Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brain/Brain State | Frith | I 12 Brain/brain research/Frith: brain research is the examination of the structure by measuring the energy that the brain consumes. I 59 Brain/consciousness/Frith: brain scanners showed that an object can cause a change in brain activity without the person being aware of it (in the Amygdala). I 61 Thesis: "Our brain does not tell us everything it knows." >Unconscious. I 88 Brain/Frith: thesis: "My brain can get along easily without me". I 89 It can initiate actions that are not the ones that you consider appropriate. I 90/91 Brain/Frith: our brain does not tell us when our body moves differently than we have intended (for normal people). I 131 Brain/world/Frith: thesis: the brain embeds us into the world and conceals the world from us at the same time. I 149 Building Block/basic building block/brain/neuron/Cajal/Frith: the basic building block of the brain is the neuron, the nerve cell with all its extensions. Reason: the extensions grow out of the cells and approach the extensions of other cells, but never unite with them. I 242 Brain/Frith: the brain works like science: it designs ever better models that are tested and improved. I 246 I/self/Frith: thesis: the "I" is created by my brain. >I, >Self, >Subject. I 249 Isolation/Frith: isolation is bad for people and for brains. I 250 Communication/Frith: in communication you should always examine two brains at the same time. >Communication. I 251 Homunculus/Frith: it is a common mistake to assume a smaller brain inside the brain. >Homunculus. Part/parts/brain/Frith: nevertheless the brain consists of parts, because there are actions that we can regret. >Emotion, >Actions. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Cybernetics | Ashby | Brockman I 179 Cybernetics/Ashby/Hillis: a control system needed to be as complex as the system it controlled. Cyberneticist W. Ross Ashby proved that this was true in a precise mathematical sense, in what is now called Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, or sometimes the First Law of Cybernetics. The law tells us that to control a system completely, the controller must be as complex as the controlled. Thus cyberneticists tended to see control systems as a kind of analog of the systems they governed, like the homunculus - the hypothetical little person inside the brain who controls the actual person. This notion of analogous structure is sometimes confused with the notion of analog encoding of messages, but the two are logically distinct. >Cybernetics/Hillis. Hillis, D. W. “The First Machine Intelligences” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Mentalese | Mentalese: Mentalese is a language of which is assumed that it is used for information processing in the brain. It is supposed to differ from the everyday language, which would require a twofold translation. Critics argue that this makes the explanations simply complicated, or the brain requires a higher work performance than necessary. The homunculus argument has become known against the language of thought. J. Fodor: Signal language of the brain: for internal processing - H. PutnamVs: Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. R. SearleVs: Regress of homunculi. - Rorty's solution is a hierarchy of dumber homunculi. |
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| Nature | Maupertuis | Gould IV 114 Nature/Maupertuis: thesis: Nature has an equal interest in the survival of all species.(1) >Evolution, >Species. IV 117 Embryology: in the 18th century: Thesis: There is a small homunculus in the egg. It didn't have to be a perfect miniature, but all structures had not only to be existent from the beginning, but also connected from the very beginning! Epigeneticians/MaupertuisVsEmbryology: Maupertuis's thesis: the visible signs of development must also be literally respected as truth. Gould: the embryo seemed to differentiate more complex parts from originally simpler ones. So it had to behave like that in reality. PreformismusVsEpigenese/VsMaupertuis: the argument: the microscopes of that time were not sufficient to recognize this. >Method, >Theory. MaupertuisVsPreformism: the oocytes of the homunculus had to contain other, much smaller homunculi, and this back over countless generations. Up to unimaginable tiny details. All the people of world history must already have been preformed in Eva's ovaries. IV 122 Maupertuis: Thesis: A kind of gravity would have to bring together the right parts to form a fetus. For example, an additional finger never springs from the belly or back of the head, but connects to the other five. IV 123 Gould: from today's point of view, this basic assumption was justified. Complexity cannot arise from transformed potential. There must be something in the egg and sperm. But today we have a completely different idea of this "something". >Forces, >Complexity. 1. P. L. M. de Maupertuis, Venus physique, Paris, (1745) |
Mauper I P. L. M. de Maupertuis The Earthly Venus 1966 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dodwell, P.C. | Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C. | I 258 Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer. >Computation, >Computer Model. I 259 VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware. The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine. I 259 Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value. I 260 The idea of a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them. DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements! Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (See Rules/Brandom). Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual. Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs). I 261 Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway) Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside. Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology: As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character. I 262 No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology! Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain. (Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.) RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea: I 263 if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement: Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain. The latter is doubtful. RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself. Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs. Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle. I 263/264 It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?"). I 265 Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid. I 266 For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills: RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations. At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs). Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature. Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes. Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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