Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 87 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abortion | Singer | I 306 Abortion/P. Singer: The verdict of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v., Wade is available online. The main points are summarized in J. Feinberg (ed.) Probem of Abortion, Belmont, 1984 I 307 See also Edwin Schur, Crimes Without Victims. NJ 1965 Abortion/Paul Ramsey: Ramsey argues with the uniqueness of the fetus against abortion in: D.H. Labby (ed.) Life or Death: Ethics and Options (London, 1968). See also Don Marquis VsAbortion/MarquisVsAbortion: "Why abortion is immoral“ Journal of Philosophy, 86, (1989), pp. 183-202. NorcrossVsMarquis: in Norcross, „Killing, Abortion and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis“, Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), pp. 268-77. See also >Abortion/Judith Thomson. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Acquaintance | Hintikka | II 22 Description/recognition/identification/individuation/Hintikka: the difference is often represented as: A) assign a name to a face, B) assign a face to a name, A) answer a what-question & B) answer a where-question. Model Theory/Hintikka: the model-theoretical situation is, however, not completely reproduced with this. Therefore, "acquaintance" and "description" should only be taken with some limitations. >Identification, >Individuation, >Model theory, >Description. II 23 Acquaintance/description/Hintikka: acquaintance corresponds to psychology/psychological: a) semantic memory and b) episodic memory. II 144 Acquaintance/reduction/reducibility/Russell/Hintikka: Russell only regarded the quantum of acquaintance as irreducible. This corresponds to the fact that he only regards logical names "this", etc. as real names. II 149 Acquaintance/description/cross-world identification/cross-world identity/Hintikka: (7) Acquaintance can thus be paraphrased: (7) I know who the man is over there. (11) (Ex) Kl (the man there = x) (12) (∃x) Kl (Sir Norman Brook = x) The unexpected parallelism between the everyday translations for (11) and (12) shows that the uniqueness conditions mutatis mutandis work in the same way for both ways of identification (acquaintance/description). World lines: world lines must not change during the course. Cf. >Four-dimensionalism. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Adolescence | Elkind | Upton I 123 Egocentrism/adolescence/Elkind/Upton: [during adolescence there is a] change in cognitive skills is reflected in the growing ability of adolescents to handle increasingly complex scientific and mathematical concepts. This new way of thinking also underlies the ability of the adolescent to engage in introspection and self-reflection, which, according to some theorists, results in heightened self-consciousness (Elkind. 1978)(1). Elkind called this phenomenon adolescent egocentrism, suggesting that this governs the way in which adolescents think about social matters. According to this theory, adolescents believe that others are as interested in them as they are in themselves and in their sense of personal uniqueness. Two aspects of adolescent egocentrism have been described: - The imaginary audience: this is where adolescents believe themselves to be ‘at centre stage’. Everyone else’s attention is riveted on them. - The personal fable: this underpins the adolescent sense of personal uniqueness and invincibility. No one else can possibly understand how they really feel; furthermore, although others may be vulnerable to misfortune, they are not. >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Elkind, D (1978) Understanding the young adolescent. Adolescence, 13(49): 127-34. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Altruism | Mayr | I 319 Behavior/Genes/Mayr: genes also contribute to the behavior and personality of man. E.g. mathematical gifts, craftsmanship, musicality, clumsiness. >Genes, >Personality, >Personality traits. I 323 Natural selection: if it only rewards self-interest, how could ethics and, for example, altruism develop? >Selection. Huxley was right with his presumption that the self-interest of the individual somehow contradicted the benefit of society. Cf. >Altruism. I 324 Def altruism: (Trivers, 1985)(1): action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. Altruism/Comte: Care for the welfare of others. >A. Comte. Altruism/Mayr: is not limited to cases of danger or harm to the altruist. Three things need to be distinguished (already Darwin): Selection/Individual: An individual is the object of selection in three respects: as an individual, as a family member (reproducer), and as member of a social group. The human dilemmas are only to be understood with regard to this triad. I 325 Altruism/Overall Suitability: is found in many animals, especially with parental care and large families. Defense of the offspring by the mother. This behavior is favored by natural selection, since it improves the fitness of the common genotype of the altruist and its beneficiaries. Selection of relatives. Indirectly rather self-serving. Seemingly altruistic. >Altruism. Some authors believe that human ethics replaced altruism directed towards overall suitability. Mayr: I recognize many actions directed toward overall suitability in the behavior of humans: for example mother's love, moral attitude towards strangers. However, only a small part of today's ethics systems. Social animals: possess a remarkable ability to recognize their relatives. I 327 Reciprocal altruism: in solitary animals. Synergy of two non-related animals for mutual benefit. E.g. cleaner wrasse, alliance of two individuals fighting a third. For primates: a kind of consideration: if I help this individual, it will help me. Perhaps a root of human morality. Human/Mayr: all the great achievements of mankind were accomplished by less than one per cent of the total population. Without reward and recognition our society would soon break apart. I 328 Human: The entire history of the hominids is characterized by strong group-selection (already Darwin). I 329 Altruism/Behavior/Mayr: In contrast to individual selection, group selection can reward genuine altruism and other virtues. Ethical behavior is adaptive in humans. >Adaption. Sociality: not all collections of animals are social. E.g. schools of young fish and the huge herds of African ungulates are not. Real altruism: can be extended to non-relatives. For example, baboons. Some hominids must have discovered that larger groups have more chances. I 330 Norms: To be able to apply group norms, the brain had to develop the ability to think. >Norms, >Thinking. Ethics: two conditions for ethical behavior (Simpson, 1969)(2): 1) There are alternatives 2) The alternatives can be assessed 3) The person can decide freely This means that consequences are anticipated and responsibility is assumed. >Responsibility, >Prediction. Ethics/Cause: it is not possible to determine the cause and effect of ethics. >Ethics, >Morals. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. G. G. Simpson (1969). On the Uniqueness of Man: Biology and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Ambiguity | Chalmers | I 63 Ambiguity/Primary/Secondary Intension/Chalmers: there is no danger of ambiguity in truth conditions when they are related to the actual world. >Truth conditions, >Possible worlds, >Reference, >Certainty, >Intensions, >Primary intension, >Propositions/Chalmers, >Centered worlds. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Anaphora | Brandom | I 438 Anaphora/Brandom: you do not describe a cat if you refer to it with "it". >Pronouns. I 438 Truth/Brandom Thesis: "true" functions I 423 Pronoun/Brandom: old: only linguistic, like bound variables (Co-Reference) - new: anaphora is more basal than Deixis! - Deixis assumes anaphora. - Anaphora without index words is possible, but not vice versa. >Pointing, >Ostension. I 627 Anaphora/Reference/Uniqueness/Unrepeatability/Brandom: substitution is of course not definable for unrepeatable tokenings - therefore it has to be referred to anaphorically. I 638 Deixis requires anaphora! No language can indicate if it does not have asymmetric, anaphoric constructions - the predecessor can even be a mere possible tokening: "refers to". I 639 Two possibilities: a) Type Recurrence: symmetrically acquired significance (e.g. proper names of certain descriptions) - 2. indexical, asymmetrical I 954 Anaphora/Rigidity/Brandom: anaphoric chains are rigid - but not "impure chains": Leibniz could have been called differently, so it is possible that the one referred to by "Leibniz" is not Leibniz - N.B.: in counterfactual situations expressions would belong to other token recurrence structures than actual. >Rigidity. I 684 Anaphoric chains/Evans/Brandom. Problem: if the predecessor is quantified: Example Hans has bought some donkeys and Heinz has vaccinated them (all or some of the some?) - Example few politicians came to the party but they had a good time (few of the few?).Cf. >Donkey sentences. I 686 Evans: Proposal: Note I 956 "An expression a c dominates an expression b exactly if the first branching node that dominates a also dominates b (and a and b do not dominate each other). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Answers | Hintikka | II 143 Uniqueness condition/W-questions/response/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a who-question (ambiguous, see above) is that (8) must imply (7): (6) Who is the man over there? (7) I know who the man is over there. E.g. It is Sir Norman Brook. (8) I know that the man there is Sir Norman Brook. Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG). II 144 Problem: we need an additional premise. E.g.: (13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x). (Non-mirrored quantifier, perceptually) "I know who Norman Brook is." II 217 Answer/Hintikka: what counts as a conclusive answer? E.g. suppose someone responds "d". This is only conclusive if it provides the desired information, i.e. it makes it possible to tell the other truthfully: (5) I know that d has killed Ackroyd. Definition conclusive/conclusive answer/Hintikka: an answer is conclusive iff. (5) implies (4), for example: (5) I know that d has killed Ackroyd. (4) (Ex) I know that (x killed Ackroyd). Problem: normally the implication is valid, but it can be because "d" (on different occasions) does not refer to the same person. Knowledge/logical form: my knowledge that one or the other killed Ackroyd means that I have enough information... II 218 ... to exclude worlds (event developments), where one or the other (!) did not kill Ackroyd. Additional premises: I still need the information that one and the same person is the murderer in all my knowledge worlds. That is, that d takes out the same individual in all the worlds. That is, that there is an individual x such that in all these worlds d = x. (6) (Ex) I know that (d = x). This only provides a conclusive answer. Short: (7) I know who is d. N.B.: this criterion can be generalized. I 219 Question/answer/Hintikka: problems that have not been solved yet: (i) In addition to searching for a particular piece of information, the question implies restrictions on possible answers. (ii) The problem of logical omniscience remains. (iii) (1) can be expressed in other words: (8) (x) (x killed Ackroyd > (Ez) (z = x & I know that (z killed Ackroyd) ((s) universal quantification!) Everyday translation: i.e. the speaker does not only want to be aware of the identity of exactly one person who killed Ackroyd, but of all persons who ((s) killed Ackroyd). (iv) What are the conditions in the case of complex questions? II 220 (V) There are good answers that do not meet the criterion of coherence. How can partial information be defined which is provided in such cases? (vi) Representations such as (4) and (8) require that quantifiers and epistemic operators (e.g. "I know that") are transitive from each other so that they can be put into a linear order. Can this fail? II 221 Menon's Mystery/Menon/Platon/Socrates/Hintikka: II 222 Problem: it is a problem that a question can only be answered if the questioner already knows the answer. Solution/Hintikka: the "already" is deceptive: it is part of the answer to provide the accompanying information, so that the questioner can say afterwards truthfully, (13) (Ex) I know that (= x) Answer/Hintikka: a W-question has two functions: A) to answer the question and B) to provide supplementary information showing that the reply itself is conclusive. N.B.: i.e. that the questioner knows what the answer expression refers to after the answer has been given. II 223 Questions/answers/Hintikka: thesis: the semantics of questions and answers is fundamentally different from the semantics for (normal) isolated sentences. II 228 Additional construction/individuals/introduction/Menon/Hintikka: the Menon Dialogue shows how new individuals (or constructions) are introduced into the discourse. Here, e.g. extension of a smaller square to a double the size. >Questions, cf. >Commands. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Anthropomorphism | Comparative Psychology | Corr I 275 Anthropomorphism/comparative psychology/animals/Gosling: many people, especially those working in sciences, have been reluctant to concede that personality exists in non-human animals. Their concerns range from philosophical arguments regarding the uniqueness of humans to methodological concerns about the perils of anthropomorphism (Gosling 2001)(1). To address concerns about the existence of personality in animals, Gosling, Lilienfeld and Marino (2003(2); see also Gosling and Vazire 2002(3)). >Animals, >Animal studies, >Animal models, >Animal language, >Personality, >Personality traits, >S.D. Gosling, >K. Sterelny, >J. Proust, >D. Radner. 1. Gosling, S. D. 2001. From mice to men: what can we learn about personality from animal research?, Psychological Bulletin 127: 45–86 2. Gosling, S. D., Lilienfeld, S. O. and Marino, L. 2003. Personality, in D. Maestripieri (ed.), Primate psychology: the mind and behaviour of human and nonhuman primates, pp. 254–88. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 3. Gosling, S. D. and Vazire, S. 2002. Are we barking up the right tree? Evaluating a comparative approach to personality, Journal of Research in Personality 36: 607–14 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Art | Flusser | Rötzer I 58 Art/Flusser: Art making is about making something that has never been there before and therefore cannot be foreseen by any given program. Rötzer I 59 Rome is the seed that was planted by auctor Romulus in a wide field, Latium. The man (vir) dug a hole in the camp with his cane (aratrum). His masculine act (actio), i. e. the rape of the field leads to the possibility (virtualitas) of semen (semen) to develop into the reality of Rome (augere)... etc. The transfer of this myth to art brought a lot of things like genius, inspiration and uniqueness. Artists as all kinds of Romulusses. >Artists, >Genius, >Creativity. Rötzer I 64 Art/Flusser: Ghettos: Museums, Academies. The more untheoretical, empirical and more on good luck these people proceed, the better they are. At present, the craftsmen's revolution has come to an end. Division into capitalists and workers resigns. The meaning of life is no longer work but consumption. In contrast to the Middle Ages, leisure no longer serves to acquire wisdom; it is pointless, and therefore the whole of life is absurd. We expect art (which we understand as a creator of experience models) to give meaning to our leisure, but this task cannot be accomplished by theory-less authors. Rötzer I 65 As long as art could not be taken seriously, the authors could not only be tolerated, but their nonsense also came in handy. But now, when art has to be taken seriously, as in television, and because leisure is more and more recognized as a goal and the main component of life, the authors become dangerous to the public. --- Flusser I 11 Art/Flusser: for a Christian, everything is art (namely God's work). >Christianity, >Artifacts. For an enlightened philosopher of the 18th century, everything is nature (namely, in principle, explainable). >Enlightenment, >Explanation. I 11ff Art/Flusser: Separation of art and technology is the result of printing. Pictures become works of art as soon as they cease to be the dominant code. They only become "beautiful" because they can no longer be "good", "true". >Beauty, >Truth, >Images. This makes them opaque. Even if they hang on walls, they are also more than just "beautiful" they are models of different ways to experience the world. You do not have to accept the romantic ideology of art as a "revelation of reality" to see that when you look at a Goya, you get a different view of the world than when you look at Matisse. They are different ways of living. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991 |
| Behavior | Mayr | I 319 Behavior/Genes/Mayr: genes also contribute to the behavior and personality of man. E.g. mathematical gifts, craftsmanship, musicality, clumsiness. >Genes, >Personality, >Personality traits. I 323 Natural selection: if it only rewards self-interest, how could ethics and, for example, altruism develop? >Selection. Huxley was right with his presumption that the self-interest of the individual somehow contradicted the benefit of society. Cf. >Altruism. I 324 Def altruism: (Trivers, 1985)(1): action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. Altruism/Comte: Care for the welfare of others. >A. Comte. Altruism/Mayr: is not limited to cases of danger or harm to the altruist. Three things need to be distinguished (already Darwin): Selection/Individual: An individual is the object of selection in three respects: as an individual, as a family member (reproducer), and as member of a social group. The human dilemmas are only to be understood with regard to this triad. I 325 Altruism/Overall Suitability: is found in many animals, especially with parental care and large families. Defense of the offspring by the mother. This behavior is favored by natural selection, since it improves the fitness of the common genotype of the altruist and its beneficiaries. Selection of relatives. Indirectly rather self-serving. Seemingly altruistic. >Altruism. Some authors believe that human ethics replaced altruism directed towards overall suitability. Mayr: I recognize many actions directed toward overall suitability in the behavior of humans: for example mother's love, moral attitude towards strangers. However, only a small part of today's ethics systems. Social animals: possess a remarkable ability to recognize their relatives. I 327 Reciprocal altruism: in solitary animals. Synergy of two non-related animals for mutual benefit. E.g. cleaner wrasse, alliance of two individuals fighting a third. For primates: a kind of consideration: if I help this individual, it will help me. Perhaps a root of human morality. Human/Mayr: all the great achievements of mankind were accomplished by less than one per cent of the total population. Without reward and recognition our society would soon break apart. I 328 Human: The entire history of the hominids is characterized by strong group-selection (already Darwin). I 329 Altruism/Behavior/Mayr: In contrast to individual selection, group selection can reward genuine altruism and other virtues. Ethical behavior is adaptive in humans. >Adaption. Sociality: not all collections of animals are social. E.g. schools of young fish and the huge herds of African ungulates are not. Real altruism: can be extended to non-relatives. For example, baboons. Some hominids must have discovered that larger groups have more chances. I 330 Norms: To be able to apply group norms, the brain had to develop the ability to think. >Norms, >Thinking. Ethics: two conditions for ethical behavior (Simpson, 1969)(2): 1) There are alternatives 2) The alternatives can be assessed 3) The person can decide freely This means that consequences are anticipated and responsibility is assumed. >Responsibility, >Prediction. Ethics/Cause: it is not possible to determine the cause and effect of ethics. >Ethics, >Morals. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. G. G. Simpson (1969). On the Uniqueness of Man: Biology and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Cambridge Capital Controversy | Harcourt | Harcourt I 119 Cambridge Capital Controversy/Harcourt: (…) [the] discussions, (…), technically, relate to simple (!) questions such as: 'Can factor-price frontiers cross more than once?' and 'What is the shape of the factor-price frontier?' (…) >Factor price frontier, >Neo-neoclassicals, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Production function, >Aggregate production function, >R.M. Solow, >Joan Robinson. Harcourt: The controversies arise because of political and ideological differences between the two sides, differences which are thrown into sharp relief when the implications of the results of certain logical exercises become apparent. Neoclassicals/Keynesians: Both sides of the debate have examined heterogeneous capital-goods models in which any one technique of production does not allow substitution between factors, i.e. fixed input-output coefficients prevail and proportions of factors may vary only by going over to another technique as a result of changing factor prices.* The objects of the exercises differed as between the two groups. Harcourt I 120 Neo-Keynesianism: To the neo-Keynesians they represent an attack on the marginalist method, an attack which has been led, in spirit anyway, by Sraffa, who, (…) subtitled his book(1), Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, by which he meant marginalist theory. >Marginalism, >P. Sraffa. Neo-neoclassicals: To the other side, the object was to justify neoclassical marginalist procedures, an object which is not identical with one of providing a rigorous defence of the concepts of an aggregate production function and the associated input of 'capital'. Idealization/simplification/economic models: A puzzle that arises, nevertheless, is whether the stories associated with smooth, one-commodity, malleable capital models can 'stand in' as analogies for comparisons using these more 'realistic' models. The aggregate production function must now refer to the relationship between value capital and other variables within the whole set of techniques (though Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1968](2) have argued recently that the term, 'production function', should be confined to the engineering aspects of each technique, which seems to me a fudge based on hindsight). If the neoclassical stories as told, for example, by Swan [1956](5) and Solow [1957(4)] did in fact hold for heterogeneous capital-goods models, this would be an enormous simplification for economic theory and econometric specification alike (see Brown [1968(6), 1969(7)]). It is to this question that the double-switching debate is especially addressed. >Reswitching, >Economic models, >Idealization. * When input-output coefficients vary as between activities in any one technique, the aggregate factor proportions associated with a given technique may change in value. 1. Sraffa, Piero[1960] Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 2. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. 3. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 4. Solow, R. M. [1957] 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of economics and Statistics, xxxix, pp. 312-20. 5. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 6. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 7. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capital | Brown | Harcourt I 172 Capital/Brown/Harcourt: Brown [1966](1), (…) just because he wishes to retain maximizing behaviour, has suggested neoclassical exploitation as a compromise. Moreover, in his later papers [1968(2),1969(3)], while he accepts the logic of the neo-Keynesian critics, as an econometrician, he, possibly rightly and certainly understandably, tries to find common ground between linear models and neoclassical ones. He works out the conditions which ensure capital-intensity uniqueness (CIU) at an aggregate level in two two-sector models, one linear, the other neoclassical, i.e. one in which each sector has a well-behaved production function. The tools which he uses are substitution and composition effects (…). „The basic result that emerges from the neoclassical analysis is that the substitution and composition effects (as defined within that system) determine the uniqueness of the relationship between the aggregate labour-capital ratio and relative factor prices. The parallel is then taken: substitution-composition effects (as defined within the linear system) determine CIU as well as other things; and substitution-composition effects (as defined within the marginal productivity system) determine, uniquely, the aggregate capital-labour and factor-price relationship.“ (Brown [1969](3), p. 355.) Harcourt: This leads him to conjecture that answers to certain large questions may not be substantially different, a philosophy and strategy which, for obvious reasons, is akin to those of Solow on his busman's holiday. Solow/Harcourt: The latest statement of Solow's philosophy, one which is entirely consistent with his earlier ones, is as follows: „So far as I know, I have never in rigorous work adopted Pasinetti's 'unobtrusive' postulate - which is intimately connected with his special version of orthodox theory - that if one of two techniques is more profitable than the other at a higher real wage and less profitable at a lower wage it will have a higher value of capital goods per man. It is true that one-capital-good models behave that way, but they are merely cheap vehicles for interpreting data (which seem to behave that way).“ (Solow [1970](4), p. 424.) Harcourt I 173 Pasinetti: Pasinetti [1970](5), p. 429, rightly points out the 'surprisingly high proportion of current economic literature [that is] carried out in terms of "neoclassical production functions" and one-commodity-models', which, whether rigorous or not, certainly do depend for their validity on the 'unobtrusive postulate'. Secondly, he points to the 'ancients' and 'moderns' who also have used the 'unobtrusive postulate' in order to get an index of scarcity in a general equilibrium system, and so a marginal productivity theory of capital. For: „It made 'capital' appear to be like a scarce resource, and the rate of profits to be like any other general-equilibrium price - an index of scarcity. It is this construction that has fallen down. For that unobtrusive postulate was essential to it.“ (Pasinetti [1970](5), p. 429.) Demand/Ferguson/Allen: Ferguson and Allen [1970](6) have carefully analysed the conditions under which the construction does break down when changes in the composition of demand due to changes in relative product prices are taken into account. They derive some comfort from their results. Their approach seems open to at least two criticisms. First, as they candidly admit, they use a model which favours the neoclassical position, as intermediate goods are ignored and the capital good is the only basic. Secondly, they do not investigate whether the changes in the composition of demand are consistent with their assumption of full employment. Moreover, as their analysis consists only of comparisons, their appeal to the facts to decide seems to be beside the point. RobinsonVsBrown/RobinsonVsSolow: Joan Robinson [1970a(7), 1970b(8)], of course, would accept neither Brown nor Solow's approach, nor Samuelson's rationalization of it. To her, Samuelson's surrogate production function, even though it allows the simple parables to be told, does so only in the form of comparisons, so that it remains a spoof-a pseudo-production function. Only when capital is actually jelly (or leets) can substitution and the other neoclassical processes occur and full employment of all factors be maintained in competitive economies. But, in her view, such constructions assume away all the real difficulties associated with the existence of heterogeneous capital goods and the implications of the disappointed expectations of atomistic economic actors in competitive situations. 1. Brown, Murray [1966] 'A Measure of the Change in Relative Exploitation of Capital and Labor', Review of Economics and Statistics, XLvm, pp. 182-92. 2. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 3. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. 4. Solow, R M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 5. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. 6. Ferguson, C. E. and Allen, Robert F. [1970] 'Factor Prices, Commodity Prices, and the Switches of Technique', Western Economic Journal, vin, pp. 95-109. 7. Robinson, Joan, [1970a] 'Capital Theory Up to Date', Canadian Journal of Economics, in, pp. 309-17. 8. Robinson, Joan, [1970b] 'Review of C. E. Ferguson, The Neoclassical Theory of Production and Distribution, 1969', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 336-9. |
