Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 25 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Affluent Society | Galbraith | Rothbard III 973 Affluent Society/Galbraith/Rothbard: At the present time growing abundance and prosperity have greatly dimmed the poverty and unemployment theme (…) Let it not be thought, however, that criticism of capitalism has died. Two seemingly contradictory charges are now rife: (a) that capitalism is not "growing" fast enough, and (b) that the trouble With capitalism is that it makes us too "affluent." Excess wealth has suddenly replaced poverty as the tragic flaw of capitalism. (1) At first sight, these latter charges appear contradictory, for capitalism is at one and the same time accused of producing too many goods, and yet of not increasing its production of goods fast enough. The contradiction seems especially glaring when the same critic presses both lines of attack, as is true of the leading critic of the sin of affluence, Professor Galbraith.(2) VsGalbraith/Rothbard: But, as the Wall Street Journal has aptly pointed out, this is not really a contradiction at all; for the excessive affluence is all in the "private sector," the goods enjoyed by the consumers; the deficiency, or "starvation," is in the "public sector," which needs further growth.(3) RothbardVsGalbraith: Although The Affluent Society is replete with fallacies, backed by dogmatic assertions and time-honored rhetorical devices in place of reasoned argument, the book warrants some consideration here in view of its enormous popularity. Rothbard III 974 Economics/History/RothbardVsGalbraith: As in the case of most "economists" who attack economic science, Professor Galbraith is an historicist, who believes that economic theory, instead of being grounded on the eternal facts of human nature, is somehow relative to different historical epochs. GalbraithVsTradition: "Conventional" economic theory, he asserts, was true for the eras before the present, which were times of "poverty"; now, however, we have vaulted from a centuries-long state of poverty into an age of "affluence," and for such an age, a completely new economic theory is needed. Methodology/RothbardVsGalbraith: Galbraith also makes the philosophical error of believing that ideas are essentially "refuted by events"; on the contrary, in human action, as contrasted with the natural sciences, ideas can be refuted only by other ideas; events themselves are complex resultants which need to be interpreted by correct ideas. Poverty/affluence/definitions/definability/method: One of Galbraith's gravest flaws is the arbitrariness of the categories, which pervade his work, of "poverty" and "affluence." Nowhere does he define what he means by these terms, and therefore nowhere does he lay down standards by which we can know, even in theory, when we have passed the magic borderland between "poverty" and "affluence" that requires an entirely new economic theory to come into being. Wealth: (…) most (…) economic works make it evident that economic science is not dependent on some arbitrary level of wealth; the basic praxeological laws are true of all men at all times, and the catallactic laws of the exchange economy are true whenever and wherever exchanges are made. >Praxeology/Rothbard, >Catallactics/Rothbard. Rothbard III 975 Marginal utility/Galbraith: Galbraith makes much of his supposed discovery, suppressed by other economists, that the marginal utility of goods declines as one's income increases and that therefore a man's final $ 1,000 is not worth nearly as much to him as his first- the margin of subsistence. RothbardVsGalbraith: But this knowledge is familiar to most economists, and this book, for example, has included it. The marginal utility of goods certainly declines as our income rises; but the very fact that People continue to work for the final $ 1,000 and work for more money when the opportunity is available, demonstrates conclusively that the marginal utility of goods is still greater than the marginal disutility of leisure forgone. RothbardVsGalbraith: Galbraith's hidden fallacy is a quantitative assumption: from the mere fact that the marginal utility of goods falls as one's income and wealth rise, Galbraith has somehow concluded that it has already fallen to virtually, or really, zero. The fact of decline, however, tells us nothing whatever about the degree of this decline, which Galbraith arbitrarily assumes has been almost total. Leisure/labour/wealth: All economists, even the most "conventional," know that as incomes have risen in the modern world, workers have chosen to take more and more of that income in the form of leisure. And this should be proof enough that economists have long been familiar with the supposedly suppressed truth that the marginal utility of goods in general tends to decline as their supply increases. But, Galbraith retorts, economists admit that leisure is a consumers' good, but not that other goods decline in value as their supply increases. Yet this is surely an erroneous contention; what economists know is that, as civilization expands the supply of goods, the marginal utility of goods declines and the marginal utility of leisure forgone (the opportunity cost of labor) increases, so that more and more real income will be "taken" in the form of leisure. There is nothing at all startling, subversive, or revolutionary about this familiar fact. Rothbard III 976 Consumption/Galbraith/Rothbard: According to Galbraith, economists willfully ignore the spectre of the satiation of wants. Yet they do so quite properly, because when wants - or rather, wants for exchangeable goods - are truly satiated, we shall all know it soon enough; for, at that point, everyone will cease working, will cease trying to transform land resources into final consumers' goods. There will be no need to continue producing, because all needs for consumers' goods will have been supplied - or at least all those which can be produced and exchanged. At this point, everyone will stop work, the market economy - indeed, all economy - will come to an end, means will no longer be scarce in relation to ends, and everyone will bask in paradise. I think it self-evident that this time has not yet arrived and shows no signs of arriving; if it some day should arrive, it will be greeted by economists, as by most other people, not with curses, but with rejoicing. Despite their venerable reputation as practitioners of a "dismal science," economists have no vested interests, psychological or otherwise, in scarcity. Rothbard III 977 Advertising/Galbraith: An informal poll taken among the people, asking whether they would accept, or know what to do with, an extra few thousand dollars of annual (real) income, would find almost no one who would refuse the offer because of excessive affluence or satiety - or for any other reason. Few would be at a loss about what to do with their increased wealth. Rothbard: Professor Galbraith, of course, has an answer to all this. These wants, he says, are not real or genuine ones; they have been "created" in the populace by advertisers, and their wicked clients, the producing businessmen. The very fact of production, through such advertising, "creates" the supposed wants that it supplies. Galbraith's entire theory of excess affluence rests on this flimsy assertion that consumer wants are artificially created by business itself.(4) Rothbard III 978 Advertising/RothbardVsGalbraith: There are many fallacies in Galbraith's conventional attack on advertising. 1) In the first place, it is not true that advertising "creates" wants or demands on the part of the consumers. It certainly tries to persuade consumers to buy the product; but it cannot create wants or demands, because each person must himself adopt the ideas and values on which he acts - whether these ideas or values are sound or unsound. Galbraith here assumes a naive form of determinism - of advertising upon the consumers, and, like all determinists, he leaves an implicit escape clause from the determination for people like himself, who are, unaccountably, not determined by advertising. If there is determinism by advertising, how can some people be determined to rush out and buy the product, while Professor Galbraith is free to resist the advertisements with indignation and to write a book denouncing the advertising? 2) Secondly, Galbraith gives us no standard to decide which wants are so "created" and which are legitimate. By his stress on poverty, one might think that all wants above the subsistence level are false wants created by advertising. Of course, he supplies no evidence for this view. But (…) this is hardly consistent with his views on public or governmentally induced wants. 3) Thirdly, Galbraith fails to distinguish between fulfilling a given want in a better way and inducing new wants. Unless we are to take the extreme and unsupported view that all wants above the subsistence line are "created," we must note the rather Odd behavior attributed to businessmen by Galbraith's assumptions. Why should businessmen go to the expense, bother, and uncertainty of trying to create new wants, when they could far more easily look for better or cheaper ways of fulfilling wants that consumers already have?(5) >Marketing research/Rothbard. 1. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958). 2. "Fable for Our Times," Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1960, p. 12. Thus Galbraith, ibid., deplores the government's failure to "invest more" in scientists and scientific research to promote our growth, while also attacking American affluence. It turns out, however, that Galbraith wants more of precisely that kind of research which can have no possible commercial application. 3. Galbraith's major rhetorical device may be called "the sustained sneer," which includes (a) presenting an opposing argument so sardonically as to make it seem patently absurd, with no need for reasoned refutation; (b) coining and reiterating Veblenesque names of disparagement, e.g., "the conventional wisdom"; and (c) ridiculing the opposition further by psychological ad hominem attacks, i.e., accusing opponents of having a psychological vested interest in their absurd doctrines - this mode of attack being now more fashionable than older accusations of economic venality. The "conventional wisdom" encompasses just about everything with which Galbraith disagrees. 4. In addition to wicked advertising, wants are also artificially created, according to Galbraith, by emulation of one's neighbor: "Keeping up With the Joneses." But, in the first place, what is wrong With such emulation, except an unsupported ethical judgment of Galbraith's? Galbraith pretends to ground his theory, not on his private ethical judgment, but on the alleged creation of wants by production itself. Yet simple emulation would not be a function of producers, but of consumers themselves- unless emulation, too, were inspired by advertising. But this reduces to the criticism of advertising discussed in the text. And secondly, where did the original Jones obtain his wants? Regardless of how many people have wants purely in emulation of others, some person or persons must have originally had these wants as genuine needs of their very own. Otherwise the argument is hopelessly circular. Once this is conceded, it is impossible for economics to decide to what extent each want is pervaded by emulation. 5. On the alleged powers of business advertising, it is well to note these pungent comments of Ludwig von Mises: „It is a widespread fallacy that skillful advertising can talk the consumers into buying everything that the advertiser wants them to buy.... However, nobody believes that any kind of advertising would have succeeded in making the candlemakers hold the field against the electric bulb, the horse-drivers against the motorcars, the goose quill against the steel pen and later against the fountain pen.“ (Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 317) |
