Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Tarski | Berka I 498 Abstraction Principle/Carnap/Tarski: with abstraction all the expressions of the language can be divided in classes with no common elements. >Partition. Two expressions belong only to the same class if they belong to the same semantic category (meaning category) - each such class, is simply a meaning category. (1) >Semantic category. 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Causal Laws | Cartwright | I 10 Asymmetry: causal laws are asymmetrical: cause and effect cannot be interchanged. - By contrast, symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: asymmetries by explanation are not real. - There is no fact about what explains what. - CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: not sufficient E.g. malaria control: for distinguishing effective from ineffective strategies. >Association, >Symmetries. I 30 Causal Law/Causal Explanation/Cartwright: causal laws are not transitive - i.e. the causal chain does not have to be determined by a single causal law. >Transitivity. I 32 Causal Law/Cartwright: something that is always the case ((s) universal occurrence, universal fact, "permanence") cannot be consequent of a causal law. - ((s) this is a convention). - Alternatively: universal fact: Alternatively, it could be said that everything is the cause of a universal fact. - ((s) Def Universal Fact/Cartwright/(s): probability = 1.). I 36 Causal Laws/Cartwright: the reason why we need them for the characterization of effectiveness is that they pick out the right properties to which we apply our conditions. I 43 Effective Strategy/Cartwright: can only be found with assumption of causal laws. - Partition: the right one is the one that is determined by which causal laws exist - without causal laws it is impossible to pick out the right factors. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Chance | Lewis | V 65 Chance/Probability/Counterfactual Conditionals/Co.co./Possible Worlds/Po.wo./Lewis: It is legitimate to mention chances in the antecedent of the counterfactual conditional - because probabilities are an objective property of the world - then you can say that there is a certain chance for C, even though this chance is unfulfilled - this is a counterexample to the alleged incompatibility - Conclusion: we should say that there would have been a tiny chance for convergence (that the possible worlds looked like the real world), even if Nixon had pressed the button. >Probability/Lewis, >Probability conditional/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 91 Chance/Lewis: a) in relation to time: E.g. in a labyrinth: it depends on the location how long we still need b) timeless: E.g. radioactive decay. "Endpoint chance": time not mentioned - chance depends on possible worlds (where one stands inside the labyrinth). Chance: function of three arguments: Proposition, time, world. V 98 Definition chance/Jeffrey: (R. Jeffrey 1965(1)): is an objectified subjective probability. V 99 Definition objectification: (in terms of a partition of a given world): the probability distribution obtained from a belief function by conditionalising (forming the conditional) through the element of the partition - objectified belief: the belief conditional on the truth - (only so much truth as is covered by the element) - which element is valid, is contingent and does not depend on what we think - an element: is the equivalence class of worlds in terms of equality of facts until before t and the dependency of the opportunities on the prehistory - ((s) I.e. in all possible worlds in which this prehistory is true ... will be. V 130 Chance/Acceptable information/Lewis: problem: under the current analysis information about current opportunities is a disguised form of unacceptable information about future history. 1. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Decision Theory | Lewis | V 307f Decision Theory/DT/Lewis: partition/division)/Lewis: is a set of propositions, of which exactly one applies in each world (or each X-world) - provide the most detailed specification of the present actions (options) of the actor. Decision theory: says which options are rational. >Proposition/Lewis. Rational choice: delivers the greatest benefit expected. Maximum benefit: if V(A) is not surpassed by any V(A™). Problem: how do you find out that A applies. That one is living in the world A (= Proposition)?. Important argument: it is in your power, to make the news yourself. That is, you find out what they like best by producing it. V 309f Non-Causal Decision Theory/Newcomb’s Paradox/NP/LewisVs: favors the rejection of small goods as rational - although this later choice does nothing to change the previous state, which favors the evil. Newcomb's Paradox: requires a causal decision theory. >Newcomb's paradox. V 315 Non-causal decision theory: only works, because the beliefs of the actor allow it to function - ... + ... Partition of propositions (sets of possible worlds), expected benefits. >Propositional Attitudes. --- Schwarz I 66 Decision-making procedure/Lewis: the >modal realism ((s) maintaining the existence of possible worlds) is not a decision-making procedure to answer questions about possible worlds. Decision-making procedure/Schwarz: E.g. is not used by behaviorists either: he simply says that statements about mental properties are reducible to statements about dispositions. >Behaviorism, >Disposition. E.g. mathematical Platonism: does not need decision-making procedure for arithmetics. >Platonism. