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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colour | Sellars | I 41 Epistemology/Color/Sellars: Traditional thesis: the expression "red" is released from the connections with the category of physical objects. SellarsVs. Tradition: E.g. we do not see the back. - E.g. a two-dimensional surface as a color carrier is not an object. >Aspects, >Perspective, >Objects, >Sense data. Colors/Sellars: The basic grammar of the attribute red is: the physical object x is red at location s and time t. However, the red color does not owe its redness in turn to a component that is red. You cannot find the place of the objects by analyzing the discourse of perception, just as entities in four-dimensional space are not due to the analysis of what we mean. >Meaning(Intending), >Colour words, >Language use, >Language game. I 42/43 Red color is not an extra component of an object - color cannot be gained from the analysis of the speech (as a component). Places in space cannot be found through analysis of what we mean. >Spatial order, >Spatial localization, >Reality, >World/thinking. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Communication | Frith | I 208 Definition "supported communication"/Frith: people with severe disability can communicate through an assistant. In tests, it can be found that it is the moderator who answers the questions. Until this is pointed out, he does not know this! Originator: the moderator is deceived about the origin. >Authorship. I 225 Communication/Frith: communication is more than just speaking. Representation/Frith: the representation that I have of a tree was developed by my brain. Through a series of assumptions and predictions. >Representation, >Localization, >Spatial localization. Communication: when I try to tell you something I have my idea in mind and my model of your idea. I can compare both directly. Control: I know I did not mediate my idea successfully when my prediction of what you are going to do next was wrong. More precisely, I can even look at the type of error: where exactly are the differences between my idea and my model of your idea? I 250 Communication/Frith: in communication you should always examine two brains at the same time. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Demonstratives | Peacocke | I 126 Place/location/Self/Peacocke: the demonstrative [this T place] does not reflect the sense of "here" in English. >Sense, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Here, >Now. E.g. you can ask "What’s going on here" without perceiving something in a certain place. >Spatial localization, >Reference, >Thinking, >Object of thought, >Belief content. That is not analog with [self]: - E.g. it may well make sense to say: "[this T place] is not here". - E.g. Dennett is in Oklahoma, while his brain is in Houston. >Self, >Self identification, >He/he himself. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Explanation | Peacocke | I 71 Explanation/behavior/Peacocke: assuming, the spatial relations of a subject determine its settings. Problem: then we could explain the behavior solely from the accepted beliefs of the subject without mentioning the spatial relations. >Belief attitudes, >Spatial localization, >Behavior, >Behavioral explanation. I 81 Narrow explanation/Peacocke: E.g. someone has only the terms "there is an F", "there are two Fs", "There are three Fs" and "the Fs are numerically equivalent to the Gs". Then operations with higher numbers are explainable with these few terms. >Numerical equality. E.g. He actually arranges 20 pebbles and pieces of gold one to one. Then there is no difference in his intentional actions without one which is formulated with its few terms. >Intentions. Problem: such an unstructured ability would then be necessary and a priori. "Numerically equivalent"/numerical equality: can be treated as an unstructured operator of 2nd order. >Operators, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Second Order Logic. I 133ff Explanation/Peacocke/Nozick: must rely on the nature of the object, not on the manner of givenness. - ((s) intension: is virtually equated with appearance- "nature" with "real object".) >Way of givenness, >Intensions. I 185 Action explanation/Peacocke: by properties of objects - explanation of thoughts: by specific markings - better: by the object itself. --- I 192 Action explanation/Peacocke: in the case of properties no specific object is meant: E.g. "red lamp", not "John's favorite color" - demonstrative: specific object, descriptively: can also be another object. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Generality | Papineau | I 255 Generality/Animal/Thinking/Papineau: no simple organism explicitly represents general facts. E.g. it is one thing to represent the location of a particular pond, that water is in ponds is quite another matter. This corresponds to the question: which animals can have beliefs? >Animals, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Thinking without language, >Spatial localization, >Representation. I 256 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: I have not defined this concept in terms of beliefs but of design: as the use of general representations. I avoid the concept belief. >Beliefs, >Content. Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations? I 257 After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Generalization. Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"? >Disposition, >Information. I do not want to dispute such content attribution. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B&T, V>R). Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: if it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple creatures can be considered ZM thinkers. I 258 Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment. >Behavior, >Embodiment. I 259 Explicit/implicit: if an organism has implicitly different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. >Complexity, >Parts, >Whole, >Sense. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| I, Ego, Self | Perry | Frank I 398ff Extra-sense/I/PerryVsCastaneda: can be recognized by others in the same way, does not explain the difference. >Extra-sense/Castaneda. Frank I 399f I/he/reference/relation/sense/meaning: difference: Quasi-indicator attributes reference, but does not establish it. >I/Castaneda, >quasi-indicator. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 Frank I 402ff I/Castaneda/Perry: "I" is not replaceable by specific labeling, when behavior is explained - "I" is a "key index word". Problem: same sentence, but different speaker: false belief "I'm making a mess ...". >Sugar trail example. Incorrect solution: "And I am the one": again a new index word. - "Lack of conceptual component" does not help: I can believe that it is me, with no specific concept of me. False: description: "the one who makes the mess"; this does not help, because there is no connection to me. Frank I 403 Belief/I/Perry: Solution: we need a distinction: belief-state/belief-object. E.g. the event starts at 12:00 - that means, "now!" or "already finished" or "there is still time". Subject: the event beginning at 12:00 State: "now". Specific decsription without an index is not enough. >Indexicality, >Index words. Frank I 414 I/individuation/Perry: The following conditions are not enough: Propositions de re, de dicto, additional conceptual feature localization in space and time, relativization on people and places, two different descriptions without "I". >Propositions, >de re, >de dicto, >Spatial localization, >Description. Perry like Castaneda: 'I' is not replaceable. >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda, >H.-N. Castaneda. Time/Person-Proposition: does not make me different from the others: "J.P. yesterday at the super market" is just as true for others. - judgement context = opinion context: "The event begins now" is true at 12:00 - does not help. True/false/truth value: does not help: that mountain A is higher than B, may be true, but does not lead to the right path. There is nothing what all have in common. >Wanderers-example. Solution: the lost wanderers are in the same opinion state (individuated by index words), but not of the same opinion. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identification | Peacocke | I 173 Demonstratives/Identification/Evans/Peacocke: Liberal theory/Peacocke: general capacity for localization. Evans: plus current localization. >Identification/Evans, >Spatial localization. Peacocke: then it is not possible that a lost person can have thoughts about seen objects. >Thoughts, >Thinking, >Knowledge, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Cognitive Map/Memory images/Recognition/Peacocke: not causal but really demonstrative. >Recognition, >Memory. I 172 E.g. a lost person is thinking: here is a glass. Peacocke: that is still a statement about a place in the public space. >Space, >Predication, >Attribution. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Logical Space | Stalnaker | I 81 Grue/Grueness/Stalnaker: grue does not form a region in logical space. >Grue. Logical space: principle: all relations must be found on intrinsic properties. >Intrinsicness, >Relations, >Foundation. I 83/84 Def Equivalence/localization/logical space/Stalnaker: saying that i is equivalent to j is to say that the localization functions i and j represent the same possible world. >Equivalence. Def intrinsic property: an intrinsic property is a region in logical space that is invariant with respect to this equivalence relation. Contrast: the contrasting property is the conventional property. >Conventions, >Properties. I 85 Logical space/Stalnaker: logical space does not exist independently of the individuals who inhabit it, but is abstracted from the world as we find it. >Abstraction. I 127 Spatial/logical/Stalnaker: solution/Stalnaker: the solution is our intuition: most of us have an actualistic conception of a possible world and possible individuals, but they represent a possibilism regarding spatial localization. Places north and south of us are just as real. We do not need surrogates for absent objects - even if there is no world-independent identity, there is still a localization-independent one. >Localization, >Identity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Map Example | Peacocke | I 76 Map/Peacocke: in order to use a map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. ((s)> e.g. Two lost wanderers/J. Perry). ((s) e.g. GPS: intensional (tells you "who you are"). Map: (extensional) will not help you. It does not tell you who you are.) >Propositional knowledge, >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Spatial localization. ((s) Explanation/(s): E.g., Two lost hikers meet. By chance, they have the same hiking book. Then, with the help of this book alone, they will not find out their localization. Reason: in the printed book the hikers are not identified, e.g. as the one who came from the west and the one who came from the east. Solution: modern navigation system: registers the path and identifies by it the user who holds the device in his hand. Distinction: propositional/non-propositional knowledge). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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