Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Independence Simons I 301
Absolutely independent/independence/Simons: an object is independent, if it is not generically dependent. God/Simons: problem: is god independent of its own thoughts? In any case, he must be a monad, because the real parts of an object are separated from him. The extreme strength of the concept of absolute independence limits its usefulness.
>Dependence, >Ontological dependence, >God.
I 302
E.g. weak independent: a continuant may still be dependent on a process in its interior. The process must be separated from the continuant (because of the category difference). E.g. (s) a body that is not identical with its metabolism (or unity of all its processes or life story). >Continuants, >Process.
Process and object can never be identical.
Event/continuant: event and continuant are categorically different, and can therefore have no common part.
>Events.
I 325
Independence/nature/world/reality/Simons: there are things in nature that do not interact: e.g. separate point events. SimonsVsSchlick/SchlickVsSum: if the sum should not have internal relations, there are no sums in nature.
SimonsVsSchlick: yes (Popper pro Schlick). Therefore, difference in shape (with internal relations) is meaningless (PopperVsShape Theory).
>Reality, >World, >Forms, >Nature.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Language Field Avramides I 113
Belief/Meaning/FieldVsReductionism: (VsReductive Griceans): it is circular, to want to explain the semantic properties by believe. (This also says the reductionism.) >Semantic properties.
Field like Grice: one can explain believe without reference to the sentence.
Solution: what makes a symbol a symbol for Caesar is the role in my learning.
Field: then there can be no inner language without a public language.
SchifferVsField: no problem: Grice (intention based semantics, IBS) does not need to assume that propositional attitudes have been acquired before the public language. Both goes hand in hand.
Only there is no logical dependence between them (and to competence).
>Intention-based semantics.
Armstrong: both are logically connected.
((s) This is stronger than Schiffer's thesis.).
>Propositions/Schiffer, >David Armstrong, >Stephen Schiffer.
---
Soames I 481
Language/Truth-Definition/Field/Soames: when truth is defined non-semantically (i.e., speaker-independent, i.e. non-physical), language becomes an abstract object. It has its characteristics essentially. >Scott Soames.
With other properties, it would be a different language - that is, it could not have been shown that the expressions could have denoted anything else. Then it is
still contingent on language, which language a person speaks.
But the semantic properties (truth, reference, applying) are not contingent.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Soames I
Scott Soames
"What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Soames II
S. Soames
Understanding Truth Oxford 1999
Modalities Simons I 253
Mereology/modal/modality/Simons: we need modality in the mereology. We also need a definition of "necessary part" and a modal definition of "sum" (because it is less intuitive than "organism"). Dependence: a) ontological dependence: an object cannot exist without another existing,
b) functional dependence: functional dependence consists between characteristics of objects which form a whole.
>Functional dependence, >Ontological dependence, >Dependence.
I 264
Modal Part/Simons: e.g. a class of counterparts might be considered a whole with different modal components. >Counterparts.
Modal Parts: modal parts are possible in various possible worlds.
>Parts, >Cross world identity.
I 268
Modality/metaphysics/metaphysical/nature/necessity/Simons: a given atom could not have other particles. They are essential parts (components). On the other hand: the given particles could have belonged to another atom. It is not essential for them to be part of this atom, i.e. to be "given".
>Essential parts.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Ontological Dependence Ontological dependency: ontological dependency exists between objects, if the one object cannot exist without the other existing, e.g. a house roof cannot exist without a house, but a tank without filling. In the course of time it can be argued that later stages of development depend ontologically on earlier stages. See also qua objects, dependency, mereology.

Ontological Dependence Armstrong
Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Ontological Dependence Esfeld I 16f
Holism/Esfeld: generic ontological dependence is not existence, but with respect to having some determined characteristics, a thing is ontological generical dependent on that fact that other things exists. The parts have their characteristic properties only as a whole (ontologically or metaphysically (Esfeld pro)). Generic: further specification is available: e.g. nothing has just a mass (without quantity), all physical quantities are generic. The opposite is determined. >Dependence, >Existence, >Relations.
I 36
Ontological dependence is necessary instead of mere functional dependence. Isolation does not destroy holism but properties that work in isolation as well, are not holistic properties. No functional definition is sufficient. Instead: there is ontological dependence. >Ontology, >Holism, >Properties, >Isolation.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Ontological Dependence Simons Chisholm II 172
Ontological Dependence/Simons: if a part cannot exist without the other (weak foundation): everything is necessarily strongly founded in itself and each necessarily existing entity. Each necessary nonexistent is a strong foundation in everything. Instead: foundation: in addition: a does not equal b and b is not necessarily exisiting.
II 173
Strong foundation: if a is a moment of b: a and b may not be identical, b is then not necessary, e.g. border. Moment: e.g. events are moments of the objects they involve: e.g. handshake of persons (not without them, but not vice versa).
II 174
Complexes are not moments of their atoms (which are their necessary parts). Complexes themselves are moments of nothing (because of their strong independence). >Foundation/Simons, >Complex/Simons, >Dependence/Simons.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987


Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Ontology McGinn I 14
Ontology/reality/existence/understanding/realism/McGinn: e.g. steam engines are not inconceivable, if the possible world in which they exist, happens to contain no living beings with the intellectual ability to understand their function. Neither the transformation from a secret to a problem involves a sudden attack of ontological purity.
>Functions, >Reality, >Understanding, >World/Thinking.
I 92
The term "home" does not appear in the relevant physical theories, but it does not follow that there are no homes. >Theory.
I 99
Ontology/explanation/McGinn: There is no ontological dependence without ontological explanation because results have a certain relationship to what produces these results. >Explanation.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Possible Worlds Plantinga Schwarz I 68
Def Possible worlds/Plantinga: Plantinga defines possible worlds as maximum possible facts ("magic ersatzism"). >Ersatz worlds.
Schwarz I 69
Facts as abstract entities about whose structure not much can be said. >States of affairs, >Abstract objects.
At any case, they are no real universes or constructions of real things.
Existence/"existence"/Plantinga: existence is a fundamental property that cannot be further analyzed. Other facts do not exist, but could exist.
>"there is", >Existence.
Def maximum/state of aafairs/Plantinga: a fact is maximum if its existence implies either its existence or non-existence for any other fact.
Cf. >Maximum, >Dependence, >Conceptual dependence, >Counterfactual dependence, >Logical dependence.
Possible worlds/Plantinga: possible worlds are maximum possible facts. For example, that "in" a world donkeys can speak means that donkeys could speak if the facts had the property of existence.
VsPlantinga: this connection between a primitive property of abstract entities and the existence of talking donkeys must be accepted as inexplicable. In particular, it has nothing to do with the internal structure or composition of the abstract entity: it contains neither a talking donkey nor a picture or model of a donkey, nor a sentence or sign that somehow represents talking donkeys.

LewisVsPlantinga:
1. Why can't this abstract entity have that primitive quality even though there are no talking donkeys? Why this necessary relationship between distinct entities? Plantinga's facts make it impossible to reduce modal truths to truth about what things with what qualities exist. Plantinga thus presupposes modality in the characterization of worlds. ((Lewis 1986e(1),§3,4)
2. Plantingas states of affairs make it impossible to reduce modal truths to truth about what things with what properties exist. Plantinga thus already assumes modality in the characterization of worlds.
3. We also want to talk not only about worlds, but also about their inhabitants. Plantinga must accept Sherlock Holmes as an irreducible abstract entity. (Plantinga 1976(2),262, 272).
>Fictions.
This is a non-qualitative (haecceitistic) property that is necessarily instantiated by an object x exactly when x is Holmes.
>Haecceitism.
So if in modal realism we have countless merely possible things, then in Plantinga we have countless entities of merely possible things.
>Modal realism, >Realism, >Possibilism, >Possibilia, cf. >Actualism.

1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979]

Plant I
A. Plantinga
The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Proof of God’s Existence Bolzano Simons I 321
Cosmological proof of God/unconditioned existence/Bolzano/Simons: (circumvents the problem of being founded by referring to classes. >Classes.
A) there is something real, e.g. my thoughts that it is like that.
B) Suppose there is some thing A that is absolutely essential in its existence, then we already have it
C) Suppose A is conditional. Then form the class of all conditional real things A, B, C, ... This is also possible if this class is infinite
D) the class of all conditioned real things is itself real. Is it conditional or unconditional? If it is absolute, we already have it
E) Suppose it is conditional: every conditioned presupposes the existence of something else, whose existence it determines. Thus even the class of all conditional things, if conditioned, presupposes the existence of something that determines it.
F) This other thing must be unconditioned, for if it were conditioned, it would belong to the class of all conditioned things
G) Therefore, there is something unconditional, e.g. a god.