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Dependence | Lewis | V 166 Nomic dependence/Lewis: two families of law propositions or individual fact p imply together all material conditionals between the two families. >Conditionals. Then the material conditionals are implied by the counterfactual conditionals which include the counterfactual dependence (conD). >Counterfactual dependence. The nomic dependence explains the counterfactual dependence. Important argument: the law propositions and the fact propositions must be counterfactually independent. Nomic dependence: is reversible. Counterfactual dependence is irreversible - E.g. Barometer/pressure. V 312f Dependence hypothesis/Lewis: here: set of propositions (sets of possible worlds) which specify everything the (omniscient) actor knows about causal dependence and independence of his actions - they form a partition. - I.e. they do not overlap. Expected benefits: Do not refer to individual dependency hypotheses. - ((s) i.e. it must not be assumed to be without alternative.) - You have to spread your beliefs on several dependencies.) Benefit: to be understood as a non-conditional belief of a variation K of an alternative dependence hypothesis. When options and dependency hypotheses differ, the difference shows the aspect which brings the novelty. >Benefit. Wrong: wanting to maximize the expected benefits to any partition - This would lead to different answers for different partitions - the partition for propositions of the value level would tell us fatalistically that all options are equally good. >Proposition. V 320 Dependence hypothesis/illustration/probability distribution/Lewis: If the same dependence applies in several worlds, the images represent the worlds in the same way. - If the images are the same, we have equivalence classes. - Then we have the partition of these equivalence classes. >Possible world/Lewis, >Equivalence class. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Dimensions | Poincaré | Pinker I 323 Dimensions/Poincaré: depends on the divisibility by an object - find an object with which you can break down the structure, count the dimensions of the divider and add 1. Example: A path can be partitioned by a point, so it has a dimension, the point cannot be partitioned, area divided through line, body divided through surface etc. >Geometry, >Topology. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Distribution | Simons | I 102 Def distributive class/Lesniewski: classes whose elements are precisely determined (and which cannot be arbitrary agglomerations) are distributive, e.g. elements of the set of teaspoons, only teaspoons, no handles. LesniewskiVs: those classes do not exist (pro nominalism). Def collective class/mereology/Lesniewski: a collective class are any (arbitrary) summaries, e.g. not only teaspoons, but also a collection of handles of teaspoons, as part of the set of teaspoons. Solution to Russell's paradox: mereological (collective) classes (clusters, sets) always contain themselves as an element. >Classes, >Sets, >Mereologcal sum, >Partition, >Mereology. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Equivalence Class | Logic Texts | Salmon I 146 Def equivalence relation/W.Salmon: transitive, symmetric and reflexive. - E.g. congruence - an equivalence relation decomposes a set into a set of equivalence classes with no common elements. >Partition. E.g. The relation to have the same number of elements. With respect to this relation all sets that have two elements are equivalent: e.g. a pair of shoes, a team of horses, a couple, a pair of twins. E.g. siblings can be defined as follows: to have the same parents. An equivalence class with respect to this relation is then a number of children who have common parents. >Equivalence. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| Excluded Middle | Lewis | V 329 Principle of the contingently (conditionally) excluded middle/Stalnaker/BSAD/Lewis: Thesis: either wX>wY or wX> w~Y applies in every world - it follows that if Y, Y", ... are a partition and X is possible, then wX>wY, wX>wY", ..., would also be a partition. Explanation: wA>wB: "if A was the case, B would be the case". >Counterfactual conditionals. Then the conjunctions of full patterns are a partition. - Vs: 1) applies to arbitrary selections. --- V 331 2) cannot deal with random events. - LewisVsVs: despite coincidences there is nothing vague or arbitrary in the counterfactual conditionals - They are simply wrong in coincidences. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Experimental Economics | Economic Theories | Parisi I 78 Experimental economics/Economic theories/Sullivan/Holt: [there is an] increasingly frequent interaction between two literatures: experimental economics and law and economics. In many ways, these literatures developed as siblings during the heady period of economic research spanning the 1960s and early 1970s. At about the same time that Ronald Coase (1960)(1), Guido Calabresi (1961)(2), and Gary Becker (1968)(3) were authoring seminal papers in the modern law-and-economics movement, acceleration of the experimental economics literature was under way with Vernon Smith’s (1962)(13) experimental challenge to the established notion that theories of efficient, perfect competition were only relevant in idealized settings with large numbers of well-informed traders. Vernon Smith: Smith’s approach to studying market equilibrium was to create a market for an artificial commodity. Adaptations of the experimental approach to other settings quickly followed, eventually bleeding into the also-expanding literature of law and economics. >Experimental economics/Vernon Smith, >Law and Economics/Sullivan/Holt. Parisi I 79 Methodology: (... )the design and implementation of controlled experiments is about as fundamental to scientific inquiry as anything could be. Parisi I 80 Another intuitive use of experiments is as part of a more open-ended search for practical solutions to a novel problem. This is often the case in experiments designed for engineering applications. Economists use experiments in much the same ways as physicists or engineers. Preconditions/hypotheses: Economic theories are typically based on strong assumptions about rationality and foresight, and evaluated on the basis of elegance, sharpness of prediction, and consistency with basic intuition. Idealization/context: features of context, interpersonal frictions, and institutional detail are frequently omitted to achieve greater tractability and generality. Experiments: The resulting theories cry out for experimental tests, where differences in individual personality traits and propensities, limitations in attention and foresight, and other details too intricate to measure or model formally can be accounted for using random assignment and other experimental controls. Example: consider the question whether a cap on damages reduces the frequency of tort suits.