Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Culture | Huntington | Brocker I 835 Culture/Huntington: Thesis: Western culture is in decline, while the economically strengthened Chinese and the rapidly growing demographically Islamic culture are becoming new challengers. Brocker I 836 Thesis: "Culture and the identity of cultures, i.e. the identity of cultural areas at the highest level", are decisive for current and future global patterns of order. (1) Brocker I 836 Huntington: Cultural areas are not closed, demarcable entities; however, we are still able to comprehend the rise and decline of certain cultural orders. Huntington differentiates seven or eight cultural areas: He distinguishes between Sinian, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Slavic-orthodox Brocker I 837 and Latin American, while the existence of a genuinely African culture is not conclusively established. (2) Relations between these cultural areas have so far taken place in two phases: 1) As "encounters": in the second until about 1500 AD, but limited by spatial and temporal distance. 2) The offensive extension of European rule to other continents led to significant intercultural relations under Western dominance, founded on the technological strength of the West. 3) We are currently witnessing real interactions between cultural centres. At this point Huntington uses Hedly Bull's system definition (1977 (3)), according to which states see themselves as part of the international system. See State/Huntington. Brocker I 838 Universal Culture/cultural universalism: the development of a "universal culture" appears to Huntington as naive wishful thinking. In fact, there is neither a universal language that goes beyond mere understanding nor a universal religion that is capable of breaking down cultural boundaries. This idea is a "typical product of Western culture". (4) The idea of such a culture is based on fallacy which the West believes in after the victory over Soviet Communism. Liberal democracy is by no means the only alternative to socialist ideas of order; nor can global trade and communication turn Western universalism into reality. Western culture is not the only modern culture. (5) A shift in the balance of power in favour of other cultural areas is "gradual, unstoppable and fundamental". (6) Brocker I 840 Culture/EspositoVsHuntington: the heart of Huntington's argument for a new world order is based on a monolithic understanding of culture. (7) Brocker I 847 Robert JervisVsHuntington: he regards cultural areas as given, unchanging units Brocker I 848 and thereby breaks with the constructivist perspective of the finiteness of identity. (8) Edward SaidVsHuntington: Said Thesis: Cultures are not ahistorical and uniform, but full of internal oppositions, adaptations, counter-concepts and variations that play no role in Huntington's crude abstractions. (9) Amartya SenVsHuntington: People are not just members of a single culture. Possible alternative attributes must not be hidden. (10) Dieter SenghaasVsHuntington: It remains unclear why certain cultures are belligerent - which is certainly due to the lack of theoretical support for the culture-behavior nexus. (11) Bruce LawrenceVsHuntington: Internal cultural heterogeneities are deliberately overlooked, giving the impression that large cultural circles can be given a united voice. The accusation of cultural racism is obvious here. (12) 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996. Dt.: Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, München/Wien 1998 (zuerst 1996).S. 19 2. Ebenda S. 57-62 3. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, New York 1977. 4. Huntington ebenda, S. 92 5. Ebenda S. 98 6. Ebenda S. 119. 7. John L. Esposito The Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality?, New York/Oxford 1999, S. 229 8. Robert Jervis »Review: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington«, in: Political Science Quarterly 112/2, 1997, 307-308. 9. Edward Said, »The Clash of Definitions. On Samuel Huntington«, in: ders., Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays, London. 2001, p. 569-590, S. 578f. 10. Amartya Sen Die Identitätsfalle. Warum es keinen Krieg der Kulturen gibt, München 2007, S. 54f. 11. Dieter Senghaas, Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst, Frankfurt/M. 1998, S. 140 12. Bruce Lawrence, 2002, »Conjuring with Islam, II«, in: The Journal of American History 89/2, 2002, 485-497, S. 489 Philipp Klüfers/Carlo Masala, „Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHunt I Samuel P. Huntington The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order New York 1996 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Formal Language | Mates | I 63 Artificial language/formal/counterpart/Mates: the statement forms of the natural language comply with formulas of the artificial, namely as a counterpart, not as abbreviations. >Propositional forms, >Propositional functions, >Natural language, >Equivalence. If symbols are not assigned to meaning, then "uninterpreted calculus". >Interpretation, >Sense, >Symbols. I 74 artificial language L/Mates: E.g. statement j: always true in relation to an interpretation I - values of "j": statements of the language L - values of I: interpretations of L. Cf. >Value progression/Frege, >Ideal language, >Universal language. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Grammar | Foucault | I 118 Search for the original root. Grammar/Hobbes: made from a system of symbols, which the individuals have chosen for themselves first. The language cannot explain to the thought at once, it must proceed linearly in one order. This linear order is foreign to the representation. The thoughts follow each other in time, but each one forms a unity. The language is for thinking and the sign what the algebra is for geometry. It substitutes for the simultaneous comparison of the parts the order whose degrees one can go through one after the other. In this sense language is the analysis of thought. Definition General Grammar: the study of the linguistic order in its relation to the simultaneity, which is to represent it according to its task. Thus, it has not thinking, and not language, as the actual object, but the discourse as a sequence of signs. In contrast to thinking, language stands as the reflected to the immediate. Language/Adam Smith: "The invention of even the simplest adjectives must have required more metaphysics than we can all comprehend." Consequences: division of the science of language into A) Rhetoric: spatial, figures, tropes, B) Grammar temporal order in time. Grammar presupposes a rhetorical nature even of the most primitive languages (see below). 2. Grammar: Reflection on the relationship that it maintains with the universality. Two forms, depending on whether one considers the possibility of a universal language. Universal/Foucault: to award each sign the unique way of representation, the power to go through all orders. The universal discourse is no longer the "only text", which, in the cipher of its mystery, contains the key to deciphering the world. Rather, the possibility to define everything. I 127ff Grammar/Foucault: The general grammar is not a comparative. It defines the system of identity/difference, which presupposes and uses those features. Analysis of the band of the link, different word types, theory of the structure, the origin, the root, the rhetorical space, the derivation. I 132 Theory of the verb: indispensable for any discourse. Without verb no language. >Verbs, >Language. Edge of the discourse, where the signs become the language. The verb indicates that the discourse is the discourse of the human who not only comprehends the names, but also judges them. I 134 The verb is the represented being of language, which makes it receptive to truth and error. This is why it differs from all signs which can be conformed, faithful (or not), what they designate, but are never true or false. What is the meaning and power that goes beyond the limits of the words? I 287ff Grammar/Language/Foucault: The horizontal comparison between languages achieves another function: it no longer allows to know what everyone brings back as memories from the time before Babel. Lexicography: first beginnings. Grammar: Principle of a primitive and general language that provides an original measure. (already existed before) Grammar/old: flection: the root is changed, the flexions are constant. Grammar/New element: role of subject or object, time of action, system of modifications. No more judging search after the first expression, but analysis of the sounds. Vowel rectangle. Comparative Grammar: one does not longer compare between the different languages a certain meaning, but the relations between the words. Language/old: as long as it was defined as a discourse, it could have no other history than that of its representations. Language/new: inner mechanism as the bearer of identity and difference, as a sign of neighborhood, a characteristic of kinship, a support of history. >Language, >Words, >Subject, >Object. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Ideal Language | Leibniz | Gadamer I 419 Universal Language/Ideal Language/Leibniz/Gadamer: The fundamental survey of the contingency of historical languages and the indeterminacy of their concepts would only be possible through mathematical symbolism: in the combinatorics of such a performed sign system - this was Leibniz's idea - new truths could be gained, which would be of mathematical certainty, because the "ordo" Gadamer I 420 depicted by such a sign system would have an equivalent in all languages.