Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interpretation | Gadamer | I 196 Interpretation/Gadamer: Schleiermacher sees the act of understanding as the reconstructive execution of a production. Such an act has to make aware some things that can remain unconscious to the author. It is obviously the aesthetics of genius that Schleiermacher transfers to his general hermeneutics with this formula. The creative method of the genius artist is the model case on which the theory of unconscious production and the necessary consciousness in reproduction is based(1). It also follows - something that hermeneutics should never forget - that the artist who creates an artwork is not the appointed interpreter of it. As an interpreter, he or she has no fundamental authority over the merely receiving. He or she is, insofar as the person reflects, his or her own reader. The opinion he or she has as a reflective person is not decisive. The yardstick of interpretation is solely what the meaning of his creation is, what it "means"(2). >Meaning, >Interpretation, >Hermeneutics, >Understanding. Thus, the doctrine of ingenious production here accomplishes an important theoretical achievement, by making the difference between I 197 interpreter and creator. It legitimizes the equation of both, as long as it is not the reflective self-interpretation, but the unconscious opinion of the author that is to be understood. Schleiermacher does not want to say anything else with his paradoxical formula (it is necessary to understand a writer better than he or she has understood him- or herself). >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher, >Understanding/Schleiermacher. I 401 Interpretation/Gadamer: A correct interpretation "in itself" would be a thoughtless ideal that misjudged the nature of the tradition. Every interpretation must fit into the hermeneutical situation to which it belongs. Situational dependence in no way means that the claim to correctness, which every interpretation must make, dissolves into the subjective or occidental. For us, interpretation is not a pedagogical behaviour, but rather the consummation of understanding itself, which is not only completed for the others for whom one interprets something, but also for the interpreter him- or herself in the explicitness of linguistic interpretation. 1. H. Patsch has meanwhile clarified the early history of Romantic hermeneutics in more detail: Friedrich Schlegel's "Philosophie der Philologie" and Schleiermacher's early drafts on hermeneutics (Ztschr. f. Theologie und Kirche 1966, pp. 434-472). 2. The modern fashion of using the self-interpretation of a writer as a canon of interpretation is the consequence of a false psychologism. On the other hand, "theory", e.g. of music or poetics and oratory, can very well be a legitimate canon of interpretation. Cf. my recent work "Zwischen Phänomeektik - Versuch einer Selbstkritik" in Vol. 2 of the Ges. Werke, p. 3ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Objects (Material Things) | Nietzsche | Danto III 93 Object/Nietzsche/Danto: for Nietzsche, no difference determined by us - not even the simplest distinction between two objects - has even the slightest basis in reality, because the concept of representationalism is in itself a fiction. >Reality/Nietzsche, >World/Thinking/Nietzsche, >Consciousness/Nietzsche. Nietzsche always gives his answer in terms of psychology; and indeed, for him, every problem was reduced to a psychological problem. >Psychologism. Danto III 264 Object/thing/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche does not think in terms of things, but of dynamic quanta. In his bequest(1) Nietzsche makes the argument that an object is merely the sum of 'his' effects, so that as soon as we exclude the effects, in order to separate the thing from what it 'really' is, we have nothing left. Danto: There is therefore no thing, there are only a number of effects, and therefore the 'thing in itself' is an empty word. >Effect/Nietzsche, >Cause/Nietzsche, >Experience/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Nachlass, Berlin 1999, S. 502 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Psychology | Carnap | VI 203 Psychology/psychologism/Carnap: our cultural objects (e.g. biological, sociological, medical items, etc.) are not psychologized here. Reason: the constructed objects are located at a higher level than the constitution. They are allogeneous. (They belog to another mode of being.) - Values: from value experiences - (such as perception of value experiences). >Constitution system/Carnap. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Psychology | Quine | V 58 Psychology/Peirce: can only be based on external facts - Quine: Problem: how can you do that when you do not speak of things such as internal ideas? - Solution: Let us talk about the language - ((s)> semantic ascent/Quine) - ((s) only shared situations and language behavior) - QuineVs: (see below) Psychology is not "shared observation" but observation sentences. simple compliance - ((s) Psychology does not identify the situation. >Observation Sentences/Quine XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. >Science/Quine XII 92 Psychology/Quine: cannot provide a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observation concepts such as rational reconstruction, because we have not grown up to learn this. That is precisely why we should insist on rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalistic terms superfluous at the end. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. Epistemology studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives: by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction. >Rational Reconstruction/Quine New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology. >Epistemology/Quine: Old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. >Epistemology/Quine XI 100 Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSensory Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. Priority is what is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. I 44 Evidence/Irritation/Quine: any realistic theory of evidence is inextricably linked to the psychology of stimulus and reaction. To call a stone at close range a stone is already an extreme case. I 154 Like other sciences, psychology favours the uniformity of nature already in the criteria of its concepts. A connection between the individual senses cannot succeed. No chain of subliminal relationships ranges from sounds to colors. We need a separate quality space for each of the senses. Worse still: within one space we have to distinguish between subspaces: a red and a green ball can be less far apart in the quality space of the child than from a red cloth. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Qualia | Chalmers | I 251 Qualia/Missing Qualia/ChalmersVsBlock: (Block 1978)(1) Thought experiments, in which system properties that reflect a human consciousness system in an economy or in the Chinese population are realized as a whole, have at most intuitive power. They are intended to show that such a system, in which an individual e.g. should stand for a neuron, as a whole system cannot develop a consciousness. ChalmersVsBlock: just as intuitively, we argue, when we say that it is hardly credible that a piece of gray mass produces consciousness and yet it does! We would not see any experiences in an economy as a whole, but we do not do that in the brain either! >Analogies, >Thought experiments, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 252 Likewise, we can explain the functioning of the whole system in the case of the population as well as the brain, even without conscious experiences. >Functions, >Experience. On the other hand, it would not in principle be ruled out that a corresponding organizational structure in a population as a whole would bring about conscious experience, but one would have to considerably increase the speed of the signal lines. BlockVsVs: we know about neurons that can do the job, we do not know this of homunculi (that would be individuals in the population in the example). I 253 Fading Qualia/VsChalmers: For example, suppose parts of the brain would be replaced by silicon chips (Pylyshyn 1980)(2), Savitt (1982)(3), Cuda (1985)(4), then it could be that Qualia faded or disappeared bit by bit. I 254 ChalmersVsVs: If the individual chips get enough input information (and if they check somewhere) then it makes no difference and the qualia remain. Bit by bit, all neurons could be replaced by chips. I 256 A being with weaker Qualia is systematically mistaken about everything it experiences. Things I perceive as different will be homogeneous for it. The being will nevertheless believe,... I 257 ...that it has these complex experiences that are actually missing him. It has lost contact with its experiences. This seems implausible. Fading Qualia: are nevertheless logically possible. >Logical possibility, cf. >Metaphysical possibility, >Physical possibility, >Possibility. I 261 ChalmersVsVs: it is reasonable to assume that no system can be misunderstood as to its experiences. I 262 Invariance of the behavior/VsChalmers: could there be a system that is completely differently structured than me, but behaves the same as I do? Such a system would have to be conscious in the same way! >Invariance, >Behavior. VsVs: On the other hand, Block's example of a huge display with all inputs and outputs is not surely conscious. (Block 1981)(5). So something must be wrong with the argument. ChalmersVsVs: 1. My argument does not apply to behaviourally equivalent systems. A perfect actor does not have to be of the same opinion as the person represented. 2. A thought experiment with equivalent behavior cannot be introduced bit by bit as with replacing neurons with electronic chips. I 263 A system like this would be rational in any case. I 266f Def Dancing Qualia/Chalmers: Assuming that 10%, 20%, 30% ... of the brain are replaced by silicon chips, and the resulting Qualia may change rapidly between systematically weak or unsystematic, we do not care. There must only be two points A and B so that... I 267 1. no more than 10% of the brain has been exchanged between A and B, and 2. A and B have significantly different experiences. Problem: There may be some unnoticed differences between different experiences. (> Sorites/Chalmers). Switch: we assume that I have a backup system of my brain and can switch back and forth from time to time. I 268 After switching, I'll be like the new system - we call it