* Randomization: randomization or careful selection algorithms could be used to partition the members of society into two identical (or at least nearly identical) groups: one group would remain under the status quo liability rules, while the other would be subject to a cap on damages. With absolutely nothing else changed, the researcher Parisi I 81 could collect data for a few months, and then compare the rates of tort suits in the two groups to see what causal effect the cap on damages had on the outcome of interest. Comparison/control: the researcher exploits control over the experimental environment to apply some treatment to only one of two otherwise identical groups of subjects. Subjects in the experiment then interact according to their normal self-interests, but those in the treatment group act under a slightly different set of rules than those in the control group. The experimenter measures observed behavior in both the treatment and control groups, and any difference in behavior reflects the causal treatment effect of interest.** Experiments without control group: (...) economic experiments are sometimes designed simply to measure and document how subjects behave in a given market structure or incentive environment without reference to any control group. Examples include experiments that test the efficiency of an auction structure, such as an innovative proposal to allow bidding for combinations of spectrum licenses in a way that protects firms from overpaying for pieces of a fragmented network.*** Variations: (...) economic experiments can also be structured to consider a range of treatment effects. An example is an experimental study of equilibrium price formation in a homogenous-good oligopoly as the number of producers drops from five, to four, to three, to two (e.g. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004(11); Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000(12)). In every case, the conceptual framework of the economics experiment is the same as that of experiments in any other field of science. Induced value theory: >Induced value theory/Economic theories. Experiments/methods: See >Experiments/Experimental economics, >Settlement Bargaining/Experimental conomics. * For economic experiments on the effect of damages caps on the rate of settlement, see Babcock and Pogarsky (1999)(4) and Pogarsky and Babcock (2001)(5). ** For broad surveys of various experimental designs in economics, see Davis and Holt (1993)(6), Kagel and Roth (1995)(7), and Holt (2007)(7). For a practical approach to experimental design for economists, see Friedman and Sunder (1994)(8). *** See Goeree and Holt (2010)(10) for a set of experiments used by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to design and implement a major auction for spectrum licenses for the provision of wireless communications services in a geographic network. Even this paper, however, had a control treatment without package bidding opportunities, which showed problems that could arise if bidders were not permitted to submit "all or nothing" bids for combinations of licenses. 1. Coase, R. H. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. 2. Calabresi, G. (1961). “Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts.” Yale Law Journal 70(4): 499–553. 3. Becker, G. S. (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76(2): 169–217. 4. Babcock, L. and G. Pogarsky (1999). “Damage Caps and Settlement: a Behavioral Approach.” Journal of Legal Studies 28(2): 341–370. 5. Pogarsky, G. and L. Babcock (2001). “Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse.” Journal of Legal Studies 30(1): 143–159. 6. Davis, D. D. and C. A. Holt (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 7. Kagel, J. H. and A. E. Roth, eds. (1995). Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Holt, C. A. (2007). Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. 9. Friedman, D. and S. Sunder (1994). Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Goeree, J. K. and C. A. Holt (2010). “Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction.” Games and Economic Behavior 70: 146–169. 11. Huck, S., H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler (2004). “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 53(4): 435–446. 12.Dufwenberg, M. and U. Gneezy (2000). “Price Competition and Market Concentration: An Experimental Study.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 18: 7–22. 13. Smith, V. L. (1962). “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 70(2): 111–137. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Interaction | Kenny | Corr I 49 Interaction/Situation/Psychology/Kenny/Asendorpf: One particularly relevant source of person-situation interaction has been surprisingly often ignored in discussions of cross-situational consistency within personality psychology: variation of dyadic social interaction in terms of who the interaction partners. (…) Many of our daily situations are dyadic interactions. In this case, person-situation interactions are by and large person-person interactions because the interaction partner largely defines the situation. Because persons cannot interact with themselves and because persons and situations are not statistically independent factors. >situations/psychological theories, >personality traits/psychological theories. Kenny and colleagues developed the social relations model (SRM) that distinguishes actor effects, target effects and relationship effects In SRM, the actor parameter corresponds to the trait of ((s) e.g.) aggressiveness: to what extent do I react aggressively to others? The target parameter (sometimes also called partner parameter) is a different trait, often ignored in studies of aggression: to what extent do I make others aggressive? Actor and target parameters can correlate positively or negatively. SRM analyses are increasingly used in person perception, dyadic relationship and family research (e.g., Cook 2000(1); Kenny, Mohr and Levesque 2001)(2). 