Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 47 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Systems | Parsons | Habermas IV 322 Action system/Parsons/Habermas: after Parsons got to know Malinowski's Freudian personality theory and cultural anthropology, his theoretical perspective shifted: action systems are no longer built up elementarily from their units, they are the starting point. For Parsons, the starting point is now the concept of culture; the systems of action society and personality are declared as institutional embodiments and motivational anchoring of cultural patterns. Elementary units are no longer units of action, but cultural patterns and symbolic meanings. These form configurations, systems of cultural values and interpretations that can be handed down. >S. Freud. Habermas IV 323 Problem: 1. How should the cultural determination of action systems be thought of? 2. How can the three concepts of order in the cultural, social and personality system be combined with the concept of action from which it could not be built? Habermas IV 326 Ad 1: Solution/Parsons: Value standards are no longer attributed to individual actors as subjective properties; culturally value patterns are introduced from the outset as intersubjective property. However, they are initially only regarded as components of cultural tradition and do not have normative binding force by their very nature. Habermas IV 327 Ad 2: From the conceptual perspective of communication-oriented action, the interpretative appropriation of traditional cultural contents presents itself as the act through which the cultural determination of action takes place. Habermas IV 328 HabermasVsParsons: this way of analysis is blocked by Parsons, because he sees the orientation towards values as an orientation towards objects. >Objects/Parsons. Habermas IV 358 Action System/Society/System/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons defined society as an action system from the mid-sixties of the 20th century, whereby culture and language give way to constitutive provisions instead of value-oriented purposive action. (1) In systems of action, the traditional cultural patterns penetrate through the medium of language with the genetically propagated organic equipment of the individual members of society. Collectives, which are composed of socialized individuals, are the carriers of the systems of action. Moreover, each action system is a zone of interaction and mutual penetration of four subsystems: Culture, society, personality and organism. Each of these subsystems is specialized in a basic function. (2) Habermas IV 359 Subsystems: since they have a relative autonomy, they are in contingent relationships with each other. However, these are determined to a certain extent by their membership of the common system of action. The subsystems form environments for each other. Control: for superior control of these basic functions, Parsons postulates a control hierarchy. (3) Habermas IV 381 At the end of his complex path of thought, Parsons is confronted with the epistemological model of the recognizing subject based on Kant for the action system. HabermasVsParsons: for the purposes of the foundation of social theory, however, the communication-theoretical model of the subject with its ability to speak and act is better suited than the epistemological one. 1. T. Parsons, Societies, Englewood Cliffs, 1966, p. 5. 2. Ibid. p. 7. 3. Ibid. p. 28 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Anti-Humanism | Braidotti | Braidotti I 23 Anti-Humanism/Braidotti: Anti-humanism emerged as the rallying cry of this generation of radical thinkers who later were to became world-famous as the ‘post-structuralist generation’. In fact, they were postcommunists avant la lettre. They stepped out of the dialectical oppositional thinking and developed a third way to deal with changing understandings of human subjectivity. >Dialectics, >Subjectivity/Braidotti. By the time Michel Foucault published his ground-breaking critique of Humanism in The Order of Things (1970)(1), the question of what, if anything, was the idea of ‘the human’ was circulating in the radical discourses of the time and had set the antihumanist agenda for an array of political groups. >Michel Foucault, >Archeology/Foucault. The ‘death of Man’, announced by Foucault formalizes an epistemological and moral crisis that goes beyond binary oppositions and cuts across the different poles of the political spectrum. What is targeted is the implicit Humanism of Marxism, more specifically the humanistic arrogance of continuing to place Man at the centre of world history. >Marxism. Even Marxism, under the cover of a master theory of historical materialism, continued to define the subject of European thought as unitary and hegemonic and to assign him (the gender is no coincidence) a royal place as the motor of human history. Anti-humanism consists in de-linking the human agent from this universalistic posture, calling him to task, so to speak, on the concrete actions he is enacting. Different and sharper power relations emerge, once this formerly dominant subject is freed from his delusions of grandeur and is no longer allegedly in charge of historical progress. The radical thinkers of the post-1968 generation rejected Humanism both in its classical and its socialist versions. Braidotti I 26 My anti-humanism leads me to object to the unitary subject of Humanism, including its socialist variables, and to replace it with a more complex and relational subject framed by embodiment, sexuality, affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities. Equally central to this approach is the insight I learned from Foucault on power as both a restrictive (potestas) and productive (potentia) force. This means that power formations not only function at the material level but are also expressed in systems of theoretical and cultural representation, political and normative narratives and social modes of identification. These are neither coherent, nor rational and their makeshift nature is instrumental to their hegemonic force. >Nature, >Identification, >Identity politics. 1. Foucault, Michel. 1970. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. New York: Pantheon Books. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Art | Habermas | III 41 Art/Habermas: reasons have in the context of literary, art and music criticism, the peculiar function of bringing a value or representation to the fore in such a way that it can be perceived as an authentic expression of an exemplary experience, or even as the embodiment of a claim to authenticity. >Authenticity, >Experience, >Individual, >Arts, >Criticism. III 42 Reasons serve in aesthetic criticism to guide perception and to make the authenticity of a work so evident that this experience itself can become a rational motif for the acceptance of appropriate value standards. >Values, >Norms. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Capital Structure | Rothbard | Rothbard III 401 Capital Structure/Rothbard: (…) there is no great difference between durable and less durable capital. Both are consumed in the course of the production process, and both must be paid for out of the gross income and gross savings of lower-order capitalists. >Production structure/Rothbard. In evaluating the payment pattern of the production structure, then, it is inadmissible to leave the consumption of nondurable capital goods out of the investment picture. It is completely illogical to single out durable goods, which are themselves only discounted embodiments of their nondurable services and therefore no different from nondurable goods. >Durable Goods/Rothbard, >Service/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Capital/Rothbard. The idea that the capital structure is maintained intact without savings, as it were automatically, is fostered by the use of the “net” approach. If even zero savings will suffice to maintain capital, then it seems as if the aggregate value of capital is a permanent entity that cannot be reduced. Rothbard III 402 This notion of the permanence of capital has permeated economic theory, particularly through the writings of J.B. Clark and Frank H. Knight, and through the influence of the latter has molded current “neoclassical” economic theory in America. To maintain this doctrine it is necessary to deny the stage analysis of production and, indeed, to deny the very influence of time in production.(1) >Interest rates/Rothbard, >Factors of Production/Rothbard. Production/time/Rothbard: The all-pervading influence of time is stressed in the period- of- production concept and in the determination of the interest rate and of the investment-consumption ratio by individual time preference schedules. Frank H. Knight/RothbardVsKnight: The Knight doctrine denies any role to time in production, asserting that production “now” (in a modern, complex economy) is timeless and that time preference has no influence on the interest rate. This doctrine has been aptly called a “mythology of capital.” >Time preference. RothbardVsKnight: Among other errors, it leads to the belief that there is no economic problem connected with the replacement and maintenance of capital.(2,3) Rothbard III 407 Every capitalist at every stage (…) demands goods that are more distantly future than the product that he supplies, and he supplies present goods for the duration of the production stage until this product is formed. He is therefore a net supplier of present goods, and a net demander of future goods. 1. If permanence is attributed to the mythical entity, the aggregate value of capital, it becomes an independent factor of production, along with labor, and earns interest. 2. The fallacy of the “net” approach to capital is at least as old as Adam Smith and continues down to the present. See Hayek, Prices and Production, 2nd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935. Reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley, 1967. pp. 37–49. This book is an excellent contribution to the analysis of the production structure, gross savings and consumption, and in application to the business cycle, based on the production and business cycle theories of Böhm-Bawerk and Mises respectively. Also see Hayek, “The Mythology of Capital” in W. Fellner and B.F. Haley, eds., Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution (Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1946), pp. 355–83; idem, Profits, Interest, and Investment, passim. 3. For a critique of the analogous views of J.B. Clark, see Frank A. Fetter, “Recent Discussions of the Capital Concept,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1900, pp. 1–14. Fetter succinctly criticizes Clark’s failure to explain interest on consumption goods, his assumption of a permanent capital fund, and his assumption of “synchronization” in production. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Capital Structure | Salter | Harcourt I 55 Capital/production/substitution/Salter/Harcourt: W. E. G. Salter's work (Salter [1959(1), 1960(2), 1962(3), 1965(4)])(…) was originally developed in Cambridge,England, over the years 1953-5, as one of the finest-and earliest examples of the embodiment hypothesis and the attempt to get away from the puzzles associated with the measurement of capital, while, at the same time, recognizing the importance of distinguishing between ex ante and ex post substitutability, the heterogeneity of capital goods and the distinction between comparisons and processes. >Capital/Robinson, >Production function. Production function/time/Salter: Salter accepted Joan Robinson's view that the production function is relevant only in an ex ante sense when investment decisions - what to scrap, what to add, how much to add (and how to pay for it) - are being made, so that only the margins of the capital stock are affected, both by scrapping and by additions. Substitution/technology/neoclassical approach: The neoclassical assumptions of substitutability and cost-minimization (with static expectations) now relate to the choice from the set of 'best-practice' techniques available - the book of blue-prints or ex ante production function, new-style - of that technique which will minimize costs and maximize profits in the sense of maximizing the present value of expected net receipts (quasirents) with given (expected) rates of wages and prices. Microeconomics: The choice is analysed at the micro level - we deal principally with the firm - so that wage rates, product prices and investment-good prices, as well as the expected rate of profits which is used as the discount factor in presentvalue calculations, may be taken as given. Labour/investment: It comes as no surprise that, in this aspect of the investment decision, the technique which is chosen is that for which the marginal rate of substitution of labour for investment, i.e. the ratio of the respective marginal products (and the slope of the ex ante production function) equals the ratio of the factor prices. >Factor price, >Factors of production. 1. Salter, W. E. G. [1959] 'The Production Function and the Durability of Capital', Economic Record, xxxv, pp. 47-66. 2. Salter, W. E. G. [1960] Productivity and Technical Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 3. Salter, W. E. G. [1962] 'Marginal Labour and Investment Coefficients of Australian Manufacturing Industry', Economic Record, xxxvin, pp. 137-56. 4. Salter, W. E. G. [1965] 'Productivity Growth and Accumulation as Historical Processes', Problems in Economic Development, ed. by E. A. G. Robinson (London: Macmillan), pp. 266-91. |
Salter I Wilfred Edward Graham Salter Productivity and Technical Change Cambridge 1960 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capitalism | Rothbard | Rothbard III 346 Capitalism/Rothbard: Popular literature attributes enormous "power" to the capitalist and considers his owning a mass of capital goods as of enormous significance, giving him a great advantage over other People in the economy. We see, however, that this is far from the case; indeed, the opposite may well be true. For the capitalist has already saved from possible consumption and hired the services of factors to produce his capital goods. The owners of these factors have the money already for which they otherwise would have had to save and wait (and bear uncertainty), while the capitalist has only a mass of capital goods, a mass that will prove worthless to him unless it can be further worked on and the product sold to the consumers. When the capitalist purchases factor services, what is the precise exchange that takes Place? >Factors of production/Rothbard. Time: The capitalist gives money (a present good) in exchange for receiving factor services (labor and land), which work to supply him with capital goods. They supply him, in other words, with future goods. The capital goods for which he pays are way stations on the route to the final product - the consumers' good. >Capital goods/Rothbard. At the time when land and labor are hired to produce capital goods, therefore, these capital goods, and therefore the services of the land and labor, are future goods; they represent the embodiment of the expected yield of a good in the future - a good that can then be consumed. The capitalist who buys the services of land and labor in year one to work on a product that will eventually become a consumers' good ready for sale in year two is advancing money (a present good) in exchange for a future good—for the present anticipation of a yield of money in the future from the sale of the final product. A present good is being exchanged for an expected future good. Rothbard III 352 If the owners of land and labor factors receive all the income (e.g., 100 ounces) when they own the product jointly, why dotheir owners consent to sell their services for a total of five ounces less than their “full worth”? Is this not some form of “exploitation” by the capitalists? The answer again is that the capitalists do not earn income from their possession of capital goods or because capital goods generate any sort of monetary income. The capitalists earn income in their capacity as purchasers of future goods in exchange for supplying present goods to owners of factors. It is this time element, the result of the various individuals’ time preferences, and not the alleged independent productivity of capital goods, from which the interest rate and interest income arise. Rothbard III 378 The pure capitalist (…) in performing a capital-advancing function in the productive system, plays a sort of intermediary role. He sells money (a present good) to factorowners in exchange for the services of their factors (prospective future goods). >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Investment/Rothbard. He holds these goods and continues to hire work on them until they have been transformed into consumers’ goods (present goods), which are then sold to the public for money (a present good). The premium that he earns from the sale of present goods, compared to what he paid for future goods, is the rate of interest earned on the exchange >Interest rate/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Class