Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Content | Brandom | I 139ff Content/Brandom: any content is derived from the content of possible judgments. >Judgments. I 145 Semantic content: role in the determination of accuracies practice - basis: inferential relations - those who have content are subject to standards - Frege: Concepts from judgments. I 150f Content/Brandom: must not presume concepts and semantic content - there is a reaction without content: E.g. iron rusts in wet conditions - solution: inferential role - e.g. measurements: an instrument has no concepts. >Semantic content, >Conceptual content, >Inferential role. I 316 Circumstances/Content/Brandom: what the interpreter considers to be the circumstances is an essential feature of the empirical content. I 479 Content/Brandom: must specify the circumstances in the context under which a person is entitled to a definition - content by accuracy of inferences: three problems: 1) functional links do not only exist intra-linguistically, but also with the world - 2) Sentences often have significant portions expressing no parts which do not expres propositions - 3) Representational vocabulary is also used in analysis (> reference/Brandom). I 530 Content/Brandom: of an expression is determined by the set of SMSICs that regulate the substitution inferences (richness) - new vocabulary must be joined with the old vocabulary by SMSICs. >SMSICs. I 566 Content/Brandom (of sentences): the explicit expression of the relations between sentences, which are partly constitutive for sentences to be full of content, can be considered the content of sentences - the contents that are transmitted to the sentences through practices of community, are systematically intertwined with each other in a way that they can be considered to be products of those contents which are connected to the subsentential expressions. >Subsententials. I 658 Content/Brandom: assertions are expressed, therefore sentences are full of propositional content - subsentential expressions are indirectly full of inferential content thanks to their significance through substitution - unrepeatable Tokenings are embedded in substitutional inferences and thus indirectly inferentially contentful thanks to their connection to other Tokenings in a recurrent structure (inheritance). I 664 Content: there must be at least one context in which the addition of an assertion has nontrivial consequences. --- II 13 Content/Brandom: is explained by the act and not vice versa. >Actions. II 35 Content/Brandom: non-inferential circumstances: (perception circumstances) are a crucial element of the content of a concept such as red - further content approves the inference from the circumstances to the consequences of using it appropriately, regardless of whether those circumstances are themselves specified in narrowly defined inferential concepts. --- I 698 Content/Action/Brandom: states and actions, as premises and conclusions, obtain content by being embedded in consequences and inferences (instead of representation). I 662 Definition content/equality/Frege : "Two judgements have the same content if and only if the conclusions that can be drawn from one in connection with various others, always also follow from the other in connection with the same other judgements". BrandomVsFrege: this is a universal quantification via auxiliary hypotheses - such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a quantity could always be found: according to Frege, any two judgements have the same consequences if they are connected with a contradiction. >Implication paradox. I 731 Narrow/Content/BrandomVs: (depends only on the individual): coherent history barely possible which only considers one individual - furthermore, the stories of similar individuals should be the same - but different context always possible. >wide/narrow content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Empirical Meaning | Hempel | II 137 "Empirical Sense"/Hempel: the empirical sense depends: 1) on the linguistic framework which determines what other conclusions can be inferred and 2) on the theoretical context of auxiliary hypotheses. Cf. >Conceptual schemes, >Hypotheses. II 138 The empirical meaning is only possible in ideal (formal) languages. >Ideal language, >Formal language. Problem: "isolated statements" can contain metaphysical things without relation to the perception and may be omitted due to the syntactic structure. Different: statements with theoretical terms are syntactically always linked to observation terms (theoretical terms: refer to the unobservable). >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Observation, >Observability. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Hypotheses | Poundstone | I 48 Hypotheses/Poundstone: most are generalizations. >Generalization, >Induction, >Generality, >Generalizability. Nicods criterion (Raven paradox): Relevance. Black and non-black non-ravens are irrelevant. >Relevance, >Statistics. I 60 Poundstone: even observing black ravens is virtually irrelevant. >Observation, >Observability. I 88 Poor hypotheses spoil good supporting evidence. >Evidence I 55 Auxiliary hypotheses/Coherence theory/Poundstone: additional hypotheses usually areassumptions about the functioning of the instruments. >Additional hypotheses, >Measurements. Problem: often the applicability of the modus tollens is not guaranteed. >modus tollens. E.g. Uranus was correctly predicted due to perturbations, Neptune wrongly predicted based on the same assumptions and methods. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Magical Thinking | Polanyi | Weizenbaum I 174 Magical Thinking/Science/Polanyi/Weizenbaum: As Polanyi notes, the imperturbability of scientific beliefs is defended with the same tricks that protect magical belief systems: (M. Polanyi 1966(1)): Every contradiction between a certain scientific statement and the facts of experience is explained by a different scientific statement; the stock of possible scientific hypotheses, with which every conceivable event can be explained, is inexhaustible... Within the natural sciences themselves, the constancy of theories against experience is guaranteed by epicyclic auxiliary hypotheses that nip alternative approaches in the bud. >Explanation, >Causes, >Effect, >Science, >Additional hypotheses, >Auxiliary hypotheses, >Mysticism. 1. M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, NY, 1966, p. 292. |
Pola I M. Polanyi Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy Eastford 2013 Pola II M. Polanyi The Tacit Dimension Chicago 2009 Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Propositional Content | Brandom | I 215 Propositional content/Brandom: from social structures that transmit it, fundamental representational contents - ((s) what is considered to be correct perception is socially regulated by standards.) I 217 Auxiliary hypotheses are different from person to person. I 218 Access: to pragmatics. Normativally - to semantics: inferentially - to the interaction between conceptual contents: social. I 236 Propositional content/Field/Brandom: two-staged: 1) belief in Mentalese, 2) meaning in public language. I 327 Maths propositional content: without empiricism. I 240 Propositional content/Brandom: (the believable) shall be distinguished by the pragmatic property of assertibility. I 254 Definition propositional content: that which is expressed by performances and which determines the specific characteristics of their significance within the genus of asserting. I 402 Propositional content: role as premises - starts with the concept of truth instead of inference - Definition action: make something true. I 473 Propositional content/Brandom: Thesis: cannot play a fundamental explanatory role - is parasitic to the expressive role! - It is about the act of asserting and not about what is asserted. I 873 Content/Brandom: propositional and other conceptual contents with which the behavior of the system is to be measured, cannot be justified with this behavior itself. >Justification. I 897 Propositional content/Brandom: what we mean depends on the actual circumstances, even if we do not know what they are. This is the perspective character of propositional content - hence the externalism begins at home: The contents of external definitions depend on their actions and of the truth of that which they make an assertion about. >Circumstances, >Meaning (intending), cf. >Externalism. --- II 207 Propositional content/Brandom: always also representational - propositional content can be reflected on in concepts of truth or reasons - "aboutness", "about" is not necessary in addition to representation - but propositional content must be able to be characterized non-representationally. II 263 Objectivity/Brandom: of the propositional content: the objectivity (fact) says nothing about who could reasonably assert something - and such facts would even exist without living beings - this objectivity is a characteristic that we can make understandable as a structure of the definitions and authorisations - every community that recognizes definition and authorization as a normative status can recognize propositional content that are objective in this sense. >Objectivity. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Quine | Fodor | IV 37 Holism/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine represents a meaning holism (MH) but supposedly also a confirmation holism (CH) which equals the >Quine-Duhem Thesis. (>Two Dogmas: phrases do not stand individually before the tribunal). IV 39f PragmatismVsRealism/QuineVsReductionism: verification conditions are not analytically included in statements. Confirmation Holism/Fodor/Lepore: confirmation holism does not have to be a pragmatist, it can also be a realist. This is compatible with the Quine-Duhem thesis (i.e. that sentences are not individually verifiable). Confirmation is not a linguistic matter, but the way the world is (Quine pro realism). Quine: this is a priori equivalent to semantics. Quine pro verificationism: sentence meaning: is a method of verification. Quine-Duhem thesis: is highly consistent with realism. Quine-Duhem thesis: a) any statement can be maintained if appropriate auxiliary hypotheses are provided, b) the requirement that evidence must be a posteriori. Quine-Duhem thesis/Fodor/Lepore: the Quine-Duhem thesis can also be read as: a) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of confirmation or b) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of meaning. IV 2189 Network/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: the only fixed nodes are the observational concepts. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Review | Lakatos | Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974(1), 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in case of conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. protective belt": every (physical ) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to make empirical predictions. These are stored like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observable that contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad-hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown confounding factors are postulated. Vs: problem: this does not explain the divergent date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the ad hoc hypothesis is introduced! ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are legitimate at all only if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. Schurz I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: A theory version is falsified only if there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "instant rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. That only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def research program/Lakatos: hard core of theory together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def negative heuristic/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only at the periphery, However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can turn on against the core. Def positive heuristic/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can cope with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Def Falsification/Schurz: A theory version is falsified, gdw. some phenomena deductively following from it were falsified by actual observation sets. (s) Schurz always speaks of propositions instead of observations. 1. Lakatos, I. (1974). "Falsifikation und die Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme". In: Lakatos, I. und Musgrave, A., Kritik und Erkenntnisfortschritt. Braunschweig: Vieweg. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Similarity Metrics | Lewis | V 10 Similarity metric/Possible worlds/Po.wo./Similarity/Lewis: order assumption: weak order: whenever two worlds can be accessed from the the world i in question, either one or the other is more similar to world i. - Decreasing or increasing similarity is transitive. - In contrast, partial order: not all couples are distinguishable. >Possible world/Lewis. V 11 Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds - (> Similarity metrics). V 12f Similarity metric/Possible worlds/Lewis: sphere/Similarity sphere: E.g. S sphere around the world i: exists, if any S world is accessible from i and closer than any ~ S world): admitting A: a sphere contains an A world. - Degree: spheres represent degrees (comparative, unlike neighborhood in topology). Compatibility/Compatible/(s): B is compatible with A if there is an A world in the B sphere. - Definition A were>>would C is true if A>C applies in an A permitting sphere around i, if such a sphere exists. >Implication. V 13 Definition Then were A>>would C would be true if AC applied in every A permitting sphere around i ((s) conjunction) - Definition A impossible worlds: >Impossible World. V 42 Similarity metric/Similarity/Possible world/Lewis: It is not about any particular similarity relation that you happen to have in mind. - Problem: if some aspects do not even count, the centering assumption would be violated. - I.e. worlds that differ in an unnoticed aspect, would be identical with the actual world. - Lewis: but such worlds do not exist.- Similarity relations: must be distinguished: a) for explicit judgments - b) for counterfactual judgments. V 150 Revision/Possible world/Similarity metrics/Stalnaker/Lewis: every revision will select the most similar antecedent world. --- Schwarz I 160 Lewis: E.g. a single particle changes its charge: then it behaves differently. - Because a possible world in which not only the charge but also the role were exchanged would be much less similar (> next world). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Terminology | Lewis | Bigelow I 180 Definition Lagadonian Language/Lagadonian/Terminology/Swift/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: by this name Lewis calls such a language, following Gulliver's travels. (1986a(1), p. 145). It is a set theoretical structure on individuals, characteristics, and relations. 1. Lewis, David 1986a. Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press Schwarz I 97 Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property. Def Perfectly natural property: (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation. - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family. - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well. IV 58 Relation/individuation/Lewis: Relations are usually individuated through coextension. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: These two relations are identical because they are coextensive. Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Question: What conditions will survive the state in which you ask yourself this question? For example, if you walk out of a duplicator, who will you be, who will come out of the right or left door, or both? Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former? But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states! IV 259 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification. "Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension. I (b) 27 Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. I (b) 31 They can always be eliminabted by being replaced by their definientia. I (b) 34 Here: the T terms are names of mental states, the A terms are names for stimuli and responses and also for causal relationships. Theoretical terms: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. V 11 Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds V 86 Principal Principle/main principle/probability/opportunity/Lewis: the Principal Principle is to be modeled according to our experience with direct conclusions. Exceptions: 1) it is about opportunity, not frequency. 2) Certainty of probabilities (opportunities) contributes to the resilience (resistance to new information). Schwarz I 99 Relations/Lewis: intrinsic: e.g., greater-relation (concerns only the two sides). Extrinsic: e.g. grandmother-relation (needs a third). Internal relation: (not equal to intrinsic relation): depends only on intrinsic properties and is reducible to them. External relation: is also intrinsic, but just not reducible. E.g., Spatiotemporal relation: "intrinsic with respect to pairs". Identity/partial relation/elementarity/Lewis: These are all no relations! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Theories | Brandom | I 313 Theory/Method/Brandom: the notion of regularity cannot distinguish regularities - regularity with respect to reference classes cannot distinguish reference classes - there are probably facts about probabilities, but no fact shows which of the possible reference classes is the right - (> Nonfactualism/Brandom, other authors on nonfactualism) >Regularities. --- I 662 Theory/Holism/Brandom: what makes evidence an evidence of an auxiliary hypothesis depends on the available auxiliary hypotheses. >Holism, >Hypotheses. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Theories | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 238 Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion: 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors. 2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment. 3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed. >Regularity, >Objectivity/Lakatos. I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational. >Falsification. I 240 Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. --- Hacking I 206 Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research. Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated. >Hypotheses, >Additional hypotheses. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics. Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core. Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.) I 202 Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences. I 206 Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Time | Lewis | V 32 Time/Arrow of time/Past/Future/Lewis: future: depends counterfactually (not only causally) on the present. >Causal dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. Asymmetry: former things do not depend on later ones - we find no counterfactual conditional that explains what would have been different in the past if the presence was different - such a counterfactual conditional would be unclear at most. V 33 Asymmetry: we can use all assumptions about the past, but not about the future - assumptions about the past are not counter factually dependent - therefore they can serve as auxiliary hypotheses. V 35 Time/Asymmetry/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Asymmetry: comes about like this: wA>wC assumes that C is later, if C is earlier, the counterfactual conditionals are only true if C is true - the counterfactual conditional tells us, like the way, how things are earlier, not depending on how things are later. V 36 Time Arrow/Epistemic/Asymmetry/Lewis: the asymmetry (that we know more about the past than about the future) is gradual, no difference in kinds. V 37f Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Lewis: 1) the epistemic contrast (that we know more about the past) is gradual. - 2) (irrelevant) - 3) Even determinism would allow an asymmetry. - 4) past, present and future are equally unchangeable. - That t is later, is irrelevant. V 38 5) in a sense we can change the future by our present actions, however. - Asymmetry: branch in the future: are the alternatives under counterfactual assumptions. - Past: here the fact remains the same, even in counterfactual assumptions. V 57 Time/Laws of Nature /LoN/Asymmetry/Lewis: if there is an asymmetry (between past and future). - Then it is a property of time, not of the laws. - It makes a difference between possible worlds. >Possible world/Lewis. V 66 Asymmetry/Time/Lewis: my argument for it is empirical. - Too many traces would have to be hidden later on. --- V 94 Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Possible world/Lewis: the asymmetry is contingent. - i.e. the properties which justify the distinction between past and future opportunities. They may be different from possible worlds to other possible worlds. >Asymmetry, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Time traveller/Lewis, >Timelessness/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Verification | Popper | I 127 ff Verifiability/verification/Popper: one examines the