Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Observation Sentences | Quine | II 43 Categorical observation sentences: are independent of time and space "Where there’s smoke, there’s fire" - are learned through language learning - knowledge still needs space/time - but they are theoretical terms - Truth of categorical observation sentences not by observation - But falsification (> Falsification/Popper). II 43~ Empirical content = categorical observation sentences: are linking theory and observation - two theories are equivalent if all categorical sentences are identical - theory implies categorical sentences without being implied by them - a theoretical term does not appear in categorical sentence. II 218f Observation sentences are not about the experience! ((s) but about language, learning, situation, circumstances) - Quine: but they are fairly analog to the experience - single observation sentences are quite independent of each other. VI 6 Observation sentence/compound/Quine: complex observation sentence is not merely a conjunction "There is blue" and "There is a pebble" - but "This pebble is blue". VI 9 Sentences enter the link with stimulus leeway as a whole - N.B.: in this case they do not contain words, but only syllables! ((s)> Language learning, conditioning). VI 10 Observation sentence/weight of theory/Quine: learned in connection with the stimulus situation, the sentence is free of theory - but considered word by word it contains theory. >Stimulus/Quine. VI 11/12 Language learning/observation sentence/ontology/Quine: we assume full sentences - if we had assumed single words, we would have ignored the problem of ontology and would already have assumed objects. >Sentences/Quine. VI 12f Categorical observation sentence/Quine: brings hypothesis: "As soon as this, then that". VI 13 But no reification of points in time. VI 15 Circumstances: should be accompanying constantly - this makes pronouns and anaphora necessary - but not observation conditional: this is gained from un-timed (timeless) sentences using the theory. VI 59ff Observation sentence/Quine: new: no longer intersubjective agreement as a criterion. VI 61 But fluidity of communication - and efficiency of practical contact - therein lies the "factualness". XII 101 Definition observation sentence/naturalized epistemology/Quine: the sentences that are causally closest to the receptors - problem: "how to eliminate superfluous information?" XII 102 Better: sentence which is insensitive within a community when it comes to differences in past experiences. XII 103 In larger communities, the number of recognized object languages drops. >Object Language/Quine. XII 105 Decide: identity of the leeway of stimuli - ((s) Set of possible deviations must be the same for all members.) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Prediction | Genz | II 18 Theory/physics/Genz: the task of theory is not prediction, but explanation. Predictions are only for review. >Confirmation, >Measurements. II 45 Prediction/description/periodicity/Genz: question: the Babylonians could also predict solar eclipses without even knowing how the solar system was constructed. Solution: this was possible because the operations in the system are periodic. Example: "Saros cycle": after 6585 1/3 days there is another solar eclipse. II 46 Periodicity/prediction/understanding/Genz: due to periodicity, prediction is possible without understanding. That is not a why-explanation. II 56 Prediction/forecasting/Genz: it is not the laws that are needed, but the consequences of these laws. II 299 Prediction/Genz: example: assuming you have a program called "Grail" that predicts the results of all possible experiments, if you have it, you do not need any laws of nature. II 300 Prediction/Genz: for example, my program "Grail" can predict the results of all experiments without knowing anything about natural laws: Assuming we wanted to build a missile shield: Grail can hardly support it, because we need more for a plan: II 301 Plan/Genz: a plan must be more than just predicting results: it must have insight into the possibilities. >Planning. Problem: no program that answers questions can decide which questions make sense. For example "Grail": doubles nature for us. We could ask nature itself instead of the Grail. Grail does not contribute to their understanding (GenzVsInstrumentalism). >Instrumentalism. The program does not explain anything, but calls for an explanation (like nature). >Explanations. Theory/Genz: physical theories have only the task of explaining sensory impressions. They form systems of statements and draw verifiable experimental conclusions from them. ((s) = observation conditional ). >Observation conditional. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Relativism | Quine | II 44 Theory: rewording: E.g. assuming, we swap electron and molecule - any empirical statement (with theoretical term) is rated opposite - solution: we mark the theoretical terms and assign them to the two theories: then no problem, no relativism. V 89 Relative Identity/Geach: (Geach, Reference and generality, p. 39f)(1): Identity only makes sense with regard to a general term such as "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this certainly applies to the beginning of language learning. Identity/Showing/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then one could still ask. "The same what?" Example: One could have pointed once at the dog and once only at the ear. Solution: You can easily say a is identical to b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get used to the identity speech. Identity/Quine: but is still relative in a deeper sense. 1. Geach, Peter T., Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1962) II 44 Relativity of Theories/Quine: A theory formulation merely implies its categorical observational sentences without being implied by them. Therefore, the observation conditionals implied by two theory formulations can all be identical without the formulations implying each other. II 45 Let us assume that in a situation there is no possibility of harmonisation by reinterpretation of the terms. We would probably not know that they are empirically equivalent. Because that they are, one usually gets out by the discovery of such a reinterpretation. Nevertheless, we want to assume that they are empirically equivalent. Further assumed: all categorical observations are de facto true, although this is not known either. Further conditions for the truth of one theory or the other certainly cannot be set. Question: are they both true? Quine: I say yes. But even they can be logically incompatible despite their empirical equivalence, which raises the spectre of >cultural relativism. Because each of them is obviously only true from its point of view. QuineVsCultural Relativism: The spectre can easily be dispelled: by a step that is as trivial as the interchange of "electron" and "molecule": Since the two theoretical formulations are incompatible, they have to evaluate a certain sentence in the opposite direction. Since they are nevertheless empirically equivalent, this sentence must contain terms that are not sufficiently determined by observation criteria. Then we might as well pick out one of these terms and treat it as if it were two independent words, one belonging to one theory, the other to another. II 46 We could indicate this by the notation. By consistently maintaining this spelling, we could resolve any conflict between these theories. From then on, both could be accepted as terminologically different true descriptions of one and the same world. The threat of truth relativism has been averted. XI 121 QuineVsCultural Relativism/Lauener: is contradictory in itself. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Theories | Leeds | I 377 Theory/illustration/Leeds: false assumption: that the question of whether our theories depict the world, depends on whether "electrons really exist". >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Reference, >Existence, >Truth maker. I 381 Truth/theory/explanation/success/Leeds: an explanation of why true theories are successful. - (Even questionable!) - You must bring into play accordance with observation. - The theory has correct observational consequences. >Observation, >Observation consequences, >Observation conditional, >Empirical content, >Explanation, >Confirmation, >Justification. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fraassen, B. van | Cartwright Vs Fraassen, B. van | I 10 Asymmetry/Explanation/Causality/Fraassen: (The scientific image): Thesis: the asymmetries (by way of explanation) are not real!. CartwrightVsFraassen: I think he is mistaken. But his question is strong and could cause us to abandon certain explanation strategies. Cartwright Thesis: what we do not give up so easily are our strategies for action in everyday life. E.g. spraying marshes with anti-mosquito agents is effective E.g. burning sheets of malaria patients is not. I 89 FraassenVsTheoretical Entities/Cartwright: why should one believe in them?. CartwrightVsFraassen: theoretical entities exist, because there is no real regularity at the level of phenomena. Regularity/Cartwright: Only exists at the level of theoretical entities, not of phenomena. Law/Laws of Nature/Cartwright: their universal applicability does not only explain why the phenomena behave as regularly as they do, but also why we sometimes see exceptions. Van Fraassen admits that. Explanation/van Fraassen: Problem: but from the fact that a bunch of principles ensures the phenomena it cannot be concluded that they are true!. right: E.g. "I think therefore I am". wrong: E.g. "P explains Q. Q is true, therefore P is true". I 92 Electron/Cartwright: Important argument: is not an entity of any particular theory! (Electrons are not theory-dependent!). That means it is not about Bohr’s electrons in contrast to Rutherford’s electrons. CartwrightVsFraassen: I choose an E.g. of van Fraassen to show how we differ: E.g. Cloud chamber/Fraassen: unlike the contrails in the sky, we cannot see anything at the frond of the cloud chamber trail, no matter how well we look. Therefore, there are no theoretical entities. CartwrightVsFraassen: I agree with the premise, not the conclusion. I 93 Theoretical entities/Cartwright: The special thing about explanations that involve theoretical entities is that they are causal explanations (not inferring the best explanation). And existence assertion is characteristic of causal explanations. Cause/Causality/Fraassen/Cartwright: he does not believe in causes. The whole causality is a fiction. I 160 Theory//Fraassen/Sellars/Cartwright: both have extraordinary respect for the theory. Both expect it to grasp the facts about the observable correctly. For van Fraassen, theoretical assertions (about the unobservable) do not have to do that. CartwrightVsFraassen/CartwrightVsSellars: a good theory does not have either! The observation consequences ((s)> observation conditional) can be broadly what we believe to be true, but they are usually not the best we can expect. CartwrightVsFraassen: 2) For me, it is not only about the observable. I suppose theoretical entities and causal processes. This brings me closer to Sellars. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
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