Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Rorty VI 9
Truth/Rorty: truth is absolute - in contrast: relative: justification is relative. - Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth - ((s) a criterion for truth is not available. >truth criterion, >definition/criterion.
Truth/Rorty: truth is undefinable (like Davidson).
VI 28
Correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the Absolute - so the idealism deprived the term of correspondence of its very substance.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Criteria Kant Danto I 24
Moral/criterion/Kant: there are no criteria for morally right action - because you could always act correctly from blind chance - nothing guarantees in the behavior itself, that it is morally. ---
Horwich I 77
Truth criterion/KantVsCriterion: the search for it is absurd - like to milk a bily goat and to keep a strainer underneath. - The agreement with the subject is given and presupposed here. - Ramsey: there can be no truth criterion, because each object is distinguishable from any other object and thus has something that is true in it but not in any other object - therefore there can be no guarantee of the truth which is independent from the referred object.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Criteria Russell Horwich I 3
Criterion/definition/truth/truth criterion/Russell: a defined object and criteria for its presence are always different - e.g. when we say that a company has made ​​the article, we do not mean that it has the right stamp. (1) - Russell: (early) I do not believe that truth has such a stamp of authenticity (no outer description).

1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Criteria Tarski Horwich I 130
Truth criterion / Criterion / Tarski: we will probably never find one - but equally not for most other concepts including the physics.(1)
1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75

Skirbekk I 177
Criterion of truth / Tarski: there is none that shows that there is no wrong record of an empirical theory - ((s) somewhere: criterion not included in the statements themselves - these are all different.) - Tarksi: Commonality of true propositions: truth, not criterion as blackness of the coal and whiteness of the snow.(2) - ((s) Arithmetic: the criterion is in the rules here.)
2. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996

Berka I 492
Truth/criterion/structural/Tarski: a structural truth-criterion allows each statement of the language to effectively allocate a statement that is equivalent to them, which, if it is not quantitative, is obviously true or obviously wrong - that works in the class calculus - a structural characteristic of true statements possible if it can be shown that the class of individuals is infinite. - ((s) Because then accuracy/provability coincide). -> general criterion of truth.
I 502
Criterion of truth/structural/Tarski: is given to us in that we find that the concept of the true statement (from §3) and the one of the provable theorem (due to the matrix method) are of the same scope - Problem: this is only true for simple languages - (i.e. with only a single semantic category E.g. only individuals).(3)
3. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Truth Ayer I 21
Truth/Circle/Ayer: true statements are determined by relation to facts - facts determined with true statements - Circle: broken by actions and observations - Ayer separates between T def and truth criterion.
I 297
VsCorrespondence Theory: confuses a method for interpreting the symbols with a truth criterion.
I 276
Truth/AyerVsTarski: should not be property of sentences but of propositions (statements expressed by sentences) - E.g. time ratio is relevant.
I 278
Truth/Tarski/Ayer: analysis of use (use, no criterion of truth).
III 101
Truth/Ayer: adds nothing - Truth/Falsehood: their function is to replace negation and assertion signs.
I 102
They themselves are not real concepts.

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Truth Tarski K.Glüer Davidson zur Einführung Hamburg, 1993 p. 22
The defined T-predicate in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination of the true can be restored. - Object and metalanguage should contain the predicate true - Davidson, however, can evade the dilemma by not giving a definition. He calls it a definition of truth in Tarski's style, hereafter referred to as T-theory.
---
Rorty IV (a) 22
True/Tarski: the equivalences between the two sides of the T-sentences do not correspond to any causal relationship. Davidson: there is no way to subdivide the true sentences so that on the one hand they express "factual", while on the other side they do not express anything. ---
Berka I 396
Truth/Tarski: we start from the classical correspondence theory.
I 399
We interpret truth like this: we want to see all sentences as valid, which correspond to the Tarski scheme - these are partial definitions of the concept of truth. - Objectively applicable: is the truth definition, if we are able, to prove all the mentioned partial definitions on the basis of the meta language.(1)
1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8
---
Berka I 475
Truth-Definition/truth/Tarski: wrong: to assume that a true statement is nothing more than a provable sentence. - This is purely structural - Problem: No truth-definition must contradict the sentence definition - N.B.: but this has no validity in the field of provable sentences - E.g. There may be two contradictory statements that are not provable - all provable statements are indeed content-wise true. The truth definition must also contain the non-provable sentences.
Berka I 482
Definition true statement/Tarski: x is a true statement, notation x e Wr iff. x ε AS (meaningful statement) and if every infinite sequence of classes satisfies x. - That does not deliver a truth criterion - no problem: nevertheless the sense of x ε Wr (x belongs to the class of true statements) gets understandable and unambiguous.
I 486
Relative Truth/accuracy in the range/Tarski: plays a much greater role than the (Hilbertian) concept of absolute truth, which was previously mentioned - then we modify Definition 22 (recursive fulfillment) and 23 (truth). - As derived terms we will introduce the term of the statement that a) in a domain of individuals with k elements is correct and - b) of the statement that is true in every domain of individuals.(2)
2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935
---
Horwich I 111
Truth/Tarski: is a property of sentences - but in the explanation we refer to "facts". - ((s) Quotation marks by Tarski).
Horwich I 124
Truth/true/eliminability/Tarski: cannot be eliminated with generalizations - If we want to say that all true sentences have a certain property. - E.g. All consequences of true sentences are true. - Also not eliminable: in particular statements of the form "x is true": E.g. the first sentence that Plato wrote, is true. - Because we do not have enough historical knowledge. - ((s) The designation "the first sentence..." is here the name of the sentence.) - This cannot be converted into the sentence itself. Eliminability: from definition is quite different from that of redundancy.(3)

3. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75
---
Skirbekk I 156
Definition Truth/Tarski: a statement is true when it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false.
Skirbekk I 158
Truth/Tarski: with our definition, we can prove the (semantic, not the logical) sentence of contradiction and the sentence definition. - The propositional logic does not includes the term true at all. - Truth almost never coincides with provability. - All provable statements are true, but there are true statements that cannot be proved. - Such disciplines are consistent but incomplete (>Incompleteness/Gödel). - There's even a pair of contradictory statements, neither of which is provable.(4)
4. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Descartes, R. Locke Vs Descartes, R. I 27
Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not!
2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible.
3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present.
ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning).
Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception.
I 45
Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different.
Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia).
Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up!
VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies.
I 52
Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought.
Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have
I 53
given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet.
LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below).
I 54
Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis,
I 55
it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form.
That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach).
Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view.
II 189
Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge.
II 190
Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke).
II 195
Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Evolution Theory Verschiedene Vs Evolution Theory Vollmer I 258
VsEvolution: the theory of evolution is circular: you can only "unroll" things that are already there. VollmerVsVs: the meaning of a term is never determined by etymology, but by definition, use, context.
The term does not have the meaning that the Romans gave it when they coined it. >Change of concept.
I 276
VsEvolution Theory: "Every adaptation requires a recognition of that to which it is to be adapted. Then the recognition of fitting is a circle." VollmerVsVs: it is not true at all that every adjustment requires recognition.
VsEvolution Theory: not predictable
VollmerVsVsVs: there is no compelling reason at all to use forecasting capability as a benchmark for the science of a theory.
Vollmer: The goal of science is not prognoses, but explanations!
I 277
VsEvolution Theory: "It is not falsifiable". For example, if one finds life on Mars, it is explained in evolutionary theory, if none is found, its absence or disappearance is also explained in evolutionary theory. (PopperVsEvolution Theory!) (s)Vs: For example, the not-being-damaged of a fallen cup can also be explained with the help of physics.)
I 278
VsEvolution Theory: from the existence of characteristics one can only conclude that they allow and possibly enable life, but not that they promote it! Therefore, one cannot necessarily accept adaptation! (Roth, 1984). Especially one cannot claim that our previous survival proves the correctness of our view of the world!
I 279
VollmerVsVsVs: that there are selection-neutral and even survival-damaging characteristics makes it probably an empirical question whether functionality is present in individual cases, but does not impair the fertility of that panselection maxim. The question "What for?" is always allowed in biology, even if it does not always find an answer.
I 279
VsEvolution Theory: 1. The transfer of selection theory to the development of cognitive abilities can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error. (Simmel, 1895). 2. Moreover, cognitive fits could also come about other than through self-adaptation, for example by the environment changing and itself adapting (by chance).
3. Correct mapping of the outside world obviously does not play a role in selection! Because there are so many species with "worse knowledge": plants are not "falsified" by the eye, the primordial eye not by the eagle eye, etc.
I 282
VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. >Pragmatism.
Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion.
Truth/Vollmer: Success is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is always indicative.
Fitting can be determined without any recourse to selection or evolution.
I 284
But one can also proceed the other way round: one finds that the contribution of the subject to knowledge is at least partly genetically determined. (Interaction).
I 285
Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all!





Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Holism Neurath Vs Holism Brendel I125
Definitional Coherence Theory/Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Representatives: Neurath. (Neurath did not explicitly refer to himself as a coherence theorist NeurathVsCoherence Theory/NeurathVsHolism).
I 126
Neurath: pro empiricism. Truth/Neurath: Thesis, the truth definition must be exhausted in a empiricist truth criterion.
Log Sentence/Schlick: foundation, unrevisable. "purely observational sentences".
Log Sentence/NeurathVsSchlick: revisable. Since they are selected on the basis of decisions.
Reality/Neurath/Brendel: Thesis: talking about it is sheer metaphysics.
Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Therefore, can only be understood relative to a system of sentences (>coherence theory).
NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: "correspondence with reality": is rejected. "True World": pointless.
I 127
Selection/Neurath: from several consistent statement sets: without truth criterion, by extralogical moments.

Neur I
O. Neurath
Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983
James, W. Ramsey Vs James, W. III 75
Truth/RamseyVsJames: it is a shame that you have to insist on these platitudes but some authors manage to deny them: according to James it is possible, for example, that the earth can be round without it being true that the earth is round.
III 76
According to James, it is possible that e.g. a pragmatist can think that Bacon wrote the works of Shakespeare and that the opinion of someone else that Shakespeare wrote them could be "perfectly true for him".
III 74
RamseyVsJames: the confusion is that the question "What is Truth" can be understood in at least three different ways. a) as a search for a criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood.
III 77
Truth Criterion/Kant/Ramsey: the search for it is absurd, because: (KdrV, Transcendental Logic, Introduction III, (A57=B82)) the explanation that truth is the agreement of knowledge with its object is given and presupposed here. But one demands to know what is the general criterion of the truth of every knowledge.

Ramsey I
F. P. Ramsey
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013

Ramsey II
Frank P. Ramsey
A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927

Ramsey III
Frank P. Ramsey
"The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Metaphysics Nagel, E. Vs Metaphysics Horwich I 128
Ernest NagelVsTarski: (among others) his truth concept (or the whole theoretic semantics) had something metaphysical. (Ernest NagelVsSemantics). I 129 Metaphysics/TarskiVsVs: the concept as such is too vague. Some cynics say Z, this is how the philosophers called their unborn children. VsMetaphysics: some think it crept in on the way through the definitions, namely, if the definition does not provide us with criteria for deciding whether an object falls within the definition or not.
VsTarski: and the concept of truth is simply too general to prevent that. I 130 Truth Criterion/Criteria/TarskiVsVs: it's true, we will probably never find a truth criterion. (see above, Kant ditto). But this is not how the truth concept differs from almost all other concepts, especially in theoretical physics (TT). Metaphysics/Tarski: the concept is used in such a broad sense that it certainly encompasses methods of logic, mathematics or the empirical sciences, and thus a fortiori also semantics!

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Schlick, M. Ayer Vs Schlick, M. III 101
SchlickVsCoherence theory: beyond the consistency of a system, one can determine the correspondence with reality. Ayer: per Schlick.
AyerVsSchlick: but we have no class of synthetic propositions which are indubitable.
III 103
Def Truth criterion/Verification criterion/Ayer: the criterion by which we test the validity of our synthetic propositions is their conformity with reality (= sensation). I.e. the criterion is the agreement with our observations.
Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: unfortunately is not content with that, but asserts that the sentences with which we describe our observation sentences, would be absolutely unquestionable.
III 104
Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: the only sense in which a sentence can be absolutely sure is that its negation would be self-contradictory. And it is not self-contradictory E.g. saying "that’s not green" if someone says "this is green". Synthetic sentences are just not true because of their form alone. Observation sentence/Schlick: would say that he never asserted this. But that he only talked about the truth of such a proposition at the moment of perception.
AyerVsSchlick: yet we must distinguish between false and such propositions that are true but trivial.
What Schlick says, is nothing more than p implies p. But it is wrong to say that when I feel pain the sentence that I feel pain is objectively certain. Because that would be a different form:
p implies that (p is objectively certain).
And that is wrong if it is a synthetic proposition.
III 105
Confirmation/Schlick/AyerVsSchlick: that Schlick felt uncomfortable with this himself is due to the vagueness of his concept. "Confirmations", of which he believed they were indubitable. Confirmation/Schlick: is nothing that could be identified with something that can be expressed. This suggests that he thinks of actual perceptions, as opposed to the sentences that describe them.
AyerVsSchlick: Dilemma:
a) if confirmations are not entences but perceptions themselves, it makes no sense to say that they are indubitable or not indubitable. Because perceptions are not the sort of thing that can be doubted. It simply occurs.
b) if they are observation sentences, they cannot be indubitable (see above).

