Mark Johnston: E.g. x is square if and only if x is seen by standard observers under standard conditions as square. - This also applies for red. >Standard conditions. Shape/color/Johnston: central difference: shape: gets detectivistic - color: is read projectivistically. Moral discourse: this discours is like the discourse about color. I 152 Euthyphro/projectivistic:> a priori knowledge - detectivistic: not a priori, not analytical. >a priori, >Analyticity, >Knowledge, >Morality, >Color, >Perception, >Judgments. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
General Terms | Zink | Wolf II 173 General term/natural kind/Zink: unlike proper names general names do not depend on historical facts but on the current use. >Language use, >Names, >Descriptions, >General terms, >Facts. Evening Star/Morning Star: detectivistic. >Morning star/evening star. So also in the case general terms: it is a discovery that they apply to the same objects. >Natural kinds, >Reference. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
Person | Rorty | I 50 Def Personality/Rorty thesis: Personality is a function of our decisions, not our knowledge. >Freedom, >Person, cf. >Projectivistic/detectivistic. Cf. >Psychological theories on Personality, >Psychological theories on personality traits. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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Hare, R.M. | Mackie Vs Hare, R.M. | Stegmüller IV 171 HareVs Objectivist ethics: incomprehensible, what is even meant by "objectivity of values". MackieVsHare: relapse into positivism of the 30's. At that time the question of >other minds was called pointless, as was the one of the difference between the world of phenomenalists and the world of realists. IV 172 If Hare cannot imagine anything, he should not assume futility, but make arguments against objective values. Objectivity/ethics/Mackie: however, the question of generally recognized measures of value bears a certain level of objectivity. IV 173 This corresponds to a subjectivism of 2nd order. This is supported by: 1. Relativity argument: we encounter different moral regulatory systems in the world. Objectivism would have to consider all of them wrong but one. IV 175 2. peculiarity argument (Absonderlichkeitsargument): whoever believes in objective values and norms, must take this belief seriously. This leads to strange entities like "Should Be Done", "Should Be Refrained From" etc. Supporter: Moore: values are "non-natural qualities". They require a special ability of insight. (>Detectivism, >Euthyphro, >Intuitionism). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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