BrownMurray I Murray Brown On the theory and measurement of technological change Cambridge 1968 PolBrown I Wendy Brown American Nightmare:Neoliberalism, neoconservativism, and de-democratization 2006 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capital Reversing | Harcourt | Harcourt I 118 Reswitching/double-switching/reverse capital/Harcourt: (…) the results of neoclassical marginal productivity theory have played a key role in both the theory of economic growth and the econometric studies of the post-war period. >Marginal Product of Capital, >Economic growth/Solow. The easiest illustration of this proposition is the essential part which the equality of marginal products with factor rewards plays in the development of the arguments in Swan's famous model of economic growth (Swan [1956](1)), and in Solow's influential - and equally famous - article on technical progress and the aggregate production function, Solow [1957](2). Double-switching: This methodology has been continuously under attack and the latest (and sharpest) arrows in the quivers of the neo-Keynesian critics are the results of the double-switching debate. Reverse capital: Not all of these are, however, related to the phenomenon of double-switching itself; a related phenomenon, capital-reversing, also plays a key role: see, especially, Garegnani [1970a(3), 1970b(4)], Bliss [1970](5), Pasinetti [1969(6), 1970(7)]. >Neo-neoclassicals, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Production function. Harcourt I 120 If the neoclassical stories as told, for example, by Swan [1956](1) and Solow [1957(2)] did in fact hold for heterogeneous capital-goods models, this would be an enormous simplification for economic theory and econometric specification alike (see Brown [1968(8), 1969(9)]). It is to this question that the double-switching debate is especially addressed. >Economic models, >Idealization. 1. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 2. Solow, R. M. [1957] 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of economics and Statistics, xxxix, pp. 312-20. 3. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 4. Garegnani, P. [1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 5. Bliss, C. J. Comment on Garegnani, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 37, Issue 3, July 1970, Pages 437–438, 6. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 7. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. 8. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 9. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Colour | Wright | I 164 Color/Supervenience/Wright: Color supervenes other physical properties: E.g. there is a chaotic variety of physical conditions which is illustrated by scarlet things. >Supervenience. This conception is therefore weaker than that according to which color words have the semantics of concepts for natural kinds. >Stronger/weaker, >Natural kinds. It's the commitment to the idea that physically identical objects share their color, even if one of the objects offers the "best" conditions and the others don't. This supervenience is therefore, as it were, a force towards the uniqueness of color concepts. >Unabiguity, >Colour words. I 169 Color/Wright: However, I do not want to go so far as to assert that color predicates are semantically concepts for natural kinds. That would also be inconsistent with the thesis that the extension is partially determined by the best opinion. >Best explanation/Wright. Color/Wright: for our everyday understanding of color words there is no such risk (that there is nothing red): if it turned out that there are no interesting physical properties that red things have in common, then we learn by that that red things are, in fact, not a natural species, but that there are still indeed infinitely many red things. >Generality. This statement is, however, entirely consistent with the belief that red things do indeed have interesting physical properties in common! >Similarity, >Properties. The explanatory intuition does not have to be more than an epiphenomenon of the presumed accuracy of the conviction that something in which redness physically consists actually exists and that it is one of the reasons for the fact that there are best judgments about that which is red. >Euthyphro contrast/Wright, >Epiphenominology. --- II 247 Color Predicates/sorites/vagueness/Wright: a color word is not like "two meters long", but "less than two meters" (length ranges). Criterion: still measuring! But we can also say without measuring what the result would be. Solution/Wright: Actual distinction between cases where we can judge by eyesight, and cases where we cannot - then still observation predicates - which other base should this distinction provide? Crispin Wright: thesis: the methodological approach must be completely behavioristic and anti-reflexive. >Behaviorism, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Judgments. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Comparisons | Allen | Colin Allen und Eric Saidel Die Evolution der Referenz in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg.) Der Geist der Tiere, Frankfurt 2005 I 332 Uniqueness/Allen/Saidel: uniquenss does not result in incomparability! E.g. even if hummingbirds have unique properties, it is not pointless to compare their wings with those of other birds or insects. |
Allen I Colin Allen Eric Saidel "The Evilution of Reference", in: The Evolution of Mind, C. Allen and D. Dellarosa Cummins (Eds.) Oxford 1998, pp. 183-203 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Concepts | Schiffer | I 63 Def Individual concept/Naturally/Russell: "the P" that is the property of unambiguously having P - nothing else has it - may contain yourself and the present moment. >Individual concept. Definite description: the thing that is now R (relation) for me = reduction to thoughts de re. >Description, >Definite description. (EP) (Emily instantiates the P and the B (Ralph The proposition >Individuation, >Uniqueness, cf. >One. I 66 Problem/Schiffer: that is not sufficient for believing that something is a dog, because you can believe that something belongs to a biological genotype, without believing that it is a dog. >Elm Trees/Beech Trees. Wrong: "species of these things" - could be mammal, pet, male, spaniel etc. >Reference class. Complete content: is never of biological nature: it does not work with children. - E.g. shepherd dog is more wolf-like than a poodle. I 68 Not a metalingual individual concept: "What experts call a dog": 1) not manageable 2) no property that only dogs have. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Consciousness | Brentano | Chisholm I 130 Unity of Consciousness/Brentano(1): if a person imagines something, or at the same time imagines several objects, he also recognizes at the same time the simultaneity of both. For example, if one hears a melody, he hears the one tone as present while he perceives the other as past. ... in which of the experiences is the idea of their simultaneity? In none! >Imagination. On the contrary, it is clear that the inner cognition of the one with the other belongs to the same real unity. I 131 Consciousness/Chisholm/Unity/Brentano/Chisholm: suggests the following principle: if it is certain for x that it is F and also that it is G, then it is also certain that it is F and G. Cf. >Perception/Kant. This seems unquestionable on the basis of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. ChisholmVs: it seems to be too strict, however. Kant: the subject, does not need to unite the ideas, it only needs to appear that it could. If it is true for x that it is F, and also that it is G, and it is considering the question whether it is both F and G, then it is certain for it. I 132 This also applies to proposed premises. 1. F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Hamburg, 1973, p. 227f --- Chisholm II 269 Consciousness/Brentano/Hedwig: Brentano has never admitted the psychological abyss of consciousness, but always insisted on the uniqueness of thinking. Chisholm II = Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Ed.), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Continuity | Ranke | Gadamer I 213 Continuity/History/Ranke/Gadamer: Ranke recognizes it as the most distinguished difference of the oriental and occidental system that in the Occident historical continuity forms the form of existence of culture(1). In this respect it is not arbitrary that the unity of world history is based on the unity of the occidental cultural world, to which occidental science in general and history as science in particular belong. Nor is it arbitrary that this Western culture is shaped by Christianity, which has its absolute moment in the uniqueness of the event of redemption. Ranke acknowledged something of this when he saw the reinstatement of man into the "immediacy to God" in the Christian religion, which he placed in a romantic way at the primeval beginning of all history(2). But (...) the fundamental meaning of this fact has not fully come to bear in the philosophical reflection of the historical view of the world (...). Continuity/Historism/Gadamer: So the empirical attitude of the historical school is not without philosophical preconditions either. What remains is the merit of the astute methodologist Droysen who removed it from its empirical disguise and recognised its fundamental significance. >Continuity/History/Droysen, >Interrelation/Ranke, >Unity/Ranke. 1. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 1, 270f. 2. Vgl. Hinrichs, Ranke und die Geschichtstheologie der Goethezeit, S. 239f. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Definitions | Gadamer | Gadamer I 419 Definition/Gadamer: (...) what is a term? A word, the meaning of which is clearly delimited, provided that it means a defined term. A term is always something artificial, provided that either the word itself is artificially formed or - the more frequent case - a term already in use is cut out of the fullness and breadth of its meanings and fixed to a certain conceptual sense. >Words, >Word Meaning, >Definability, >Uniqueness. In contrast to the life of meaning of the words of spoken language, of which Wilhelm von Humboldt rightly showed(1) that a certain range of fluctuation is essential to it, the term is a frozen word and the terminological use of a word is an act of violence perpetrated on language. >Language use, >Language, >Meaning change, >Meaning. Ancient Philosophy/Terminology/Gadamer: Even as an interpreter of scientific texts, one will (...) always have to reckon with the coexistence of the terminological and the freer use of a word(2). Modern interpreters of ancient texts tend easily to underestimate this demand, because the term is more artificial and insofar more fixed in modern scientific use than in antiquity, which does not yet know any foreign and few artificial words. >Hermeneutics, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. 1. W. v. Humboldt, Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus, p. 9. 2. One should consider here, for example, the Aristotelian usage of phronesis, whose sub-minological occurrence endangers the certainty of developmental conclusions, as I once tried to show against W. Jaeger (Cf. Der aristotelische Protreptikos, Hermes 1928, p. 146ff.). (Cf. now in vol. 5 der Ges. Werke, p. 164—186.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Definitions | Tarski | Skirbekk I 186 Def definition/Tarski: one says of a propositional function that it defines a given object, if this is the only object that satisfies this function.(1) >Propositional functions, >Distinctiveness, >Uniqueness, >Unambiguity. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Demonstratives | Demonstratives: E.g. this, that, that one. Problems in language use bcause of lack of clarity when referring back to prior description. - In logic missing expressibility of uniqueness. See also anaphora, deixis, relations, logical proper names, index words, indexicality, iota operator. |
||
| Denotation | Hintikka | II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation of 1905 is that it is the quantifiers which denote! >Quantifiers. Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") thesis: the theory of denotation contains the reduction of denotation on objects of acquaintance. >Acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this connection is amazing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance. Unambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. >Existential generalization. E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are permitted, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is indeed a primary event, that is, his example (2). "Whether"/"if"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: Russell and Hintikka wanted to know if "instead of" "did not know". Secondary Denotation/Russell: one can also say that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley if he was Scott. >Waverley-example. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects? Knowledge who/what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a to-know-who does not exist. >Identification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Denotation | Russell | Hintikka I 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for real constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of the substitutability of the identity (SI) in intensional contexts. >Substitution, >Identity/Frege, >Opacity, >Intensionality, >Intension. Informative identity/Frege: that identity can sometimes be informative at all is related to this. ((s) Explanation: uninfromative identity. a0a - informative identity: a=b; the same object under a different description.) EG/existential generalization/Russell: it, too, can fail in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). >Existential generalization, >Nonexistence. HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather avoids the problems with denotating terms. The present King/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: but there are other problems. (See below: because of the ambiguity of the cross-world identification). >Cross world identification. Hintikka I 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers who denote! >Quantifiers. Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance. >Theory of descriptions/Russell. I 174 Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance. >Acquaintance. Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know". Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. I 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects? Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist. >Ambiguity. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Descriptions | Lewis | I (a) 10 Description/Lewis: it always is also about the meaning of the terms used. - Therefore, it is pointless to point out several differences. Description: a true sentence about things of any kind as such is not about those things by themselves, but about them together with the meaning of the expressions you use. It is therefore useless to point out various differences. In the case of >identity theory, we can explain these differences without denying the body/mind identity. Detailed descriptions lead to deviations due to the expressions used. IV 240 Definite Description/Lewis: necessary: something outstanding, relative prominence - not: uniqueness. - The prominence changes constantly during the conversation. Denotation by a definite description then depends on the score keeping. >Scorekeeping model. Alignment rule: Prominence of an object is affected by the course of the conversation. Boundaries/Lewis: it is easier to expand the boundaries than to narrow them. --- I (b) 26/27 Failed descriptions are not meaningless. (Putnam: the theoretical terms of a refuted theory are meaningless.) LewisVsPutnam: they are not, if they are similar failed descriptions. "The Mars moon" and "The Venus moon" name nothing here in our real world (in any normal way); but they are not meaningless, because we know very well what they denote in certain other possible worlds. >Senseless/ Sensible, >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Descriptions | Russell | Cresswell I 117 Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental objects. Geach I 61 Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer. Newen I 90 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scott (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity. Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided. I 92 N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world. >Fregean sense, >Truth value gap. Russell I VIII E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott. I 46 Descriptions/Russell: are always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features. >Function/Russell. I 96 Description/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> ?concept=Definitions">definition, definability). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flor III 122 Descriptions/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.) >Incomplete symbol, >Names. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Distribution Theory | Neo-Neoclassical Economics | Harcourt I 170 Distribution theory/Value theory/Neo-neoclassicalsVsMarx/Harcourt: The neo-neoclassicals have produced a string of rebuttals ((s)to Joan Robinson’s remarks on Value theory). >Distribution/Value theory/Robinson. Rate of profit/demand: First, they argue that no one, these days, tries, or ever did try, to determine the rate of profits or other prices within the production system alone. After all, the neoclassical marginalist 'revolution' was concerned with first the prior, and then the equal, importance of the blade of scissors known as 'demand'. Measurement of capital: Secondly, they could refer to Bliss's arguments (…), and to the statements by Hahn and Matthews [1964](1) at the end of their survey of the theory of economic growth. Thus: „As far as pure theory is concerned the 'measurement of capital' is no problem at all because we never have to face it if we do not choose to. With our armchair omniscience we can take account of each machine separately. Moreover the measurement business has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of whether imputation theory is or is not valid. In an equilibrium of the whole system provided there is perfect competition, no learning by doing and no uncertainty, the neoclassical imputation results hold. Harcourt I 171 This should now be beyond dispute. It is also of little comfort to the empirically inclined.“ (p. 888.) „Returning once more to the question of the validity or otherwise of imputation theory there is a further, purely theoretical, point of some importance to be made. When an economy with many goods is considered, then we must also find the relative equilibrium prices of these goods. Whether these are determined a la Leontief-Samuelson-Sraffa or a la Walras, imputation is at once involved. If we abandon imputation entirely then the whole question of relative prices must be reconsidered afresh. Perhaps it ought to be, but recognition that this problem exists seems desirable“.(p. 889.) >Relative prices. Harcourt: (…) [the neo-neoclassicals] could refer to Samuelson's opening remarks in Samuelson [1962](2), (…) and Solow's closing ones, Solow [1970](3). That is to say, they would dismiss an aggregative approach to a rigorous theory of distribution - and capital - (though not, necessarily, one to econometrics). They could next invoke Swan's appendix, Swan [1956](4), and Champernowne's original paper [1953-4](5). In the latter, when doubleswitching is allowed to occur, the production function is multi-valued, i.e. the same q is associated with two or more values of k. Factors of production/factor price: Nevertheless, factors are paid their marginal products. Labour/capital/ Champernowne: However, 'the question of which (r, w) and hence what income-distribution between labour and capital is paid is left in this model for political forces to decide' (p. 130) - surely one of the most perceptive comments of the whole debate? (At the (double) switch points, one technique is coming in at one point, leaving at the other, as it were; which, then, is the relevant one to determine distribution?) Champernowne adds: 'It is interesting to speculate whether more complex situations retaining this feature are ever found in the real world.' Harcourt I 172 To the neo-neoclassical answer that the existence or not of an aggregate production function or of a well-behaved demand curve for capital at economy (or industry level) has nothing to do with marginal productivity relations, some critics (Kaldor [1966](6), Nell [1967b](7)) might reply: Your logic may be impeccable but your results are, nevertheless, irrelevant for the world as we know it, and especially for an explanation of distribution, i.e. they would reject maximizing behaviour as a fundamental postulate of economic analysis (see Solow [1968](8) also). This raises a puzzle in the analysis of choice of technique where most writers, including Sraffa, explicitly assume maximizing behaviour. Kaldor: Kaldor, of course, does not; his analysis is based upon the implications of businessmen following rules of thumb such as the pay-off period criterion. Brown: Brown [1966](9), on the other hand, just because he wishes to retain maximizing behaviour, has suggested neoclassical exploitation as a compromise. Moreover, in his later papers [1968(10),1969(11)], while he accepts the logic of the neo-Keynesian critics, as an econometrician, he, possibly rightly and certainly understandably, tries to find common ground between linear models and neoclassical ones. He works out the conditions which ensure capital-intensity uniqueness (CIU) at an aggregate level in two two-sector models, one linear, the other neoclassical, i.e. one in which each sector has a well-behaved production function. >Capital/Brown. 1. Hahn, F. H. and Matthews, R. C. O. [1964] 'The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey', Economic Journal, LXXIV, pp. 779-902. 2. Samuelson, P.A. [1962] 'Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function', Review of Economic Studies, xxix, pp. 193-206. 3. Solow, R M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 4. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 5.Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 6. Kaldor, N. [1966] 'Marginal Productivity and the Macro-Economic Theories of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 309-19. 7. Nell, E. J. [1967b] 'Theories of Growth and Theories of Value', Economic Development and Cultural Change, xvi, pp. 15-26. 8. Solow, R. M. [1968] 'Distribution in the Long and Short Run', The Distribution of National Income, ed. by Jean Marchal and Bernard Ducros (London: Macmillan), pp. 449-75. 9. Brown, Murray [1966] 'A Measure of the Change in Relative Exploitation of Capital and Labor', Review of Economics and Statistics, XLvm, pp. 182-92. 10. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 11. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Egocentrism | Elkind | Upton I 123 Egocentrism/adolescence/Elkind/Upton: [during adolescence there is a] change in cognitive skills is reflected in the growing ability of adolescents to handle increasingly complex scientific and mathematical concepts. This new way of thinking also underlies the ability of the adolescent to engage in introspection and self-reflection, which, according to some theorists, results in heightened self-consciousness (Elkind. 1978)(1). >Adolescence, >Cognitive development, >Stages of development. Elkind called this phenomenon adolescent egocentrism, suggesting that this governs the way in which adolescents think about social matters. According to this theory, adolescents believe that others are as interested in them as they are in themselves and in their sense of personal uniqueness. Two aspects of adolescent egocentrism have been described: - The imaginary audience: this is where adolescents believe themselves to be ‘at centre stage’. Everyone else’s attention is riveted on them. - The personal fable: this underpins the adolescent sense of personal uniqueness and invincibility. No one else can possibly understand how they really feel; furthermore, although others may be vulnerable to misfortune, they are not. 1. Elkind, D (1978) Understanding the young adolescent. Adolescence, 13(49): 127-34. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Emotion System | Cosmides | Corr I 61 Emotion system/evolution/Tooby/Cosmides: Applied to emotional dispositions, Tooby and Cosmides’ argument (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(1) is that, if differences in emotionality (e.g., low versus high fearfulness) had been subject to selection pressure, they would not have prevailed over evolutionary times but would have converged to an optimal level of emotionality (e.g., medium fearfulness). VsTooby/VsCosmides: However, as noted by Penke, Denissen and Miller (2007)(2), inter-individual differences in emotionality could have evolved if, as seems plausible, a generally optimal level of fearfulness, irascibility, etc. did not exist in our evolutionary past, but different levels of emotionality were most adaptive in different environments or social niches. >Emotion system/psychological theories. 1. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 2. Penke, L., Denissen, J. J. A. and Miller, G. F. 2007. The evolutionary genetics of personality, European Journal of Personality 21: 549–87 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotion System | Psychological Theories | Corr I 56 Emotion System/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: the emotion system seems to consist at its core of a mechanism that (1) monitors the relevance of cognized events for the person’s desires or motives, and (2) communicates detected motive-relevant changes to other personality sub-systems and simultaneously proposes particular action goals (Frijda 1994(1); Reisenzein 2009(2)). A person can to a considerable degree decide to heed versus ignore the ‘suggestions’ made by her emotions, as well as control or regulate the emotions themselves. As Frijda (1986(3) put it, ‘people not only have emotions, they also handle them’. >Emotions, >Emotional intelligence, >Behavior, >Self-knowledge, >Consciousness Corr I 60/61 it is widely accepted today that emotions have adaptive effects, which were the reason why the emotion system (at least its core) emerged in evolution. This raises the question of whether individual differences in emotionality (e.g., fearfulness or irascibility) are likewise, at least in part, the product of natural selection. Although there is now strong evidence for the partial heritability of the Big Five (e.g., Bouchard (2004)(4) and hence for the heritability of basic inter-individual differences in emotionality, this does not imply that these heritable inter-individual differences are adaptive. adaptive. On the contrary, it has been argued that the very existence of heritable variation in a trait signals a lack of adaptive significance (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(5). >emotion system/Tooby, >emotion system/Cosmides. 1. Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, pp. 112–36. Oxford University Press 2. Reisenzein, R. 2009. Emotions as metarepresentational states of mind: naturalizing the belief-desire theory of emotion, Cognitive Systems Research 10: 6–20 3. Frijda, N. H. 1986. The emotions. Cambridge University Press, p. 401 4. Bouchard, T. J. Jr. 2004. Genetic influence on human psychological traits, Current Directions in Psychological Science 13: 148–51 5. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotion System | Tooby | Corr I 61 Emotion system/evolution/Tooby/Cosmides: Applied to emotional dispositions, Tooby and Cosmides’ argument (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(1) is that, if differences in emotionality (e.g., low versus high fearfulness) had been subject to selection pressure, they would not have prevailed over evolutionary times but would have converged to an optimal level of emotionality (e.g., medium fearfulness). VsTooby/VsCosmides: However, as noted by Penke, Denissen and Miller (2007)(2), inter-individual differences in emotionality could have evolved if, as seems plausible, a generally optimal level of fearfulness, irascibility, etc. did not exist in our evolutionary past, but different levels of emotionality were most adaptive in different environments or social niches. >Emotion system/psychological theories. 1. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 2.Penke, L., Denissen, J. J. A. and Miller, G. F. 2007. The evolutionary genetics of personality, European Journal of Personality 21: 549–87 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Epistemic Logic | Hintikka | II 11 Epistemic Logic/standard/Hintikka: there are usually extremely many alternatives that are compatible with what a person b knows. But it is not necessary to demand that all such worlds are really within the domain of permitted alternatives. >Possible worlds. II 12 Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: it is not clear how we should assess the situation A) Vs Restriction of the individual domain: since the restriction can hardly be avoided in alethic standard modal logic, this is again an argument against the possibility of alethic modal logic. B) One could affirm the idea that not all epistemic and doxastically possible worlds must be logically possible. II 17 Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: epistemic logic is usually regarded as a branch of modal logic. Semantics of possible worlds/possible world/semantics/Hintikka: the semantics of a possible world is a misleading term for the semantics of epistemic logic. Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: most of the work focuses on syntactic questions and deductive techniques. This is a mistake. Instead: One should focus on semantic (model-theoretical) questions. Epistemic Logic/laws/Hintikka: the basic laws are obtained by a simple idea: Def knowledge/Hintikka: knowledge is what enables the knowing person to concentrate on the subset W1 of the set of all worlds W. W1: W1 is then relative not only to the knowing person b, but also relative to the scenario w0 ε W. Definition b knows that S iff. S is true in all epistemic b alternatives. II 143 Uniqueness Condition/W-questions/response/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a who-question (ambiguous, see above) is first that (8) has to imply (7) (6) Who is the man over there? (7) I know who the man is over there. E.g. It is Sir Norman Brook. (8) I know that the man there is Sir Norman Brook. Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG). >Existential generalization. II 144 Problem: for that, we need an additional premise. E.g. (13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x). (Non-mirrored quantifier, perceptually) "I know who Norman Brook is." Epistemic Logic/criterion/Hintikka: with this the epistemic logic freely provides an additional criterion for complete answers. N.B.: this applies to both methods of identification (public/perspective). Uniqueness condition: for the fact that e.g. "the man over there" is a clear and complete answer to (9): (14) (∃x) Kl (that the man there = x) That is, that the man who is pointed to is as an aquaintance of the one who asks the questions. >Acquaintance. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Events | Simons | I 129 Event/occurrents/Simons: events or processes are like continuants in time, but with temporal parts. No identity conditions can be specified. Continuants cannot be eliminated. Brutus-events cannot be seperated into individual events without reference to Brutus. I 131 Event/part/mereology/Simons: spatially and temporally extended events may have parts that are neither purely temporal nor purely spatial, e.g. the part of the football match which is attributable to a single player. Range/span/spn(e): a range or span is a spatiotemporal localization. "Being in": means within larger regions. "Covering": means covering exactly the part. Def spread/spr[e]: a spread is an exact space. Def spell/sp[e]: spell refers to an exact time. Atomic: if pan and spread = 0. Connected: two events are connected, if their span (consisting of span and spell) are topologically connected. Def temporal part: the temporal part contains all simultaneously occurring parts of the event (analog spatial part). Def phase: a phase has temporally related part. Def disc: a disc is a phase with duration 0. Def segment: a segment is a spatially related spatial part. Def section: a section is a segment with expansion 0. I 134 Sum/event/mereology/Simon: for sums of events, it is different than for sums of objects: if events are causally isolated, they cannot form a sum. However, they can be part of a wider whole (they may have an upper limit). Events do not satisfy the full mereology, but the weaker axioms. I 182 Product/events/Simons: problem: the products can exist interrupted. E.g. two objects could alternate between overlapping and separateness, e.g. light spots on a screen, e.g. two bodies share at a time certain members, at others times not. Problem: in the latter case the same product may arise again, but with other elements. >Interrupted Existence. I 183 The change of products requires topological terms. I 182 Coincidence/events: the lack of extensionality allows only one proof of coincidence instead of uniqueness. I 281 Event/reduction/reductionism/Forbes/Simons: events are open to a reduction in such a way as continuants are not, therefore, it is questionable whether there are irreducible truths de re about events ((s) that cannot be traced back to anything else). Essentialism: but as events are also real objects, there should also be essential truth about them. Problem: they are specified by descriptions. Simons: thesis: pro essentialism for events: e.g. the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by principle contains both essentially. E.g. bomb instead of firearm: is a different murder but not with swapped bullets. I 282 It is essential for an event that it is exactly part of those events, of which it is part at this point of time. Different: four-dimensionalism: it does not obey the essentialism. I 305 Event/continuants/Simons: event a: here a formula like "a < b" is complete. Continuants: here we need additionally a time index (with quantification): "ž(Et)[a |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Explanation | Mayr | I 99 Biology: Questions: e.g. unique events: "Why are there no hummingbirds in the old world"? E.g. "Where did Homo sapiens begin?" This leads to historical representation as the only possible form. This approach is fundamentally different from the explanation by means of causal laws. One can never categorically prove that a historical representation is "true". >Single-case causation, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >History, >Historiography. I 100 Reproducibility/Science: the uniqueness is not reserved for the living nature! E.g. each of the nine planets is unique. Every mountain range and stream has unique features on the earth. Hume/Science: cannot say anything satisfying about the cause of any unique phenomenon. >Causes, >Effect, >Causality/Hume. MayrVsHume: the historical representation can often explain unique events satisfactorily and sometimes even make verifiable predictions. >History/Mayr). I 101 History/Causation/Mayr: earlier events usually contribute causally to later ones. "Particularistic causality". I 103 Biology/explanation/Mayr: here we often find more than a causal explanation. Perhaps one has to explain most of the phenomena of biology even with several theories! A theory of science that cannot cope with pluralism is unsuitable for biology. >Theories. I 166 Explanation/biology: by direct causes: molecular biology, functional morphology, developmental biology, physiological genetics Indirect: evolutionary biology, classical genetics, ethology, systematics, comparative morphology, ecology. Problem: separation of morphology and genetics. Overlaps. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Folk Psychology | Schiffer | I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs simultaneously. >Functional role, >Belief. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green). Then both have the same T#-correlated functional role. (T* = folk psychology). >Meaning theory/Loar, cf. >Homophony. I 276 Here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. >Uniqueness condition. It is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. "If p is true, one believes that p". N.b. "p" exists inside and outside the belief context. Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. >Opaque context. I 34 All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Schiffer: Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception. I 38 BurgeVsFolk Psychology/BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. In w he has a correct use of "Arthrite". Then he has in w not the believe that he has arthrite in his thigh - (because this belief is false). N.b.: in w he is in exactly the same T*-correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false. >Functionalism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Formal Language | Formal language: a language that usually consist of a set of symbols (icons for a defined domain of objects) and rules regarding their linkage. Purposes of formalization are brevity, uniqueness and versatility in applications like programming, automation, mathematics et al. See also domains, symbols, signs, language, recursion, rules, systems. |
||
| Formal Language | Strawson | I 250 Ideal language/Quine/Strawson: here without singular term, extended theory of descriptions, but no subject expression as a genuine proper name. Instead subject: existence sentences with uniqueness condition. Uniqueness: "There is something that is the only F". I 251 Incomplete: "There is something that is the only F and that..." An expression of the normal language is a subject expression if it resolves into a quantified assertion plus relative pronoun in ideal language. It is a predicate expression if it does not resolve in this way. Now all expressions introducing a particular resolve (in the way mentioned) and therefore cannot be anything else than logical subject expressions. >Introduction/Strawson, >Universals/Strawson. Some expressions that introduce universals can also resolve, but others cannot. Therefore, universals can occur either as subjects, or as predicates. Quine's main concern is to ensure, if possible, that universals appear only as predicates. He calls this "nominalism". >Nominalism/Quine, >Universals/Quine, >Conceptualism/Quine. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Functional Role | Schiffer | I 21 Functional Property/Schiffer: the concept of the functional property is derived from the notion of a functional role. Def functional role/Schiffer: simply any property 2nd order, of a state-type 2nd order. Its possession means that the possession of this state-type is causal or counterfactual to other state-types, namely, to output, input, distal objects and their properties. 1. A given physical state-type has an indeterminate number of functional roles. 2. Two different physical state-types may have the same functional role. Def functional property/Schiffer: each functional role uniquely determines a functional property-If F is an f role, then the functional property is expressed by the open sentence: x is a token of a state-type which has F. ((s) The functional property is a token of the physical state-type which has this and the role. In short: property = to be token of the type with the role.) Schiffer: Type here is always "physically"). >Type/Token. Properties belong to tokens - roles belong to types. E.g. the neural state-type H (hunger) has different functional roles in different people, because it is not triggered for all by pizza smell (various inputs.) >Input/output. I 23 Then you can correlate propositions with functional roles and a belief-property with a functional property. - For every proposition p, there is a functional role F so that a belief that p = to be a state token of the state-type that has the role F. >Propositions. I 26 The criterion that a state-token n is a belief that p that n is a token of a state-type which has the functional role, which is correlated with the definition of Bel T p. I 29 Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. ((s) e.g. "believes..."). >Propositional attitudes. I 30 Folk Psychology: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves 2. input conditions for perception (cannot be part of the common knowledge) 3. output conditions for actions. Problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology. >Generalization. I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows # (that snow is = Bel T#(that grass is green) - then both have the same T-correlated functional role. >Brian Loar. I 276 N.b.: although the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. - It is not sufficient for: that one is in a particular belief-state that is linked to them: E.g. "if p is true, one believes that p." N.B.: "p" occurs inside and outside of the belief context - therefore, the theory will say something unique about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. >Uniqueness condition. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. I 34 All that does not differentiate the belief that dinosaurs are extinct, from that, that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Problem: there is a lack of input: "rules that do not relate to perception". I 35 Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: folk psychology must be false because in the twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. >Twin earth. E.g. Ralph believes there are cats - twin earth-Ralph believes - "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats). Therefore twin earth-Ralph does not believe that there are cats - i.e. so two different beliefs but same functional role. Twin earth-Ralph is in the same neural state-type N - the specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth-Ralph. N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology). Outside the folk psychology: "every token of "cat" is triggered by the sight of a cat". Wrong solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". Thhis cannot be a necessary condition - in addition there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for one's own truth. VsDescription: no solution: "The thing in front of me". >Acquaintance. I 38 f Tyler Burge: no functional role can determine what one believes (this is not about the twin earth, but wrongly used terms). I 286f Belief/SchifferVsLoar: problem: his realization of a theory of belief/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states) whose functional roles are determined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role instead of a lot of roles. Schiffer: thesis: that will not work, therefore the Quine/Field argument is settled. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Functions | Mates | I 56 Functions/Mates: A function is a subset of the two-place relations. - Although the converse is a function, the function is one to one. - You need to define equal cardinality. >Sets, >Set theory, >Relations, >Uniqueness, >Definitions, >Definability. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Geometry | Inhetveen | Thiel I 287 Geometry/Protogeometry/Inhetveen/Thiel: Often, an "operational" model of geometry is mentioned, whereby it must be taken into account that the properties thus acquired can only be realized if they are idealized. (> Accuracy). --- I 288 There is an attempt of a "protogeometry": "a circular-free method of size comparison" (Inhetveen) In order to satisfy the circular freedom, we have to deal without the need for recourse to geometrical "devices" in the production of forms on bodies. --- I 289 The simplest operation with two bodies K1 and K2 is to bring them into contact with each other. The relation of the touch is symmetrical. Two bodies each have at least one possible contact point. Further bodies K3 and K4 can then always be constructed, so that K3 contacts K1 at the point where K2 previously did this. "Imitation", "Replace". Inhetveen has called this the "weak transitivity". The subjungat requires three rather than two antecedents. Definition "weaker"/Thiel: weaker means in mathematics less prerequisite. --- I 289/290 We extend our regulations to the touching of two bodies, not only at individual points, but in all parts of a given surface part. The bodies (Definition) "fit" then in these pieces. These formulas are statements about bodies, but they are not sentences about bodies that we have before us in our body world. In this way, we make statements about the production targets we are pursuing. Inhetveen describes it as "aphairetic" (from drawing, taking away) criteria for the quality of a technical realization. They lie protogeometrically before the theory of geometric forms. --- I 290/291 Now there are the terms of the "fitting" as well as derived from that one of the original and imprint. Fit: "protogeometrically congruent". For technical purposes, however, one would not only like to be able to shape bodies in such a way that they fit one another, but also fit a third one. Or that each of them fits the other. Definition weak transitivity of the fitting: every body must match a copy of itself (since it cannot be brought to itself in a situation of fitting). Definition "copy stable": the definition says nothing about how a body is made to fit with any copy, and in fact it can happen in different ways .... + ... I 291 --- I 293 Folding axes, rotational symmetry, mirror symmetry are derived protogeometrically. Terms: "flat", "technical line" (=edge), "complementary", "supplementary wedges", "tipping", "edge". (...) The methods are considered. The transition from protogeometry to geometry takes place in two abstraction steps. We do not look at the methods and consider the results in geometry. --- I 299 No reference is made to tools. By the way, there are devices that are more effective than compasses and rulers: two "right-angle hooks" cannot only achieve all constructions that can be executed with compasses and rulers, but also those which lead analytically to equations of third and fourth degrees. The angle bisector can be constructed by means of a copy. ((s)Fitting/((s): Equality in forms does not lead to fit: E.g. plugs fit on sockets, but not sockets on sockets and not plugs on plugs.) --- I 300 Protogeometry defined, geometry proves. (> Proof). If geometry is to be the theory of constructible forms, then we have to take into account this independence (which can be described as "quantity invariance" (> measure)) and do so with the, in constructive science theory, so-called Form principle: If two additional points P', Q' are obtained by a construction extending from two points P, Q, then each figure obtained by means of a sequence K1... Kn of construction steps from P' zbd Q' is geometrically indistinguishable from the figure to which the same construction steps of P and Q lead. --- I 301 A whole series of important statements of classical geometry can only be proved by using this principle. For example, the squareness of the fourth angle in the Thales' theorem can be assured in a purely protogeometric manner just as little as the uniqueness of the parallels to a given straight line through a point outside. Only the Euclidean geometry knows forms in the explained sense in such a way that figures are equal in form if they cannot be distinguished and no application of the same consequences of further steps of construction makes them distinguishable. |
Inhet I Rüdiger Inhetveen Logik: Eine dialog-orientierte Einführung Leipzig 2003 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Geometry | Thiel | I 287 Geometry/Protogeometry/Inhetveen/Thiel: There is often talk of an "operative" model of geometry, whereby it must be borne in mind that the properties captured in this way can only be realized if they are idealized. >Accuracy. I 288 There is the attempt of a "protogeometry" "circle-free method of size comparison" (Inhetveen) In order to satisfy the requirement of freedom from circles, we have to do without any geometric "devices" when producing shapes on bodies. I 289 The simplest operation with two bodies K1 and K2 is to bring them into contact with each other. The relation of touching is symmetrical. Two bodies each have at least one possible point of contact. Then further bodies K3 and K4 can always be constructed, so that K3 touches K1 at the point where K2 used to do so. "Imitation" "Replace". Inhetveen has called this "weak transitivity" because the subject requires three antecedents instead of two. I 289 Def "Weaker"/Thiel: means less demanding in mathematics. I 289/290 We extend our determinations to touching two bodies not only at individual points, but at all points of a given surface piece. The body definitions then "fit" together in these pieces. These formulas are statements about bodies, but they are not sentences about bodies that we have in front of us in our body world. We thus make statements about the manufacturing goals we pursue. Inhetveen describes them as "aphaetic" criteria for the quality of a technical realization. They lie protogeometrically before the theory of geometric forms. I 290/291 Now there are the terms of "fitting" as well as the original and impression derived from them. Fitting: "protogeometrically congruent". For technical purposes, however, one would not only like to be able to shape bodies in such a way that they fit, but also to fit a third person. Or that each of them also fits on the other. Def Weak transitivity of fitting: each body must fit to a copy of itself (since it cannot be brought to itself in a situation of fitting). Def "impression stable": the definition says nothing about how a body is brought to fit with any copy, and in fact this can happen in different ways...+...I 291 I 293 Folding axes, rotational symmetry, mirror symmetry are derived protogeometrically. Terms: "flat", "technical straight line" (= edge), "complementary", "supplementary wedges", "tilting", "edge". (...) The procedures are considered, the transition from protogeometry to geometry takes place in two abstraction steps. We ignore the methods and consider the results in the geometry. I 299 No reference is made to tools at any point. By the way, there are devices that are more effective than compasses and rulers: two "right-angle hooks" can achieve not only all constructions that can be done with compasses and rulers, but also those that lead analytically described to third-degree and fourth-degree equations. The bisector can be constructed using a copy. I 300 Protogeometry defined, geometry proven. >Proof. If geometry is to be the theory of constructible forms, then we have to consider this independence (describable as "size invariance" (>measurements)) and do this with what is known as the Form principle: if two further places P', Q' are obtained by a construction starting from two further places P,Q, each figure obtained by a sequence K1...Kn from construction steps of P' zbd Q' is geometrically indistinguishable from the figure to which the same construction steps starting from P and Q lead. I 301 A whole series of important statements of classical geometry can only be proved by using this principle. For example, the perpendicularity of the fourth angle in the theorem of thalas cannot be determined purely protogeometrically, nor can the uniqueness of the parallels to a given straight line be determined by a point outside. >Measurement. Only Euclidean geometry knows forms in the explained sense, in such a way that figures are identical in form if they cannot be distinguished and no application of the same consequences of further construction steps makes them distinguishable. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Heritability | Tooby | Corr I 266 Heritability/personality traits/psychology/Tooby/Comides: Tooby and Cosmides (1990)(1) have claimed that traits that are heritable and variable, such as the >Big Five personality traits that are heritable by a margin of .3 to .5 (MacDonald 1995)(2), cannot be the result of adaptation. Nevertheless, most evolutionary personality psychologists have generally concluded that individual differences in personality traits are adaptive in nature (see Figueredo, Sefcek, Vasquez et al. 2005(3) for a review). 1. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 2. MacDonald, K. B. 1995. Evolution, the five-factor model, and levels of personality, Journal of Personality 63: 525–67 3. Figueredo, A. J., Sefcek, J. A., Vasquez, G., Brumbach, B. H., King, J. E. and Jacobs, W. J. 2005. Evolutionary personality psychology, in D. M. Buss (ed.), Handbook of evolutionary psychology, pp. 851–77. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Historiography | Gadamer | I 10 Historiography/Science/Gadamer: Whatever science may mean here, and even if in all historical knowledge the application of general experience to the respective object of research is included - historical knowledge nevertheless does not strive to grasp the concrete phenomenon as the case of a general rule. The individual does not simply serve to confirm a lawfulness from which predictions can be made in practical terms. Its ideal is rather to understand the phenomenon itself in its unique and historical concreteness. No matter how much general experience may become effective: the aim is not to confirm and expand these general experiences in order to arrive at the knowledge of a law, for example, how people, peoples, or states develop in general, but to understand how this person, this people, this state is, what it has become - in general terms: how it could come to be that way. >Humanities/Gadamer, >Humanities/Dilthey, >Historiography/Droysen. I 340 Historiography/Gadamer: The historian behaves differently [than the hermeneutician] to handed-down texts in that he or she strives to see a piece of the past through them. I 341 The historian feels it to be the philologist's weakness that he sees his text as a work of art. A work of art is a whole world that is sufficient in itself. But the historical interest does not know such self-sufficiency. DiltheyVsSchleiermacher: This is how Dilthey felt about Schleiermacher: "Philology would like to see a rounded existence everywhere"(1). Gadamer: If a handed-down poem makes an impression on the historian, it will nevertheless have no hermeneutical meaning for him or her. The historian cannot, in principle, see him- or herself as the addressee of the text and assume the claim of a text. Rather, he or she questions the text with regard to something that the text does not want to give away of its own accord. I 400 Historiography/Gadamer: (...) the historian usually chooses terms to describe the historical uniqueness of his or her objects, without explicit reflection on their origin and justification. He or she follows only his or her own material interest and does not give any account of the fact that the descriptive suitability he or she finds in the terms the historian chooses can be highly disastrous for his or her own intention, as long as it adapts the historically foreign to the familiar and thus, even with an unbiased view, has already subjected the otherness of the object to his or her own anticipation. Unless the historian admits his or her naivety to this, he or she undoubtedly misses the level of reflection required by the object. The historian's naivety becomes truly abysmal, however, when he or she begins to become aware of the problem of the same and demands, for example, that in historical understanding one should leave one's own concepts aside and think only in terms of the epoch to be understood. This demand, which sounds like a consistent implementation of historical consciousness, reveals itself to every thinking reader as a naive illusion. The demand to leave aside the concepts of the present does not mean a naive transposition into the past. Rather, it is an essentially relative demand, which only has any meaning at all in relation to its own terms. The historical consciousness misjudges itself when, in order to understand, wants to ex- I 401 clude what alone makes understanding possible. >Meaning change, >Concepts/Gadamer. Historical Consciousness/Gadamer: To think historically means in truth to carry out the implementation that happens to the concepts of the past when we try to think in them. Historical thinking always contains a mediation between those terms and our own thinking. To want to avoid one's own terms when interpreting them is not only impossible, but obvious nonsense. 