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The author or concept searched is found in the following 49 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chomsky | Deacon | I 35 Chomsky/Deacon: his theory is reminiscent of evolutionary theory by assuming "hopeful monsters": random mutations that produce new abilities. >Hopeful monsters. For example, children's ability to acquire the grammar of the grammar they learned first. Explanation/Chomsky: this can only be explained if we adopt a "universal grammar" that is built into all human brains as a blueprint. >Universal grammar. I 36 Such a "language organ" could explain why no other species has developed a language. It would also explain why there are no intermediate stages between human and non-human language. Other advantages: such a thesis explains why human and non-human communication are not similar, it explains the systematically independent nature of grammatical rules (they are all derived from the neurological interconnection of the brain), it explains the allegedly universal characteristics of language structures, it explains the reciprocal translatability of languages, it explains the ease of language acquisition with lean input and lack of error correction. I 37 DeaconVsChomsky/DeaconVsUniversal grammar: many linguists ask the wrong question: they expect something (the child's ability to learn) and ask how it comes about. The assumption of a universal grammar serves as a placeholder for everything that cannot be learned. >Learning. I 38 To say that only the human brain is able to produce a grammar, takes the problem from the linguists' hands and passes it on to the neurobiologists. >Grammar, >Neurobiology, >Neurobiology as author. Chomsky/Deacon: however, he is not concerned with the emergence of language, but with explaining the origin of language competence. >Competence, >Language acquisition, >Language emergence. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Coincidence | Mayr | I 105 Coincidence/Mayr: we call a certain mutation coincidental if it is not related to present needs of the organism and is otherwise unpredictable. >Mutation, cf. >Necessity. I 250 Coincidence/Mayr: dominates the variation Necessity/Mayr: dominates in selection. >Selection. Selection: there is no "selective force"! I 252 Selection: Bates' discovery of mimicry (1862)(1) in edible and poisonous butterflies: first proof of natural selection. Benefit/Biology: what is the benefit of the emergence of a trait for survival: adaptionist program. >Adaptation, >Benefit, >Emergence. 1. H.W. Bates (1862). Contributions to an Insect Fauna of the Amazon Valley. In: Trans Linn. Soc. London 23. S. 495-566. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Completeness | Poundstone | I 252 Puzzle/Poundstone: anticipate the basic problem of inference, namely the question of how to recognize a paradox - (NP-complete). >Conclusions, >Paradoxes, >Recognition. Right turn rule: is overcome by islands, therefore inefficient. Solution: Tremaux: thread, at a dead end return to the last node. Also mark dead ends. - Two breadcrumbs mark old dead ends. - At old node choose a path that was not chosen before. I 259 Results in first exploring remote areas. I 267 "Problem of the longest path": is there an easy way? Trying does not lead directly to the shortest one. - No intelligent algorithm is available. I 270 NP-Complete/Poundstone: the answers are easy to verify! E.g. puzzle: the right way may only be two nodes away, but you had to try out many combinations. >Review, >Verification, >Confirmation. I 282 Prove that NP problems cannot be solved with a computer. I 274 Combination/Permutation/Combinatorics: P: polynomial function: n² - E.g. puzzle with 5000 parts. solvable - NP: exponential function. 2n. E.g. Puzzle with 5000 paths - unsolvable. In general: difficult to solve. NP: "non-deterministically polynomial-temporally complete". I 276 So far no evidence that NP problems cannot be solved in polynomial time. - But no empirical evidence. - The process of logical inferences is itself an NP problem. - Our conclusions about the world are limited. I 281 The chain end, the very basis of our knowledge, can be recognized in polynomial time and checked for contradictions (lists; - but not walkable as a puzzle). >Knowledge, >Contradictions, >Consistency. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Kelly | I 4092 Complexity/Kelly: the same dynamic that shapes complexity in the natural world, it is also expressed in Technicum ((s) terminology: Technium is Kelly's expression of a technology that evolves naturally and makes its own demands.) I 4104 Software complexity increased linearly between 1993 and 2003 from about 5 million lines of code for a Windows operating system to about 50 million.(1) >Software, >Computer programming. I 4108 Machine parts: their number is growing exponentially.(2) >Technology. I 4113 Development of complexity: several scenarios are possible: Scenario 1: most of the technology remains simple, as in nature, this applies to things made of materials such as stone, wood, etc., but also metal cables. I 4119 Scenario 2: a final stage is reached somewhere by reaching physical limits. Scenario 3: Growth without limits. I 4168 Natural Diversity/Life Forms/Kelly: the number of taxonomic families has grown linearly in evolution (3) while the number of technical patents has grown exponentially over the last 150 years. (4) I 4316 Cell types/complexity/Kelly: the increase in specialized types of cells follows a saturation curve, it is limited.(5) >Evolution, >Mutation. 1. Data from Vincent Maraia. (2005) The Build Master: Microsoft ’s Soft ware Configuration Management Best Practices. Upper Saddle River, NJ; Addison-Wesley Professional. 2. Data from Robert U. Ayres. (1991) Computer Integrated Manufacturing: Revolution in Progress. London: Chapman & Hall, p. 3. 3. J. John Sepkoski, (1993) “Ten Years in the Library: New Data Confirm Paleontological Patterns.” Paleobiology, 19 (1), p. 48. 4. Brigid Quinn and Ruth Nyblod. (2006) “United States Patent and Trademark Office Issues 7 Millionth Patent.” United States Patent and Trademark Office. 5. Data from James W. Valentine, Allen G. Collins, et al. (1994) “Morphological Complexity Increase in Metazoans.” Paleobiology, Paleobiology, 20 (2), p. 134. http://paleobiol.geoscienceworld.org/cgi/content/abstract/20/2/131. |
Kelly I Kevin Kelly What Technology Wants New York 2011 |
| Concepts | Mayr | 91 Concepts/Mayr: they must be particularly "open" in science, so that further results can be included. >Order, >Progress, >Science, >Classification. Concepts can be transferred unintentionally from one particular phenomenon to another. E.g. "mutation" initially used for species, later for genes. E.g. "teleological": used for 5 different phenomena E.g. "group": 5 different phenomena E.g. "evolution": three very different processes E.g. "variety". >Evolution, >Teleology. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Darwinism | Koestler | Gould I 40 Darwinism/Arthur KoestlerVsDarwinsmus: has fought in his last years a fight against the Darwinism he misunderstood. He gives the example of a development that has taken place twice, once on the mainland and once on an island.(1) ">Evolution. GouldVsKoestler: The answer to this must be: that one must deny energetically that highly convergent living beings are actually identical with each other. >Convergence, >Identity, >Similarity, >Mutation. 1. A. Koestler, The Case of the Midwife Toad, London, NY 1971. |
Koestler I Arthur Koestler The Case of the Midwife Toad Plano, TX 2016 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Darwinism | Mayr | I 135 Darwin/Science Theory/Mayr: we speak of Darwin's first and second revolution. 1) Acknowledgement of evolution through common descent. a) Replace supernatural by natural explanation, b) Replace the linear model with a complex one. 2) Natural selection: refutation of the theory of acquired traits, refutation of mixed inheritance, discovery of the source of genetic diversity (mutation, genetic recombination, diploidy). >Explanation, >Evolution, >Causal explanation, >Selection, >Genes. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Evolution | Dawkins | I 48 Evolution/Dawkins: There is a tendency in molecules to duplicate faster, because they will automatically be the majority. Evolution/Dawkins: There is no "desire for evolution". I 60 Inheritance/Dawkins: In fact, no whole chromosomes are transmitted. I 66 Evolution/Dawkins: If we were to examine a very short genetic unit, it may have been put together for the first time in a very remote ancestor. I 67 Def Point mutation/Dawkins: An error that consists in a single wrong letter. This is rare, but of great importance. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Evolution | Fodor | IV 145 Evolution Theory/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: Dennett sees evolution theory as an "element of interpretation". Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: but Dennett should not see something as a means of survival that you do not have. DretskeVsDennett/MillikanVsDennett: that is why most evolutionists are realists in terms of content. IV 146 Irrationality/belief/evolution/rationality/Dennett: thesis: we must not describe irrational mutations as a system of belief. A belief system that believes something wrong is a conceptual impossibility. Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: the theory of evolution can hardly act as the guarantor for the principle of truth. IV 149 Theory of Evolution/truth/Fodor/Lepore: if you use the theory of evolution to explain intentional attribution, it is rather an empirical than a conceptual question whether the principle of truth applies or not, but we do not agree with the antecedent anyway. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evolution | Kelly | I 1765 Evolution/Kelly: "random" mutations are often not free of tendencies: Variation is determined by geometry and physics. More importantly, they are formed by inherent recurring patterns of self-organization. >Mutations, >Coincidence. I 1791 Stephen Jay Gould/Kelly: represented the thesis of the omnipresent contingency in evolution, against a directionality, e. g. towards the emergence of the human being. (1) I 1804 KellyVsGould: later investigations revealed that the Burgess slate showed less diversity of life forms than Gould assumed in Gould's thesis. In this way, the possibility of a convergent evolution becomes more visible again. Evolution/Kelly: its third mainstay is structural inevitability. For example, a poison sting used for defense purposes has been created at least twelve times in evolution. The reason for this is not a common history, but a common pattern. >Self-organization. 1. Stephen Jay Gould. (1989) Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and Nature of History. New York: W. W. Norton, p. 320. |
Kelly I Kevin Kelly What Technology Wants New York 2011 |
| Evolution | Mayr | I 43 Evolution/Mayr: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or the individual. (MayrVsDawkins). >Species, >Genes, >R. Dawkins, >Genes/Dawkins, >Evolution/Dawkins. Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual. >Selection. I 183 Evolution/Mayr: Species is the decisive entity of evolution. I 230 Evolution/Progress/Mayr: Cohesion: an expression of the fact that the system of development has become very narrow. Evolution: proceeds very slowly in large, member-rich species, and very quickly in small peripheral isolated groups. >Speciation, >punctuated equilibrium/Eldredge/Gould. A start-up population with few individuals and therefore little hidden genetic variation can more easily assume a different genotype. Macroevolution: is most strongly determined by the geographical factor (isolation). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). >Gradualism, >Saltationism. 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). >Selection. I 377 Evolution of life: a chemical process involving autocatalysis and a directing factor. Prebiotic selection. Cf. >St. Kauffman. I 237 Pasteur: proofed the impossibility of life in oxygen-rich atmosphere! In 1953, Stanley Miller grew amino acids, urea and other organic molecules in a glass flask by discharging electricity into a mixture of methane, ammonium, hydrogen, and water vapor. I 238 Proteins, nucleic acids: the organisms must form these larger molecules themselves. Amino acids, pyrimidines, puridine do not need to formed by the organisms themselves. I 239 Molecular biology: discovered that the genetic code is the same for bacteria, which do not have nuclei, as in protists, fungi, animals and plants. I 240 Missing link: Archaeopteryx: half bird half reptile. Not necessarily direct ancestor. Speciation: a) dichopatric: a previously connected area is divided by a new barrier: mountain range, inlets, interruption of vegetation. b) peripatrically: new start-up population emerges outside of the original distribution area. c) sympatric speciation: new species due to ecological specialization within the area of distribution. Darwin's theory of gradualism. >Gradualism. I 243 VsGardualism: cannot explain the emergence of completely new organs. Problem: How can a rudimentary wing be enlarged by natural selection before it is suitable for flying? I 244 Darwin: two possible solutions: a) Intensification of the function: E.g. eyes, e.g. the development of the anterior limbs of moles, whales, bats. b) Functional change: E.g. Antennae of daphia (water flea): additional function of the swimming paddle, which is enlarged and modified under selection pressure. E.g. Gould: Feathers probably first for temperature control before any animal could fly. Function/Biology: Functional differences are also related to behavioral patterns, e.g. feather cleaning. Competing theories on evolutionary change I 247 Salationism: Huxley later Bateson, de Vries, (Mendelists). The saltationist emergence of new species only occurs poyploidy and some other forms of chromosomal restructuring (very rare) during sexual reproduction. Teleological theories: assume that nature has a principle: Osbron's arsitogenesis, Chardin's omega principle. Should lead to perfection. >Teilhard de Chardin. Lamarck's Theories: Changes go back to use and non-use, environmental conditions. Until the 1930s! I 248 Def "soft inheritance" (acquired characteristics). Was refuted by genetics. Def "hard inheritance" (so-called "central dogma"): the information contained in the proteins (the phenotype) cannot be passed on to the nucleic acids (the genotype)! (Insight of molecular biology). I 256 Macroevolution: after saltationism, soft heredity and autogenesis, had been refuted with evolution, macroevolution had to be explained more and more as a phenomenon on the level of the population, i.e. as a phenomenon directly attributable to events and processes during microevolution. (Speciation: faster in isolation). (>Gould, Eldredge, 1971(1): "punctuated equilibrium", punctualism.) I 281 New: we know today that the cycles of herbivores elicit those of the predators and not vice versa! Coevolution: E.g. the Yucca moth destroys the plant's ovules by its larvae, but pollens the flowers. 