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Definitions | Mates | I 248 Definitions/Mates: we need them to represent formalized theories. - They introduce designations that do not belong to the vocabulary of the language, but make them more readable. >Theories, >Formulas, >Logical formulas, >Theoretical language, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Definitions, >Definability. I 250 Def Creative Definition/Mates: leads to new theorems in which the defined symbol does not occur. >Symbols. Requirement: a satisfactory definition should be non-creative. >Vocabulary/Mates. I 248 Metalinguistic definitions/Mates: Metalinguistic definitions bring a name of the defined symbol in object language: the symbol itself - e.g. a) metalinguistically: if a and b are terms so is a = b for I21ab b) object-language: (x) (y) (x = y I21xy). >Metalanguage, >Object language, >Identity, >Definition/Frege, >Symbolic use. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
Public Sphere | Habermas | IV 509 Public sphere/Habermas: The political system ensures mass loyalty in both positive and negative ways; positive through the prospect of the redemption of welfare state programs, selective by excluding topics and contributions from public debate. This can be done through socio-structural filters, through the bureaucratic deformation of the structures of public communication or through manipulative control of communication flows. The interaction of these variables explains why the symbolic self-representation of the political elites in public can be largely decoupled from the real decision-making processes within the political system.(1) This corresponds to the segmentation of the voter role. IV 510 The election decision generally only has an influence on the recruitment of management personnel and its motives are beyond the reach of discursive decision-making. This amounts to a neutralization of the possibilities of political participation legally opened up by the citizenship role. >Political elections, >Electoral systems, >Democracy, >Society, >Discourse, >Discourse theory, >Deliberative democracy, >Politics. 1.M. Edelmann, The symbolic use of politics, Urbana 1964; D.O. Sears, R.R. Lau, T. R. Tyler, H. M. Allen, Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics, Am. Pol. Rev. 74, 1989, p. 670ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Rules | Habermas | III 148 Rules/Habermas: For example, rules of operation (e. g. calculation rules) have no explanatory power; following them does not mean, as in the case of following rules of action, that the actor refers to something in the world and orients himself/herself towards claims of validity that are linked to motivational reasons for action. >Addition, >Quaddition, >Rule following, >Kripkes' Wittgenstein, >Nonfactualism. IV 36 Rules/Habermas: based on the model by Mead (see Internalisation/Mead) we assume that A does not produce his utterance (gesture, symbol) with the intention of following a rule and not in the expectation that the listener or listeners recognize the utterance as conforming to the rules. >Internalization/Mead. Behavioural expectations have only prognostic meaning, the conventional meaning component is missing. This means that expectations can be disappointed, but incorrect behavior cannot be recognized. According to Mead, the interaction works up to here through a mutual anticipation of reactions. (1) IV 39 Only when context-dependence has been overcome does the symbolic use of expressions or gestures of interaction occur. According to Mead, we can then say that meaning identity results from conventionally defined rules of use for symbols. >Use, >Symbols, >Understanding. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 86. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Symbolic Learning | Deacon | I 84 Symbolic Learning/Symbolic Association/Symbols/Animal/Savage-Rumbaugh/Rumbaugh/Deacon: (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978(1); 1980(2) and Savage-Rumbaugh 1986(3)): Experiments with chimpanzees and other species of monkeys. The monkeys get screens with clickable symbols (lexigrams) with which they learn associations of these signs with objects or activities. Symbolic use of signs: was difficult for the animals to learn, but a rudimentary form of syntactic links developed. Thus, learning went beyond a simple index-like use of the signs. Cf. >Indexicality, >Signs, >Signals. I 85 Groups of symbols have been created for objects or actions. After the animals had learned several symbols in certain combinations, they were confronted with new combinations. Some animals repeated stereotypically the learned combinations, while others tried all possible combinations. Learning problem: useless combinations cannot be excluded before they occur. The reason for this is that the animals lack an understanding of the possible combinations determined by the properties of the system. >Syntax. I 86 Categories: whether the animals had learned the difference between liquid and solid, turned out when new symbols for new objects were introduced. In fact, the new symbols required considerably fewer attempts until the learning success had been achieved. The animals had also learned certain logical relations between the symbols (lexigrams), not only between symbols and objects. I 87 Symbolic learning: three levels: (represented by two levels and their mapping relations) Lowermost level: Index-like/sign-like: only direct relations between signs and objects. No correlation between signs, no correlation between objects. Middle level: Patterns of symbol combinations are formed - still no correlations between the objects. Top level: Symbolic: here there are correlations on both levels: the level of objects (pragmatic and physical correlations) - on the symbol level: logical relation between the symbolic tokens. Symbolic learning/conclusion/(s): due to the structure of the relations between symbols among each other, this learning process differs greatly from the learning of signs which are only mapped to objects. I 88 Symbolic reference/Deacon: no single symbol (lexigram) defines its reference. >Reference. I 413 Symbolic learning/Deacon: what makes symbolic learning so difficult is the learning of conditioned higher-level associations. Individuals with rudimentary symbolic abilities have an enormous selection advantage. In the long run, this has made symbolic learning almost infallible. >Evolution, >Selection. 1. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978). Symbolization, language and chimpanzees: A theoretcal reevaluation based on initial language acquisition processes in four young Pan troglodytes. Brain and Language 6, 265. 2. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980). Reference: The linguistic essential. Science 210. 922-925. 3. Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1986). Animal intelligence. Ape language: From conditioned response to symbol. Columbia University Press. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
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