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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Essence | Simons | I 258 Essential/Simons: what exists, exists essentially. But it does not exist necessarily. Solution: assuming that e.g. whatever is a human, must be a human. Essential/Simons: essential means "relatively necessary". It is essential for Cicero that he exists. Necessary/Wiggins: necessary should distinguish these cases. >Necessity/Wiggins, >Necessity de re/Wiggins. I 261 Trivially essential/Simons: e.g. to be colored if red, e.g. to be self-identical, e.g. to exist, e.g. "to be like that 2 + 2 = 4" is trivially essential. Essential attributes: essential attributes are no "mere facts" ("brute facts"), but an object has them by virtue of the fact that it belongs to a certain type. It is not accidental for an object of a given type, that it has the characteristics which underlie the type. >Attributes, >Features/Frege. I 284 Normal/essential/middle course/Simons: "normal part of a normal thing of a type" is the middle course between simple and essential part. This is often forgotten by philosophers ((s) they take type as the fundamental concept but no formal theory). Normality: perhaps starting from wellformedness. Woltersdorff: e.g. music piece, performance. SimonsVs: this does not work because of transitivity of identity. >Transitivity, >Identity. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Facts | Simons | I 317 Mere fact/Simons: e.g. that something happens to be a part of something else is a mere fact. >Bare facts, >Mere facts, >Coincidence. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Realism | Fraassen | I 4 Realism/FraassenVsRealism: inverted error as in positivism: instead of making everything into language, it realizes everything that cannot be defined away. >Positivism. I 7 ((s) VsRealism/Fraassen/(s): realism cannot claim that the present best theory is false, i.e. it is ultimately denying progress.) I 9 However, the orientation to truth does not imply that we are ever entitled to believe a theory. I 21 Realism/Best Explanation/Fraassen: every regularity needs an explanation. Nominalism: there are only regularities, but they do not all have to be explained. >Nominalism. I 24 Regularities are "mere facts" (or: "naked facts"). I 32f Sellars: pro Realism - Theory/Sellars: explains not at all, but shows why observable objects obey so-called laws - there are no empirical laws - For example that water boils at 100°C is valid only under normal pressure. - (> Laws/Nancy Cartwright, Theories/Cartwright, Explanations/Cartwright). I 37 Realism/Dummett: new: realism should not relate classes of entities and expressions, but classes of statements - these can only be understood by reference to the kind thing we would accept as evidence - thus the nominalist becomes a realist. I 38 Realism/Dummett/Fraassen: this is where Dummett is concerned with language. - According to him, not all sentences must be true/false - but they can be! Constructive Empiricism: also the constructive empiricism adopts mind-independent truth values. FraassenVsDummett: this is not about language. >Empiricism. I 209 Realism/Fraassen pro: we know of some regularities - so there must be underlying reasons - according to Thomas Aquina's proof of God's existence. >Proof of God's existence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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