Conflict | Marx | Rothbard II 376 Class conflict/Marx/Rothbard: Even assuming that the unexplained incompatibility between the productive forces and the relations of production exists, why shouldn't this incompatibility continue forever? Why doesn't the economy simply lapse into permanent stagnation of the technological forces? This 'contradiction', so to speak, was scarcely enough to generate Marx's goal of the inevitable proletarian communist revolution. >Productive forces, >Relations of production, >Historical materialism, >Technology/Marx. Class conflict: The answer that Marx supplies, the motor of the inevitable revolutions in history, is inherent class conflict, inherent struggles between economic classes. For, in addition to the property rights system, one of the consequences of the relations of production, as determined by the productive forces, is the 'class structure' of society. For Marx, the fetters are invariably applied by the privileged 'ruling classes', Who somehow serve as surrogates for, or living embodiments of, the social relations ofproduction and the legal property system. In contrast, another, inevitably 'rising' economic class somehow embodies the oppressed, or fettered, technologies and modes of production. Rothbard II 377 The 'contradiction' between the fettered material productive forces and the fettering social relations of production thus becomes embodied in a determined class struggle between the 'rising' and the 'ruling' classes, which are bound, by the inevitable (material) dialectic of history to result in a triumphant revolution by the rising class. Material dialectic: (…) the material dialectic takes one socio-economic system, say feudalism, and claims that it 'gives rise' to its opposite, or 'negation', and its inevitable replacement by 'capitalism', which thus 'negates' and transcends feudalism. And in the same way electricity (or whatever) will inevitably give rise to a proletarian revolution which will permit electricity to triumph over the fetters that capitalists place upon it. RothbardVsMarx: It is diffcult to state this position without rejecting it immediately as drivel. In addition to all the flaws in historical materialism we have seen above, there is no causal chain that links a technology to a Class, or that permits economic classes to embody either technology or its 'production relations' fetters. There is no proffered reason why such classes must, or even plausibly might, act as determined puppets for or against new technologies. Why must feudal landlords try to suppress the steam mill? Why can't feudal landlords invest in steam mills? End of dialectic/end of history: If, finally, class struggle and the material dialectic bring about an inevitable proletarian revolution, why does the dialectic, as Marx of course maintains, at that point come to an end? For crucial to Marxism, as to other millennial and apocalyptic creeds, is that the dialectic can by no means roll on forever. On the contrary, the chiliast, whether pre- or post-millennial, invariably sees the end of the dialectic, or the end of history, as imminent. Marx's atheist dialectic, too, envisioned the imminent proletarian revolution, which would, after the 'raw communist' stage, bring Rothbard II 378 about a 'hig her communism' or perhaps a 'beyond communist' stage, which would be a classless society, a society of total equality, of no division of labour, a society without rulers. But since history is a 'history of class struggles' for Marx, the ultimate communist stage would be the final one, so that, in effect, history would then come to an end. BakuninVsMarx: Critics of Marx, from Bakunin to Machajski to Milovan Djilas, have of course pointed out, both prophetically and in retrospect, that the proletarian revolution, whichever its stage, would not eliminate classes, but, on the contrary, would set up a new ruling class and a new ruled. There would be no equality, but another inequality of power and inevitably of wealth: the oligarchic elite, the vanguard, as rulers, and the rest of society as the ruled. >Marx/Rothbard, >Ideology/Marx. Höffe I 366 Class Conflict/Marx/Höffe: (...) [Marx] asserts an uninterrupted conflict, "which ended each time with a revolutionary transformation of the whole society. For its own time, it is the conflict of two classes, the main economic bourgeois called "bourgeois," the capitalists, and the wage laborers called "proletarians". This contemporary struggle is supposed to be the last one in world history, since the existing opposition is not replaced by a new opposition. The victory of the wage laborers over the capitalists is meant to overcome all (...) class barriers, thus bringing unity, harmony and peace to the world. >History/Marx. 1. K. Marx und F. Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, 1848 |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Commodity | Marx | Rothbard II 409 Commodity/Marx/Rothbard: Marx found a crucial key to this mechanism in Ricardo's labour theory ofvalue, and in the Ricardian socialist thesis that labour is the sole determinant of value, With capital's Share, or profits, being the 'surplus value' extracted by the capitalist from labour's created product. >Capital. But, in order to arrive at the labour, or quantity-of-labour-hours, theory of value, Marx, in his systematic work Capital, had to dispose of Other, subjective, claimants to determining value. He also had to demonstrate that value was somehow objectively embodied in the product (a material good, of course, since Marx, with Smith, had dismissed immaterial services as 'unproductive'). Marx begins Capital by concentrating on 'the commodity', an Object - (…), a material substance - which has utility for satisfying human wants. In this way like Ricardo, he leaves immaterial services out of the picture, and also omits studying the value of non-reproducible products, which have no ongoing costs of production. Like Ricardo, Marx also begins With the necessity ofutility, but, like his master, he quickly dismisses this basic fact as of little or no use in explaining 'exchange-value', the proportion in which commodities exchange for one another on the market. As in Smith and Ricardo, therefore, use-value and exchange-value, or price, of commodities are sundered from each other. How, then, explain exchange-value? Problem: How, in short, explain the proportions by which commodities exchange for each other on the market? Rothbard II 410 Solution/Marx: (…) „two things must (…) be equal to a third, which in itself is neither the one nor the other. Each of them so far as it is exchange-value, must therefore be reducible to this third... of which thing they represent a greater or less quantity.(1) RothbardVsMarx: Thus, Marx inserts his crucial error at the very beginning of his system. The fact that two commodities exchange for each other in some proportion does not mean that they are therefore 'equal' in value and can be 'represented by an equation'. As we have learned ever since Buridan and the scholastics, two things exchange for each other only because they are unequal in value to the two participants in the exchange. A gives up to x to B in exchange for y, because A prefers y to x, and B, on the contrary, prefers x to y. An equals sign falsifies the essential picture. And ifthe two commodities, x andy, were really equal in value in the sight of the two exchangers, why in the world did either of them take the time and trouble to make the exchange? >Barter economy. Value/measurement/RothbardVsMarx: If there is no equality in value, then there is clearly no third isomething' to which these values must be equal. Marx compounds his original error With another, assuming that if there were an equality of value, there is therefore necessarily some third tangible thing to which they must be equal and by which they can be measured. There is no warrant for this leap from equality of value to measurement of an objective third entity; the implicit, and fallacious, assumption is that 'value' is an objective entity like weight or length which can be scientifically measured against some third, external, standard. Utility/value/use value/RothbardVsMarx: Emphasizing by mere assertion that utility can have nothing whatever to do With exchange-values, a point crucial to his case, he claims that use-values have nothing to do With exchange-values or prices. This means that all real attributes of goods, their natures, their varying qualities, etc., are abstracted from, and can have nothing to do with, their values. By tossing out all real-world properties from the discussion, Marx is perforce left With goods as the embodiment of pure, abstract, undifferentiated labour hours, the quantity of allegedly homogeneous labour hours embodied in the product. >Value theory of labour/Marx, >Value theory/Ricardo, >Utility. Solution/Marx: Marx of course sees that there are great problems with this approach. What about the scholastic thrust: is the market expected to cover the costs, the enormous number of labour hours, needed to make a product in an obsolete way? If a book is printed, or hand-scripted, is the market going to cover the payment for the enormous number oflabour hours needed in the Rothbard II 411 hand-copying process? Is the market expected to pay the labour costs of carrying goods across land, as compared to shipping them by sea? Marx's way of disposing of these awkward questions was to create the concept of 'socially necessary' labour time. The determinant of the value of a good is not any old labour time spent on, or embodied in, its production, but only labour time that is 'socially necessary'. RothbardVsMarx: But this is a cop out, and evades the issue by begging the entire question. Market value is determined only by the quantity of 'socially' necessary' labour time. But what is 'socially necessary'? Socially necessary/Marx/Rothbard: Marx defines 'labour time socially necessary' as 'that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of Skill and intensity prevalent at the time'.(2) This brings up a corollary problem: how to meld a myriad of different qualities and skills of labour into one homogeneous, abstract 'labour hour'? Here, taking up a hint from Ricardo, Marx inserts the concepts of 'average' and 'normal'. It all averages out. But how is this average obtained? It is done by weights, with higher quality, unusually productive labour weighted more heavily in quantity labour-time units than is the labour of an unskilled worker. But who decides the weights? Once again, Marx's crucial question-begging methodology comes into play. For Marx acknowledges that it is the market, its relative prices and wages, which determines the weights, i.e. which labour is more productive or higher in quality and in what degree than some other forms of labour. So market values, prices, and productivities are being used to try to explain the determinants of those same values and prices.(3) >Rate of profit/Marx, >Surplus value/Marx. 1. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 37. 2. Ibid. p. 39 3. 3. Compare the discussion in David Conway, A Farewell to Marx: An Outline and Appraisal of His Theories (Harmondsworth, Mddx: Penguin Books, 198 7), pp. 83-9. Habermas IV 492 Commodity/Marx/Habermas: Marx's approach owes its theory-strategic superiority over the designs developed since then at the same level of abstraction, to an ingenious coup: the analysis of the commodity form. By analyzing the dual character of the commodity ((s) with utility value and exchange value), Marx gains basic value-theoretical assumptions that make it possible to describe the process of unfolding capitalist societies simultaneously from the economic perspective of the observer as a crisis-like process of self-exploitation of capital, as well as from the historical perspective of the person concerned (...) as a conflict-prone interaction between social classes. In terms of value theory, the relationship between the exchange of labor for variable capital, which is fundamental to the mode of production and institutionalized in the employment contract, can be simultaneously explained as a control mechanism of a self-regulated reproduction process and as a reflection relationship that makes the entire accumulation process understandable as an objective, anonymous process of exploitation. Exchange value/Marx: is the medium that objectivistically covers and objectifies class dynamics at the same time, i.e. makes them more objective. The mechanism of the labour market, institutionalised under private law, assumes functions of the previously politically institutionalised relationship between social violence and economic exploitation. The class ratio becomes the basis of the Habermas IV 493 monetization of the labour force. The analysis of the class ratio must therefore start with the dual character of the commodity labour force. >Labor/Marx, >Labor Power/Marx, >Theory of Value. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communicative Action | Habermas | III 128 Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. >Agreement, >Language/Habermas. III 143 Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved. III 157 In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. >World/thinking, >Reality. III 158 Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. >Observation, >Method, >Interpretation, >Practice. III 385 Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. >Situations. III 395 Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. III 396 Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. III 397 HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. >Meaning/Intending. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. >Understanding. III 457 Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 223 Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives. >Cultural tradition, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Computer Model | Weizenbaum | I 234 Computer Model/General Problem Solver/GPS/Artificial Intelligence/Newell/Simon/Weizenbaum: (described in A. Newell und H. A. Simon 1972(1)). General Problem Solver/Weizenbaum: is basically nothing more than a programming language in which you can write programs for certain highly specialized tasks. >Computer languages, >Problem solving. I 236 The General Problem Solver (GPS) is a frame within which the logical theory program runs. To solve problems, you have to work with very general symbolic structures that represent objects, operators, properties of objects and differences between objects, and one also has to create a method catalog. But even then, GPS does not allow you to draw conclusions from such "principles". >Principles. WeizenbaumVsSimon/WeizenbaumVsNewell: the statement that the General Problem Solver (GPS) is in every sense an embodiment of human problem solving is tantamount to the statement that the algebra of the secondary school is also such an embodiment. I 237 Problem: that says nothing about the psychology of human problem solving. Outside world/Newell/Simon: Particular attention should be paid to the restrictions on GPS access to the outside world. The initial part of the explicit commands to GPS has been acquired by humans long before this when building up their vocabulary. >Language, >Language use, >Language community, >Knowledge, >World/Thinking. I 238 WeizenbaumVsSimon/WeizenbaumVsNewell: this is where the true facts are bypassed. In reality, the question is what happens to the whole person as he or she builds up his or her vocabulary. >Language acquisition. How is his/her understanding of what a "problem" is shaped by the experiences that are an inseparable part of his/her vocabulary acquisition? >Problems, >H.A. Simon, >A. Newell. 1. A. Newell und H. A. Simon, Human Problem Solving, Englewood Cliffs(N. J. 1972, Kap 9: Logic, GPS and Human Behavior, S. 455-554 |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Cultural Tradition | Parsons | Habermas IV 322 Cultural Tradition/Parsons/Habermas: after Parsons got to know Malinowski's Freudian personality theory and cultural anthropology, his theoretical perspective shifted: systems of action are no longer built up elementarily from their units, they are the starting point. For Parsons, the starting point is now the concept of culture; the systems of action society and personality are declared as institutional embodiments and motivational anchoring of cultural patterns. Elementary units are no longer units of action, but cultural patterns and symbolic meanings. These form configurations, systems of cultural values and interpretations that can be handed down. Habermas IV 323 The part of cultural tradition that is relevant for the constitution of systems of action is the pattern of value. These are processed through internalisation into personal motives or character-forming dispositions for action. Then action systems are complementary channels through which cultural values are translated into motivated actions.(1) >Values, >Action Systems. Problem: 1. How should the cultural determination of systems of action be thought of? 2. How can the three concepts of order in the cultural, social and personality system be combined with the concept of action from which it could not be built? Habermas IV 326 Ad 1: Solution/Parsons: Value standards are no longer attributed to individual actors as subjective properties; cultural value patterns are introduced from the outset as intersubjective property. However, they are initially only regarded as components of cultural tradition and do not have normative binding force by their very nature. Habermas IV 327 Ad 2: From the conceptual perspective of communication-oriented action, the interpretative appropriation of traditional cultural contents presents itself as the act through which the cultural determination of action takes place. >Action theory, >Communicative action. Habermas IV 328 HabermasVsParsons: this way of analysis is blocked by Parsons, because he sees the orientation to values as an orientation to objects. >Objects/Parsons. 1.Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, NY 1951, S. 54. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Cultural Values | Habermas | III 71 Cultural values/Habermas: Cultural values are not universal. They are limited to the horizon of the lifeworld of a certain culture. For this reason, the critique of value standards presupposes a common understanding of the argumentation participants, which is not available for disposition, but at the same time constitutes and limits the scope of the thematic claims to validity. (1) >Cultural tradition, >Lifeworld, >Validity claims. III 133 Cultural values/Habermas: we do not associate cultural values with a claim to normative validity, but values are candidates for embodiment in norms; they can attain general obligations with regard to a matter in need of regulation. >Norms, >Values, >Cultural relativism, cf. >Generality. In the light of cultural values, the needs of an individual also appear plausible to other individuals who are in the same tradition. However, needs are transformed into legitimate motives for action only by the fact that the corresponding values become normatively binding for a group of affected persons in the regulation of problem situations. 1.Vgl. Konferenzbericht: G. Großklaus, E. Oldemeyer (Hrsg.); Werte in kommunikativen Prozessen, Stuttgart 1980. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Culture | Habermas | III 41 Culture/Habermas: we call a person rational who interprets his or her nature of need in the light of culturally well-coordinated value standards, but especially when he or she is able to adopt a reflexive attitude towards the standards of value that interpret needs. >Rationality/Habermas. Cultural values do not occur like norms of action with a claim to generality. Values candidate at most for interpretations among which a circle of interested parties can describe and standardize a common interest. >Cultural values, >Culture shift, >Interpretation, >Values, >Norms. Therefore, arguments used to justify value standards do not fulfil the conditions of discourses. In the prototypical case they have the form of aesthetic criticism. In the context of literary, art and music criticism, reasons have the peculiar function of presenting a value or representation in such a way that it can be perceived as an authentic expression of an exemplary experience, or even as the embodiment of a claim to authenticity. >Aesthetics, >Art, >Literature, >Experience, >Authenticity. IV 209 Def Culture/Habermas: I call culture the inventory of knowledge from which the communication participants provide themselves with interpretations by communicating about something in a world. Def Society/Habermas: I call society the legitimate orders through which communication participants regulate their affiliation to social groups and thus ensure solidarity. Def Personality/Habermas: By personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, i.e. repairing, participating in processes of communication and thereby asserting one's own identity. Semantics/Habermas: the semantic field of symbolic contents form dimensions in which the communicative actions extend. Medium/Habermas: the interactions interwoven into the network of everyday communicative practice form the medium through which culture, society and person reproduce themselves. These reproductive processes extend to the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. We must differentiate between the preservation of the material substrate of the lifeworld. >Life world, >Substrate, >Media, >Society. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Currency | Rothbard | Rothbard II 230 Currency principle/currency/Rothbard: The prohibition of small notes, however, scarcely tackled the main problem. The first to go beyond this minor aspect of banking and go straight to the heart of the matter was a brilliant and influential thinker Who has remained as little known to historians as he was obscure in his own day. It is With justice that Lionel Robbins has wittily referred to James Pennington (1777—1862) as the 'Mycroft Holmes' of the later monetary controversy of the classical period. Rothbard II 231 (…) Pennington followed up his first memorandum with another, a year later (16 May 1827) on ‚Observations on the Coinage'.(1) After explaining the technical procedures of the gold standard, Pennington detailed the dangers to gold of the existence of a paper currency, and then added a tantalizing hint: 'It is possible to regulate an extensive paper circulation... to render its contraction and expansion... subject to the same Law as that which determines the expansion and contraction of a currency wholly and exclusively metallic'. Here was the first indication in Great Britain of the 'Currency Principle': that more than simple gold redeemability was needed to transform bank money into a mere surrogate of gold. Rothbard II 232 Pennington: If the Bank of England were the monopoly issuer of notes, Pennington prophetically counselled, it would be easy for it to control the total supply; in lieu of that, the private banks, London and country, could in some way be totally and immediately controlled by the bank. In either case, the bank could then be compelled to keep its securities (i.e. its earning assets) fixed in total amount; if so, its note issues would move in the same direction, and to the same extent, as its stock of gold. While the bank would not have 100 per cent gold reserves to its notes, the legally fixed gap between them would mean that bank notes (and by extension, the total money supply) would move in the same way and to the same extent as the gold supply - thus arriving at the equivalent of 100 per cent specie money for all further operations of the bank. Here was the seed of Peel's great Act of 1844, the embodiment of the currency principle. Rothbard II 234 Rothbard: It is still a mystery how men so keenly aware and critical of the cartellizing and inflationary role of the Bank of England should have proposed centralizing control into the hands of the very same bank, and all in the name of stopping inflation and tying the monetary system closely and one-to-one to gold. Rothbard II 249 Central Bank/Robert Peel/Rothbard: Robert Peel's proudest achievement, (…) was his banking reform, his Act of 1844. In essence, Peel's Act established the currency principle. It divided the Bank of England into an issue department, issuing bank notes, and a banking department, lending and issuing demand deposits. True to the rigid currency school separation ofnotes and deposits, deposits would be totally free and unregulated, while notes would be limited to a ceiling of E 14 million matched by assets of government securities (roughly the extent of existing note issue). Any further notes could only be issued on the basis of 100 per cent reserve in gold. The second main provision was to grant the Bank of England its long-sought monopoly of the note issue. This was not done immediately, but to be phased in over a period of time. Specifically: no new banks were to issue any bank notes, existing banks were to issue no further notes, and the Bank of England might contract With bankers to buy out their existing notes and replace them with the bank's own. 1. James Pennington. 1827. Observations on the Coinage. In: Economic writings of James Pennington 1826-1840 / edited with an essay on the life and work of James Pennington by R.S. Sayers. London: Routledge/Thoemmes, 1996. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Diversity (Politics) | Liberalism | Gaus I 244 Diversity/Liberalism/D’Agostino: (...) if we tolerate 'too much' diversity in individuals' cognitive and evaluative attitudes, it cannot be ruled out that we will be unable to identify a collectively best system of social arrangements. Of course, neither pluralism nor representativeness requires the recognition of all empirically given diversity of attitudes (see, especially, Gaus, 1996(1)). ((s) For problems in relation to diversity see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino.) Normalization: some attitudes can reasonably be 'filtered out' or normalized as part of any reasonable procedure for the identification of collectively binding social arrangements. If this can be done compatibly with specifically liberal principles, then liberalism can acknowledge diversity without abandoning a commitment to coherence in theory and in its institutional embodiments. (The idea of normalization is associated with Michel Foucault, 1977, (...). Nromalization/Rawls: John Rawls's original position (1973(2): ch. Ill) represents the most influential attempt to identify a device of normalization that meets specifically liberal requirements. Bruce Ackerman's (1980)(3) 'neutral dialogue' and Jürgen Habermas's (1990)(4) >ideal speech situation are other examples (...). Normalization/Rawls: Rawls addresses this problem by considering how diversity of individuals' antecedent judgements might be reduced compatibly with specifically liberal ideals and principles. His task is twofold: 1) to find a basis for reduction, and 2) to find a specifically liberal rationale for reduction. Without (1), the coherence requirement cannot be satisfied; there is 'too much' antecedent diversity for a collectively best structure to be identified. Without (2), representativeness is not adequately acknowledged, for, absent a rationale, any reduction will be arbitrary from an ethical point of view - i.e. will arbitrarily fail adequately to represent decision-relevant diversity of assessments. Rawls's solution is embodied, specifically, in the veil of ignorance. >Veil of ignorance/Rawls, >Veil of ignorance/D’Agostino. Arrow’s Theorem/problems/solutions: a problem of coherence results, in fact, precisely in so far as we demand, of a solution to the problem of collective choice, that it identify a particular option as one which will be binding on all the individuals involved. >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino. Three Individuals (A, B, C) and three possible social arrangements (S1, S2, S3); Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st There is, however, another possibility, and it has been widely exploited in specifically liberal institutions. It is, in effect, to see the profile of preferences represented in Table I as the end-point, not the starting-point, of a process of collective deliberation. Perhaps the individuals involved agree to devolve decision-making about these options to the individual level. In so far as they do agree to this, we have a collective solution to a problem of choice. Each of the individuals agrees, with all the others, not about what preference should collectively be honoured, but rather that that distribution of preferences over individuals is to be preferred to any other in which each individual has the preferences which he antecedently has (or which he would have, subject to specifically liberal normalization of his attitudes). 1. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1973) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 4. Habermas, Jürgen (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge: Polity. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Exemplification | Exemplification: the relation to be an example of something. This does not have to be an embodiment. Each individual trivially embodies each of its current properties. In relation to works of art Nelson Goodman explains exemplification in contrast to denotation. Se also denotation, reference, relevance. |
||
| Formal Language | Weizenbaum | I 143 Meaning/Programming Language/Program/Computer/Weizenbaum: in a hierarchy of programming languages whose lowest level is machine language, a higher-level programming language is in reality a formal language. >Language, >Computer languages, >Computer programming, >Software, >Formal language, cf. >Ideal language. The meanings of expressions written in this language are defined (...) by their transformation rules, which in turn are embodied in the procedures they translate into assembler- and ultimately into machine language. For the meanings one would have to refer to the machine language (with the symbols 0 and 1) and finally to the machine itself. Then you would say, "The program means what this machine does with this code. Problem: the translator (assembler) is itself a program that transforms the computer into a completely different machine. I 144 One could say that the distinctions between languages and their embodiments by machines disappear. Programming language: can be understood as a machine itself, ultimately every formal language at a higher level is an abstract machine. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Generality | Papineau | I 255 Generality/Animal/Thinking/Papineau: no simple organism explicitly represents general facts. E.g. it is one thing to represent the location of a particular pond, that water is in ponds is quite another matter. This corresponds to the question: which animals can have beliefs? >Animals, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Thinking without language, >Spatial localization, >Representation. I 256 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: I have not defined this concept in terms of beliefs but of design: as the use of general representations. I avoid the concept belief. >Beliefs, >Content. Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations? I 257 After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Generalization. Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"? >Disposition, >Information. I do not want to dispute such content attribution. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B&T, V>R). Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: if it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple creatures can be considered ZM thinkers. I 258 Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment. >Behavior, >Embodiment. I 259 Explicit/implicit: if an organism has implicitly different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. >Complexity, >Parts, >Whole, >Sense. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Goals | Rorty | V 39 Aim/Purpose/Machine/Rorty: the purpose of a machine is not inherent in it. - A machine can be used for many different purposes. - Machines do not have a center. - Those with fewer parts are not perfect machines. Purpose/Machine: a machine can be used for many different purposes. The purpose of the machine is not inherent in it. Aim/Purpose/Human/MacIntyre/Rorty: it is difficult to see where the purpose of the human could be. We cannot maintain the "functional" Aristotelian concept that establishes a relationship between "human" and "live well" along the lines of "harpist" and "good at playing the harp." (Collingwood as well). >MacIntyre, >Collingwood. V 39 Newton/Universe/Rorty: Newton sees the universe as a mechanism. Consequence: a purpose is no longer inherent in the world itself! The world no longer teaches people how they should live. Darwin/Purpose: interaction between species coincidental. Therefore also here: the purpose is not inherent in the event itself. VI 434f Aim/Purpose/Darwinism/Rorty: Darwin banned purpose from nature, as far as it reaches beyond the needs of a specific organism. Aim/Purpose/RortyVsDewey: but as soon as purpose disappears from nature, there is no philosophical problem anymore that would affect the ability of science (of knowledge)! For then, the reconciliation of the purposes of the subject with those of the object is no longer a problem. The object is no longer the embodiment of a telos (of nature, Aristotle), but simply an object of handling. >Nature/Aristotle, >Teleology, >Actions, >Epistemology, >Darwinism, >NatureNature, >Nature/Dewey. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Humanities | Braidotti | Braidotti I 153 Humanities/Braidotti: (…) the identity crisis of the contemporary Humanities is related to the high levels of technological mediation and the multicultural structure of the globalized world. This places the issue of the relationship between the two cultures - the Humanities and the Sciences - at the centre of the debate. In a critical evaluation of the contemporary situation, Roberts and Mackenzie (2006)(1) argue for a variety of robust and constructive institutional alternatives to the rather unresolved and often conflict-ridden relationship between the Humanities and the Sciences in the third millennium. Braidotti I 154 One useful strategy aims at identifying points of compatibility between the two cultures and points out the role played by cultural representation, images and literary devices - all of them drawn from the ‘subtle’ (a term that I find vastly preferable to the derogatory ‘soft’) sciences - in the making of publicly acclaimed science. For instance, Gillian Beer’s (1983)(2) study of evolutionary narratives was positively path-breaking in this respect, and it was brilliantly pursued by studies of literary Darwinism (Carroll, 2004)(15). Working within scientific culture, Evelyn Fox Keller (1995(3), 2002(4)) is a pioneer of a different kind, producing a series of key texts to illustrate the complementary nature of humanistic knowledge and empirical science. The study of Barbara McClintock’s life and work (Keller, 1983)(5) is especially relevant in that it demonstrates the contiguity between cultural insights, spiritual resources and experimental science. Another angle of approach to the question of the two cultures today focuses on the function of visualization in science. Stephen Jay Gould and Rosamond Purcell (2000)(6) pioneered the dialogue between art and science by a sophisticated interplay of images and scientific information. This tradition was brought to new heights by the collaborative interdisciplinary work on picturing science and the arts by Carrie Jones and Peter Galison (1998)(7). The field is large and well-endowed with talents that range from the political analysis of the scientific gaze (Keller, 1985(8); Jordanova, 1989(9); Braidotti, 1994)(10) to the cultural history of photography and new media (Lury, 1998(11); Zylinska, 2009)(12). Cross-over studies of the visual arts in relation to the physical and biological sciences are also crucial, as Barbara Stafford has brilliantly demonstrated (1999(13), 2007(14)). 1. Roberts, Celia and Adrian Mackenzie. 2006. Science: Experimental sensibilities in practice. Theory, Culture & Society, 23 (2–3), 157–82. 2. Beer, Gillian. 1983. Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 3. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1995. Refiguring Life: Metaphors of Twentieth Century Biology. New York: Columbia University Press. 4. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 2002. Making Sense of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1983. A Feeling for the Organism. New York: Henry Holt. 6. Gould, Stephen Jay and Rosamond Wolff Purcell. 2000. Crossing Over. Where Art and Science Meet. New York: Three Rivers Press. 7. Jones, Caroline A. and Peter Galison (eds.) 1998. Picturing Science, Producing Art. New York and London: Routledge. 8. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1985. Reflections on Gender and Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 9. Jordanova, Ludmilla. 1989. Sexual Visions: Images of Gender in Science and Medicine between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries. London: Macmillan. 10. Braidotti, Rosi. 1994. Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory, 1st edn. New York: Columbia University Press. 11. Lury, Celia. 1998. Prosthetic Culture. Photography, Memory and Identity. London and New York: Routledge. 12. Zylinska, Joanna. 2009. Bioethics in the Age of New Media. Boston, MA: MIT Press. 13. Stafford, Barbara. 1999. Visual Analogy: Consciousness as the Art of Connecting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 14. Stafford, Barbara. 2007. Echo Objects: The Cognitive Work of Images. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 15.Carroll, Joseph. 2004. Literary Darwinism. Evolution, Human Nature and Literature. London and New York: Routledge. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Humans | Braidotti | Braidotti I 26 Humans/Braidotti: The human of Humanism is neither an ideal nor an objective statistical average or middle ground. It rather spells out a systematized standard of recognizability - of sameness - by which all others can be assessed, regulated and allotted to a designated social location. The human is a normative convention, which does not make it inherently negative, just highly regulatory and hence instrumental to practices of exclusion and discrimination. The human norm stands for normality, normalcy and normativity. It functions by transposing a specific mode of being human into a generalized standard, which acquires transcendent values as the human: from male to masculine and onto human as the universalized format of humanity. This standard is posited as categorically and qualitatively distinct from the sexualized, racialized, naturalized others and also in opposition to the technological artefact. The human is a historical construct that became a social convention about „human nature“. >Human nature, >Humans. Anti-Humanism/Braidotti: My anti-humanism leads me to object to the unitary subject of Humanism, including its socialist variables, and to replace it with a more complex and relational subject framed by embodiment, sexuality, affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities. Equally central to this approach is the insight I learned from Foucault on power as both a restrictive (potestas) and productive (potentia) force. This means that power formations not only function at the material level but are alsoexpressed in systems of theoretical and cultural representation, political and normative narratives and social modes of identification. These are neither coherent, nor rational and their makeshift nature is instrumental to their hegemonic force. >Anti-Humanism, >Humanism, >Subjects. Braidotti I 29 The anti-humanist position is certainly not free of contradictions. As Badmington wisely reminds us: ‘Apocalyptic accounts of the end of “man” [. . .] ignore Humanism’s capacity for regeneration and, quite literally, recapitulation’ (2003(1): 11). Antihumanism is a position fraught with such contradictions that the more one tries to overcome them, the more slippery it gets. Not only do anti-humanists often end up espousing humanist ideals - freedom being my favourite one – but also, in some ways, the work of critical thought is supported by intrinsic humanist discursive values (Soper, 1986(2)). Somehow, neither humanism nor anti-humanism is adequate to the task. The best example of the intrinsic contradictions generated by the anti-humanist stance is emancipation and progressive politics in general, which I consider one of the most valuable aspects of the humanistic tradition and its most enduring legacy. Across the political spectrum, Humanism has supported on the liberal side individualism, autonomy, responsibility and self-determination (Todorov, 2002(3)). On the more radical front, it has promoted solidarity, community-bonding, social justice and principles of equality. Profoundly secular in orientation, Humanism promotes respect for science and culture, against the authority of holy texts and religious dogma. It also contains an adventurous element, a curiosity-driven yearning for discovery and a project-oriented approach that is extremely valuable in its pragmatism. >Secularization. 1. Badmington, Neil. 2003. Theorizing Posthumanism. Cultural Critique, No. 53, pp. 10–27. Balibar, Etienne. 2002. Politics and the Other Scene. London: Verso. 2. Soper, Kate. 1986. Humanism and Anti-Humanism. LaSalle, IL: Open Court Press. 3. Todorov, Tzvetan. 2002. Imperfect Garden. The Legacy of Humanism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Income Tax | Economic Theories | Rothbard III 916 Income tax/Economic theories/Rothbard: (…) an income tax will shift the social proportion toward more consumption and less saving and investment. >Income tax/Rothbard, >Time preference/Rothbard. VsTime preference: It might be objected that the time-preference reason is invalid, since the government offcials and the people they subsidize will receive the tax revenues and find that their money stock has increased just as that of the taxpayers has declined. Saving/Investments/RothbardVsVs: (…) no truly productive savings and investments can be made by government, its employees, or the recipients of its subsidies. Saving/Investments/economic theories/VsIncome tax: Some economists maintain that income taxation reduces savings and investment in society in yet a third way. They assert that income taxation, by its very nature, imposes a "double" tax on savings-investment as against consumption.(1) The reasoning runs as follows: Saving and consumption are really not symmetrical. Saving: All saving is directed toward enjoying more consumption in the future; otherwise, there would be no point at all to saving. Saving is abstaining from possible present consumption in return for the expectation of increased consumption at some time in the future. No one wants capital goods for their own sake. They are only the embodiment of increased consumption in the future. (2) Rothbard: This line of reasoning correctly explains the investment-consumption process. RothbardVsFisher, Irving: [Fisher’s theory] suffers, however, from a grave defect: it is irrelevant to problems of taxation. It is true that saving is a fructifying agent. But the point is that everyone knows this; that is precisely why people save. Rothbard III 917 Time preference/saving/Rothbard: Yet, even though they know that saving is a fructifying agent, they do not save all their income. Why? Because of their time preferences for present consumption. >Time preference/Rothbard. Every individual, given his current income and value scales, allocates that income in the most desirable proportions between consumption, investment, and additions to his cash balance. >Cash balance/Rothbard. Any other allocation would satisfy his desires less well and Iower his position on his value scale. The fructifying power of saving is already taken into account when he makes his allocation. Double penalizing: There is therefore no reason to say that an income tax doubly penalizes saving-investment; it penalizes the individual's entire standard of living, encompassing present consumption, future consumption, and his cash balance. It does not per se penalize saving any more than the other avenues of income allocation. >Neutral taxation/Rothbard, >Neutral taxation/Economic theories, >Cost principle/Rothbard, >Benefit principle/Rothbard. 1. Thus, cf. Irving and Herbert W. Fisher, Constructive Income Taxation (New York: Harper & Bros., 1942). "Double" is used in the sense of two instances, not arithmetically twice. 2. These economists generally conclude that not income, but only consumption, should be taxed as the only "real" income. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Individuals | Hintikka | II 2 Individual/well-defined/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined if it can be picked out by a name at a node of the world line. >World lines; cf. >Four-dimensionalism. World Line: a world line can link non-existent embodiments of individuals as long as they are well-defined, for all worlds in which a node of the world line is localizable. Truth conditions are then simple: (Ex) p (x) is true in world w iff. there is an individual, e.g. with the name z such that p (z) is true in w. II 43 Individual/possible worlds/existence/Hintikka: how can an individual exist in several worlds? (By being in different worlds in different relations to its environment?) >Possible worlds, >Centered worlds, >Possible worlds/Lewis, cf. >Counterpart theory. Solution/Hintikka: World Line/Hintikka: we must distinguish two ways, in which a world line cannot be drawn. Case 1: our criteria of cross-world identification work with individual i would still fail in world w, which leads us to say that i does not exist in w. Case 2: more radical: the criteria fail even in the sense that they cannot tell us what i is at all, then we cannot decide whether i exists in w or not (well-defined). Well-defined/existence/Hintikka: N.B.: we can now say: thesis: that well-defined objects are in a certain sense in the actual world. This is the best rational reconstruction. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Infrastructure | Edwards | I 40 Infrastructure/Star/Ruhleder/Edwards: Infrastructure thus exhibits the following features, (…) summarized by Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder: -Embeddedness. Infrastructure is sunk into, inside of, other structures, social arrangements, and technologies. -Transparency. Infrastructure does not have to be reinvented each time or assembled for each task, but invisibly supports those tasks. -Reach or scope beyond a single event or a local practice. -Learned as part of membership. The taken-for-grantedness of artifacts and organizational arrangements is a sine qua non of membership in a community of practice. Strangers and outsiders encounter infrastructure as a target object to be learned about. New participants acquire a naturalized familiarity with its objects as they become members. I 41 - Links with conventions of practice. Infrastructure both shapes and is shaped by the conventions of a community of practice. - Embodiment of standards. Infrastructure takes on transparency by plugging into other infrastructures and tools in a standardized fashion. - Built on an installed base. Infrastructure wrestles with the inertia of the installed base and inherits strengths and limitations from that base. - Becomes visible upon breakdown. The normally invisible quality of working infrastructure becomes visible when it breaks: the server is down, the bridge washes out, there is a power blackout. -Is fixed in modular increments, not all at once or globally. Because infrastructure is big, layered, and complex, and because it means different things locally, it is never changed from above. Changes require time, negotiation, and adjustment with other aspects of the systems involved. Adapted from S. L. Star and K. Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for Large Information Spaces,” Information Systems Research 7, no. 1 (1996): 111–. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Jigsaw Method | Social Psychology | Haslam I 223 Jigsaw method/Social Psychology: Within social psychology, the theoretical contribution of the jigsaw strategy (Aronson et al. 1978(1); >Jigsaw method/Aronson; >Jigsaw method/psychological theories) was limited because of difficulty in clarifying the underlying mechanisms that accounted for the effects obtained. Indeed, moving into the contemporary era, this focus on outcomes rather than process limited the kind of theory development that was becoming critically important for publication within social psychology. (…) the phrase ‘jigsaw classroom’ has not appeared in the title of an article published in a leading social psychology journal (…). Preliminary work: Contact hypothesis: Beginning with research in the 1930s but catalysed by Allport’s (1954)(2) classic book The Nature of Prejudice, the contact hypothesis had represented the state-of-the art intervention for improving intergroup relations (see Dovidio et al., 2003)(3). Aronson’s work drew heavily on Sherif et al.’s (1961)(4) concept of superordinate goals in the Robbers Cave study, helped to revitalize interest in the way intergroup contact can improve intergroup relations. And although it may seem that the jigsaw classroom was somewhat neglected by social psychologists, this is certainly not the case today. (Paluck and Green(2009)(5). Explanations: It was the development of two other contemporaneous frameworks – social cognition and social identity – that ultimately provided the essential insights into the underlying processes (e.g., after Fiske and Taylor, 1984(6); Tajfel and Turner, 1979(7)). Categorization/social cognition: intergroup biases are conceptualized as outcomes of normal cognitive processes associated with simplifying and storing the overwhelming quantity and complexity of information that people encounter daily. One fundamental aspect of this process is the tendency to categorize individuals as members of social groups based on distinguishing characteristics, Haslam I 224 often socially constructed as essential qualities. >Categorization/Dovidio. Haslam I 225 Social identity theory: According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979(7); see also Abrams and Hogg, 2010)(8), the other important development around the time of Aronson and colleagues’ (1978)(1) original work on the jigsaw strategy, a person’s experience of identity varies along a continuum that ranges at one extreme from the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements, to another extreme in which the self is the embodiment of a social collective or group. Individual level: here, one’s personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. Group level: here, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one’s own, and the group’s welfare is paramount. Intergroup relations: begin when people think about themselves as group members rather than solely as distinct individuals. (See Sherif (1961(4) and Tajfel and Turner (1979(7)). 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Allport, G.W. (1954) The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Addison-Wesley. 3. Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L. and Kawakami, K. (2003) ‘The Contact Hypothesis: The past, present, and the future’, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 6: 5–21. 4. Sherif, M., Harvey, O.J., White, B.J., Hood, W.R. and Sherif, C.W. (1961) Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange. 5. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67. 6. Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1984) Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley. 7. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Law | Weber | Habermas III 231 Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality. Habermas III 232 The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Religion. Habermas III 278 Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough. Habermas III 332 Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice. The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere. Habermas III 346 HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. >Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community. Habermas III 347 Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. Habermas III 351 Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III 353 Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. Habermas III 354 Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty. Habermas III 357 Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice. Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel. (2) >Natural Justice. Habermas III 358 HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber. Habermas III 362 Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values. Habermas IV 122 Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >E. Durkheim. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638 3.Ibid p. 654 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Learning | Habermas | IV 464 Learning/Society/Habermas: Societies learn by solving system problems that represent evolutionary challenges. >Progress, >History, >Society. They can learn evolutionary ones by using the moral and legal concepts contained in world views for the reorganization of action systems and by developing a new form of social integration. >Worldviews, >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas, >Morality, >Law. This process can be imagined as the institutional embodiment of structures of rationality that are already pronounced on a cultural level. >Rationality/Habermas, >Cultural Tradition/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Markets | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 57 Market/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Buchanan saw the market mechanism as a spontaneous order in which individuals cooperate for the mutual gain of all who engage in voluntary exchanges. Those exchanges further the welfare of the individuals who participate in them; the evidence being that they voluntarily choose to exchange. Thus, Buchanan says, “For the scientist in the academy, understanding such principles does, or should, translate into reasoned advocacy of classical liberal policy stances” (Buchanan, 2000(1): 114). Armed with an understanding of economics, Buchanan saw a scientific basis for promoting a classical-liberal social order. By allowing individuals the liberty to make their own choices, and by enabling them to cooperate with others to achieve their goals, individuals are best able to improve their own welfare while not infringing on the liberty of others to do likewise. The social sciences, which study how people interact with each other, treat liberty as an instrumental value - that is, as a means to a higher end. About this treatment of liberty Buchanan wrote: Boudreaux I 58 „Classical liberals themselves have added confusion rather than clarity to the discussion when they have advanced the claim that the idealized and extended market order produces a larger “bundle” of valued goods than any socialist alternative. To invoke the efficiency norm in so crude a fashion as this, even conceptually, is to give away the whole game.“ (Buchanan, 2000(1): 116) Buchanan understood the strong temptation to make this efficiency argument. Boudreaux: It is, after all, correct. But to make this argument shifts the terms of the debate to that of socialists and other critics of the market order. Yes, a market order is indeed more productive. Yet for Buchanan the ultimate and sufficient justification for a market order is that it is essential to protect individual liberty. Ultimately, individuals want to make their own choices. They do not want others to tell them what to do. Fortunately, a market order allows them to make their own choices. In addition, a market is more productive than is a system in which some persons force their decisions on others. But this efficiency advantage should not distract the classical liberal from advocating liberty as a fundamental value. >Agreement/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 97/98 Market/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Buchanan insisted that the focus of economic analysis should be on markets, that is, on institutions of exchange, rather than on resource allocation. Buchanan says of economists who “are wholly concerned with the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends or uses… that theirs is not legitimate activity for practitioners of economics, as I want to define the discipline” (Buchanan, 1964(2): 216). The reason Buchanan insisted on this distinction (…) is that to conceive of economic activity as an exercise in resource allocation is to unwittingly assume that society is rather like a giant sentient individual with preferences all its own. Given its preferences and its income, society has only one “correct” way to “choose” - that there is one optimal allocation of resources. Society/Buchanan: But, (…) society is not a giant sentient individual with its own preferences and brain for choosing. Society is the complex interactions of many individuals each in pursuit of his or her own goals. Solution/Buchanan: An “economy,” Buchanan observed, is the name that we give to the on-going process of many different individuals (and other organizations, including households and firms) pursuing their own individually chosen goals but with no overarching shared goal such as “the goal of the national economy.“(3) Boudreaux I 99 „The market or market organization is not a means toward the accomplishment of anything. It is, instead, the institutional embodiment of the voluntary exchange processes that are entered into by individuals in their several capacities. This is all there is to it. Individuals are observed to cooperate with one another, to reach agreements, and to trade. The network of relationships that emerges out of this trading process, the institutional framework, is called “the market.” It is a setting, an arena, in which we, as economists, as theorists (as “onlookers”), observe men attempting to accomplish their own purposes, whatever these may be.“ (Buchanan, 1964(4)). 1. Buchanan, James M. (2000). “The Soul of Classical Liberalism,” Independent Review (Summer). 2. Buchanan, James M. (1964). “What Should Economists Do?” Sothern Economic Journal (January). 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid, p. 219 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Meaning | Weizenbaum | I 143 Meaning/Programming Language/Program/Computer/Weizenbaum: in a hierarchy of programming languages whose lowest level is machine language, a higher-level programming language is in reality a formal language. >Language, >Computer languages, >Computer programming, >Software, >Formal language, cf. >Ideal language. The meanings of expressions written in this language are defined (...) by their transformation rules, which in turn are embodied in the procedures they translate into assembler- and ultimately into machine language. For the meanings one would have to refer to the machine language (with the symbols 0 and 1) and finally to the machine itself. Then one would say: the program means what this machine does with this code. Problem: the translator (assembler) is itself a program that transforms the computer into a completely different machine. I 144 One could say that the distinctions between languages and their embodiments by machines disappear. >Robots. Programming language: can be understood as a machine itself, ultimately every formal language at a higher level is an abstract machine. >Abstraction, >Abstractness. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Opposition | Policy of Spain | Levitsky I 122 Opposition/Policy of Spain/Levitsky/Ziblatt: When (...) Spain made its first truly democratic turn in 1931, hopes were high. The new leftist government under Prime Minister Manuel Azaña stood for parliamentary democracy,(1) but it was confronted with a deeply divided society, between anarchists and Marxists on the left and monarchists and fascists on the right. Both sides regarded each other not as competing parties, but as mortal enemies. On the one hand, right-wing Catholics and monarchists watched in horror as the church, army and monarchy, social institutions they held in high esteem, were deprived of their privileges. In their eyes, the new republic had no right to exist. They saw themselves, as one historian writes, as fighters in a battle against "Bolshevik foreign agents"(2). On the other hand, many socialists and other left-wing republicans regarded right-wing politicians such as the leader of the Catholic-conservative Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), José Maria Gil-Robles, as monarchist or fascist counter-revolutionaries(3). At best, they saw in the CEDA a façade behind which ultra-conservative monarchists planned the violent overthrow of the Republic. Although the CEDA was apparently prepared to Levitsky I 123 participate in the democratic process and to compete with their political opponents in elections, their leaders refused to stand unreservedly behind the new regime(4). Consequently, mistrust of them remained high. In short, neither the Republicans on the left nor the Catholics and monarchists on the right accepted the other side as legitimate opponents. Lack of mutual respect led to the collapse of the Spanish Republic. Since many socialists and leftist republicans saw the center-left government from 1931 to 1933 as the embodiment of the Republic, they regarded attempts to change or withdraw its policies as fundamentally "disloyal" to the Republic(5). Cf. >Opposition/Policy of the United States, >Opposition/Levitsky/Ziblatt, >Polarization/Levitsky/Ziblatt. 1. Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965, p. 52. 2. Shlomo Ben-Ami, »The Republican ›Take-Over‹. Prelude to Inevitable Catastrophe«, in Paul Preston (Hg.), Revolution and War in Spain, 1931–1939, London 2001, p. 58–60. 3. Raymond Carr, Spain 1808–1939, Oxford 1966, p. 621. 4. Michael Mann, Fascists, Cambridge 2004, p. 330. 5. Juan J. Linz, »From Great Hopes to Civil War. The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain«, in Juan J. Linz/Alfred Stepan (Ed.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Europe, Baltimore 1978, p. 162. |
|
| Opposition | Policy of the United States | Levitsky I 121 Opposition/Policy of the United States/Levitsky/Ziblatt: (...) the idea that political opponents are not enemies is (...) a remarkable and challenging innovation(1). Opposition to the ruling class has almost always been considered treason in history. Even at the time of the founding of the United States, the idea that there could be legitimate opposition parties was still considered heresy. In the early American party struggles, both sides - John Adams' federalists and Thomas Jefferson's republicans - regarded each other as a threat to the Republic. Federalists: The federalists considered themselves the embodiment of the Constitution; in their view, one could not be against the federalists without being against the entire American project. Republicans: When Jefferson and Madison began building the Republican Party, the federalists considered them and their supporters traitors and even accused them of an inclination toward revolutionary France, with which the United States was almost at war. The Jeffersonians, for their part, accused the federalists of being tories and of planning Levitsky I 122 a monarchical restoration supported by the British(3). Both sides hoped to defeat the other,(4) and took measures - such as the laws of 1798 against foreigners and seditions - to punish the political opposition per se. Party politics: The debate between the parties was so heated that many feared the failure of the young republic. Only gradually and over the course of decades did America's hostile parties come to the hard-won insight that they did not have to be mortal enemies and could take turns in power instead of seeking mutual annihilation(5). This insight forms a decisive foundation of American democracy. 1. Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System. The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780–1840, Berkeley, Kalifornien, 1969, p. 8. 2. Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx. The Character of Thomas Jefferson, New York 1997, p. 122; Gordon S. Wood, The Idea of America. Reflections on the Birth of the United States, New York 2011, p. 114; Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System. p. 105, 111. 3. Wood, The Idea of America, p. 244 f.; Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System. p. 94. 4. Wood, The Idea of America, p. 245. 5. Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System. |
|
| Pain | Chalmers | I 17 Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> Functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person. >Qualia/Chalmers. Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain! I 18 Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts. Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger. >Psychology/Chalmers. I 19 Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here. >Phenomena, >Aspects, >Emotion. Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Beliefs, >Intentionality. Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a)(1): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360). >Intentionality/Searle, >Content. I 146f Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him. >Pain/Kripke, >Identity/Kripke. Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O: Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery. >a posteriori necessity. I 147 ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility. >S. A. Kripke, >Essentialism, >Modality, >Necessity, >Possibility. I 148 Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974)(2), McGinn (1977)(3)). >Brain states. Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980)(4): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world. >Materialism, >Actual World, >Possible Worlds. I 149 Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing. ChalmersVsKripke: 1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive. 2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity. 3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain". 4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (>cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established. >Rigidity, >Supervenience. 1. J. R. Searle, Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Scineces. 13, 1990: pp.585-642. 2. F. Feldman, Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71, 1974: pp. 665-76 3. C. McGinn, Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2, 1977: pp. 78-80 4. R. N. Boyd, Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In: N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. VOl. 1. Cambridge 1980. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Power | Parsons | Habermas IV 400 Power/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: within Parsons system theory, power is understood as a communication medium (the other three communication media in Parsons are money, influence and value retention). >Money/Parsons, Communication Media/Parsons. As a control medium, power represents the symbolic embodiment of value without itself having an intrinsic value. Power consists neither in effective performance nor in the use of physical force. Like money, the power medium reflects the structure of claim and redemption. Habermas IV 401 Claims: the nominal claims for readiness to follow up on binding decisions defined by the code can be settled in real values and covered by special reserves. According to Parsons, the "utility value" of the realization of collective goals corresponds to the "exchange value" of power. The disposition via coercive means is used as cover. (1) Code: is structured similarly in the case of power as in the medium of money: rulers and subjects of power belong to the same collective. After all, power interests are defined by mobilising performance potential for the achievement of collectively desired goals. The generalized value here is efficiency (in money it is benefit). The power code schematizes possible expressions as consent to or rejection of imperatives. Habermas IV 402 Value: the amount of value corresponding to the claim to readiness to comply is not as manipulable as the exchange value in the case of money. This is because there is no sign system available in the power medium as in the case of the money medium. Symbols of power such as uniforms, emblems or official seals are not comparable to the system of prices from a syntactic point of view. This leads to the problem of measurability. Power can be sold, but is not circulable like money. However, power can only take the form of a medium because it is not attached to certain rulers or contexts. However, power binds itself more symbiotically to persons and institutions than money does. Habermas IV 403 Power must be demonstrated from time to time, as it is not covered like a deposit in a bank. Overall, power cannot be calculated as well as money. Power/Money/Luhmann: in terms of system characteristics, the two media money and power behave partly in the opposite direction: while financing money, e.g. granting credit, usually increases the inherent complexity of the economic system, the complexity of the system is reduced in the event of an increase in power.