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Abduction | Armstrong | III 104 Abduction/Peirce: conclusion to the best explanation. - E.g. on >hidden parameters - e.g. velocity faster than light, etc. - HolismVsAbduction. >Best explanation, >Holism. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Observation | Observation: detecting characteristics and behavior of objects by whatsoever contact with the object unlike conclusions from past processes or assumeded or imperceptible parts or hidden parameters. See also hidden variable, observation language, theories. |
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Opacity | Boer | I 18 Opacity/description dependent/Boer: 1. This is usually a question of hidden parameters, additional arguments in the logical form, which do not appear in everyday language. The hidden parameters would be the kind of representations quantified in (D5): (D5) R is a concept-dependent relation = for each object x and y that x has the relation R to y, entails for a representation z and one behavior-determining relation Q: A) a has Q to z and B) either (i) z forms y (i.e., z is or contains something that represents y for x) (ii) z expresses y (i.e., z is a representation with a fulfillment condition which they have from y) and C) for each representation r which maps y or expresses whether x has q to r depends on whether r has one or more intrinsic properties of a certain domain (i.e. there is a set F of intrinsic features of x' representations, for each representation r which maps y for x, x has Q to r iff r exemplifies a feature from F). Or any entities that could be gained from such representations. This explains why the alleged breach of (T2) (T2) For arbitrary objects x, y, z and every two-digit relation R: if y = z and x has R to y, then x has R to z. is only an apparent one: for the fact that b = c and that R (a, b, r) need not to contain R (a, c, r'), if this is not made explicit, it seems to be a two-digit relation that violates (T2). 2. Another possibility is that R itself is context-dependent: that "b = c" and "R (a, b)" would be logically compatible with "~R (a, c)" if the contexts are only different enough. E.g. "R" could be analyzed as the complex binary predicate "[λxy (Er) Gyrx]" whereby the domain of the questionable quantifier is a contextual set of mediating representations, --- I 19 which differ in the applications "b = c", "R (a, b)" and "~ R (a, c)". 3. Strategy: Thesis that the alleged relations of R are not the real relations. It is not guaranteed that "b" in the various uses always stands for the same object here. For example, if a name appears in a sentence both inside and outside of quotes, it is natural to assume that it refers once to the bearer, but also to a wordtype. Thus, in our case, different referents of "b" could also be assumed. 4. "about": can also be ambiguous. This can lead to that identity fails in the belief of something. (A) In one sense, a belief about the evening star is at the same time also a belief about the morning star B) in another sense, it is not. ((s) de re/de dicto). Weaker/Boer: "For a G, A believes that N is G." --- I 20 "From"/de re/Boer/(s): is stronger and, together with the identity of morning star and evening star, implies that the belief "of" the morning star equals the belief of the evening star. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Properties | Armstrong | III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
Properties | Martin | Armstrong III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). Armstrong III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). Armstrong III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. Armstrong III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". Armstrong III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. Armstrong III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. Armstrong III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. Armstrong II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. Armstrong II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) Armstrong II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Properties | Place | Armstrong III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). Armstrong III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). Armstrong III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. Armstrong III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". Armstrong III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. Armstrong III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. Armstrong III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. Armstrong II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. Armstrong II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) Armstrong II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