Simons: this makes no use of being founded:

C) leaves the possibility of an infinite chain open.
>Foundation, >Justification, >Reasons, >Ultimate justification, >Conditions.
1.
RussellVsBolzano/Simons: one might have doubts about the "class of all unconditioned things". >Paradoxes, >Russell's paradox, >Sets, >Set theory.
Solution/Bolzano: it's about the real things from which we can assume spatial-temporal localization.
>Localization.
2.
SimonsVsBolzano: Step F)
I 322
Why should the class of all conditioned things not be conditioned by something within? This would be conditioned itself, etc. but any attempt to stop the recourse would again appeal to being founded. ((s) The thing that conditions would be within the class of conditioned things, it would be conditioned and conditional at the same time).
>Regress.
Solution/Simons: we need additionally a conditioning principle.
Definition Conditioning Principle/Simons: if a class C is such that each dependent element of it has all the objects on which it depends within X, then X is not dependent. (Simons pro).

Simons: this allows infinite chains of dependencies. A kind of infinite dependence already arises e.g. when two objects are mutually dependent.
>Dependence, >Causal dependence, >Ontological dependence.
If the conditioning principle applies, why should the class X be still externally conditioned?
Ad Bolzano: Suppose we accept his argument until e). Then it can go on like this:
H) if the class of all conditioned things is conditioned, then there is an element of it that is dependent on something that is not an element of that class. (Contraposition to the conditioning principle)
>Contraposition.
I) Then such an (unconditioned) object is not an element of the class of all conditioned things, and is thus unconditional.
J) Therefore, there is in any case something unconditioned.

SimonsVsAtomism: that is better than anything that an atomism achieves.
>Atomism.
Conditioning principle/Simons: is the best extension of the strong rigid dependency (//), i.e.

(N) (a // x ↔ (Ey) [x ε a u a // x] u ~ x ε a)

>Rigidity.
SimonsVsBlack: with the strong instead of the weak dependency, we can counter Black.
>Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories.
I 323
God/Mereology/Ontology/Simons: in any case, the strong rigid dependence does not prove the existence of God. Only the existence of an unconditional, which Bolzano cautiously calls "a God". >God, >Existence, >Ontology.
Independence/Simons: does not include divinity.
>Independence, >Existence statement.


Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Proof of God’s Existence Hume Fraassen I 212
Proof of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas: the universe instead of God. If God's will would be crucial how should we understand this will? ((s) God's will would always be identical with the factual and therefore not to distinguish from anything else.) ---
II 253
Cosmological proof of God: there must be a cause for every thing and thus an explanation of its existence. This is something necessary existent. >Cause, >Condition, >Dependence, >Causal dependence, >Ontological dependence.
HumeVs: the existence of God would be a fact. Facts are never necessary.
>Facts, >Necessity, >Contingency.
Hume: the necessary existing could be the universe instead of God.
>Totality, >Whole, >Universe.
II 256
Teleological proof of God/Hume: the teological proof of god is the only one he takes seriously, because it does not require a priori assumptions. >Teleology.
Here: variant: the amazing reconciliation cannot be a coincidence. An intelligent creator is necessary.
>"Clockmaker".
HumeVs:
1. It lacks the repetition which is necessary for connection. 2. The analogy to humans is questionable.
>Absoluteness, >Connection, >Distribution.
II 257
3. If yes, then they would make a) the unity of God and b) the immateriality and endlessness questionable. >Unity, >Infinity.
II 259
4. Order is not evidence of conscious planning, e.g. animals have no less order than a clock, but are not begotten by a watchmaker, but by parents. >Order, >Planning, >Evolution.
II 260
Principle: the production of plants and animals is always herbal or animal. In human inventions, there is an understanding of the causes but not in divine inventions. >Knowledge, >Causality.
5. (Anticipating the theory of evolution): matter is in constant motion and eventually reaches a certain stability.
>Entropy, >Second law of thermodynamics.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Qua-Objects Fine Simons I 298
Qua-objects/Kit Fine/Simons: x qua F - or x under the description of F. Definition Basis: the underlying object Def Explanation/Fine: x qua F is always differentiated from the base.
SimonsVsFine: this is too strong, because then one would also have to distinguish "x qua self-identity" from x - also essential properties should not make up the qua. - Only contingent properties are ment to occur in the explanation.
>Mereology, >P. Simons, >Explanations.
Simons: most qua-objects have incorporated their explanation, not as a property. - (This already exists in Principia Mathematica(1)).
Qua-objects provide an ontological dependency for a conceptual dependency - e.g. fist qua clenched hand. - e.g. statue qua shaped clay.
>Statue/clay, >Conceptual dependence, >Ontological dependence.
SimonsVs: they do not achieve anything, one cannot form with them new singular terms from old.
>Singular terms, >Concepts, >Identification, >Distinctions.