1. Cook, W. L. 2000. Understanding attachment security in family context, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 285–94 2. Kenny, D. A., Mohr, C. D. and Levesque, M. J. 2001. A social relations variance partitioning of dyadic behaviour, Psychological Bulletin 127: 128–41 Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Kenn I A. Kenny A New History of Western Philosophy Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Newcomb’s Paradox | Lewis | V 300 Newcomb’s Paradox/NP/Prisoner dilemma/PD/Lewis: thesis: the two are identical - it’s not about a prediction. - New theories are successful if they predict (=explain) already observed phenomena - whether they get the bigger profit is causally independent of what I’m doing now - therefore, my prediction should be causally independent of my decision. - Solution: move the prediction into the past - it is only important whether a prediction could have been made - and that it is conditional on whether I get the million. - Important argument: no one needs to develop a theory about my beliefs - whether someone puts a million into the box depends on a process which is not regarded to be a prediction of my choice. Cf. >prisoner's dilemma. V 301 Newcomb’s Paradox/Prisoner dilemma/Lewis: Million only if a certain prediction process (before, during or after) of the choice justifies the prediction that I will not take the thousand - e.g. a copy (replica) of me. - Important argument: regardless if someone else makes a prediction about how I watch my replica (react to it?), the decision of my replica is still a prediction process regarding my prediction process. V 303 Even if coincidence prevails, it is rational to cooperate. V 303f Newcomb’s Paradox/Prisoner dilemma/PD/Lewis: some: it is rational not to cooperate if the partners are just similar enough. - LewisVs: You should take the thousand - because whether you get the million it regardless of what you do. - PD/Lewis: it is rational to cooperate, because you would be ratted by others, no matter what you do yourself - (not causal). V 309 Newcomb’s Paradox/Lewis: Variant: E.g. Take the thousand and trade them for the possibility of a disease (not causal) - and you’re convinced that the latter is out of your control - then there is no reason not to take the thousand - even though your choice is proof of a possible disease - it is proof that there was a former state which was both favourable for the thousand and the disease. - Important argument: if the former condition exists, there is nothing you can do about it now. V 312 Newcomb’s Paradox/Lewis: It cannot exist for someone who knows everything about how things depend causally from him. V 309f Non-causal decision theory/DT/Newcomb’s Paradox/LewisVs: favors the decline of the small benefit as rational - although this later choice does nothing to change the previous state, which favors the evil. - NP: requires a causal decision theory. V 315 Non-causal decision theory: only works because the beliefs of the actor allow it to function - ...+... Partition of propositions (sets of possible worlds), expected benefits. Cf. >predictions, >decision theory. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Probability | Schurz | Def Conditional probability/Schurz: the probability of A assuming that B exists: P( A I B) = p(A u B)/p(B). (pB) must be >0. B: conditional event, antecedent. A: conditional event, consequent. In the statistical case, p(A I B) coincides with the rel.frequ. of A in the finite set of all B's. Or with the limit of rel.frequ. in an infinite random sequence of B's. >Bayesianism. Non-monotonicity/non-monotonic/conditional probability /Schurz: conditional probabilities are non-monotonic: i.e. from p(A I B) = high does not follow that p(A I B u C) = high. >Monotony. Objective probability /type/predicate/Schurz: statistical probabilities always refer to a repeatable event type, expressed in a predicate or an open formula. Subjective probability: refers to an event token, expressed in a sentence. E.g. that it will rain tomorrow: tomorrow exists only once. >Subjective probability. Subjective/objective/probability /Reichenbach: Principle for the transfer from objective to subjective probability: I 101 Principle of narrowest reference class/Reichenbach: the subjective probability of a token Fa is determined as the (estimated) conditional probability p(Fx I Rx) of the corresponding type Fx, in the narrowest reference class Rx, where a is known to lie. (i.e. that Ra holds). E.g. Whether a person with certain characteristics follows a certain career path. These characteristics act as the closest reference class. Ex Weather development: closest reference class, the development of the last days. Total date/carnap: principle of: for confirmation, total knowledge. Subjective probability: main founders: Bayes, Ramsey, de Finetti. Logical probability theory/Carnap: many authors Vs. Mathematical probability theory/Schurz: ignores the difference subjective/objective probability, because the statistical laws are the same. I 102 Disjunctivity/ probability: objective. The extension of A u B is empty subjective: A u B is not made true by any admitted (extensional) interpretation of the language. Probability/axioms/Schurz: A1: for all A: p(A) > 0. (Non-negativity). A2: p(A v ~A) = 1. (Normalization to 1) A3: for disjoint A, B: p(A v B) = p(A) + p(B) (finite additivity). I.e. for disjoint events the probabilities add up. Def Probabilistic independence/Schurz: probabilistically independent are two events A, B. gdw. p(A u B) = p(A) times p(B) . Probabilistically dependent: if P(A I B) is not equal to p(A). >Conditional probability, >Subjective probability. I 109 Def exhaustive/exhaustive/Schurz: a) objective probability: a formula A with n free variables is called exhaustive, gdw. the extension of A comprises the set of all n tuples of individuals b) subjective: gdw. the set of all models making A true (=extensional