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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Classification | Mayr | I 133 Classification: Classification usually is done by logical division downwards: how many species are classified and what weight do the different characteristics have: "progressive" or "downwards classification". (Actually identification). >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification. Therefore later: "Upwards classification: hierarchical arrangement of ever-growing groups of related species into classes. >Species. Darwin's method confirmed the upward classification and thus triggered a scientific revolution. >Darwinism, >Evolution. I 134 Classification/20th Century (1950) two new schools: a) Numerical Phenetics b) Cladistics. Cladism: the cladist system is intended to reveal the history of the tribe only, while the evolutionary system strives to form taxa from the most similar and closely related species (useful for ecology and biology). >Ecology. Both species can continue to coexist, because they have very different objectives. I 173 Systematics: not only to describe but to contribute to understanding. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information b) comparative research. Information storage. 1) Classes should be as homogeneous as possible 2) Attribution according to most common characteristics, 3) If the differences are too great, create a new class 4) The degree of difference between classes is ordered in a hierarchy. I 176 Taxonomy: two steps: 1) Differentiation of species (microtaxonomy). 2) Classification of species into related groups (macrotaxonomy). I 177 Microtaxonomy: The delineation of the species "Species Problem": Species usually means "organism type". Problem: Males and females are also different types of organisms, just like young and adult organisms. Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). >Similarity. "Typological concept of species: four characteristics: 1) Common "nature". 2) Between the species sharp discontinuity 3) Each species is spatially and temporally constant. 4) Possible variation within the species is strictly limited. ("Natural kind"). >Species, >Natural kinds, >Essence, >Essentialism. I 178 MayrVsTypological Concept of Species: Darwin refutes the notion of the "constancy of species". Populations vary geographically, individuals vary within a population. In the animate nature there are no types or essences! Def twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 178 Biological Concept of Species (VsTypological Concept of Species): derives from this criterion of the lack of reproduction among one another. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups that correspond to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but are merely described and delineated. >Definitions, >Definability. I 185 Macrotaxonomy: The classification of species (in superordinate groups) Groups: Usually easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles. Downward classification (actually identification). Dichotomy (Aristotelian), high time of medical botany. E.g. warm-blooded or not warm-blooded, with feathers or not. I 187 Upwards Classification/Mayr: Even Linné himself from 1770 onwards: better suited. Classes are distinguished and then grouped into superordinate groups. Unfortunately no strict methodology. There was no theoretical basis for the hierarchy. Functional Classification: Sub-form of the upwards classification. Only selected features. I 188 Two criteria: genealogy (common descent) and degree of similarity (extent of evolutionary change). Causal classification: E.g. diseases according to causes: pathogen, aging process, toxic substances, genes, malignant changes, harmful radiation, etc. >Causal explanation. Any classification that takes into account the causes is subject to severe restrictions and can never become a purely artificial system. I 189 "Taxon": Separate group of offspring. Each taxon consists of the descendants of the next common ancestor. "Monophyletic". Genealogy: Does not a classification make! Similarity cannot be neglected, because the diverging branches were subject to changes of varying extend. Result: Classification into families, genera, divisions, orders. >Systems, >Theories, >Explanation, >Causes, >Effects, >Single-case causation. Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous features. I.e. a feature derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor. >Homology. I 373 You must always infer homology! There is a lot of evidence for homology, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors. >Evidence. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Features | Allen | Colin Allen und Eric Saidel Die Evolution der Referenz in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg.) Der Geist der Tiere, Frankfurt 2005 I 330 Feature/Property/Allen/Saidel: Question: when are the features of different species individual tokens of the same type of feature? --- I 331 The upper limbs of birds, bats, and dragonflies, for example, are all considered as wings, because they have the same functional role: they make the animals capable of flying. Homology/Homoplasia: On the other hand, the considerable anatomical differences of the wings are decisive. Language: Problem: it can have many different functions. Here, we must define the identity of a feature. Problem: the choice of the feature is dependent on the interests. Of course, people can do things with their language that animals cannot. --- I 332 Likewise, e.g. hummingbirds can do things with their wings, which eagles cannot do with their wings. > Order,> identity,> difference. They share a common feature despite the differences. Language/Allen: one does not have to ask what it is, but what it does! |