Bill. He may have a blue instead of my red experience. I could even go back and forth, that would be the dancing qualia. N.B.: when switching back and forth, I will not notice any difference! I 269 A change or altered behavior would require a functional difference between the two systems, contrary to the stipulated (functional) isomorphism. Since this is not the case, I cannot acquire any new beliefs, such as, for example, "My qualia just jumped." If it were otherwise, we would have to accept a completely new, changed psychology and phenomenology. N.B.: it could even be that our Qualia are actually constantly dancing in front of our eyes! I 270 The only place where you could draw a principal line would be the functional level! Solution/Chalmers: the only thing that prevents us from accepting the possibility of the dancing qualia in our own case is the following principle: Principle: If someone's conscious experiences change significantly, one notices the change. ((s) Circular between "significant" and "noticeable"). If we neglect the principle, we have no longer any defense against skepticism. >Skepticism. I 271 VsChalmers: Objections refer to gaps in the argument about the perception history, speed, weak inversions,... I 272 ...unnoticed qualia, which for their part are interchanged, e.g. at the edge of the facial field,... I 273 ...multiple changes. ChalmersVsVs: none of these arguments is critical for my argument. Absent Qualia/Chalmers: absent qualia are extremely implausible, dancing and interchanged Qualia are even extremely implausible. Functionalism: But this does not confirm functionalism in its strongest form (the thesis according to which the functional organization is constitutive for consciousness), since such qualia are not logically excluded. >Functionalism, >Functionalism/Chalmers. 1. N. Block, Troubles with functionalism. In: C. W. Savage (Ed) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundatzion of Psychology. Minneapolis 1978. Reprinted in N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1, Cambridge 1980. 2. Z. Pylyshyn, The "causal power" of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 442-44 3. S. Savitt, Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences5, 1982: pp. 342-43 4. T. Cuda, Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 111-27. 5. N. Block Psychologism and behaviorism Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43 (1981). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Reference | Chisholm | I 51 Each kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-attribution. 1) The one who means must be able to make himself an object; 2) He must understand propositions and facts; Direct attribution (self-attribution) is the original form of all attribution. I 133 But this is not yet self-consciousness: in addition, we need knowledge that it is the subject itself, to which the property is attributed. >Self-consciousness, >Self-ascription. --- II 24 real/Rutte: for calling something real: conditions: 1) this way of appearing, - 2) arranged in the way it appears - 3) the right causation. - Reality must be distinguished from the outside the world. >World. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 II 112/113 Reference/Brandl: other way of reference, depending on whether description or acquaintance - the latter allows reference without information, or even to ignore information - BrandlVsRussell: different motivation of the distinction. Between the appearance of the object and our knowledge of how the object is the cause of the phenomenon. Description allows us to exceed the limits of our experience II 105f Reference/Reference/Brandl: by sign or speaker? by speaker - Strawson: dito, so use of the sign refers, not the sign - problem: intentionality would have to explain sign. BrandlVsChisholm: thesis: it is no use to decide whether the linguistic or psychological (intentionality) should have primacy. Directedness is incomprehensible if the designation of the words has not yet been introduced. - A separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. >Behaviorism, >Psychologism. II 107 "Unity" would also not explain anything. - Also here question about primacy: either "thinking of" or talking about objects. - Solution: differentiate different kinds of singular term for different types of reference - but only a kind of intentionality. >Intentionality. II 108 Domain/Russell: non-singular propositions are always related to a domain of objects, not unambiguous - singular propositions: contain the object as a genuine component" (by acquaintance).>Acquaintance. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. >Domains, >Use, >Mention. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Seeing | Quine | XII 100 Seeing/Vision/QuineVsTradition: it is not about the problem if there is an unconscious two dimensional radiation or a conscious three dimensional perception. - instead: stimuli. Also QuineVsGestalt Psychology: if we have only stimuli, then there is no problem, whether we have a gestalt or atoms. >Gestalt theory, >Perception. XII 100 Seeing/Quine: old mystery: Problem: how to solve the epistemological priority: The retina is irradiated two-dimensionally, yet we see things three dimensional without conscious conclusion. Problem: what should be considered as observation, the unconscious two dimensional or the conscious three dimensional? Tradition: here the conscious had priority. New: now we can drop consciousness because we explain observation through stimuli. This makes old paradoxes about unconscious data and chains of conclusions that would have to be completed too quickly obsolete. Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSense Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. >Gestalt Psychology. Priority is what is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. XII 101 Protocol Sentence/Vienna Circle/Quine: there was a debate in the Vienna Circle about what should be considered an observation or protocol sentence: a) Reports on sensory impressions b) Elementary statement about the outside world c) (Neurath): Reports on the relation between perception and reality. Quine: the worst thing was that there was apparently no objective decision. Solution/Quine: we look at them unreservedly in the context of the outside world. Def Observation Sentence/naturalized epistemology/Quine: the sentences that are causally closest to the receptors. Problem: how to measure the distance? Solution: Observation sentences are those that make the least use of stored information in language learning. However, there can be no total independence from stored information. >Holism, >Network/Quine, >Logical particles, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Observation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sensations | Husserl | I 72f Sensation/Husserl: sensation is 1. body movement (kinesthesia, alignment) and 2. sensation with respect to the subject. HusserlVsPsychologism: constitutive consciousness is not temporal in itself. Kinesthesia: see Terminology/Husserl. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Thinking | Evans | Dummett I 11 Evans: Language can be explained by modes of thought. - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! Modes of thought are explained by language. (Frege ditto). Dummett I 112 "Philosophy of thought"/Evans/Peacocke: The "Philosophy of thought" does not give the language the same basic position. - It deals with the problem of what it means to have a thought, as well as with the structure of the thoughts and their components. What does it mean that a thought is about an object of this or that kind? What does it mean to capture a concept? What makes a concept a part of a thought? Dummett I 115 DummettVsEvans: it is dangerous to reverse the priority of language against the thought (danger of psychologism when thoughts are subjective and not communicable). Dummett I 131 Communication/Understanding/Belief/DummettVsEvans: Evans is in danger of making understanding dependent on the belief that the intersubjectivity is based on the belief that the words of the other mean the same. But meaning does not depend on the individual consciousness, but objectively on the use. >Use theory. Dummett I 137 Analytical philosophy/DummettVsEvans: Language has priority over thoughts. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Thinking | Peacocke | Dum I 112 "Philosophy of thoughts"/Evans/Peacocke: Evans thesis: the language has no longer the basic position, - It deals with the problem of what it means to have a thought, and with the structure of thought and its components. What does it mean that a thought is about a subject of one kind or another? What does it mean to grasp a concept? What makes a term a component of a thought? >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Belief objects. I 115 DummettVsEvans: dangerous to reverse the priority of language over the idea (risk of psychologism, when thoughts are subjective and incommunicable). >Psychologism, >Analytic philosophy/Dummett, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language, cf. >Animal language, >Animals. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Evans, G. | Dummett Vs Evans, G. | Davidson I 58 In a distal theory, the meaning is directly linked to the conditions which make sentences intersubjectively true or false. Here Quine sides with Dummett (DummettVsEvans) and opposes to aligning the meanings with the truth conditions. QuineVsEvans, DummettVsEvans: meaning not from truth conditions. Dummett I 11 Language/Evans: New Current: Gareth Evans argues that language could only be explained by means of concepts for different types of thoughts that are considered regardless of their linguistic expression. I 115 In his book "Varieties of reference" Evans tries to analyze language-independently different ways of thinking about an object in order to explain various linguistic means of referencing with the help of these ways of thinking about the object. DummettVsEvans: therefore, Evans is no analytical philosopher for me anymore. The anal. ph. came about as soon as the "turn to language" was completed. Earliest Example: Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884. DummettVsEvans: If thinking about an object only existed if you think something specific with regard to this object, then Frege’s answer would have been that the numbers are only given ,because we grasp complete thoughts about them. Evans: Language explainable by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (also Frege) Language