1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Evolution | Millikan | I 26 Mutation/evolution/Millikan: every move of an evolutionary caused thing fights against cases of its absence. I 27 Evolution/properties/Millikan: evolutionary caused things have properties which, instead of other properties, are real because they are associated with certain functions. I 142 Language/evolution/Millikan: Language has not arisen evolutionary, because that would have taken much longer. >Language development. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evolution | Minsky | I 145 Evolution/Minsky: Evolution illustrates how processes can become enslaved by the investment principle. >Terminology/Minsky. Why do so many animals contain their brains inside their heads — as with fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and bats? This arrangement was inherited long before our earliest aquatic ancestor first crawled upon the land three hundred million years ago. For many of those animals — woodpeckers, for example — another arrangement might serve at least as well. But once the pattern of centralizing so many functions in the head was established, it carried with it great networks of dependencies involving many aspects of anatomy. Because of this, any mutation that changed any part of that arrangement would disrupt many other parts and lead to dreadful handicaps, at least in the short run of evolution. And because evolution is so inherently short-sighted, it would not help if, over longer spans of time, such changes could lead to advantages. >Obsolescence/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Evolution | Vollmer | I 51 Evolutionary Epistemology/Vollmer: in the evolution of science, there are no "mutations" because there is no "offspring" in scientific theories. Evolutionary epistemology is only useful insofar as subjective knowledge structures are inherited. >Success, >Pragmatism, >Proofs, >Provability. I 75 The evolutionary epistemology does not have the concept of truth of pragmatism - it is not proven by success. Success/Vollmer: only proves that the hypothesis was not entirely wrong. >Hypotheses. I 217 VsEvolution theory/VsDarwinismus. Circular. VollmerVsVs: it is wrong that "Fitness" can be defined without recourse to "surviving". >Survival, >Fitness. I 260 Fitness is not determined by the survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more habitat, more partners, more offspring, etc. I 264 Entropy/Evolution/life/Vollmer: contrary to popular belief it is not always a measure of disorder. >Entropy. Under special conditions (low total energy and existence of lasting interactions or inclusion by external forces) the increase in entropy even includes an increase of order and structure - thus the second law does not contradict the origin of living things. >Life, >Energy, >Order. I 279 Adaptation/selection/VsEvolutionary Epistemology is no falsification - the original eye is not falsyfied by the eye of the eagle - proper mapping does not matter - transferring the selection theory on cognitive skills can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error (Simmel, 1895) - VollmerVsVs: this is not an argument VsEvolution - no matter who is adapting to whom - Co-adaption. I 298 Evolution/success/Vollmer: the accuracy of knowledge cannot be inferred from evolutionary success - otherwise naturalistic fallacy - confusion of facts with norms. >Naturalistic fallacy, >Norms, >Facts. --- II 190 Evolution/time direction/Vollmer: due to cosmic expansion there are no two moments of evolution identical - (> time arrow). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Forms of Thinking | Logic Texts | Read III 126 In fact, it seems that the two worlds are identical, except that there is a permutation of identities, that is, of counterparts. This, the anti-Haeccetist replies, is a distinction without distinction! >Haecceitism, >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world, >Identity. --- II 252 Description level: Now, here, all meaning of "truth" and "falsehood" is abstracted, except for their difference. --- Read III 59 "Too much"/"too little": The classical view with the substitution of Bolzano produces too much: it counts conclusions as valid, which are obviously invalid. But it also produces too little by citing arguments as invalid which should be recognized as valid in a plausible manner. III 78 It is disputed whether the production of such a counterexample is a necessary condition for the invalidity. That is, whether the inability to produce one is sufficient for validity. >Sufficiency. III 113 Stalnaker: includes an "impossible world" under his worlds, which he calls lambda, in which every statement is true! All such conditional sentences are found to be true here. ((s) Explanation: in such a world A and not-A would be true at the same time - contradiction.) III 212 If the boundary (interpretation or naming) between two things is indeterminate, one is the other in an undefined way. >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification, >Gaurisankar example. "ad hoc": III 232 But if we were to protest against the introduction of a new link with the sole reason that it leads to a paradox, this objection would be entirely ad hoc. There would be no diagnosis of the problem. III 232f Bluriness (fuzzy): does not help with Sorites - graduation distribution is no possibility distribution. >Sorites, >Vaguenes. --- I 54 Impermissible duplication: the mythical Crete, as different from Greek Crete, the historical Crete, the European Crete, the remembered Crete. >Ontology, >Qua objects. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Genes | McGinn | I 235 McGinn: Genes have representation abilities without semantics. >Representation, >Semantics. Genes/McGinn: 2nd possibility: that it is less useful for the brain to develop a potential solution to our philosophical problems than it is for the genes (genetic code). Genetic Code/Genes/McGinn: contain principles encrypted by the genes Principles that go beyond the reach of human reason and yet answer some of the bewildered questions of reason? ((s) VsMcGinn: from all these arguments that it would be highly useful it does not follow that it is). Obviously, the genetic code is a rule for the construction of animal bodies including the brain and mind. >Brain, >Mind. I 228 Genes/McGinn: one of their most amazing features is the ability to store information. Likewise, the ability to copy the entire reproductive process. Errors occur only very rarely. That means that genes are virtually incapable of learning! Environmental changes lead to virtually no change in the construction rules for the next generation, no matter how disastrous they may be. Only random mutation. While the reason is a paragon of flexibility, genes are the culmination rigid behavior. >Behavior. I 229 McGinn: thesis: It could be that the genes (discussed above) have solved our philosophical problem, at least partially. Because firstly, they must have already solved the purely physical problems of the construction: i.e. they represent plans for the construction of the body, and secondly what is true of the body, also applies to the mind. As far as a mental feature is biologically sound, genes must contain instructions for building organisms with this feature. (Building consciousness, also the I, freedom of will, intentionality, all kinds of knowledge.) >Body, >Intentionality, >Existence, >Consciousness, >Knowledge. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Genetic Programming | Norvig | Norvig I 155 Genetic Programming/Russell/Norvig: The field of genetic programming is closely related to genetic algorithms. The principal difference is that the representations that are mutated and combined are programs rather Norvig I 156 than bit strings. The programs are represented in the form of expression trees; the expressions can be in a standard language such as Lisp or can be specially designed to represent circuits, robot controllers, and so on. Crossover involves splicing together subtrees rather than substrings. This form of mutation guarantees that the offspring are well-formed expressions, which would not be the case if programs were manipulated as strings. Interest in genetic programming was spurred by John Koza’s work (Koza, 1992(1), 1994(2)), but it goes back at least to early experiments with machine code by Friedberg (1958)(3) and with finite-state automata by Fogel et al. (1966)(4). VsGenetic Programming: As with genetic algorithms, there is debate about the effectiveness of the technique. Koza et al. (1999)(5) describe experiments in the use of genetic programming to design circuit devices. Good overview texts on genetic algorithms are given by Mitchell (1996)(6), Fogel (2000)(7), and Langdon and Poli (2002)(8), and by the free online book by Poli et al. (2008)(9). 1. Koza, J. R. (1992). Genetic Programming: On the Programming of Computers by Means of Natural Selection. MIT Press 2. Koza, J. R. (1994). Genetic Programming II: Automatic discovery of reusable programs. MIT Press. 3. Friedberg, R. M. (1958). A learning machine: Part I. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 2, 2–13. 4. Fogel, L. J., Owens, A. J., and Walsh, M. J. (1966). Artificial Intelligence through Simulated Evolution. Wiley. 5. Koza, J. R., Bennett, F. H., Andre, D., and Keane, M. A. (1999). Genetic Programming III: Darwinian invention and problem solving. Morgan Kaufmann 6. Mitchell, M. (1996). An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. MIT Press. 7. Fogel, D. B. (2000). Evolutionary Computation: Toward a New Philosophy of Machine Intelligence. IEEE Press. 8. Langdon, W. and Poli, R. (2002). Foundations of Genetic Programming. Springer 9. Poli, R., Langdon, W., and McPhee, N. (2008). A Field Guide to Genetic Programming. Lulu.com. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Genetic Programming | Russell | Norvig I 155 Genetic Programming/Russell/Norvig: The field of genetic programming is closely related to genetic algorithms. The principal difference is that the representations that are mutated and combined are programs rather Norvig I 156 than bit strings. The programs are represented in the form of expression trees; the expressions can be in a standard language such as Lisp or can be specially designed to represent circuits, robot controllers, and so on. Crossover involves splicing together subtrees rather than substrings. This form of mutation guarantees that the offspring are well-formed expressions, which would not be the case if programs were manipulated as strings. Interest in genetic programming was spurred by John Koza’s work (Koza, 1992(1), 1994(2)), but it goes back at least to early experiments with machine code by Friedberg (1958)(3) and with finite-state automata by Fogel et al. (1966)(4). VsGenetic Programming: As with genetic algorithms, there is debate about the effectiveness of the technique. Koza et al. (1999)(5) describe experiments in the use of genetic programming to design circuit devices. Good overview texts on genetic algorithms are given by Mitchell (1996)(6), Fogel (2000)(7), and Langdon and Poli (2002)(8), and by the free online book by Poli et al. (2008)(9). 1. Koza, J. R. (1992). Genetic Programming: On the Programming of Computers by Means of Natural Selection. MIT Press 2. Koza, J. R. (1994). Genetic Programming II: Automatic discovery of reusable programs. MIT Press. 3. Friedberg, R. M. (1958). A learning machine: Part I. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 2, 2–13. 4. Fogel, L. J., Owens, A. J., and Walsh, M. J. (1966). Artificial Intelligence through Simulated Evolution. Wiley. 5. Koza, J. R., Bennett, F. H., Andre, D., and Keane, M. A. (1999). Genetic Programming III: Darwinian invention and problem solving. Morgan Kaufmann 6. Mitchell, M. (1996). An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. MIT Press. 7. Fogel, D. B. (2000). Evolutionary Computation: Toward a New Philosophy of Machine Intelligence. IEEE Press. 8. Langdon, W. and Poli, R. (2002). Foundations of Genetic Programming. Springer 9. Poli, R., Langdon, W., and McPhee, N. (2008). A Field Guide to Genetic Programming. Lulu.com. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Grammar | Chomsky | Searle VIII 414 ChomskyVsStructuralism: phrase structure rules alone cannot resolve ambiguities. E.g. >Active/Passive. Solution/Chomsky: transformation rules, transformation phrase markers by permutation, insertion, eradication of elements in other phrase markers - then the syntax consists of two components: base and transformation. VIII 418 Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning. >Meaning. Surface structure: determines the phonetic form (late works: sometimes the meaning). Syntax/Chomsky: is to be separated from semantics - (according to Searle): man is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactic. >Syntax. VIII 421 SearleVsChomsky: from this it would follow that if one day we had syntactically modified forms, we would have no language anymore, but something else. VIII 421 Generative grammar/NeogrammariansVsChomsky: semantics crucial for the formation of syntactic structures. >Young turks, >Neogrammarians. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hopeful Monsters | Deacon | I 35 Definition Hopeful Monsters/Deacon: the hopeful monster is the counterpart of the evolutionary theorist to the divine intervention in which a random mutation produces a radically different and better endowed organism. >Mutation. The most successful theory of such a kind was Noam Chomsky's theory about children's ability to acquire the grammar of the grammar they learned first. >N. Chomsky. Explanation/Chomsky: this can only be explained if we adopt a "universal grammar" that is built into all human brains as a blueprint. >Universal Grammar. I 36 Such a "speech organ" could explain why no other species has developed a language. It would also explain why there are no intermediate stages between human and non-human language. >Chomsky/Deacon. I 36 Hopeful monsters/Deacon: such theories explain a lot, from stone tools to cave drawings to rapid extinction. They make sudden changes much more obvious than gradual processes. I 37 They make adaptive explanations superfluous. DeaconVsHopeful monsters: such theories are all too strongly tailored to the explanation's end. They suggest that too many questions need not be answered at all. For example, the assumption of a speech organ that was only created by chance in humans makes it impossible to examine many details of the emergence of language. >Language origins. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Hopeful Monsters | Goldschmidt | Gould I 197 Evolution/Hopeful Monsters/Richard Goldschmidt/Gould: Goldschmidt thesis: (strongly hostile): Most macro evolutions are unfortunate and devastating: They give birth to "monsters". In a few promising cases he spoke of "promising monsters". Thesis: macro evolution goes through such promising monsters (hopeful monsters) and not through the accumulation of microevolutions.(1) >Evolution, >Selection, >Mutations, >Darwinism, >Life. 1. R. Goldschmidt 1940. The Material Basis of Evolution. Yale University Press. |