Allen I Colin Allen Eric Saidel "The Evilution of Reference", in: The Evolution of Mind, C. Allen and D. Dellarosa Cummins (Eds.) Oxford 1998, pp. 183-203 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language | Allen | I 333 Language/Evolution/Allen/Saidel: to what extent can different functions of language be separated from each other and be proved in different phylogenetic groups? a) harder line: (stronger separation of man and animal): Homology (common precursors) is necessary, homoplasia (convergent evolution) is not sufficient. Vs: that's premature. Although homology provides more evidence of a common historical path, but also Homoplasia provides relevant information: it presupposes a similar selection pressure. It can also uncover general principles. I 335 Language/Evolution/Allen/Saidel: if they are to be homologous, there must have been a common ancestor with the disposition to it. I 336 To answer this, one needs comparative work on people, apes, monkeys and nonprimates. I 339 Animal/Species/Reference/Allen/Saidel: E.g. Seyfarth, warning calls from long-tailed monkeys offspring must be confirmed (repeated) by adults so that they are taken seriously by the others.(1) I 340 Shared attention/language/animal/Allen/Saidel: if it is present, the utterances of humans and adult animals maintain the same relations to the objects of attention. >Reference, >Animals, >Animal language. Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980): Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28(4), 1070–1094. |
Allen I Colin Allen Eric Saidel "The Evilution of Reference", in: The Evolution of Mind, C. Allen and D. Dellarosa Cummins (Eds.) Oxford 1998, pp. 183-203 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Linguistic View | Field | II 159 Linguistic view/Field: does not assume any meanings as mind-independent entities - but assigns the words of a speaker to interpreter's words. - The relations are based on other characteristics - that is, on inferences that contain that word. - This is what I call "meaning-characteristic" - e.g. II 160 ChurchVsLinguistic view/Translation/Field: (Church 1950)(1): ("translation argument"): allegdly says: that if the word "lapin" means [rabbit], then it says that "lapin" means the same as "rabbit", then its German translation should be: ""lapin" means [rabbit]"" instead of ""lapin" means [Kaninchen]"" (Kaninchen, sic). ChurchVs: but this disagrees with the purpose and normal use of translations. Schiffer dito: E.g. two monolingual German speakers: Karl is told that Pierre said something in French that is equivalent to "Schnee ist weiß" (german, sic) - Fritz : ... equivalent to "snow is white". Problem: absurd: then Karl thinks rather than Fritz that Pierre said that Schnee ist weiß (sic, german) - but only because of the linguistic view. FieldVsVs: the linguistic view only has to be formulated more cautiously. Solution: >quasi-translation or > quasi-meaning. II 162 Leeds/linguistic view/LeedsVsChurch/Meaning/Extension/Field: (Leeds, 1979)(2): literal meaning/Leeds: E.g. the German word "bedeutet" means literally not the same as the English word "means": it does not even have the same extension. N.B.: (hereinafter "Hund", sic) "means" refers to "Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund", but not to "dog". - "Means": "dog" refers to "dog" and "Hund" to "dog" but not to "Hund". But: "bedeutet" and "means" are nevertheless in an important homology relation: Homology/meaning/Field: E.g. following two predicates are extensively different: a) "the temperature-in-Fahrenheit of x is r" and b) "the temperature-in-celsius of x is r". Solution: this homology makes it sensibly to translate "bedeutet Hund" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important. We cannot get it. Field dito. DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument. >Michael Dummett. II 165 Linguistic view: Alternative to it: a) to assume that that-sentences do not denote and "means that" are "believes that" operators - E.g. inference of "Susan believes that E = mc²" to "Susan believes Einstein's theory". Then the first is only the abbreviation of the second. - Then that-sentences are still singular terms. b) That-sentences and parentheses refer to intentional entities. 1. Church, Alsonzo, 1950. On Carpa's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief. Analysis 10, pp. 97-9. 2. Leeds, Stephen, 1979. Church's Translation Argument. Canadian Journal of PHilosophy 9, 43-51 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning | Leeds | Field II 162 Leeds/linguistic perspective/LeedsVsChurch/meaning/extension/Field (Leeds 1979)(1): - literal meaning/Leeds : e.g. the German word "bedeutet" literally means not the same as the English " means" : it does not even have the same extension - N.B. " bedeutet" refers "dog " to " Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund" , but not to "dog". "Means ": maps "dog" on "dog" and "Hund" on "dog" but not to "dog" but "bedeeutet" and "means" nevertheless stand in a homology relation: Homology/Meaning/Field: Example The following two predicates are extensional different : a) "The temperature in Fahrenheit of x r" b ) "The temperature in Celsius of x r". Solution : this homology makes it sensible to translate "means dog" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important! We can not even get it. Field ditto. DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument. >Translation, >Reference, >Translation/Field, >Meaning/Field. 