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Truth Criterion Russell Vs Truth Criterion Horwich I 3
Truth criterion/criteria/truth/Russell: when we ask what constitutes the truth or falsity of a belief (constitutes), I do not ask for a criterion. Criterion: is a quality (property), which is itself different from the truth that belongs to all, whatever is true, and nothing else, but at the same time is not identical with truth. It is a hallmark (trademark, characteristic), a relatively obvious characteristic which ensures the authenticity.
((s) Criteria: always there, never absent, never at something else, but unidentical:> Carnap "companion". Many authors:. Unequal definition ((s) E.g. Definition being-an-even-number. Divisibility by 2 (definition against: Criterion: last digit 0,2,4,6 or 8) If it says "all and only... have ...". then it is not yet clear whether the criterion or the essential is mentioned).
Truth/Truth criterion/Russell: But when we say that this and this company has made the product, we do not mean that the product has the right stamp. ("To mean", mean):
I 4
Therefore, there is a difference between truth and truth criterion, and just this distinction is helpful. RussellVsTruth Criterion: I do not believe that truth has such a hallmark. But that is not what I want, I do not want to know which external characteristics truth has, with which we can recognize them but what truth itself is.
Truth/mind/judgment/Russell: what relation has truth to mind? Always on judgments. Thus, truth is mind dependent. ((s) So here truth not as the basic concept).
Nevertheless, it does not depend on the manner in which a single individual judges.
So truth and falsity of judgments has any objective reason. And it is quite natural to ask whether there are not objective truths and falsehoods as objects of judgments (judgment object).
Russell: that is plausible in the case of truth, but not in falsehood. (1)


1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Various Authors Vollmer Vs Various Authors II 169
Method/Physics/Vollmer: the method of experimental physics does not exist at all. What would be the "unity of science" then?
II 170
Bondi: Method is the most important thing in science. VollmerVsBondi: Results are more important than the method, unity of science means more than unity of method.
II 97
DitfuthVsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionist Identity Theory): Life is certainly understandable as a system property. However, a material system is either animated or not animated. There is nothing in between. Vitality is an all or nothing property. On the other hand, there are different, even unlimited degrees of "soulfullness/animation": the psychic is not erratic, but has developed very gradually!
Therefore it is inadmissible to simply add the "mental" (soul) to matter as a further, analogous stage.
Ditfurth Thesis: Evolution could lead to the emergence of our brain and thus of consciousness only because the mental was present and effective in this development from the very beginning! ((s) >Evolution/McGinn).
II 98
VollmerVsDitfurth: this one constructs a contrast that does not exist in this sharpness. 1. Life has also developed in many small steps. However, the intermediate stages have long been eliminated.
2. One can also say from consciousness that something is either "animated" or not "animated".
Consciousness/Mind/Soul/Vollmer: one has to differentiate stronger between the individual functions in the future: memory, abstraction, language ability, self-confidence.
I 40
VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: only the evolutionary epistemology takes the human out of his central position as "legislator of nature" and makes it an observer of cosmic events, which includes it.
I 293
VollmerVsVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject". Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic.
Similarity/Löw: Similarity exists only for one subject.
VollmerVsLöw: this is surely wrong.
VollmerVsProjection Theory
II 90
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat at all: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. Fig. cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. (s)Vs: Example not mandatory.
VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. ((s) These are extrinsic properties).
II 92
Projection/Vollmer: this is how the projective model explains the apparent incompatibility of different properties such as mind and physis as different aspects of the same thing.
II 93
VsProjection/Vollmer: could be interpreted as a relapse into the postulation of an unknown substance. VollmerVsVs: Solution: System concept of System Theory:
System Theory/Vollmer: For example diamond/graphite: consist of the same carbon atoms, but have a different structure.
Example diamond/silicon: same structure, different building blocks: (here silicon).
II 94
None of the components is logically or ontologically superior to the other! Knowledge of one does not replace knowledge of the other. Both are constitutive. This shows how little is gained with the knowledge of the building blocks.
I 282
VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. Cf. Pragmatism.
Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Truth Criterion Dummett, M. III 17/18
Criterion of truth / truth criterion / Dummett: the thesis that there can be no tr. c. is now commonplace.   Reason: we determine the sentence sense on the truth conditions so that we do not first know the meaning of the sentence and then be able to apply a criterion.
  Just as we do not a criterion for winning the game because that is also taught in learning the game.