Goldschm I Richard Goldschmidt The Material Basis of Evolution New Haven 1982 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Indeterminacy | Quine | Rorty I 227 McDowellVsQuine: If truth is underdetermined by the entirety of the observable, then it must be independent of it. This is absurd for verificationists, therefore one must not understand it realistically. This strategy would imply, however, that one includes biology, but excludes translation. ChomskyVsQuine: there is only one indeterminacy: the familiar underdeterminacy of each theory through all observations. ((s) You never know whether all the observations are taken into account, or are already done. Quine I 257 Indeterminate singular terms do not designate objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore stand in purely significant position: E.g. "The tax inspector is looking for someone" (position significant - "someone" is not significant). >Singular Terms/Quine. I 283 Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x .." I 285 Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinite different things (Indeterminacy). II 33 Inscrutability of reference: no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the spatiotemporal strand, which is filled by a dog" - it is only one statement about the used terminology and its translation, not about physical objects (representative function). Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. >Translation/Quine. VI 69 Indeterminacy of translation/syntax/Quine: the ambiguity does not extend to the syntax - but on the referential apparatus: plural endings, equal signs, quantifiers - but these are not part of syntax. XII 60 Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: E.g. numbers of Neumann, Frege, Zermelo: each definition is correct, but they are all incompatible with one another. Solution: we invent set-theoretic models which must comply with the laws that fulfill the numbers in non-explicit meaning - Problem: you do not know if you talk about the terms or about the Goedel numbers (>shifted ostension). XII 62 Indeterminacy of translation/Native language/Quine: the indeterminacy of translation is also valid in a language: E.g. we may translate the "hopefully" of a particular speaker differently - principle of indulgence: justifies deviations from the homophonic translation, reproduction by the same phoneme order - compensation: can be made by corrections to the predicates - problem: we cannot ask: "are you really referring to Goedel numbers?" - Because the answer: "to numbers" lost its right to homophonic translation - ((s) because of the principle of indulgence). XII 97 Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/linguistics/Quine: the linguist always comes to an accurate translation, but only because he/she unconsciously makes arbitrary decisions - decisive: the holism: statements cannot be isolated. ((S) any differences can be compensated in other partial-translations.) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Inscrutability of reference | Quine | II 33 Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference between: x is a dog or: x is the space time portion that is filled by a dog. Only the Statement about the terminology is used and its translation, it is not about physical objects (representative function). Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. VI 71 Analytical hypothesis/Translation manual/Quine: is done term by term translation. Problem: then meaningful sentences may arise which refer to something else. This is the inscrutability of reference. XII 58 Inscrutability/Reference/Quine: goes much deeper than indeterminacy of translation: even within a language, even if the apparatus of individuation (plural, pronoun, identity, quantification, etc.) is assumed to be fixed. - E.g. protosyntax: (only strings of signs of one type (1st stage) - in that case, expressions are always types, not tokens. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine. ad XII 64 Non-factualism/(s): if something is indeterminate in principle, then there is no fact to explore. - Quine: e.g. if meaning is a property of the behavior, the inscrutability of reference cannot lie in the inscrutability of a fact - because there is nothing to investigate. But it probably makes a difference whether one refers to rabbits or parts, - or e.g. to the formulas or Goedel numbers. Because then there would be no difference between them. Reference would lose its meaning. But the difference is not tangible, neither through the behavior nor through ostension. -> Indeterminacy/Quine. - Formulas: have different properties than numbers. XII 65 Reversed spectra/Inscrutability/Quine: corresponds to the problem rabbit/part (Gavagai). Only that there is no frame of reference (apparatus of individuation). It can never be found out. Things are reversed, properties are retained. ((s) Things do not change sides, properties). XII 66 Pointing/Ontological relativity/Inscrutability/Quine: you cannot point to absolute location or speed. -Just as you cannot point to rabbits or parts. (> Gavagai/Quine). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Institutional Drift | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 108 Institutional Drift/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) even societies that are far less complex than our modern society create political and economic institutions that have powerful effects on the lives of their members. No two societies create the same institutions; they will have distinct customs, different systems of property rights (...). >Institutions. E.g., Some will recognize the authority of elders, others will not; some will achieve some degree of political centralization early on, but not others. Societies are constantly subject to economic and political conflict that is resolved in different ways because of specific historical differences, the role of individuals, or just random factors. These differences are often small to start with, but they cumulate, creating a process of institutional drift. Just as two isolated populations of organisms will drift apart slowly in a process of genetic drift, because random genetic mutations cumulate, two otherwise similar societies will also slowly drift apart institutionally. Acemoglu I 114 E.g., Western Europe, experiencing many of the same historical processes, had institutions similar to England at the time of the Industrial Revolution. There were small but consequential differences between England and the rest, which is why the Industrial Revolution happened in England and not France. This revolution then created an entirely new situation and considerably different sets of challenges to European regimes, which in turn spawned a new set of conflicts culminating in the French Revolution. The French Revolution was another critical juncture that led the institutions of Western Europe to converge with those of England, while Eastern Europe diverged further. Acemoglu I 208 E.g., (...)the Glorious Revolution involved the emergence of a new regime based on constitutional rule and pluralism. This outcome was a consequence of the drift in English institutions and the way they interacted with critical junctures. Feudalism spread throughout most of Europe, West and East. But (...) Western and Eastern Europe began to diverge radically after the Black Death. Small differences in political and economic institutions meant that in the West the balance of power led to institutional improvement; Acemoglu I 209 in the East, to institutional deterioration. But this was not a path that would necessarily and inexorably lead to inclusive institutions. Many more crucial turns would have to be taken on the way. Though the Magna Carta had attempted to establish some basic institutional foundations for constitutional rule, many other parts of Europe, even Eastern Europe, saw similar struggles with similar documents. Yet, after the Black Death, Western Europe significantly drifted away from the East. Documents such as the Magna Carta started to have more bite in the West. In the East, they came to mean little. Trade: This drift of institutions now interacted with another critical juncture caused by the massive expansion of trade into the Atlantic. (...) one crucial way in which this influenced future institutional dynamics depended on whether or not the Crown was able to monopolize this trade. [Merchands] wanted and demanded different economic institutions, and as they got wealthier through trade, they became more powerful. The same forces were at work in France, Spain, and Portugal. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Inverted Spectra | Fodor | IV 195 Exchanged spectra: nothing in the behavior can uncover the permutation (VsBehaviorism). >Behaviorism. Representation of the frequencies does not represent the sensation. The descriptions can be changed at will. Tradition: sensation is not a necessary property of color. If there is a "metaphysically necessary" connection between perception and neurophysiology, then still none between color concept and psychophysical concept. >Sensation, >Colour. IV 195 State space/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: the problem of identity will always return. Ultimately, there is no other criterion than observational concepts. >Observation lnguage, >Observation sentences, >Identity, >Criteria. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Life | Kauffman | I 60 Primordial Soup/Kauffman: Earth's atmosphere mainly hydrogen, methane and carbon dioxide. Vs: it should have been extremely diluted. Solution: new theory by Alexander Oparin, biophysicist, Soviet Union: When glycerine is mixed with other molecules, gel-like structures are formed which are called coacervates. Inside these structures, the molecular processes are isolated from the diluted aqueous environment. Life/Emergence/Stanley Miller, 1952: received amino acids from the primordial soup tracted with lightning in the laboratory. DNA: pure DNA does not replicate itself. This requires complex mixtures of protein enzymes. I 68 Life/Development/RNA/Kauffman: a naked, replicating RNA molecule would be conceivable. It would be a more promising candidate for the first living molecule. Practically never succeeds in experiments. There are only balls instead of stretched structures. DNA/RNA/Kauffman: 10 years ago (until 1985) it was believed that the two are largely inert chemical information stores. Then it was discovered that the RNA itself can act as enzymes! Ribozymes. They cut out their introns themselves. I 71 Life/Emergence/Kauffman: Assuming that such a molecule had been created. Could it have defied mutation-related destruction? Could it have gone through a development? 1. Vs: Both times: probably no! Problem: Error catastrophe. 2. KauffmannVs: it is unlikely because those bare RNA molecules are not complex enough. All living beings have a certain minimum complexity which cannot be undercut! The simplest living organisms, the bacteria "Pleuromona" already possess cell membranes, genes, RNA, particles for protein synthesis, proteins. Question: why is a system simpler than Pleuromona not viable? I 77 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: Life is not bound to the magical power of matrix replication, but is based on a deeper logic. Life is an inherent characteristic of complex chemical systems. As soon as the number of different types of molecules in a chemical soup exceeds a certain threshold, an autocatalytic metabolism suddenly occurs in a self-sustaining network of reactions. >Self-organisation. Life was already complex at the time of its creation and has remained so to this day. The roots reach deeper down than to the level of the double helix, they are based on the laws of chemistry itself. >Complexity. I 79 Life/Development/Kauffman: Assuming that the laws of chemistry would be somewhat different, e. g. nitrogen four instead of five valence electrons and therefore only four instead of five possible binding partners. Key: Catalysis. Life: Condition of emergence: catalytic closure. This is necessary, but not yet sufficient. >Necessity, >Sufficiency Chemistry/Reaction/Kauffman: in general, chemical reactions are reversible. >Symmetries, >Asymmetry. I 97 Life/Kauffman: thesis: the emergence of autocatalytic formations is almost inevitable. >Emergence. In more complex systems, the number of edges compared to the nodes is increasing. Molecules with the length L can be composed of smaller polymers in L-1 ways. I 107 All we need is sufficient molecular diversity. I 108 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: simple systems do not achieve catalytic closure. Life emerged in one piece and not in successive steps, and it has retained this holistic character to this day. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Method | Boyd | Fraassen I 77 Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is needed for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. This is to explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. >Theories, >Realism, >Explanation. I 78 BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other. >Evidence, >Observation Consequences. BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is stated there, and it cannot be improved either. Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a completely different definition of empirical equivalence than he has. >Empirical equivalence. 