interpretations) coincides with the set of all models of the language considered possible. I 110 Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. >Probability theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Probability Theory | Schurz | I 110 Probability theory/theorems/Schurz: a) unconditioned probability: (objective und subjective) (T1) p(~A) = 1 – p(A) (complementary probability) (T2) p(A) ≤ 1 (upper bound) (T3) p(A u ~A) = 0 (contradiction) (T4) p(A1 v A2) = p(A1) + p(A2) – p(A1 u A2) (general law of addition). b) conditioned probability (for formulas X in antecedens position) (PT1) If B > A is exhaustive, gilt p(A I B) = 1. The converse is not valid. (PT2) p(A u B) = p(A I B) mal p(B) (PT3) Für jede Partition B1,...Bn: p(A) = ∑ 1≤i≤n p(A I Bi) times p(Bi) (general law of multiplication) (PT4): Def Bayes-Theorem, 1st version: p(A I B) = p(B I A) times p(A)/p(B) (PT5) Def Bayes-Theorem, 2nd version: for each partition A1,...An: p(Ai I B) = p(B I Ai) times p (Ai) /∑ 1≤i≤n p(B I Ai) times p(Ai). (PT6) Symmetry of probabilistic dependence: p(A I B) > p(A) iff p(B I A) > p(B) iff p(B I A) > p(B I ~A) (analog for ≥). Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. I 110 Consequence relation/probability/consequence/probability theory/Schurz: the probability-theoretic inference relation can be characterized as follows: a probability statement A follows probabilistically from a set D of probability statements iff. A follows logically from D and the Kolmogorov axioms (plus mathematical definitions). >Probability. I 112 Probability theory/Schurz: still unsolved problems: (a) objective probability: definitional problems. Definition of statistical probability: problem: with one random experiment one can potentially produce infinitely many infinitely increasing sequences of results, Why should they all have the same frequency limit? Why should they have one at all? Problem: even worse: from a given sequence of results, one can always construct a sequence with an arbitrarily deviating frequency limit value by arbitrary rearrangement or place selection. I 113 Law of large numbers/Schurz: ("naive statistical theory"): is supposed to be a solution for this problem: the assertion "p(Fx) = r" does not say then that in all random sequences the frequency limit is r, but only that it is r with probability 1. StegmüllerVs/KutscheraVs: This is circular! In the definiens of the expression "the probability of Fx is r" the expression "with probability 1" occurs again. Thus the probability is not reduced to frequency limits, but again to probability. >Circularity. Rearrangement/(s): only a problem with infinite sets, not with finite ones. Mises/solution: "statistical collective". 1. every possible outcome E has a frequency threshold in g, identified with probability p(E), and 2. this is insensitive to job selection. From this follows the general product rule/statistic: the probability of a sum is equal to the product of the individual probabilities: p(Fx1 u Gx2) = p(Fx1) times p(Gx2). Probability /propensity//Mises: this result of Mises is empirical, not a priori! It is a substantive dispositional statement about the real nature of the random experiment (>Ontology/Statistics). The Mises probability is also called propensity. >Propensity. Singular Propensity/Single Case Probability/Single Probability/Popper: many Vs. Probability theory/Schurz: problem: what is the empirical content of a statistical hypothesis and how is it tested? There is no observational statement that logically follows from this hypothesis. >Verification. That a random sequence has a certain frequency limit r is compatible for any n, no matter how large, with any frequency value hn unequal to r reached up to that point. Bayes/Schurz: this is often raised as an objection by Bayesians, but it merely expresses the fact that no observational theorems follow from statistical hypotheses. I 115 Verification/Statistics/Schurz: Statistical hypotheses are not deductively testable, but they are probabilistically testable, by sampling. I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: subjective probabilities, if objective probabilities are known, must be consistent with them. Lewis (1980): singular PP: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. >Propensities. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear what property a singular propensity should correspond to in the first place. Solution/de Finetti: one can also accept the objective notion of probability at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on an arbitrary experience datum E(b1...bn) over other individuals b1,..bn is important to derive two further versions of PP: 1. PP for random samples, which is needed for the subjective justification of the statistical likelihood intuition. 2. the conditional PP, for the principle of the closest reference class and subject to the inductive statistical specialization inference. PP: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r PP for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk times (1 r)n k. Conditional PP: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r. Principal principle: is only meaningful for subjective a priori probability. I.e. degrees of belief of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual degree of belief: for him the principle does not apply in general: e.g. if the coin already shows heads, (=Fa) so the act. dgr. of belief of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. a priori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedent of a conditional probability statement w( I W). Actual: = personalistic. Apriori probability: connection with actual probability: Strict conditionalization/Schurz: let w0 be the a priori probability or probability at t0 and let w1 be the actual probability I 116 Wt the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A holds: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Closest reference class/principle/Schurz: can be justified in this way: For a given event Fa, individual a can belong to very many reference classes assigning very different probabilities to Fx. Then we would get contradictory predictions. Question: But why should the appropriate reference class be the closest one? Because we can prove that it maximizes the frequency threshold of accurate predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Process/Flux | AI Research | Norvig I 447 Process/AI research/Norvig/Russell: events with the property of having (temporal) subintervals are called process categories or liquid event categories. Norvig I 448 Time intervals: Moments: have a duration 0 seconds: Partition({Moments,Extended Intervals}, Intervals) I ∈ Moments ⇔ Duration(i) = Seconds(0) . Durations: Interval (i) ⇒ Duration(i) = (Time(End(i)) − Time(Begin(i))) . >Ontology/AI research, >Categories/AI research, >Objects/AI research, >Events/Philosophical theories. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Qua-Objects | Qua objects, philosophy: qua objects are objects, explicitly referred to under a particular description, to extract one of several possible functions of this object. E.g. Reagan qua President in contrast to Reagan qua actor. This reduces the amount of possible conclusions resulting from the use of names for this object. In the technical sense, the use of Qua objects prevents an object from being counted multiple times. Problems arise with regard to which "address" e.g. a quote is to be attributed to. See also partition, attribution, individuation, identification, specification. |
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| Simpson’s Paradox | Cartwright | I 23 Simpson's Paradox/Cartwright: E.g. Exercise prevents cancer even in smokers. - It may be that the risk reduction through exercise is greater than the cause by smoking. Paradox: that exercise seems to cause cancer - i.e. in the case, when smoking and exercising are highly enough correlated in the population. - Solution: form subgroups - In the whole group smoking seems no more harmful - but important argument: in both subgroups: athletes and non-athletes - E.g. Salmon: a cause does not necessarily increase the probability of its effect. >Probability, >Explanation. I 25 Causally homogeneous: if all or no one work out, exercise cannot be correlated with cancer. I 27 Better: law "uranium causes radioactivity", then no matter whether polonium present. >Causality, >Causal explanation, I 37 If the third factor is causally irrelevant to E, then there is no reason to keep it fixed, and fixing it even provides a false evaluation of causes and strategies. - E.g. The university seemed to reject women more often. - Solution: division into departments. - Women applied more in subjects with higher rejection rate. (E.g. medicine) - Problem: the partition variable is arbitrary: in roller skating more women would have been rejected. ((s) if the actually Rejected in that subject had been looked at). |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Theories | Nozick | II 121 Inegalitarian Theory/Nozick: an inegalitarian theory assumes that a state is privileged as a "natural". This needs no explanation and also does not allow one. - Other situations are then differences that need to be explained. E.g. For Newton rest or uniformity of movement was the natural state. For Aristotle: rest. - inegalitarian theory does not answer, 1. Why this state is the natural. 2. Why exactly these forces are making a difference. To accept something as a natural state is also to ascribe a specific content to him. II 122 R. Harris: the thesis that something remains the same, does not need to be explained. >Regularity, >Explanations, >Constancy. NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing for the purposes of this principle counts as the same and not in other contexts. Existence: the question concerning it, is typical inegalitary. Punchline: here we presuppose the nothing as their natural state. Cf. >Existence/Leibniz. II 126 1. We do not know what the natural state is. 2. We do not know whether there is a fundamental natural state at all. That means whether the correct fundamental theory is inegalitary. Each inegalitarian theory leaves a bare fact as inexplicable back, a "natural state". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/Nozick: needs to see much more possible states as in need of explanation. - But it asks no longer the question "Why X instead of Y?" - But always "Why X?". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/existence/nothing/Nozick: "principle of indifference" (from probability theory). - For them, there are many ways, how things could be, but only one possibility how nothing exists. - Punchline: then is the chance that something exists much greater than that nothing exists. Vs: one has to make an appropriate division into states that are to be treated as equally likely. - Many ways how things exists can be summarized as one. Extreme case: only two ways: something exists or does not exist. II 128 Under the worst assumption if we assume a division, there is a 50%-chance that something exists. - Because all other divisions have to be at least three partitions then, the chance that something exists rises for the next alternative already to two-thirds. - At the end almost 1. - Problem: the probability theory is still assuming the non-existence as the natural state - because it assumes that if something exists, then randomly - The natural state of a way is the non-realization. Solution:> richness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Valuation | Bigelow | I 125 Valuation function V/Bigelow/Pargetter: its definition is complex because it has to be recursive. It assigns an interpretation or a semantic value. (To each expression of the language). >Recursion. Valuation: First, semantic values are assigned to the non-logical constants. >Semantic value. Rules are then created for semantic values from compound expressions. Logical constants: their valuation is specified by recursive rules. >Logical constants. Domain: can also be restricted, e.g. if you want to exclude the Barcan formula. >Domains. For example, restriction: for each world w you can assume a separate individual domain