Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Analyticity/Syntheticity | Quine | I 120
Lasting Sentences: In lasting sentences the meaning of the stimulus is more sparse. Accordingly, the synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity. I 339
Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. V 114
QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences later e.g. "A dog is an animal". Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. Analyticity is as social as language. Random first examples should not have any special status.
Definition Analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. That is bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs.VI 79
Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity.
>Holism/Quine.--- VII (b) 21
Analytical/QuineVsKant: Quine limits them to the subject-predicate form. They can be reformulated as following: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts". VsEssentialism: a creature is arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational. This is relative. VII (b) 23
Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) this is translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried. The problem is that it is based on unclear synonymy.
Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent. it does not work with e.g. bachelor/unmarried.VII (b) 28ff
Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning. A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be an unempirical dogma. VII (b) 37
Verification Theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning. Then "analytically" becomes a borderline case: method does not matter. Synonymous: the method of refutation and confirmation are the same. VII (b) 37
Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement.
VII (i) 161ff
Analyticity/Quine: analyticity is an approximate truth because of meaning. That says nothing about existence.
>Synonymy/Quine, >Verfication/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

Conditional | Adams | Field II 252/296
Material Conditional/Adams Conditional/Field: (Lit. Adams 1974): (outside of mathematics): few of us would agree with the following conclusion: E.g. from
Clinton will not die in office to If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President. That suggests that here the equivalence between A > B and ~(A v B) does not exist. >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditional. In other words: If A then B does not seem to have the same truth conditions as ~A v B. >Truth conditions. Adams-conditional: it may only be used as a main operator. - The degree of belief of A > B is always the conditional belef degree (B I A). >Operators, >Conditional probability. II 253
In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always required. - Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. Problem: then they will say less about the world.
Indicative conditional sentence/material implication/truth/field: further considerations have however led many to doubt that there are truth conditions here at all.>Material implication. Conditional/Field: A > B: here the premise A is always required when concluding. That is, we accept conditional B relative to premise A. Adams: the idea of contingent acceptance justifies our intuitive beliefs according to which conclusions with conditionals are correct. Cf. >Presuppositions, >Principle of Charity. But then it is anything but obvious that conditionals say something about the world. For example, there must not be a statement C whose probability in all circumstances is the same as the conditional (contingent) probability of (B I A). That is, the conditional A > B is not such a C. N.B.: this shows that we do not have to assume "conditional propositions" or "conditional facts". This is the nonfactualist view. >Nonfactualism. ((s) Truth conditions/nonfactualism/conditional/(s): if there are no facts, then there are also no truth conditions.) Borderline case: If the conditional (contingent) probability is 0 or 1, it is justifiable that the assertibility conditions (acceptance conditions) are the same as those of the material conditional. Vs: one could argue that a sentence without any truth conditions is meaningless. >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. Field: ditto, but the main thing is that one cannot explain the acceptance conditions without the truth conditions in terms of the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. 1. R. Adams (1974). Theories of Actuality. Nous, 5: 21-231. --- Lewis V 133
Conditional/Adams/Adams-conditional/Lewis: is an exception to the rule that the speaker usually expresses nothing that is probably untrue. - Then the assertibility goes rather with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent.
>Subjective probability, >Conditional probability, >Probability. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |

Conditional | Field | II 253
Conditional/Deflationism/Field: the nonfactualist view is not the only one possible, both classical and non-classical logic can be used. -
>Nonfactualism.Disquotational truth: it seems to require truth conditions. - E.g. "If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President" is true iff Clinton dies in office and de Vito becomes President. >Disquotationalism. II 254
Conditional/Facts/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984) Thesis: the conditional facts are not expressible in 1st order logic, but in indicative "If .. then .." clauses.
>Logic, >Second order logic.^{(1)}:II 255
Conditional/Factualism/Field: 1st Variant: assumes that "if A, then B" has the same truth conditions as "~A v B".
Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - Non-factualism: seems committed to them.II 255
Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979)^{(2)}: Thesis: counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless they are true.
There is a conventional implicature for that when we assert "if A, then B", that not only the probability P (A> B) is high, but also the conditional probability P (A > B I A). Field: the requirement that P(A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P(B I A) is high - "Surface logic" has to do with assertibility. "Deep logic": says what is truth preserving. II 256
Factualism: must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e. on the surface) and the acceptability on a deep level.
>Acceptability.Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can then distinguish between non-factualism and factualism without using the concepts "true" or "fact". Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - non-factualism: seems committed to them. >Facts. II 257
Non-Factualism/Field: must assume that the acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability laws governing the acceptance of "fact sentences".
>Probability laws.1. Robeert C. Stalnaker. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass: MIT PRess. 2.Frank Jackson, On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. The Philosophical Review Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 565-589 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Entailment | Nelson | Berka I 156
Entailment/E. J. Nelson: (1930)^{(1)} intensional implication, "having the consequence".
Cf. >Consequence relation, >Material implication, >Conditional, >Intensions, >Extension, >Intensionality, >Extensionality.1. E.J. Nelson (1930) Intensional Relations. Mind, N. S. 39, 440-453. |
NelsonL I Leonard Nelson Die kritische Methode in ihrer Bedeutung für die Wissenschaft (Gesammelte Schriften in neun Bänden, Bd. 3) (German Edition) Hamburg 1974 NelsonT I Theodor Holm Nelson Possiplex Sausalito 2011 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |

Entailment | Prior | I 139ff
Entailment/logical form/logic/entailment/Chisholm: if certain features of a situation are "requiring" that a particular reaction takes place, then this requirement can be overridden by other traits of this situation.
So it may be that p requires that q, and p-and-r not require that q. - Although p-and-q includes (entails) that p.>Consequence, >Inference, >Conditional, >Material Conditional, >Material Implication, >Situations, >Contextuality. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |

Implication | Armstrong | III 42
Material Implications/Armstrong: dissolves Hempel's paradox: (W Chart): simply all combinations: (X)(x raven and black) v (~R a blck) v (~R a ~blck) - VsRegth/Problem: Asymmetry between "it is a HU (Humean uniformity) that Fs are Gs" and "it is a law, ..." |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States InDispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted InDispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin InDispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |

Implication | Field | II 255
Material conditional/paradoxes of the material implication/Jackson/Field: best solution: (Jackson, 1979)^{(1)}: Thesis: Contraintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: the conclusions cannot be asserted, but nevertheless true.
>Acceptability, >Truth, >Conclusions.There is a conventional implication for that if we assert "if A then B", not only the probability is high (A > B), but also the conditional probability P (A > B I A). >Probability, >Probability conditionals. N.B.: the demand that P (A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P (B I A) is high. >Nonfactualism. "Surface logic": has to do with assertibility - "depth logic": says what is truth-maintaining. >Assertibility, >Truth transfer. II 256
Factualism: has then to distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level.
>Facts/Field.Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can distinguish between nonfactualism and factualism without using the terms "true" or "fact". >Deflationism. Factualism: the factualism does not accept any contraintive conclusions. Nonfactualism: seems committed to it. 1.Frank Jackson, On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. The Philosophical Review Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 565-589 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Implication | Quine | I 339
Material implication "p implies q" is not equal to p > q (> mention/use) - implicit and analytical are the best general terms.
>General Term/Quine.X 46
Material Implication/Quine: occurs when the sense can be reproduced only with negation and conjunction. Normal implication: in addition to existential quantification. III 67
Implication/Conditional/Quine: Implication only exists if the conditional is true. I 68
Implication/Mention/Use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their descriptions.
For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their descriptions. So we mention the sentences by using their descriptions. We are talking about the sentences. ((s) implication is done via the sentences. Different: Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema. Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry. This mentions Cassius but it does not mention a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation. Implication/Quine/(s): only example "p implies q" but not "Cassius' skinniness implies..." III 72
"Only if....then"/Quine: is the sign for the hind leg! It also does not have the meaning of the whole "then and only then" (biconditional). I 389/90
Conditional with a false antecedent/Quine: > truth value gap. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

