Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Concepts | Proust | I 230 Concept/perception/Proust: Difference: concepts allow inferences, simple perceptions don't. Definitions are normative, because each has its conditions of use. >Inference, >Conclusion, >Perception, >Application conditions, >Language, >Logic, >Language use. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language | Proust | I 230 Animals/Davidson: since animals have no language, they also have no concepts. >Concepts, >Language, >Animals, >Animal language, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language. ProustVsDavidson: Davidson uses a Cartesian strategy. >Cartesianism. I 231 Triangulation: triangulation seems impossible in animals, because the absence of a shared symbolic language does not allow access to intersubjectivity. >Triangulation. Concepts/Davidson: concepts are normative because each has its particular application conditions. With this, Davidson takes up Descartes' basic idea. 1. If an organism has the concept of X, it is predisposed to decide whether something is X or not. 2. The term can then be applied to new cases. 3. Concepts form an inferential structure (a theory). >Predication, >True-of. I 232 Concept/Animal/ProustVsDavidson: it is not an overstated assumption that certain animals can form concepts that make important aspects of their environment understandable to them. Possibly social animals (dogs, primates, etc.) have theories for the organization of social relations. These theories contain concepts for dominant animals, offspring, enemies, allies, as well as the inferential and associative links between these categories for sharing food, protection, partnering, etc. Cf. >Theory of Mind. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Mathematics | Schlick | Thiel I 40/41 Mathematics/Moritz Schlick/Thiel: Mathematics is a system of signs with exclusively syntactic relations, and accordingly the field of application is not the world of facts, but only the sign system of language. There is no point in asking questions about the application conditions of mathematics. ThielVsSchlick: can the problem really be solved like this? The language of Schlick is not the everyday language, but already strictly regulated. Our interpretations always give the signs additional meaning. Why are some sign systems transferable to reality, but not others? >Everyday language, >Signs, >Symbols, >Systems, >Formalism, >Formalization, >Formal language. I 42 Russell (1903)(1), if "empirical constants" are used for variables, it must be examined each time whether the formulas are fulfilled. >Variables, >Logical constants. Mathematics would then only be transferable insofar as it is "isomorphic" (equal in structure) with the world of experience. 1. Bertrand Russell (1903). The Principles of Mathematics. |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Meaning | Wittgenstein | I Tugendhat 187 Meaning/Wittgenstein: "the meaning of the word is what explains the explanation of the meaning" (Philosophical Investigations/PI § 560 ) - Tugendhat: purely linguistic, therefore there is no object for which the meaning stands - characterization - declaration - understanding -> use theory/Dummett. --- Hintikka I 234 Meaning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: early: understanding of a binary relation - middle period: learning of rules (problem : singular ostension) - late: mastering of a technique. I 268 Meaning/language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : now there is no language game given to us that would give a meaning to a particular expression. >Language games. --- II 81 Word/meaning/word meaning/Wittgenstein: the word has a meaning in itself - it cannot be something else - something you might not know - however: the rules are not something that the word has got in itself - they describe later use. >Use, >Words. --- III 220 Meaning/Wittgenstein/late/Flor: no application conditions - a word has meaning also if there is no concrete asserting condition - a word has no meaning "in itself" - (( s)> More authors on use theory). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Method | Tarski | Berka I 401 Consistent-proof/Gödel: cannot be performed if the meta language does not contain variables of higher type. >Metalanguage, >Expressivity, cf. >Type theory. Undecidability: Undecidability is eliminated when one enriches the examined theory (object language) with variables of higher type.(1) >Decidability. 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, VOl. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 --- I 462 Meta language/Tarski: is our real examination object. ((s) because of the application conditions of the truth concept). I 464 Meta language/Tarski: 2nd category of expressions: specific terms of structural-descriptive character. >Structural-descriptive name. Names of specific signs and expressions of the class calculus, names of classes names of sequences of such expressions and of structural relations between them, Any expression of the considered language (object language) one can allocate - on the one hand an individual name of this expression, and - on the other hand an expression that is the translation of this expression in the meta language. That is decisive for the construction of the truth-definition. >Truth definition/Tarski. I 464 Name/translation/meta language/object language/Tarski: difference: an expression of the object language can in the meta language a) be given a name, or b) be a translation. Berka I 525 Morphology/Tarski: our meta language includes here the entire object language - that is, for us only logical expressions of the general class theory. - That is, only structural-descriptive terms. >Homophony. So we have the morphology of the language, that is, even the concept of inference is traced back. I 526 Thus we have justified the logic of this studied science as a part of the morphology.(2) >Description levels, >Semantic closure. 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Understanding | Nagel | Frank I 148 NagelVsUnderstanding - (empathy only with mental states). VsSolipsism: is the result of interpreting the empathic imagination as sensual. >Empathy. I 149f Understanding/Nagel: we can have evidence for the truth of something that we do not understand - individuals of radically different genera (scientists from Mars) can both understand the same physical events in objective terminology. For this they do not need to understand the phenomenal forms.(1) >Phenomena. 1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 Nagel I 75 Understanding/Wittgenstein: communication through language consists not only of a match in the definition, but in the judgments. >Judgments, >Language, >Vocabulary. Logic seems to abolish this, but it does not - congruence in language use and judgment is necessary, but not sufficient for meaning (intending). Nagel: if the application conditions do not appear to be sufficient, it may be that one misinterpreted the concept - but also that we misunderstood the conditions. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Various Authors | Vendler Vs Various Authors | Wol I 258 Syntactic Theory/Personal Names/C. Sloat: proper names in analogy to general names, related to our predicate concept. I 258/259 The modified proper names from the example have the same application conditions as the unmodified ones in the singular: Example (1) Jones is a Jones VendlerVs: the unusual is a special case: "the Joe in our house" has something unusual. That there are two Joe's is incompatible with the idea of a logical proper name. Burge: we can agree with that: these modified occurrences are in a sense not just any object as the only "own". There is also no reason to assume that ordinary proper names are ever "logical proper names". I 260 Our semantic theory cannot be bound to the assumption that proper names apply to only one subject. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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