(2) Habermas IV 404 Unlike money, power not only needs cover (through coercive means) and legal standardization (in the form of incumbency), but it also needs legitimation. >Legitimation, >Legitimacy 1.T Parsons, Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process, in: T. Parsons, Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967, S. 264ff 2.N. Luhmann, Zur Theorie symbolische generalisierter Kommunikationsmedien, in. ZfS 1974, S 236ff. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Protestant Ethics | Habermas | III 318 Protestant Ethics/Habermas: is by no means an exemplary, but a distorted, highly irrational embodiment of moral consciousness, which is first expressed in the ethics of religious brotherhood. R. Döbert has analysed this ambiguity of professional ethics.(1) >Professional ethics, >Ethics/Weber, >Morality, >Rationality, >Procedural rationality. III 319 Döbert: For example, structures of consciousness are only selectively used: especially through the particularism of grace of a god whose conclusion is in principle unfathomable. >Grace, >God, >Religion, >Society. Selectivity is also evident in the isolation of the religious individual, who even within his/her own community adjusts to instrumental behavior. 1. R. Döbert, Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme, Frankfurt 1973.S. 544ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Pseudo-Production Function | Solow | Harcourt I 76 Pseudo-Production Function/Solow/Harcourt: The embodiment hypothesis has also been used, especially by Solow, to discuss the process of 'deepening' in a world of non-malleable capital goods, where there is therefore no possibility of ex post substitution, see Solow [1962a(1), 1963b(2)], Robinson [1958(3), 1959(4), 1960(5)]. For “embodiement” (progress in the form of machines) see >Terminology/Harcourt. The model is essentially Salter's but applied at the economy level. The purpose of the exercises was twofold: first, to show that neoclassical methods of analysis could be used and neoclassical results obtained in such a world, especially those that relate to factor productivities and factor rewards; Harcourt I 77 secondly, to argue that observations taken from short-run production functions in which the possibilities of substitution are limited or nil can nevertheless provide data for good estimates of long-run substitution possibilities as the types of machines installed change in response to changes in factor prices over 'time', i.e. in the long period. Pseudo-production function: The pseudo-production function which is estimated is a series of isolated islands of long-period equilibrium. This point is made very clearly in Solow's discussion of a hoary old puzzle, the effect of changes in the wage rate on the use of machinery, see Solow [1962a](1), pp. 215-16. He shows that 'an increase in the wage rate leads to the construction of new machinery of lower (i.e. more mechanized) type' after account has been taken of the need for the higher (equilibrium) wage rate to be associated with a lower (equilibrium) rate of profits. It is also an excellent example of, in this context, a legitimate application of the results of a comparison to an analysis of a change. Harcourt I 78 It is stressed that this is a pure theory of production - the conditions under which the short-run fullemployment level of output will in fact be demanded are not investigated. Constant returns to scale, competitive conditions and static expectations rule. Specific capital goods require fixed complementary amounts of labour to man them, though, because machines are divisible in Champernowne fashion (…) arguments which depend crucially on the ability to employ one more man may be used. >D.G. Champernowne. A simple operating and scrapping rule of positive to zero quasirents presides. An approach which is similar in some respects but which is designed for a different purpose, namely, to analyse the development through accumulation of an economy from the handicrafts industry stage to mechanized, capital-intensive industries, industry by industry, is used by Bensusan-Butt [1960](6) in On Economic Growth. >D. M. Bensuan-Butt. 1. Solow, R. M. [1962a] 'Substitution and Fixed Proportions in the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxrx, pp. 207-18. 2. Solow, R. M. [1963b] 'Heterogeneous Capital and Smooth Production Functions: An Experimental Study', Econometrica, xxxi, pp. 623-45. 3. Robinson, Joan [1958] 'The Real Wicksell Effect', Economic Journal, LXVIII, pp. 600-5. 4. Robinson, Joan [1959] 'Accumulation and the Production Function', Economic Journal, LXDC, pp. 433-42. 5. Robinson, Joan [1960] Exercises in Economic Analysis (London: Macmillan). [1962a] Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth (London: Macmillan). 6. Bensusan-Butt, D. M. [1960] On Economic Growth: An Essay in Pure Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press). |
Solow I Robert M. Solow A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth Cambridge 1956 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Rationalization | Habermas | III 22 Rationalization/Sociology/Habermas: Understanding rational action orientations becomes the point of reference for understanding all action orientations. For sociology, this means the following relationship between meta-theoretical and methodological level: a) At the metatheoretical level, it chooses basic concepts that are tailored to the increase in rationality of modern life. b) At the methodological level, the understanding of rational action orientations becomes a reference point for the understanding of all action orientations (>Theory of Meaningful Understanding). This is about internal relationships between meaning and validity. >Sociology, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Theory, >Method. III 209 Rationalization/HabermasVsMarx/VsAdorno/VsHorkheimer/VsWeber/Habermas: the concept of rationality of these authors is too narrow to grasp the comprehensive social rationality they have in mind. >Rationality/Habermas, >Rationality/Adorno, >Rationality/Weber, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsMarx, >HabermasVsWeber. The term would have to be used at the same level as the productive forces, the subsystems of functional rational action, the totalitarian bearers of instrumental reason. >Productive Forces/Habermas. That is not happening. The concept of action of these authors is not complex enough for this. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. In addition, basic concepts of action and system theory must not be confused: LuhmannVsMarx, LuhmannVsWeber, LuhmannVsAdorno: the rationalization of action orientations and lifeworld structures is not the same as the increase in complexity of action systems.(1) >LuhmannVsWeber. III 457 Communicative action/rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 459 Rationalization/Habermas: the paradox of rationalization, of which Weber spoke, can be understood abstractly in such a way that the rationalization of the world allows a kind of system integration ((s) of subsystems with non-linguistic communication media such as money and power) that competes with the integration principle of ((s) linguistic) understanding and under certain conditions has a disintegrating effect on the world of life. >Lifeworld. IV 451 Rationalization/Modernism/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber could not classify the problems of legitimacy that a positivistically undermined legal rule raises within the pattern of rationalization of modern societies, because he himself remained imprisoned by legal-positivist views. >Legitimicy/Habermas. Solution/Habermas: Thesis: (p) The emergence (...) of modern societies requires the institutional embodiment of moral and legal concepts of a post-traditional nature, but (q) capitalist modernization follows a pattern according to which cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates beyond the realms of economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and takes precedence there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality. (r) This causes disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 452 Problem: a progressively rationalised lifeworld is simultaneously decoupled and made dependent on increasingly complex, formally organised areas of action such as economics and state administration. This takes sociopathological forms of internal colonization. To the extent that critical imbalances can only be avoided at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" experienced crises or pathologies threatening identity). IV 486 Paradoxically, rationalization releases both at the same time - the systemically induced reification and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always inherited the stigma that it dissolves traditional forms of life without saving their communicative substance. >Reification 1.N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Reality | Deutsch | I 105 Criterion for reality: something that can hit back exists. But also Dr. Johnson did not directly hit the stone. He just hit some nerves, and so on. Cf. >Reality/Hacking. I 107 Def Reality/Deutsch: if a quantity is complex and autonomous according to the simplest explanation, then it is real. >Simplicity, >Complexity, >Explanation. I 111 Theory: the more fundamental a theory is, the more comprehensive are the observations that play a role in it. Physical reality is therefore self-similar in several ways. >Theory, >Theory/Deutsch, >Self-similarity. After all, not everything that is real must be easy to identify. I 119 Simulation: A reality simulator indirectly conveys both internal and external experiences to the recipient, but it cannot be programmed to simulate a particular internal experience. Roulette example and tennis example: the framework conditions are defined here, the course of the game must be open, which means that the abstract laws themselves and not only their predictive power can be simulated in virtual reality. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Simulation, >Prediction. I 190 Life = simulation: both are embodiments of theories about the environment; Something that only exists in the laws of classical physics does not exist in reality. Real hurricanes and butterflies obey the laws of quantum theory, not those of classical mechanics! I 225/26 Plato's apparent refutation that the methods of natural science could lead to mathematical truth: we cannot know anything about perfect circles because we only have access to imperfect circles. DeutschVsPlato: then we can also only build inaccurate tool machines, because the first ones are built with inaccurate tools. So there would be no possibility of self-correction. Cf. >Ideas/Plato. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Representation | Papineau | I 248 Representation/Animals/Papineau: there is the danger to put more into the explanation than justified by the specific design of animals. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Behavior, >Animals, >Animal language. I 256 Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations? >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. I 257 After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Dispositions. Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"? >Embodiment. I do not want to dispute such content attributions. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B & T, V > R). Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: when it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple beings can be regarded as purpose-means thinkers. I 258 Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment. I 259 Explicit/implicit: if an organism implicitly has different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. >Adaption. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-middle-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ...of our evolutionary heritage. Then purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. >Purpose, >Function. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Buchanan | Brocker I 568 State/Buchanan: Buchanan's approach leads to a separation of law and state. The state only stands for the validity of the legal system. See Constitution/Buchanan. According to Buchanan, the state becomes the embodiment of the arbitrator who controls the parties, assuming that everyone tries to cheat. (1) Buchanan cites the universal desire for disarmament as the reason for the conclusion of contracts in order to reduce costs. Brocker I 569 Protective State/Buchanan: a protective cover to ensure the exchange of private goods. Problem: this does not secure the handling of public goods. Productive State/Buchanan: Question: Which regulatory system must be introduced to ensure the possible and reasonably desired improvement in the situation compared to natural distribution or to a society consuming only private goods? Solution/Buchanan: the post-constitutional contract (which presupposes the constitutional contract to secure private property) creates a genuinely political system for the creation and distribution of public goods. >Majorities/Buchanan, >Public Goods. Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them.(2) 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 96f. 2. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25 Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Boudreaux I 21 State/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „The state has its origin in, and depends for its continuance upon, the desires of individuals to fulfil a certain portion of their wants collectively. The state has no ends other than those of its individual members and is not a separate decision-making unit. State decisions are, in the final analysis, the collective decisions of individuals.“(1) Government Debt/Boudreaux/Holcombe: When analyzing the activities of government, the costs and benefits of government policies fall on individuals, not on aggregates or groups. The argument that domestically held public debt is no burden because “we owe it to ourselves” is revealed as fallacious once we recognize that the aggregate—ourselves—is really composed of many individuals, some of whom will pay the taxes to finance the debt repayment, and some of whom will receive the proceeds when they redeem the bonds they hold. Boudreaux I 74 State/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Ideally, the outputs of the productive state result from collective agreement in which individuals exchange their tax payments for the collectively produced outputs - outputs such as pollution abatement, roads, and municipal parks. Problem: But how can citizens determine the size and range of duties of the productive state that will be most welfare-enhancing? How can they ensure that the state does what the people wish it to do and only what they wish it to do? (…) Buchanan’s answer was to limit the activities of the state to those that command agreement from all of its constituents. But this benchmark of consensus on state activities presents a challenge. >Agreement/Buchanan, >Democracy/Buchanan, >Government/Buchanan. In the real world, people have not agreed to the activities of the state. Under what conditions could people be depicted as being in agreement with institutions to which they have not actually agreed? >Solution/Buchanan: Buchanan extended the market-exchange logic - one in which all parties to an exchange voluntarily agree to it - to collective activity >Collective Action/Buchanan. 1. James M. Buchanan, “The Pure Theory of Government Finance: Suggested Approach” (1949) |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| State (Polity) | Hegel | Mause I 47 State/society/Hegel: Hegel reconstructs the relationship between the social order of the market and the political order of the constitutional-monarchical state within the framework of a theory of modern "morality" (1), which he describes on the basis of the three institutionalized spheres of socialization and action of "family", "bourgeois society" and "state"(2). I 48 Bourgeois society/Hegel: Hegel describes this as the "state of need and understanding"(3), which he distinguishes from the "state" as the "reality of the moral idea"(4), that is, from the "state" of the third section of morality.