Implication Paradox | Cresswell | Hughes I 34f
Paradoxies of material implication/Hughes/Cresswell: a true proposition (statement) is implied materially by any other proposition. A false proposition implies materially any proposition - (material, not strict!).
>Strict implication, >Implication.Paradoxes of strict implication: a necessary proposition implies strictly any arbitrary proposition, - an impossible is strictly implied by each. Solution: (p strimp q) simply means that q-and-not-p is impossible. Hughes I 191
Paradoxy of material implication: summarized: of two statements, the first always implies the second or vice versa.
>Paradoxes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |

Implication, strict | Lewis | Berka I 154
Definition Strict Implication/CI. I. Lewis/Berka: (1918)^{(1)}: C'pq = NMKpNq - "It is not the case that p is true and q is false". - >Paradox of material implication: the for it responsible statement "p is true and q is false" is not free of self-contradiction - Implication: if it should have the meaning "q derivable from p", the above statement is obviously a contradiction.
---I 155
Paradox of strict implication: 1. An impossible statement implies any statement - 2. A necessary is implied by each statement. - It also follows that all impossibilities and all necessities are strictly equivalent. - Solution: enhanced propositional calculus.
1.C.I. Lewis: A Survey of Symbolic Logic. Berkeley 1918, Reprint, New York 1960. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |

Inference | Sellars | Brandom II 76
Material inference/Sellars/Brandom: from a east of b" to "b west of a" - also from lightening to thunder - needs no logic.
>Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars.Brandom II 79
Formally valid inferences can be derived from good material inferences, but not vice versa.
Proof: given is a subset of somehow privileged vocabulary, so an inference is correct if the material is well and it cannot turn into a poor inference, if non-privileged vocabulary is replaced by non-privileged vocabulary. If one is only interested in logical form, one must be able to distinguish previously a part of the vocabulary as specifically logical. E.g. if you want to examine theological inferences, one must examine which substitution preserves the material quality of the inference when replacing non-theological vocabulary by non-theological. >Vocabulary, >Privileged vocabulary, >Conservativity, cf. >Material implication, >Formal implication. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 InWahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |

Mistake Mention/Use | Quine | I 339
Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use). - "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms.
>Mention, >use, >word, >object. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

Nonfactualism | Adams | Field II 255
Definition "surface logic"/material conditional/paradoxes of implication/Field: the surface logic tells us which conclusions are acceptable. (This is just the logic of Adams offered by nonfactualism).
>Conditional/Adams, >Acceptability.Def "depth logic"/material conditional/Field: the depths logic tells us which conclusions are truth maintaining. This is the standard logic for ">". >Truth transfer. Problem: does the depth logic do anything at all, even if our mental performance is explained by the surface logic? Solution/Field: Perhaps one can say that at the deepest level classical logic prevails and the special conventions of the assertion only come later. II 256
Factualism/Field: It must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level (which only seems unacceptable by a superficial violation of the convention).
Deflationism/Field: the deflationism between nonfactualism and factualism can be distinguished in the same way without using the terms "true" or "fact".>Deflationalism. Field II 256
Factualism/Conditional/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984) (here, at first limited to non-embedded conditionals): here his approach provides the logic of Adams, i.e. Factualism is indistinguishable from nonfactualism in relation to which conclusions ("paradox of material implication") are considered correct.
>Paradox of Implication.^{(1)}:Deflationism/Field: can he differentiate between nonfactualism and factualism? One possibility is that if there are conditionals where the antecedent is logically and metaphysically possible, but not epistemically. Nonfactualism: thesis: in epistemic impossibility of the anteceding of a conditional, there is no question of acceptability. For the joke of conditionals consists in the assumption that their antecedents are possible epistemically. N.B.: then all conditionals with epistemically unacceptable antecedents are equally acceptable. FieldVsStalnaker: for him there is a fact due to which a conditional is true or false. And some conditionals with epistemically impossible antecedents will be true and others false! Factualism/Deflationism/Field: the test of whether someone adheres to this type of factualism is then whether he takes acceptability of such conditionals seriously. 1. R. Stalnaker (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Proof Theory | Hilbert | Berka I 384
Proof Theory/Hilbert: first, the concepts and propositions of the theory to be examined are represented by a formal system, and treated without reference to their meaning only formally. I 385
Proof Theory: this (subsequent) investigation is dependent on the logical meaning of its concepts and conclusions. Thus formal theory is compared with a meaningful meta theory (proof theory)^{(1)}. Berka I 395
Proof Theory/Hilbert: basic thought, thesis: everything that makes up existing mathematics is strictly formalized, so that the actual mathematics becomes a set of formulas. New: the logical signs "follow" (>) and "not".
Final scheme:S S › T T Where each time the premises, i.e. (S and S > T) are either an axiom, or are created by inserting an axiom or coincide with the final formula. Definition provable/Hilbert: a formula is provable if it is either an axiom or an axiom by insertion from it, or if it is the final formula of a proof. >Proofs, >Provability. Meta-Mathematics/proof theory/Hilbert: meta mathematics is now added to the actual mathematics: in contrast to the purely formal conclusions of the actual mathematics, the substantive conclusion is applied here. However, only to prove the consistency of axioms. >Axioms, >Axiom systems, >Axioms/Hilbert. In this meta-mathematics, the proofs of the actual mathematics are operated upon, and these themselves form the subject of the substantive investigation. >Meta-Mathematics. Thus the development of the mathematical totality of knowledge takes place in two ways: A) by obtaining new provable formulas from the axioms by formal concluding and B) by adding new axioms together with proof of the consistency by substantive concluding. >Consistency, >Material implication. Berka I 395
Truth/absolute truth/Hilbert: axioms and provable propositions are images of the thoughts which make up the method of the previous mathematics, but they are not themselves the absolute truths.
>Truth/Hilbert.Def absolute truth/Hilbert: absolute truths are the insights provided by my proof theory with regard to the provability and consistency of the formula systems. Through this program, the truth of the axioms is already shown for our theory of proof ^{(2)}.1. K. Schütte: Beweistheorie, Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg 1960, p. 2f. 2. D. Hilbert: Die logischen Grundalgen der Mathematik, in: Mathematische Annalen 88 (1923), p. 151-165. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |

Subjunctive Conditionals | Grice | Walker I 419 ff
Subjunctive Conditionals/Counterfactual Conditionals/Walker: every material implication with a false antecedent is true, but usually we distinguish true and false unreal conditional clauses. A speaker makes an effort to express one certain subjunctive conditional clause and not another.
Talking of a baby without a head is confusing in a way as it is not in a subjunctive conditional clause.>Counterfactual conditionals. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |

Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Discourse Representation | Partee Vs Discourse Representation | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse, Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994 I 21
Discourse Representation/Discourse Representation Theories/DRT//File Change Semantics/FCS/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: (Heim 1982, 1983, Kamp (1981, with Reyle: 1993): Thesis the analysis should go beyond the individual sentence. Anaphora/DRT/FCS/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: should be able to go beyond the boundaries of sentences. NP: are not quantifier expressions, but precisely anaphorical. They can also refer to "virtual" objects. File/Terminology/Heim/Heusinger: the possibly virtual objects of discourse. Discourse Reference/Terminology/Karttunen: like Heim's files. I 22 Anaphora: anaphoric relations take place between files and certain operators can the bind files or give them a certain "lifetime". Discourse Representation/Heusinger: is displayed on a model only in the model-theoretic interpretation.
Def Meaning/FCS/DRT/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: is a dynamic concept here, it is not the truth condition of sentences, but the information-changing potential of sentences. (Therefore terminology: file change) NP: new: they are discourse references here (with possibly changing correspondences) and more referential than quantifying. Referential/Heusinger: referring to particular properties. Quantifying/Heusinger/(s): not referring to properties.I 23
Discourse Representation Theory/Heusinger: Solution: there is no anaphora paradox (because NP, like pronouns, are interpreted as a discourse reference) and the problem of the wide range of the existential quantifier is resolved. Problem/VsDiscourse Representation Theories: the problem of compositionality remains. Problem: the texts can then only obtain a truth value in their entirety. Chrysipp Sentences/Heusinger: New: the conditional is represented not as a material implication, but as unselective all-quantification over cases in the sense of Lewis (1975) Adverbs of Quantification. I 24 Proportion Paradox/Partee/ParteeVsHeim/ParteeVsDiscourse Representation Theory/Donkey Sentence/Heusinger:(Partee 1984): Problem (40) can only be represented as (40a), but that becomes incorrect if out of 6 farmers who each have a donkey, five beat theirs, while the sixth farmer has 10 donkeys, all of which he treats well. Problem: the quantification over cases only considers farmer-donkey pairs. I 25
Dynamic Logic/Groenendijk/Stokhof/Dekker/Heusinger: (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991, Dekker 1993): VsDiscourse Representation Theory: departs from a dynamic concept of meaning, like this one, which is not incorporated in the representation, but is coded in a new interpretation of the well-known logical inventory. Sentence meaning: no longer truth conditions, but contribution to the change of the context or information. Relevant information: is that on the variable assignment. Sentence meaning: is then the relation between two variable assignments. Discourse references: do not exist here. Dynamic Logic/Heusinger: Inspired by computer languages. I 42Epsilon AnalysisVsDiscourse Representation/VsHeim/VsKamp/Heusinger: here, NP are not introduced as discourse referents on the additional semantic level of the discourse representation structure, but directly refer to selected objects of the model according to the principle of selection. |
Part I B. Partee Mathematical Methods in Linguistics (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) New York 1990 |

