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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstractness | Wright | I 226 f Abstract/Purely Abstract Objects/Dummett: (Frege:" logical objects "): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects whose meaning, however, cannot be presented as being our ability to identify objects as their carriers. >Identification. Wright: could be read as nominalism (i.e. that there are no abstract objects). >Nominalism. But that is not Dummett's view. Dummett precisely does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but have reference indeed. They even play a semantic role! >Singular terms, >Reference, >Conceptual role, >Inferential role. Example "largest prime number": empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role! >Meaning, >Semantics, >Non-existence. Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question about whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach according to which the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. >Numbers, >Platonism. I 227f Abstract/Morality/Ethics/Wright: that matches our approach to discourse of morality well: the cause of moral realism is not really confined to the question whether moral discourse is evaluable in relation to truth, or not. >Truth-evaluableness, >Morals, Discourse. If the "capacity for truth" (truth evaluability) is affirmed, there are still a number of realism-relevant questions. >Realism. I 223 ff It is also not in dispute that we use abstract singular terms in an intelligent manner. Wright: There is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects. Frege (Platonist) asserts quite correctly, that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any rational sense. (Wright: This is minimalism regarding reference). >Minimalism. I 242 Abstract Singular Terms/Wright: it is impossible that they influence the thinking of someone who does not know what they are. >Objects of thought. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Content | Wright | I 45 Content/"Deep Content"/"Deep Reference"/Wright: can be masked or simulated by syntax. (negations, conditionals). >Expression Theory. ((s) For the expression theory the question is: do the sentences have content or is it only simulated syntactically?) >Syntax, >Signs, >Meaning, >Reference. Common basis of realism and anti-realism: that this is not the case! >Realism, >Anti-realism. E.g. with Frege's numbers, there is no deep reference. The suitability of an expression to refer to one object depends on its syntax. It ensures that it can function as a singular term. >Singular terms, >Numbers/Frege. Then no more questions can be asked whether the object reference is successful. However, it is conceded that the appropriate contexts in which this is the case are true. (No "deep reference",or "deep content".) I 44 Syntactic Surface Characteristics: it must be ensured that a sentence that contains a truth predicate can be embedded in conditionals and has significant negations. >Negation, >Truth-predicate. Content/Wright: must satisfy discipline and surface syntax (e.g. conditional, negation) of a discourse. The thus secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes). >Discourse, >Platitudes. I 157 Content/Wright: in conditions: is needed to prevent expressions like "whatever it takes" (> role/Wright, > circularity). - Solution: independence condition: fulfillment must be logically independent of the details of the extension of the terms (projectivistic terms such as color, morality, humor ) - then only terms within intensional operators - WrightVs provisional equations for moral discourse. I 242f Def wide cosmological role: (I 250) a content has a wide cosmological role iff the mention of facts of which it consists can occur at least in certain types of explanations of contingencies; explanations whose possibility is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of the discourse. >Minimalism. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) E.g. thesis: morality has no wide cosmological role. Wide cosmological role of content: we want to measure its reach for a discourse on the extent to which the provision of the various facts can potentially contribute to the explanation of all those things that have nothing or not directly something to do with our attitudes by which we conceive such facts as objects. I 248 Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not from our attitudes. >Meaning, >Content, >Conventions, >Language community. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Ethics | Harman | Wright I 224 Ethics/Explanation/Harman: e.g. instead of moral judgment without assessment, we take psychological characteristics and education. We look at characteristics of the assessor, not of the action. >Judgments, >Actions, >Education. Wright I 244 SturgeonVsHarman: e.g. that our belief that Hitler was morally corrupt is based on things that he did precisely because he was morally corrupt, so his depravity is part of the explanation of our belief that he actually was. >Explanations, >Causal explanation, >Circularity. I.e. we must be prepared for this kind of explanation simply because of the realization that moral discourses are at least minimally capable of truth and that thus the missing analogies (to science) will appear elsewhere. <Discourses, >Morality, >Discourse theory, >Analogies, >Minimalism, >Capacity for Truth. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Minimalism | Wright | I 52 Definition minimalism/Wright: Ingredients: (i) the equivalent scheme "it is true that P if and only if P, (ii) "P" says that P, (iii) a sentence can be characterized as true if its proposition is true, (iv) the validity of the modus tollens, (v) that it is not malicious, "P" corresponds to the facts "more than" "the things are as "P" says that they are" - recognizes truth as a real property.(VsDeflationism) >Deflationism, >Truth, >Validity, >modus tollens, >Propositions, >Sentences, >Equivalence. I 102f Minimalism/Wright: neutral between anti-realism: (Super-assertibility) and Realism: evidence transcendental truth. >Superassertibility, >Assertibility, >Realism, >Anti-realism. I 225 Minimal capacity for truth/Wright more than minimal capacity for truth: if the facts must be mentioned in the best explanation of our true beliefs to which the beliefs relate. >Truth evaluability, >Best Explanation/Wright. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) I 267ff Global Minimalism/Wright: ... it could be a global minimalism concluded rather than a total skepticism: all meanings and the truth are only at the most minimal capable of truth. I 271 Boghossian: Global minimalism, Non-Factualism: related to meaning, not truth: there is no property that a word means something, hence no fact - attracts global non-factualism unlike any other non-factualism. >Non-factualism. I 285 Boghossian: "global minimalism": with the truth also all meaning tilts. >Meaning, >Facts. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Roles | Wright | I 250 Def Wide cosmological role: A content plays a wide cosmological role exactly in the case in which the mention of facts, of which it is composed, may occur at least in certain types of explanation of contingencies, explanations, the ability of which is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of discourse. >Truth evaluability. ((s) Truth capacity/truth-apt/truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) E.g. thesis: morality plays no wide cosmological role (problem for the moral realism). Cosmological role: see >Content/Wright. How can the specification of any facts contribute to explaining? I 248 Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not by our attitudes. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Terminology | Wright | I 41 "Platitude"/Wright: "P" is true if and only if "P" corresponds with the facts correspondence platitude Correspondence platitude/CP/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says that they are - Deflationism/Wright: accepts (like us) following platitudes: claiming something means, representing something as true, any truth enabled content has a meaningful negation, to be true means to correspond with the facts, a statement can be justified without being true, and vice versa. I 60 Epistemic Constraint/EC: if P is true, then there is evidence for that -> enforces revision of logic, otherwise P cannot be true if there is no evidence. I 99 Platitudes: are called so because they are intended to help preventing a weighty metaphysical realm. I 108ff Definition evidence transcendence: the presence of decidable parameter does not have to ensure that the answer to the question is equally decidable. I 115 Error theory: Mackie (ethics), Field (mathematics). Everything would have to be traced back to a metaphysical realm to make it true. But there is no metaphysical realm. ad I 115ff Error theory/elsewhere: a theory that seeks to explain why our intuitions are different than the theory asserts. I 118ff Convergence 1: weak: only trend - more: Convergence 2: enforces convergence - Definition minimal capacity for truth: requires use of standards for assertibility and thus the existence of criteria - Vs "appropriate circumstances" unclear - VsWright: discourse about the strange: not minimal capable of truth. - WrightVs: there are no "permissive conditions" - Convergence platitude/representation platitude/Wright: divergent output can only be explained by divergent input - Definition cognitive coercion: a discourse enforces cognitive coercion if divergences can only be explained by divergent input - Tradition: moral discourse does not satisfy the criteria of cognitive coercion - Wright: but cognitive coercion is compatible with flexible standards, it is an additional condition for minimal truth-capable discourses. I 138 Wright pro convergence also in the discourse about the strange. I 150 Solidification/Wright: a solidification will change the modal status. Whether P is true, may be contingent, but if P is true, the statement is necessary that P is actually true. - Problem: this should not apply for the basic equation for shape - Another problem: "if S would be in the same circumstances, it would judge equally": if too much remains still valid in other possible worlds, the equation would be true in all possible worlds and the distinction gets questionable. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rawls, J. | Newen Vs Rawls, J. | New I 157 Def Just/Basic Order/Rawls/Newen: just is a basic order if the participants themselves have agreed on it under fair conditions. Original State/Society/Rawls/Newen. Precursor: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau. Rawls: 1) The contract parties make a final choice of a basic order 2) They choose the order from a list of historical influential candidates that they can modify 3) the contract parties think rationally 4) they have the three higher-ranking regulatory interests. 5) they have general economic and psychological knowledge 6) they make their choice behind the veil of ignorance: they do not know their place in society. I 158 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: Point: leads to an endorsement of the Maximin principle. Principles/Rawls/Newen: the two principles would be supported by someone if their enemy can assign them a place. (Rawls ThdG 233). Newen: with that, Rawls builds on Kant. I 159 Veil of Ignorance/Rawls/Newen: is released gradually, each with reference to decisions already taken on a level. Justice/Justice Theory/Rawls/Pogge/Newen: a conception of justice that people with different worldviews obey together neither needs to affirm nor deny its own capacity for truth. Justification/Pogge: it is enough for it to distinguish it as the most sensible or appropriate for our political culture. (Pogge, John Rawls, p 173). I 160 VsRawls/Newen: people are more influenced by emotion than Rawls believes. Should people heavily influenced by emotion be excluded from the order? I 161 VsRawls: he is at risk of falling behind the procedural fairness of the Enlightenment which ensures that all people can participate in the constitution-making process on an equal footing, regardless of race, opinion, and education. VsRawls: this leaves open the possibility of a "justice expertocracy". UntilitarianismVsRawls/EnlightenmentVsRawls: they consider the political autonomy also of non-experts a priority. VsRawls: cannot submit a concept for the (inhomogeneous) world population. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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