Quantum Mechanics | Esfeld | I 253 Quantum Mechanics: quantum mechanics violates the separability (independent existence). Local effect: the local effect is a principle, which excludes interaction between 1st and 2nd measurement. >Non-Locality, >Quantum mechanics/Genz. I 256 Reality/EPR/Einstein-Podolski-Rosen: reality is the prediction of a size without intervention. Incompleteness of the quantum mechanics: something must correspond to the size, regardless of whether the second measurement is carried out. Hidden parameters/quantum mechanics: hidden parameters are over-light speed, backward causality and common cause (deterministic or stochastic). >Hidden parameters. I 260 Bell's theorem: there are no hidden parameters in Bell's theorem. Bell's inequation: the upper limit for correlations is violated - this shows that no common cause is possible. I 281f Quantum Holism/quantum mechanics/Esfeld: the reason for it should not be purely epistemic: otherwise hidden parameters would be excluded only because of a lack of recognizability (too weak) (epistemic/ontological). Non-locality: non-locality is not holism. It is a whole matter holistic system, because a quantum system has the properties that make it into a quantum system only with all the other quantum systems together. >Holism. I 283 Hidden parameters/Bohm: hidden parameters are compatible with holism. Bohm: thesis: a quantum system has a definite value of the location at all times, all other observables are context dependent. Measurement updates the properties. Properties are dispositional - a potential (quantum field) determines the path of the quantum system causally. This is a violation of the parameter independence and the local effect but non-local interaction is not holism. I 286 Ontology/quantum mechanics/Esfeld: minimal ontological interpretation: this means to recognize definite numerical properties as properties of the system. I 293 Quantum-Holism/Esfeld: most quantum holisms show an absence of supervenience: both systems are together in a state with properties. >Supervenience. Singulett state/plate: the singulett state is a relation, not supervenience on non-relational properties (but it is also not a substrate: you do not need any individuals). Also, the state is no realism with regard to universals. >Universals. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Roles | Armstrong | Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
Supernatural | Kanitscheider | II 174 Supernatural/embedding/geometry/dimension/Kanitscheider: a 4-dimensional curved Riemannian manifold can be embedded in a 10-dimensional flat Euclidean space. Def Embedding/Kanitscheider: the formal classification into a more comprehensive structure.(1) >Space time/Kanitscheider, >Space/Kanitscheider, >Space curvature/Kanitscheider. Embedding/Theology/Kanitscheider: Analogously, the theologian can say that natural science can in principle explain every inner-worldly context, but cannot establish that the (observable) world is all that exists. >Theology. Quantum mechanics/Kanitscheider: Quantum mechanics limits by its laws the number of dynamic variables which can be complementary to each other and thus also the kinds of the conceivable aspects in which matter can appear. >Quantum mechanics. For an analogy of the complementarity of nature and supernature, no comparable limitation of the ways of seeing or levels exists. >Levels of description, >Levels (order). II 174/175 Supernature/theology/embedding/Kanitscheider: for the relation of supernature to nature, therefore, embedding offers itself as a formal structure. Vs: problem: ontology "runs away": i.e. God is really the "last principle" of all being. To prevent this, the embedding must break off after the first step. For this the theologian has to find reasons! This difficulty is a consequence of the abandonment of the principle of parsimony, not to admit more entities than necessary for the explanation of the phenomena. >Conservativity, >Explanation. If one conceives the universe as "thought of God", one needs a rational justification why this process is not comprised again by a further, higher numinous entity. (Regress). >Regress. The embedding, however, would have the advantage that world and superworld would be absolutely separated ontologically and causally. >Causality, >Ontology. II 177 Supernatural/religion/theory/Kanitscheider: even a partially transcendent, hidden entity comes into conflict with the causal closure of the world. One cannot blame several causes for an event when one is enough. For example, if a goblin exerted a real additional force on the falling stone, it would have to fall faster. >Hidden variables, >Hidden parameters. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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Einstein, A. | Verschiedene Vs Einstein, A. | Esfeld I 283 Hidden Parameters/David Bohm/Esfeld: best elaborated theory of hidden parameters. But compatible with holism. Although Bohm does not take a deterministic view of the world, his alternative to conventional quantum mechanics (QM) is deterministic. Thesis: a quantum system (QS) always has a definite value of place. This value is the hidden parameter. Each quantum system therefore has a definite orbit that is causally determined. The behavior of the quantum system in the measurement is also causally determined. "Causal interpretation of quantum system". Apart from the location, all other observables are context-dependent. Regardless of the context of the measurement, the particle (Quantum System) has only a potential value of the observable. Measurement/Bohm: updates the properties. E.g. the spin is acquired. Properties/Quantum System/Bohm: should therefore be regarded as dispositional. (>Disposition). Independent of hidden parameters. I 284 Quantum Mechanics/Bohm: Thesis: there is a potential or quantum field. It determines the path of a quantum system causally. The quantum potential (QP) is non-local. BohmVsEinstein: in contrast to the classic potential, the quantum potential does not need to become smaller with the spatial distance! Bohm/Esfeld: violates the parameters independence (PI), while the conventional quantum mechanics violates the result independence (RI). Quantum Potential: is a new kind of interaction (force), non-local interaction. So a violation of the local effect. I 285 Bohm/Esfeld: is this a rich holism? The quantum potential cannot be described in terms of pre-existing relationships between particles. It is not determined by the locations of the particles alone. It is therefore not sufficient for a philosophical locality condition such as Hume's supervenience (Lewis, see below). on the other hand, Bohm identifies non-locality with indivisible wholeness and not separability. Bohm ignores the distinction between non-separability and violating the local effect. With the quantum potential, he introduces a new, non-local effect. However, non-local interaction is not holism! Holism/Bohm/Esfeld: in relation to holism, Bohm is at least ambiguous. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 176 Clock-Experiment/BohrVsEinstein: 1. No completely rigid arrangement can serve as a scale. In general, every measuring instrument must be able to react to changes in the measured variable. This makes it an object which itself is subject to the uncertainty relation quantum mechanics.(> Measuring). 2. Each weighing (measurement) takes time. The more accurate it should be, the more time is needed. N.B.: it is precisely the general relativity theory that Einstein refutes: the longer the measurement takes and the greater the variation in height of the system, the less precisely it determines the time at which the photon escaped. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Sellars, W. | Fraassen Vs Sellars, W. | I 32 Empirical Laws/Sellars: We don’t have them! E.g. that water boils at 100 ° applies only when the pressure is normal. (> Cartwright). Fraassen: that’s only methodically so far, because we have no confidence in the generalization of our everyday experiences. Problem: but we expect of a theory that postulates microstructure (theoretical entities) that it shows actual universal regularities. FraassenVsSellars/FraassenVsRealism: thus an unobservable reality is postulated behind the phenomena. E.g. Suppose at an early stage of chemistry it was discovered that different samples of gold dissolved at different speeds in aqua regia. But the samples were identical in terms of observation. I 33 Solution: (then): for the two samples a different microstructure was postulated. Then, the variation was explained with that the samples were mixtures of these two substances (which are identical in terms of observation). Thus, the laws have no observation-wise counterpart. Without that no explanation seems possible. And that is the goal of science, so we have to believe in an unobservable microstructure. This leads to three questions: 1) Does the postulation of the microstructure really have new consequences for the observable phenomena?. 2) Does science really always have to provide explanations?. 3) Could there be another rationale for the use of the image of the microstructure in the development of theories?. FraassenVsSellars: Ad 1): it seems that these hypothetical chemists very well postulated new observable regularities: Suppose two substances A and B with dissolution rates x and x+y. Every gold sample is a mixture of the two substances. Then it follows that every sample dissolves at a rate between x and x+y. And that is not implied by the fact that different samples have dissolved in this scope in the past. Thus Sellars is refuted in the first point. Suppose (for the sake of Sellars’ argument), there is still no way to predict the dissolution rates more accurately. Do we then need a categorical statement that is not based on the observable? (That was Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause, or the demand for the existence of hidden parameters). Sellars/Hidden Parameters: clearly recognizes that this would counter the current quantum mechanics, accordingly, he says that their mathematical models are incompatible with it. I 34 So he is limits himself to those cases where it is consistent to assume hidden variables. Consistency/Fraassen: is, of course, a logical hold point. FraassenVsHidden Variables/FraassenVsSellars: this does not prevent the disaster: although there is some evidence that hidden variables cannot be introduced in a classical deterministic theory, this evidence demands something much more stronger than consistency: E.g. the assumption that two different physical variables cannot have the same probability distribution in the measurement across all possible states. So if we are unable to specify differences in the forecast for the observable, there is no real difference. (No distinction without difference. Stronger demand than consistency stronger/weaker). Ad. 3) How can anti-realism make sense of that? Apart from the actually new empirical consequences (see above) he will cite methodological reasons. With the assumption of a particular microstructure we could come to new implications of empirical regularities. This is, of course, only a hope. But: Science/Fraassen: Thesis: it is not about explanation as such, but about new statements about observable regularities. I 30 FraassenVsHidden Parameters: if this is empirically equivalent to the orthodox quantum mechanics, it leads to non-logical correlation of non-classical nature, which would still violate the principle of the common cause. But this question is also academic, because modern physics does not need hidden parameters. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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Hidden Parameters | Esfeld, M. | I 281 ~ Bohm hidden parameters /: compatible with holism. - Bohm theory: a quantum system has at all times a definite value of the place, all other observables are context-dependent. - Measurement updates the properties. -Properties: dispositional - a potential (quantum field) causally determines the path of the qu.s. - Violation of the independence of the parameters and the local effects - but non-local interaction is not holism. |
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