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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Temporality | Gadamer | I 126 Temporality/Artwork/Gadamer: We ask about the identity of [the] self, which presents itself so differently in the changing times and circumstances. Obviously it does not throw itself into its own changing aspects in such a way that it loses its identity, but it is there in all of them. They all belong to it. They are all with it simultaneously. Thus the task of a temporal interpretation of the work of art arises. One generally calls this simultaneity and presence of the aesthetic being its timelessness. But the task is to think this timelessness together with the temporality with which it essentially belongs together. Timelessness is initially nothing but a dialectical determination that rises on the basis of temporality and in opposition to temporality. I 127 Artworks/Work of Art/Representation/Temporality: We [assume] that the work of art is a game, i.e. that it has its actual being inseparable from its representation, and that the unity and autonomy of a structure emerge in the representation. It is part of its essence that it is instructed to represent itself. >Play/Gadamer, >Representation/Gadamer. Representation has the character of repeating the same thing in an indissoluble and indelible way. Repetition here, of course, does not mean that something is repeated in the true sense, i.e. is traced back to an original. I 128 Rather, each repetition is equally original to the work itself. We know the highly enigmatic time structure that is present here, from the festivities or celebrations(1). It is at least part of the periodic festivities that they repeat themselves. In the case of the festivity we call it its return. Yet the recurring festivities are neither different nor a mere reminder of an originally celebrated one. The originally sacred character of all celebrations obviously excludes such distinctions as we know them in the time experience of present, memory and expectation. The time experience of the festivity is rather the celebration, a presence sui generis. >Simultaneity/Gadamer, Cf. >Time, >Present, >Past, >Future, >Presence. 1. Walter F. Otto and Karl Kerényi have the merit of having recognized the importance of the celebration for the history of religion and anthropology (see Karl Kerényi, Vom Wesen des Festes, Paideuma 1938). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Collins, A.W. | Fodor Vs Collins, A.W. | Cresswell II 157 Sentence/reason/mental object/Collins/Cresswell: (Collins 1979, 225f) thesis: sentences are mental particulars ((s) VsCompositionality). Problem: but everything that can have a truth value (true value) must be a universal. Mental Events/Collins: here we need temporality. Truth/Collins: the carriers of truth and falsehood need propositionality instead of temporality (CollinsVsFodor). Cresswell: this corresponds to Frege’s distinction between idea and thought. FodorVsCollins: Collins is right, but if we believe something, then there is a representation in us that has semantic properties. CresswellVsFodor: Fodor makes use of a confusion of object and content. Belief/relation theory/Fodor/Cresswell: his proof that belief is relational (1981, 178-181) is in fact a proof that "believes" relates a person with a content (not an object). Belief Object/Fodor/Cresswell: Fodor also has other arguments for belief objects. Object/Content/Cresswell: I just want to say that once this distinction has been made, it does not answer the question what the "content" is that objects are described (order/distinction: if A and B are different, a description of A does not help to understand B). II 159 Belief/Collins: (1979, 420): thesis: a belief can be no internal state, because if I want to find out if I believe p, this is indistinguishable from the procedure that I would use to determine p and different from the procedure I would use if I’m in a particular internal state or not. Semantics/stages/McGinn/Cresswell: McGinn (1982) thesis: semantics has several stages. Lately, this thesis has found several followers. Cresswell: this certainly involves a distinction between the object and content. Because then it is about two things: the explanation of truth conditions and the explanation of the role of linguistic thinking in our mental life. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Heidegger, M. | Tugendhat Vs Heidegger, M. | Habermas I 182 TugendhatVsHeidegger: by making the word of truth to a basic concept, he just avoids the problem of truth. Tugendhat I 88 TugendhatVsHeidegger: Being: ambiguous in all languages. Heidegger was completely naive not to investigate this beforehand. Def veritative being: e.g. "It is the case that", "It is so, as you say, Socrates..." I 90 Disclosure: all disclosure that is articulated in statements is in this respect a disclosure of (veritative) being. I 91 Heidegger/Tugendhat: did not give an account of it. It seemed natural to him to say with the figurative tradition that all to be is a to be of being, although this does not fit at all to the veritative being ("If something is the case, it is also true"), let alone to the expanded concept. (TugendhatVsHeidegger). I 92 Disclosure/Heidegger: original development is not at all related to objects. By "objectivity" in being and time he meant "existence", not only that which singular terms stand for, but the entire ontological perspective that results from the orientation towards a statement. Pre-linguistically. I 104 TugendhatVsHeidegger: this contradicts the central importance that Heidegger attached to language ("Language is the house of being"). Heidegger fell back to the level of the most primitive theories of language by emphasizing the meaning of the word for the resoluteness of being. II 65 Being/Heidegger: the content of that universal proposition of existence as enabling all "is"-saying is quasi the epitome of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: this sense remains unclear. Ambiguity: "being and nothingness" in its formulations has finally changed into "being and non-being". Through this ambiguity he also failed to make clear the difference between his position and the traditional ontology. II 109 Quotation Marks/Heidegger: its use of quotation marks is not uniform. Being/Plato: "...what you mean when you use the expression "being"..." TugendhatVsHeidegger: he omits the quotation marks! Falsification! One can now argue about whether he means the meaning of the word or the meaning of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: typical: he makes inconspicuous shifts from harmless starting positions with considerable consequences. II 110 Sense of the Being/Heidegger/Tugendhat: no other way out than to speak of two different kinds of meaning: Sense1 and Sense2. When Heidegger now asks for the sense of being, he asks for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. He asks for the sense2 (which in any case is not the sense of a word) of something that we mean when we speak of the being of an existing being. And what this something is, is left open. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he was even content to leave the words unclear that should be the most important to him and to us. II 111 Def Sense/Heidegger: "The result of the design, from which something becomes understandable as something." Only existence has meaning if it is disclosed. Def World/Heidegger: The "Whereupon" of Understanding Def "Worumwillen" (what for) of the Being/Heidegger: its own being that is designed in one way or another. TugendhatVsHeidegger: Question: to what extent is anything we can refer to meaningless? Heidegger had used another meaning of "sense" here, something like the purpose of words. Thus one can speak of the meaning of the human, but not of the meaning of being. Sense of Sense/Heidegger: nothing behind being, but in existence. TugendhatVsHeidegger: suggests that the same being can once be opened up and once not. II 112 Tugendhat: isn't something that we can refer to always accessible? Sense of Sense/Heidegger: Time. Like what was understood by "being" since the Greeks: "attendence", "present", "presence". TugendhatVsHeidegger: Presence is not only made accessible by being seen in the horizon of time, it is from the beginning in this horizon. This could only be overlooked by someone who is completely immersed in "presence". And that is exactly what Heidegger accused ancient philosophy of of! II 113 But there are simple words (like "present", "time") that we understand only in connection with other words. II 115 Understanding/Heidegger: all human understanding is primarily an understanding of being. It goes beyond language. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he has not seen the following tension: on the one hand his being should be of being, on the other hand he is oriented towards the "is" and connects this with the thesis that all understanding is understanding of being. II 116 For example "It is so that it rains" here one can say that the "is" refers to the state of affairs, and that is also a being. But that is not possible with unicorns. Tugendhat: Why should one deform oneself so? Example (from Heidegger): "The sky is blue". Question: To which being does the "is" refer to the sky, or to what is meant by "blue", or to both? So it makes sense to omit the orientation towards the existing and to speak only of being. II 121 TugendhatVsHeidegger: his will to clearly think through what he had seen once was weak. Heidegger has seen quite a few new things, two themes seem worth preserving. II 123 Mood/Heidegger: the primary way in which we are related to the world "as a whole". Being has no intentional content (!), it is directionless. ("fear", "withdrawal") focus on the "being in the whole". TugenhatVsHeidegger: here a substantiated "nothing" appears again, so to speak: an (impossible) negative proposition of existence: "There is nothing I can hold on to". II 124 Being/later Heidegger: the "one who differs from all that exists", "absolutely other to all that exists". This could not have been formulated in such a way in "Being and Time" yet. "Being" is now the "world". It no longer stands for "is" but for "there is". TugendhatVsHeidegger: I see no clue for the vibrating thesis that all understanding can be understood from this being. Everything but clear. II 129 Greek concept of being/TugendhatVsHeidegger: Heidegger uses a sleight of hand: one must ask whether he was actually aware of the swindle. "Ousia" belongs to the tribe of "einai". Ousia = "being" pre-philosophically: "property", "house", "yard". Heidegger translates it as "estate" and projects back. In being and time he claims: "pareinai" = "being by" and could be translated as "estate", but the equation of ousia with parousia is simply wrong! II 130 Time/Heidegger: the temporality of existence is more original than Heidegger's so-called "vulgar" time. (With a ratio of "sooner" and "later"). Future/Heidegger: one must see the self-behaviour to one's own being as a reference to the future. II 131 Play on words: "Future" (German: "Zu-kunft") as that which is already fixed for being, in contrast to the indefinite future. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but this vulgar time must still be assumed. Of course, in every waking moment of my life I refer to the time ahead. II 131 Time as meaning of being/time/future/Heidegger: he tried to construct a peculiar "movement" of existence, unlike the rest of being. This had to fail. II 132 TugendhatVsHeidegger: the transfer of a structure, which is essentially conscious or present, to something else - even being - makes no sense! II 132 Turn/Heidegger: can be understood as an attempt to project the "movement", which lies in the temporality of existence, into being itself or to settle it now on both sides. Here the terms "world" and the supposedly original concept of truth of "unconcealment" or "discovery" play a role. II 133 Existence has its motion only from the motion of being, from the time thus understood as meaning of being. Oblivion of Being: HeideggerVsMetaphysics: which supposedly has forgotten the actual being and sees only the being of the existing. II 134 TugendhatVsHeidegger: the new "movement of being" (understood from the movement of existence) is the crux of the "turn". Tugendhat: this fails: the reference to existence is a phenomenon sui generis. It is an extension of Husserl's intentionality (from Heidegger's point of view) both in the direction of the world and in the direction of temporality. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but we have no possibility to consider a somewhat mirror image correspondence on the part of being. All words stand for the very process that takes place in the "vulgar" time! Heidegger: wants existence to be temporal and yet not processual. That is contradictory. An emergence that is not an emergence in the "vulgar" time does not exist. Heidegger's reaction to these contradictions was a quasi-religious attitude whose practical counterpart was "serenity". |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Heidegger, M. | Verschiedene Vs Heidegger, M. | Derrida I 44 Paul de ManVsHeidegger: Heidegger quotes Hölderlin "as a believer quotes the Holy Bible". Derrida I 87 "Clearing of being" etc. RicoeurVsHeidegger: this is a return of the metaphor in a thinking that no longer understands itself as metaphysical. (+ I 98,99) Heidegger: Presence encompasses present and future. FigalVsHeidegger: this suggests that future and entity can be understood as modifications of presence. Its threefold structure would have proved to be a peculiarity of everyday existence. Thus the temporality worked out in everyday existence itself would have had to be exceeded. Difficulty: it is impossible, according to the original logic of its program, to make philosophy understandable from the everydayness of existence, which is analogous to Aristotelian phronesis. For this purpose, the temporality divided into three parts should also have been interpreted as the time of philosophy (and not only of everyday life). Thus philosophy can no longer be explained by the structure of everyday existence. Thus the program of fundamental ontology has failed. II 101 JaspersVsHeidegger: Heidegger's philosophy is "inherently unfree, dictatorial, communicationless. II 127 VsHeidegger: Existence: the human is not subject, degraded consciousness. Antihumanism. II 161 Death as a possibility: the possibility of the impossibility of any behavior to...