DW. Which, for example, consists only of the possibilia of this possible world. >Possibilia, >Possible worlds. I 126 Def partition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a family of individual domains that do not overlap. I.e. no individual is in more than one possible world. That would correspond to Lewis's counterpart theory. >Counterpart theory. I 129 Counterfactual Conditional/Valuation/Valuation Function/Valuation Rules/Bigelow/Pargetter: V9 If a = (ß would be γ) then V (a) is the set of all possible worlds w ε w so that there is a possible world u where ß is true and γ is true and every possible world v in which ß is true and γ is false, is less accessible from w than from u. >Similarity metrics, >Counterfactual conditional. Similarity/possible worlds/similarity metrics/counterfactual conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: Rule V9 states that a counterfactual conditional (ß would be > would be γ) is true in a possible world if the next ß-worlds are all γ-worlds. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Writing | Rousseau | Ricoeur II 39 Writing/Rousseau/Ricoeur: For Rousseau, as long as language relied only on the voice, it preserved the presence of oneself to oneself and to others. Language was still the expression of passion. It was eloquence, not yet exegesis. With writing began separation, tyranny, and inequality. Writing ignores its addressee just as it conceals its author. It separates men just as property separates owners. The tyranny of the lexicon and of grammar is equal to that of the laws of exchange, crystallized in money. Instead of the Word of God, we have the rule of the learned and the domination of the priesthood. The break-up of the speaking community, the partition of the soil, the analycity of thought, and the reign of dogmaticism were all born with writing. An echo of Platonic reminiscence may, therefore, still be heard in this apology for the voice as the bearer of one's presence to oneself and as the inner link of a community without distance. >Writing/Plato, >Writing/Bergson, >Writing/Ricoeur. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Mill, J. St. | Cartwright Vs Mill, J. St. | I 38 Objective probability/VsCartwright: It might be objected that the partitioning on irrelevant factors would do no damage, once all factors are fixed. "True prob"/Cartwright: = objective prob? Relative frequency/RelFreq/Cartwright: is not the same as objective prob. Simpson’s Paradox/Solution/VsCartwright: We can certainly always find a third factor, but normally we do are not dealing with finite frequencies, but with objective prob. Objective prob/VsCarwright: if you do not extract it from finite data, no apparent correlations will come about. I 60 Vector addition/Cartwright: according to this view, two forces (gravitational force, or electromagnetic force) are produced, but none of them exists. Composition of forces/Causes/MillVsCartwright: he would deny that both do not exist: According to him, both exist as part of the resulting effect. E.g. two forces in different directions. "Partial forces". CartwrightVsMill: there are no "partial forces". Events may have temporal parts, but there are no parts of the kind that Mill describes, e.g. one northwards and one eastwards, with the object not moving neither north nor east, but to the northeast. I 59 CartwrightVsMill: Problem: then it is vital for the laws to have the same form, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the composition. And that’s not possible! It is not possible if the laws are intended to describe the actual behavior of concrete object. I 70 Def Super-Law/Explanation/Law/Circumstances/Terminology/Mill/Cartwright: in the case of E.g. Coulomb’s law and the law of gravity, we can simply put an increasingly complex antecedent in front of it to grasp the situation and thus explain what is happening. Mill: that is possible in mechanics, but not in chemistry. This explains why chemistry is not a deductive or demonstrative discipline. This presupposes the covering-law approach. CartwrightVsSuper law/CartwrightVsMill: 1) Super laws are not always available; if we do not describe everything exactly, we lose our understanding of what is happening. And we explain without knowing super laws. We need a philosophical explanation for why these explanations are good. 2) Super laws may often not even be a good explanation. This is an old objection Vscovering laws. E.g. why does the quail in my garden shake its head? Because all quails do this. I 71 Equally E.g. "All carbon atoms have five energy levels" explains nothing. 3) Certainly, covering laws are explanatory for complex cases. In particular, if the antecedent of the law does not precisely grasp the components of the individual situation, but provides a more abstract description. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Various Authors | Fraassen Vs Various Authors | Hacking I 93 Best explanation/Fraassen: should be rejected, even if one accepted theories! Theories can clarify something and explain it, but they are not literally true. Hacking I 95 Def best explanation/Peirce: "conclusion to the best explanation". Method of hypothesis or abduction. When there is an explanation that makes otherwise unintelligible things understandable, this should probably be right. Peirce later took refrain. Fraassen I 110 Explanation/James Greeno/Fraassen: makes a proposal in relation to statistical theories: A universal explanation is less problematic and more relevant than an assessment of knowledge with respect to individual cases (individual events). (FN 17). Greeno/Fraassen: adopts as a model of a theory one that assumes a single probability space Q as correct plus two partitions (or ranges of variables) of which one is the explanandum and the other is the explanans. I 111 E.g. sociology cannot explain why a particular rich kid stole a car in San Francisco, but it can claim factors such as income and residential area as explanatory factors. Explanatory force: its level is measured brilliantly in Greeno: I: measures the information that the theory supplies for M: variable for the explanandum on the basis of S: the explanans. Maximum: (of explanatory power) is reached when all related probabilities P (Mi I Sj) are 0 or 1 (the deductive nomological case) and Minimum: is reached if the related probabilities are 0, namely, when S and M are statistically independent of each other. FraassenVsGreeno: that encounters the same old problems: E.g. Suppose S and M describe the behavior of barometers and storms: Suppose the probability that the barometer falls (M1) is equal to the probability that there will be a storm (S1). Namely 0.2 and the probability that there will be a storm, given that the barometer falls is equal to the probability that the barometer falls, given that there will be a storm, namely = 1! In this case, the variable I (information) is at its maximum. Problem: it is also there if we swap storm and barometer!. Explanation: we have none for either case. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Causality | Cartwright, N. | I 10 Causal Principle/Cartwright: explained in Essay 1. Thesis: causal laws are as objective as Hume's laws of association. I 40 Cartwright: Thesis: pro causal laws: it would make a difference if they did not exist, we need to differentiate between effective and ineffective strategies. Another question is. Causal Laws/Human World/Cartwright: Thesis: There cannot be a human world for every possible world by eliminating its causal laws. This is because of the above condition for the connection of causal laws and laws of association. I 43 Causal Law/Conclusion/Cartwright: Thesis: the correct partition is determined by which causal laws there are. Without causal laws one cannot pick out the right factors. The objectivity of strategies requires the objectivity of causal laws. I 202 Properties/Reality/Ontology/Causality/Cartwright: Thesis: Causality is the key to which properties are real. Not all theoretically significant predicates pick out properties that are real to the theory itself! ((s) A property must be able to be a cause or play a causal role). |
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| Humean Superven. | Lewis, D. | V Main Thesis pro Humean Supervenience (HS) (Is already prepared in part 1, as it turns out now). Original passage: "Guide for subjectivists to objective probability". V IX Def Humean Supervenience/Lewis: (in honor of the great denier of necessary connections). Thesis: everything in the world is a great mosaic of local facts, always a small thing and then another. (But it is not part of the thesis that these local facts are mental ones). V 111 Probability/Hume/Lewis: Thesis: a broad Humean approach (doctrine) (which I think is correct), assumes that all facts that exist about the world are certain ("single") facts, or combinations thereof. V 131 ... Solution: if there is a possibility for a Humean Supervenience for chances, as I defended it in this paper, then the solution lies in the other direction: thesis the pre-history chance conditionals (VCK) must trivially supervene by not being contingent at all! V 324 Hume/Lewis: Thesis (neo-Humean thesis): any contingent truth about a world - law, dependency hypothesis, etc. - is somehow valid by virtue of the total history of manifest patterns of facts. Same history, same everything! Problem: this does not yet imply that the dependency hypothesis (DH) applies by virtue of causal factors. V 312 Def Dependency Hypothesis/DH/Lewis: the type of propositions that an actor knows, who knows what depends on him or does not depend on him. They are maximum specified, therefore they cannot differ without conflict, they form a partition ((s) i.e. they do not overlap). 1. The dependency hypothesis is causal in content: the classified worlds together on the basis of their similarity in relation to causal dependence. 2. But also the dependency hypotheses themselves are causally independent of the actions of the actor. Sv I 32 Mosaic/Lewis: thesis: all truths about our world also about the temporal extension of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points. |
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| Cond. Excl. Middle | Lewis, D. | V 329 Def Principle of the Conditionally Excluded Middle/Stalnaker/Lewis: thesis: either X w > w Y or X w > w ~Y is valid in every world. From this it follows that if Y,Y",...are a partition and X is possible, then X w > w Y,X w > w Y",..., is also a partition. Then the conjunctions of full patterns are a partition, because for each option A, the counterfactual conditional A w > w S, A w > w S"... are a partition. There are two objections to the principle of the conditional sentence of the excluded middle: 1. Vs: it makes arbitrary selections, it says that the way things are when there is a wrong but possible proposition X is no less specific than the way things actually are. 2. Vs: more serious objection: V 330/331 Example, suppose the actor thinks that the real world could very well be indeterministic, where many things come out by chance. Explanation/(s): A w>w B: If A were the case, B would be the case. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Extension | Wilson, K. | Grover II 182 Extension/Kent Wilson: (Wilson 1980) könnte man Extensionen für -žwahr-œ und -žfalsch-œ haben, wenn sie keine Eigenschaften zuschrieben? These Es scheint so, als ob eher ein eigenschafts-zuschreibendes -žwahr-œ für eine lückenlose Aufteilung (Partition) des Bereichs von Sätzen gebraucht wird. Es muß dann für jeden Satz eine Enthaltenseins-Bedingung geben (für Enthalten sein in der Menge der wahren bzw. falschen Sätze). W-Prädikat/wahr/Wilson: würde dann gebraucht, um die Enthaltenseins-Bedingung zu formulieren. Aber das ist nicht die einzige Möglichkeit: DF Umkehrung: Bereich/wahr/falsch/Partition/Wilson: Instruktion: nimm jeden Satz, bringe ihn in die Frageform Bsp -žIst Schnee weiß?-œ, -žSind Fische Vögel?-œ .Ist die Antwort -žja-œ kommt der Satz in die Extension, bei -žnein-œ in die Anti-Extension. Das liefert dieselben Mengen. |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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