Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
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Comparisons | Carnap | IX 93 Comparison / Carnap: two objects can be compared only in relation to a property that both have in various degree. >tertium comparationis, >Similarity, >Distinctions, >Dissimilarity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Equality | Frege | I 89 f Number/Frege: the number is an abstract object - not a property (see below). Equality of Numbers/numerical equality/equality: equality is a concept (not a subject). >Numbers, >Objects. I 94 Equality/Frege: if a = b is true, is found out by introducing a third element (a mark), is there a c for which the following applies: a = c and b = c? ((s) tertium comparationis) ((s) here: e.g. equality in terms of numbers). I 95 Equality/Frege: ((s) number equality/numerical equality/(s): number equality is a concept, not an object - this is what we need here.) Frege: assuming equality simpliciter would require re-explaining it in any case by establishing an equation. I 95 Direction/Frege: we can obtain the concept of direction from the parallelism of straight lines - by conceiving a II b as an equation. From this we abstract the concept of direction. Also with parallelism the concept of equality is the first thing to be established. ((s) but not equality of direction). >Concepts. I 96 Direction/Frege: direction cannot distinguish from the straight line. I 102 Equality of Numbers/numerical equality/numbers/definition/Frege/(s): quantity can be defined by numerical equality, because there is no need to count for numerical equality! E.g. assigning knives to plates without counting. >Definition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
Index Words | Wessel | I 362 Index / Wessel: in relations: e.g. a ‹ pb: indicates the feature and method of comparison. >Tertium comparationis, >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Indexicality, >Context. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
Language Games | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 29 Language game/use/explanation/analysis/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not the usual language use is unanalysable and inexplicable according to Wittgenstein - but the language games are. I 247 Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the only thing that distinguishes Wittgenstein's late period from the middle. - Solution to the problem: random acting in accordance with the rule to differentiate from real rule following. >Rules, >Rule following. I 250 Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Brown book: not fragments of language - but in itself closed system of understanding. - Simple primitive languages. - Solution to the problem of naming: role in our language. - There are so many relationships between names and object, as there are names and objects. >Names, >Words. I 273 Language/world/language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: StegmüllerVsWittgenstein: supposedly does not show how the language is directly linked to the reality. - Stegmüller: thesis: it would not be about the "vertical" connections, but only about the horizontal between steps in the language game. - Hintikka: quasi mere role without facts. - HintikkaVs: that would mean that not even descriptive meaning is based on truth conditions. - justification solely by the role of words in our lives. - Hintikka: Wittgenstein emphasizes the vertical relationship on the contrary - whereby the logic before each match lies with facts - such as the method of measurement before measuring. - Measurement is very probably a comparison with facts. I 281 HintikkaVsStegmüller: otherwise speaking would be already the whole language game. I 282 Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: distinction between language games - a) that gives a word a meaning - b) the game in which we express the word. - E.g. we learn what a lie is, not like other words. I 329 Definition physiognomic language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. pain behavior: is conceptual - not bound to facts. >Pain, >Facts. I 331 Also involves the reaction of others. - This is a logical connection, which is constitutive for the language game. I 335 Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. physiognomic language games. - Here doubts about the certainty are meaningless. - In primary language games epistemological concepts like knowledge/belief/truth/error and so on do not occur. I 348 Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Steps in them cannot be corrected - otherwise they could not serve as the basis of the relation language/world. - In primary language games there are no criteria. - But they can provide as a whole criteria for mental processes. - Terminology: "primary language games": in Wittgenstein "beginning of the language game". --- II 237 Explore/Law/Natural Law/Wittgenstein: Supposing someone has discovered the law of energy conversion - it could be a new math - he has developed a new game. - Not new mechanics. >Discoveries. II 283f In accordance/Wittgenstein: dependent on language games. - tertium comparationis. - An imagination in the context of truth does not relate to us. - Wrong: to think that things would be an extension of something else. - As if a sentence would be more true if it coincides with reality - that is not an extension. - ((s) > "Make true"/Wittgenstein, >More authors on Truthmakers). --- VI 138 Language game instead of calculus: - the rules are not strict - undefined terms - is not a theory of the language game - VsTheories: better: to search for a way. >Calculus. --- Metzinger II 721 Language Game/rules/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: Problem: Stability/flexibility or changeability and historicality of the language game rules. Criteria can become symptoms and symptoms can become criteria. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 354). Wittgenstein himself tends to assume that criteria are undisputed that excldudes an appliance to exotic possibilities. (Residual Verificationism). Birnbacher: Pretty conservative fixation: not every new application is a shift in meaning. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