1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fin I
K. Fine
The Limits of Abstraction Oxford 2008

FinA I
A. Fine
The Shaky Game (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) Chicago 1996


Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Simons Vs Aristotle I 241
Primordial Matter/SimonsVsAristotle: the primordial matter fell from grace because of Aristotle who brought together the following two concepts: a) the substrate of change (change) and
b) the carrier of properties.
VsAristotle: it was an unhappy (perhaps metaphorical) formulation of "withdrawing" all attributes (shape) of the things to obtain them pure, that means as formless matter which only potentially cannot exist for real.
Simons: but we do not have to bring a) and b) together.
Primordial Matter/Simons: the primordial matter may well have its own special characteristics.
Pro Aristotle: if we follow the chain downwards we already recognize that more and more characteristics are lost and that the micro-objects become simpler.
Diversity/tradition/Simons: diversity was explained by the combination options of simpler building blocks. That would come to an end with a basic building block. Then you could explain all the qualities by relations between the constituents. This can already be found in the Tractatus.
Foundation Stones/Tractatus/Simons: (2.0231-2): foundation stones are colorless.
Simons: but the foundation stones have quite characteristics, even the objects of the Tractatus are not bare particulars, but their properties are modal (if they are to be essential and internally (internal) or if they are accidentally real (Tractatus 2.0233).
I 291
Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happen to it ((s) its life story!). SimonsVsFour Dimensionalism: a sum is also more evidently understood than this four-dimensional block.
Universal Realism/Simons: universal realism could construct individual things with properties as a sum of concrete carriers and abstract characteristics.
Simons: these examples are at least not arbitrary.
Whole/Wholeness/Simons: the whole appears to be equally arbitrary definition dependent (SimonsVsWholeness, Vs German Philosophy Between The World Wars).
I 292
Whole/Aristotle/Simons: the whole seems to require inner relations towards a sum. Inner Relations/whole/Aristotle: e.g.: continuity, firmness, uniformity, qualitative equality, to be of the same type, to be made of the same matter.
This includes species and genera.
SimonsVsAristotle: the list is merely impressionistic and does not mention the most important relation: causation.
Husserl/Simons: Husserl discusses the most Aristotelian problems, without mentioning his name.
Def "pregnant whole"/Husserl: the "pregnant whole" is an object whose parts are connected by relation foundation (>Foundation/Husserl, Foundation/Simons).
Foundation/Husserl/terminology/Simons: a foundation can be roughly described as ontological dependence (oD).
Substance/tradition/Simons: the substance is (sort of) ontologically independent.
Ontological Dependence/oD/Simons: to have a substantial part is ontological dependent.
I 318
Independence/ontology/Simons: where independence is seen as positive (dependent objects are then those of a 2nd class) - as such many times in philosophy (rather theology) - is about the existence of God. Substance/Aristotle: the substance is a very weak form of independence.
Def primary: primary ist, what can be without other things while other things cannot exist without it.
SimonsVsAristotle: that is not accurate enough.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Frege, G. Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. Brandom I 919
TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. ---
Dummett I 32
Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs
I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege).
Dummett I 62
Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding.
Dummett I 158
WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. ---
Wolf II 344
Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed.
II 345
Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". ---
Simons I 342
Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context.
Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases.
Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection.
Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others!
---
Wittgenstein I 16
Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated.
According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones?
Wittgenstein I 45
Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object.
I 46
Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself.
Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular.
I 65ff
Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning).
I 66
Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions
I 222
Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here).
Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red.
I 223
But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the
actual objects: elements of knowledge.
(> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology).
---
II 73
Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character.
---
Wittgenstein VI 119
WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning.
WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference).
There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game.
Wittgenstein VI 172
Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). ---
Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,.
3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words.
3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing.
(WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name).
3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic).
---
Wittgenstein IV 28
Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use.
Wittgenstein IV 40
Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning.
IV 47
Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes.
E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical.
4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it.
IV 47/48
So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers.
Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ...
General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular.
IV 49
Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names.
WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name.
IV 53
Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined.
Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities.
Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters
IV 54
Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true.
Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke).
IV 59
Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning
IV 60
of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names.
IV 62
Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori.
5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another.
((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.)
5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of,
IV 63
an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist.
5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current.
IV 70
Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations.
IV 101
Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence.
IV 102
Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves.