(5) HegelVsRousseau: Hegel reconstructs the monarchical-constitutional state as a supraindividual moral communication and meaning context and thus reconstructs the Republican primacy of politics over the economy. MarxVsHegel, State/Marx. Brocker I 794 State/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: instead of understanding the moral sphere of the state as an intersubjective relationship of reciprocal acts of recognition, Hegel treats the state in his later writings as if it were always an existing entity before all interaction. >Intersubjectivity/Hegel. Consequently, it is only the vertically conceived relationships that the individuals maintain "to the higher authority of the state" as "the embodiment of the mental", "which in its approach suddenly assume the role that certain, highly demanding forms of mutual recognition should have played in a concept of moral recognition theory".(6) Solution/HonnethVsHegel: this results in the task of replacing Hegel's speculative categories with concepts of empirical science and thus making them Brocker I 795 "empirically controllable". (7) 1. G. W. F. Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 292. 2. Ibid. p. 307. 3. Ibid. p. 340 4. Ibid. p. 389 5. Cf. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 1986, S 261-264. 6. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 98 7. Ibid. p. 150 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 331 State/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel develops his system of political thought, the philosophy of law and state, against the background of his now expanded philosophical system(1). HegelVsKant: Against the - allegedly threatening in Kant - the danger of a purely through thought Höffe I 332 conceived construction of normative claims, the subject area of the philosophy of law and state is considerably expanded. Instead of being content with a normative theory, an a priori theory of law and justice, Hegel also focuses on motivational, social, and above all institutional factors (...). Philosophical Philosophy of Law/Hegel: "(...) the idea of the law, (...) the concept of the law and its realization becomes the object"(2). State: (...) [is the] "moral universe," [which] is to be understood as something reasonable. Freedom: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. From it Hegel wants to show how, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, he gradually attains his full, alienation-absorbing reality. >Freedom/Hegel, >Morals/Hegel, >Customs/Morality/Hegel. Höffe I 336 The culmination of morality, its synthesis, at the same time the summit of Hegel's entire philosophy of law, is the state as a "mediated by itself", which is now far more than just a state of necessity and understanding. As a community in the literal sense it is the public institution responsible for the common good, the "reality of the moral idea". Because in it freedom attains its perfect form, it is not "something arbitrary" but "supreme duty," i.e. again a categorical imperative, for man to be a member of a State. [This is a] modern, namely no longer eudaimony-based, but freedom-based way (...). Only in the living together of free and equal people can [the human] complete both his/her rational nature and his/her nature based on right and justice. >Society/Hegel. Höffe I 337 From abstract law to morality, the "idea of free will in and for itself" finally develops into the unity and truth of both moments. In it, in morality, Hegel in turn advances from the natural spirit, the "family," through the stage of separation, the "bourgeois society," to objective freedom, the "State. Within the section "the State," however, there is surprisingly, instead of a further stage, now a regression. For the opposition to free will, the full legal relations and the moral whole, is achieved already at the first stage, the "internal constitutional law". On the second stage, however, the "external constitutional law," the moral whole is exposed to chance. And the last stage is determined ambivalently with respect to free will. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 2. Ibid. § 1 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Subsystems | Habermas | III 457 Subsystems/Communicative Action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday action and the formation of subsystems for purpose-rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 247 Examples of subsystems are market economy and modern administration. IV 399 Subsystems/Habermas: are indicators of a successful formation of subsystems: - the crisis-like fluctuations in the quantitative ratio of the values embodied by the medium (here: money) and the real values represented by them (i.e. the dynamics of inflation and deflation) - The reflexive upgrading of the medium, which makes capital markets possible, for example. A subsystem such as the economy can only become more differentiated via the medium of money if markets and forms of organisation emerge that bring the system's inherent traffic with the relevant environments under monetary control. This regulation does not necessarily require a double relation in the sense of an exchange of pairs of factors and products, which runs over two different media. E.g. it is not foreseen that in the relationship between the economy and the private household sector, labour enters the economic system through a non-monetary medium such as value retention. >Marxism/Habermas, >Systems, >Systems theory. IV 400 Subsystems/Habermas: for the development of a media-controlled subsystem it seems sufficient that boundaries are created across through which a simple exchange with all environments can take place controlled by a (single) medium. This also triggers changes in the interaction areas that form environments for the subsystem. >Communication Media/Habermas, >Control Media. IV 418 Subsystems/Lifeworld/Media/Technocracy/Habermas: Subsystems that are differentiated via media such as power and money can become independent from a lifeworld forced into the system environment. From the perspective of the lifeworlds, the conversion of action to the media appears both as a relief of communication effort and risk and as a conditioning of decisions in extended contingency scope. In this sense, they appear as a mechanization of the lifeworld. On the other hand, a generalization of the inlfuence of the medium cannot have such an effect. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Superintelligence | Bostrom | I 61 Superintelligence/Bostrom: Biological enhancements: Compared with possible breakthroughs in machine intelligence, however, biological enhancements I 62 would be relatively slow and gradual. They would, at best, result in relatively weak forms of superintelligence (…). Brain–computer interfaces/Bostrom: look unlikely as a source of superintelligence. Networks/superintelligence: Improvements in networks and organizations might result in weakly superintelligent forms of collective intelligence in the long run; but more likely, they will play an enabling role similar to that of biological cognitive enhancement, gradually increasing humanity’s effective ability to solve intellectual problems. Forms: I 64 (1) Def Speed superintelligence/Bostrom: Speed superintelligence: A system that can do all that a human intellect can do, but much faster. Because of[ the] (…) time dilation of the material world, a speed superintelligence would prefer to work with digital objects. (…) it could interact with the physical environment by means of nanoscale manipulators, since limbs at such small scales could operate faster than macroscopic appendages. I 65 Def Collective superintelligence/Bostrom: A system composed of a large number of smaller intellects such that the system’s overall performance across many very general domains vastly outstrips that of any current cognitive system. Collective intelligence excels at solving problems that can be readily broken into parts such that solutions to sub-problems can be pursued in parallel and verified independently. I 66 A system’s collective intelligence could be enhanced by expanding the number or the quality of its constituent intellects, or by improving the quality of their organization. A new conference format that lets scholars exchange information more effectively, or a new collaborative information-filtering algorithm that better predicted users’ ratings of books and movies, would clearly not on its own amount to anything approaching collective superintelligence. I 67 (2) Collective superintelligence could be either a) loosely or b) tightly integrated. a) To illustrate a case of loosely integrated collective superintelligence, imagine a planet, MegaEarth, which has the same level of communication and coordination technologies that we currently have on the real Earth but with a population one million times as large. I 338 foot note Vs: A planet large enough (…) would implode, unless it were made of very light matter or were hollow (…). I 68 b) Tightly integrated: If we gradually increase the level of integration of a collective intelligence, it may eventually become a unified intellect—a single large “mind” as opposed to a mere assemblage of loosely interacting smaller human minds. I 338 foot note On some views of consciousness, such as the global workspace theory, it seems one might expect more integrated brains to have more capacious consciousness. Cf. Baars (1997)(1), Shanahan (2010)(2), and Schwitzgebel (2013)(3).) (3) Def Quality superintelligence/Bostrom: A system that is at least as fast as a human mind and vastly qualitatively smarter. I 338 foot note Even small groups of humans that have remained isolated for some time might still benefit from the intellectual outputs of a larger collective intelligence. For example, the language they use might have been developed by a much larger linguistic community, and the tools they use might have been invented in a much larger population before the small group became isolated. I 69 (…) normal human adults have a range of remarkable cognitive talents that are not simply a function of possessing a sufficient amount of general neural processing power or even a sufficient amount of general intelligence: specialized neural circuitry is also needed. This observation suggests the idea of possible but non-realized cognitive talents (…) I 70 Direct and indirect reach: a) Indirect reaches of superintelligence: Superintelligence in any of these forms could, over time, develop the technology necessary to create any of the others. The indirect reaches of these three forms. b) Direct reaches: (…) depend on the degree to which they instantiate their respective advantages—how fast a speed superintelligence is, how qualitatively superior a quality superintelligence is, and so forth. (…)quality superintelligence would be the most capable form of all, inasmuch as it could grasp and solve problems that are, for all practical purposes, beyond the direct reach of speed superintelligence and collective superintelligence. >Hardware/Bostrom, >Software/Bostrom. I 111 Anthropomorphism/BostromVsAnthropomorphism: It is important not to anthropomorphize superintelligence when thinking about its potential impacts. Anthropomorphic frames encourage unfounded expectations about the growth trajectory of a seed AI and about the psychology, motivations, and capabilities of a mature superintelligence. >Anthropomorphism/superintelligence/Yudkowsky. 1. Baars, Bernard J. 1997. In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Shanahan, Murray. 2010. Embodiment and the Inner Life: Cognition and Consciousness in the Space of Possible Minds. New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2013. “If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious.” Working Paper, February 8. |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Synonymy | Habermas | IV 28 Synonymy/Habermas: an identical meaning (no longer just a coincident meaning) exists when ego knows how alter should react to a significant gesture. It is not enough to expect that alter will react in a certain way. >Understanding, >Agreement, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas This is achieved in the different development stages of the interaction: a) First, the interaction participants learn to internalize an excerpt from the objective sense structure to such an extent that both can combine identical interpretations with the same gesture. b) Then they learn what it means to use a gesture with communicative intent and to enter into a reciprocal speaker/listener relationship. c) Thirdly, the attribution of an identical and no longer only congruent meaning of gestures is added. IV 32 Meaning Identity/Habermas: this cannot mean the same thing as the identity of an object that can be identified under different descriptions. This already requires an understanding of singular terms. >Description dependency. In contrast to this: Symbolic meanings constitute or create identity in a similar way to rules that create unity in the diversity of its exemplary embodiments, its various realizations or fulfilments. Meaning identity is explained by conventional regulation. >Symbols/Habermas. IV 33 Equality/Rule Following/Wittgenstein/Habermas: according to Wittgenstein, the equality of meaning is connected to the following of a rule, namely the identical rule by all communication participants. >Rule following/Wittgenstein, >Rule following. However, keeping the rule the same is not empirical, but is based on intersubjective validity, i.e. on the fact that a) subjects can deviate from their rule-guided behaviour and b) can criticise their deviating behaviour as a rule violation. (1) >Rules/Habermas. 1.Vgl. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, Schrifen Bd I, (1960) S. 382. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Technical Progress | Solow | Harcourt I 69 Technical progress/Solow/Harcourt: Harcourt I 66 Terminology/Harcourt: (…) [we distinguish between] the malleable capital world in which technical progress is disembodied and the vintage world where it is embodied (…). Harcourt I 69 Substitution/Solow/Harcourt: In one paper, Solow [1960](1) accepted the embodiment hypothesis - technical advance enters only via gross investment - but maintained ex-post the ex ante substitution possibilities on existing vintages. Productivity: Thus the average productivities of labour on vintages when they are manned at their 'optimum ratios', as determined by expectations concerning factor prices when they were installed, are lower, the older (i.e. earlier) are the vintages, but technical variations in the amounts of labour manning each vintage allow these levels of productivity to be departed from and any of the investment-labour ratios of the (then) ex ante production functions to be reproduced ex post. >Expectations/Harcourt. Neoclassical view: Adopting the neoclassical view that full employment of labour is either automatically "assured in the short run, a la Wicksell [1934](2), pp. 111-16, or is contrived by an all-wise government, see Meade [1961](3), Robinson [1961a](4), also Robinson 1965b](5), pp. 15-29, Swan [1956](6) (advised now and then and at the highest levels, by such well-known neoclassical Keynesians as Samuelson and Tobin), the available labour supply is allocated at each point of time over the existing vintages such that the marginal product of labour on each vintage is the same, equals the overall wage rate and total output is maximized. (The older is the vintage, the less labour-intensively will it be worked.) Productivity: This viewpoint allows technical progress to affect the growth of labour productivity only when it is embodied via gross investment expenditure. Harcourt I 72 Selecting plausible orders of magnitude Solow uses the model to perform again his measurement of technical progress exercise and to show that capital accumulation and deepening have a more significant part to play, though the relationship between the pace of investment and the rate at which productivity rises is not a simple one. Growth: Solow also provides a timely warning against being bedazzled by constant exponential rates of growth when doing 'back-of-an-envelope' calculations. Embodied view: Once we adopt the embodied view of technical progress, sudden spurts upwards (or downwards) in the rate of gross investment are more significant than trend rates of growth of the capital stock, as far as the impact on the rate of growth of productivity is concerned. Solow also examines in this paper a one-number value measure of the vintage capital stock which depends crucially on the assumption of perfect foresight and realised expectations (…). Thus, if asset valuations faithfully reflected perfect foresight, the "homogeneous capital" model .. . would be accurate, provided the capital stock were measured not by a count of machines but by the real market