is a social phenomenon, not private property of individuals. So there is still the possibility of conceiving thoughts as objective and entirely different from inner consciousness-events without having to resort to Platonic mythology. DummettVsEvans: Therefore, it is dangerous if you want to turn around the priority of the language over the thought like Evans and others. (Risk of psychologism if thoughts are subjective and incommunicable.) I 131 The meanings cannot depend on what happens in our consciousness. They could not if these inner processes were communicable! DummettVsEvans: at risk of deriving such an unauthorized view. The meaning is objective, because it is included in the use which a competent speaker has to make of this expression. Stalnaker II 1 Def Analytische Philosophie/Dummett/DummettVsEvans/Stalnaker: Thesis: die Philosophie des Denkens kann nur über die Philosophie der Sprache erfasst werden. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Folk Psychology | Functionalism Vs Folk Psychology | Schwarz I 147 Analytical Functionalism/Terminology/Schwarz: this is how Lewis's position is sometimes called because of its holistic characterization. (Block, 1978(1), 271ff). Schw I 148 "Analytical": because the characterization of causal roles in Lewis is supposed to be analytical. But if functionalism is to be understood as Vs Identity theory, then Lewis is not a functionalist, but an identity theorist. Standard objections Vs functionalism do not affect Lewis at all: e.g. mental states: Mental states/Lewis: for their characterization it also needs an essential connection to the perceived environment etc. Therefore there is no danger that we would have to attribute feelings to the Chinese economy. (>DennettVsSearle?). On the other hand, it does not only depend on input-output relations, so that machines that behave externally like us, but are internally completely different (E.g. Blocks (1981)(2) "Blockhead", Searle: e.g. Chinese Room (1980)(3), would have desires, pains and opinions (> E.g. Martian pain). Pain/VsLewis/VsFolk Psychology: if we want to know what pain is, we should ask pain researchers and not the man on the street. Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Schwarz: Thesis: that we interpret the behavior of our conspecifics with the help of an internalized set of rules and principles and not, for example, through mental simulation. This is completely wrongly attributed to Lewis. He never expressed his opinion on it. Everyday Psychology/Lewis: is not a special "theory". It only assumes that we have opinions and expectations about mental states but not necessarily about conscious ones. (1997c(4): 333, early: "Collection of Platitudes" (1972,§3)(5). LewisVsPsychology: that would be a change of subject. We want to know whether a biological state plays the role we associate with "pain". Schw I 149 SchwarzVsLewis: the contrast may be less strong, some pain researchers might know better what pain is. E.g. depression. 1. Ned Block [1978]: "Troubles with Functionalism". In C.W. Savage (Hg.) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 2 .Ned Block [1981]: “Psychologism and Behaviourism”. Philosophical Review, 90: 5–43 3. John Searle [1980]: “Minds, Brains and Programs”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417– 457 4. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 5. David Lewis [1972]: “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Gestalt Theory | Quine Vs Gestalt Theory | V 17 Stimuli/Quine: instead of sensory data. Gestalt Theory: VsSensual Atomism. VsSense Data. Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist ((s) with stimuli instead of sensory data, but renunciation of Gestalt theory). VsGestalt Theory: it is about the relation of the stimuli to the receptors, not to consciousness. XII 100 Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSense Data Atomism. QuineVsGestalt Psychology: no matter if Gestalt or atoms push themselves to the forefront of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. Priority has which is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Objectivity | Chisholm Vs Objectivity | II 105f Referring/Reference/Brandl: through signs or speaker? Through speaker. Strawson ditto: i.e.use of the sign refers, not the sign itself. Problem: intentionality would have to explain the sign - BrandlVsChisholm: Thesis: pointless to decide whether the language or the mental aspects (intentionality) should prevail. Directedness incomprehensible if designation of words not yet introduced. Separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. II 107 "Unit" would not explain anything either! Again question of primacy: either "thinking of" or "talking about" objects Solution: Distinguishing various types of singular terms for various types of reference, but only one type of intentionality. II 120 Objective reference/Chisholm: depends on "epistemic proximity". Possibility of identification. E.g. Suppose Tom were the smallest spy: we could not infer that every reasonable person thinks Tom is a spy. He cannot make a de-re attribution yet. So we do not need to classify this belief attitude as de-re in the strict sense. II 120/121 Suppose e.g. the smallest spy was also the richest coffee trader: then I can give two relationships