2. Principle: (according to Boyd accepted by all philosophers): Suppose a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of epistemology to explain the reliability of this principle. >Reliability, >Likelihood, >Epistemology, >Principles. Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree with that. It is itself a principle about principles. Boyd/Fraassen: they have a special example in mind: (P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it is most likely to fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all. Fraassen: this is harmless as it is stated there. I 79 Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he "understands" here "knowledge" as "light", i.e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms that are based on previously accepted theories. >Knowledge, >Prior knowledge, >Causal relations, >Causality. Boyd: e.g. Suppose, M: chemical mechanism A: Antibiotic C: Bacterial type L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, the dosage of A and the time. Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment? 1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls, but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L which is to be prooved, which does not work in this alternative way. Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval). 2. E.g. one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that mutates the cell walls. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here. In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments. Knowledge/Fraassen: we must understand knowledge here as "implied by a previously accepted theory". >Supervenience, >a posteriori necessity, cf. >Morals/Wright. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Method | Chomsky | I 278 Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement: we must be able to describe what the person receives. - The percept itself is a construction of the first order. - Its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: Grammar is a construction of the second-order. For this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker. VsBehaviorism: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset. >Behaviorism. I 297ff Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning. >Ambiguity. I 303 Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it. - My thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. >Grammar, >Hypotheses. --- II 316 Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance. ((s) Something dissimilar may also be associated.) II 321 Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. - If reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data. Cf. >Psychological theories on reinforcement and reinforcement sensitivity, >Learning. II 323 Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language. >Language acquisition. II 324 VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me. >Probability. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Negation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 150 Negation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the negation is the same picture - the sense of which is, however, reversed - (polarized) - so that the sentence negation is eliminated. Negation/Frege/Russell/Hintikka: negations of the predicate eliminate them and instead add the sentence negation. II 51 Negation/Wittgenstein: its meaning can only be expressed through rules of use. II 51 Denial/negation/Wittgenstein: there must be an agreement: E.g. the red light is on its own not the instruction to stop. It must be explained with the help of language. The meaning of "no" can only be expressed in rules that apply to its manner of use. II 72 Negation/explanation/Russell: explained ~ p by saying that ~ p is true when p is false, and vice versa. II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsRussell: but that is no explanation of negation, because it could also apply to other than the negative sentences. (> Truth table). II 74 Negation/fact/Wittgenstein: what corresponds to the sentence "the door is not open" if it is open? But here a mistaken analogy comes into play, because it is nothing that corresponds to p. And that, what corresponds to ~ p , is not being the case of p. II 75 Denial/negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: the understanding of "no" is like understanding a chess move. >Chess. II 113 Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts. "Positive" and "negative" refer to the form of the sentences and not to the facts. >Facts. II 114 A negative statement has not meaning in the same way as a positive statement; it cannot be described by positive terms and maintain its negative meaning. >Thoughts/Frege. II 221 Internal negation/Wittgenstein: the statement "this table is green" does not form part of the statement "this table is not green"? - ((s) claim, not sentence) - Wittgenstein: we rather draw a picture. >Picture theory. II 234 Generality/general things/general/negation/Wittgenstein: the grammars of the generality and the negation are ambiguous in incredible ways. >Generality. E.g. "This square is white" I could translate it as: "all the points of this square are white". Then we cannot say: "a point is not white" without introducing new conventions. Negation/"all"/Wittgenstein: both have different grammars. One has raised the question whether the negation of sentences implies the same as a disjunction of sentences. In certain cases, it is actually so: E.g. disjunction: "this is one of the primary colors, but not red", which means: "this is white or yellow or green or blue or black." However, there is no disjunction which corresponds to "Schmitz is not in this room". >Disjunction. Double Negation/Wittgenstein: is frequently used in the sense of a simple negation. E.g. "I like it and I do not like it". II 239 Who says we do not mean them in that sense, is saying that there are different types of double negation. Some say: "the application will be different." But how can one speak of a system of signs, without talking of the application. >Use, >Signs. E.g. I can lay my hands together so that they are covering each other. But one can ask: How would you like to explain "cover" with or without reference to something that is brought to cover? II 276 Double negation/Wittgenstein: double negation equals affirmation: it is not a determination about our habits, because then it would be a statement of natural history and not even a true one. It may be that the double negation means the negation in a symbol system. >Symbols. II 282 Negation/disjunction/Repertoire/Wittgenstein: if one has a distinct repertoire one can equate negation "not-p" with a disjunction e.g. "q v r v s" - that does not work, with e.g. "not this red here". - Delimited repertoire: E.g. permutations. Philosophy/Wittgenstein: the words "true" and "false" are two words, of which the philosophy was so far dependent. The philosophy is always based on questions without sense. We can completely abolish true and false. Instead, "sentence" and "negation". ((s)> referential quantification, > semantic ascent). II 288 Shadow/negation/world/reality/figure/Wittgenstein: we believe the sentences must correspond at least with something like a shadow. But nothing is thus obtained. After all, why in the world should there be a shadow of that reality? The confusing of the negation is in the thought, a symbol must correspond to something. >World, >Reality. How can you know what is meant when no equivalent is there? Nevertheless, you must know what you mean. >Meaning (Intending). II 289 Negation/Wittgenstein: E.g. "here is not a chair" corresponds to that here is the place and somewhere in the world are chairs. E.g. "I wish Schmitz may come" erroneous idea: that the sentence must consist of somehow jointed portions, like a box has a bottom and a lid. II 290 Negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: if one has understood "~ p", one must also have understood "p". But if p is false, there is nothing that corresponds to it. What does it mean to understand a command, if you do not follow him? By forming an image one does not get closer to the execution. >Understanding. --- IV 79 Negation/denial/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5,513 one could say, two sentences are opposed to one another if they have nothing in common - and: every sentence has only one negative - ((s)> completeness,> maximum). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Obsolescence | Minsky | I 145 Obsolescence/ideas/knowledge//Minsky: Some ideas acquire undue influence. The Investment Principle: Our oldest ideas have unfair advantages over those that come later. The earlier we learn a skill, the more methods we can acquire for using it. Each new idea must then compete against the larger mass of skills the old ideas have accumulated. (Cf. Matthew principle). This is why it's so much easier to do new things in older ways. Obsolescence/Problem: The many superficial similarities will make it hard for you to tell which aspects of your old skills are unsuitable, and the easiest course is to keep applying your old technique, trying to patch each flaw until none show. Solution: In the long run, you'd probably do better by starting fresh with a new technique — and then borrowing what you can from your older skills. Evolution/Minsky: Evolution illustrates how processes can become enslaved by the investment principle. Why do so many animals contain their brains inside their heads — as with fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and bats? This arrangement was inherited long before our earliest aquatic ancestor first crawled upon the land three hundred million years ago. For many of those animals — woodpeckers, for example — another arrangement might serve at least as well. But once the pattern of centralizing so many functions in the head was established, it carried with it great networks of dependencies involving many aspects of anatomy. Because of this, any mutation that changed any part of that arrangement would disrupt many other parts and lead to dreadful handicaps, at least in the short run of evolution. And because evolution is so inherently short-sighted, it would not help if, over longer spans of time, such changes could lead to advantages. Cf. >Evolution/Dennett, >Evolution/Gould. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Order | Carnap | VI 206 System/Reference/Transformation/Meaning/Relation/Permutation/Carnap: any other relations could be accepted arbitrarily, for which still exactly the same empirical propositions (according to the signs!) apply, which now mean something else, however. - E.g. we only need a harmonized transformation of the set of the basic elements in itself and as a new basic relation those relations whose inventory is the transformed inventory of the old basic relations. Then, the new relations are structurally equivalent (isomorphic) to the old ones. VI 213 Order/Carnap: E.g. dog in the zoological realm: point - as an individual different - temporal order unlike any other - the distinction singular term/general term corresponds to that between orders - qualities are ordered differently than by space and time - this is equivalent to the difference between identity of localization and sameness of color of view field points - reason: different equally located (with the same number of digits) quality classes can never belong to the same elementary experience, but those of the same color can. Only thus could we separate the two orders of field of view and color body (>dimensions). VI 215 Identity of location: is what allows the knowledge synthesis in the first place. - ((s) Two things can only be in the same place after one another - temporal dimension - not with sameness of color). >Similarity, >Quality, >Identity, >Space, >Time; cf. >Simultaneity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Order | Kauffman | Dennett I 306 Self-organization/Kauffman/Dennett: Kauffman's laws are not those of form, but of design, the compulsions of meta technology. >Laws/Kauffman, >Laws, >Laws of nature. Dennett I 308 Self-organization/Kauffman: the ability to evolve, i. e. the ability to search the area of opportunity, is optimal when populations are "melting out" of local regions. >Self-organisation. Local/Global/Self-organization/Technology/Kauffman: Local rules create global order. >Local/global. Dennett: mankind's technology is not governed by this principle. For example, pyramids are organized from top to bottom, but the building activity is of course from bottom to top. >Technology. Until the evolution of rational human technology, the rules run from local to global, then the direction is reversed. --- Kauffman I 9 Order/Human/Kauffman thesis: natural selection has not formed us alone, the original source of order is self-organization. The complex whole can show "emergent" characteristics in a completely unmystic sense, which are legitimate for themselves. >Complexity, >Emergence. Kauffman I 21 The human then no longer appears as a product of random events, but as the result of an inevitable development. >Life, >Humans. Kauffman I 18 Definition Rational Morphologists/Kauffman: (Darwin's predecessor): Thesis: biological species are not the product of random mutation and selection, but of timeless laws of shape formation. (Kauffman goes in a similar direction). Order/Physics/Kauffman: physics knows phenomena of profound spontaneous order, but does not need selection! Cf. >Selection. Kauffman I 30 Self-organization/Kauffman: thesis: certain structures occur at all levels: from ecosystems to economic systems undergoing technological evolution. >Ecosystems, >Economy. Thesis: all complex adaptive systems in the biosphere, from single-celled organisms to economies, strive for a natural state between order and chaos. Great compromise between structure and chance. >Structures, >Random. Kauffman I 38 Order/physics/chemistry/biology: two basic forms: 1. occurs in so-called energy-poor equilibrium systems: For example, a ball rolls into the middle of a bowl. For example, in a suitable aqueous solution, the virus particle composes itself of its molecular DNA (RNA) and protein components, striving for the lowest energy state. 