1. Clara Misch: Der junge Dilthey. Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern 1852–1870. Leipzig 1933; Stuttgart/Göttingen 1960, S. 94. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| I, Ego, Self | Strawson | I 123 Doctrine of non-possessing/I/self/consciousness/Strawson: (probably not Wittgenstein's position/StrawsonVs) Representative of this doctrine: "OP" (our philosopher). Descartes: thesis: the uniqueness of a body should be sufficient to evoke the idea that the experience is attributed to it. Strason: it was just unfortunatly expressed in terms of possessing. Our PhilosopherVsDescartes: then it would be inadmissible, to assume an "ego" additionally, whose sole function of this is "possessing". Difference: body has experience causally, contingently. I 124 "Ego" has them necessarily, conceptually (wrong). Solution/Our Philosopher: only things whose possession is logically transferable, can ever be possessed - experiences are then no ownership of the subject. StrawsonVsOur Philosopher: is using himself the false possession term. I 125 Actually our experience in this particular sense are our own, and only identifiable by that. StrawsonVsDescartes/VsOur Philosopher: there are not two uses of "I". >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. I 126 From particular experience of the subject arises not the necessity of a self-concept. Cf. >Self-consciousness/Strawson, >self-identification/Strawson, >self-ascription/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Identity | Cultural Psychology | Upton I 120 Identity/Cultural psychology/Upton: (…) [the] developing sense of self can be seen as an important Step on the road to adult independence since, in Western society, the goal of self-development is to establish our individuality or a sense of our own uniqueness and separateness from others. Indeed, in Western society the word ‘identity’ is often taken to be the same thing as uniqueness and individuality; you might test this out by looking in a thesaurus for synonyms of the word identity’. The extent to which this search for individuality is a universal goal of development has, however, been questioned (Guisinger and Blatt. 1994(1). Studies from anthropology have suggested that this Western view, with its emphasis on the distinctiveness of the individual from others, differs from that of other cultures. There is evidence that non-Western cultures have a more socially centred ideal of the person that plays down, rather than draws attention to, the distinction between the self and others (Kim and Berry, 1993)(2). This has led some psychologists to challenge the tradition of emphasizing the importance of the development of the self, and of identity over the development of social relations (Guisinger and Blatt, 1994)(1). Indeed, there is evidence that connectedness in the form of family relationships and friendships can enhance the search for identity in adolescence (Kamptner, 1988)(3). 1. Guisinger, SJ and Blatt, S (1994) Individuality and relatedness: evolution of a fundamental dialectic. American Psychologist, 49: 104-11. 2. Kim, U and Berry, JW (1993) Indigenous Psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 3 . Kamptner, LN (1988) Identity development in early adolescence: causal modeling of social and familial influences. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 17:493-513. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Identity Conditions | Hintikka | II 143 Uniqueness Condition/W-questions/answer/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a who-question (ambiguous) is, first, that (8) must imply (7). (6) Who is the man over there? (7) I know who the man over there is. E.g. It is Sir Norman Brook. (8) I know the man there is Sir Norman Brook. Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG). >Existential generalization. II 144 Problem: for that we need an additional premise. E.g. (13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x). (Non-mirrored quantifier, perceptually) "I know who Norman Brook is." II 145 HintikkaVsQuine: Quine does not recognize the role that my uniqueness conditions play. Quine: Quine says that these conditions can also be transferred to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka wants the subject to know who or what the person or thing is. Whom or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I would only use one kind of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (belief, seeing, knowledge) is one of analogy, not of identity. Solution: the sets of compatible worlds are respectively different ones in the case of knowledge, seeing, memory, belief! II 146 Identification/belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: every world of belief will contain innumerable bodies and objects that are not recognizable at all, simply because the believer believes that his world contains a countless number of such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are meaningless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how should one exclude them? >Quantification. Solution: one would have to limit the range of the variables to such objects, over which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea. Problem: how should one determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple when we quantify over individuals in doxastic worlds: E.g. operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything, Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify over inhabitants of such worlds by simply using a quantifier within the operator. ((s) i.e. that Jack, but not we differentiate?) Problem: it could be that we want to consider the inhabitants as our neighbors from the actual world w0 ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem for itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: it rather lies in the notation of the conventional modal logic, which runs from the outside to the inside and which does not allow the evaluation process, to ever turn around so that it runs from the inside outwards. Solution/Saarinen: the solution is "retrospective" operators. Solution/Hintikka: it may be that we can trace back an individual from w1 to w0, even if it does not fulfill the uniqueness conditions. (These require that an individual is identifiable in all worlds.) HintikkaVsQuine: the latter is mistaken that the question of identity is meaningless if the uniqueness conditions are not all fulfilled. On the contrary: it has to be meaningful so that we are able to see that the conditions are not fulfilled! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if the uniqueness condition is not fulfilled, it means only that we cannot find an individual in every world. II 150 Truth Conditions/uniqueness conditions/Hintikka: the truth conditions of the uniqueness conditions are very different from the truth conditions for other types of the most simple sentences. World Lines/Hintikka: world lines can therefore be drawn in different ways, without tipping over the remaining semantic situation. >Truth conditions, >Possible world semantics, cf. >Situation-semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Imitation | Holmes | Krastev I 8 Imitation/Krastev/Holmes: (...) we should separate the imitation of means from the imitation of goals. Borrowing technical means does not affect identity, at least not in the short term, while imitating moral ends cuts deeper and can initiate a much more radically transformative process, veering close to a ‘conversion experience’. In rebuilding their societies after 1989, Central Europeans strove to replicate the lifestyles and moral attitudes which they observed in the West. The Chinese, by way of contrast, have taken a path not unlike the one identified by >Veblen, adopting Western technologies to drive economic growth and boost the prestige of the Communist Party for the explicit purpose of resisting the siren song of the West. The imitation of moral ideals, unlike the borrowing of technologies, makes you resemble the one you admire but simultaneously makes you look less like yourself at a time when your own uniqueness and keeping faith with your group are at the heart of your struggle for dignity and recognition. Krastev I 10 An important reason why cosmetically imitative behaviour is so common in political life is that it helps the weak appear stronger than they are – a useful form of mimicry for surviving in hostile environments. It also makes the imitators seem legible to those who might otherwise help, hurt or marginalize them. In the post-Cold War world, ‘learning English, displaying copies of the Federalist Papers, wearing Armani suits, having elections’ – and, to recall Jowitt’s favourite example, ‘playing golf’(1) – enable non-Western elites not only to put their powerful Western interlocutors at ease, but also to make economic, political and military claims upon them. Krastev I 11 Russia: In Moscow, of course, the situation was different. Communism there was never experienced as foreign domination, and thus imitation of the West could not be plausibly presented as a recovery of the country’s authentic national identity. Krastev I 25 Because Central European elites saw imitation of the West as a well-travelled pathway to ‘normality’ (>Revolution/Michnik, >Revolution/Krastev, >Communism/Havel), their acceptance of the post-Cold War Imitation Imperative was wholly spontaneous, voluntary and sincere. >Normality/Krastev. Krastev I 73 Imitation/post-communist countries/Krastev: Because copycat nations are legally authorized plagiarists, they must, on a regular basis, seek the blessings and approval of those who hold the copyright to the political and economic recipes being borrowed and applied second-hand. They must also unprotestingly accept the right of Westerners to evaluate their success or failure at living up to Western standards. The surprising passivity of Brussels in the face of outrageous violations of judicial and press independence in both Poland and Hungary means that this is not a practical issue but a symbolic one. 1. Ken Jowitt, ‘Communism, Democracy, and Golf’, Hoover Digest (30 January 2001). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Imitation | Krastev | Krastev I 8 Imitation/Krastev: (...) we should separate the imitation of means from the imitation of goals. Borrowing technical means does not affect identity, at least not in the short term, while imitating moral ends cuts deeper and can initiate a much more radically transformative process, veering close to a ‘conversion experience’. In rebuilding their societies after 1989, Central Europeans strove to replicate the lifestyles and moral attitudes which they observed in the West. The Chinese, by way of contrast, have taken a path not unlike the one identified by >Veblen, adopting Western technologies to drive economic growth and boost the prestige of the Communist Party for the explicit purpose of resisting the siren song of the West. The imitation of moral ideals, unlike the borrowing of technologies, makes you resemble the one you admire but simultaneously makes you look less like yourself at a time when your own uniqueness and keeping faith with your group are at the heart of your struggle for dignity and recognition. Krastev I 10 An important reason why cosmetically imitative behaviour is so common in political life is that it helps the weak appear stronger than they are – a useful form of mimicry for surviving in hostile environments. It also makes the imitators seem legible to those who might otherwise help, hurt or marginalize them. In the post-Cold War world, ‘learning English, displaying copies of the Federalist Papers, wearing Armani suits, having elections’ – and, to recall Jowitt’s favourite example, ‘playing golf’(1) – enable non-Western elites not only to put their powerful Western interlocutors at ease, but also to make economic, political and military claims upon them. Krastev I 11 Russia: In Moscow, of course, the situation was different. Communism there was never experienced as foreign domination, and thus imitation of the West could not be plausibly presented as a recovery of the country’s authentic national identity. Krastev I 25 Because Central European elites saw imitation of the West as a well-travelled pathway to ‘normality’ (>Revolution/Michnik, >Revolution/Krastev, >Communism/Havel), their acceptance of the post-Cold War Imitation Imperative was wholly spontaneous, voluntary and sincere. >Normality/Krastev. Krastev I 73 Imitation/post-communist countries/Krastev: Because copycat nations are legally authorized plagiarists, they must, on a regular basis, seek the blessings and approval of those who hold the copyright to the political and economic recipes being borrowed and applied second-hand. They must also unprotestingly accept the right of Westerners to evaluate their success or failure at living up to Western standards. The surprising passivity of Brussels in the face of outrageous violations of judicial and press independence in both Poland and Hungary means that this is not a practical issue but a symbolic one. 1. Ken Jowitt, ‘Communism, Democracy, and Golf’, Hoover Digest (30 January 2001). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Incarnation | Gadamer | I 422 Incarnation/Christianity/Language/Gadamer: There is (...) a thought which is not a Greek thought and which does better justice to the being of language, so that the language-forgetfulness of Western thinking cannot become a complete one. It is the Christian thought of incarnation. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy. Incarnation is obviously not "Einkörperung" (English, literally: process of becoming subsumed into a body, embodimet). Neither the concept of the soul nor the concept of God, which are connected with such a "Einkörperung", correspond to the Christian concept of incarnation. The relationship between soul and body, as it is thought in these theories, such as in Platonic-Pythagorean philosophy, and corresponds to the religious idea of the transmigration of souls, sets rather the complete otherness of the soul in relation to the body. In all "Einkörperungen" it retains its being for itself, and the detachment from the body is regarded as purification, i.e. as restoration of its true and actual being. Also the appearance of the divine in human form, which makes the Greek religion so human has nothing to do with incarnation. God does not become a human there, but shows himself to man in human form, while at the same time retaining his superhuman form completely. In contrast to this, the incarnation of God, as taught by the Christian religion, includes the sacrifice that the Crucified One, as the Son of Man, takes upon himself, but that is to say, a mysteriously different relationship, the theological interpretation of which takes place in the doctrine of the Trinity. >Trinity/Gadamer. I 423 Gadamer: [The incarnation is closely connected with the] problem of the word. The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task facing the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is already in the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in the university scholasticism based on the human relationship between speaking and thinking. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from its spirituality, which at the same time signifies his cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). >Word of God. Already the way, how in Patristics theological speculation about the mystery of the Incarnation is connected to Hellenistic thinking, is characteristic of the new dimension at which it aims. Thus, at the beginning, one tries to make use of the stoic concept of the inner and the outer logos (logos endiathetos - prophorikos)(2). This distinction was originally intended to distinguish the stoic world principle of the logos from the outwardness of mere repetition(3). For the Christian faith of revelation, the opposite direction now immediately becomes of positive importance. The analogy of the inner and outer word, the utterance of the word in the "vox", now gains exemplary value. >Word/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy. 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. In the following I refer to the teaching article "Verbe" in the Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, as well as to Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité. 3. Die Papageien: Sext. adv. math. V Ill, 275. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Individual Causation | Vollmer | II 56 Uniqueness/Unique/explanation/uniqueness/unique items/Science/Vollmer: Pauli: the unique does not have to be less essential - uniqueness/Vollmer: only when something is in principle and necessary or proven unique the arguments can be applied VsExplanation. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Essence. II 57 E.g. cosmology: refers to the principle unique. II 58 Uniqueness/Unique/explanation/uniqueness/unique items/Science/Vollmer: Problem: then law of nature is indistinguishable from boundary conditions. >Natural laws, >Conditions. E.g. Why the gravitational constant G has the value G = 6.67 has 10 -8, does not follow from the whole classical physics - all the constants have random values. >Natural constants. Law of nature/Vollmer: also the laws of nature are random. >Contingency, >Random. II 63 Mistake: to assume that only the repeating is based on laws of nature, but not the unique - solution: causality as energy transfer. >Energy. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Individuation | Meixner | I 58 Individuation: fictitious persons: by the set of associated properties (we have nothing else). >Fictions. This is not possible with real individuals. - (possibility of incompleteness or overdetermination). >Overdetermination, cf. >Identity/Henrich, >Incompleteness, >Ambiguity, >Uniqueness, >Unambiguity. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Induction | Quine | IX 217 Induction/Quine: problem: because of the deceptive infinity/finity: problem of uniqueness of subtraction: it is only then clear if a natural number n is proved to be L, because no class has enough elements (namely n) to be candidate for an element of n in question. Solution: we must show that any natural number can turn out in this way as Λ, in short that Λ ε N. Problem: can we prove it in New Foudations? Granted, ϑ ε ϑ, admitted in ϑ there are infinitely many elements Λ, {Λ], {{Λ}}, ... which are all different, but the proof is not possible. >Infinity, >Provability. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Intensional Objects | Cresswell | I 115 Defensive object/Cresswell: is an object which is a different thing (or several things) in different possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Cross word identity, cf. >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory. Hintikka: better: game theory as a solution for identity in intensional contexts - whereby the first player tries, to make the proposition true, and the second to make it false. >Game-theoretical semantics. CresswellVsHintikka: the examples should be better understood in this way that they include normal quantification, but above entities of higher order, e.g. classes of individuals. >Quantification, >Levels (Order). I 120 Intensional objects/Cresswell: a) new in every possible world b) always from the actual world. >Actualism, >Actuality. CresswellVs: instead with Russell: predicate S: "is the largest wooden building" - then disambiguate: (13) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) ). Nφy). ((s) There is only one most beautiful and that is necessary wooden) (14) N (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y).φy)- ((s) There is neccessarily only one most beautiful and that is wooden (14), although both are wrong only (14) fails because the uniqueness of S is not logically guaranteed.) Solution: the following is true instead of (14): (15) (E1x) (Xs. N ((E1x) Sx> (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . φy)) N.B.: but the data of these variables are normal things, not intensional objects. I 122 ff Intensional objects/Cresswell: Problem. E.g. (18) It is true in the other possible world that the largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere is wooden in the other world (19) O (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . Oφy) (19) is not equivalent to (20) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) .φy) - because (19) is wrong in w1 because the thing that is the largest wooden building in w2 is not wooden in w1 (20) is true, however, because the largest wooden building in any possible world is, of course, in this (s) same possible world) wooden. Intensional object: according to this view we should treat the description "The largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere" as a name - then we must consider the form of (18) as (21) OOφs. But OOφs is equivalent to φs, whatever an intensional object is attributed to s. Therefore the meaning of (18) expressed by (19) cannot be captured by (21). Complex property: "in the other world wooden". >Modal properties, >Cross world identity. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Knowledge | Russell | Frank I 654ff Proposition/Knowledge/Russell: one can know propositions, even if one is not familiar with all components. >Proposition, >Statement. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 Russell IV 116 Knowledge/wrong knowledge/false knowledge/Russell: E.g. Someone thinks that the name of the Prime Minister starts with B (Bannerman is correct) - but he thinks Balfour was Prime Minister - no true knowledge. Hintikka 167 Knowledge/who/what/where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze constructions of the form white + W sentence. General: (10) a knows who (e.g., x) is such that A (x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A (x). Hintikka: but this is only possible if we modify Russell's approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be traced back to the non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed with Russell's theory of descriptions. >Existential Generalization, >Theory of descriptions. Problem: for each person, there are a lot of people whose names the person knows and of whose existence the person knows, but of whom the person does not know who they are. ((s) celebrities, people of whom one has heard, hear-say) not aquaintance, but by description. I 168 Charles Dodgson, for instance, was for Queen Victoria one person she had heard of, but she did not know herself. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10) it applies: (12) ~ (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x But this is trivially wrong, even according to Russell. The following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson Existential Generalization/EG: results then in: (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x So exactly the negation of (12) is a contradiction. Descriptions/Hintikka: descriptions are not involved here at all. Therefore Russell's theory of descriptions cannot help here. I 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Uniqueness/Russell/Hintikka: What ways Russell could have taken? Knowledge-who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge who did something with the existence of an individual of whom is known that it has done so. >Identification, >Individuation. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Language | Christianity | Gadamer I 422 Language/Christianity/Gadamer: There is (...) a thought which is not a Greek thought and which does better justice to the existence of language (cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy), so that the language-forgetfulness of Western thinking cannot become a complete one. It is the Christian thought of >incarnation. Incarnation is obviously not incarnation (German: "Einkörperung"). I 423 Gadamer: [The incarnation is closely connected with the] problem of the word. The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task facing the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is based on the human relationship between speaking and thinking, already in the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in the university scholasticism. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is a Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from its spirituality, which at the same time signifies its cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). Certainly, human language is only indirectly elevated to the object of contemplation. It is only in the counter-image of the human word that the theological problem of the word, of the verbum dei, namely the unity of God the Father and God the Son, is to emerge. But precisely this is for us the decisively important thing, that the mystery of this unity is reflected in the phenomenon of language. >Language/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy. Thus, in the beginning, one tries to make use of the stoic concept of the inner and the outer logos (logos endiathetos - prophorikos)(2). This distinction was originally intended to distinguish the stoic world principle of the logos from the outwardness of mere repetition(3). For the Christian faith of revelation the opposite direction now immediately becomes of positive importance. The analogy of the inner and outer word, the utterance of the word in the "vox", now gains exemplary value. >Word/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy, >Creation Myth/Gadamer. 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. I refer in the following to the teaching article "Verbe" in the Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, as well as to Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité. 3. Die Papageien: Sext. adv. math. V Ill, 275. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language Evolution | Gärdenfors | I 71 Language Evolution/Evolution/Language/Gärdenfors: Thesis: in early forms of communication the communicative act itself was more important than its expressive form. (See H. Clark, 1992(1), Winter, 1998(2), Gärdenfors, 2010(3)). Therefore, the pragmatics of natural language is evolutionary seen the fundamental. Later, when the communication acts become more diverse and independent of the immediate context, the semantics is brought to the fore. Syntax is needed when the communication becomes even more conventional later: markers are used to establish uniqueness. Then syntax is used only for the most subtle aspects of communication. VsGärdenfors: this is in contrast to most contemporary authors in linguistics. ChomskyVsGärdenfors: for Chomsky's school syntax is at the beginning of the investigation, semantic features are added only when grammar is not enough. GärdenforsVsChomsky. I 72 Pragmatics/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: For Chomsky, the pragmatics is only the waste basket for the remains: context, deixis, etc.). Gärdenfors: for a theory of the evolution of language, we must proceed differently: pragmatics before semantics before syntax. I 73 Language formation/Gärdenfors: just as the money was later added to the exchange economy and made it more efficient, the language was added to the existing communication among humans. Analogy/linguistic communication/monetary economy/Gärdenfors: one can extend the analogy: just as the money allows a stable price system, a relatively stable system of meanings is formed by language. Game theoretical explanation/analogy: just as prices, linguistic meanings are also equilibrium points in a system. (> Meeting of minds). I 78 Langauge Formation/Communication/Gärdenfors: Thesis: growing semantic complexity is achieved by extending the domains in the shared conceptual space. One can understand the linking of different domains as the creation of product spaces. ((s) Product space: Cartesian coordinate system, where one axis corresponds to a conceptual dimension.) This is how domains are combined. 1. Clark, H. (1992). Arenas of language use. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Winter, S. (1998). Expectations and linguistic meaning. Lund University Cognitive Studies 71. Lund: Lund University. 3. Gärdenfors, P. (2010). Evolution and semantics. In P.C. Horgan (ed.) Cambridge encyclopedia of the language sciences (pp. 748-750). Cambridge: Cambridge University. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Many-Worlds Interpretation | Kanitscheider | II 122 Many-worlds-interpretation/coincidence/existence/life/Kanitscheider: Brandon Carter 1974(1) Suggestion: to accept an ensemble of worlds in which a real subset has a life-favorable tuning of the constants. The fact that our world belongs to the knowable subset is then logically necessary, otherwise we could not make such a consideration. ((s) Reversal: many worlds instead of a one-off coincidence. The anthropic principle works in reverse). Kanitscheider: This reduces the astonishment that we exist. Cf. >Anthropic principle. Many worlds/Epicurus(2): There are countless worlds, some similar to ours, some dissimilar. After all, atoms are not built for one world, nor for a limited number of worlds. Nothing stands in the way of the assumption of an infinite number of worlds. II 123 Many worlds/Giordano Bruno(3): It is a general, empty, immeasurable space in which countless globes float like this one. Space is infinite because there is no reason or possibility to limit it. Many worlds/Huygens(4): (1629 - 1695): "Principle of Plenitudo" as justification. Nature harbors unlimited potential, one would restrict its creative power too much if one only assumed one world. Many worlds/tradition/Kanitscheider: In traditional theses, very different ideas are assumed, some of these worlds are presented as alien planets, but always with a causal connection among these "worlds". Many worlds/modern cosmology/Kanitscheider: causal decoupling is assumed here. Among other things, because of infinite distances. >Causality. Many worlds/laws of nature/George Gamov(5): One could assume that the fundamental laws of relativity, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics apply to all worlds, but the natural constants have different values. >Natural constants. II 124 Some of these worlds are perfectly imaginable, while others, which are logically possible simply because they contain no internal contradictions, elude our imagination. Many worlds/Kanitscheider: Which processes take place in worlds with any but constant legal structure can hardly be determined. But you can override individual laws in a thought experiment. Eg second law suspended: anti-entropic worlds already have such bizarre properties that we probably cannot understand them properly. Empiricism/observation/Kanitscheider: Even in very close areas there are zones that are inaccessible to measuring devices for physical reasons. E.g. the interior of the sun. We will never observe it directly. >Quantum mechanics, >Measuring. II 125 Many worlds/Kanitscheider: If there was a proof from the principles of physics that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity are the only ones that make our world possible, the matter would have been superfluous. But there is no such proof whatsoever. Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: Whether the one-world hypothesis is the simplest depends on the respective theoretical situation. For example, in chaotic inflation, where quantum fluctuations in high-dimensional superspace represent the natural state of reality, a single world would be a difficult assumption. Many Worlds Interpretation/EWG/Everett(6)(9)/Wheeler/Graham: here the wave function contains all possibilities of states in superposition. Quantum cosmology/Kanitscheider: The traditional separation of measuring device, observer and object cannot be maintained here, since there is no outside. >Quantum mechanics. Everett/Wheeler/Graham/EWG: This thesis now proposes that the state vector (the geometric counterpart of the wave function in Hilbert space) never collapses. Instead, splitting up into parallel worlds. >Wave function. II 126 Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: In view of the many-worlds interpretation, one can ask which quantum mechanics of measurement should be considered simpler: 1. The one that works with an acausal, discontinuous, untimely, indeterministic collapse process, or 2. The one that is based on a more comprehensive reality, but also on a deterministic, causal, continuous, dynamically describable measurement process. >Simplicity. Elementary particle physics/today/Kanitscheider: Everything that is not forbidden actually occurs. So decays that do not violate the conservation laws. >Conservation laws. Many Worlds/Sciama(7): The theory means no violation of Occam's razor if one interprets this as the lowest number of restrictions that are compatible with the observational material. Cf. >Conservativity. II 127 Einzigigkeit/Leibniz(8): Metaphysical justification: there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God. >Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Cf. >Possible Worlds. 1. Brandon Carter (1974). Large Number Coincidence amd the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. In: M.S. Longair (Ed): Cosmological Theories in Confrontation with Cosmological Data. In: International Astronomical Union Symposium Nr. 63. Dordrecht. pp.291-298. 2. Diogenes Laertius: LEben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen. Buch X, 45, 2. Aufl. Hamburg: Meiner. 1967. S. 243f. 3. Giordano Bruno: De L'infinito universo et mondi. Zitiert nach: A. Koyré: Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 1969. 4. Ch. Huyghens;: The Celestial Worlds discovered: or, Conjectures concerning the inhabitants, planets and productions of the worlds in the planets. London 1698. 5. George Gamov: Mr. Tompkins seltsame Reisen durch Kosmos und Mikrokosmos. Braunschweig: Vieweg 1980. 6. B. S. DeWitt: The Everett-Wheeler-Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In: C. DeWitt/J.A. Wheeler (eds.): Bettelle Rencontres, 1967, Lectures in Mathematics and Physics. New York: W.A. Benjamin 1968, S. 318-332 7. D.W. Sciama: The Anthropic Principle and the non-uniqueness of the Universe. In: F. Bertola/U. CUri (eds.): The Anthropic Principle. Cambridge: UP 1993, pp. 107-110. 8. G.W. Leibniz: Monadologie. Hamburg: Meiner 1976 § 53. 9. Hugh Everett (1957). “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. In: Reviews of modern physics. Vol. 29, 1957, S. 454–462 |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Map Example | Map example: examples with maps are used by various authors to discuss problems related to image, representation, uniqueness, reduction, and the relationship between copy and reality. |
||
| Mental States | Avramides | I XI Avramides thesis: in favour of a subjective concept of mind, which is incompatible with Gricean reduction. I 109 Mental/Nagel/Davidson: both, Nagel and Davidson: the impossibility of access is in the method! >Mind/Davidson, >Understanding/Davidson, >Understanding/Nagel. I 135 Objective mind/(AvramidesVs): the idea of an objective mind stems from Descartes. >Objective mind. Instead: Equal access for all, there is no first-person perspective, there is no "as it is"; there is no uniqueness. >First Person, >Mind/Descartes, >Thinking/Descartes. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Object | Chisholm | I 27 Eternal objects/e.o./Chisholm: are present if x has necessarily the property H and H cannot possess anything else, and there is a fact which implies H and necessarily consists. I 60 Object/Chisholm: e.g. the thing that is believed to be wise. Content/Chisholm: the property to be wise. >Content. Chisholm: but we do not need to accept a third thing that involves the thing as well as the property because attribution is not an acceptance of propositions. >Attribution. Self-attribution/Chisholm: needs no identification. >Identification I 62 Otherwise false mixing of direct and indirect attribution. I 63 Eternal objects/Chisholm: relations, properties, facts. Properties: one has an opinion about a property, if one assigns to the property a further property - i.e. as a thing to which one is in a relation e.g., contrast, uniqueness, frequency. Individuation: properties are individuated by properties. >Individuation, >Relations, >Properties, >Facts. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Ontology | Chisholm | I 9 Ontology/Chisholm: only: "Ens": a) contingent: states (events), individuals (borders, substances) b) necessary: abstractions, substance - only 5 basic concepts: 1. "x exemplifies y", 2. "x is necessary so that it is F ", 3" x is a condition of y ", 4" x is part of y ", 5" x thinks that there is something that is F "- ontology/Chisholm : platonic, accepted eternal things - VsNon-Platonic Entities: E.g. "property to be identical with that thing", "living vis-a-vis " ("purified ontology") - we do not accept that, in addition to the matters still there are events - existence: non-obtaining things (situations) can exist. I 10 Individuals/Chisholm: contingent things that are not states states/Chisholm: things that are the being of other things thing/Chisholm: not a state of something limits/Chisholm: no entia per se, no substances substratum/Chisholm: if "x is F", then "x" is the substrate and being F is the content. >States, >Events, >Individuals, >Substances, >Abstractions, >Contingency, >Necessity. I 175 Ontology/Chisholm: undefined basic concepts: thinking [conceiving] existence [obtaining], exemplify, relation, possibility de re, direct attribution. I 27 Eternal objects/e.o./Chisholm: are present if x has necessarily the property H and H cannot possess anything else, and there is a fact which implies H and necessarily consists. I 60 Object/Chisholm: e.g. the thing that is believed to be wise. Content/Chisholm: the property to be wise. >Content. Chisholm: but we do not need to accept a third thing that involves the thing as well as the property because attribution is not an acceptance of propositions. >Attribution. Self-attribution/Chisholm: needs no identification. >Identification I 62 Otherwise false mixing of direct and indirect attribution. I 63 Eternal objects/Chisholm: relations, properties, facts. Properties: one has an opinion about a property, if one assigns to the property a further property - i.e. as a thing to which one is in a relation e.g., contrast, uniqueness, frequency. Individuation: properties are individuated by properties. >Individuation, >Relations, >Properties, >Facts. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Ostension | Ostension: is the pointing to objects for the purpose of definition or description. A known problem is the indeterminacy or lack of uniqueness of the reference in pointing. For example, an object, its form, its nature, its history, its weight, etc., can be meant. See also Gavagai, pointing, to mean, indicative definition, definition, definability, statue/sound. |
||
| Partial Identity | Meixner | I 48 Partial Identity/Ship of Theseus/Meixner: if the ship survived, a collector could build a second original from the old parts. Both are not identical, but equally good candidates for uniqueness: that is absurd. >Unity, >Uniqueness, >Identity, >Completeness, >Ontology, >Parts, >Part-of-Relation, >Mereology. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Presuppositions | Strawson | Newen I 93 Presupposition/implication/Strawson: existence assertion and uniqueness assertion ("at least one and at most one ...") are merely presupposed and not implied by a sentence that contains a description. Def implication: A imp B iff. it can not be that A is true but B is false. Def presupposition: A presupposes B iff. B must be true in order for A to have any specific truth value. >Truth value, >Non-existence, >Truth value gap, >Implication. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 265 Psychology/evolutionary psychology: Although evolutionary psychologists agree that evolution is relevant to all psychological mechanisms, there has been very little research done on personality from an evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary psychologists have generally been interested solely in what Tooby and Cosmides (1992)(1) have termed the psychic unity of mankind. Therefore, they have been primarily concerned with human nature rather than individual differences. Consequently, much of evolutionary personality psychology research has focused on universally-shared psychological mechanisms that result in phenotypic plasticity due to varying environmental input without regard to genetic variability or heritable traits. >Personality/evolutionary theories. However, the vast behavioural genetics literature on personality traits indicates strong genetic components for differences in all of the >Big Five personality traits (Loehlin, McCrae, Costa and John 1998)(2). The genetic variability of such traits is dismissed or explained by some evolutionary psychologists as selectively neutral or as genetic ‘noise’ (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(3). >Personality traits/evolutionary psychology. 1.Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1992. The psychological foundations of culture, in J. Barkow, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby (eds.), The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, pp. 19–136. New York: Oxford University Press 2. Loehlin, J., McCrae, R., Costa, P. and John, O. 1998. Heritabilities of common and measure-specific components of the Big Five personality factors, Journal of Research in Personality 32: 431–53 3. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Quantifiers | Russell | Hintikka I 173 Quantification/quantifier/acquaintance/description/Russell/Hintikka: in Russell, the quantifiers (or the domain of bound variables) go only via objects of the acquaintance. ((s) physically present things). Description/Theory of Description/Russell: descriptions are eliminated in the context in favor of quantifiers. There are only quantifiers and bound variables. >Bound variables. Russell/Hintikka: one could paraphrase it as the following: the concept "is always true" is the only one occuring in propositions which originally contained certain descriptions. Power/Russell/Hintikka: the force ((s) semantic force) of the reduced propositions depends on the individual range of the variable. N.B./Hintikka: now it is only a part of the story that Russell has successfully eliminated non-existent objects (E.g., the current King of France is bald). His reduction continues: Quantifier/Russell/Hintikka: the quantifiers go only via objects of the acquaintance. ((s) objects of which we only know by description are not allowed, they cannot be quantified via according to Russell, which is more than the elimination of non-existent objects because there are also existing objects which we know only by description). Hintikka I 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation of 1905 is that it is the quantifiers which denote! Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting")(1) Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance. >Acquaintance. I 174 Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows his own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know". Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. I 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects? Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist. Hintikka I 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (A) of the acquaintance, (B) of the description. Problem: Russell had not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in relation to the actual world! Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds, which change with the different propositional attitudes. >Possible world, >Propositional attitude. Hintikka I 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denotating descriptions, one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go via individuals that are identified descriptively. ((s) >intensional object ). Otherwise the real Bismarck would not be an admissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain kind. Problem: then these quantifiers must not be constituents of the propositions, for their range of values consists not merely of objects of acquaintance. So Russell's mistake was a twofold one. 1. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka: by 1905 he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def apparent variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. 2. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variables should only be objects of the acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Hintikka I 180 Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not distinguish between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): for him, quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them it is not necessary to define the range of possible interpretation, therefore it does not make a difference when the domain changes! Quantification/Russell: for him it was implicitly objective (referential), in any case not substitutional. >Domains, >Referential quantification, cf. >Substitutional quantification. 1. Russell, B.(1905). On Denoting. Mind 14 (56):479-493 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Questions | Ancient Philosophy | Gadamer I 372 Questions/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: (...) in the Socratic-Platonic dialectic the art of questioning [is] raised to conscious handling (...). However, this art is a matter of its own. (...) [it is] reserved (...) for those who want to know, who therefore already have questions. The art of questioning is not the art of resisting the compulsion of opinions - it already presupposes this freedom. It is not at all an art in the sense in which the Greeks speak of >Techne, not a teachable skill through which one becomes powerful in the knowledge of truth. The so-called epistemological digression of the 7th letter is rather aimed precisely at setting this strange art of dialectic in its uniqueness against all that can be taught and learned. The art of dialectic is not the art of arguing victoriously against everyone. On the contrary, it is possible that he or she who exercises the art of dialectic, i.e. the art of questioning and seeking truth, will be the loser in arguing in the eyes of the listeners. Dialectic as the art of questioning only proves its worth in the fact that the one who knows how to ask is able to capture his or her questioning, and that means: the direction into the >open. The art of questioning is the art of asking further questions, i.e. it is the art of thinking. It is called dialectic, because it is the art of having a real conversation. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Questions | Hintikka | II XVII Question/answer/Hintikka: the key to a theory of questions and answers lies in the relation of a question to its exhaustive answer. Epistemic Logic: epistemic logic provides the solution. >Epistemic logic. --- II 18 Questions/answers/Hintikka: the most important application of epistemic logic is a theory of question and answer. E.g.: (1.1) Who lives here? Is constructed as: (1.2) Make that I know who lives here. II 19 Answer/Hintikka: problem: when does a reply d on a W-question fulfill its purpose? Of course, if it makes the desideratum: (1.3) "I know who lives here" true. But what does the answer "d" do? Obviously: (1.4) I know d lives here. Answer/Hintikka: the problem is when (1.4.) implies (1.3). Logical Form: the logical form of (1.3) and (1.4) is (1.5) (Ex) {I} K (x lives here) and (1.6) {I} K (d lives here). Epistemic Logic/response/quantifier/operator/Hintikka: that is, the operational problem is when (1.6) implies (1.5). It is about the interplay of quantifiers and epistemic operators. II 19 Knowledge/w-questions/knowing/Hintikka: the right treatment is ensured by a series of steps. II 20 (i) Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: cross-world identity must be assumed as solved, so that we can use our quantifiers. >Cross world identity. World Line/Hintikka: world lines should connect the counterparts of an individual in different worlds. >World lines. If we have a web of world lines (in relation to a subject of knowledge), we have truth conditions for quantified sentences in an epistemic logic of the 1st level. Truths Conditions: the truth conditions solve Quine's problem here ((s) of the cross-world identity) or transform them into problems how the world lines are to be drawn. (ii) Individual Area/individual/existence/possible worlds/Hintikka: it cannot be assumed that the same individuals exist in all models. When we speak of z as an element of the actual world, we must assume that it exists in this world, so that it has a bona fide value of the quantifiers, which also applies, among others, in the actual world. II 98 W-questions/who/what/where/Hintikka: thesis: w-questions are nothing but quantified phrases. II 99 Logical Form: (1) John knows who the Prime Minister of Norway is. As a that-construction: (2) (Ex) John knows that (the Prime Minister of Norway = x) (= de dicto). Problem: you have to specify the domain of the individual that the variable "x" passes ((s) quotation marks from Hintikka). II 102 W-Questions/non-existence/Hintikka: variant: problem: (7) John knows that Homer did not exist. That is, in any epistemically possible world of John, Homer does not exist. This implies that it makes sense to ask for existence. >Non-existence. Uniqueness/existence/Hintikka: i.e. we must distinguish between the existence and the uniqueness (determinateness) of an individual. Non-existence/Hintikka: non-existence does not make the identity of the individual unknown. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Quotation Marks | Brandom | I 438 Anaphora/Brandom: you cannot describe a cat by referring to it as "it". >Anaphora. I 438 Truth/Brandom thesis: "true" works anaphorically and not descriptively. >Truth predicate, >Description. I 423 Pronoun/Brandom: old: only linguistically, like bound variables (co-reference) - new: anaphora is more basal than deixis! - Deixis implies anaphora - anaphora possible without index words, but not vice versa. >Pronouns, >Ostension. I 627 Anaphora/Reference/Uniqueness/Unrepeatability/Brandom: Substitution is note definable for unrepeatable tokenings, of course - therefore anaphoric reference must be made to them. I 638 Deixis requires anaphora. No language can indicate if it does not possess asymmetric, anaphoric constructions - the predecessor may even be a merely possible Tokening: "refers to". I 639 Two options: a) Type recurrence: symmetrically acquired significance (e.g. proper names of specific descriptions) - 2) indexical, asymmetric. I 954 Anaphora/rigidity/Brandom: anaphoric chains are rigid - but not "impure chains": Leibniz could have had a different name, so it is possible that the person to which "Leibniz" refers is not Leibniz - N.B.: in counterfactual situations, expressions with different token recurrence structures would be considered factual. >Rigidity. I 684 Anaphoric chains/Evans/Brandom: Problem: if the predecessor is quantified: E.g. Hans bought some donkeys and Heinz vaccinated them (all or some of them?) - E.g. few politicians came to the party, but they enjoyed themselves a lot (few of the few?). I 686 Evans: Proposal: I 956 An expression a dominates an expression b then if and only if the first branch node that dominates a, also dominates b (and a and b do not dominate each other mutually). II 112 Distancing quotation marks/Brandom: one takes the responsibility for the claim - however, one attributes the responsibility that these words are appropriate to another - the exact reverse of de re attribution. >Attribution, cf. >Description levels. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reference Classes | Reference classes, philosophy: is the set of objects, situations, or even data for which an expression stands and which can be exchanged with each other while the meaning of the expression and the context of its use are preserved. The so-called reference class problem arises when the class of the possible data is so extensive or so designed that several interpretations are possible which mutually exclude each other. See also reference system, uniqueness, indeterminacy, probability theory. |
||
| Reswitching | Harcourt | Harcourt I 118 Reswitching/double-switching/reverse capital/Harcourt: (…) the results of neoclassical marginal productivity theory have played a key role in both the theory of economic growth and the econometric studies of the post-war period. >Marginal Product of Capital, >Economic growth/Solow. The easiest illustration of this proposition is the essential part which the equality of marginal products with factor rewards plays in the development of the arguments in Swan's famous model of economic growth (Swan [1956](1)), and in Solow's influential - and equally famous - article on technical progress and the aggregate production function, Solow [1957](2). Double-switching: This methodology has been continuously under attack and the latest (and sharpest) arrows in the quivers of the neo-Keynesian critics are the results of the double-switching debate. Reverse capital: Not all of these are, however, related to the phenomenon of double-switching itself; a related phenomenon, capital-reversing, also plays a key role: see, especially, Garegnani [1970a(3), 1970b(4)], Bliss [1970](5), Pasinetti [1969(6), 1970(7)]. >Neo-neoclassicals, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Production function. Harcourt I 120 If the neoclassical stories as told, for example, by Swan [1956](1) and Solow [1957(2)] did in fact hold for heterogeneous capital-goods models, this would be an enormous simplification for economic theory and econometric specification alike (see Brown [1968(8), 1969(9)]). It is to this question that the double-switching debate is especially addressed. >Economic models, >Idealization. 1. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 2. Solow, R. M. [1957] 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of economics and Statistics, xxxix, pp. 312-20. 3. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 4. Garegnani, P. [1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 5. Bliss, C. J. Comment on Garegnani, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 37, Issue 3, July 1970, Pages 437–438, 6. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 7. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. 8. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University ofNew York at Buffalo. 9. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Risk Perception | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 123 Risk perception/adolescence/Developmental psychology/Upton: [during adolescence there is a] change in cognitive skills (…).This new way of thinking also underlies the ability of the adolescent to engage in introspection and self-reflection, which, according to some theorists, results in heightened self-consciousness (Elkind. 1978)(1). >Egocentrism/Elkind. Elkind called this phenomenon adolescent egocentrism, suggesting that this governs the way in which adolescents think about social matters. According to this theory, adolescents believe that others are as interested in them as they are in themselves and in their sense of personal uniqueness. Two aspects of adolescent egocentrism have been described: - The imaginary audience: this is where adolescents believe themselves to be ‘at centre stage’. Everyone else’s attention is riveted on them. - The personal fable: this underpins the adolescent sense of personal uniqueness and invincibility. No one else can possibly understand how they really feel; furthermore, although others may be vulnerable to misfortune, they are not. Personal fable: An important aspect of the personal fable — a sense of invulnerability — is suggested to be the cause of adolescent risk taking: drug use, smoking, unprotected sex, drinking and so on (Alberts et al.. 2007)(2). According to Arnett (1992)(3), risky behaviour in adolescence may well result from a combination of cognitive factors: a feeling of invincibility combined with flawed probability reasoning — the idea that It will never happen to me.’ >Adolescence. 1. Elkind, D (1978) Understanding the young adolescent. Adolescence, 13(49): 127-34. 2. Alberts, A, Elkind, D and Ginsberg, S (2007). The personal fable and risk-taking in early adolescence. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 36: 71-6. 3. Arnett, JJ (1992) Reckless behaviour in adolescence: a developmental perspective. Developmental Review, 12: 339-73. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Selection | Mayr | I 65 Natural selection/Mayr: is no random process. (Although coincidence happens in evolution). >Mutation. I 248 Selection/Mayr: is today completely accepted. Two steps: variation and actual selection. 