Modal Logic | Quine Vs Modal Logic | Chisholm II 185
QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality.
SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants).--- Lewis IV 32
QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description.
Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description.QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic. LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial. --- I 338
But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is:
Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic.Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity. --- I 339
(1) It is necessary that 9 > 4
it is then explained as follows:(2) "9 > 4" is analytically. It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction: "If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)" if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional. C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication". Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable. --- I 339
Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators.
Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator.If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all. --- I 340
An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention.
But is it legitimate?--- I 341
It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false:
(3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque. The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other. Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent. (4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw). --- I 342
(This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence)
However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p".Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is: (5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x as (6) x = y and x exclusively then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6): (7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y) However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p. --- I 343
The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear.
---I 343
Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition
Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret(8) [9 > 4] is necessary (Brackets for class) and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction. One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible. --- I 344
Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties:
(9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9.This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets". This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say (§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II). But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object. E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified? Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary. --- I 344
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties
Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent.Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.) --- I 345
But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails.
We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality.There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define "P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))". Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties. But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic. --- VI 41
Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions.
Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators.Quine: without modal operators: E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future." ((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx). Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators. --- VI 102
Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto.
---VI 103
Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions.
Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence).--- VI 104
QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense.
--- XI 52
QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to.
---XI 53
Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages:
1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity.2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p" 3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm InPhilosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |

Russell, B. | Lewis, C.I. Vs Russell, B. | Hughes I 190
Strict implication/C.I.LewisVsRussell/LewisVsPrincipia Mathematica (1912) a series of systems, VsParadoxes of (material implication).
Paradoxes of implication/Hughes/Cresswell: usually from Principia Mathematica: ^{(1)}/PM:a) a true statement is implied by any statement: (1) p > (q > p)
b) a false statement implies any statement:
(2) ~p > (p > q)Both together are called the paradox of (material) implication. Since either the antecedens of (1) or the antecedens of (2) must be true for each statement p, it is also easy to derive (3) from (1) and (2): (3) (p > q) v ( q > p). I 191
i.e. of two statements always the first implies the second or vice versa. I 191
Paradox of material implication: summarized: of two statements the first always implies the second or vice versa
C.I.Lewis: did not intend to reject this thesis, on the contrary, (1) and (2) were "neither mysterious wisdom, nor great discoveries, nor great absurdities", but they reflect the truth-functional sense with which "implicate" is used in Principia Mathematica. Strict implication/C.I.Lewis: there is a stronger sense of "imply", according to which "p implies q" means that q follows from p. Here it is not the case that a true one is implied by every statement, or that out of a false one any follows. This stronger form leads to pairs of statements, none of which imply the other. Strict implication: necessary implication. Notation(s): "strimp". Strict disjunction/C.I.Lewis: analog to the strict implication: necessary disjunction. analog: Strict equivalence/C.I.Lewis: necessary equivalence. Hughes I 191
Strict implication/C.I.Lewis: p strimp q: "p follows from q" avoids paradox of (material) implication leads to pairs of statements, none of which implies the other.
C.I.Lewis: introduces a whole series of systems, e.g. in the book "A Survey of Logic": the "Survey System". Basic operator here: logical impossibility, and conjunction/negation). strict implication: first comprehensively discussed in "Symbolic Logic" Lewis and Langford, (1932). (Systems S1 and S2). (Also the first comprehensive treatment of modal logical systems ever). Basic operator here: Possibility. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |

Russell, B. | Wessel Vs Russell, B. | I 14
Ontology/Logic/Psychology/RussellVsLaws of Thought: it is not important that we think in accordance with laws of thought, but that the behavior of things corresponds to them.
Russell: what we believe when we believe in the sentence of contradiction is not that our consciousness is constructed this way. We do not believe, for example, that we cannot think at the same time that a tree is a beech and not a beech either. We believe that if the tree is a beech, it cannot be not a beech at the same time. I 15
And even if belief in the sentence of contradiction is a thought, the sentence of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning the things of the outside world.
If what we believe would not apply to the things of the outside world, then the fact that we are forced to think like this would not guarantee that the sentence of contradiction cannot be wrong (this shows that it cannot be a law of thought). WesselVsRussell: logical laws do not concern the outside world! They do not give us any information about the outside world. The validity results only from the determination of the use of the signs! Of course, such phrases can also be formulated ontologically, but they are not ontological statements. Where else would we have the certainty that they are unrestrictedly valid? We cannot search the world endlessly. I 123
Subjunction/Material Implication/Frege/Wessel: Frege calls it "conditionality". I 123/124
Difference: between the subjunction A > B and a
logical conclusion in which the only conclusion rule accepted by Frege is to conclude from A > B and A to B. ((s) modus ponens).Russell/Whitehead/Principia Mathematica ^{(1)}: took over from Frege. "Essential property" of the implication: what is implied by a true statement is true. Through this property, an implication provides evidence. Def Implication/Russell/Principia Mathematica ^{(1)}: p > q = def ~ p v q.(Materials Implication). WesselVsRussell: this is just inappropriate and misleading! It is purely formal! Implication/Conclusion/Wessel: the implication has a completely different logical structure than the consequence: Subjunction: > is a two-digit proposition-forming operator and p > q is synonymous with ~p v q. Conclusion (implication): "q follows logically p" or "P implies q" is a statement about statements: "From the statement p follows logically the statement q". "Follows from" is a two-digit predicate - not an operator. Conclusion (also called implication) refers to linguistic structures. Notation l-. Subjunction: > refers to facts. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |

Various Authors | Jackson Vs Various Authors | Field II 255
Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979): Thesis: Counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: Although the conclusions are not assertible, they are nevertheless true. (Assertibility/Truth).
Field: in explanation of non-assertibility the classical truth conditions do play a role, but not an indispensable one.Conventional Implicature/Jackson: Thesis: there is a conventional implicature for that if we assert "if A then B" not only the probability P(A>B) is high, but also the conditioned probability P(A>BIA). A violation of this implicature would be very misleading. ((s) I.e., we assume that the premise is realized when we express a conditional). Important Argument/Field: the requirement that P(A>BIA) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the non-factualist that P(BIA) is high. Field: thus, Jackson arrives at the same assertibility conditions as non-factualism. EdgingtonVsJackson/Field: (Edgington, 1986, standard objection): it seems that we do not not only assert things like E.g. Clinton/de Vito, but we actually do not believe them, too!. JacksonVsEdgington/Field: would probably say that the conventional implicature makes it even inappropriate to even "assert it mentally". The perceived invalidity then consists in that these conclusions do not receive mental assertibility, although they received truth. So we get both: surface and logic "deeper logic". |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Material Conditional | Jackson, F. | Field II 255
material conditional / paradoxes of material implication / Jackson / Field: best solution: (Jackson 1979): counter-intuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Although the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless true. (Assertibility / truth). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |