Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grice | Black | I 61f BlackVsGrice: Grice's theory is 1) too complicated - 2) does not cover self-talk (you do not intend to give yourself a reason...). Speaker's intention: cannot always be to produce belief in the other person: E.g. test candidate. >Knowledge paradox. Liar paradox: the liar must always tell the truth according to Grice: he has to mean "yes" when he says "no". >Paradoxes. I 64 Grice Thesis: S (speaker) means something when he intends to achieve a certain effect in L (listener), for example, that L believes that p. I 65 BlackVsGrice: that requires modifications: negative conjunctions or corresponding positive disjunctions. I 66 E.g,. there is no need to explain all infinite chess moves, but to say: "he intended the consequences of chess" is not an explanation - E.g. "keeping the king from moving", in turn, does require an explanation - that is exactly Grice's problem. - ((s) Because he assumes speaker intention which cannot be found in the rules) BlackVsSpeaker's intention - BlackVsIntended Effect. I 67 BlackVsGrice: his theory is inadequate: 1) Relying on standard effects - 2) Trust that speaker's intention brings about such effects. >Speaker's meaning, >Utterance meaning. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intentionality | Geach | I 132 Intentionality/Geach: three-digit relation: person-verb-object. E.g. For a z, z is a man and I saw z in Oxford under the aspect: "ran past". GeachVsBuridan: "ratio", "appeals to", "regard": here there are no identity conditions. >Identity conditions. There is no need for the subject to be perceived under this aspect. >Aspects. E.g. Buridan: Socrates knows that some stars are above the horizon." Geach: Suppose, Socrates is in the jungle, from which does he know? Buridan: "of those who are it". GeachVs: only of "some", not e.g. from the constellation Aries (false aspect). Incorrect complex expression: "Socrates, knows that Aries is over ..." GeachVsBuridan: Buridan exploits here the peculiarity of "know" (from knowledge follows truth). >Knowledge, >Truth, >Knowledge paradoxes. I 137 Intentional Identity/Intentionality/Geach: E.g. 1. "There is a poet whom Smith and Brown admire" - or 2. "Smith and Brown admire both the same poet" The latter would also be true if it was a high-stacker. "Under the description"/Aspect: Problem: E.g. Smith dreamed of the world's fattest woman, who is actually red-haired, but in the dream she was bald. The medieval problems are still not solved today. de dicto, >de re, >Proposition, >Intensional objects, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental objects, >Medieval philosophy. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Knowledge | Buridan | Poundstone I 186 Jean Buridan, "Sophismata": Knowledge/Knowledge Paradoxia/Buridan/Poundstone: E.g. "No one believes this sentence". If it is true, no one believes it, and consequently no one knows it. If it is wrong, at least one person believes it, but no one (neither believer nor unbeliever) knows it because it is wrong. So it is impossible for anyone to know that this sentence is true! + ... Poundstone I 187 There could be an omniscient being who knows every one of your beliefs and could tell you at any time whether you believe it. E.g. "No one knows what stands here" If it is true, no one knows it, but if it is wrong, contradiction: no one can know anything wrong. So what stands there, cannot be wrong. It is an undeniable truth that no one can know. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Knowledge | Logic Texts | Read III 202 Knowledge/Read: from knowledge follows truth. >Truth. --- Sainsbury V 141 Knowledge paradox/unexpected examination/Sainsbury: it does not matter that the students might have expectations which they are not entitled to have. V 143 It is precisely because we believe that we have refused the teacher, and that we have thus taken away the opportunity from her to let the work be written, makes the announcement come true again. Variant: the class knows of the truth of the announcement. Then n can show the class that she cannot know that it is true. Variant: the announcement also contains the fact that the class does not know because of the announcement ... - E.g. A1 "You will not know on the morning in question ..." - questionable principle: "If you know ... then you know, that one knows it. "- N.B.: a paradox occurs only when we have to conclude on W(A1). V 148 Variant: Announcement: A2 either [M and non-WM (If A2, then M)] or [D and non-WD (If A2, then D)] - New: this is self-referential - Problem: then you know on Tuesday (If A2, then D) that A2 is wrong.V V 150 Real knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: A3 W (non-A3) e.g. the man knows that the announcement is wrong -that is how we come to MV 3 (...) inter alia: "What is proved is known". - MV 3: 1. Assumed, A3 2. W (non-A3) (definition of A3) 3. Non-A3 (which is known is true) 4. If A3, then non-A3 - (1-3 combined) 5. Non-A3 (after 4.) 6. Non-W (non A3) (according to 5. + definition of A3) 7. W (non-A3) - (5. + what is proved is known). - 6 and 7 contradict each other. V 160 Locus classicus: Montague/Kaplan. V 155 Believe paradox/Sainsbury: G1 a does not believe what G1 says - if a G1 believes, then he can understand that he says something wrong. - Contains two assumptions: 1) that a can understand that G1 is false, if he believes in it, and true, if he does not believe in it. 2) that a will understand what he can understand - now one can construct through inserting of rationality, self-consciousness, as well as unity and understanding, the paradox analogously to the paradox of knowledge. V 156 Self-consciousness: If G(f), then G[G(f)]. Reasonableness: If G(f) then non-G (non-G). Closure: If G (if f, then y) and G (non-y), then G (non-f). - Although believe does not involve knowledge, one can construct the same paradox. V 160/61 Knowledge/believe/knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: there is a discussion as to whether knowledge or belief should be correctly represented by an operator or a predicate. E.g. Operator: A1 is true. E.g. predicative: it will have to do with names of expressions, rather than with their use. Montague/Kaplan: predicative version, to rule out that operators are to blame. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Knowledge | Plato | Bubner I 35 Knowledge/Cave-Parable/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge acquired by the few should not lead to theoretical self-sufficiency. The rare insight into the nature of the good is to be implemented politically. It is not a question of the value neutrality of a supreme object. The philosophers must descend again to share life with fellow prisoners. They are committed to do this because of the peculiarities of what they have seen! (Good). Only the one who has a goal in life can act rationally (reason). Summary: the idea of the good must be understood literally. The parable-like dress does not point to an ontological secret doctrine. The philosopher who, with this question of the meaning and purpose of the theory, relativizes the possibilities of the theory itself, becomes a dialectician. (Dialectic). >Good/Plato, >Dialectic/Plato. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to this with the myth of Anamnesis. (Remembrance of the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial, whether to be seen as an induction) there is prior knowledge. >Knowledge/Aristotle, cf. >Knowledge paradox. Gaus I 311 Knowledge/governance/Plato/Keyt/Miller: in the Statesman [Politikos] the Eleatic Stranger pursues the idea of the rule of reason to its logical terminus and draws a conclusion that in the Republic remains tacit - that knowledge by itself provides sufficient warrant for the application of force, even deadly force, when persuasion fails (for the antithesis see Plt. 296bl, 304d4). It is within the bounds of justice, according to the Eleatic Stranger, for the true statesman, the man who possesses the political art and is 'truly and not merely apparently a knower' , to purge his polis, with or without law, with or without the consent of his subjects, by killing or banishing some of its members (Plt. 293a2-e2). The only true constitution is the one ruled by such a person. Since such persons are exceedingly rare (Plt. 292el-293a4, 297b7-c2), a central question is how a polis bereft of a true statesman can share in reason. The answer of the Eleatic Stranger is that it can share through law, law being an imitation of the truth apprehended by the true statesman (Plt. 300c5-7, 300el 1-301a4). Imitation: Since the true statesman rules without law, there is a better and a worse way of imitating him. The rulers of a polis can imitate reason's rule by ruling according to reason's reflection in law, or they can imitate reason's lawlessness by ruling contrary to law (Plt. 300e7-301 c5). Given that the rulers are one, few, or many, there are three good and three bad imitations of the one true constitution. Since the fewer the rulers the stronger the rule, the six imitations form a hierarchy, fewer rulers being better when rule is according to law but worse when it is contrary (Plt. 302b5- 303b5). >Governance/Plato. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Omniscience | Chisholm | II 95ff Omniscience/determinism/Gombocz: omniscience and freedom of action may be in conflict: the free-doer must be able to disappoint the forecast of the omniscient. Formal paradox: the knowledge of the omniscient shall contain at least the logical truth that the actions of the free-doer are free. Omniscience does not rule out the possibility that others are omniscient, which leads to compensation losses in the other, if this free nature should be limited. II 102 VsTheism/omniscience/Gombocz: endangered by will - variant: God limited his knowledge intentionally. >Free Will, >Knowledge, >Knowledge paradoxes. Wolfgang L. Gombocz. Maxima. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Paradoxes | Poundstone | I 47 Ravenparadox/Poundstone: "This herring is red" supports both contra positions: a) "All non-black things are non-ravens" and "all non-white things are non-ravens" (contra position of "All ravens are white") - it follows:. black is white - that is the paradox. I 66 Does not need to be a paradox if the number of objects is finite. >Infinity. I 175 Knowledge paradox/prisoners paradox/Poundstone: (unexpected execution) only works if the other thinks about the situation and draws wrong conclusions. >Knowledge paradox. I 192 Knowledge paradox/prisoners paradox/Quine/Poundstone: (unexpected execution) the "knowledge" here is an illusion. - The first conclusion, after which the prisoners cannot be executed on the last day is not valid. The illogical is better off: he can suspect the right. - The assumption of a specific day causes that the execution can take place on any day. Poundstone: error: the assumption when the impossible is excluded, there should remain something possible. - If the prisoner assumes the impossibility, he can be executed on any day. I 221 Thomson's lamp/Poundstone: the light turns on for 1/2 minutes, then off for 1/4 minutes, then on for 1/8 ... Total: 1. Question: is it on or off after 1 min? (Sum of infinite elements). This is the wrong question. Analog: if the greatest number is odd/even. I 228 Ultimately physical limit: frequency, energy, switchers. Cf. >Zeno, >About Zeno. I 224 Zenon/Achilles/Poundstone: Solution: overtaking after 111,111 ... cm - the "infinity" lies in Zenon's analysis, not in physics. Arrow paradox: even in the relativity theory the moment remains blurry. - Also here we believe in cause and effect: the present determines the future. >Cause, >Effect, >Causation, >Causality, cf. >Determinism. How does the arrow know, where it must go? - This is no physical problem, the row term is no solution. I 236 Olbers Paradox: four times the area balances four times weaker radiation - it would heat up on earth to the average temperature of stars - solution: redshift. >Olbers Paradox. I 243 Tristram Shandy paradox/Russell/Poundstone: if he lived infinitly long, there would remain no day undescribed because there could be no day mentioned, for which it would be impossible. - A one-to-one allocation is possible but never completed. But not at reversal infinite past: you cannot make an unambiguous assignment of certain days to certain years. - In the last year he cannot have written about one day of this year, - There will be an infinitly long incomplete manuscript. >Time, >Past, >Future, >Present. I 400 Paradox/antinomy/Poundstone: general form: the illusion that all truth is also recognizable. Unexpected execution: the victim is wrong because he thinks he can achieve something through logical reasoning, which is impossible to achieve in that way. Newcomb's paradox: the one who makes the prediction, cannot know his own thoughts. >Newcomb's paradox. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Pollock’s Gas Chamber | Poundstone | I 215f Pollock's gas chamber/Poundstone: one can reject belief in more than one way: 1. the light looks green (without information about the color of the gas) 2. Usually things have the color that they have on the screen, therefore there is color TV. Vs: the second is even weaker than the first. - So there is even a third reason in addition to the sign next to the door. Being right for the wrong reasons: Refutation: a) rejecting: simply says that a belief is false b) undermining: that belief is invalid. E.g. if you discover that you are a brain in a vat, which is an undermining truth over all beliefs about the world. >Refutation, >Verification, cf. >Confirmation, >Brains in vat. N.B.: the belief could then still be true. Undermining better than rejecting truth. I 220 Prisoner's Paradox/knowledge paradox: (unexpected execution) the set of beliefs generates its own undermining truth - so there are refutations of refutations. I 216f Pollock's gas chamber: undermining Vs rejecting refutation. >Paradoxes, >Knowledge paradoxes. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
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