Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Atomism Sellars I 33
Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars.
It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are.
>Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization.
Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances.
---
I 34
Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content.
>Logical space.
2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism.
>Independence, >Empiricism.
3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space.
>Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables.
Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of ​​a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time.
>Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects.
Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements.
>Truth functions.
---
I 70
Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars.

cf.
Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations.
Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts.
---
II 314
SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb.
>Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism.
This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito.
---
II 321
If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus).
>Facts, >States of affairs.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Colour Sellars I 41
Epistemology/Color/Sellars: Traditional thesis: the expression "red" is released from the connections with the category of physical objects.
SellarsVs.
Tradition: E.g. we do not see the back. - E.g. a two-dimensional surface as a color carrier is not an object. >Aspects, >Perspective, >Objects, >Sense data.

Colors/Sellars: The basic grammar of the attribute red is: the physical object x is red at location s and time t. However, the red color does not owe its redness in turn to a component that is red. You cannot find the place of the objects by analyzing the discourse of perception, just as entities in four-dimensional space are not due to the analysis of what we mean.
>Meaning(Intending), >Colour words, >Language use, >Language game.
I 42/43
Red color is not an extra component of an object - color cannot be gained from the analysis of the speech (as a component). Places in space cannot be found through analysis of what we mean.
>Spatial order, >Spatial localization, >Reality, >World/thinking.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Demonstration Strawson I 22
Ostension/pointing/Strawson: pointing shows no order. >Order, >Definition, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Ostensive definition, >Pointing.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Identity Wessel I 220
Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini. >Singular terms, >Statements, >Levels/order, >Description levels.
I 220f
Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time. >G.W.F. Hegel.
WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged.
I 221
Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects. >Identity/Leibniz, >Leibniz Principle.
I 227
Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact. >Identity/Russell.
I 335
Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? Def diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = def E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2)
((s),Tthere are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.).
Identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2.
((s) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.)
I 379f
Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order
2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact).
Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time.
>Temporal identity.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Imagination Strawson McGinn I 210
Space/thinking/Strawson: Thinking without spatial awareness is not possible for us. The mere thought of several instantiations of the same property presupposes an idea of space. >Space/Strawson, >Identification/Stawson, >Exemplification, >Repetition, >Recognition, >Spatial order.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Judgments Strawson V 217
Judgment / Strawson: a second, corrective judgment seems to be precipitated by a second point of view. Vs: but that is not logically necessary - and not logically necessary that they comply at all. >Perspective, >Order, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Statement, >Assertion, >Utterance/Strawson.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Propositions Sellars I XXXII
Proposition/thoughts/tradition: classical empirical model of thoughts: they have the function to give worrds and sentences a meaning. >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning.
Task: to produce actions in form of beliefs.
RyleVsTradition: category confusion: thoughts are not locatable.
>Thoughts, >Categories/Ryle, >Localization, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Logical space.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Space Geach I 315
Space/time/Geach: Time and space are radically different: that you need "between" in both cases, is misleading. Spatial order: affects individual objects.
Temporal order: what is ordered here, is represented by complex sentences.
Geach: in the temporal sense there are more and more complex structures, not in the spatial dimension.
E.g. "x is between (y and w) and z" makes no sense.
>Time, >Space, >Dimensions, >Localization, >Temporal order, >Spatial order.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Time Geach I 303
Time/GeachVsQuine: Vs time cuts, Vs "hours-thick sclices". >four dimensionalism).
Space and time are not equal axes - otherwise temperature curves would be the same as "world lines" in the "temperature-time continuum".
It is not true that quantifiers can only be applied to four-dimensional space-time points.

((s) This is not what Quine asserts: "Sometimes"/Quine: "there are some points of time...">Logical form/Quine.)
I 314
Space/time/Geach: Space and time are radically different: that the expression "between" is used in both, is misleading - spatial order: affects individual objects. - Temporal order: what is ordered here is represented by complex sentences. Geach: in the temporal, ever more complex structures can be built, not in the spatial. - e.g. "x is between (y is over w) and z" makes no sense.
I 316
Time/Modal logic/Geach: I am convinced that the basic time determinations "before", "after", etc. belong to the formal logic. I think they have to do with "possible" and "necessary".
>Possibility, >Necessity, >Modal logic, >Modalities.
One has claimed that a world in which the modus ponens no longer applies can be described as a world in which the time is two-dimensional or the past can be changed.
If the basic truths about time are logical, then a differently temporal world would be a chimera.
>Space/Geach, >Time, >Spacetime.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Kant Strawson Vs Kant Rorty VI 359
StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). ---
Strawson V 9
StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. ---
V 16
Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe.
---
V 19
StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. ---
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. ---
V 25
StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". ---
V 37
Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge.
E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas").
StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it?
---
V 29
StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. ---
V 32
Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle.
---
V 33/34
Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. ---
V 35
Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. ---
V 36
Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. ---
V 49
Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening.
---
V 50
StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. ---
V 58
StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills.
Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves.
StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us.
---
V 66
Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite.
---
V 73
StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. ---
V 75
StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? ---
V 83
StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge?
Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made?
E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles.
---
V 84
Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object".
StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two.
---
V 106
Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences.
---
V 107
StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. ---
V 116
Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one.
---
V 118
Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects.
---
V 124
Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves.
---
V 128
StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. ---
V 157
StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. ---
V 163
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. ---
V 164
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. ---
V 178
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. ---
V 184
Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action.
---
V 194
StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. ---
V 222
Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our".
---
V 249
StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000