in which I am exclusively to the smallest spy. If I knew, moreover, that it is the same person, I would have to be "epistemically familiar" with him or her. I might as well already be, even if I only have one source of information, without being acquainted with the person. de-re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy de-re, before I know him personally. VsChisholm: we do not learn from him what this closer relationship of "knowing" is to consist in. This again makes it unclear what the mechanism of indirect attribution is supposed to contribute. II 123 Reference/Acquaintance/Description/BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two types of uniqueness relation correspond to the problem that in addition to the referential one also attributive reference in the game. II 124 Danger of simplification: there is no clear distinction referential/Attributive: we must always ask what role one or the other form of reference has in a particular case. There is a range of possibilities that cannot be explained by the dichotomy ref/att. Own experiences and information from others affect the mechanism of reference. II 125 VsChisholm: only in very special cases, namely the purely referential ones, this succeeds only thanks to "epistemic intimacy". II 126 Question: what could act as such a link between and X? Wittgenstein: two candidates: 1) an image that is more similar to the object than any other 2) an utterance of the presenter which only denotes X. ChisholmVsWittgenstein: The relationship between an utterance (sentence) and an object could not be more "fundamental" than that between V and X. II 128 BrandlVsChisholm: vice versa: Wittgenstein asks a trick question here. If we argue reductionistically, we will never find an end point. We always need more intermediaries as links. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Psychologism | Danto Vs Psychologism | DantoVsPsychologie: in dieser Hinsicht skandalös, da sie Ansichten über ihren Gegenstand vertrat, die völlig im Unklaren liessen, was es eigentlich bedeutet, Ansichten zu vertreten. I 54 DantoVsPsychologie: Unterschied zu den anderen Wissenschaften: für Physik, Chemie und sogar Biologie ist es nicht wichtig, besonders auf Physiker, Chemiker und Biologen zu achten. Wenn indessen die Gesetze der Psychologie nicht zur Repräsentation dessen, was die Psychologen selber machen, taugen, dann steckt in diesen Repräsentationen ein schwerwiegender Defekt. Für die übrigen Wissenschaften ist ein so strenger Externalismus ohne besonderen Belang. Der Wissenschaftler wirft keinen Schatten auf die Welt.((s) wird von vielen bestritten)(DantoVsKonstuktivismus,DantoVsIntuitionismus) Die Psychologie jedoch nimmt oft ihren Forschungsgegenständen gegenüber einer so distanzierte und »objektive« Haltung ein, dass sie vergisst, dass die Psychologen selber ein Teil der angesprochenen Realität sind. I 276 |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Psychologism | Dennett Vs Psychologism | Lanz I300 Dennett: functional explanations make an optimality condition. (The machine uses its energy to fulfil its tasks). Similarly intentional explanations: the actor is rational: he has goals that he should have because of his constitution and his place in the world. Likewise, he has opinions that he should have. So only the physicalist, causal explanation remains. If it is asked which causally relevant factors are for which educated is the behavior which can be explained functionally or intentionally, depending on the interest and complexity of the behavior, then only the physical explanation provides information! It follows: it is an illusion to believe that intentional states are in turn causes of other mental states and causes of actions! Psychological characterizations are merely heuristic and no naturalistic descriptions. (DennettVsFolk Psychology). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Psychologism | Dummett Vs Psychologism | I 115 Language is a social phenomenon, not private property of individuals. So there is the possibility of conceiving thoughts as objective and entirely different of inner consciousness-events without having to resort to Platonic mythology. DummettVsEvans: Therefore, it is dangerous if you - like Evans and others - to reverse the priority of language against the idea. (Danger of psychologism if thoughts are subjective and incommunicable). |
Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Psychologism | Fodor Vs Psychologism | Davidson I 31 Many philosophers have come to the conclusion that beliefs and other propositional stances are not quite as subjective, as has been assumed. Fodor: submits to the psychologists the process of "methodological solipsism" (Carnap): the psychologist should deal with "truly psychological states" whose identity be determined exclusively by what is "in the head". (There are similar proposals by Daniel Dennett and David Kaplan). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Psychologism | Frege Vs Psychologism | Brandom I 47 FregeVspsychologism: here the difference between the reasons which justify a conviction, and the causes that they really evoke disappears. The laws of the real conclusions are not consistently laws of correct reasoning. For then fallacies would be impossible. Psychologism misunderstands the pragmatic significance of semantic content. He can not explain how standards are applied. I 48 Correct decisions are normative terms. No natural. Conflicting judgments are not prohibited by the laws of nature! Frege: Logic is also normative. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Psychologism | McGinn Vs Psychologism | II 113/114 Def panpsychism/McGinn: moves the mind back in the material world (VsHyperdualism). ("Elvis Is Everywhere"). He states that consciousness is everywhere and wafts through space. II 115 a) Hard version of panpsychism: the neurons in the brain literally feel the pain, see yellow, think about dinner - and electrons and stars do the same. McGinnVsPanpsychism: 1. this is obviously not the case. Regular matter doesn't show any sign of thirst or pain. II 116 2. The problem with panpsychism is that it makes our mind look like an epiphenomenon! Since our mind is allegedly composed of all the states of mind that were intrinsic to matter before being formed into our brains. II 117 3. If all matter had mature thoughts and feelings, why do organisms then need nervous systems and brains to be able to think and feel? b) Soft panpsychism: obvious that atoms do not have mental states, but could they not contain the mind in a diluted form or on a lower level? McGinnVsPanpsychism (soft form): Problem: It is difficult to define what that means. If dilute states should be approximately like the consciousness before falling asleep, that leads back to the hard version. Stones would therefore have something like "proto mental" states, defined as any property of matter that allows for consciousness. II 118 McGinnVs: this theory is empty. It is true of course that matter has this or that property. And of course, matter must have the ability to give rise to consciousness, because it does so constantly. b) brain plays an active role: the brain makes use of the properties of matter and transforms it by virtue of its particular structure in consciousness. McGinn pro! McGinn pro panpsychism: all matter must have the potential to co-create consciousness because in the matter of which the brain tissue is constructed there is nothing really special (!). Ultimately, all traces of matter can be traced back to the Big Bang. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Psychologism | Chisholm Vs Psychologism | III 73 Knowledge/Chisholm: We have said that the propositions refer to certain abstract entities or immutable objects such as numbers, properties, propositions or facts. Is it possible to interpret them differently?. III 74 Psychologism/Theodor Lipps/Chisholm: (19.Jahrh.) Thesis: logic is the truth about the ways in which people think. E.g. everyone is psychologically constituted in a way that it is impossible for him to think that something is both red and blue at the same time. I Implication reformulated according to E.g. ChisholmVsLipps/ChisholmVsPsychologism: this does not express what is meant at all. The psychological sentences are empirical generalizations III 75 PsychologismVsVs/Chisholm: will then reformulate his position: it was not about empirical statements about the thought of man, but of rules of thought. ChisholmVsVs: then he would also have to argue that the laws of thought were ethical rules or imperatives. III 76 Then one would have to regard E.g. chess rules as imperatives. And these imperatives may be neither valid nor invalid. But that would only be possible if they were accompanied by indicative sentences that describe in how many moves a certain position leads to checkmate. Psychologism: Variant: the laws of logic tell us what paths of belief lead to the truth and which lead to falsehood. ChisholmVsVs: That would correspond to the request, in the case of the question of whether something can be red and blue, to abstain from the belief regarding every particular ((s), because then nothing can go wrong). |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Various Authors | Husserl Vs Various Authors | I 8 HusserlVsPsychologism. I 82 HusserlVsPsychologism: the constituting consciousness cannot be conceived again as time sequence! Picture Theory/Husserl: picture theory creates separation between immanent and "outside beings" (HusserlVs/HusserlVsPicture Theory). Separation creates two realities, matter and image, but an image as one thing, something real, would have to apply for the same model. > Infinite Regress. Things as a tree, are there. Nothing lies between the real and what is meant thereby. (Reclam Hauptwerke der Philosophie 20. Jahrh.) |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Artwork | Croce, B. | Graeser I 216 Artwork/Croce/Collingwood/Graeser: artworks have a mental or spiritual structure. GraeserVs: 1. Although no one will deny the importance of ideas and concepts, in the philosophical discussion one is reluctant to to attach structures of this kind a lot of weight. > FregeVsPsychologism. Vs: 2. precisely because the study of works of art presupposes their accessibility, they cannot have a purely mental constitution. I 217 VsVs: But that idea is linked to the existence of subjects does not mean that ideas would be subjective. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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