1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964
---
Wittgenstein II 343
Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number?

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Gestalt Theory Schlick Vs Gestalt Theory Simons I 290
Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: criticizing the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. arbitrary sums/Simons: they are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions.
Individuals / Simons: it is not clear what properties they hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums).
Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being individual is not!
Gestalt/SimonsVsGestalt theory/VsWholeness/Simons: it has never clearly stated what this is to be.
Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name.
SimonsVsFrege: of which one has recovered late. But there are also plural names (> plural designation, plural reference (> Black) see above). And also >empty names.
Simons I 324
Wholeness/Gestalt/SchlickVsGestalt theory/SchlickVsDriesch/Simons: (Schlick 1935): There is no ontological difference between wholenesses and sums. These are only differences in the presentation (representation) of the same object. "Micro-Reductionism"/Schlick: (per): (Simons: for today's tastes too extreme).
Schlick/Simons: yet never denies the usefulness of a holistic view.
Sum/SimonsVsSchlick: has in any case a precisely defined meaning.
stronger/weaker/Simons: e.g. the equivalence of various formulations collapses when the principles of the theory are weakened. ((s) >Strength of Theories).

Schlick I
Moritz Schlick
"Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994

Schlick II
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Mereology Simons Vs Mereology Simons I 290
Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: mereology criticizes the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. Arbitrary Sums/Simons: arbitrary sums are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions.
Individuals/Simons: it is not clear what properties individuals hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums).
Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being-individual is not!

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Tradition Simons Vs Tradition I 291
Integrity/connection/individual/tradition/Simons: thesis: integrity belongs to the spatio-temporally continuous objects. SimonsVsTradition: microscopically all things are distributed and no longer connected (> Microstructure, MiSt).
Quine: this applies to all things that are not only of a single elementary particle (1960,98).
Object/thing/philosophy/Simons: distributed objects are also called objects: e.g. galaxies, e.g. Indonesia.
Individual/Leibniz: an individual must be atomic. (>Monads). (Simons: virtually all authors VsLeibniz).
I 306
Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: a relational accident may very well exist. This applies to accidents that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. the collision between two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: e.g. weddings, divorces, football matches. This is nothing mysterious.
I 342
Proposition/connection/copula/tradition/Simons: the cohesion of the proposition is delivered according to the tradition of the copula: Copula/VsTradition: the copula occurs in the proposition only as a normal word like the others, so it cannot explain the cohesion.
Solution/Frege: a solution is offered by the unsaturated parts of a sentence.
Proposition/WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection simply is a common juxtaposition of words (names). That means that there is not one part of the sentence which establishes the connection.
Unsaturatedness/Simons: unsaturatedness perfectly matches the ontological dependence (undated): a part of a sentence cannot exist without certain others!

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Holism Esfeld, M. I 2
Thesis: Holism in the philosophy of mind (HPG) and in quantum mechanics (HQM) have a common conceptual content.
I 16
Holismus/Esfeld: Question: What kind of dependency exists between the parts of a holistic system? Thesis: within a holistic system there is a generic ontological dependence.
This does not refer to the existence of the parts as such (isolated), but to the extent that they have certain properties.
Parts/Properties/Holism/Esfeld: Thesis: for each constituent part of a holistic system (constituent) there is a family of non-disjunctive, qualitative properties that make something a constituent, given a suitable arrangement with other things.
I 200
Holism/ontological/epistemic/Esfeld: the proposed social holism and persuasion holism implies the epistemological thesis that even if one has complete physical knowledge about a possible world, one cannot know whether there are beings in the world concerned who follow the rules and which rules these beings follow.
Ontological Dependence Simons, P. I 296
Ontological Dependence / philosophy / Simon: Applications: e.g. subjective idealism: theory that the whole world is ontologically dependent on me   weak form: .... of subjects in general.
  E.g. universals: universals are ontologically dependent on generic instances.
  E.g. o.d. of the accidental of the substance.