Galbraith I John Kenneth Galbraith The Affluent Society London 1999 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Causal Explanation | Cartwright | I 10 Causal Explanation/Cartwright: Here, truth is critical - (but explanatory power does not guarantee truth). - But it's only the truth of deeply settled causal principles and phenomenological laws. >Explanation, >Description, >Truth, >Causality, >Causal laws, >Physics. I 82 Causal Explanation/Important Argument/Cartwright: in causal explanations we do not have to assume redundancy (possibility of alternative explanation or alternative causes) as with the mathematical (theoretical) explanation - theoretical explanation: can be justified by inference on the best explanation - causal explanations not - instead: they have an independent test for their truth: the controlled experiment. >Experiments. I 89 Declaration/Fraassen: the truth of an explanation cannot be inferred from its success. - E.g. Ptolemaic astronomy - ultimately not on the existence of theoretical entities. Duhem: truth is an external feature of explanations. >Truth/Duhem, >Explanation/Duhem. I 91 Different: in causal explanations, truth is inherent - a false cause makes the causal explanation false. >Causes. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Content | Block | Fodor IV 172 Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles throws no light on the distinction of meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to determine the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed. Categories/Block: he himself says that most empirical taxonomies do not provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the application of their own categories. Narrow Content/Categories/Twin Earth/Block/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Problem: how narrow contents can be expressed. E.g. if the mental states of the twins ipso facto share their contents, what then is the content that they share? It cannot be determined by what both share, namely the use of "water is wet": for that expresses the narrow proposition that water is wet. What then are the truth conditions? >Truth conditions. IV 173 Wide Meaning/Block: may be better suited to explain behavior. ((s) not only meaning in mind but also the circumstances). >Circumstances. Circumstances/Twin Earth/Wide Content/(s): Problem: if the circumstances consist in that once H2O and once XYZ is effective, the circumstances are something that the individual is unable to recognize. I.e. we do not know in which circumstances we are or which circumstances are given, since you cannot hold both situations up to one another.) >Twin earth. Fodor/Lepore: ... but only as far as there are nomological relations between world and belief. Psychological laws: if there are psychological laws, then there are ipso facto generalizations that work with wide, but not with narrow content. Fodor/Lepore pro. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it misses the main point: some of these psychological laws would then be fixed with regard to intentional content: IV 174 "Ceteris paribus, if someone believes this and that and wants this and that, then he will act in this and that way". Problem: there is then an appeal to these intentional laws and not to the non-contingent connections between mind and behavior, which supposedly define the functional definitions of the content. And these intentional laws are then supposed to support the psychological explanations. >Behavior. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Descriptions | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of description Explanatory power (of laws) The semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model. >Fundamental laws/Cartwright. Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to the truth. I 57 Description/Laws of Nature/LoN/Physical Laws/Cartwright: E.g. the gravitation law does not describe the behavior of the objects, because electrical forces also play a role - (Coulomb's law) - no charged body behaves according to the gravitation law. And every massive body is a counter-E.g. to Coulomb's law. Solution: "... if no other forces..." - without ceteris paribus. >ceteris paribus. I 131 Description/Physics/Cartwright: false: that we have to depart from existence assumptions to come to a description according to which we can set up the equations. Correct: the theory has only few principles to move from descriptions to equations - these principles certainly require structured information. - And the "descriptions" on the right side have to satisfy many mathematical requirements. >Equations, >Principles. The best descriptions are those that best match the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Economic Cycle | Schumpeter | Rothbard III 854 Business cycle/Schumpeter/Rothbard: Joseph Schumpeter's business cycle theory is one of the very few that attempts to integrate an explanation of the business cycle with an analysis of the entire economic system. The theory was presented in essence in his Theory of Economic Development, published in 1912. This analysis formed the basis for the "first approximation" of his more elaborate doctrine, presented in the two-volume Business cycles, published in 1939.(1) Rothbard: The latter volume, however, was a distinct retrogression from the former, for it attempted to explain the business cycle by postulating three superimposed cycles (each of which was explainable according to his "first approximation"). Periodicity: Each of these cycles is supposed to be roughly periodic in length. They are alleged by Schumpeter to be - the three-year "Kitchin" cycle; - the nine-year "Juglar"; and - the very long (50-year) "Kondratieff." These cycles are conceived as independent entities, combining in various ways to yield the aggregate cyclical pattern.(2) RothbardVsSchumpeter: Any such "multicyclic" approach must be set down as a mystical adoption of the fallacy of conceptual realism. Cf. >Conceptual realism. Rothbard III 855 Economic cycles: Rothbard: There is no reality or meaning to the allegedly independent sets of "cycles." The market is one interdependent unit, and the more developed it is, the greater the interrelations among market elements. It is therefore impossible for several or numerous independent cycles to coexist as self-contained units. It is precisely the characteristic of a business cycle that it permeates all market activities. Clycles/Economic theories: Many theorists have assumed the existence of periodic cycles, where the length of each successive cycle is uniform, even down to the precise number of months. T RothbardVsEconomic cycles: the quest for periodicity is a chimerical hankering after the laws of physics; in human action there are no quantitative constants. Praxeological laws can be only qualitative in nature. Therefore, there will be no periodicity in the length of business cycles. It is best, then, to discard Schumpeter's multicyclical schema entirely and to consider his more interesting one-cycle "approximation" (as presented in his earlier book), which he attempts to derive from his general economic analysis. Circular flow equilibrium: Schumpeter begins his study with the economy in a state of "circular flow" equilibrium, i.e., what amounts to a picture of an evenly rotating economy. Rothbard: This is proper, since it is only by hypothetically investigating the disturbances of an imaginary state of equilibrium that we can mentally isolate the causal factors of the business cycle. First, Schumpeter describes the ERE (Evenly Rotating Economy), where all anticipations are fulfilled, every individual and economic element is in equilibrium, profits and losses are zero - all based on given values and resources. >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard. Changes: Then, asks Schumpeter, what can impel changes in this setup? Demand: First, there are possible changes in consumer tastes and demands. This is cavalierly dismissed by Schumpeter as there are possible changes in population and therefore in the labor supply; but these are gradual, and entrepreneurs can readily adapt to them. Saving/investment: (…) there can be new saving and investment. Wisely, Schumpeter sees that changes in saving-investment rates imply no business cycle; new saving will cause continuous growth. Sudden changes in the rate of saving, when unanticipated by the market, can cause dislocations, of course, as may any sudden, unanticipated change. But there is nothing cyclic or mysterious about these effects. (…) Rothbard III 856 Innovation: Schumpeter turned to a fourth element, which for him was the generator of all growth as well as of business cycles - innovation in productive techniques. >Technology, >Inventions, >Progress. Innovations/RothbardVsSchumpeter: (…) innovations cannot be considered the prime mover of the economy, since innovations can work their effects only through saving and investment and since there are always a great many investments that could improve techniques within the corpus of existing knowledge, but which are not made for lack of adequate savings. This consideration alone is enough to invalidate Schumpeter's business-cycle theory. >Innovations/Rothbard. Clusters of innovation: Finally, Schumpeter's explanation of innovations as the trigger for the business cycle necessarily assumes that there is a recurrent cluster of innovations that takes Place in each boom period. Why should there be such a cluster of innovations? Why are innovations not more or less continuous, as we would expect? Schumpeter cannot answer this question satisfactorily. The fact that a bold few begin innovating and that they are followed by imitators does not yield a cluster, for this process could be continuous, with new innovators arriving on the scene. Schumpeter offers two explanations for the slackening of innovatory activity toward the end of the boom (a slackening essential to his theory). On the one hand, the release of new products yielded by the new investments creates diffculties for Old producers and leads to a period of uncertainty and need for „rest“. >Innovations/Schumpeter. 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 193 6), and idem, Business Cycles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939). Reprinted by Porcupine Press, 1982. 2. Warren and Pearson, as well as Dewey and Dakin, conceive of the business cycle as made up of superimposed, independent, periodic cycles from eachfield of production activity. See George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson, Prices (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 193 3); E.R. Dewey and E.F. Dakin, cycles: The Science of Prediction (New York: Holt, 1949). |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Explanation | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics, the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. >Fundamental laws, >Laws, >Natural laws, >Physics. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of the description. 1) explanatory power (of laws) does not speak for truth 2) even for falsehood, because we need ceteris paribus laws 3) the semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. >Truth, >Reality, >ceteris paribus. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law - Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model - E.: is not a guide to the truth. I 11 E/Physics/Cartwright: wrong question: "which is the correct equation?" - Different models bring different aspects - causal explanation: not in scientific practice, we do not tell sometimes one, sometimes another causal story. >Theories, >Models. I 44 E/CartwrightVsTradition: has nothing to do with truth - ((s)> Truth/M.Williams / >Truth/Horwich). I 47 E/Cartwright: after the laws of nature (LoN) are known, we still have to decide which factors should occur in an explanation - the decision of which is, however, not suggested by our knowledge of the laws of nature. I 50 Laws of Nature are never sufficient to explain something in a particular moment - the reasons to believe in them are not normal reasons, because we have never tested them - only reasons: explanation strategy - I 52 E: is still needed even after complete description. >Description, >Observation. I 70 E/All/Generalization/VsSuper Law/C: E.g. "Why is the quail in my garden shaking its head?" - "Because all of them do it" - no explanation! - Nor: E.g. "All carbon atoms have 5 energy levels" - Super laws in turn require the application of individual laws - and these do not represent facts. I 73 Explanation/Cartwright: Uses causes - ((s) not laws) - (EmpiricismVsCauses). I 92 E/LoN/Cartwright: it is not the fundamental laws (laws of nature) that I need for the explanation, but E.g. properties of electrons - plus assumptions about the specific situation. I 94 f Explanation/Grünbaum: a more comprehensive law G explains a less comprehensive law L which it contains not through the causes of L. I 96 Explanation/Duhem: does not draw a "veil" from reality - Explanation/Cartwright: explaining a set of phenomenological laws means giving a physical theory of them - without explaining these laws. I 103 Explanation/W. Salmon/Richard Jeffries: E. are no arguments. I 152 Explanation/Duhem: Organization (order of knowledge). Hacking I 96~ Explanation/Cartwright/Fraassen: if something is an explanation, it is no reason to believe it. I 99 Anti-Realism: E are not a feature of the truth but of adequacy. >Adequacy. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Explanation | Wright | I 182 Best Opinion/ethics/morality/Wright: we will see in Chapter 5 that moral issues do not occur in the best explanations of our moral beliefs. >Best Explanation/Wright. I 196f Best explanation/Wright: an explanation cannot be the best if it does not contain certain details. (But this is not supposed to be any naturalistic or scientific reductionist kind of explanation). An explanation will not be considered the best, as long as there is a competing equally good explanation, but which does not use the cognitive susceptibility. If such a declaration is actually equally good, it will explain why the (different) person in his community does not stand out. >Community, >Language community, >Convention. But then, the entire community can be considered deficient. The specific cognitive ability, thus becomes a fifth wheel. >D. Wiggins, >Cognitive Coercion, >Causal Role. I 240 Best explanation/Physics: should the best explanation not always be the same? Finally, the causal antecedents are, so to say, already in place, whatever the fate of the theory will be later. Why should the best explanation go beyond the statement of reasons and laws that precisely explain the forces that generate our beliefs? Wright: There is no reason why the best explanation should refer to any state of affairs which actually conveys truth to the theory, as we assume. Best explanation/Physics/Wright: should consist in scientific heritage, as well as in observations and certain psychological laws. >Explanation/Harman. ((s) So there is no mentioning of the facts.) Could the best explanation not always be "done better" , by always searching for a more fundamental level (for example: subatomic, etc.) If explanations are only best if they are valid, then they will always "overtake" their content. >Assertibility, >Superassertibility, >Ideal assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| History | Pareto | Brocker I 103 History/Pareto: Pareto (...) saw the essential driving force of history in the affects of humans. These are generally not very changeable. Politics and political sociology would have to take this legality into account if they did not want to lose their reference to reality. See Power/Pareto, Terminology/Pareto, Emotions/Pareto. VsPareto: Pareto has been accused of naturalizing social reality and mystifying the irrational. He undoubtedly had anthropological structures in mind that are upstream of consciousness. ParetoVsPositivism: In this aspect of his work, however, Pareto shows himself above all as a representative of the intellectual movement of the fin de siècle, to which George Sorel, Gustave Le Bon and Sigmund Freud, among others, belonged. This movement was described as a "revolt against positivism" (Hughes 1977, 33) (1) because it brought into play the spontaneity and feelings of the masses against the rationality of planning and progress. >Positivism. VsPareto: However, it is not without a certain irony that Pareto himself raised social affects to the scientific object and wanted to surpass positivism by means of the hermeneutic process. ((s) See also Anomalous Monism/Davidson: there are no psychological laws.) Brocker I 109 History/Progress/Pareto: Pareto shaped the concept of the social elite. According to Pareto, every given society is inherent in a fundamental conflict: that between the ruling elites on the one hand, and the opposing elites on the other. The opposing elites are striving for a change of power and thus an exchange of the ruling elites. This leads to a constant "circulation of the elites" (2)((§ 2042), the actual driving force of social structural change. "History is a cemetery of the elite." (3) See Progress/Pareto. 1. Hughes, Henry Stuart, Consciousness and Society. The Reorientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930, New York 2. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale, Florenz 1916. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale. Edizione critica a cura di Giovanni Busino, 4 Bände, Turin 1988. Dt.: Vilfredo Paretos System der allgemeinen Soziologie, herausgegeben und übersetzt von Gottfried Eisermann, Stuttgart 1962, § 2042 2. Ibid. § 2053. Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Laws, fundamental | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered descriptive, the fundamental laws are considered explanatory - problem: the explanatory power is lost in favor of the descriptive adequacy. >Physics, >Natural laws, >Laws, >Adequacy, >Explanation. I 102 Nature/reality/laws/Natural Laws/Cartwright: without accepting God and a book of nature we have no reason to assume that the phenomenological laws are derived from the fundamental laws. >Phenomena. I 112 Fundamental laws/Natural Laws/Cartwright: represent rather the relations between properties than between individuals - practice: for the engineer it is about objects instead of properties. >Properties, >Relations, >Objects. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Literal Truth | Cartwright | I 65 Literal truth/literally/Fraassen/Cartwright: e.g. laws, which may not be followed literally: e.g. Onsager law for the combination of causes, cross effect. >Cause, >Effect. Problem: they must always be interpreted in an arbitrary manner. Solution/Cartwright: nature should be described with many phenomenological laws that are tailored to individual situations, not by first principles. I 77 Cartwright: not literally: explanatory laws - literally: causal laws (only those are t/f). >Theories, >Natural laws, >Laws, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal laws, >Explanation, >Observation. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Logic | Mates | I 258 Definition logic/Mates: theory of conlcusion relation. Task: to find general laws about what follows from what - correct thinking is not a contribution to logic. >Conditional/Mates, >Consequence, >Inference, >Conclusion, >Logical laws. I 260 Logic/Aristotle/Mates: Aristotle did not yet know the distinction mention/use. >Mention/use, >Aristotle. It is the same: if a thing is contained in another, and when each is stated of the other. I 261 First clear use of variables in history - for these names are used. >Variables, >Unity and multiplicity, >Difference, >Names. Variables/Stoics: "the first", "the second", etc. (unlike Aristotle). I 262 "Zukommen"/Aristotle: goes in both directions - which shows that there is no distinction between concept and object. >Concept, >Object, >Object/Quine, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description. I 265 Terms for "Zukommen" are nouns, sensual beings, human, for "Nicht-Zukommen" substance, sensual being, number. ((s) Today the corresponding form is "true of".) >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. I 281 Logic/Hobbes/Mates: influential (misleading) Argument: necessary truths would just come about through the random way how people like tthe o use their words. >Necessity, >Contingency, >Language use. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Logical Constants | Davidson | Glüer II 63f Principle of Charity/Wilson/Quine: the identification of the logical constants: one must translate in a way that the logical laws are not violated. >Principle of charity, >radical interpretation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Logical Truth | Quine | X 87 Logical Truth/Quine: is always in relation to a particular language, because grammatical structure (is not transcendent). - Because the same language (i.e. set of sentences) can be generated by different formation rules or encyclopedia - dependency on language and its grammar. X 88 Identity/logical truth/structure/Quine: Identity puts structural conception of the logical truth (as structural property of schemes) in question, because they become wrong if one inserts a different predicate instead of = (in logical truth each predicate must be replaceable by another). X 90 Identity/logical truth/structure/definition/Quine: if = is not simply interpreted as a predicate in the lexicon of the object language, but only as an abbreviation for compound sentences like (3), then the laws of identity are nothing but abbreviations of logical truths of the quantifier logic. Then the structural conception of the logical truth is saved. X 109 Logical truth/attitudes/propositional attitude/Quine: if we had schemes with them, we could not decide which of them are valid. - Laws for attitudes should not be logical laws, because propositional attitudes are too content rich. X 109 Logical Truth/modality/modal logic/Quine: the modalities leave more room here than the attitudes: we can get schemes here that are valid: E.g. ~(~ p necc. p) - Also, we receive from any valid scheme another one by prefixing of necessary E.g. necc. (p or ~p) from p or ~p. X 127 Logical truth/Carnap: Thesis: are purely linguistical, because they are true in every replacement from the lexicon. >Lexicon/Quine. X 127ff Logic/language/reality/QuineVsCarnap: logical truth is not purely linguistic, because evidence is as important as the translation. - E.g. expression of "it is raining" when it rains. - But no logical consequences from circumstances, because true sentences follow from any sentence. - All evident things are inseparable from the translation. - Semantic ascent seems to speak for the language of logic. - Vs: the truth predicate shows the separation from the language. - Quine: the logic is based on the world and not on the language. I 133 Yet: pro Carnap: we learn the logic by learning the language. - But that’s not different from everyday knowledge. >Logic/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Natural Laws | Cartwright | I 3 Natural Laws/Truth// Cartwright: thesis: the truly explanatory (theoretical) laws of physics do not tell us the truth. >Explanations, >Physics, >Truth, >Reality. I 21 Laws of nature / Cartwright: two ways: a) Association / Hume: e.g. the equations of physics: whenever force acts on an object, the acceleration f/m. >Equations. b) causal laws: E.g. Smoking causes cancer. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal laws, >Fundamental law/Cartwright. Hacking I 56 Laws of nature / Nancy Cartwright: deceptive, only phenomenological laws > possibility of truth. But it is possible that we know about causally effective communication. I 70 Laws do not reflect facts and do not evoke anything. CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are features of the processes by which we theorize - per Entity -Realism VsTheory-Realism. >Regularity. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Person | Simons | I 207 Person/body/Simons: e.g. operation: the person does not exist during the operation. The operation is carried out on the body, e.g. after amnesia + unlimited capacity to learn: we have a new person in the old body (Simons pro Locke). On the other hand: person: a) to have rights, b ) substrate of change, controlled by psychological laws. Then the definition of a person is: the capacity to characteristic processes, not the current practice of capacity. The person remains the person when he/she sleeps. >Continuants, >Body, >Human. I 211 Person dies/body remains. Coincidence: nevertheless the person has no parts that the body does not have, in particular no intangible parts. >Parts. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Possibility | Wittgenstein | II 31 Possibility/Wittgenstein: we must not say: "A sentence p is possible." If p was not possible, it would not even be a sentence. II 139 Possibility/Novelty/News/Wittgenstein: we discover new facts, not new possibilities. There is no point asking if red exists. >Existence, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Sense. II 167/168 Possibility/Necessity/Realism/Idealism/Wittgenstein: in the arguments of idealists and realists the words "can", "cannot" and "must" always appear somewhere. However, no attempt is made to prove their theories through experience. >Experience, >Necessity. The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility". II 228 Possibility/Wittgenstein: we tend to see a possibility as something that exists in nature. "This is possible" here, the real is a certain picture. >Picture. II 229 For example, "it is potentially present" gives the impression that we have given an explanation that goes beyond the possibility. But in reality, we have only replaced one expression with another. II 235 Possible/impossible/possibility/meaning/Wittgenstein: this is in a certain sense arbitrary. We say nobody sits in that chair, but someone could be sitting there. That means: the sentence "someone sits on this chair" makes sense. II 359 Possibility/Wittgenstein: by this we mean logically possible. Where can we look for the phenomenon of possibility? What justifies a symbolism is its usefulness. >Logical possibility. II 362 Possibility/Assignment/Wittgenstein: the possibility of assignment itself seems to be a kind of assignment. IV 19 Thinking/Possibility/Logic/Tractatus: 3.02 What is conceivable is also possible. 3,031 It was said: God could do anything, but nothing that would be contrary to the logical laws. For we could not say what an "illogical world" would look like. >Conceivability/Chalmers. IV 20 3.032 Something "contrary to logic" cannot be depicted, nor can a figure in geometry whose coordinates contradict the laws of space. IV 20 Tractatus: 3.13 the sentence includes everything that belongs to projection, but not what is projected. IV 21 So the possibility of the projected, not this itself. The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it. IV 81 Possibility/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.525 It is incorrect to reproduce the sentence "(Ex).fx" as "fx is possible". - Possibility: is expressed by the fact that a sentence makes sense. Impossibility: by the fact that the sentence is a contradiction. >Contradictions. VI 113 Possibility/Wittgenstein/Schulte: everything that is possible at all is also legitimate. Example: Why is "Socrates is Plato" nonsense? Because we have not made an arbitrary determination, but not because the sign itself is illegitimate. >Use, >Convention. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Prediction | Quine | VI 2 Prediction/Forecast/Quine: it is always observations, what we predict. >Observation/Quine. VI 137 Terms/Theory/Quine: Exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy" have no predictive power. IV 413 Theory: as a whole, a theory has consequences that can serve as predictions. I 45 Theory/prediction/concepts/sentences/observation/Quine: is a mutual animation of sentences. A prediction is actually an anticipation of further evidence. If a prediction turns out to be wrong, we are dealing with a deviant and disturbing sensory stimulus that deletes the conditioning from one sentence to another that led to the prediction. So it happens that theories die when their predictions fail. >Theories/Quine. I 232 Truth: there are philosophers who stubbornly claim that the utterance "true" in relation to logical or mathematical laws and the utterance "true" in relation to weather forecasts or confessions are two different uses of the one ambiguous term "true". QuineVs: what amazes me is the persistence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood as unambiguous, but very general, and the difference between true logical judgements and true confessions should not only be seen as the difference between logical laws and confessions? >Truth/Quine. I 335 Theoretical statements of science and mathematics are usually timeless, even reports and predictions of specific individual events are timeless if points in time, places and persons are given objectively and are not subject to the change of the reference objects of indicator words. A timeless sentence can be expected to contain no index words. >Timelessness/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Principle of Charity | Davidson | Glüer II 42 Def Principle of Charity: Consider the fact that the speakers of a language consider a sentence (under observed conditions) to be true as prima facie evidence that the sentence is true under those conditions. Glüer II 63f Principle of charity/Wilson/Quine: the identification of the logical constants: it must be translated so that the logical laws are not violated. Glüer II 72f Principle of charity/e.g. Champagne: (the person with the champagne is angry - but the person intended drinks only water) if a true statement is assumed, the principle is questionable. I 74 DavidsonVsBurge: 1. It is wrong that our intuitive notions would suggest that the linguistic utterances and thoughts of an actor would be in the sense of what others mean by the same words. I 75 Problem: which group should determine the standards? Another reason: we best understand the speaker as he or she intends to be interpreted (charity). 2 According to Burge, what the speaker means should be tied to the possibly unconscious use of an elite: Contradiction with the authority of the first person. >Meaning (intending), >Interpretation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Reality | Cartwright | I 202 Properties/reality/ontology/causality/Cartwright: Thesis: causality is the key to the question which properties are real. - ((s) A property must be able to be a cause or may play a causal role). >Causality. Predicates/Cartwright: many predicates represent only properties in the model, characteristics which allow the derivation of real phenomenological laws. >Models, >Theories, >Representation. I 203 Invariance/Cartwright: is a mathematical tool - (as well as the unitarity operator) - but rotational invariance is also an expression of a real physical characteristic - (There are more spectral lines). >Invariants, >Method. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Reference | Prior | I 3 Reference/Prior: E.g. if you think that some men are pigs because some actually are, you forget you could think the same, if no man at all is a pig. >Non-existence, >Reference, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Logical laws, >Logic/Russell, >Contradictions, >Errors, >Delusions. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Similarity | Hintikka | II 189 Similarity/semantics of possible worlds/similarity metric/Hintikka: we interpret the distance as a dissimilarity of worlds. >Semantics of possible worlds. Dimension: here, of course, there are different dimensions, i.e. directions in which worlds can differ, Intentionality/Hintikka: intentionality has therefore different dimensions. >Intentionality/Hintikka. Similarity/semantics of possible worlds/similarity metrics/Hintikka: In the following respects possible worlds may differ or resemble each other: a) Facticity: One can only know what is the case. Formal: Every possible world is always an element of a set of alternative worlds. There is then always a world, which is maximally similar to the considered possible world. b) Preservation of individuals/constant, fixed domain: One world can be similar to another because the same individuals are in it. This can fail in two ways: (i) The existence of individuals is not preserved in the transition to another possible world. (ii) Individuals can exist in worlds without existing in the actual world. (iii) Preservation of the identity of individuals can be violated twice: (a) by the fusion of individuals in another world, which are two in the actual world, (b) by splitting an individual from the actual world in another world. The extensibility of worldlines: can fail twice: (i) a worldline cannot be drawn to an alternative world, (ii) it cannot be drawn from an alternative back to the possible world under consideration. II 190 e) Logical invariance: The logical invariance of worlds is possibly the most radical deviation: in a world logical laws could be invalid. f) Methods to draw world lines: Here, different principles could apply to different intentional concepts. Sometimes they could be more objective, sometimes more dependent on the actions of the person. This is less about distance between worlds than about the strength of the connections between them. Memory/Belief/Hintikka: Criterion (f) explains why Bsp memory is less intentional than e.g. belief. Worldlines/Hintikka: Worldlines correspond to Lewis' counterpart relation (GR). They are determined only by reference to the worlds they connect. Therefore, at first glance, they are independent of the subject. But this does not mean that they are independent of conventions. Intentionality/Hintikka: We are concerned here with the ways of general human operations that lead to the prevalence of a particular fabric of world-lines for a particular intentional concept. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Society | Rawls | I 4 Def society/Rawls: Let us assume that a society is a more or less self-sufficient merger of people who recognize certain behavioral rules and usually live in harmony with them. These rules are intended to create a system of cooperation which will provide the participants with advantages. Then society is typically characterized by conflicts as well as equal interests. I 12 Society/Rawls: according to our principle of justice as fairness, we assume that the parties of the initial situation are rational and not interested in the interests of others. That is, for example, that they allow that their religious attitudes differ. I 13 Inequality: e.g. in prosperity and authority: is only justified if it serves the public good and the weakest members of society. Unequal distribution should be such as to encourage the willingness of all to cooperate. I 17 Objectives/purposes: objectives and purposes should not be placed in a ranking. I 118 Society/initial position/Rawls: what is the initial position for a society to be established? I 119 We must show that the two principles of justice (See Principles/Rawls) have emerged from a rational choice of individuals in the initial situation to secure their own benefits. For example, that they are an answer to unbridled egoism. When individuals judge deductively, an equilibrium will develop, such as in markets, for example. I 120 Equilibrium: but does not guarantee that the state is fair yet. It just means that people act effectively to secure their position. Initial position: is defined as a status quo in which all reached agreements are fair, in which the parties involved are moral persons and the result is not determined by accidental inequalities. This makes it possible to adopt procedural fairness from the outset. Of course, the initial situation is a completely fictional one; it cannot serve to explain concrete human action. I 121 Psychology: It is also not about psychological laws that could be effective in building a society. We assume psychology only in relation to rational expectations in connection with the individual interests of people. However, our further procedure can be purely deductive. Nevertheless, my approach is always very intuitive. Initial situation/Rawls: still allows different interpretations regarding attitudes, beliefs and available alternatives for the parties involved. I 123 Optimum: Unfortunately, we have no way of identifying which action alternatives are best for the participants in the initial situation. We are content with a small selection of classical possibilities, which we assume will be available to the parties involved: I 124 For example, the principles of greatest general equality, average utility, a social minimum, the principle of usefulness, the principle of perfection, the intuitional balance between overall utility and equal distribution, average utility against the principle of remedy, the dictatorship of the first person, free-riding, solipsism, total freedom for everyone. I 128 Circumstances of the initial situation: we assume a certain scarcity of resources and a disinterest of the persons in the individual interest of others, as well as a knowledge that these circumstances exist. I 129 Mutual disinterest is intended to ensure that the principles of justice are not based on overly strong assumptions. For the basis of a theory it is best to assume as little as possible. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Theoretical Terms | Schiffer | I 29 Theoretical Term/Folk Psychology/Lewis/Schiffer: Theoretical terms get their meaning from the roles they play in the theory that they introduce. >Conceptual role, >Theories. Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. >Functional role. Folk Psychology/Schiffer: a few years ago it was represented by all stringent materialists. Today it is represented by no one. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsFolk Psychology: no common sense theory has the means to define belief/desires. It would have to formulate law-like generalizations. - We do not wish in everyday life to rely on psychological laws. LewisVsVs: there must be covering laws. >Covering laws. I 30 SchifferVsCovering laws. Solution: we attribute belief under certain conditions, even without laws. Folk Psychology/Schiffer: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves 2. input conditions for perception (they cannot be part of common knowledge) 3. output conditions for actions. - Problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Theories | Cartwright | I 96 Theory/Duhem: is an abstract system for summing and logical classification of a set of experimental laws. - Does not explain the laws. >Laws, >Experimental laws. I 97 Theory is an organization of our knowledge. Theories/Cartwright: are abound - their explanations are not all needed. >Explanation. I 100 Theory/Cartwright: Prediction: lies in the fundamental laws. Content: lies in the phenomenological laws. I 133 Theory Entry: preliminary state: "unprepared description": left of the as-if-operator. 1st order prepared description: requires equation. 2nd order: Investigation of the prepared description with principles. - E.g. a laser can be described quite differently. (With or without memory). According to the decision, there are bridge principles that say which equations are to be applied. >Bridge laws. Hacking I 362 Theory/Cartwright: includes no truth itself. - If truth, then by approximations! >Idealization, >Truth. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Veil of Ignorance | Rawls | I 136 Veil of Ignorance/society/Rawls: this is about excluding contingent peculiarities when establishing a new form of society. To this end, the parties are to remain behind a veil of ignorance in the >initial situation of a society to be established, with regard to alternatives concerning their own individual case. I 137 This is intended to ensure that the principles in question are chosen on the basis of general considerations. Certain facts are said to be unknown: No one knows their place in society, class affiliation or social status, or their endowment with goods, intelligence, strength, and so on. Even his individual psychology, such as his propensity to optimism or pessimism, risk appetite or affiliation to a certain generation. On the other hand, general facts about human society should be known: people understand political problems and economic theory, social organization and the laws of the human psyche. I 138 There should be no restrictions on general information, i. e. on general laws and theories. ((s) Rawls assumes here that there are psychological laws, especially laws of moral psychology. (DavidsonVsRawls: VsPsychological Laws: see Anomalous Monism/Davidson). Initial Condition/problems/Rawls: it must be clarified that proposals belong to the range of permissible alternatives and general consequences of proposed principles must be known. I 139 The initial state is not a general assembly, that would be too much of a strain on the imagination. On the other hand, it is important that it does not matter who accepts the perspective of the initial state or when he does it. This is what the veil of ignorance is supposed to guarantee: the information available should be relevant but always the same. VsRawls: one can argue that the veil is irrational. RawlsVsVs: it is about ensuring that everyone can be convinced by the same arguments. Then people's points of view can be picked out by chance, the other people will behave in the same way. In addition, it is possible to accept an arbitrator who declares a ban on coalition, but this is superfluous if one assumes that the consultations of the parties are the same. Since no one has any further information, he cannot adjust the situation to his personal advantage. I 140 The only exception: an egoist could basically refuse to make his savings available to posterity. He could decide to do that without having any further information. The question of intergenerational justice must therefore be tackled elsewhere. I 141 Unanimity/conformity: in the initial state it is not a matter of agreement on concrete random facts (which are not known anyway). Otherwise, only trivial problems could be solved. I 142 Through the veil of Ignorance, the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls) are preferred to the criterion of usefulness. I 143 Rationality/Initial state: even in the initial state, where individuals have only general information, we assume that they strive to have more of it than less in relation to primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). I 166 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls: there is no problem with the assumption that newcomers arriving at the initial situation, which of course have less information. The veil of ignorance erases every basis for distinguishing different levels of information. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Covering Law | Cartwright Vs Covering Law | I 11 Explanation/Physics/Cartwright: two different types of activity: 1) causal explanation: when we explain a phenomenon, we find its causes. 2) theoretical explanation: we adapt the phenomenon to a broader theoretical framework Covering law/Cartwright: this approach tries to combine both strategies in one. CartwrightVsCovering law: the function of the laws is different in the two strategies, and also their claim on truth. And the difference is more than merely philosophical, we find it in scientific practice. Equations/Science/Physics/Cartwright: thesis: it is wrong to ask: "What are the correct equations?". Various models bring different aspects to the fore, some equations give a rougher estimate, but are easier to solve. No single model meets all purposes. We sometimes use this and someties the other equation. I 16 CartwrightVsCovering law: Individual case causation/Cartwright: although I think you can give a causal explanation of isolated events, I will confine myself here to the normal cases, which are described by phenomenological laws. (> Wesley Salmon Scientific Exspl. and A causal Structure of the World)). AllVsCovering law: does not describe the causes correctly. (> Scriven). But can it adapt the phenomena to the right frame?. I 17 CartwrightVsCovering law: instead: "Simulacrum" view. Def Simulacrum/Oxford Dictionary/Cartwright: "something that has merely the form or the appearance of a certain thing without possessing its substance or real qualities". Cartwright: that describes it very well! First, we construct a model that adapts the phenomenon to a theory. Covering law: thesis: there is one single correct explanation for each phenomenon. CartwrightVsCovering law: there are always several possible explanations. Theories are always redundant. That is what the deductively nomological approach misunderstands. I 45 VsCovering law model/VsHempel/Explanation/Cartwright: most object that Hempel allowed too much. E.g. the fact that Henry is not pregnant is by this approach due to him taking birth control pills if he does. Or e.g. it is possible that the barometer explains the storm. CartwrightVsCovering law/CarwrightVsHempel: one criticism is just the other way round: Hempel allows too little! With a covering law model we can explain almost nothing, not even the rainbow. Because we do not have enough LoN to explain it in detail ((s) not the general, but the individual rainbow). Explanation/Cartwright: many phenomena that have a perfect scientific explanation are not covered by any laws. That means, not by true laws. But at most by ceteris paribus laws/CPL). |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Creary, L | Cartwright Vs Creary, L | I 62 Factual View/Causal forces/Lewis Creary/Cartwright: Creary tries to maintain separate causal laws and at the same time to save the facts-view by postulating an intermediate effect: physical laws/Creary: Thesis: there are two types of them: a) Laws on causal influence: E.g. law of gravity. Coulomb’s Law: they tell us, what forces or other causal impacts become effective in different circumstances. b) Laws about causal action: ("Action laws"): they tell us what results arise from such