2. type of order: is present when the preservation of the structure requires a constant substance or energy supply. (Dissipative). For example, a whirlpool in the bathtub. For example, the Great Red Spot on Jupiter. It is at least 300 years old, which is longer than the mean residence time of a single gas molecule in the vortex. It is a stable structure of matter and energy through which a constant stream of matter and energy flows. One could call it a living being: it supports itself and gives birth to "baby whirls". >Life/Kauffman. Cells, for example, are not low-energy, but rather complex systems that constantly convert nutrient molecules to maintain their inner structure and multiply. Kauffman I 115 Order/life/emergence/Kauffman: the autocatalytic formations must coordinate the behaviour of several thousand molecules. The potential chaos is beyond imagination. Therefore, another source of molecular order has to be discovered, of the fundamental internal homeostasis (balance). Surprisingly simple boundary conditions are sufficient for this. >Laws/Kauffman. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Order | Monod | I 11 Order/Structure/Organization/Monod: two terms are subordinated to it. 1. Teleonomy (a property dictated by a superordinate purpose) of the "apparatus" organization. 2. Invariance of the information underlying the teleonomic structures. Proteins: are bearers of teleonomic performance Nucleic Acids: is an information storage thanks to complementarity as an exclusive interaction. >Teleonomy. Reproduction: is almost invariant through organized protein nucleic acid systems. (With a certain blur). Mutation occurs through translation errors. >Mutation. I 13 Nucleic acids: divide into DNA: memory and RNA: messenger. Due to the non-reversibility of this division, the teleonomic program, although it is the subject of the mutation, cannot itself contribute to its change. --- I 14 Selection/own: It is based on a physically clearly formulated evaluation concept. If it were purely arbitrary, it would be "survival of the survivor". Selection, however, means restriction of the coincidence. In large numbers the selection of necessity obeys. ((s) But surely not on a goal!). Manfred Eigen: selection is done according to strict criteria. >Selection. Coincidence/necessity/Manfred Eigen: the necessity occurs equally next to chance, as soon as a probability distribution exists. >Probability distribution. I 25 Order/Organization/Criteria/Monod: an even more disappointing criterion would be the function: For example, compare horses on a field with cars on the road. >Functions, >Functional explanation, >Criteria. E.g. the eye and camera can be compared according to structure and performance. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
| Phrase Structure Grammar | Lyons | I 215 Constituent structural grammar/history/Lyons: three stages: 1. Bloomfield: introduced the term. Thesis: The analysis is appropriate if it takes the meanings into account. 2. Wells and Harris: Distribution, distributional criteria. >Distribution. 3. Chomsky: Investigation of the nature of the rules that generate sentences. >N. Chomsky, >L. Bloomfield, >Z.S. Harris. Ambiguity/Grammar/Lyons: Example a) beautiful (girls dress) or b) (beautiful girl's) dress: requires brackets (and therefore layers). Constituent: is made clear by brackets. On the other hand: 2. E.g. they can fish: there is no difference in the brackets, instead "fish" can be interpreted as a verb (they can fish) or a noun (they fill fish into cans). I 216 3. E.g. some more convincing evidence: Possible views: a) some evidence, which is more convincing: - some (more convincing) evidence b) some more evidence, which is convincing: - (some more) (convincing evidence). N.B.: here, however, there is a difference in the distributional classification of the elements beyond the difference in brackets. E.g. some less convincing evidence is no longer ambiguous. Nor, for example, some more good convincing evidence. Distribution: e.g. more belongs to at least two distributional classes: a) It combines like less with adjectives to adjective complexes (but its distribution is more limited than that of less, because here more is in complementary distribution with the suffix -er. Similar to e.g. nicer versus more nice), b) In contrast to less, it combines with a preceding some to a "closer definition" (modification) of nouns and nominal groups (cf. some more evidence to some less evidence). Ambiguity/Grammar/Lyons: can therefore 1. be a consequence of the constituent structure or 2. the distributional classification of the final or intermediate constituents. This applies to many languages. Solution: Naming the nodes (or bracket structures) of the family tree. E.g. ∑{ NP ( A [poor] + N[John]) + VP(V [ran] + Adv [away] ) } Brackets: there is no ranking between the two types of brackets used here. The different brackets are for readability only. I 217 Modification/Tradition/Lyons: in traditional theory "poor John" would be classified as a nominal complex because he "assumes the function of a noun" in sentences. Distribution: this can be interpreted in such a way that expressions of the form adjective + noun have the same distribution in the sentences generated by the grammar as nouns. The corresponding node is characterized by "NP". Ambiguity/Grammar/Lyons: can be removed: instead of A + N1 + N2 we write brackets: (A+ N1) + N2 or A + (N1 + N2). For example fresh (fruit market) or (fresh fruit) market and new fruit market, but not (new fruit) market. For simplicity's sake, we assume that neither fresh fruit market nor new fruit market have more than one interpretation. Semantics: from their point of view we will say that they are clear. Grammar: Question, can they still be grammatically ambiguous? I 218 For example, is the constituent structure fresh (fruit market) and in the other case (new fruit) market grammatically permissible? Cf. >Acceptability. Problem: an explicit grammar must be able to answer this. It is a matter of subclassification with two limiting uncertainty factors and the question of "decreasing yield" - grammar must not become too complicated. Rules should not only apply to the creation of a few sentences. Constituents/Grammar/Lyons: Constituent grammar allows sentences to be understood as composed of layers of constituents. The main reason for this: more economical and intuitively more appropriate description. (as by "subject"/"predicate"). In addition, ambiguities can be eliminated (by brackets corresponding to the layers). I 218 Constituent Structure Grammar/Constituent Structure/Lyons: 1) It is about finding out where to put the brackets. 2) It is about constructing a system of rules that clearly assign correct constituent structures to these sentences. First of all: we will only look at the following systems, which were examined by Chomsky: Concatenating replacement systems/Chomsky/Grammar/Lyons: I 219 We call these Simple constituent structure grammars/phrase structure grammar/Chomsky: Replacement systems/Chomsky/Lyons: E.g. (1) ∑ > NP + Vp (2) VP > V + Adv (3) Np > A + N >Rules/Lyons, >Ambiguity/Lyons, >Unambiguity. I 226 Discontinuous constituents/Grammar/Lyons: Problem: Constituents of a construction do not have to stand next to each other. Example: Interrupted constituents: e.g. to call ...up a) John called up Bill b) John called Bill up c) John called him up Wrong: John called up him. Discontinuous constituents/grammar/Lyons: Problem: Constituents of a construction do not have to stand next to each other. Example Interrupted constituents: e.g. to call ...up Structure: called up is not only a common constituents of a) - c), but these three also have the same constituent structure. Solution: distinction optional/obligatory: the rule operates optionally in the case of a) and b), and in the case of c) obligatory ((s) i.e. in a) and b) the word position can be changed, but not in c)). Problem: this assumes that we can specify the conditions under which the rule is optional or obligatory. Word order: e.g. free word order: Latin. For example: Catullous Clodiam amabat, allows all permutations, because the accusative is marked by the ending. Solution: we need additional permutation rules. I 227 Problem: if the word order were really completely free, the permutation rules would be simple, but the order of certain words is subject to restrictions, which complicates the question. I 237 Distribution/constituent grammar/Lyons: the distributional basis for the replacement rules is clear here: Each rule of the form A > B + C is based on the distributional identity of A and B + C. The A disappears, except as the name of a higher node. I 238 Replacement Rules/Lyons: in a grammar with replacement rules, the terms "endocentric" and "exocentric" are not introduced at all! >Terminology/Lyons. Constituent Structural Grammar/Lyons: NP and VP could just as easily be called X and Y. The relationship between nominal complexes, nouns and pronouns ((s) categories) is not expressed by the nomenclature as in the "classificatory" approach, but by the fact that they are derived from a common node. I 238 Categorical Grammar/Tradition/Lyons: here the term dependency (dependency similar to subordination) is fundamental. >Categorial grammar. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Politics | Baudrillard | Blask I 11 Politics/Baudrillard: The Symbolic Exchange and Death/Baudrillard: (early work): Baudrillard advocates for the elimination of political economy by a catastrophic theory of universal subversion. The symbolic exchange obeys no equivalence principle anymore. It is not based on dialectics, but on omnipresent reversibility. >Symbol, >Simulation, >Simulacra, >Dialectic, >Dialectic/Barthes. Blask I 19 Politics/Baudrillard: Baudrillard The Divine Left (1984). The left is blind to the current political situation. It does not notice the disappearance of reality and utopia. The value-oriented left is lacking immorality. Blask I 70 Indifference/Baudrillard: according to Baudrillard dreams, utopias and ideas have been acted up, they have already been redeemed in reality. Everything has already taken place. The avant-garde has become as meaningless as the revolution. This is the transpolitical. Definition Transpolitical/Baudrillard: the mode of the disappearance of the political. Everything has become political, at the same time nothing is political anymore. This anomaly has no critical consequences for the system. It is a mutation figure. Blask I 72 Abnormalities: three forms: 1. The hostage 2. The thickness 3. The Obscene 1. Hostage-taking: the only still relevant social relationship: between hostage and terrorist is ruling and being controlled. Blackmail. The principle of freedom is later based on security and ultimately on that of supersaturation. We are all hostages and blackmailers. The real problem for the terrorist is to get rid of his hostage. Blask I 73 2. Obesity: social proliferation, randomness of bodies. Against the difference between the sexes. Archaic multiplication by division and doubling. The commonality between the hostage and the obese is loss of the illusion. 3. The Obscene: not only the hostage and the obese are obscene, but almost all social phenomena: gambling, culture, sex, pornography and above all the social. Permanent commitment to transparency and obscenity. Blask I 74 Sexuality/Politics/Economics/Baudrillard: We live in a sphere of the transsexual, transeconomic, transaesthetic. >Sexuality. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Qualia | Stalnaker | I 222 Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: functionalism will explain qualia with a relational structure. >Functionalism. Problem: if we could have a permutation so that the relational general structure remained - then no functionalist theory could be right. >Inverted spectra, >Permutation. I 223 Vs: this can be disputed:the relations are more complex, for example, there are relations of colors among each other - that would mean denying symmetry. >Colour. Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: bad solution: a bad solution would be to introduce additional characteristics, e.g. blue is cool - we only need the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. >Symmetries. Functionalism: functionalism identifies qualia intra-personnally through distinguishability. Shoemaker: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons with qualia. >Sydney Shoemaker. Interpersonal/Wittgenstein: interpersonal arises from the possibility to change intra-personnally. Bad solution/swapped spectra: It is not a good solution to introduce additional characteristics like red is hot, blue is cool etc. >Metaphors. Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put aside such objections. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. Qualia/Functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intrapersonally via distinguishing capacities, one should expect it to accept the Frege/Schlick view, i.e., that there is no interpersonal counterpart to it. >Moritz Schlick. Shoemaker: That would be too simple. Thesis: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach. While we cannot define certain qualitative states in functionalist terms, we can define classes of qualitative states. Classes of qualitative states: We functionally define identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) sameness and dissimilarity. >Identity conditions. Thus we obtain equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those which are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations. >Equivalence classes. ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason he resists the Frege/Schlick view is... I 224 ...the view that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there can be intrapersonally interchanged spectra. And he believes that from there there is an argument for interpersonal swapped spectra that cannot be resisted. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Reference | Quine | Rorty I 219f Quine: inscrutability of reference: not talking of what the objects of a theory are in an absolute sense is useful, but the question of how a theory of objects can be interpreted or re-interpreted in another one. E.g. How can you find out if someone sees everything upside down, or in complementary colors? It makes sense to talk about subordinate theories, but only relative to the theoretical framework with its own preliminarily appropriated and ultimately inscrutable ontology. >Inscrutability. Hartry FieldVsQuine: has shown that Quine’s talk of "relativization to a background language," and of "taking the reference literally" is not consistent with his general reasoning. RortyVsQuine: a real holism would consider the question "are we referring in reality to rabbit or rabbit parts? To formulas or to Goedel numbers" neither meaningless nor meaningful only relative to a background language, but in reality to be a question such as " Are we are really talking about nations or groups of individual persons?" "Are we talking about witches or hallucinations?" These questions make sense if we give them meaning. That means that something else depends on their answer. --- Quine I 273 Shared reference: Terms, not objects! - Nevertheless, it is water, which is spread - mass terms: cumulative reference, (grammatically like singular term) - singular term: shared reference. >Language acquisition, >Triangulation, >Mass terms. I 166 Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man. I 273 Theories and things: Prerequisite of an object is not the same as reference, but same motivation - Fido-Fido principle: individual chairs mostly nameless, "chair" refers to virtually any chair. Reference: comes out through the predication: it is the same in dogs and milk: Milk is white, Fifi is a dog - But: milk and dog cannot be. compare II 13f. --- II 33 Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the space time portion, which is filled by a dog" - only statement about the terminology used and its translation, not physical object (proxy function). - inscrutability: in translation or permutation. Putnam II 194 Reference/Quine: there are definitely true and false sentences, but no specific reference relation - reason: the true sentences have an infinite number of models, and there is not the one designated model (Loewenheim) - in various true models, there are then various reference relations. --- Quine I 129 Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunction, negation, alternation) - identifiable: stimulus analytic sentences, stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences of the natives - untranslatable: stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences. --- VII (g) 130f Reference/Theory of reference/th.o.r./Quine: name, truth, denotation (designating ("true-by")), extension, values of variables, ontological commitments - theory of reference includes the semantic paradoxes. --- Lauener XI 175 Reference/extensions/Singular term/general term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular term: have a reference - general term and sentences have an extension. >Singular terms, >Extension, >Intension. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Selection | Darwin | Gould I 53 Selection/Darwin: suggested two types of sexual selection. (a) competition among male members of a species for access to females, and (b) a selection made by the females themselves. Gould I 54 WallaceVsSexual Selection: it attaches too much importance to the "wanting" of animals. It puts emphasis on characteristics, which are rather hindering for a well-functioning machine. GouldVsWallace, who had an exaggerated idea of the effectiveness of the selection, abruptly stopped short of the brain. He argued that our morality and our intellect cannot be the product of natural selection. However, since it is the only way to develop forms, a divine being must have intervened. Nowadays, absurdly, an attitude is called "Neo Darwinism" which is much closer to Wallace's rigorous selectionism than to Darwin. >Selection. Gould IV 266 Natural selection/Darwin: admitted that two authors before him had discovered the natural selection: Patrick Matthew, Scottish naturalist and fruit grower, 1831. Williams Charles Wells, famous doctor, member of the Academy of Sciences. IV 269 William Charles Wells: clarified a mistake regarding a disease with large black spots on the skin of white people. They are by no means genealogically or otherwise very similar to people of color. IV 270 Black skin: has an advantage in hot climates. This is the traditional Darwinian argument! In fact, it is about the combination with other characteristics, e. g. better protection against tropical diseases accidentally paired with darker skin. IV 271 Wells: Recognized that animals cannot be considered as an amalgam of independent parts. That was new at the time. IV 272 Selection/tradition, old view: the fight between individuals within a population. Selection, new: Wells preferred variants cannot assert theirselves in stable populations with a large number of individuals! Inheritance/Mendel: (Mendel's results have not yet been known to Wells): Mendel: preferred characteristics are often caused by mutation, and these characteristics cannot be diluted by crossbreeding with normal individuals. The mutation may not be phenotypic (if it is recessive) in the next generation, but it does not disappear. Selection, new: Today, increased attention is paid to group selection. IV 273 Variation: everybody knew at Wells' time that organisms vary. However, experience from dog breeding cannot be transferred to the development from fish to humans. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Selection | Kelly | I 1772 Selection/Adaption/Kelly: the old view on the adaptation was that the internal source (the mutation) caused a change, while external factors (the environment) selected or directed the development. >Mutation, >Evolution, >Adaption. New: the new view is that external (physical or chemical) conditions produce the forms, while internal factors (self-organization) make the selection. >Self-organization, cf. >St. Kauffman. |
Kelly I Kevin Kelly What Technology Wants New York 2011 |
| Selection | Mayr | I 65 Natural selection/Mayr: is no random process. (Although coincidence happens in evolution). >Mutation. I 248 Selection/Mayr: is today completely accepted. Two steps: variation and actual selection. 1. Variation: In each generation, recombination, gene flow, random factors and mutations generate a great genetic diversity. The genetic material is "hard" and not "soft", as Darwin assumed. >Randomness, >Necessity. Sexual Reproduction: the parental chromosomes are broken and reassembled. Thus uniqueness of the offspring by recombination. Composition of the genes according to no law! >Genes. I 249 2. Selection: differences in the survival and reproduction of newly formed individuals. >Individuals/Mayr, >Life/Mayr. Even in species producing millions of offspring in each generation, on average, only two of them are needed to maintain population balance. >Species, >Evolution. I 250 Coincidence/Mayr: dominates the variation. Necessity/Mayr: dominates the selection. Selection: there is no "selective force"! I 252 Selection: Bates' discovery of mimicry (1862)(1) in edible and poisonous butterflies: first proof of natural selection. >Mimicry. Benefits/Biology: what is the benefit of the emergence of a characteristic for survival: adaptionist program. Characteristics/Survival: favourable characteristics: Tolerance against adverse climate, better utilisation of food, resistance to pathogens, escape capability. (through sexual reproduction). Selection by females (peacock tail) may be more important than the ability of males to defeat rivals. >Features/Mayr. I 253 Brother and sister rivalry and parental care: affect reproductive success rather than survival. This selection is apparently more important than the concept of sexual selection suggests. I 260 Extinction: 99.9% of all evolutionary lines that once existed on Earth are extinct. Selection: Darwin: "Natural selection is on an hourly basis all over the world to detect the slightest changes".(2) I 261 Selection/MayrVsDarwin: the genetic variation needed to perfect a characteristic may not occur at all! For example, the inner/outer skeleton: vertebrates up to the dinosaur, outer skeleton: the giant crab has remained the largest creature. The difference is determined by the different paths taken by the ancestors, not by the presence of characteristics! I 262 Selection/Mayr: further restriction: interaction in development. The parts of the organism are not independent of each other. No one reacts to the selection without interacting with the other characteristics. Geoffroys, 1818(3): "Law of Balance": Organisms are compromises between competing demands. Selection/Mayr: 3rd Restriction: Ability to non-genetic modification: the more plastic the phenotype (due to flexibility in development) is, the less the force of selection pressure. Plants (and especially microorganisms) have a much greater ability to phenotypic modification (more diverse reaction standard) than animals. Ability for non-genetic adaptation is exclusively genetically controlled! Coincidence: works at every level. I 264 New: whole populations or even species could be the target of the selection. I 265 Soft/hard group selection: Soft group selection: Success through the average selection value of the individuals. This means that each individual selection is also a soft group selection. Hard group selection: the group as a whole has certain adaptive group characteristics that are not simply the sum of the contributions, the advantage of the group is greater than that of the sum of the individual members. >Adaption. Division of labor, cooperation (guardian, search for food). Here the term "group selection" is justified. I 266 Origin of the species: this controversy completely changed the status of so-called species selection: the emergence of a new species seems to contribute very often to the extinction of another species. "Species Exchange," takes place according to strict Darwinian principles. I 279 Definition r-selection: strongly fluctuating, often catastrophically exposed population size, weak intraspecific competition, very fertile. K-Selection: constant population size, strong competition, stable life expectancy. I 280 As population density increases, so too does the influence of adverse factors: competition, food shortages, lack of escape routes, predators, growth slows down. I 317 Could the human being become a superhuman? The odds are not so good here! Not enough selection pressure. Group selection was particularly a thing of the past. Selection/Human: Today, however, in mass society there is no sign of selection for superior genotypes that would allow the human being to rise above its present abilities. Many authors even claim that the human gene pool is decaying. Francis Galton was the first to suggest that one could and should improve humanity with appropriate selection. He coined the term "eugenics". 1. H.W. Bates (1862). Contributions to an Insect Fauna of the Amazon Valley. In: Trans Linn. Soc. London 23. S. 495-566. 2. Ch. Darwin (1859). On the Origin of Species. London: John Murray. 3. E. Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1818). Philosophie anatomique. Paris. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Simulacrum | Baudrillard | Blask I 26 Simulacra = are artificial worlds of signs. Baudrillard: Order of the Simulacra: 1st order: (Renaissance) Imitation, pretense, automat 2nd order: (industrial revolution) production/reproduction, robot 3rd order: (Present) There is random permutation. Negation is integrated. There is total relativity. There is no choice. All answers are already there. Blask I 29 Def Simulation/Baudrillard: simulation is that irresistible process, in which things are linked together as if they had a meaning. It eliminates the principle of truth and thus the semantic equivalence between the signifier and the signified. >Simulation, >Robots, >Truth, >Synonymy, >Sign, >Symbol, >Renaissance, >Relativism. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Spam | AI Research | Norvig I 865 Spam/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: Language identification and genre classification are examples of text classification, as is sentiment analysis (classifying a movie or product review as positive or negative) and spam detection (classifying an email message as spam or not-spam). Since “not-spam” is awkward, researchers have coined the term ham for not-spam. We can treat spam detection as a problem in >Supervised learning. Norvig I 866 In the machine-learning approach we represent the message as a set of feature/value pairs and apply a classification algorithm h to the feature vector X. We can make the language-modeling and machine-learning approaches compatible by thinking of the n-grams as features. This is easiest to see with a unigram model. The features are the words in the vocabulary (…) and the values are the number of times each word appears in the message. That makes the feature vector large and sparse. If there are 100,000 words in the language model, then the feature vector has length 100,000, but for a short email message almost all the features will have count zero. This unigram representation has been called the bag of words model. You can think of the model as putting the words of the training corpus in a bag and then selecting words one at a time. The notion of order of the words is lost; a unigram model gives the same probability to any permutation of a text. Higher-order n-gram models maintain some local notion of word order. With bigrams and trigrams the number of features is squared or cubed, and we can add in other, non-n-gram features: the time the message was sent, whether a URL or an image is part of the message, an ID number for the sender of the message, the sender’s number of previous spam and ham messages, and so on. >Language Models/Norvig, >Data compression/Norvig. Norvig I 867 Data compression: To do classification by compression, we first lump together all the spam training messages and compress them as Norvig I 867 a unit. We do the same for the ham. Then when given a new message to classify, we append it to the spam messages and compress the result. We also append it to the ham and compress that. Whichever class compresses better—adds the fewer number of additional bytes for the new message—is the predicted class. The idea is that a spam message will tend to share dictionary entries with other spam messages and thus will compress better when appended to a collection that already contains the spam dictionary. Experiments with compression-based classification on some of the standard corpora for >Text classification. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Structures | Carnap | VI 206 System / Reference / Transformation / Meaning / Relation / Permutation / Carnap: one could arbitrarily take any other relations, for which empirical statements still are exactly the same - the apply, but now mean something else - E.g. We need only a one-to-one transformation of the set of basic elements in themselves and as a new basic relation those relations whose existence is the transformed inventory of the old basic relations. - ((s)> Löwenheim). - Then the new relations are the structurally the same as the old ones (isomorphic). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Terminology | Foucault | I 25 Way of being/Foucault: Thesis: This is not to say that reason has made progress, but that the way of being of things and order has been fundamentally changed, which offers the thing knowledge by dividing it. I 26 Def Archeology/Foucault: Archeology defines systems of simultaneity, something the series of necessary and sufficient mutations to describe the threshold of a new positivity. 56 ff Signatures: signs of similarity. However, the system is not closed. I 100f Def Tableau/Foucault: the meaning will be given in the complete tableau of the signs. If the existence of the sense stands entirely on the side of the sign, the whole functioning lies on the side of the signified. I 109 Def Natural History/Foucault: Science of characteristics that structure the continuity of nature and its intermeshing. Therein: money theory and value theory, also general grammar. Definition mathesis/Foucault: science of equations, that is, of assignments and judgments, the science of truth. Def Taxinomia/Foucault: treats identity/difference. It is the science of structure and classes. It is the knowledge of beings. Space in table form: most clearly in the form of the theory of language, classification, and money. II 128ff Def "Referential"/Foucault: defines the possibilities of the emergence and delimitation of what gives the sentence its meaning. It is not produced by "realities" or "facts", but by possibility laws, of existence rules for the objects. II 258 Def Positivities/Foucault: they show the rules by which a discursive practice can form subject groups, utterances, conceptual bundles, and series of theoretical choices. The elements thus formed do not constitute a science with a structure of defined idealism. Their system is certainly less accurate, but not a mere accumulation. They are that of which a coherent proposition has been built, more or less precise descriptions are developed, verifications are made, and theories are developed. A preform.- II 265 Threshold of positivity: the moment when a discursive practice separates itself and gains its autonomy. Threshold of epistemologization: makes use of verification and coherence norms. Threshold of scientificity: construction laws of propositions. Threshold of formalization: is achieved when the formal building is unfolded. Archeology: explores the temporal distribution of these thresholds. It is, in fact, neither regular nor homogeneous. For example, the beginning of mathematics is less questioned as a historical event than as a principle of historicity. Unhooking: in the economy particularly numerous: II 267 Threshold of positivity in practice and theory of mercantilism. Separation into what is not yet, and what is ultimately scientific. Discursive formation: not a developing totality, but a distribution of gaps. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Terminology | Gould | I 190 1. Stasis: most species show little change in one direction or another during their presence on Earth. 2. Sudden appearance: in all areas of life, species do not occur due to incessant changes in their predecessors, but suddenly and "fully developed". I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. (See Evolution/Gould). b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. Most theoreticians prefer the "allopatric" speciation (which happens in a different place). This is the orthodox view. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. I 198 Definition preadaption: preadaption is derived from the thesis that other functions would be fulfilled in the initial stages, e.g. half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature. I 240 Definition Eozoon: an Eozoon is an early form of an animal. I 256 Definition protists: protists are single cell precursors. Definition Metazoen: a Metazoen is a multicellular offspring. I 258 Definition homologous similarity in common precursors: two organisms may have the same feature because they got it from a common ancestor. Definition analogous similarity: organisms with analogous similarity have no common precursors. The two organisms have a common feature that represents the result of a separate but similar evolutionary change in independent lines of development. I 281 Definition parallelism, Definition convergence: parallelism is a separate development of similar features in the course of evolution. This occurs very often. II 56 Definition diploid: animals with paired chromosomes in both sexes are diploid. Some animals use a different trait for sex determination: the females are diploid, but the males have instead of each female pair only one chromosome and are considered to be the first males. Definition haploid: organisms with only one chromosome (half of the diploid number) are haploid. In other words, the males develop ironically from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. Animals using this system are called Definition Haplodiploid: the males develop from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. This can be used to control the number of females. II 57 This fascinating system can help explain the origin of social systems in ants. Or also, for example, that a male mite dies before its own birth after fertilising its sisters in the womb. At least 10% of all known animal species are haplodiploid. II 186 Definition homeotic mutation: legs or parts of legs replace a variety of structures on the head mainly antennae and parts of the mouth. Not all incorrectly placed parts are homoeoses. William Bateson (not Gregory), who later invented the word genetics, called cases only homeotically in which organs that have the same development or evolutionary origin are replaced. II 192 Viable homoeostats that emulate the primordial forms are not really reborn ancestors. Double elements are formed, no old patterns are found. II 193 These things make it clear how few genes are responsible for regulating the basic order in the body of a fruit fly. II 240 Definition zoocentric: zoocentrism is a erspective that derives general principles from the behaviour of other animals and then completely subsumes the human being into this category, because we are undoubtedly also animals. Definition anthropocentric: a point of view is anthropocentric when it tries to subsume nature in us by considering our peculiarities as the goal of life from the very beginning. The zoocentric view can be extended to the caricature, which is often referred to as "nothing but error": the human is "nothing more than an animal" (reductionism). Popular science is flooding us with the excessively broad version of zoocentrism. II 331 Definition "genetic drift"/Gould: the genetic drift is the process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency. II 352 Definition Clade: a clade is a branch on an evolutionary tree. Cladism tries to establish the branching pattern for a number of related species. II 353 Definition sister group: the sister group forms an upside-down Ypsilon: two tribes sharing a common ancestor from which no other tribe branches off. Gorillas and chimpanzees form a sister group. We can then consider the chimpanzee gorilla group as a unit and ask which primate forms the sister group with it. II 354 Definition derived feature: properties that only occur for members of a direct lineage are derived features. For example, all mammals have hair, which is not the case with any other vertebrate. II 355 Hair is a derived feature for the class of mammals, because it has developed only once in the common ancestors of mammals and therefore identifies a true branch in the family tree of vertebrates. Common derived characteristics are common to two or more strains and can be used to identify sister groups. II 356 GouldVsCladism: most derived features are ambiguous: they either tend to be too easily delimitable, or they are adaptive enough to be developed by several strains through natural selection independently of each other. II 360 Definition classification (cladism): classification was designed for the purpose of reflecting relative dimensions of similarity. Definition phenetism: phenetism is another theory of classification, it focuses solely on the overall similarity and tries to evade the reproach of subjectivity by referring to a large number of features, all of which are expressed numerically and processed by the computer. II 374 Definition "Telegony": Telegony means that features of long extinct ancestors reappear. They are also called "descendants from afar." Telegony refers to the idea that a producer could influence offspring that were not conceived by him. Definition "Pangenesis" (1868, provisionally developed by Darwin) thesis: all cells of the body produce small particles called "Gemmulae", which circulate throughout the body, accumulate in the gametes and eventually transfer the features to the offspring. GouldVsPangenesis: since the "Gemmulae" can change, acquired features can be inherited, which would be Lamarckism. II 377 Definition orthogenesis: orthogenesis is the assumption that a pre-drawn path is followed. IV 103 Doctrine of uniformity: (represented by Charles Lyell and James Hutton) the uppermost layers of the earth have remained unchanged for millions of years. IV 153 Definition Monogeny: (19th century): thesis: Monogeny is the assumption of a common ancestry of all humans from the ancestors Adam and Eve. (Lower races were later degenerated from original perfection.) Definition Polygeny: (19th century): thesis: Polygeny is the assumption that Adam and Eve are only the ancestors of the white peoples. IV 159 Definition subspecies: a subspecies is a population inhabiting a specific geographical area. IV 357 Definition sympatric: sympatric means being in the same place. Definition allopatric: allopatric means being in separate places (assuming that species can only develop separately). III 19 The "Full House": Gould's central argument: natural reality is an accumulation of individuals in populations. Variation is not reducible but "real" in the sense that "the world" consists of it. Error: it is wrong to always describe populations (according to Plato) as "average", which is then considered "typical". III 67 "Full House": "Full House" describes the need to focus not only on an abstract measure of an average or a central tendency, but on the variation within whole systems. Error: it is an error to consider the likely outcome for a single individual as a measure of a central tendency. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Threats to Development | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 32 Threats to development/Developmental psychology/Upton: Maternal health: for the influence of rubella: Dontigny et al. 2008(1)) for the influence of nutrition: see Derbyshire, 2007(2) Upton I 33 Maternal age: see Jacobson et al. 2004(3), Frazer et al. 1995(4). Maternal stress: see Talge et al. 2007(5) Upton I 34 Drugs: see Lester et al., 2002(6), - Alcohol: see Caley et al. 2008(7) Upton I 35 Tobacco: see Shea and Streiner, 2008(8) Environmental hazards: e.g., radiation can cause gene mutations: Upton I 36 See Hertz et al., 2008(9) Paternal health: see Cordier, 2008(10), Yang et al. 2007(11). 1. Dontigny, L, Arsenault, M.-Y. and Martel, M-J. et al. (2008) Rubella in pregnancy.Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaeco logy Canada, 30(2): 152—68. 2. Derbyshire, E (2007) The importance of adequate fluid and fibre intake during pregnancy. Nursing Standard, 21(24): 40—3. 3. Jacobsson, B., Ladfors, L., Milsom, I. Advanced maternal age and adverse perinatal outcome. IN: Obstet Gynecol. 2004, Oct, 104(4) 727-33. 4. Fraser, AM, Brockert, JE and Ward RH (1995) Association of young maternal age with adverse reproductive outcomes. New England Journal of Medicine, 332: 1113–17. 5. Talge, N M, Neal, C and Glover, V (2007) Antenatal maternal stress and long-term effects on child neurodevelopment: how and why? Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3- 4): 245—6 1. 6. Lester BM1, Tronick E.Z., LaGasse L., Seifer R., Bauer C.R., Shankaran S., Bada H.S., Wright L.L., Smeriglio V.L., Lu J, Finnegan L.P., Maza P.L. The maternal lifestyle study: effects of substance exposure during pregnancy on neurodevelopmental outcome in 1-month-old infants. Pediatrics. 2002 Dec;110 (6):1182-92. 7. Caley, L., Syms, C., Robinson, L., Cederbaum, J., Henry, M. and Shipkey, N. (2008) What human service professionals know and want to know about fetal alcohol syndrome. Canadian Jour nal of Clinical Pharmacology, 15: ei 77—e 123. 8. Shea, AK and Streiner, M (2008) Cigarette smoking during pregnancy. Nicotine and Tobacco Research, 10 (2), 267–78. 9. Hertz-Piciotto, I., Park, H.Y. and Dostal, M. (2008) Prenatal exposure to persistent and non-persistent organic compounds and effects on immune system development. Basic and Clinical Pharmacology and Toxicology, 102: 146—54. 10. Cordier, S. (2008) Evidence for a role of paternal exposures in developmental toxicity. Basic and Clinical Pharmacology and Toxicology, 102: 176—81. 11. Yang, Q. Wen, S.W., Leader, A., Chen, X., Lipson, J. and Walker, M. (2007) Paternal age and birth defects: how strong is the association? Human Reproduction, 22: 696—701. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Translation | Quine | Rorty I 217 Quine: indeterminacy of translation: we look at the totality of truths about nature, also unknown and unobservable as well as future truths. My thesis is that the indeterminacy of translation even resists all of these truths, the whole truth about nature. There is not really a question of making the right choice. Also within the allotted choices under determination any theory about nature has no objective fact. >Indeterminacy, >Facts, >Objectivity, >Theories. VsQuine: Many critics believe this is a remnant of traditional empiricism (Chomsky). PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of the physics of the day is so insignificant that it merely exists "in the eyes of the affected person". (subjective convenience). Quine I 90 Stimulus meaning/SM: objective reality that the linguist needs - translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. I 81 Translation: is independent of stimulus meaning. E. g. "soltero" = "Bachelor" not because of a particular face. - But words are learned first through stimulus meaning, later through abstraction. I 117 Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object. - Our special denoting apparatus. - But stimulus meaning is similar for natives. - Goodman’s individuals calculus is translatable as syllogistic. I 129ff Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunctions, negatives, alterations) - Identifiable: stimulus analytical sentences, stimulus synonymous occasion sentences of natives - untranslatable: stimulus synonymous occasion sentences. I 368 Animal: for them fear is equivalent to an English sentence. - Church: but this sentence has many different possible translations. I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically. - That is like some sentences used in Church: "true in a higher sense". - Quine: Sometimes that is acceptable. --- II 34 Permutation: is possible if sentence-by-sentence structure is maintained. II 37 Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the two translation manuals is right - Actual ontologically, naturalistically - neither transcendental nor epistemological. - Physical conditions, not empirical skills are decisive. - Reinterpretation is possible only for others, not for ourselves. - Factuality like gravity, inherent to our nature. >Radical interpretation. II 61 ff Cognitive synonymy: various points in time, individual > Community > substitutability of words - same verdicts. - But this does not hold for translation. >Synonymy. --- VII (c) 60f Translation/Quine: (early): a) link a sound sequence to the circumstances - b) a synonymy of this sound sequence with English sound sequence that is associated with similar circumstances, assume - problem: the relevant properties of the circumstances are hidden in the person of the speaker (>Gavagai). Cassirer/Whorf/Quine: language inseparable from the rest of the world - differences correspond with circumstances of the form of life - Morning Star can still be a good translation of the Evening Star. - We confuse meaning and reference, because we are used to pointing to things - problem: during work alienation from direct reports, thus the clarity of potential conflicts decreases. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Variation | Vavilov | Gould II 132ff Variation/Evolution/Vavilov/Gould: Nikolai I. Vavilov was the leading Mendelian geneticist in Russia. In 1936, he served as the main target for the Soviet agronomist T. D. Lyssenko, who had a great influence under Stalin. Vavilov was attacked because of his theory, the so-called law of homologues rows in variation. Vavilov had collected barley, oats and millet from a wide variety of different breeds of wheat from various locations, and noted that within the different species of a genus, but also frequently within the species of related groups, remarkably similar series of varieties could be found. II 135 Definition homologous: similar due to inheritance of the same genes, Definition analogous: similar due to forced adaptation to the environment. Vavilov thesis: The new species emerge by developing genetic differences that exclude crossbreeding with related species. But the new species is not all genetically different from its ancestors. Most of them remain untouched. The parallel variations thus represent the "play through" of the same genetic abilities, which are inherited as blocks of one species to another. Gould: Darwin does not disagree with such a thesis, since it gives the selection an important role. While each variety can represent a predictable latent ability, its development in any climate or geographic region requires selection to maintain the adaptive variant and eliminate others. DarwinismVsVavilov: However, Vavilov's thesis comes into conflict with strict Darwinism, since it weakens the main doctrine that selection is the creating force of evolution. >Evolution, >Darwinism, >Ch. Darwin. II 136 Random and undirected variation plays a major role in Darwin because it determines the central position of selection by guaranteeing that the evolutionary variation itself cannot be attributed to variation. >Mutation. The variation is only the raw material. It arises in all directions and is at least not arranged preferably in an adaptive way. The direction is slowly being determined by natural selection, as the more adapted generations proliferate. However, if the possibilities are very limited and one species shows all of its different varieties, then this choice cannot be explained by selection alone. That's how Vavilov sets himself apart from Darwin. VavilovVsDarwin: Variation does not take place in all directions, but in classes that are analogous to those of chemistry and crystallography. GoudlVsVavilov: Vavilov underemphazised the creative role of the environment. II 139 Lysenko/Gould: Lysenko was a charlatan and undialectic (against his own assertion) by considering plants as modelling clay in the hands of the forming environment. Vavilov died in the name of an apparant Lamarckism. There was an excessively strict Darwinism in the Soviet Union, which misinterpreted Darwin. >Lamarckism. II 140 Gould: From today's perspective, Vavilov has cast a glimpse of something important. New species do not inherit their adult form from their ancestors. They will receive a complex genetic system and a number of development opportunities. This set of options narrows the variation width to a line along which the selection can select points that it cannot move. II 141 In recent experiments with recurring traits in bred mice one has not found Darwinian homologous series in the sense of Vavilov. The simplest and most common conclusion would be to consider snails with a smooth shell on all islands as related and those with a ribbed shell as members of another related group. However, we now know that the complex set of properties always arises independently. VsVavilov: he has overemphasized the internal limitations and reduced the power of selection too much. >Selection. |
Vavilov I Nikolai I. Vavilov Origin and Geography of Cultivated Plants Cambridge 2009 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
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| Antirealism | Boyd Vs Antirealism | Fractions I 77 Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is necessary for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. To explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. --- I 78 BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other. BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is written down like this, and it cannot be improved either. Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a quite different definition of empirical equivalence than he does. 2. Principle: (accepted by all philosophers according to Boyd): Suppose, a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of knowledge theory (epistemology) to explain the reliability of this principle. Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree to that. It is itself a principle of principles. Boyd/Fraassen: has a special example in mind: (P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it will most likely fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all. Fraassen: this is harmless as it is written down like this. --- 79 Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he understands "knowledge" here "light", i. e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms, which are based on previously accepted theories. Boyd: E.g. Suppose, M: chemical mechanism A: Antibiotic C: Bacterial type L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of the bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, dosage of A and time. Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment? 1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L to be tested, which does not work in this alternative way. Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval). 2. For example, one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that allows the cell walls to mutate. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here. In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 |
| Darwin, Ch. | Dennett Vs Darwin, Ch. | I 450 Directed mutations / Ridley: orthodox Darwinism: all mutations are random. Ridley: no evidence of directedness. DennettVsRidley: this is a bit too strong. The orthodox theory must not presuppose them, but can accept them. Specially Manfred Eigen s ideas about the quasispecies. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Darwin, Ch. | Kauffman Vs Darwin, Ch. | Dennett I 309 KauffmanVsDarwin: a definition of the early development and thus of Baer s laws do not represent a specific mechanism Rather the definition of early development reflects the fact that the number of ways in which living things can be improved, shrunk faster than the number of paths in the later development. KauffmanVsDarwin: according to his theory, the evolution takes place only by the gradual accumulation of advantageous variants. Kauffman I 27 KauffmanVs: according to that the first multicellular organisms would have evolved apart! That was obviously not the case: one of the most puzzling features of the Cambrian explosion is that the taxonomic system was filled from top to bottom. Selection / Kauffman: there is a second boundary of the selection: it not only fails in random landscapes. I 278 KauffmanVsDarwin: the selection may also fail in uniform fitness landscapes, the "heartland" of Darwinism: it can trigger an error catastrophe. E.g. a bacterial species with initially identical individuals can be scattered from a local peak, down, simply because the mutation rate is too high! |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Shoemaker Vs Frege, G. | Stalnaker I 222 Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: this one will explain it with a relational structure. We have distinctive skills and are disposed to make certain judgments about similarity and difference. That means that we can combine certain kinds of experiences with others. Discernment: is the intrapersonal criterion for the identity of qualia. Inverted spectra/inverted qualia//symmetry/Stalnaker: Assuming (as does the thesis of the inverted spectra) that the relational structure is symmetrical (in some way). Suppose we could permute types of qualitative experiences systematically, so that all I 223 judgments about equality and diversity survived and thus generally the whole relational structure. Functionalism: will then determine the functional identity (because of the symmetry), with a qualitative contrast (because qualia were depicted with other qualia, which are distinguishable from them). Pointe: if that is correct then no functionalist description of qualia could be correct. Vs: you can deny this 1. by denying the symmetry. One can say that even if there is a certain symmetry in the structure of color experiences - in the distinctive skills and judgments about equality and diversity - the whole relational structure is much more complex. There are interactions of colors with others who are not preserved during permutations. bad solution/inverted spectra: to introduce additional characteristics such as e.g. red is hot, blue is cool, etc. Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put those objections aside. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intra personnel through distinctive capabilities, you should expect that he accepts the Frege/Schlick-view that means that there is no intra personnel counterpart. Shoemaker: that would be too simple. Thesis: He wants to reconcile intra personnel comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach. Although we cannot define certain qualitative states functionalistically but rather classes of qualitative states. Classes of qualitative states: we define functionally the identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) equality and diversity. Thus we get equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those that are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations. ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason why he resists the Frege/Schlick-view, I 224 that he thinks that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there may be intra personnel inverted spectra. And he believes that through this there is an argument for intra personnel exchanged spectra that you cannot resist. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Gould, St. J. | Dennett Vs Gould, St. J. | I 371 Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often. I 388 Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! " Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever. Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation. Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping). DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process. I 405 DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development. I 409 DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism. I 423 Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others. I 424 Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements. Münch III 379 Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.(1) 1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Various Authors | Eigen Vs Various Authors | VII ~171 EigenVsInformationsästhetik: Vs Mittelwertbildung, wo die wesentliche Information allein im Detail zu finden ist. VII 187 Evolution/Leben/Ordnung/EigenVsMonod: die Evolution ist überhaupt nicht so zufällig, wie Monod es darstellt. Der Ausgleich der Schwankungen ist ein makroskopisches Geschehen, das den Naturgesetzen gehorcht. VII 317 Evolution/EigenVsMonod: daß sie "allein aus störenden Geräuschen hervorgegangen ist" spricht nicht gegen das Gesetzmäßige der Evolution. Allerdings hat der Zufall seinen Stellenwert in der Mutation. EigenVsTeilhard: der "Punkt Omega" findet in der molekularbiologischen Forschung keinerlei Rückhalt, d.h. es gibt keinen vorgezeichneten Weg und kein vorgezeichnetes Ziel der Evolution. VII 345 ästhetische Information/EigenVsMoles: das Shannonsche Konzept der Information erweist sich nur dort als leitsungsfähig, wo es ein abgegrenztes System mit festgelegter Symbolmenge (Repertoire) gibt. 1. Moles läßt die Normierungsbedingungen bei der Berechnung von Melodien außer Acht. 2. "Originalitätsparameter" hat keinen Sinn, wenn er einmal aus wenig aufgeführten Werken resultiert, ein andermal aus häufig gespielten. |
Eigen I M. Eigen Ruth Winkler Laws of the Game : How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance, Princeton/NJ 1993 German Edition: Das Spiel München 1975 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Vs Gradualism. | Gould, St. J. | Dennett I 330 GouldVsgradualism: thesis: "punctuated equilibrium". Development in reality often erratic. Long periods of stability, periods of intense changes. But no theory of macro-mutation. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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