-- offers no clue to be curious about anything. VsHeidegger: mere semantic trick. Spiegel Interview with R. Augstein Heidegger 1966/1976 Art/Augstein: "the modern art often sees itself as experimental art, their works are experiments..." Art/Heidegger: "I like to be taught". The big question is, where does art stand? What place does it have? Art/AugsteinVsHeidegger: fine, but then they demand something from art, which they no longer demand from thinking. Heidegger: I do not demand anything from art, I am just saying, it is a question of which place it occupies. AugsteinVsHeidegger: because art does not know its place, is it therefore destructive? Art/Heidegger: Well, paint it. But I would like to state that I do not see the pioneer of modern art, especially since it remains dark, where it sees or at least seeks the very essence of art. AdornoVsHeidegger: ~there is no such thing as "life itself," and no one, like Heidegger, may confuse its remnants with the "absolute". |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Kant | Heidegger Vs Kant | Derrida I 47 HeideggerVsKant: the "I think that must be able to accompany all my ideas" this highest principle is metaphysical. - At the same time Kant is, for Heidegger, the "first and only" who thought the temporality of categories, since they have to be applicable to intuitions. Categories / Kant/Heidegger: makes clear, that Kant already thought the categories and their unit not as eternal and immutable principles, but as variable in time and through time! II 87 VsKant: defines the being under the spell of being imagined. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Kant | Leibniz Vs Kant | Frege III 31 Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 and 1, one can prove it, in a way: Definitions: 1st 1 and 1 are 2, 2nd 2 and 1 are 3 3rd 3 and 1 are 4 Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains. Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4 Leibniz I 83 Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient. 1. Principle of contradiction 2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction). Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality). as panlogically as Hegel's system. I 84 In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form. Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created. Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate. I 128 Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation". The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential. In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines": The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „The overarching generality“, >Paradoxes). I 129 The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.) LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance. The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways. 1. as a whole but each time under another perspective 2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances, 3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions. The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself. The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference. I 130 This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes]. The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation. This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other. I 133 Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else. I 134 The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Parmenides | Kanitscheider Vs Parmenides | Kanitscheider II 35 World/HeraclitusVsParmenides: Question: is the totality of all things or all events the world? Time/Kanitscheider: that amounts to the question whether temporality is an inner quality of the world. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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| Platonism/Math. | Pro | Thiel I 17 Nicolai Hartmann and Günther Jacoby. The view would have the mathematical objects a "fictitious in-itself-stock". We think the being of mathematical objects not in actuality, but in analogy. We omit the spatiotemporality and keep only the "independence from being referred to." |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Double Contingency | Luhmann, N. | II 101 Double Contingency/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: Basic situation: two black boxes get to deal with each other. The problem is a self-solving one, it sets a process in motion and can even incorporate errors and coincidences. Thesis: double contingency inevitably leads to the formation of social systems. AU Kass 13 Double Contingency/Luhman: in societies there is always a high share of common norms and values, but this does not prevent parties from arguing. (Party programs almost identical). How do we get to the regulation of conflicts? Common values are only secondary; at the beginning we may not know which ones are common. The thesis is pure temporality, one acts first! In this way one puts the other before the alternative of accepting or rejecting. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Mental Objects | Collins, A.W. | Cresswell II 157 Sentence / reason / mental object / Collins / Cresswell: (Collins 1979 225f) sentences are mental particulars ("causes" = reasons?). ((s) Vs compositionality). Problem: anything that can have a truth value must be a universal. mental events / Collins: here we need temporality Truth / Collins: the carrier of truth and falsehood needs propositionality instead of temporality . (CollinsVsFodor). Cresswell: corresponding Frege’s distinction between idea and thought. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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