theories by deriving them from sets of lesser generality (deduction). These records must be verifiable themselves in the same way, ad infinitum. No regress if one renounces the ultimate justification by deduction. We do not demand that each set will actually be verified, but only that each set should be verifiable. Every single verifiable, not all verified. >Deduction, >Ultimate justification, >Regress, >Confirmation, >Falsification. I 126 Reproducibility/Repeatability: the controversy over whether there are repeatable, unique operations, cannot be decided within the science, it is "metaphysical". I 122 VsFalsifiability: there are arguments that a theoretical system can never be definitively falsified. There are always some possible ways out. For example, ad hoc inserted auxiliary hypotheses. Falsifiability/Popper: We will mark the empirical method just by the exclusion of those procedures. --- Flor II 483 Definition degree of probation: depends on whether a theory solves more or fewer problems (more exactly). From probation one cannot indicate to the results of future tests. This has no probabilty. Definition verifiability: varies in scope. Animal: the amoeba cannot critically behave to their expectations or hypotheses, it cannot imagine: they are a part of it. See also >Falsification/Popper. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Ayer, A. J. | Hempel. Vs Ayer, A. J. | II 112 Demand for Partial Confirmability/(2.3)/Ayer: his criterion is supposed to determine by content that a statement S has an empirical sense if observation statements can be derived from S together with suitable auxiliary hypotheses, which cannot be derived from the auxiliary hypotheses alone. HempelVsAyer: Although this is more similar to the logical structure of the verification, it is much too permeable. ((s) >Quine-Duhem Thesis/QDT: allows just any auxiliary hypothesis). Hempel: E.g. "If the absolute is perfect, then this (!) apple is red". This allows the derivation of the observation statements, which obviously does not follow from the auxiliary hypothesis. ((s) But it does not allow to call a green apple red). Stace: "principle of observable species": "The facts that are denied or affirmed, must be of a type or class so that it is logically possible to observe some facts immediately, which are cases of that class or species. If a statement asserts or denies facts about a class, so that it is not logically possible to observe them directly, then the statement is not significant. II 113 HempelVsStace: this is undecided, he does not say how we determine those classes. And that is precisely what the criterion was supposed to do. Moreover, we can always form a class that contains the fact f together with the fact which is expressed by an observation statement at our discretion, which makes f a member of a basically observable class!. Therefore, the first part of the principle, like Ayers original wording, already includes everything. Criterion of Meaning/Ayer: Additionally: a statement has a meaning if it can be derived from observation statements together with an auxiliary hypothesis. HempelVsAyer: too permeable ((s) >"fake theories".) Modification of 2.3/Ayer: limits the auxiliary hypothesis to statements that are either analytical or can be verified independently. Conjunction/HempelVsAyer: this new criterion fulfills the demand for full falsifiability of an arbitrary conjunction S u N and thus has unintended empirical significance for this one. ChurchVsAyer: Suppose there are any three observation statements, none of which implies any of the others alone, then follows for an entirely arbitrary statement S that either itself or its negation has an empirical sense according to Ayers new criterion. |
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| Frege, G. | Brandom Vs Frege, G. | I 506 BrandomVsFrege: he blurs the distinction between free-standing and embedded contents. (Brandom also allows sub-sentential level). I 592 BrandomVsFrege: his call for all truth values to be clarified results in disastrous consequences in his late work Basic Laws of Arithmetic. I 662 Def Content/Frege: "Two judgments have the same content iff the inferences that can be drawn in conjunction with several other ones always also follow from the others in connection with the same other judgments." I 807/808 BrandomVsFrege: That’s an all-quantification via auxiliary hypotheses: it is not enough to have one set of other judgments that lead to the same set of consequences. Such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a set can always be found: according to Frege, any two sentences have the same consequences if they are connected to a contradiction. Dual aspect: what constitutes evidence as evidence of an auxiliary hypothesis depends on the available auxiliary hypotheses (Holism). Names: Fregean Line: the speaker connects a property (or conjunction of properties) with each name, which determines its reference as the only one. BrandomVsFrege: it is hard to see why this should be Fregean. For Frege, properties are part of the "meaning", not of the "sense" - they are not immediately detectable. And how would this analysis be extended to predicates in Frege’s view? They are surely not to be determined by property sets. Brandom: the conceptual contents expressed by proper names differ from conventionally conceived Fregean sense in that their individuation is not epistemically transparent. We can be in the dark as to whether two Tokenings belong to the same anaphoric chain or not. In this sense, we do not always know what we say and think. Frege IV 85 (> Knowledge). Frege speaks about grasping, not about seeing! Frege: "Someone" refers to nothing. - "He" refers to nothing. (BrandomVsFrege: anaphora!). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Galilei, G. | Feyerabend Vs Galilei, G. | I 128 Perception/Natural Interpretation/Galilei/Feyerabend: apart from natural interpretations Galilei also changes perceptions that seem to endanger Copernicus. He admits the existence of such perceptions, praises Copernicus for ignoring them, and claims to have removed them with the help of the telescope. But he gives no theoretical reasons for the unreliability of the telescope in celestial observations. Conclusion//Feyerabend: an argument is construed that Copernicus disproved due to the observation. The argument is reversed in order to discover the natural interpretations which are responsible for the contradiction. The offensive interpretations are replaced by others (through propaganda). The new natural interpretations are formulated as auxiliary hypotheses. They are partly established because of the help they give Copernicus, partly due to plausibility considerations and ad hoc hypotheses. This gives rise to a completely new ’experience’. Independent data are still missing completely, but this is not a disadvantage. They will only come about after a long time. What we need now is a theory of aerodynamics and of solid objects. They have been left out completely. But their task is now determined. This points the way for further research. I 129 Movement/Aristotle/Feyerabend: Question: how is it possible that something is moving, and yet occupies a certain place. Answer: it is not possible. This response by Aristotle agrees with quantum mechanics. A well-defined movement with a well-defined momentum has no place in it. Movement/Galilei/FeyerabendVsGalilei: all that is lost in the revolution of Galilei. He is looks at idealized movements that exist nowhere in the world. Difference Newton/Galilei/Feyerabend: Newton could never push all the rich reality aside like this. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Popper, K. | Lakatos Vs Popper, K. | Feyerabend I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but such. And beyond that totally irrational. Hacking I 199 "Protective belts"/Lakatos: you only make a selection of problems you are dealing with. Further objections are then ignored. LakatosVsPopper: so verification still has a place! The researchers choose a few problems, refutations can then be completely uninteresting! Hacking I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be right because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule according to which the human thinks and directs nature is not tenable. Two false assumptions: 1. there is a psychological boundary between speculative and observational sentences 2. assuming that observational evidence could be proven by facts. Schurz I 196 Theory Revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to establish empirical prognoses. These are located like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be resolved by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date that contradicts the whole theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown interfering factors are postulated. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is falsified only when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "immediate rationality" (immediate decision) which theory is better. This only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def Research Program/Lakatos: hard theory core together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def Negative Heuristics/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only on the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can be directed against the core. Def Positive Heuristics/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can be handled with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theoretical version/Schurz: Core plus periphery. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Add. Hypotheses | Duhem, P. | Hacking I 193 Duhem: thesis: any theory can be saved by additional auxiliary hypotheses. (ad hoc). (Extreme anti-realist). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Quine-Duhem-Th. | Fodor, J. | IV 39 Quine-Duhem-Thesis (sentences are not individually verifiable) Quine-Duhem-Thesis/QDT/Fodor/Lepore: very compatible with realism. Quine-Duhem-Thesis/QDT/Fodor/Lepore: there are different versions in Two Dogmas, depending on how they are polemically used: Example a) "you can keep any statement if you are confronted with stubborn data". (Auxiliary hypotheses). IV 40 that is not the same as (b) the requirement that supporting documents must be a posteriori. But it's hard to see how the first can be true without the second. TD/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: in the middle between the two main parts there is this thesis the unity of meaning is not the proposition but the whole theory IV 50 Variant of Quine-Duhem-Thesis says: confirmation relations are a posteriori. |
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