1. Stephen Leeds (1979). Church's Translation Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43 - 51 |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Method | Mayr | I 154 "Kinship"/biology: can only be determined by comparisons! (VsPhysicists, who dispute the science of biology). >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Systems, >Theories, >Science, >Laws of Nature, >Physics. I 153 Biology: expression coined around 1800 by Lamarck. I 154 1870: Division: a) Biology of evolutionary causes (research by comparisons and conclusions) b) biology of immediate causes, (experiments and physiology) With the discovery that the cell mechanisms in plants and animals are the same, the old separation between botany and zoology seemed no longer useful. Practically all molecular processes are the same. I 156 Misleading classification: descriptive - functional - experimental biology. I 189 E.g. Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous characteristics. That is, a feature that is derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor. >Features/Mayr, >Homology. I 373 One always has to conclude homology! For homology there are many proofs, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Similarity | Gould | I 43 Similarity/Evolution/Gould: geometry: triangles, parallelograms and hexagons are the only flat figures that can completely fill the room. The logarithmic spiral is the only curve that does not change its shape as it grows. Gould: this is how similarities in independent developments can be explained with a small number of possible solutions. I 257 Similarity/Gould: similarity is empirically not mysterious, but in terms of its causes it is anything but clear: I 258 Definition homologous similarity in common precursors: two organisms may have the same feature because they got it from a common ancestor. (This is Darwin's word for "close relatives".) Example: Homology: the front limbs of humans, horses, guinea pigs and bats, are inherited from a common precursor. Definition analogue similarity: analogue similarity means that there is no common precursors but two organisms have a common feature that represents the result of a separate but similar evolutionary change in independent lines of development. It is the spectre of genealogists, because it confuses our naïve notion that what is similar must have similar causes. For example, the wings of birds, bats and butterflies. These have no common precursor, two of them had wings! I 259 We know in the broadest sense how homologies are determined, because analogies have their limits: they can produce striking external and functional similarities, but they cannot change thousands of complex and independent parts in the same way. At a certain level of complexity, similarities must be homologous. In addition, genetic changes often have far-reaching effects on the external appearance of adult organisms. Therefore, a similarity that looks too scary and too complex to occur more than once can actually be a simple and repeatable change. Important: we do not compare the correct organisms with each other, but only their descendants! How can we recognize their original structure? Gould IV 174 Similarity/Darwin: "Our classification encompasses more than mere similarity relationships, this "more" is an ancestral relationship. It is the cause of order in nature.(1) >Evolution, >Explanation, >Darwinism. 1. Ch. Darwin. (1859): On the origin of species by means of natural selection. London: John Murray. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Similarity | Mayr | I 189 Similarity/Mayr: not all similarities of organisms are based on homology: three kinds of characteristic changes can simulate homology: 1st Convergent evolution: independent acquisition of the same characteristic in unrelated lines of descent, e.g. wings in birds and bats. 2nd Parallel evolution: the same with related descent lines due to genetic predisposition for this characteristic, even if it was not phenotypically pronounced in the ancestors. For example, independent acquisition of goggles by a whole family group of flies. 3rd "Setback": loss of the same developed characteristic in several descent lines. >Homology, >Evolution, >Convergence. I 190 Similarity: Darwin regards it as one of the classification criteria because there is no absolute direct correlation between branching and divergence. >Classification, >Criteria. In some family trees, all branches diverge to the same extent. Similarity/Mayr: must be determined as a first step, then the genealogy. I 373 Def similarity: certain characteristics must occur together with other characteristics from which they are logically independent. >Independence, >Method. I 190 Taxonomy: Problem: inconsistent evolution of different groups of characteristics. This can result in completely different classifications. For example, larvae in comparison to adult individuals: can fall into completely different similarity classes. For example, humans are more molecularly similar to chimpanzees than different species of the genus Drosophila among each other. I 192 Categories/Mayr: there is no reliable definition for the higher categories. Higher taxa can be described very well: e.g. birds or penguins. But the category to which they are assigned to is often subjective. >Categories, >Categorization, >Taxa. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Dennett, D. | Gould Vs Dennett, D. | Dennett I 342 Adaptionism / Dennett: one can not explain the concept of homology without relying on adaptionism. GouldVsAdaptionism: there are no standards for when a adaptionist declaration is too much of a good. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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