value of the stock of capital.' (Solow [1960](1), p. 100.) But it would be unfair to imply that Solow takes much notice of this result, though he does call it 'remarkable'. In a later paper, Solow, Tobin, von Weizsacker and Yaari [1966](7) analysed the case of 'quickening' - that in which there is only one viable 'best-practice' technique at any moment of time (the ex ante production function is a point, not a curve) for which there are no ex post substitution possibilities. No use is made of a generalized capital concept, competitive conditions are assumed and three sorts of technical progress - purely capital-augmenting, purely labour-augmenting and Hicks neutral* - and two types of economy - neoclassical and Keynesian - are examined. Def Purely capital-augmenting technical progress: means that only capital productivity rises over time; Harcourt I 73 Def purely labour-augmenting: means exactly the opposite - that labour alone gets the treatment. Def Hicks neutral: means that factor productivities grow at the same rate so that marginal rates of substitution remain unchanged at given factor ratios. (In the case of 'quickening', however, where only one ratio of factors is relevant at any one time, Hicks neutral technical progress means that the ratio remains the same because the absolute amounts of the factor inputs per unit of output both decline by the same proportion.) Neoclassical view: The neoclassical economy is one in which the full employment of labour is automatically assumed; Keynesianism: the Keynesian economy is one in which effective demand determines the level of output. In both economies, neoclassical modes of analysis are used, quasi-rents on vintages are shown to equal their marginal products, and the wage rate is shown to equal the marginal product (equals the average product) of the vintage on the margin of scrapping (the Salter process). >W.G.E. Salter, >Idealization/Solow. Harcourt I 112 Technical progress/rate of return/Solow/Harcourt: (…) Solow(1) adds (…) the role of technical progress and its effects on the measurement of the rate of return. With technical progress occurring, saving and accumulation are twice blest; not only is society's productive capacity raised by saving, because it provides more capital, but also because it now provides 'better' capital. This applies to the lot if technical progress is disembodied, at the margin if it is embodied. For embodied and disembodied technical progress ((s) e. g., knowledge) see >Terminology/Harcourt. a) With disembodied technical progress (which is illustrated by Cobb-Douglas) there emerges the possibility that the rate of return, especially the oneperiod one, which, in this case, equals the net marginal product of capital at the level ruling in the appropriate period, will get greater and greater, unless capital deepening is occurring at the same time and at approximately the same rate as (neutral) technical progress. >Cobb-Douglas production function. Harcourt I 114 b) Solow's analysis of embodied technical progress ((s) e.g., equipment) uses a model (…), in which both ex ante and ex post substitution is possible. His illustration is Cobb-Douglas – all vintages have the same exponents and retain ex post the substitution possibilities open to them ex ante. However, once installed, the machines are immune to technical progress - it is not catching. Malleability: Solow thus retains malleability - 'butterness' - and embodiment both. >One-commodity model. Expected obsolescence (absent, of course, in the disembodied case, where all capital shares in the dispensation of grace) reduces social and private rates of return below the corresponding marginal products of capital as ordinarily measured but does not disturb, in the cases examined, their own equality one with another. 'The return to current saving is reduced by the fact that current saving adds less to future consumption-potential than next year's saving would.' (p. 62.)(8) 1. Solow, R. M. [1960] 'Investment and Technical Progress', Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences 1959: Proceedings of the First Stanford Symposium, ed. by K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 89-104. 2. Wicksell, Knut [1934] Lectures on Political Economy, Vol. i (London: Routledge). 3. Meade, J. E. [1961] A Neoclassical Theory of Economic Growth (London: Allen and Unwin). 4. Robinson, Joan [1961a] 'Equilibrium Growth Models', American Economic Review, u, pp. 360-9. 5. Robinson, Joan [1965b] Collected Economic Papers, Vol. Ill (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 6. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 7. Solow, R. M., Tobin, J., von Weizsacker, C. C. and Yaari, M. [1966] 'Neoclassical Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 79-115. 8. Solow, Robert M. [1963a] (Professor Dr. F. De Vries Lectures, 1963) Capital Theory and the Rate of Return (Amsterdam: North-Holland). |
Solow I Robert M. Solow A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth Cambridge 1956 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Universal History | Historism | Gadamer I 215 Universal History/Historism/Gadamer: Universal history, world history - these are in truth not embodiments of a formal nature, in which the whole of what is happening is meant. In historical thought, the universe as the divine creation is elevated to the consciousness of itself. Admittedly, this is not a comprehensible consciousness. The ultimate result of historical science is "compassion, complicity of the universe"(1). Ranke's famous twist can be understood on this pantheistic background according to which he wants to exterminate himself. >World history. DiltheyVsRanke: Of course, such self-extinction is in truth, as Dilthey(2) has objected, the expansion of the self into an inner universe. But it is not by chance that Ranke does not carry out such a reflection, which leads Dilthey to his psychological basis of the humanities. >L. v. Ranke. RankeVsDilthey: For Ranke, self-extinction is still a form of real participation. One must not understand the concept of participation in psychological-subjective terms, but must think of it from the concept of life that underlies it. Because all historical phenomena are manifestations of "all-life" (German: "All-Leben"), participation in them is participation in life. >W. Dilthey. 1. Ranke (ed. Rothacker). S. 52. 2. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 281. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Vitalism | Braidotti | Braidotti I 91 Vitalism/Braidotti: I want to argue for a vitalist view of the technologically bio-mediated other. This machinic vitality is not so much about determinism, inbuilt purpose or finality, but rather about becoming and transformation. This introduces a process that Deleuze and Guattari(1) call ‘becoming-machine’, inspired by the Surrealists’ ‘bachelor machines’, meaning a playful and pleasure-prone relationship to technology that is not based on functionalism. For Deleuze this is linked to the project of releasing human embodiment from its indexation on socialized productivity to become ‘bodies without organs’, that is to say without organized efficiency. >Gilles Deleuze, >Felix Guattari. Braidotti I 91 This is no hippylike insurrection of the senses, but rather a carefully thoughtthrough programme that pursues two aims. Firstly, it attempts to rethink our bodies as part of a nature-culture continuum in their in-depth structures. >Culture/Braidotti. Secondly, it adds a political dimension by setting the framework of recomposition of bodily materiality in directions diametrically opposed to the spurious efficiency and ruthless opportunism of advanced capitalism. Contemporary machines are no metaphors, but they are engines or devices that both capture and process forces and energies, facilitating interrelations, multiple connections and assemblages. They stand for radical relationality and delight as well as productivity. 1. Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| World | Jarvie | Habermas III 115 World/Rationality/Jarvie/Habermas: Jarvie makes an interesting use of Popper's theory of the three worlds (Popper: World 1: physical objects, World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content). Habermas III 120 Jarvie/Habermas: by adopting Popper's concept of the third world for the characterization of social relationships and institutions, Jarvie Popper has to introduce the socially active subjects following the example of theoretical and problem-solving scientists. The members of society are constantly learning something about them.(1) Jarvie: they create maps that are in some way "softer" than geographical maps. Habermas III 121 These social maps are landscapes that other people have to study and map.(2) HabermasVsJarvie: a) Jarvie blurs the difference between a performative and a hypothetical-reflexive attitude towards cultural traditions. b) He neglects the elements of cultural tradition that cannot be attributed to "thoughts" or truthful statements. He restricts the objective contexts of meaning that the acting subjects create and discover at the same time to the cognitive patterns of interpretation in the narrower sense. Habermas III 122 c) His proposal does not allow any distinction to be made between cultural values and the institutional embodiment of values in norms. This does not explain the coercive nature of existing standards and institutions. 1.I.C. Jarvie, Die Logik der Gesellschaft, München, 1974, S. 254f 2. ibid S. 248 |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dewey | Rorty Vs Dewey | VI 428 Phenomenon/Manifestation/Reality/Dewey/Rorty: a large part of Dewey's work is dedicated to the desperate and futile attempt to abolish this distinction. Instead, he wanted to distinguish more and less strongly targeted forms of empiricism. VsDewey/Rorty: the attempt was fruitless, because his colleagues insisted on the possibility of discussing losing "contact with reality". >Appearance. VI 429 Animal/RortyVsDewey: Dewey should have realized that a wide gap yawns between sensation and cognition. Cognition is not possible without language. >Cognition. VI 434 Purpose/Darwin/Rorty: Darwin banished purpose from nature as far as it goes beyond the needs of a specific organism. Purpose/RortyVsDewey: but as soon as purpose disappears from nature, there is no philosophical problem anymore, that would affect the "possibility of science" (of insight)! For then the reconciliation of the purposes of the subject with those of the object is no longer a problem. VI 435 The object is no longer the embodiment of a telos (of nature, Aristotle), but simply an object of handling. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Hume, D. | Nozick Vs Hume, D. | Brendel I 254 Skepticism/Dretske/Nozick/Brendel: both. Thesis: the truth of the skeptical hypothesis is, however, not to be excluded. But it does not follow the impossibility of any knowledge. DretskeVsHume/NozickVsHume/Brendel: knowledge and the possibility of skepticism can coexist peacefully. Nozick II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. The solves the problem e.g. of localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he did not search thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never the identical with the object. The difficulty of specifying the relationsh of a property with an object is the general reason why we have such trouble locating the self, but that is not a particular problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways how a person can be identified with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Kant | Nozick Vs Kant | II 12 Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible. How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible. One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant). II 110 Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution: II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! II 318 Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance). What are actions to be connected to? Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best"). Then we need to know the relevant facts as well. II 319 Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions: (1) Action A is correct (2) S does A on purpose (intentionally) (III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally. (IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A. Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar: "Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger. Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others". then: correctness: (3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A (4) if A were mandatory, S would do A. "the best": (1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum) (2) S does A intentionally (3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A (4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A. II 320 So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present. Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway. NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4). In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different. E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods). Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness. Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions: A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4). II 352 Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result. How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation? II 353 Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused. 2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason 3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source, II 354 but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature. Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature? Could external sources not be as binding for us? Why should I want to be moral? Do I have to wish to be happy? Why should I want to be rational? "Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature". Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult. "Your nature, that is you." If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah? "But you have no choice, you had to be what you are." So, that is what you offer me as freedom. Objective morality seems to be something inevitable. Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows: "Do this if you wish to be rational" "Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command). Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us. II 355 Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature. Nozick: but does that not bind us, too? Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives? NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear. Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?" Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good. Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part! Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice, self-ownership.). |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Lorenz, K. | Vollmer Vs Lorenz, K. | I 59 Embodiment of Information/Lorenz: Thesis: the horse's hoof is an "image" of the steppe soil, the fin an "image" of the surrounding water, it "reflects" the laws of hydrodynamics. Embodiment/VollmerVsLorenz: is misleading because there is no mirror, no image and no copy of soil or water. It is true that the nature of the horse's hoof is indicative of the nature of the ground. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mentalese | Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 55 Mentalese/Propositional Attitude/Fodor: Thesis: A belief sentence is a sentence in the speaker's thought language. CresswellVsFodor: Problem; then the original speaker and the attribution speaker must have the same sentence in mentalese in their inner system; Newen/Schrenk I 131 Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with the assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: thesis that thinking is lived in such a way that it already has all the core characteristics of natural language (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. For example, fuel gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized by brain states. I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p.199) Thesis: One cannot give a construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (embodiment) of another formal system: "Properly" requires: a) There must be a general procedure for assigning formulae to states of the organism. b) For each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism, so that c1) the state can be interpreted as a relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingent identical) to have propositional attitudes for it. d) Mentalese representations have their causal role by virtue of their formal characteristics. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Embodied Information | Lorenz, K. | Vollmer I 59 Embodiment of Information / Lorenz: thesis: the horse’s hoof is an "image" of the steppe soil, the fin an "image" of the surrounding water, it "reflects" the laws of hydrodynamics. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| |||