Picture (Mapping) | Hacking | I 233 Figure/equality/Hacking: similarity is something independent. It is not a relationship, but it creates the relations of a relationship! >Similarity, >Equality, >Relations. First comes the similarity and equality with respect to this or that. First, there is the presentation and then the "real". >Representation, >Reality. Much later the terms come into play with which we can describe the respects in which there is similarity. >Concepts, >Theoretical terms. Similarity can occur independently, without concepts x, y, or z, where you think, "similar with respect to x, but not in terms of y and z". >tertium comparationis. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
Proper Names | Carnap | VI 216 Name/Carnap: names are answers to descriptions and vice versa. >Descriptions, >Description theory. Identity: the problem exists only because of the possibility to use different descriptions and names - VI 219 Identity is not a "pure experience" because it is not originally given. >tertium comparationis, >Comparisons, >Identity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Relations | Wessel | I 362 Relations/Wessel: Comparative statements regarding a common trait. >Statements, >Levels/order, >Description levels. Order statements: E.g. mutual spatial position of two objects: always at least two objects in relation to a third thing (reference point of order). Cf. >Space, >tertium comparationis, >Comparisons, >Comparability. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
Similarity | Frege | I 89 f Number/Frege: the number is an abstract object - not a property (see below). Equality of Numbers/numerical equality/equality: numerical equality is a term (not a subject). >Numbers, >Objects. I 94 Equality/Frege: if a = b is true can be found out by introducing a third element (a mark), is there a c, for which the following applies: a = c and b = c? ((s) tertium comparationis) ((s) here: e.g. equality in terms of numbers). I 95 Equality/Frege: ((s) equality of numbers/numerical equality/(s) is a concept, not an object - we need it here.) Frege: assuming equality simpliciter would demand that it would have to be re-explained in any case, by establishing an equation. >Concepts. I 95 Direction/Frege: we can obtain the concept of direction from the parallelism of straight lines - by conceiving a II b as an equation. From this we abstract the concept of direction. Also with parallelism the concept of equality is established first. ((s) But not the equality of direction). I 96 Direction/Frege: direction cannot be distinguished from the straight. I 102 Equality of Numbers/numerical equality/numbers/definition/Frege/(s): quantity can be defined by numerical equality, because there is no need to count for numerical equality! E.g. assigning knives to plates without counting. >Definition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
Translation | Flusser | I 337 ff Translation/Flusser: the model of the human being as a black box - this is not a psychological, sociological or philosophical question about the inner being, but a formal question. >Black Box/Flusser. I 339 Definition Translation/Flusser: How to translate? By comparing. Comparison requires a third element, tertium comparationis. >Comparison, >Comparability, >tertium comparationis, >Analogies. For example, when I translate from English into French, I compare both languages with a third. This third language is the hybrid between the two languages in my memory. So it is not a real language, but a meta-language. Meta-linguistic decisions have an individual character. >Metalanguage. Portuguese Jesuits in Brazil, for example, have written a tupi Portuguese dictionary without a template. The question of choice is therefore not a bottomless one like the question of language learning. >Language acquisition. I 341 The structural relationship between languages is more important than the repertory one. >Vocabulary. The question must be asked at what level the translation takes place and how the translation of poems relates to that of chemistry books and telephone conversation. Definition Translation/Flusser: general broadcasts in which different programmed codes have been selected. I can theoretically translate all languages into French. i.e., the competence of French in theory includes all other languages. This imperialism of all open languages is reversible to all others, however: theoretically I can translate everything into Cro-Magnon, but distorted. The universe of French as an imperialist metacode is quite different from the universe of Cro-Magnon as an imperialist metacode. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
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