combinations. E.g. law of vector addition, provides satisfactory explanations. Composition/Creary: less satisfactory types: E.g. amplification, interference, elimination (predomination). I 63 Truth/Physical laws/Creary/Cartwright: according to Creary these laws are true, because they correctly describe what influences are produced. Truth/Law/CartwrightVsCreary: this is a plausible representation of the structure of many causal explanations, but it has two disadvantages: 1) often there are no general laws of interaction. The dynamics of the vector addition is fortunate in this regard. Problem: irreversible processes: flux, Laws of transport (heat transport) distribution functions. The equations in statistical mechanics do not apply in 90% of cases. (Kline, Similitude and Approximation, NY, 1969, p. 140). I 65 Creary/Cartwright: his action laws (which provide the resulting overall behavior) only apply to individual cases. CartwrightVsCreary: better correct laws like Fick’s law. Nature/Cartwright: should rather be described by many phenomenological laws which are tailored to individual situations, than ruled by first principles. (s) VsCartwright: there can be no laws for individual situations (specific situations). CartwrightVsCreary: 2) causal influence: E.g. resulting force in vector addition: Creary: Thesis: there is no force that results, but a movement (behavior). With that we can deny the reality of a resulting force. Cartwright: We both agree that there cannot be three forces: the first two, and in addition the resulting one. CartwrightVsCreary: but I assert the reality of the resulting force while Creary asserts the component forces. Causal influence/Creary: is an intermediary factor between cause and what was initially thought to be the effect. CartwrightVsCreary: this will not work in general. E.g. two laws: a) C causes E b) C’ causes E’. In addition: C and C’ together cause E’’. Then we do not want to assume three effects E, E ’and E’’, but we need to assume some other incidents F and F’ as the actual effects of the two laws a) and b). And, according to another law, these will produce E’’. CartwrightVsCreary: this can work in individual cases, but not always. I see no reason why such intermediate factors should be found all the time. These seem to me more shadowy. |
Nancy Cartwright I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 |
| Davidson, D. | Harman Vs Davidson, D. | Field II 59 Meaning/HarmanVsCompositionality/HarmanVsDavidson: (1075, p.286): Davidson’s theory would be circular if the speaker, who somehow has to represent that snow is white, used the words "snow is white". If that is to be solved with Mentalese, the problem occurs again with the question about the meaning of Mentalese. Solution: not knowing the truth conditions is important for the semantics of representations, but we must attribute the truth conditions, not their knowledge. Field: we also want to be able to distinguish between beliefs about Caesar and those about quarks. Field: but it is a serious question why we should distinguish these contents of representations at all!. For the purposes mentioned above we only need syntax, no semantics of representations. E.g. Suppose a super-simple psychological theory that only seeks to explain the link ">" in representations legally: II 60 E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1> S2] and wishes S2, then they also want S1. Important argument: although this is explained by a truth value table, we do not need it for our psychological laws (of the super-simple theory). I.e. we do not need to know the meaning of the sentences S1 and S2. ((s) Is this about attribution? Then it is okay. Otherwise it would correspond approximately to: "I wish that the conditions for positive events are realized." And that is too complex and indirect.) Field: however, we must be able to introduce degrees of belief here. The super-simple theory could also include laws such as this: E.g. There is a special class of observation sentences in the representation system, with the property that each of them is connected with a particular type of stimulus. Whenever the stimulus occurs, the organism believes the observation sentence. Important argument: here we do not need to know the meaning of the observation sentence. The psychological theory does not need to assume that the sentence E.g. "there are rabbits in the vicinity" is true. Scientifically nothing is lost if the relation R is assumed to be one between people and meaningless sentences. E.g. in RI: RI: E.g. the native lifts his rifle in the face of the rabbit. This is an overwhelming reason to assume that he beliefs that there are rabbits in the vicinity. Solution: he beliefs a sentence in his language, which in his psychology II 61 plays about the same role as the sentence "there are rabbits in nearby" plays in mine. Semantics/Field: Important argument: is this really a semantic concept? Translation: Is a semantic concept, but a weak one. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Feynman, R. | Cartwright Vs Feynman, R. | I 19 Science/Cartwright: My image of it is not as pure as that of positivism. It is a jumble of unobservable entities, causal processes, and phenomenological laws. Reality/Positivism/Cartwright: pro: we have no better reality apart from the one we have at hand. Cartwright: Thesis: there is no reality behind the things, which would be described by theoretical laws. Explanation/Feynman: fitting the phenomena into the patterns of nature. CartwrightVsFeynman: What patterns? Nature/Cartwright: is a wild abundance that our thinking does not tame. Things that seem to be the same are not if we look at them up close. I 59 Force/Forces/Composition/Cause/Composition/Causality/Physics/Laws of Nature/LoN/Cartwright: E.g. the mix of electromechanics and gravity is an example of the composition of forces. Forces: are composed vectorially. Is that not a solution for all fears? We then obtain from vector addition the "resultant force". Vector Addition/Cartwright: We add numbers here (that represent the forces). These are calculations. It is not nature that "adds" the forces. For the "component forces" do not even exist! Only in a metaphorical sense. And the related laws must be seen metaphorically as well. The story with the vector addition presupposes that Feynman has forgotten something in his version of the law of gravitation, because it sounds as if the law described the results rather than the components. I 60 Law of Gravitation/CartwrightVsFeynman: should be better be written as follows: instead of ’... exercise ... ": "two bodies produce a force between each other.... (the force according to the gravitational)..." I 161 Refraction/Causality/Model/Feynman: (2nd Volume Berkeley Physics lectures: ~ "...we can now solve differential equations better than in the first semester. Previously, we were only able to find the refraction index for materials of low density such as gases, but during this process the physical principles that produced this index became clear. I 162 Now on the other hand (with differential equations) the physical origin is obscured! (This comes from reflected waves that interfere with the original ones. However, the theory is now simpler. CartwrightVsFeynman: I do not understand what it means for a theory to be "telling a causal story". How does he explain in the first volume that the physical principles produce the refraction? Cartwright: I already know what he does and he is successful in extracting a causal representation from his model. Causality/CartwrightVsFeynman: but I have no philosophical theory about how this is done. Causality/Philosophy/Cartwright: we need a new theory for the relation between causal processes and the fundamental laws. Our old theories are not suitable. Here, neither the covering law approach nor my simulacrum view are of any help. |
CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Kant | Frege Vs Kant | I 30 HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature! I 30 Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious. I 41 Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds I 42 Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!. I 43 A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity. I 120 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 121 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. IV 61 Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic. I 119 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 120 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection. I 121 The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. Stepanians I 34 Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. Stepanians I 34 pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view. I 36 Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic. Newen I21 Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical. Quine X 93 Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory. Tugendhat II 12 "Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Materialism | Wessel Vs Materialism | I 21 "Panlogism"/Wessel: panlogism refers to a philosophical doctrine, according to which the world develops according to logical laws. (World Laws, logos, Idealism). According to this, the world is dominated by something spiritual. Hegel: Everything real is reasonable. There are similar approaches in materialism. WesselVsMaterialism: projects only the general linguistic structure (logic) into reality and then identifies it with the structure of the world. The universality of logical rules that we represent has nothing to do with panlogism. Logical laws do not give us any information about the nature of non-linguistic reality. However, it is precisely the knowledge of this self-legality that allows us to distinguish real knowledge about non-linguistic reality from purely logical true statements. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Metaphysics | Cartwright Vs Metaphysics | I 102 Laws/Law of Nature/Include/LoN/Grünbaum: ("Science and Ideology", The Scientific Monthly, July 1954, p. 13-19): while a more comprehensive law G contains a less comprehensive law L, and thus provides an explanation, it does not provide the cause for L. Laws are not explained by showing how the regularities which they assert arise from a causation, but by showing that their truth is a special case of a broader truth. Cartwright: That is also the view of many of today’s realists. GrünbaumVsMetaphysics/Cartwright: should thus be acceptable to modern empiricists. I 103 "Generic-specific point of view"/Terminology/Grünbaum/Cartwright: I call his point of view the "generic-specific point of view". Grünbaum Thesis: in any particular set of circumstances the fundamental explanatory laws and the phenomenological laws make the same assertions. The fundamental laws are superior, because they make more general statements. Deductive-nomological model: goes with: the phenomenological ones are derived from the fundamental laws. |
CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Reductionism | Cartwright Vs Reductionism | I 100 Book of Nature/Science/BoN/17th Century/Boyle/Hooke/History/Cartwright: God wrote down the fundamental laws in the BoN. Then the phenomenological ones are a consequence of it. I 101 A lot of these cann still be found even in today’s philosophy of science, especially in the reductionism and the deductive-nomological model (although not by its authors Hempel, Grünbaum and Nagel). Cartwright: I myself have formerly used such stories in the classroom with the students: namely two creation stories: a) Reductionism: E.g. God writes the book of nature, Peter was his assistant. God writes down the fundamental laws and then leaves the hard-working Peter with a bit of a poor imagination to establish the phenomenological laws. b) God takes special care of the regularities in the world, there are no distinctions between different kinds of laws, God himself dictates every single one of them. Now Peter’s task is much more demanding: he must find the possible initial conditions! According to this view, all the laws are true together. I 102 Cartwright: I have searched long for a non-metaphorical analysis of these metaphors. Today I believe that it cannot be found. Laws/Derivative/Important argument/CartwrightVsReductionism: without the story of God and the Book of Nature, there is no sense in assuming that in nature something is derived from something else. I.e. that the fundamental laws are more "fundamental" and that the others apply "by virtue of them". Deductive-nomological model/Cartwright: here is only an apparent help: because here we can look for quasi-causal relation between LoN. If we do not find any, we focus on language. Then we have formal placeholders for relations between laws. CartwrightVsRealism: but the deductive-nomological model itself is not an argument for realism. Truth/Cartwright: without all the metaphysics, the success in the organization of our knowledge is no argument for the truth of the theory. We still need a story about how the connection between fundamental equations and complex laws should be. > Grünbaum (see above I 94). |
CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Russell, B. | Wessel Vs Russell, B. | I 14 Ontology/Logic/Psychology/RussellVsLaws of Thought: it is not important that we think in accordance with laws of thought, but that the behavior of things corresponds to them. Russell: what we believe when we believe in the sentence of contradiction is not that our consciousness is constructed this way. We do not believe, for example, that we cannot think at the same time that a tree is a beech and not a beech either. We believe that if the tree is a beech, it cannot be not a beech at the same time. I 15 And even if belief in the sentence of contradiction is a thought, the sentence of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning the things of the outside world. If what we believe would not apply to the things of the outside world, then the fact that we are forced to think like this would not guarantee that the sentence of contradiction cannot be wrong (this shows that it cannot be a law of thought). WesselVsRussell: logical laws do not concern the outside world! They do not give us any information about the outside world. The validity results only from the determination of the use of the signs! Of course, such phrases can also be formulated ontologically, but they are not ontological statements. Where else would we have the certainty that they are unrestrictedly valid? We cannot search the world endlessly. I 123 Subjunction/Material Implication/Frege/Wessel: Frege calls it "conditionality". I 123/124 Difference: between the subjunction A > B and a logical conclusion in which the only conclusion rule accepted by Frege is to conclude from A > B and A to B. ((s) modus ponens). Russell/Whitehead/Principia Mathematica(1): took over from Frege. "Essential property" of the implication: what is implied by a true statement is true. Through this property, an implication provides evidence. Def Implication/Russell/Principia Mathematica(1): p > q = def ~ p v q.(Materials Implication). WesselVsRussell: this is just inappropriate and misleading! It is purely formal! Implication/Conclusion/Wessel: the implication has a completely different logical structure than the consequence: Subjunction: > is a two-digit proposition-forming operator and p > q is synonymous with ~p v q. Conclusion (implication): "q follows logically p" or "P implies q" is a statement about statements: "From the statement p follows logically the statement q". "Follows from" is a two-digit predicate - not an operator. Conclusion (also called implication) refers to linguistic structures. Notation l-. Subjunction: > refers to facts. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Skepticism | Ryle Vs Skepticism | Fodor/Lepore Note 14. on IV 240 (related to IV 173) Functionalism: a functional semantics implies intrinsic connections between propositional attitudes and behavior. Wittgenstein/RyleVsSkepticism: attempted e.g. to use criteria for the relationship between mental states and behavior. Vs: the price for it is that the generalizations about relative consequences, which define a mental state, IV 241 are not contingent ipso facto, therefore Ryle does not believe in psychological laws. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Smart, J. C. | Quine Vs Smart, J. C. | II 118 ff The Oxford trained philosopher today turns one ear to common sense and the other one to science. Historians who do not want to be outflanked claim that the real driving force behind development was fashion. Even quantum theorists are heard to say that they do not attribute reality so much to the tiny objects of their theory as primarily to their experimental apparatuses, i.e. to ordinary things. In refreshing contrast to that is the Australian philosopher Smart: he represents a shamelessly realistic conception of physical elementary particles. The worldview of the physicist is not only ontologically respectable, but his language gives us a truer picture of the world than common sense. (Smart mainly studies physics). There have also been materialists who believe that living beings are indeed material, but subject to biological and psychological laws, which cannot be reduced to physical laws in principle. This was the emergence materialism. Smart's materialism is more robust than that. II 119 Smart Thesis: He denies that there are any laws in the strict sense in psychology and biology at all. The statements there are site-specific generalizations about some terrestrial plants of our acquaintance. SmartVsEmergence. They are at the same level as geography or reports on consumer behavior. That even applies to statements about cell division. They will most likely be falsified at least elsewhere in outer space, if not even here with us. (Law: explanatory force) Smart admits that statements about the small processes in biology tend to have more explanatory force. (Precisely, they come indeed closer to physicochemistry.) Biology describes a site-specific outgrowth, while physics describes the nature of the world. Psychology then describes an outgrowth on this outgrowth. II 120 Colors: Smart on the color concept: Color dominates our sensory experience, with its help we distinguish objects. But, that's the point of Smart's explanations: color differences rarely have an interesting connection to the laws of physics: a mixed color can appear to us as a pure one depending on contingent mechanisms inside us. It can be assumed that extraterrestrial beings have similar concepts of distance and electric charge, but hardly similar concepts of color. To view the world sub specie aeternitatis we have to avoid the concept of color and other secondary qualities. Primary: length, weight, hardness, shape, etc. are those that are easiest to incorporate in physical laws. For Smart, physicalism wins. On the subject of "humans as machines", today's opponents of mechanistic thought refer to Godel's theorem, which states that no formal proof method can cover the entire number theory. II 121 Smart, who represents the mechanistic view, argues against this rather gloomy application of the great Gödel theorem. The place where man defies the barriers of formal proof theory is that of the informal and largely resultless maneuvers of scientific method. Determinism: Smart agrees with Hobbes that >determinism and freedom are not antithetic to one another: deterministic action is considered free if it is in a certain way mediated by the agent. Ethics: The differentiation of activities for which one can be responsible, and those for which this is not true, follows the social apparatus of rewarding and punishing. Responsibility is assigned a place where reward and punishment tended to work. Disposition/Smart: This corresponds to an important element in the use of "he could have done." Smart continues to infer on "it could have" (e.g. broken). He brings this into context with the incompleteness of information relating to causal circumstances. Quine: I welcome this thesis for modalities. These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. because of ignorance, disregard details. There is a conception mocked by Smart, according to which the present moment moves forward through time at a velocity of sixty seconds per minute. Furthermore, there is the idea that sentences about the future are neither true nor false. Otherwise fatalism would get the the reins in his hand. Such thoughts are widespread and confused and partially go back to Aristotle. They have been put right with great clarity by Donald Williams et al. As Smart puts them right again, distinctive details are added. II 122 Incredible contrast between probability and truth. Smart: "probably" is an indicator; such as "I", "you" "now" "then" "here", "there". A word that depends on the use situation. For a specific statement of fact is, if at all, true at all times, whether we know it or not, but even then it can be more or less probable, depending on the situation. So modality concept of probability finally ends in subjective ambiguity, like the modalities. Quine: Smart is an honest writer. Smart overcomes all moral dilemmas; the materialist takes the bull by the horns and effortlessly wins over the moralists! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Tarski, A. | Kripke Vs Tarski, A. | III 337 Expansion/Language/Kripke: Here we need Set Theory, at least the sets of the expressions of L. (As Tarski, who is dealing, however,with referential language). DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: he needs less ontology and less richness of metalanguage. III 367 Substitutional quantification/sQ/KripkeVsTarski: substitution quantification together with the formula Q(p,a) solves Tarski’s problem to define a "true sentence". III 410 Language/Kripke: When a language is introduced, an explicit definition of W is a necessary and sufficient condition that the language has mathematically defined (extensional) semantics. Otherwise, the language can be explained in informal English. The semantics is then intuitive. Before Tarski, semantics have generally been treated that way. Convention T/DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: for Davidson the axioms must be finite in number. Kripke: his work is much more controversial than that of Tarski. Field I 245 Def disquotational truth/dW/Field: can be defined with the help of substitution quantification (∏/(s): for all sentences, not objects .... is valid) for all sentences, not objects") definiert werden. S is true iff ∏p(if S = "p", p). where "p" sentences are substituents. But which sentences?. Konjunctions/Understanding/Paradoxies/Field: Konjunctions of sentences: makes only sense if the sentences have been understood beforehand, i.e. that the conjunctions themselves (and sentences constructed from them) are not allowed as conjuncts. (>Semantic Paradoxes, (s) >Everything he said is true). Solution: Tarski similar hierarchy of T-predicates. Predicates: then the definition of the dW by substitutional quantification (sQ)is typically ambiguous: each element of the hierarchy is provided by the corresponding sQ. KripkeVsTarski: (Kripke 1975): he is to restrictive for our aim: as such we do not obtain all ueK that we need. Solution/Kripke: others, quasi imprädikative Interpretation von dW. Analog für Field I 246 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Kripke: Authorizes sentences to be a part of themselves and things, which are build from those sentences, to be conjuncts. However, the truth value of those quasi impredicative conjuncts are to be objectively indeterminate until the truth value is assigned to a certain level. sQ/Field: Allows then ueK without semantic ascent. If we want to talk about the non-linguistic world, why should we use sentences which we do not need?. → sQ: Could then be used as a basic term. → Basic term/Field: This means that a) the basic term is not defined by even more basic termini. → b) the basic term does not try to explain even more basic terms in theory (Field for each a) and b). → If we accept a), we need, however, to explain how the term obtains its meaning. Perhaps from logical laws which regulate its use. If we accept a), it is not a problem to accept b) as well. → Explanation/Field: e.g. the issue regarding mentalistic terms is not to give a meaning, but to show that the term is not primitive (basal). The ideology in logical terms does not need to be reduced that much. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tradition | Cartwright Vs Tradition | I 44 Truth/Explanation/Science/Theory/Tradition/Cartwright: theories tell us, a) what is true in nature, and b) how we should explain it. CartwrightVsTradition: thesis: truth and explanation are two totally different functions and should be kept apart, which is often not done. Explanation/Description/Tradition/Cartwright: is mostly viewed as a byproduct of truth. Theories allegedly explain by virtue of the description which they give of reality. That would mean, once you have a description, science becomes obsolete. Description/Tradition/Cartwright: would list all the laws, the values of the fundamental constants, the distributions of the mass, and ipso facto determine how we have to explain them. Explanation/CartwrightVsTradition: this is a misunderstanding! And this misunderstanding is favored by the covering-law model. I 100 Phenomenological laws/tradition: apply only due to underlying, more fundamental laws. CartwrightVsTradition: this is an extreme realism with regard to these fundamental laws. As if the fundamental laws made the phenomenological laws true. That is the view of the 17th century. (Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke). I 136 Bridge principles/Theory/Tradition/Cartwright: tell us what Hamiltonians must be selected. CartwrightVsTradition: if that were so, the students would learn bridge principles, with mathematical formulas on one side and descriptions of real things on the other. But that is not so. In fact, real things are not even mentioned! You only learn rows of Hamiltonians for fictional objects. |
CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Tradition | Wessel Vs Tradition | I 16 Universality/WesselVsTradition: according to the traditional view there are individual domains in which the logical rules supposedly do not apply: e.g. states of change. In modern intuitionist mathematics, double negation is not equated with position. Wessel's Question: why do we regard these logical laws as universal and not others? Where is the boundary between universal and nonuniversal laws? Here one should not expect reasonable answers. Logical laws, by their very nature, do not allow for exceptions, I 17 and they do not depend on any peculiarities of an area. The only thing that depends on the range is which of the known laws are used. I 329 Definition/Wessel: it is always about the introduction of a new term for an already known (introduced) term. ta ‹_›def tb or a ‹_›def b. I 330 Tradition: a more general term is always restricted. (>genus, differentia specifica). Example electron: light, negative elementary particle. ta '_'def t(b lv P u Q) (b lv P u Q: "b with the property P u Q"). WesselVsTradition: a definition can also have a completely different form: ta '_' t(a1 v ...van) (e.g. "fruit", enumeration). |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Various Authors | Cartwright Vs Various Authors | I 79 Mathematical explanation/Quantum damping/Agarwal: Important argument: There are six different approaches here with six different equations! (>Redundancy, alternative explanation). I 80 For example, There are various versions of the Schroedinger equation. I 81 Equation/Theoretical explanation/Laws/Cartwright: Thesis: these (alternative, redundant) explanations do not determine any objective laws. Equations/CartwrightVsAgarwal: the alternative equations are in competition with each other. They offer a variety of laws for the same phenomenon. AgarwalVsCartwright: he thinks that different approaches serve different purposes. That means they do not compete. I 94 Laws/Include/Explanation/Laws of Nature/LoN/Grünbaum: ("Science and Ideology", The Scientific Monthly, July 1954, p 13-19): while a more comprehensive law G contains a less comprehensive law L, and thus provides an explanation, it is not the cause of L. Laws are not explained by showing that the regularities which they assert arise from a causation, but that their truth is a special case of a more comprehensive truth. CartwrightVsGrünbaum: In this, it is assumed that the fundamental laws make the same assertions as the concrete ones which explain them. I 95 This then depends on the phenomenological laws being derived from the fundamental ones (>deduction >deductive) if the situation is specified. If the phenomenological laws are right, then the fundamental ones are too, at least in that situation. Problem: there is still a problem of induction: do the fundamental laws make correct generalizations about situations? Explanatory laws/Explanation/Cartwright: the explanatory laws are to explain the phenomenological ones and therefore a variety of other phenomenological laws in other situations. But they are much more economical (because they do not need to specify the special situations). Measuring/Reality/Realistic/Real/Cartwright: if we want to know which properties are real in a theory, we must look for the causal role. I 182 Measuring/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Problem: the static values of dynamic variables have no effect. Only if systems exchange energy, momentum or another conserved quantity, something happens in the QM. E.g. knowing the position of a particle, does not say anything about his future conduct. The detector only responds to a change in energy. Measuring/QM/Henry Margenau/Cartwright: (Margenau, Phil.of Science 4 (1937) p 352-6): Thesis: all measurements in QM are ultimately position measurements. Cartwright: but position measurements themselves are ultimately registrations of interactions at the destruction. This is inelastic, that is, the energy is not conserved in the particles. That means the detector absorbs the energy of the particle. This causes the detector to be ionized. Transitional prob/CartwrightVsMargenau: Solution: So it’s about the prob that the ionization of the detector takes place. Problem: there could be background radiation which causes the ionization without particles. Or, conversely, the disc could be ineffective, so that the energy of the particle is not registered. I 183 Problem/Cartwright: Another problem: the energy must be adequate. This could lead to inconsistencies. Soret effect: here we only need to assume simple linear additivity in our law of action, and we obtain a cross-over effect by adding a thermal diffusion factor to Fick’s law. Unfortunately this does not work for any random influences in the "Transport Theory" (heat transfer, etc.). I 65 Cross-over effect/Cartwright:. There is only one failed attempt to establish general principles for cross-over effects: by Onsager, 1931, further developed in the 1950s. But this was merely a Procrustes-like attempt that explains nothing new. VsOnsager: His principles are empty because they have to be interpreted once in one way and another time in a different way. They may not be followed literally, too much of it is up to the physicist’s imagination. Principle: is empty if it has to be interpreted differently on different occasions. I 174th Schroedinger equation/CartwrightVsSchroedinger equation: Problem: according to it, the electron in the accelerator has neither a particular direction nor a particular energy - SE is refuted daily by reducing the wave packet - not by measurement, but by preparation. I 75 Science/Explanation/Cartwright: the framework of modern physics is mathematical and good explanations will always allow precise calculations. Explanation/Rene Thom: (1972, p 5): Descartes: his vortexes and atom chains explained everything and calculated nothing. Newton: calculated everything and explained nothing. CartwrightVsThom: in modern science we have to keep causal and theoretical explanation apart as well, but they work differently: If we accept Descartes’ causal story, we must accept his assertions of linked atoms and vortexes as true. But we do not assume Newton’s law on the inverse square of the distance to be true or false. |
CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Covering Law | Cartwright, N. | I 16 Covering Law: Thesis 1. Phenomenological laws are derivable from fundamental laws. 2. It is the fundamental laws that govern phenomenology. Perhaps by more abstract, more general description. I 17 Covering law: Thesis: there is a single correct explanation for each phenomenon. CartwrightVsCovering Law: there are always several possible explanations. Theories are always redundant. This is what the deductive-nomological approach fails to recognize. |
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| Laws | Cartwright, N. | Cartwright: I have three connected arguments. Thesis 1: The obvious explanatory power of fundamental laws does not speak for their truth. Thesis 2: The way in which fundamental laws are used in explanations speaks for their falsity. We explain by ceteris paribus laws by merging causes by approximations that exceed what the fundamental laws dictate. Thesis 3: The appearance of truth comes from a bad explanatory model, I 4 that connects laws directly to reality. Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum-View"/Cartwright: from explanation: Thesis: the path from theory to reality goes like this: theory > model > phenomenological law. Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are true only of the objects in the model. I 10 Asymmetry: Causal laws are asymmetric: Effect and cause cannot be interchanged. - On the other hand symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: e.g. length of shadow/height of mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: The explanatory asymmetries are not real. There is no fact about what explains what. CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: Association is not sufficient to distinguish between effective and ineffective strategies to fight malaria. I 51 Laws of Nature/Science/Cartwright: Thesis: There are no laws for cases where theories overlap. |
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| Theory | Cartwright, N. | I 3 Cartwright: Thesis: The path from theory to reality is as follows: theory > model > phenomenological law. Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be) - fundamental laws/Cartwright: are true only of the objects in the model. Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to truth. I 131 Description/Theory/Equation/Cartwright: Thesis: The descriptions that describe best are just not the ones to which the equations apply best. |
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