(1) >Language/Leibniz. Gadamer: It is probably clear that such a claim of the characteristica universalis to be an ars inveniendi, as Leibniz claims, is based precisely on the artificiality of this symbolism. It enables us to calculate, i.e. to find relations from the formal laws of combinatorics - regardless of whether experience leads us to corresponding contexts in things. Leibniz: For human reason, there is no higher adequacy of recognition than the notitia numerorum(2), and all calculation is based on the same pattern. GadamerVsLeibniz: [1.] But it is generally true that the imperfection of man does not permit adequate knowledge a priori and experience is indispensable. [2.] Knowledge through such symbols is not clear and distinct, because the symbol does not mean a vivid given. Such knowledge is "blind" in so far as the symbol takes the place of a real knowledge, indicating its availability alone. Leibniz: The ideal of language, which Leibniz pursues, is thus a "language" of reason, an analysis notionum, which, starting from the "first" concepts, would develop the whole system of true concepts and achieve the representation of the Universal of Being, as it would correspond to divine reason. GadamerVsLeibniz: In truth, this ideal makes it clear that language is something other than a mere sign system for designating the objective whole. The word is not only sign. In a sense that is difficult to grasp, it is also almost something like an image. One only needs to consider the extreme counter-possibility of a pure artificial language to recognize a relative right in such an archaic theory of language. The word is mysteriously bound to the "depicted", belonging to the being of the depicted. 1. Cf. Leibniz, Erdm. p. 77. 2. Leibniz, De cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684) Erdm., p. 79ff. 3. As is well known, already Descartes in his letter to Mersenne of November 20, 1629, which Leibniz knew, developed the idea of such a sign language of reason, which contained the whole of philosophy, on the model of the formation of number signs. A preform of this, admittedly in platonizing restriction of this idea, is already found in Nicolaus Cusanus, Idiota de mente Ill, cap. VI. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Hintikka | II 39 Language as a calculus/Hintikka: language as a calculus allows model theory. >Model theory. Language as a Universal Medium/Hintikka: the representative of language as a universal medium is not entirely completed by semantic questions. According to Hintikka, they only cannot be represented in the language. Many philosophers today mingle the two conceptions without knowing where they come from. Hintikka I 15 Wittgenstein/Hintikka: 1. Language as a universal medium: thesis: it is not possible to look at the language from outside - meaning relationships are required. Hintikka I 43 ff Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the thesis of language as a universal medium has as a consequence the idea of the universality of language. (Universal Language). Philosophical views do not enjoy the privilege of formulating in their own meta-language. As there is no metaphysics, there is no meta logic. The expression 'to understand a sentence' is also not meta logical, but an expression like any other. (Ms 110, 189). Cf. >Metaphysics, >Universal language. Hintikka I 15 Language as a universal medium/LUM/Hintikka: the thesis of language as a universal medium (LUM) does not include the impossibility of semantics at all. It is just not possible to articulate. For example Frege has the opinion that the meaning of quantifiers cannot be appropriatly expressed linguistically. >Circular reasoning, >Levels, >Description levels, >Semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Metalanguage | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 43 ff Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the thesis of language as a universal medium has as a consequence the idea of the universality of language. (Universal Language). Philosophical views do not enjoy the privilege of formulating in their own meta-language. As there is no metaphysics, there is no meta logic. The expression 'to understand a sentence' is also not meta logical, but an expression like any other. (Ms 110, 189). >Cf. >Metaphysics, >Universal language. I 44 Example: the case corresponds to that of the orthography, which also has to do with the word 'orthography'. >Self reference. Wittgenstein's philosophical technique is to ask again and again the question: On what occasion would someone express the sentence? This presupposes that a philosophical discussion is not one of the relevant opportunities. I 45 All metatheoretical and philosophical discourses are excluded from the study. Basic thesis of the universality of language. >Circular reasoning. I 47 Metalanguage/metatheory/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there can be no metatheory, not even in mathematics. There are basically no higher levels - thus you can actually apply no semantic concept of truth in mathematics. >Levels, >Description levels, >Object language. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| |||
No results. Please choose an author or concept or try a different keyword-search.