1. Variation: In each generation, recombination, gene flow, random factors and mutations generate a great genetic diversity. The genetic material is "hard" and not "soft", as Darwin assumed. >Randomness, >Necessity. Sexual Reproduction: the parental chromosomes are broken and reassembled. Thus uniqueness of the offspring by recombination. Composition of the genes according to no law! >Genes. I 249 2. Selection: differences in the survival and reproduction of newly formed individuals. >Individuals/Mayr, >Life/Mayr. Even in species producing millions of offspring in each generation, on average, only two of them are needed to maintain population balance. >Species, >Evolution. I 250 Coincidence/Mayr: dominates the variation. Necessity/Mayr: dominates the selection. Selection: there is no "selective force"! I 252 Selection: Bates' discovery of mimicry (1862)(1) in edible and poisonous butterflies: first proof of natural selection. >Mimicry. Benefits/Biology: what is the benefit of the emergence of a characteristic for survival: adaptionist program. Characteristics/Survival: favourable characteristics: Tolerance against adverse climate, better utilisation of food, resistance to pathogens, escape capability. (through sexual reproduction). Selection by females (peacock tail) may be more important than the ability of males to defeat rivals. >Features/Mayr. I 253 Brother and sister rivalry and parental care: affect reproductive success rather than survival. This selection is apparently more important than the concept of sexual selection suggests. I 260 Extinction: 99.9% of all evolutionary lines that once existed on Earth are extinct. Selection: Darwin: "Natural selection is on an hourly basis all over the world to detect the slightest changes".(2) I 261 Selection/MayrVsDarwin: the genetic variation needed to perfect a characteristic may not occur at all! For example, the inner/outer skeleton: vertebrates up to the dinosaur, outer skeleton: the giant crab has remained the largest creature. The difference is determined by the different paths taken by the ancestors, not by the presence of characteristics! I 262 Selection/Mayr: further restriction: interaction in development. The parts of the organism are not independent of each other. No one reacts to the selection without interacting with the other characteristics. Geoffroys, 1818(3): "Law of Balance": Organisms are compromises between competing demands. Selection/Mayr: 3rd Restriction: Ability to non-genetic modification: the more plastic the phenotype (due to flexibility in development) is, the less the force of selection pressure. Plants (and especially microorganisms) have a much greater ability to phenotypic modification (more diverse reaction standard) than animals. Ability for non-genetic adaptation is exclusively genetically controlled! Coincidence: works at every level. I 264 New: whole populations or even species could be the target of the selection. I 265 Soft/hard group selection: Soft group selection: Success through the average selection value of the individuals. This means that each individual selection is also a soft group selection. Hard group selection: the group as a whole has certain adaptive group characteristics that are not simply the sum of the contributions, the advantage of the group is greater than that of the sum of the individual members. >Adaption. Division of labor, cooperation (guardian, search for food). Here the term "group selection" is justified. I 266 Origin of the species: this controversy completely changed the status of so-called species selection: the emergence of a new species seems to contribute very often to the extinction of another species. "Species Exchange," takes place according to strict Darwinian principles. I 279 Definition r-selection: strongly fluctuating, often catastrophically exposed population size, weak intraspecific competition, very fertile. K-Selection: constant population size, strong competition, stable life expectancy. I 280 As population density increases, so too does the influence of adverse factors: competition, food shortages, lack of escape routes, predators, growth slows down. I 317 Could the human being become a superhuman? The odds are not so good here! Not enough selection pressure. Group selection was particularly a thing of the past. Selection/Human: Today, however, in mass society there is no sign of selection for superior genotypes that would allow the human being to rise above its present abilities. Many authors even claim that the human gene pool is decaying. Francis Galton was the first to suggest that one could and should improve humanity with appropriate selection. He coined the term "eugenics". 1. H.W. Bates (1862). Contributions to an Insect Fauna of the Amazon Valley. In: Trans Linn. Soc. London 23. S. 495-566. 2. Ch. Darwin (1859). On the Origin of Species. London: John Murray. 3. E. Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1818). Philosophie anatomique. Paris. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Self- Ascription | Chisholm | II 117 Self-ascription/indirect ascription/Chisholm: corresponds to Russell: knowledge by acquaintance/by description. >Acquaintance, >Description, >Attribution. Chisholm: then ultimately everything is attributive reference (for direct ascription) - Patently: then there is a uniqueness relation alone by self-ascription - if the existence of the object is secured. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 Frank I 19ff Self-ascription/Chisholm: I can very well be wrong in interpreting my self-ascription. >Incorribility. Frank I 261ff Self-ascription/VsChisholm: a toddler does not judge first, that it recognizes the mother and then ascribes the judgement to himself. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Strawson | Frank I 41ff Self-consciousness/Strawson: M-predicates: do not presuppose consciousness to which they are attributed P-predicates: (psychological): imply that the person to whom they are attributed, knows this. Def P*-predicates/Shoemaker: it is impossible that any other subject, except me, can have certain properties. >Terminology/Strawson. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 --- Strawson I 130 I/self-consciousness/Strawson: previously only: all my experiences are specifically related to the body M, this one is distinguished by that. - But the same goes for all other bodies in each case. Problem: what does the word "mine" has to do in it? >Identification, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Identification/Strawson, >Particulars/Strawson. I 131 Uniqueness of the body is no guarantee of Cartesian soul. Solution: we must recognize the concept of the person as a primitive (but not fundamental) concept. >Body. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Semantic Categories | Tarski | Berka I 498 Def Semantic Category/meaning category/Husserl/Tarski: 1. two expressions belong to the same meaning category when its first propositional function is one that contains any of these phrases. 2. When no function that contains one of these expressions loses the character of a propositional function if this expression is substituted by the other - ( reflexive, transitive, symmetric). Example of Category propositional function: e.g. names of individuals - e.g. variables. >Propositional functions, >Variables, >Proper names, >Meaning categories. I 499 Def Main Principle of semantic categories/Tarski: in everyday language a single case seems to satisfy the propositional function which is preserved while replacing the expression. >Everyday language. Meaning category/Tarski: here not for compound expressions but only for variables - Decisive is the mere form. Wit of the Main Principle: we want that substitution always results in new statements, we can use as variables only expressions of the same semantic category. >Inserting, >Substitution, >Abstraction/Tarski. I 500 It follows that no character can be a functor of two functions at the same time that can have a different number of arguments or two such functions (even if they have the same number of arguments) in which two of their relevant arguments belong to different meaning categories. >Uniqueness, >Unambiguity, >Functors. I 520 Bound variables have no influence on the semantic type.(1) >Bound variables. 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Set Theory | Field | II 333 Set Theory/uniqueness/continuum/Field: there are many self-consistent sets that conflict with each other. - (E.g. in terms of the cardinality of the continuum). Tt makes no sense to assume that there is a privileged term of a set, so that the entities that the meet different conditions, all are distinguished from the entities that satisfy the privileged theory. >Paradoxes, >Levels (Order). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Subject-Object Problem | Beauvoir | Brocker I 305 Subject-Object Problem/Gender Relation/Beauvoir: As the subject, the man opposes the world, he makes it the field of his designs and formation and turns himself into its ruler, "[if] however he grasps himself as a body, as something sexual, he is no longer autonomous consciousness, transparent freedom: he is engaged in the world, is a limited, transitory object". Sexuality "denies the proud uniqueness of the subject" (1). Man alienates himself from the real totality of his existence, because he, caught in omnipotence fantasies and self-glorification, is not prepared to accept the bodily-creatural limitations of his existence. The woman, on the other hand, succumbs to the temptation of self-abandonment and thus chooses the opposite path of an unsuccessful existence. Problem: "In addition to the ethical claim of every individual to assert oneself as a subject, there is the temptation to flee one's freedom and to constitute oneself as a thing. >Subject/Hegel, >Object/Hegel, 1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), S. 218. Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Time | Thorne | I 543 Time/Quantum Mechanics/Thorne: quantum gravity: dissolves time and space in their uniqueness. - No "before/after". - The space is like foam. - There is no particular curvature, or topology. >Space curvature, >Quantum mechanics, >Space, >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future, |
Thorne I Kip S. Thorne Gekrümmter Raum und verbogene Zeit München 1996 Thorne II Kip S. Thorne Christopher Nolan The Science of Interstellar New York 2014 |
| Trinity | Gadamer | I 423 Trinity/Language/Gadamer: The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task that was set to the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is based already with the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in higher scholasticism on the human relationship between speaking and thinking. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from his spirituality, which at the same time signifies his cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). Certainly, human language is only indirectly elevated to the object of contemplation. It is only in the counter-image of the human word that the theological problem of the word, of the verbum dei, namely the unity of God the Father and God the Son, is to emerge. But precisely this is for us the decisively important thing, that the mystery of this unity is reflected in the phenomenon of language. >Language/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy, >Creation Myth/Gadamer, >Word/Augustine. I 425 Word of God/Creation/Language: The mystery of the Trinity finds its mirror in the miracle of language in so far as the word which is true because it says how things are, is nothing in itself and does not want to be anything in itself: nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur. It has its being in its manifestation. This is exactly what is true of the mystery of the Trinity. Here again it is not the earthly appearance of the Redeemer as such that is important, but rather his complete divinity, his equality of essence with God. The theological task is to think in this equality of essence nevertheless the independent personal existence of Christ. For this purpose the human relationship is offered, which becomes visible in the word of the Spirit, the verbum intellectus. It is more than a mere image, for the human relationship of thinking and speaking corresponds in all its imperfection to the divine relationship of the Trinity. The inner word of the Spirit is just as essential to thinking as the Son of God is to God the Father. I 427 Trinity/Gadamer: The process of thinking is (...) not a process of change Gadamer I 428 (motus), i.e. not a transition from potency to act, but an emergence ut actus ex actu: the word is not formed only after the knowledge is completed, scholastically spoken, after the information of the intellect by the species is completed, but it is the completion of the knowledge itself. In this respect, the word is at the same time as this formation (formatio) of the intellect. >Word/Thomas, >Word of God/Gadamer. Word/Language/Thinking/Gadamer: In this way it can be understood that the creation of the Word was understood as a true image of the Trinity. It is a matter of real generatio, and real birth, although here, of course, there is no receiving part next to a begetting one. But it is precisely this intellectual character of the production of the Word that is decisive for its theological model function. There is really something in common between the process of the divine persons and the process of thinking. Trinity/Gadamer: The mystery of the Trinity, which is to be illuminated by the analogy with the inner word, must ultimately remain incomprehensible from the point of view of human thinking. If in the divine word the whole of the divine spirit is pronounced, then the processual moment in this word means something for which basically every analogy lets us down. If the divine spirit, by recognizing itself, at the same time recognizes all that exists, then the Word of God is the Word of the spirit that sees and creates everything in an intuition. The process disappears in the actuality of the divine All-Wisdom. Creation, too, is not a real process, but only interprets the order of the world as a whole in a temporal scheme.(2) 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. It is clear that the patristic and scholastic interpretation of Genesis to some extent repeats the discussion about the right interpretation of "Timaios" that was held between Plato's disciples. (Cf. my study of "idea and reality in Plato's "Timaios". (Meeting reports of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, Philos.-histor. Class, 2nd Abh. Heidelberg 1974; now in vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 242-270). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Understanding | Weizenbaum | I 96 Understanding/truth/Weizenbaum: it may be that what we understand is true, but cannot yet be formalized by us, e.g. about the future behaviour of animals. >Formalization, >Animals, >Animal language, >Knowledge, >Prediction. I 97 A computer program based on an incomplete derived formal system will undoubtedly show the wrong behavior. >Behavior. Problem: the theory represented by this program will not only contain certain individual errors, but it will obviously make false assertions about its own subject matter. However, it is usually assumed that the error in a program refers to a detail. The real question is: can we describe everything we want to do in terms of an effective procedure? The answer to that is no. (>Decidability). I 145 Understanding/Computer program/Weizenbaum: we can understand the input and output behavior of a subroutine without necessarily simultaneously understanding how it converts the input to what comes out of it. I 150 Clarity/Computer/Weizenbaum: the often repeated truism that a computer can only do what it has been told is at least problematic. There are many ways to "say something" to a computer. The idea that someone can write a program that embodies something he understands through and through is no less problematic. >Uniqueness, >Human-machine communication. I 151 But programming - like any form of writing - is experimental in the majority of cases. One does not program because one understands something, but in order to arrive at an understanding. I 154 Successful problem solving is no proof that the programmer has an understanding of the problem solving process. >Problem solving. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Universal Grammar | Deacon | I 38 Universal Grammar/Pinker/Deacon: Pinker is a representative of many ideas of Chomsky about the uniqueness of human language. >St. Pinker, cf. >N. Chomsky. Language instinct/Pinker/Deacon: Thesis: innate grammatical knowledge is not incompatible with an adaptive interpretation of its origin. This instinct could have developed gradually in the course of natural selection. In this way, we avoid having to accept improbable coincidences(1). >Selection. Deacon: on the other hand, this does not yet provide us with a formal explanation of language competence and how it was created in the selection process. >Competence. DeaconVsPinker: Pinker's theory of linguistic instinct repeats only a description of the problem and gives it a new name. I 103 Universal grammar/Chomsky/Deacon: (Chomsky 1972(2);1980(3);1988(4)) Chomsky assumed three insights: 1. The logical structure of grammar is much more complex than previously assumed, but it does not pose a problem for speakers of a language. 2. Although languages have very different features on the surface, ... I 104 ...they have a common deep structure (depth logic). This, in turn, makes it difficult to discover these rules, which must first be made accessible indirectly. >Deep structure. 3. One can observe that children quickly learn a remarkable knowledge of the complex grammatical rules, without the trial and error procedure. Some authors have expanded this to the thesis that the abstract rules for a natural language could never be discovered. Other authors argued that one could never inductively infer the rules from texts if there was no prior knowledge of grammar. (See Chomsky and Miller, 1963(8) for a formal representation of this argument). DeaconVsUniversal Grammar: this cure is more radical than the suffering it is supposed to eliminate. Your assumptions about brains and evolution are far too strong. It turns children into super-intelligent learning subjects. I 105 Some authors VsUniversal Grammar: assume that straw men are build here: a limited model of language acquisition as an induction and the assertion that language experience takes place without feedback. I 138 Universal Grammar/DeaconVsUniversal Grammar/Deacon: Def Pidgin language/pidgin languages/Deacon: these are languages that have arisen from a collision of native languages of an area with immigrant languages. Pidgin languages are no one's mother tongue. They can disappear within a generation in favour of "Creole languages". Surprisingly, the syntactic structures of different Creole languages are similar. I 139 Among other things, Bickerton (1981(5), 1984(6), 1990(7)) takes this as evidence of innate grammatical patterns. DeaconVsBickerton/DeaconVsUniversal Grammar: We can explain the language learning skills differently than through an innate universal grammar: the children take many phrases as an unanalysed whole first, and then break them down later. I 140 Brains have developed in such a way that they can apply different learning strategies at different points in time. These strategies compete for neural resources. >Brain/Deacon, cf. >Neural networks. (1) Pinker, Steven (2000): The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language. New York: Perennial Classics. (2) Chomsky, Noam (1972). Language and Mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. (3) Chomsky, Noam (1980) Rules and Representations. New York: Columbia University Press. (4) Chomsky, Noam (1988) Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures. Cambridge Ma: MIT PRess. (5) Bickerton, Derek (1981): Roots of language. Ann Arbor: Karoma Publishers, Inc., Pp. xiii + 351. (6) Bickerton, Derek (1984): The Language bioprogram hypothesis, June 1984, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7(02): 173 - 188. (7) Bickerton, Derek (1990): Language & Species. University of Chicago Press. (8) Chomsky, Noam & G. Miller (1963) Introduction to formal analysis of natural language. In Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, Vol 2, ed. R. D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter. New York: John Wiley. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Universal Grammar | Pinker | Deacon I 38 Universal Grammar/Pinker/Deacon: Pinker is a proponent of many of Chomsky's ideas about the uniqueness of human language. >Noam Chomsky, >Grammar, >Language. Language Instinct/Pinker(1)/Deacon: Thesis: innate grammatical knowledge is not incompatible with an adaptationist interpretation of its origin. This instinct may have evolved gradually in the course of natural selection. In this way, we avoid having to assume improbable coincidences. DeaconVsPinker: on the other hand, this does not yet provide us with a formal explanation of language competence and how it arose in selection. >Selection, >Adaption. DeaconVsPinker: Pinker's theory of language instinct merely repeats a description of the problem and gives it a new name. 1.St. Pinker (1995). The Language Instinct. New York: Harper. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Value Theory | Neo-Neoclassical Economics | Harcourt I 170 Distribution theory/Value theory/Neo-neoclassicalsVsMarx/Harcourt: The neo-neoclassicals have produced a string of rebuttals ((s)to Joan Robinson’s remarks on Value theory). >Distribution/Value theory/Robinson. Rate of profit/demand: First, they argue that no one, these days, tries, or ever did try, to determine the rate of profits or other prices within the production system alone. After all, the neoclassical marginalist 'revolution' was concerned with first the prior, and then the equal, importance of the blade of scissors known as 'demand'. Measurement of capital: Secondly, they could refer to Bliss's arguments (…), and to the statements by Hahn and Matthews [1964](1) at the end of their survey of the theory of economic growth. Thus: „As far as pure theory is concerned the 'measurement of capital' is no problem at all because we never have to face it if we do not choose to. With our armchair omniscience we can take account of each machine separately. Moreover the measurement business has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of whether imputation theory is or is not valid. In an equilibrium of the whole system provided there is perfect competition, no learning by doing and no uncertainty, the neoclassical imputation results hold. Harcourt I 171 This should now be beyond dispute. It is also of little comfort to the empirically inclined.“ (p. 888.) „Returning once more to the question of the validity or otherwise of imputation theory there is a further, purely theoretical, point of some importance to be made. When an economy with many goods is considered, then we must also find the relative equilibrium prices of these goods. Whether these are determined a la Leontief-Samuelson-Sraffa or a la Walras, imputation is at once involved. If we abandon imputation entirely then the whole question of relative prices must be reconsidered afresh. Perhaps it ought to be, but recognition that this problem exists seems desirable“.(p. 889.) >Relative price. Harcourt: (…) [the neo-neoclassicals] could refer to Samuelson's opening remarks in Samuelson [1962](2), (…) and Solow's closing ones, Solow [1970](3). That is to say, they would dismiss an aggregative approach to a rigorous theory of distribution - and capital - (though not, necessarily, one to econometrics). They could next invoke Swan's appendix, Swan [1956](4), and Champernowne's original paper [1953-4](5). In the latter, when doubleswitching is allowed to occur, the production function is multi-valued, i.e. the same q is associated with two or more values of k. Factors of production/factor price: Nevertheless, factors are paid their marginal products. Labour/capital/ Champernowne: However, 'the question of which (r, w) and hence what income-distribution between labour and capital is paid is left in this model for political forces to decide' (p. 130) - surely one of the most perceptive comments of the whole debate? (At the (double) switch points, one technique is coming in at one point, leaving at the other, as it were; which, then, is the relevant one to determine distribution?) Champernowne adds: 'It is interesting to speculate whether more complex situations retaining this feature are ever found in the real world.' Harcourt I 172 To the neo-neoclassical answer that the existence or not of an aggregate production function or of a well-behaved demand curve for capital at economy (or industry level) has nothing to do with marginal productivity relations, some critics (Kaldor [1966](6), Nell [1967b](7)) might reply: Your logic may be impeccable but your results are, nevertheless, irrelevant for the world as we know it, and especially for an explanation of distribution, i.e. they would reject maximizing behaviour as a fundamental postulate of economic analysis (see Solow [1968](8) also). This raises a puzzle in the analysis of choice of technique where most writers, including Sraffa, explicitly assume maximizing behaviour. Kaldor: Kaldor, of course, does not; his analysis is based upon the implications of businessmen following rules of thumb such as the pay-off period criterion. Brown: Brown [1966](9), on the other hand, just because he wishes to retain maximizing behaviour, has suggested neoclassical exploitation as a compromise. Moreover, in his later papers [1968(10),1969(11)], while he accepts the logic of the neo-Keynesian critics, as an econometrician, he, possibly rightly and certainly understandably, tries to find common ground between linear models and neoclassical ones. He works out the conditions which ensure capital-intensity uniqueness (CIU) at an aggregate level in two two-sector models, one linear, the other neoclassical, i.e. one in which each sector has a well-behaved production function. >Capital/Brown. 1. Hahn, F. H. and Matthews, R. C. O. [1964] 'The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey', Economic Journal, LXXIV, pp. 779-902. 2. Samuelson, P.A. [1962] 'Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function', Review of Economic Studies, xxix, pp. 193-206. 3. Solow, R M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 4. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 5.Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 6. Kaldor, N. [1966] 'Marginal Productivity and the Macro-Economic Theories of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 309-19. 7. Nell, E. J. [1967b] 'Theories of Growth and Theories of Value', Economic Development and Cultural Change, xvi, pp. 15-26. 8. Solow, R. M. [1968] 'Distribution in the Long and Short Run', The Distribution of National Income, ed. by Jean Marchal and Bernard Ducros (London: Macmillan), pp. 449-75. 9. Brown, Murray [1966] 'A Measure of the Change in Relative Exploitation of Capital and Labor', Review of Economics and Statistics, XLvm, pp. 182-92. 10. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 11. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Vocabulary | Kripke | III 335 Language/Davidson: Davidson’s criterion: a language may not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the first language. >Language acquisition. III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: we only have to demand that only a finite number of axioms contain new vocabulary (weaker). III 338 Truth theory/Kripke: (here): condition i) the axioms define truth implicitly (i.e. we assume that the referential variables have intended domains and the substitutional variables have intended substitutional classes (which implicitly defines a quantity of truths of L.). Condition ii): a) the new axioms must have a true interpretation in the old vocabulary (with the intended interpretation)..., b) there is an equivalence schema for each closed sentence of the object language that only contains old vocabulary. Advantage: the ontology does not contain quantities of expressions of the meta language. Condition iia): is the requirement that there is a new interpretation of the predicates that contains the old ones. Condition iib): guarantees that T(x) contains a single extension (uniqueness). Tarski: Tarski only needs i) for its explicit truth definition (i.e. only old vocabulary). III 249 Condition (i) is satisfied (without presupposed truth concept) by (4) - (6) in the old vocabulary. III 347 Truth Theory/Davidson//Kripke: meta language may also contain semantic vocabulary! Translation is also guaranteed if both sides contain semantic vocabulary. Kripke: this is quite different in Tarski: truth and all semantic terms are explicitly defined in non-semantic vocabulary. >Truth theory, >Axioms/Kripke, >Meta language, >Object language. --- Frank I 32 Mental/physical/Kripke/Frank: the distinction mental/physical teaches the difference of the logical subjects of the physical and the mental. I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalist one (semantic structures). >Naturalism, >Mentalism, >Semantics, >Syntax. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Willingness to pay (WTP) | Tversky | Parisi I 358 Willingness to pay/Tversky/Kahneman: For example, considered as a whole, most of the wages of college football coaches is economic rent since, were their salaries lowered en masse, they would be unlikely to leave for other jobs. The measures correspond to willingness to pay (WTP) for gains and willingness to accept (WTA) payment to bear costs, which measures are consistent with the psychological (utility) effects associated with prospect theory, which is steeper for losses than gains, convex in losses, and concave in gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)(1). They thus have an intuitive appeal and are consistent with the goal of BCA, which is to give those same values markets would give were prices available. The differences in values between the WTP and the WTA payment can be large, and are larger the more expensive the good (income effects) and the more unique the good (substitution effects). The differences would be very large, then, in estimating the value of the Grand Canyon, which is unique and also highly valuable, or in determining the value of a right to an abortion. For goods of less value or uniqueness whose value is captured by markets, the WTP and WTA values are the same for small changes in quantities. In practice both benefits and costs are often measured solely by the WTP on grounds that the WTA is more difficult to measure. In general practice the WTP is usually approximated by the change in consumer or producer surpluses. This can be an important source of error for goods in which the discrepancy between the WTA and WTP measures are large. The basic BCA test has been the Kaldor–Hicks (KH) test, which uses the sum of the CVs. This test sums benefits as measured by WTP for them and subtracts from them the sum of costs, which is the WTA compensating payment for losses. KH is satisfied when the gains are sufficient to hypothetically compensate the losses so that it is also referred to as the “potential compensation test” (PCT). >Efficiency/Kaldor, >Efficiency/Hicks, >Cost-benefit analysis/Zerbe. 1. Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1992). Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 29. Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| World Lines | Hintikka | II XVI World Line/cross-world identity/Hintikka: 1. We must allow some objects not only to exist in certain worlds, but also that their existence is unthinkable there. That is, world lines can cease to exist - even worse: it may be that they are not defined in certain worlds. Problem: this is not permitted in the usual knowledge logic (belief logic). 2. World lines can be drawn in two ways: A) object-centered or B) agent-centered. Analogy: this can be related to Russell's distinction between knowledge through acquaintance and by description. --- II 20 World Line/Hintikka: world lines should connect the counterparts of an individual in different worlds. If we have a network of world lines (in relation to a subject of knowledge), then we have truth conditions for quantified sentences in an epistemic logic of the 1st level. II 22 World Line/epistemic logic/knowledge logic/acquaintance/description/knowledge/Hintikka: there must be two types of world lines: A) public: knowledge through description (psychological: semantic memory). B) private: knowledge through acquaintance, e.g. visual perception (including memory). This is only related to a subject (psychological: episodic memory). These world lines are then bound to a scenario. Quantification: problem: we need two pairs of quantifiers then. Spelling: (∀x)/(∃x) for the public and the descriptive spelling (Ax)/(Ex) for the private world lines established by acquaintance. Then: (2.5) (Ex) {b} K (d = x) I.e. in a visual perception situation, b can find a niche for d under his/her visual objects. More generally: b is known with d, b knows d. II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use world lines instead of Frege's "way of being given". II 105 World Lines/possible worlds/semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there are two sets of world lines for a set of worlds, which also connect each individual to an individual in another world, but the two sets differ in which individual is connected to which one. Perception/observation language/observation concepts/Hintikka: for perception verbs we need such a possibility ((s) because it can be that one mistakes an object for another.) II 148 World Lines/identification/cross-world identity/Hintikka: thesis: the world lines must be drawn before the conditions are applied at all. The drawing of the world lines is never a part of the application of the uniqueness conditions ((s) otherwise it would be circular). Truth Conditions/atomic/atomic set/Hintikka: for my theory the interplay of truth values of atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows, e.g. how the truth values of sentences of the form "knows + a-W-word" sentences depend on the truth values of sentences of the form (18) - (19). (18) (∃x) K (b = x) (19) (Ex) K (b = x) HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is that these conditions are always indexed (indexical), i.e. that they are context-dependent. That is, that it is only in a certain situation whether an individual is the same. Or whether it is analog to one that would criticize traditional truth tables because some of the sentences that they serve to put them together are, for their part, blurred. Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: the epistemic logic, however, is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was. Cf. >Four-dimensionalism, >Space-time. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evans, G. | Peacocke Vs Evans, G. | I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of a place in the public space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Fodor, J. | Ramsey Vs Fodor, J. | Schurz I 215 Carnap-Sentence/Carnap-Conditional/CS/CK/strengthening/strengthened/Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1970, 83 85): Suggestion to strengthen the Carnap-Sentence: by assuming that the theory implicitly postulates that the reference of its theoretical terms (TT) in the actual world is unambiguously determined. N.B.: the analytical content of a theory is thus represented by the following local "definitions" with the help of certain descriptions of theoretical terms: Identification as Definition/Lewis: Example τi designates the i-th term of the unambiguous n-tuple of entities, which fulfils the claim T(X1,...Xn) in the actual world. (1970.87f) PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories go hand in hand with existence and claims of uniqueness for the reference of the theoretical terms is doubtful even if it is interpreted realistically. Instrumentalistic: it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6,Fn 5). Definition/SchurzVsLewis: Definition by description (description, designation) are not full-fledged, but only partial, because they determine the extension of theoretical terms only in those possible worlds in which the underlying existence or uniqueness assumption is fulfilled. I 216 Theoretical Terms/FodorVsHolism: Vs semantic theory holism: the determination of the meaning of theoretical terms is circular. Def semantic theories holism/abstract: Thesis: the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution/Ramsey-Sentence/RS/Carnap-Sentence/CS/Schurz: Ramsey-Sentence/Carnap-Sentence/Holism/Meaning/Circle/Schurz: the method of conjunction of Ramsey-Sentences and Carnap-Sentences is the solution for the accusation of circularity of FodorVsHolism. a) On the one hand: because of compositionality, the meaning of T(t1,...tn) is determined by the meaning of theoretical terms (in addition to the meaning of the other concepts of T), b) On the other hand: it follows from semantic theories holism that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. FodorVs: that is a circle RamseyVsFodor/CarnapVsFodor: Solution: the Ramsey-Sentence R(T) can be understood without assuming an independent knowledge of the meaning of theoretical terms, and the Carnap-Sentence or Lewis definitions add that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in designating those entities which fulfil the assertion of the theory. ((s) Carnap-Sentence/Schurz/(s): states that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in the designation of the entities which satisfy the theory. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Frege, G. | Quine Vs Frege, G. | Quine I 425 VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them. I 209 Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object) "a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object. Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs). I 264 according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ... I 265 Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited. I 266 Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function. II 201 Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear. II 202 "So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write: "{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment). (i.e.the inversion of "so that"). Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes! We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality. The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular. II 203 It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory: (1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx}) This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic! III 98 Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates. III 99 Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences. Applying: Terms apply. Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs. III 100 Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person. Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension. QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes"). Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes. VII (f) 108 Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are. Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities. VII (f) 109 Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71). Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements. Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language: Names are one kind of expression and statements are another! QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements. Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme. "p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111) VII (f) 115 Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names. IX 216 Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT! Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again. NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction. Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands. Ad 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks). XI 55 QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")". QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy). 2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization (Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7)) comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Newen Vs Frege, G. | I 209 Physicalism/Identity Theory/New: because of the possibility that mental phenomena could be realized in different ways (functionalism) token physicalism was abandoned in favor of type physicalism. (VsToken Physicalism) Functionalism/Newen: Problem: we do not know what the possibly physical states have in common ((s) on a mental level). Mental Universals/Newen: are needed then. Bieri: Problem: either a theory about mental universals seems empirically implausible. Or it is empirically plausible, then it does not tell us what we want to know. (Bieri: Anal. Ph. d. Geistes, p. 41). Functional State/Newen: similar to dispositions in that it can be characterized by hypothetical relations between initial situations and consequent states. I 211 VsFunctionalism/Newen: qualia problem FunctionalismVsVs: zombie argument: I 212 There need be no qualia to explain behavior. Mental Causation/Newen: is still an open question. NS I 90 Descriptions/Theory/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: the objective is to overcome two problems: 1) identity statements: need to be informative 2) negative existential statements or statements with empty descriptions must be sensible. Names/Personal Names/Russell: Thesis: names are nothing but abbreviations for decriptions. Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1) There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion). 2) There is not more than one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) 3) Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content). This is about three possible situations where the sentence may be wrong: a) nobody wrote Waverley, b) several persons did it, c) the author is not a Scot. NS I 91 Identity/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: if the identity of Cicero with Tullius is necessary (as self-identity), how can the corresponding sentence be informative then? Solution/Russell: 1) There is at least one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 2) There is not more than one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 1*) There is at least one author of "De Oratore" 2*) There is not more than one author of "De Oratore" 3) whoever denounced Catiline is identical with the author of "De Oratore". Empty Names/Empty Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Solution: 1) There is at least one present king of France 2) There is not more than one present king of France 3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. Thus the sentence makes sense, even though the first part of the statement is incorrect. Negative Existential Statements/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: assigning a sensible content. It is not the case that 1) there is at least one flying horse 2) not more than one flying horse. Thus, the negative existence statement "The flying horse does not exist" makes sense and is true. RussellVsFrege/RussellvsFregean Sense/Newen/Schrenk: this is to avoid that "sense" (the content) must be assumed as an abstract entity. Truth-Value Gaps/RussellVsFrege: they, too, are thus avoided. Point: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, however, now become general propositions about the world. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Frege, G. | Stechow Vs Frege, G. | I 29 Attitude/Propositional Attitude/Meaning Rule/Stechow: For example Caroline knows that Fritz knows Alla: for this we only have to assume that propositions are objects of certain verbs, the attitude verbs. [[ [VP knows]]]] = the function f, so that for any proposition p applies: f(p) the function is g, so that x applies to any individual: g(x) = f(p)(x) = {s | x knows p in s} We do not need to ask what it means to know a proposition. It is important that propositions are objects that can be known. VsFrege: a semantics that uses only truth values for sentence meanings cannot express this verbal meaning (> attitude, >propositional attitudes). Stechow I 123 Meaning/Semantics/Linguistics/Stechow: with this we have four facets of linguistic meaning: Meaning* Intension - Extension - Presupposition. The character will be added as the 5th. Presupposition/Frege/Stechow: place of origin, original place, 1892a): Example "Kepler died in misery" assumes that the name designates something. But this condition is not part of the thought expressed in the sentence. Certain Article/Stechow: standard work about it: Russell 1905. Presupposition/Article/RussellVsFrege: Russell proposes the existence and uniqueness presupposition to the content of "the". I.e. to the contribution that the word makes to the truth conditions. Strawson: pro Russell. Stechow: pro Frege. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Goodman, N. | Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. | Introduction Putnam II IV Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language. Sainsbury V 129 Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 358 Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher. ((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.) I 359 Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger: 1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction 2. provisional nature 3. without claim to factuality 4. expediency. RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed. I 360 Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95). Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 406ff Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery. It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production. 407 Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura. (Bolz pro Aura). Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility. Putnam I 256 Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it. |
Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Heim, Irene | Verschiedene Vs Heim, Irene | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 20 Def Skolem Function/Heim/Heusinger: (Heim 1990, Chiercha 1992, 159) (spelling f(x)) is interpreted in the meta-language as the function that assigns to each man a donkey that belongs to him. (33) Every man who has a donkey beats it. (33a) (x)[man (x) & (Ey)[donkey (y) & has (x,y)] > beat(x,f(x))]. VsSkolem Function/VsHeim/Heusinger: this pragmatic approach is more flexible than Neale's syntactic approach, but it overgenerates: Example (34) *Every donkey1 –owner beats it1. Problem: for (34) there is no reading in which the anaphoric pronoun can refer to the NP donkey-owner. (?) ((s) wouldn't it also require that there be only one donkey1?). Solution/Chiercha/Heusinger. (Chiercha 1992, 159): Rule for limiting the value range of the skolem function with a syntactic rule: (35) In a configuration of the form NPi,...esi, if esi is interpreted as a function, the range of this function is the head (value) of NPi. Problem: Uniqueness condition: in the given interpretation one receives only the weak reading of donkey sentences, since the skolem function always assigns only one donkey to a farmer. I 21 Selection function/Solution/Chiercha: must map each man to one of the (s) maybe several) donkeys he has. So this will be a selection function and a unique one. In this type of context, however, it will be a whole family of functions that are a priori all good candidates. VsChiercha/VsHeim/VsSkolem Function/Heusinger: the problem of ambiguity between strong and weak reading remains or is simply put into context. |
|
| Hintikka, J. | Quine Vs Hintikka, J. | I 73 Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities. Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory. I 137 QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If no identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world. HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism. Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc. I 138 It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed. Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible. Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations. Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification. I 139 Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes. I 140 Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby (2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby) Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E). Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from (3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby) i.e. (3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby. ... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise: (4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x) i.e. (5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is. Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke). Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is. HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it. I 141 Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway. I 145 HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of identity. Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time. I 146 Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are pointless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them? Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited. Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds: Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator. ((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish). Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out. Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above) Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds). HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met. On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world. Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same. I 147 Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic. HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play. Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form (18) (Ex) K(b = x) and equally of (19) (Ex) K(b = x) become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences! Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description. I 148 World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form "knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19). HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred. Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was. I 160 Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same. The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question. I 161 Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Montague, R. | Hintikka Vs Montague, R. | II 97 Quantifier/Natural Language/HintikkaVsMontague: his theory is not appropriate because of his treatment of quantifiers. Terminology: "PTQ": Montague: "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English". Montague: Theses: (i) Meaning entities are functions of possible worlds on extensions. (ii) Semantic objects ((s) words) are connected to meaningful expressions by rules that correspond on a one-to-one basis to the syntactic rules by which the expressions are composed. I.e. the semantic rules work from inside out. (iii) Quantifiers: E.g. "a girl", E.g. "every man". II 98 Behave semantically like singular terms. I.e. E.g. "John is happy" and "Every man is happy" are on the same level. Hintikka: ad (i) is the basis of the possible worlds semantics. (It is a generalization of Carnap’s approach). ad (ii) is a form of Frege’s principle (compositionality). ad (iii) has been anticipated by Russell in Principia Mathematica(1). Individuals Domain/Possible World/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: this is precisely what leads to problems. In particular, in belief contexts. Individual/Montague: individuals are the range of functions that operate as a sense of a singular term. Belief Context/Opaque Context/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague dedicates no special treatment to contexts with propositional attitudes (attitude contexts). E.g. "knowing who", E.g. "remembering where," E.g. "seeing what". This is a deficiency, because Montague had admitted his interest in propositional attitudes. W-Questions/Who/What/Where/Hintikka: Thesis: are nothing more than quantified phrases. II 99 logical form: (1) John knows who the prime minister of Norway is analyzed as a that-construction: (2) (e.g.) John knows that (the Prime Minister of Norway = x) (= de dicto) Problem: you have to specify the individuals domain over which the variable "x" goes ((s) quotation marks from Hintikka). de re: (de re interpretation of (1)): (3) (Ex) (x = Prime Minister of Norway & (Ey) John knows that (x = y)) De Re/De Dicto/Hintikka: de re does not entail de dicto, i.e. (3) does not entail (2). ((s) Because otherwise omniscience would follow again). Knowledge/Hintikka: we do not need to analyze it here as the relation to the alternatives, which singles out one and the same individual in each possible world compatible with the knowledge. HintikkaVsMontague: problem: all this does not work in the context of Montague. Problem: in the natural extension of Montague semantics, which we are considering here, the following sentences are all valid: (4) ((x)(Ey)(x = y) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) John knows that y = z))) II 100 Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows of every currently existing individual who that is (de re). (5) (x)(Ey)(John knows that (x = y)) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) Bill knows that (y = z))) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: Bill knows of every individual whose identity is known to John who this individual is (again de re). Problem: both are blatantly false. Non-Existence/Hintikka: However, that is not a problem as long as we do not need to consider the possible non-existence of individuals in epistemically possible worlds. Hintikka: Problem: but that does not change the problem. Possible Non-Existence/Hintikka: we do not allow it here, i.e. every individual is somehow linked to one or another individual in every possible world. Terminology/Kaplan/Hintikka: "TWA" "Transworld Heir Line" ((s) same pronunciation) world line that links an individual between possible worlds. Individual: it follows that every individual is well-defined in all possible worlds. This means that the sentences (4) and (5) are valid in our extension of Montague semantics. TWA/World Line//Hintikka: therefore, we must also allow the world lines to break off somewhere and not to be continued ad libitum. Non-Existence/Intensional Logic/Montague: according to Montague’s thesis we need not worry about possible non-existence. For one and the same individual occurs in every possible world as a possible denotation of the same name (name phrase). ((s) Because the individuals domain remains constant). HintikkaVsMontague: that is precisely why our criticism applies to Montague. Non-Existence/Montague Semantics/Hintikka: how can his semantics be modified to allow for possible non-existence in some possible worlds?. II 101 Important argument: Knowing-Who/Knowledge/Hintikka: for John to be able to know who Homer was, it is not necessary that his knowledge excludes all possible worlds in which Homer does not exist. Quantification/Opaque Context/Belief Context/Hintikka: therefor,e we need not assume with the quantification in intensional contexts that a world line exists that connects an existing individual in all knowledge worlds accessible to John. Solution: All we need is that we can say for each of these possible worlds whether the individual exists there or not. ((s) I.e. we do not allow any possible worlds in which the question of the existence or non-existence is meaningless.) E.g. I.e. in this example we only have to exclude those worlds for John, in which it is unclear whether Homer exists or not. World Line/Hintikka: this shows that world lines are independent of the question of the possible non-existence. Quantification/Intensional Contexts/Epistemic/Hintikka: i.e. an existence theorem with quantification in an epistemic (opaque) context E.g. (6) (e.g.) John knows that F(x) can be true, even if there is no world line that singles out an existing individual x in any knowledge world of John. Important argument: but it must always make sense to ask whether the individual exists in a possible world or not. Non-Existence/Hintikka: So there are two possible ways of failure of existence: a) non-existence b) Non-well-definedness (i.e. it does no longer make sense to ask whether an individual exists). World Line: breaks off in both cases, but there is a difference. TWA: can only be drawn if there is comparability between possible worlds, and that is no longer the case in b). II 102 Comparability/Hintikka: always needs regularity (continuity). E.g. spatiotemporal continuity. HintikkaVsMontague: with this distinction we move away from his oversimplified semantics with constant individuals domain. W-Questions/Non-Existence/Hintikka: Variant: Problem: (7) John knows that Homer did not exist. I.e. in every epistemically possible world of John Homer does not exist. This implies that it makes sense to ask about the existence. Uniqueness/Existence/Hintikka: i.e. we must distinguish between existence and uniqueness (determinacy) of an individual. Non-Existence/Hintikka: non-existence does not make the identity of the individual unknown. ((s) otherwise the question would not make sense). II 103 Non-Existence/Not Well Defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague semantics does not allow the question of the existence or non-existence to be pointless, because an individual in a possible world is not well defined. ((s) Because the individuals domain is assumed to be consistent in Montague). Individuals Domain/Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow the domain of individuals to be inconsistent. But problem: Quantification/Belief Context/Existence/Truth/Hintikka: In the following example, we must presuppose existence, so that the sentence can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is, too. ((s) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural interpretation of (11) it must be assumed that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a longer range than "is looking for". ((s) I.e. both are looking for the same unicorn. Problem: how can you know whether both subjects believe in the same individual or have it in their heads?) ((s) >Geach E.g. „Hob, Cob, Nob, Hob/Cob/Nob E.g. (Geach 1967, 628) Cresswell. II 142 (Needs quantifier that is simultaneoulsy inside and outside the range of the attitude verb). Hob/Conb/Nob-E.g./Geach/(s): ~Hob believes that a witch killed his sow and Nob believes that it is the same witch who bewitched Cob’s horse: problem: the sentence must be true in order to preserve the ordinary language meaning of "believe". On the other hand, it must be wrong, because there are no witches, exacerbation: "the same witch" poses an additional condition to the truth of the sentence. The demanded identity makes it harder to simply say that the three believe something wrong). II 103 Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless, example (11) shows that the reading should not oblige us to assume the existence of unicorns. Non-Existence/Epistemic Context/Intensional/Belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can seek the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some possible worlds. For this purpose, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: in more complex sentence, all the problems resurface: II 104 E.g. John does not know if unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn, because Mary is looking for one. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a particular unicorn. (because otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true) although he is considering possible non-existence. World Line/Hintikka: to expand the Montague semantics we have to allow more or less unnatural world lines. HintikkaVsMontague: according to his semantics all sentences of the following form would be valid: (8) John knows that (Ex) (x = a) > (Ex) John knows that 0 (x = a) ((s) i.e. conclusion from de dicto to de re.) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows the reference of a name immediately if he knows that the name is not empty. That is, of course, often wrong. World Line/Hintikka: therefore, the world lines cannot be identical with lines that connect names with their references. ((s) Otherwise again a kind of omniscience would follow. Moreover, it implies that names are non-rigid.) Species/Common Noun/Hintikka: the same applies to common names (generic names): They cannot identify the same individuals in all possible worlds, otherwise sentences like the following could not be analyze in the possible worlds semantics: E.g. (9) John holds this bush for a bear. Perception Concepts/Perception/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsMontague: here there are further problems: E.g. all sentences of the following form become contradictory accoridng to Montague semantics: (10) (Ex)(Ey)(x = y & it appears to John visually that x is right of y). I 105 SIolution: It may well be that John sees an object as two. World Line: can split or merge. But according to Montague semantics they are not allowed to! World Line/Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there were two sets of world-lines for one set of possible worlds, these also connected every individual with an individual in another possible world, but the two sets differed in which individual is connected with which. Perception: we need such a possibility for perception verbs ((s) because it may be that you confuse one object with another. Elegance/Theory/Cantor/Hintikka: elegance is something for taylors, not for mathematicians. II 106 Quantification/Quantifiers/Ambiguity/Any/HintikkaVsMontague: All in all, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity is caused by the interaction of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man (13) John is looking for a dog. HintikkaVsMontague: only explains why certain expressions may be ambiguous, but not which of them actually are. In general, he predicts too many ambiguities. Because he does not consider the grammatical principles that often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. Range/Hintikka: determines the logical sequence. Quantifier/Quantification/Each/He/Montague/Hintikka: E.g. (14) If he exerts himself, he will be happy (15) If everyone exerts themselves, they will be happy. Problem: in English "if" has precedence over "every" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). II 107 HintikkaVsMontague: So we need additional rules for the order of the application of rules. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Neale, St. | Verschiedene Vs Neale, St. | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 19 E-Type-Analysis/Neale/Identifications/Unity Conditions/Heusinger: Recently Neale (1990) has given the E-Type-Analysis a boost by allowing the violation of the uniqueness condition. Solution/Neale: Def "numberless pronouns"/Neale: (1990, 235, (*8))= Pronouns as a certain description without uniqueness condition. "Whoever". Spelling: „whe“ (whoever) Here: as generalized quantifier in (31) as term-building operator in (32) (31) ‚[whe x: Fx] (Gx)’ is true iff I F-GI = 0 and I F I > 1. (32) G whe (x) Fx ⇔ (Ex)Fx & (x)(Fx > Gx) Chrysipp Sentence/Neale/Heusinger: this is how the pronoun in (30) receives universal power. And not by the indefinite NP, which is interpreted as the classical E-Quantifier, but by the number-less pronoun, which designates all objects that fulfill the antecedent theorem. (30e) If a man is in Athens, whoever is a man and is in Athens is not in Rhodes. (30f) (Ex) [Man (x) & Athens (x)] > ~ Rhodos (whe (x) [Man (x) & Athens (x)] ) (30g) (x) [Man (x) & Athens (x)] > ~Rhodos (x)]. Problem: this is only possible at the price of an ambiguity of the pronouns (ambiguous, whether as Iota expression or "whoever" expression). This cannot be seen in the sentence. VsNeale/Heusinger: This leaves open the questions of a system of strong or weak readings, the solution of the proportional paradox and a comparison of symmetrical and asymmetrical readings. I 20 E-Type Analysis/pragmatic/anaphora/pronouns/Cooper/Heim/Heusinger: Thesis: here the descriptions are formed by a characteristic that stands out in the context. ...Example ... Advantage: (VsNeale/CoopervsNeale): here you do not have to take all the material of the sentence containing the antecedent. |
|
| Objectivity | Chisholm Vs Objectivity | II 105f Referring/Reference/Brandl: through signs or speaker? Through speaker. Strawson ditto: i.e.use of the sign refers, not the sign itself. Problem: intentionality would have to explain the sign - BrandlVsChisholm: Thesis: pointless to decide whether the language or the mental aspects (intentionality) should prevail. Directedness incomprehensible if designation of words not yet introduced. Separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. II 107 "Unit" would not explain anything either! Again question of primacy: either "thinking of" or "talking about" objects Solution: Distinguishing various types of singular terms for various types of reference, but only one type of intentionality. II 120 Objective reference/Chisholm: depends on "epistemic proximity". Possibility of identification. E.g. Suppose Tom were the smallest spy: we could not infer that every reasonable person thinks Tom is a spy. He cannot make a de-re attribution yet. So we do not need to classify this belief attitude as de-re in the strict sense. II 120/121 Suppose e.g. the smallest spy was also the richest coffee trader: then I can give two relationships in which I am exclusively to the smallest spy. If I knew, moreover, that it is the same person, I would have to be "epistemically familiar" with him or her. I might as well already be, even if I only have one source of information, without being acquainted with the person. de-re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy de-re, before I know him personally. VsChisholm: we do not learn from him what this closer relationship of "knowing" is to consist in. This again makes it unclear what the mechanism of indirect attribution is supposed to contribute. II 123 Reference/Acquaintance/Description/BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two types of uniqueness relation correspond to the problem that in addition to the referential one also attributive reference in the game. II 124 Danger of simplification: there is no clear distinction referential/Attributive: we must always ask what role one or the other form of reference has in a particular case. There is a range of possibilities that cannot be explained by the dichotomy ref/att. Own experiences and information from others affect the mechanism of reference. II 125 VsChisholm: only in very special cases, namely the purely referential ones, this succeeds only thanks to "epistemic intimacy". II 126 Question: what could act as such a link between and X? Wittgenstein: two candidates: 1) an image that is more similar to the object than any other 2) an utterance of the presenter which only denotes X. ChisholmVsWittgenstein: The relationship between an utterance (sentence) and an object could not be more "fundamental" than that between V and X. II 128 BrandlVsChisholm: vice versa: Wittgenstein asks a trick question here. If we argue reductionistically, we will never find an end point. We always need more intermediaries as links. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Russell, B. | Strawson Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 17 StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things. --- Newen/Schrenk I 92 Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses (i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion) (ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition (iii) truth value gaps are allowed (iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects. (v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties). Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use. Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference: Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand: Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value. Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied. E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness. Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis. Newen/Schrenk I 94 He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him. Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier. Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential. Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer). Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...". In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential. --- Quine I 447 StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. --- Schulte III 433 StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language. "The common language has no exact logic" Schulte III 434 King-xample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences: 1. There is a king of France. 2. There are no more than a king of France. 3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald. Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total. StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction. 2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence. 3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning. --- Schulte III 435 Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied". Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything. Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game. --- VII 95 Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person. There can also be more than one description in one sentence. VII 98 StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing. This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense. VII 99 King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful. VII 100 Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology: "Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description). Sentence begins with clear referring description. Sentences that can start with a description: (A1) sentence (A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence accordingly: (B1) expression (B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same. VII 101 Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson: Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times. Statement (proposition): ditto Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition). VII 102 StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning. VII 104 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent. VII 105 Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false. VII 106 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use. It is about conventions, habits and rules. VII 106/107 King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense. 2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one, StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim. 2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists. Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson). Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object. VII 110 Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica(1): (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists". StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table VII 111 This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers. Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table. Referencing is not the same as claiming. Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing. Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name. You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement. VII 112 StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names). He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute. VII 113 Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use). They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something. When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".) VII 122 StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive. VII 123 Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..." StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..." Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table". VII 124 Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott). VII 126 Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Russell, B. | Peacocke Vs Russell, B. | I 131 Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence. They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence. And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence. PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition. But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker. 2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix. PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive. But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience": PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content". I 180 Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism. SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible. Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents. Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes. Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself. Later: Vs. Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it). The salient feature is the idea of relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy. I 182 Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness. For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object. "Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not. This preserves two features of Russell's concept: 1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it. 2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation. Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing). We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought. I 183 This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence). I 195 Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information: Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties: 1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone). 2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context I 196 with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue: E.g. Cicero died long ago E.g. arthritis is painful. We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts. Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence. What kind of a mental state should that be? It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'. But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description. Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object. Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another. There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name. VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent. PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional. We must distinguish sharply between a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'. I 196/197 Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude. ((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.) Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs: a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that). E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle': Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community. 2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language. You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation. I 198 b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions. E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought: ^[self x]^[now t]. But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'! Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts. Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'. c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives. The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however. But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally. I 201 Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones. This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions. RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts. |
Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Russell, B. | Hilbert Vs Russell, B. | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 1 Epsilon/Heusinger: brings a new representation of certain and undefined NP: these are interpreted like pronouns as context-dependent terms, which are represented by a modified epsilon operator. This is interpreted as a selection function. VsRussell/VsIota Operator: this operator is less flexible because it is subject to the uniqueness condition. Context Dependency: is also dynamic in that the context reflects the advancing state of information. I 30 EO/Hilbert/Bernays/Heusinger: term building operator that makes the term x Fx from a formula F and a variable x. It can be understood as a generalized iota operator to which neither the condition of uniqueness nor the condition of existence applies. Iota Operator/HilbertVsRussell: has no contextual definition for Hilbert, but an explicit definition. I.e. ix Fx may be introduced if the condition of uniqueness and existence expressed in (48i) is derivable for the formula F. Problem: this is impractical because you do not always see if the formula meets the conditions. Eta Operator/Solution/Hilbert: may be introduced as in (48ii) if there is at least one element that makes F true. Its content is interpreted as a selection function. Uniqueness Condition: has therefore been replaced by the selection principle. Problem: also this condition of existence cannot be seen in the formula. Solution/Hilbert: Epsilon Operator/EO: is defined according to (48iii) even if F is empty, so that an epsilon term is always well defined. I 38 Determination/VsRussell/Heusinger: this means that determination is not attributed to uniqueness (>Iota operator) but to the more general concept of salinity (according to Lewis). Generality/(s): whether salience (which is itself context-dependent) is more general than uniqueness is questionable). Determination/Heusinger: is either a) a global property, such as it applies to unique and functional concepts (deictic use), or b) local: determined by the context. (anaphoric use) Both have a dynamic element. Rucker I 263 HilbertVsRussell: improved shortly after the publishing of Principia Mathematica(1) the techniques to elaborate with their help his idea of the "formal system". Mathematics/Logics/Hilbert: idea to understand all relations like x = y, x = 0, and z = x + y as special predicates in predicate logic: G(x,y), N(x), and S(x,y,z). Then the axioms of mathematics can be regarded as formulae of predicate logic and the proof process becomes the simple application of the rules of logic to the axioms. I 264 this allows mechanical solution methods. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
|
| Saussure, F. de | Luhmann Vs Saussure, F. de | AU Cass 12 Language/Luhmann: Language is structural coupling. That is their task, their function. This means: language is not a system! Language Theory/Tradition/Luhmann: traditional theories: Saussure: language is a system! Luhmann: but his concept of system is not related to operation! Rather on structures, differences etc. LuhmannVsSaussure: in his distinction between spoken word and language it remains empirically unclear what the basal operation actually is. Unless one refers to communication. But that would force us to distinguish more strongly between mental and social systems than is usual in linguistics. Language/Luhmann: 1. It is not a system. 2. Language does not have its own mode of operation. So no linguistic operation that is not communication or non-linguistic thinking. ((s) A genuinely linguistic operation would therefore have to be non-linguistic itself.) Luhmann: this has to do with the deep storage of the concept of the operation and with the precision with which one empirically asks what is to be excluded. Saussure/Luhmann: the sign means the meaning of the object. Saussure/Luhmann: or the sign means what the speaker thought. LuhmannVsSaussure: and thus his theory loses its uniqueness! Then the sign no longer denotes the object, but the inner state of the speaker. Double reference to subject and object of the sign. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Verschiedene Vs Strawson, P. F. | Grice I 277 Strawson: Tautology: that someone who says p also believes p. HungerlandVsStrawson: not necessary. He may speak incorrectly or with intent to deceive. Grice I 300 Presupposition/Strawson: Def "S presupposes S": "The truth of S" is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the assertion that S. For example, "All my children sleep soundly" presupposes "I have children". I 303 David RyninVsStrawson: from this interpretation paradoxically follows that all presupposed assertions would be true: it should apply: S > S" and ~S > S"; but it also applies: S v ~S. From this follows: S". In other words: (~S" > ~(Sv~S)) > S is analytically true in a system of bivalent propositional logic. I 309 HungerlandVsStrawson: the relationship he defines is not that of context implication. I additionally imply that I believe to have children. His definition makes no reference whatsoever to the beliefs or the intentions of so-speakers or listeners, nor to any circumstances of communication. Strawson/Presupposition: "The S is P". Hungerland: consists of two independent parts: 1. function of the particular article, (relevant grammar). Strawson's model is a logical explanatory model. VsStrawson: normal communication does not do this. HungerlandVsStrawson: he has confused rule and exception (in terms of frequency). Strawson: also interprets errors as exceptions to the rules (HungerlandVs). Strawson I 103 VsStrawson: the idea of the simultaneous existence of what is perceived and what is not perceived is certainly linked to the idea of the simultaneous presentation of elements, each of which has a certain character, but which at the same time stand in a system of relations that goes beyond those established in the respective character of the elements. The first idea is necessarily an extension of the latter. It is simply the idea that such a system of relations extends beyond the limits of what is observable. StrawsonVs: the critic could argue this way, but he would overreach himself! He ignores the idea of change between observer and scene. If he claims to have given only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for such an extension, we cannot reply to that. Strawson I 131 VsStrawson: "What right do we have to speak of the unambiguous subject in this way? Why should there not be any number of experiential subjects, perhaps indistinguishable? The uniqueness of the body does not guarantee a unified Cartesian soul." StrawsonVs: in order to free ourselves from these difficulties, we must recognize the concept of the person as a primitive (not fundamental) concept. Def Person/Strawson: type of entities such that both states of consciousness and physical characteristics can be attributed. Initial questions: not independent on each other: 1. Why are states of consciousness ascribed to a subject at all? 2. why the same thing as physical qualities? Strawson I 170 VsStrawson: isn't there a danger for us that there could be any number of exactly the same individual consciousness that are connected in the same way to a single body? I 171 Strawson: the concept of a single consciousness can exist only as the concept of a non-essential, secondary type of single things. Only in this way. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Selfconsciousn.. irreduc. | Pro | Frank I 33 Self-consciousness / Frank: the first 12 essays (in Frank: Shoemaker, Anscombe, Kripke, Nagel, Castaneda, Perry, Chisholm): s.c. unanalyzable and irreducible. Through description of, for example C-fiber irritation alone it can not be explained - Middle Position: Gareth Evans: between Perry (direct Reference and Strawson): in principle veritative symmetry between "I" and "he / she" thought. This attenuates the uniqueness of Self-reference. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| TheoreticalTerms | Papineau, D. | Schurz I 215 PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories have existence and uniqueness assertions for the reference of the theoretical terms is even doubtful if it is interpreted realistically. In an instrumentalist sense it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6, Fn 5). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Bundle Theory | Searle, J.R. | I 102 Bundle theory / Searle / Newen / Schrenk: an attempt to solve the problem of the lack of uniqueness of the object theories for names: Thesis: the standard meaning of a name is sufficiently recognized when some central characteristic descriptions are known. Reference is then the object of which "all or most" descriptions are true. |
|
| |||